Sustaining the Responsible Drawdown of Forces in IraqItem Unique Identification Technology

A French Logistics OMLT in Afghanistan

A Vision of Army Logistics

with 20/20 Hindsight

Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.PB700–11–02Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy

MARCh–APRIL 2011

WWW.ALU.ARMY.MIL/ALOG

TheArmy’sFunctionalConceptforSustainment —byMajorGeneralJamesL.Hodge

AVisionofArmyLogisticsWith20/20Hindsight —LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson

SustainingtheResponsibleDrawdownofForces —BrigadierGeneralGustaveF.Perna

SecurityAssistanceFromtheLogisticsPointofView —MajorDanielM.Maloney

TakingOilAnalysistoSouthwestAsia —JackieE.Carney

CentralPowerSolutionTrainingCourse —DanielR.Grachanin

JointSupplyChainArchitecture —MaryP.Fletcher

PackingtheLargestShipmentoftheIraqWar —CaptainKyleP.McNealy

VehicleRecoveryTrainingatJMRC —MajorDerekW.Hoffman

AFrenchLogisticsOMLTinAfghanistan —LieutenantColonelChristopheBarbe,FrenchArmy

OperationalMentorandLiaisonTeamsasaForceMultiplier —MajorJohnF.Jacques

ItemUniqueIdentificationTechnologyImproving AssetManagement —PabloA.BrownandJohnE.Laudan

EnablingtheResponsibleDrawdownofForces ThroughtheTheaterProvidedEquipmentPlanner —KellieWade

NowHiring:QualityNCOsNeededtoLeadSoldiers —LieutenantColonelSeanM.Herron

TrainingAmmunitionSupplySoldiersWhileDeployed —CaptainTheodoreL.Zagraniski andChiefWarrantOfficer2GaryN.Carr

PB700–11–02VOLUME43ISSUE2MARCH–APRIL2011www.alu.army.mil/alog

11

3

9

14

18

20

26

25

30

33

36

38

40

Cover:Theidentificationoftheneedfora“RevolutioninMilitaryLogistics”inthelate1990sledtomajorimprovementsinforcesustainment,forceprojection,andtechnologyapplicationandacquisitionagility.Inthearticlebeginningonpage3,theArmy’sDeputyChiefofStaff,G−4,LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson,looksbackoverthelastdecadeandevaluateshowfartheArmyhascomeandwhatstillneedstobedonetoachievetheenvisionedrevolution.Technologicaladvancessuchastheverysmallapertureterminal(VSAT)haveplayedamajorroleinimplementinglogisticstransformation.Inthecoverphoto,asergeantwiththe311thSustainmentCommand(Expeditionary)performsamaintenancecheckonaVSATinSouthwestAsia.

30

2

PAgE

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

42

CleaningUpContingencyOperatingBaseAdder —SergeantJamesKennedyBenjamin,USAR

MRAP’sFutureWiththeArmy —MajorDaleB.Woodhouse

RiversofLife,RiversofDeath: TheWorldWarIMesopotamianCampaign —MichaelYarborough

CreatingaKnowledgeManagementCulture attheArmySoldierSupportInstitute —StephanD.Wilcox

RaisingMechanicSkillstoIndustryStandards —ChiefWarrantOfficer2MatthewR.McCaslin

Writingfor Army Sustainment

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1100601

BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman

Major General James L. HodgeCommander

ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand

MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson

DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy

Lieutenant General William N. PhillipsPrincipalMilitaryDeputy

totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology

Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral

ArmyMaterielCommand

Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget

AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller

Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral

Ex OfficioColonel Gwendolyn Bingham

TheQuartermasterGeneral

Colonel Clark W. LeMasters, Jr.ChiefofOrdnance

Brigadier General Edward F. Dorman IIIChiefofTransportation

Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander

ArmySoldierSupportInstitute

Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral

ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand

Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral

ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand

ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY

Colonel Mark A. McCormickPresident

STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor

Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor

Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant

GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.

ThismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdisseminationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelop-mentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirprofessionaldevelopment.

ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:

GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy

ChiefofStaff

Official:

Army Sustainment(ISSN2153–5973)isabimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.

Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.

Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede

officialArmypublications.Themasculinepro-nounmayrefertoeithergender.

Reprints:ArticlesmaybereprintedwithcredittoArmy Sustainmentandtheauthor(s),exceptwhencopyrightisindicated.

Distribution:Unitsmayobtaincopiesthroughtheinitialdistributionsystem(DAForm12series).Privatedomesticsubscriptionsareavailableat$23.00peryearbywritingtotheSuperintendentofDocuments,P.O.Box371954,Pittsburgh,PA15250–7954,orbyvisitinghttp://bookstore.gpo.govontheWeb.Forcreditcardorders,call(866)512–1800.SubscribersshouldsubmitaddresschangesdirectlytoArmy Sustain-ment(seeaddressbelow).Army SustainmentalsoisavailableontheWorldWideWebathttp://www.alu.army.mil/alog.

Postmaster:Sendaddresschangesto:EDITORARMYSUSTAINMENT/ALU/2401QUARTERSRD/FTLEEVA23801–1705.

47

48

50

52

54

57

58

42PAgE

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

61

2 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

heseareexcitingtimesforallthemembersofthesustainmentcommunity.Over24monthsago,theArmyrewroteitsCapstoneConcept,whichinturncreatedtheneedtorewritetheArmy’sFunctionalConceptforSustainment.Thisrewrite,andallthatitentails,isamajorpriorityfortheArmyCombinedArmsSupportCom-mand(CASCOM).

Thepast8yearshaveprovidedvaluableinsightsandobservationsconcerninghowwe,assustainers,conductsustainmentoperationsinsupportofthejointfightinthenewoperatingenvironment.TheArmyCapstoneConcept(ArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand[TRADOC]Pamphlet525−3−0)andtheArmyOperatingConcept(TRADOCPamphlet525−3−1)havechangedthepreviousdirectioninwhichtheArmywasheadingbyacknowledg-ingthatthebasicnatureofwarhasnotchanged.

Despiteouradvancesintechnology,uncertaintyremainsaconstantintheoperationalenvironment,andourdominanceaswarfighterswillcontinuetoforceouradversariestoblendinwiththelocalpopulation,causingustooperateincomplexandurbanterrain.

AsanexpeditionaryArmy,wemustbeabletodeploytothefight,operateoverextendeddistances,anddealwithanti-accessandareadenialchallenges,allwhileconduct-ingdistributedoperations.Wewillalsohavetosustainallphasesoffull-spectrumoperations,oftensimultaneously.Sustainingthefutureforceinaneraofpersistentconflict,underconditionsofuncertaintyandcomplexity,requiresanadaptiveandversatilesustainmentframeworkthatiscapableofmaintainingtheforce’sfreedomofaction.

ThenewTRADOCPamphlet525−4−1, TheUnitedStatesArmyFunctionalConceptforSustainment2016−2028, approvedinOctober2010,expandsontheideaspresentedintheArmyCapstoneConceptandtheArmyOperatingConceptanddescribesthefunctionalcapabilitiesrequiredtosustainthefutureforcewhileconductingfull-spectrumoperations.SustainingfutureArmyforcesinaustereenvironments,oftenattheendofextendedlinesofcommunication,requiresalogisticsnetworkcapableofprojectingandprovidingthesupportandservicesnecessarytoensurefreedomofaction,extendoperationalreach,andprolongendurance.

However,ifthelogisticsnetworkistobesuccessful,futureArmyforcesmustdecreasethedemand-sidecharacteristicsoftheforce.Thosedecreaseswillservetoreducethestrainandfrequencyofresupplyoperations.Insupportofthisapproach,TRADOCPamphlet525−4−1servesasafoundationforfutureforcedevelopmentpertainingtosustainmentandthesustainmentwarfightingfunction.

ConceptdevelopmentleadschangefortheArmyanddrivesthedevelopmentandintegrationoffuturecapabilities.

Italsoprovidesaframeworkforanalysis,readinessassess-ments,prioritization,andfeedback.TheCASCOMteamisconductinganumberofeffortstohonefuturerequiredcapa-bilitiesintheArmyFunctionalConceptforSustainmentbyincludingasustainmentfunctionalcapabilities-basedassess-ment(CBA)andconductinganumberoforganizational-basedassessments(ObAs).

OurCBAlooksacrossthe21functionalareaswithinthesustainmentwarfightingfunctionandidentifiesgapsandsolutionsthatenableustoaccomplishoursustainmentmissioninthemostappropriateandresource-informedmanner.Withyoursupportfromthefield,weareevalu-atingourtheatersustainmentcommand,expeditionarysustainmentcommand,sustainmentbrigade,andexplosiveordnancedisposalformationsduringtheObAstodevelopandrefinecriticalrequiredcapabilities,gaps,andsolutionsfortheArmyandthesustainmentcommunity.

However,wearenotdevelopingtheSustainmentFunctionalConceptinastovepipe.WehavesuccessfullyintegratedourconceptandCBAeffortwiththeArmyCapabilitiesIntegrationCenterandtheotherTRADOCcentersofexcellence.Thispastwinter,IhadtheopportunitytoprovideanassessmentbriefingtotheArmyChiefofStaffonourSustainmentWarfightingFunctionalConceptwiththefiveotherwarfightingfunctionstoensureanintegratedandmutualsupportingapproachtothefuture.

IforeseethegreatestimpactofthenewSustainmentFunctionalConcepttobeonourgreatestresource,oursustainmentleadersandSoldiers.Wewillemphasizeculturalawareness,operationaladaptability,andthepracticeofmissioncommandtoourSoldiersatallechelons.Well-trainedandinformedSoldierswillbeourmostversatileresource,whiletrainingandeducationwillservetocreateoperationaladaptabilityattheindividualandsmall-unitlevels.SustainmentSoldierswillbecapableofreactingtounforeseenchanges,operatinginadegradednetwork,andmakingdecisionsatthelowestlevel.

Bythetimeyoureadthisarticle,wewillhavecomplet-edourimportantworkonthecurrenteditionoftheArmyFunctionalConceptforSustainment,wewillbeabouttocompletetheSustainmentFunctionalCBA,andwewillstarttherevisionsofthenexteditionsoftheArmyOperat-ingConceptandtheArmyFunctionalConceptforSustain-ment.Throughoutourefforts,yourinvolvementhasproveninstrumentaltooursuccess,andIvalueyourcontinuedinputandlookforwardtohearingfromyouonthesevitalandimportantconceptsforoursustainmentcommunity.

Major General jaMes l. HodGe is tHe coMMandinG General of tHe arMy coMbined arMs support coMMand and sustainMent center of excellence at fort lee, VirGinia.

TheArmy’sFunctionalConceptforSustainment

by Major General jaMes l. HodGe

T

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 3

commandandcontrolcapabilityatechelonsabovebri-gadethatprovidesjoint-capableoptionstothecombat-antcommander.

WiththeArmyForceGenerationprocess,wealsochangedthewaywegenerateforces—standardizingcapabilitiesintheActiveandReservecomponentstodeliverasteadystreamoftrainedandreadycapabili-tiesandcentralizingwhatmightbetermedstrategicreachbackthroughtheintegrationofindustryandstra-tegicpartnersinthenationalsustainmentbase,allwhilehelpingtoscalebackorreducethedeployedfootprint.

The1990sVisionofLogistics2010Howdidwegettothispoint? Inthelate1990s,the

thinkingwasthatbecauseoftheexpeditionarynatureofArmyoperations—withforcesdeployedabroadforextendedperiodsoftimeinlocationswithlittleinfra-structureorlinesofcommunication(LOCs)—wewouldrequireafundamentallydifferentviewofsus-tainability.Indeed,thathasbeenthecaseinAfghan-istanandIraq.

Backthen,thepremiseofthejointoperationalcon-ceptswasthatthekeyoperationalchallengewouldbetogainaccesstoatheater,establishasustainingcapability,andestablishalogisticsfootprintthatnotonlycouldbesmallerbutwouldalsotakeintoaccountthesocialandpoliticalrealitiesofthecountrieswheretheArmywoulddeploy.That,too,hasbeenthecase.

nthelate1990s,wespentquiteabitoftimetryingtoenvisionwhatArmylogisticswouldlooklikein2010.Therewasconsiderablediscussionoftheneedfora“RevolutioninMilitaryLogistics.”Theideagainedmomentum,stronglyinfluencedbytheArmyAfterNextprojectandbytheemergingrequirementsassociatedwithsupportingthenewbrigadedesignsthatbegantodevelop.DuringhistenureastheArmyChiefofStaff,GeneralPeteSchoomakerestablishedataskforcethatwasgivenablanksheetofpaperto“revo-lutionize”logistics,leveragingalltheworkthathadbeendonetodate.

Now,lookingback10to15years,howdidwedo?Whatstillneedstobeworkedon?Andwhatdidwemissentirely?

Theeventsof11September2001,thewarsinIraqandAfghanistan,and32deploymentsdivertedourattentionfromtransformationsomewhat.However,overallprogresshasbeen,Ithink,substantial.Wehaveleveragedthegreatworkproducedinearlieryearsandincorporatedlessonslearnedfrom9yearsofcombattogiveusavery,verycapablelogisticsforce.Feedbackfromthefieldindicatesthatlogisticstransformationisworkingwell,butweknowwewillnevergetthingsexactlyrightandmustcontinuetoadapt.

Ournewcapabilitieswerenotdreamedupover-night—theyweretheresultofyearsofstudy,debate,andexperience.Furthermore,manyoftheprinciplesthatdrovestrategistsbackthengenerallyremainvalidtodayandwilldriveusinthefuture.Uncertainty,dis-order,andfluiditywillcontinuetocharacterizebattle-fields,andlogisticsmustadaptaccordingly.

Ataveryhighlevel,logisticstransformationwasaboutaconceptofsupportformodularitythatleve-ragesjointandstrategicpartners.Itcreatedmodularorganizationsthatsupportfull-spectrumoperations;enhancedourtheater-openingandforce-receptioncapabilities;anddevelopedasingleArmylogistics

AVisionofArmyLogisticsWith20/20Hindsight

by lieutenant General MitcHell H. stevenson

I

What happened to the Revolutionin Military Logistics that beganin the late 1990s? The events of 9/11and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistanintroduced barriers to some changes,but overall progress has been substantial.

4 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Ourgoalwasto“evolveaseamlesslogisticssystemthattiesallpartsofthelogisticscommunityintoonenetworkofsharedsituationalawarenessandunifiedaction.”Topursuethatendeavor,wesetgoalsforthreedomains:forcesustainment,forceprojection,andtech-nologyapplicationandacquisitionagility.

Force sustainment.Wewantedasinglelogisticssystemthatwouldbemorepredictiveandresponsive.Thiswastobethesinglemostimportantfactorinlay-ingthefoundationforinformationsupremacyandsitu-ationalunderstanding.

Force projection.Thefocusherewasontheneedforlighteryetmorepowerfulland-powersystemsthatwereeasiertodeployglobally,atlowercost,andwithgreaterspeed;strategicpre-positioningofequipmentandmate-rieltoreduceinitialairandseatransportrequirements;anddeploymentoftask-organized,modularlogisticsorganizationstosupportinitialcombatoperations.

Technology application and acquisition agility.Thekeyherewastheintegrationoftechnologyandacquisi-tionprocessestoworkatreducingthephysicalsizeofoursystems.Thegoalwastofindmaterialsthatarelighter,stronger,andmorereliableandconsumelessfuel,alongwithstreamliningtheprocesstoquicklyandcost-effectivelyacquirematerielandservicesnec-essarytomaintainreadiness,transitiontowar,andsus-taincombatoperations.

WhatHasComeToFruition?Let’sstartatthetop.Oneofthemostsignificant

changeshasbeenthemovementawayfromadivision-centricforcetothemodularbrigadecombatteamsandechelons-above-brigadeunitsoftoday.Modularityhascreatedamajorchangeforlogisticiansinhowweareorganizedandconductoperations.Overall,we’vedoneaprettygoodjobofadjustingtotheneworganizations;functions;tactics,techniques,andprocedures;andmis-sionroles.Combatservicesupport(CSS)withinmodu-larityhasdoneexactlywhatitwasdesignedtodo:sustaincombatoperationsintwotheaterswithoutmis-sionshortfall.

ForceSustainmentAdmittedly,wehavenotyetachievedourvisionofa

SingleArmyLogisticsEnterprise(SALE),butwearewellonourwaywithtechnologicaladvancementsthatsignificantlyimpactoperations.TheArmyMaterielCommand’sLogisticsModernizationProgramleadstheway,havingjustlauncheditsfinaldeployment.TheGlobalCombatSupportSystem-Army,whichinvolvesthereengineeringof12legacyArmylogisticsprocesses,isnotfarbehind,operatingnearitsfullfunctionalityina

limited-usertestwiththe11thArmoredCavalryRegi-mentatFortIrwin,California.WiththeSALE,wewillfinallyachieveaweb-based,integratedenterprisesolu-tionthatenablesmaterielreadinessandprovidesassetmanagementandaccountability,acquisitioncompliancy,andfinancialtransparency.

AswemovetowardrealizationoftheSALE,wecontinuetolookforwaystoreplacelegacysystemsandapplications.Inthelast5years,we’vecuttheArmy’sstandingrepositoryforinformationtechnologyinvestmentsby80percent.BycentralizingtheArmycorps/theaterautomateddataprocessingservicecen-tersatasinglesite,wereducedtheArmy’stacticalsupplysystemfootprint,reducednetworktraffic,enhancedresponsetime,andsaved115manpowerslotsthatwerereturnedtotheforcepool.

Twootherinformation-relatedtechnologieshavebeenimplementedandaregreatlyenhancingforcesus-tainment:verysmallapertureterminalsanditemuniqueidentification.

Verysmallapertureterminals(VSATs)usecom-mercialsatellitetechnologytodeliverthenetworkstowarfightingsustainmentunits.Networkcommunica-tionscannowbeprovidedforupto40tents,vans,orshelterswithina7-by7-kilometerareausingwirelessbridgingbetweennodes.AllCSSunitsnowhavecon-nectivityorganictotheirunits.VSATshavebeen,andwillremain,agamechangerforArmysustainment.

Itemuniqueidentification(IUID)representsasig-nificantstepinimprovingassetvisibilityandwillenablethelife-cyclemanagementofenditemsandmajorcomponentslikeneverbefore.Initialresultsinthe160thSpecialOperationsAviationRegimentindi-cateapotentialfora50-percentreductionindigital

Technology has transformed Army logistics. With this very small aperture terminal, warriors in remote

locations have a wireless ability to send in their or ders.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 5

arms-roominventory,issue,andreceipttimes,aswellasareductionintransactiontimesinautomatedtoolrooms,aviationlifesupportequipmentmanagement,andorganizationalclothingandindividualequipmentmanagement.(Seerelatedarticleonpage36.)

Fordeploymentandin-theaterdistributionman-agement,theTransportationCoordinator’sAutomatedInformationforMovementsSystem(TC−AIMS)isonlineandworkingwell.ThedecisiontoadopttheAirForce’sCargoMovementOperationSystems(CMOS)inplaceofblocksIVandVofTC−AIMSwillbehelp-ful.TheMovementTrackingSystem(MTS)alsocon-tinuestoevolve;itnowincorporatesanabilitytoreadactiveradiofrequencyidentificationtagsonthecargobeingcarriedbyMTS-equippedtrucks,thuseliminat-ingtheneedforfixedinterrogatornetworks.

In-transitvisibilityhascontinuedtomature.AswemovecargooutofIraq,intoAfghanistan,andbacktothecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS),we’reabletoseewherethecargoisallthetime;thatisunlikeOperationDesertStorm,wherewehadlittle-to-novisibilityofcargoshipmentsandzero“inthebox”visibility.Insomeinstances,wealsoareusingsensortechnologiestoaddresstheconditionofitems,alongwithpilferageandintrusionofcontainers.Andourcommercialcarriersareusingsatellitetransponderstoidentifyandtrackcargo.

Severalimprovementshavebeenmadeindistribu-tion.Velocitymanagementhasgonefromanideatoaroutinewayofdoingbusiness,reducingaveragecus-tomerwaittimeforoutsideCONUSairshipmentsfrom21daysin1994tojust13daysin2010.WeareleveragingtheDefenseLogisticsAgency’sforwarddis-tributiondepotstogainfurtherefficiencies.TheArmystooduptheArmySustainmentCommand,bringingtogetherthepowerofourstrategicandjointpartnersinthenationalsustainmentbaseandextendingthatpowerforwardintoAfghanistanandIraq.

Wearecollaboratingwithsystemproductmanagerstodemonstrateacondition-basedmaintenancecapabili-tytomonitorhealthindicatorsofourmorecomplexweaponsystems.We’vealreadyequippedoverhalfoftheArmy’smannedaircraftfleetwiththeabilitytocol-lectessentialmaintenancedatafromcomponentsandtransmitthatinformationoff-platform.Thusfar,thishasextendedthetimebetweenoverhaulon22parts,elimi-natedalmost5,000maintenanceevents,improvedmorethan125maintenanceprocedures,andenhancedsafetythroughavoidanceofatleastthreeclassAmishaps.

Wecontinueworkingtoimplementacommonlogis-ticsoperatingenvironment(CLOE),whichcomprisesafully-integratedsuiteofArmylogisticsinformationtechnologiesandprocessesthatfusenetwork-centricdata-sharingandsensor-basedself-reportingsystemswithintheArmy’sLandWarNetconstructinsupportofmultifunctionallogisticsoperations.

Innovationalsohasbeenbroughttodistributioninthetacticalandoperationalspacesthroughimprovedaerialresupplyoptions,includingbothhigh-andlow-altituderesupplysystems.Jointprecisionairdropsys-temsareusedat20,000feetandabove;atloweraltitudes,low-costlow-altitudesystemsareusedat150to500feetabovetheground.Testingofanothersys-tem,free-droppackaging(foraltitudesbelow100feet),isongoing.

InSoldierprotection,significantenhancementshavebeenmadeoverthepastdecade,particularlyinbodyarmor.ThesamecanbesaidforArmycombathelmetcapabilityenhancements,suchasfragmentationpro-tection,increasedSoldiercomfort,andhelmetsensorinternalmounts.

Warfighterfeedbackhasdrivenimprovementsinfieldfeeding.Wedevelopedandcontinuetoenhanceunitizedgrouprations(UGRs),simplifyingandstream-liningtheprocessofprovidinghigh-qualitymealstotheSoldierinthefield.ThefirstUGR,introducedin1995,maximizeduseofcommercialitems,significantlyreducedline-itemrequisitioning,easedpreparationandassembly,andreducedthelogisticsfootprint.

Variousimprovementshavecontinuedtothepres-ent.Forexample,in2005,wereplacedtheunitizedBration,whichhad200mealson1pallet,withtheUGR−B,whichoffers400completemeals(alsoin50-servingmodules)onapallet;thiseffortreducedtheoverallcostoftherationbyreducingcomponentsbymorethan65percent.In2007,weintroduced“UGR−Express,”acompleteself-contained,self-heatinggroupmealforupto18Soldiersoperatinginremoteareas.

Asthesefoodimprovementswerebeingmade,wealsodesignedtheFirstStrikeRation,aneat-on-the-moveassaultmealdesignedforshortdurationsof

The Army has equipped over half of its manned air­craft fleet with Condition­Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+). In this helicopter, CBM+ detected a crack along the vertical fin and a broken intermediate gear­box (IGB) mounting foot.

6 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

highlymobileandhigh-intensitycombatoperations.EachFirstStrikeRationcontainsaday’ssupplyoffood,averagingatotalof2,900calories,whileatthesametimereducingtheSoldier’sload.Oneration,inplaceofthreedailymeals,ready-to-eat,saves49percentinweight,55percentinspace,and22percentincosts.

Wealsoarelookingatimprovementsinbatteryuse.Useofrechargeablebatteriesisincreasing,withsomeunitsusingthem90percentofthetimeduringdismount-edoperations.Modularbrigadesofalltypesarenowabletoleveragemanyofthebenefitsofrechargeablebatteries,andwearenowexaminingpolicyandtrainingrecommendationsthatprovidefortheiruse,whenpracti-cal,asthepreferredmethodofpoweringenditems.

ForceProjectionItisinthisdomainthatthegreatestimprovements

haveoccurred.Wehavesignificantlyenhancedourthroughputandcapacityatpower-projectioninstallations.Forexample,whereastherailheadatFortHood,Texas,inyearspasthada4-spurrailheadwithnosupportingfacili-ties,todayithasa240-railcarrail-head,a300-railcarclassificationyard,a45,000-square-yardmarshal-lingyard,andthecapabilitytodeploy240to320railcarsperday.SimilarimprovementsattheFort

Lewis,Washington,railandlogisticsfacilityhavepro-videdacapabilitytodeploy240railcarsperday.Andtherearemanymoresuchexamples.

Atthejointlevel,wenowhavea“DistributionPro-cessOwner,”resultinginastrongerrelationshipamongtheDefenseLogisticsAgency(thesupplyarmofDepart-mentofDefenselogistics),theU.S.TransportationCom-mand,andtheservices.Theoutcomehasbeenbetterplanning,execution,andcontrolofglobaldistributionoperations.

TheC−17GlobemasterIII,themostflexiblecargoaircrafttoentertheairliftforce,hasreplacedtheC−141Starlifterasourprincipalcargolifter.Itiscapableofrapidstrategicdeliveryoftroopsandalltypesofcargotomainoperatingbasesordirectlytoforwardbases.TheC−17,designedtoprovidedirectdeliveryofcargoloads

Soldiers arrive in Pakistan aboard a C−17 Globemas ter III with supplies

in support of flood relief efforts. The aircraft is the most flexible to

enter the airlift force.

First Strike Rations contain a day’s supply of food for warfighters on the move. The rations are also half the weight and volume of three daily meals, ready­to­eat.

An example of the Army’s improved force­projection capabilities is provided by the expansion of the Fort Hood, Texas, rail facility. It has gone from a 4­spur railhead to today’s 240­railcar railhead, 300­railcar classification yard, and 45,000­square yard marshal ling facility.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 7

toaustereairfields,hasbeenusedextensivelyinAfghan-istan.Itcanlandwithpayloadsofupto160,000poundsonaustererunwaysassmallas3,500feetby90feet.

TechnologyApplicationandAcquisitionAgilitySignificantaccomplishmentshavealsobeenmade

inthisdomain.Sensorsarebeingusedtoreportreal-timestatusofcriticalitems;diagnosticsandprognos-ticscansensependingsystemfailures,requisitionparts,andschedulerepairs;smartmunitionsareenablingmaterielmasstobedecreased;andartificialintelligenceandintelligentagentsarehelpinglogisti-cianstoperformanalyticalandjudgmentaltasks.

Inacquisitionreform,wehaveincreasedtheuseofelectroniccommerce;conductedprivatizationandout-sourcingofnon-corecapabilities;increasedtheuseofcommerciallycontractedmaintenanceandservices;andimplementedtheuseofperformanceorcommercialinsteadofmilitaryspecificationswhereappropriate.

WemadegreatprogressinhowweconductbusinessoperationsthroughimplementationoftheSin-gleStockFundandNationalMain-tenanceProgramwhileadaptingtoaMaterielEnterprisethatwillsup-portbroadereffortsthatleadtoa

balancedArmy,betterbusinessprocesses,shortercycletimes,andreducedcosts.

AtatimewhentheArmy’senergycostshavecon-tinuedtorise,wehaveembarkedonastrategytohelpachieve,overtime,lessenergyconsumption,whichwillultimatelytakefuelconvoysoffdangerousLOCs.Intheshortterm,theArmyhasdonesuchthingsasapplyingexteriorsprayfoaminsulationtotemporarystructuresinIraqandAfghanistan,whichreducesfuelconsumptionforheatingandcoolingby50percent.

Technologyalsohasimprovedthewaywaterisproducedonthebattlefield.InIraqandAfghanistan,1,500gallon-per-hourtacticalwaterpurificationsys-temsareinuse,asare125gallon-per-hourlight-weightwaterpurificationsystems.Andwaterre-usetechnologyisnowusedinallofourlaundryandshowerunits.

Forthepast5years,theArmyhasbeenabletosus-taininIraqandAfghanistangroundequipmentreadi-nessratesofgreaterthan90percent.Ourmilitaryindustrialbaseproduction,forexample,istwiceashighaspre-warlevels,anditisnowatthegreatestout-putsincetheVietnamWar.Ourdepotsandarsenalsareworldclass.Inthelast5years,theyhavewon26Shin-goAwards(whatsomecallthe“NobelPrize”forpro-ductionandmanufacturingexcellence).Theyhavereducedcosts,increasedproductivity,andgainedeffi-ciencies—allwhileourNationisatwar.

Aspartofourlogisticstransformation,wealsohavegonefromafour-leveltoatwo-levelmaintenancesys-tem,supportedandenhancedbythecreationofArmyfieldsupportbrigadesforwardonthebattlefield.It’sthesumofalltheseimprovementsthathasbeenagamechangerformaintenancesupport.

Manynewtechnologiesarebeingdevelopedtoreducedemandsonmanpower;improvetheefficiencyoflogisticssupport;andimprovereliability,maintai-nability,sustainability,andoperationalreadiness.

A mechanic at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, dismantles

an M88 recovery vehicle. Army depots and arsenals have won 26 highly­coveted Shingo Awards for

production and manufacturing excellence in the last 5 years.

The Army had spray foam insulation applied to temporary structures in Iraq and Afghanistan, which reduced fuel consumption and thereby took fuel convoys off dangerous roads.

8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

MakingTheEvolutionARevolution

Working with our partners in the Department of Defense, joint, and other service communities, the Army needs to evolve several areas to complete the Revolution in Military Logistics. They include:

Networked communications. While there are a num-ber of communications systems in the theater, no single network provides guaranteed communications for all orga-nizations. As a result, some organizations are unable to establish or maintain contact while they are on the move.

Joint distribution information systems. A variety of information technology systems are used by joint and ser-vice organizations, but many are organization-centric and do not communicate or transfer data rea dily across the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). This hinders their ability to coor dinate and control distribution operations in a holistic manner.

Distribution-based logistics. Distribution opera tions are managed by a variety of disparate joint and service organizations, and their efforts are not ade quately synchro-nized. As a result, distribution opera tions are not managed for effectiveness, stock hold ings are larger than they could be, and delays occur that adversely impact distribution.

Joint operational-level logistics command and control. No standing joint logistics organization can

command and control logistics and theater distribu tion operations at the operational level in the theater in support of the regional combatant and joint force commanders.

Integration of coalition and host-nation capabil-ities. Current and future operations increasingly in volve coalition and host-nation partners. These part ners will have requirements that need to be provided for and capabilities that can contribute to the distribu tion operation.

Intertheater airlift. The current fleet of strategic aircraft is based around the C−5 Galaxy transport and the newer C−17 Globemaster III. The increase in ex peditionary operations, often in distant and austere locations, and in future requirements for rapid inter-ventions means that the airlift capability must be ca pable of deploying and supporting a deployed force. This is likely to require an increase in the size and a change in the makeup of the airlift fleet.

Energy. More needs to be done, and is being done, in developing capabilities for energy and power sys tems that satisfy mission requirements, minimize the need to transport energy sources, and promote greater indepen-dence from vulnerable logistics resupply.

Theseincludenext-generationwirelesscommunica-tionsthatcansignificantlyenhancethevisibilityofArmyassets;roboticstechnologiesthatcanperformrepetitive,dangerous,ordifficultworkthathumanscannotperformwellorwouldnotwanttoperform;micro-electricalmechanicalsystemsthatcantracktemperature,humidity,andvibrationsotheycanmoni-torshelf-lifeandenvironmentalfactorsaffectingassets;andsuchthingsastheHellfireCaptiveCarryMonitorforAssetReadiness,whichisinusetodaybytheArmytomonitorandrecordtheenvironmentaldetailsofassetsinstorageandtransport.

WhatDoWeStillNeedtoDo?Despiteallthathasbeenaccomplishedsincewe

introducedtheRevolutioninMilitaryLogistics,2warsand32deploymentshavesomewhatslowedsomeofthetransformationthathadbeenenvisionedadecadeearli-er,makingthe“revolution”moreofan“evolution.”

Asprioritieschanged,theneededfundingfordevel-opmentandfieldingoftechnologiesthatwethoughtwouldbeimportanthadtobedivertedtomoreimpor-tantareas,suchasfieldingandsustainingtensofthou-sandsofmine-resistant,ambush-protected(MRAP)vehiclescriticaltokeepingSoldiersaliveonthebattle-field.So,we’renotdoneyet—notbyanymeans!Fulltransformationwilltakeagreatdealmoretime,perhaps

adecadeormore.Consequently,Armylogisticsmustcontinuallyadaptaccordingly!

AfghanistanandIraqhaveshownusthattheneedtosupportsmalldispersedunitsoversignificantdistanceswillonlygrowinimportance,aswilltheneedtoappro-priatelysizeandreducethelogisticsfootprint.Manyofourchangesrepresentparadigmchangesinhowweoperate.Theevolvingstrategicenvironmentwillposeaseriesofstrategicchoicesthatwewillneedtoexamineasweadaptthecharacteroflogistics’contributionstothefight.

Overthelastdecade,logisticsorganizations,process-es,tools,andtechnologyhavewitnessedsignificantadaptation,whichhascreatedacontinuumofmomen-tumthatmakesthenextlevelofadaptationmorereadilyapparent.Technologymaturationwillbeafactor,butourcontinuedpartneringandteamingwithindustryandacademiawillhelptoshapetheprogression,integration,andimplementationofevolvingtechnologies.Aswemoveforward,wewillcontinuetoseekcapabilitiesthatsatisfytheSoldiers’needsandhelpustobettermanagetheuncertaintythatwillcontinuetocharacterizecurrentandfutureoperations.

lieutenant General MitcHell H. steVenson is tHe deputy cHief of staff, G−4, departMent of tHe arMy.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 9

clearlyremembervisitingmyfather’sofficeasachildandseeingapictureframewiththequote,“Peo-pleworkingtogether,withoutconcernforwhowillgetthecredit,canaccomplishanything.”Needlesstosay,forthoseofusservinginIraq,teamworkandself-lessservicearethekeyvaluesthatledtoouroverallsuccessintheresponsibledrawdownofforces(RDoF).

FoundationsofDrawdownSuccessOn1September2010,followingordersfromthe

President,50,000militarypersonnelremainedinIraqinsupportofOperationNewDawn.Duringthepastyear,wehaveclosed263bases,retrogradedover1.5millionpiecesofequipment,includingover25,000piecesofrollingstock,andtransportedover100,000personnelbyrotary-andfixed-wingaircraft—remarkableaccom-plishmentstosaytheleast.

We,U.S.Forces-Iraq(USF–I),aresuccessfullyaccomplishingtheRDoFbecauseofdedicated,hard-workingSoldiers,becauseofnoncommissionedoffi-cerswhoensurethatstandardsanddisciplineremainhigh,becauseofcommandersatalllevelswhoissueclearandconciseintent,andbecauseofcivilians,bothDepartmentofDefenseemployeesandcontractors,whodirectlysupportthemissionandarereadytodowhatisneededtoaccomplishit.

WearealsosupportedbyremarkablepartnersliketheUnderSecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,Tech-nologyandLogistics;theDeputyChiefofStaffoftheArmy,G–4;theArmyForcesCommand;theU.S.CentralCommand;theArmyMaterielCommand;theDefenseLogisticsAgency;andmanyotheragencies.Together,wehavealreadyaccomplishedsomethingthatmanysaidwecouldnotdo:WehaveexecutedtheRDoFwithprecisionevenwhilebringinghomemoreequipmentandpersonnelthantheArmyhassinceleavingEuropeandthePacificafterWorldWarII.

Ourdrawdownbeganin2008afterthepeakofthesurgeoperationsandwillcontinueuntilthecomple-

tionofourmissionon31December2011,assetforthinthesecurityagreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandIraq.Thedrawdownhasbeenacontinuousprocessthatbeganafterviolentextremistsbegansteadilylosinggroundatboththeoperationalandtacticallevelsatthepeakofthesurgeoperations.Theseveredegradationofextremistviolencewasclearlyevidentinearly2009.

ThedrawdownispossiblebecauseoftheincreasedcapabilitiesoftheIraqiSecurityForcesandtheoverallimprovementofthesecurityenvironment.Thesefac-torsallowUSF–Itocontinuetotransitionfromcombatoperationstostabilityoperations.Improvedsecurityallowsforcontinuedprogresstowardalong-termbilat-eralrelationship—anenduringpartnership—withasovereign,secure,andself-reliantIraq.

OperationNewDawn,whichbegan1September2010,isaboutadvising,assisting,andtrainingtheIraqiSecurityForces,conductingpartneredcounter-terrorismoperations,andprovidingsupporttoprovin-cialreconstructionteamsandotherorganizationsastheyhelpIraqbuildcivilcapabilities.However,eventhoughOperationNewDawnhasbegun,wecontinuetosetconditionsforthefinalRDoF.

SustainmentDuringtheDrawdownOurdrawdownplanmustensurethatthecom-

manderhasmaximumflexibilitytocontrolthemea-suredpaceoftheredeploymentofU.S.forcesbasedonassessmentsofthesecurityenvironmentandtheprogressofthenewGovernmentofIraq’stransition,includingthereadinessoftheIraqiSecurityForces.

AsweareplanningforthefinalRDoF,wemusteffectivelyandefficientlyexecutedailysustainmentoperationsforaforcestructurethatconsistsofjustunder50,000servicemembersand75,000civiliancontrac-tors.TheconceptofsupportinIraqischallengingandrequiresaconstantflowofcommodities,suchasthe1.2milliongallonsofJP8fuelthatwereceiveanddistributeeverydayacrosstheIraqjointoperationsarea(IJOA).

SustainingtheResponsibleDrawdownofForces

by briGadier General Gustave F. Perna

I

Following the President’s orders to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq, U.S. Forces-Iraq has been busy closing bases, retrograding equipment, and transitioning from combat to stability operations.

10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Currently,wedistributecommoditiesovermainsup-plyroutesthatspanfromHarborGateinthenorthtoUmmQsarinthesouth(roughlyadistanceequaltothelengthofCalifornia).Undoubtedly,oursustainmentcon-voysmuststayvigilantagainstindirectfire,directfire,andofcourse,improvisedexplosivedevices.

Thecommoditiesrequiredtosustainaforcethatatonetimenumberedover200,000troopsandcivil-iansaremonumentalinnumber.Thus,theRDoFisnotjusttheretrogradeofrollingandnonrollingstock.Itisalsothe“rightsizing”ofcommoditiessothatwestillhaveenoughtosustainthe125,000troopsandciviliansremainingwithouthavingmorethanwerequire.ClassesIII(petroleum,oils,andlubricants),V(ammunition),andIX(repairparts)areverydifficultcommoditiestorightsizebecausetheyaredemandoriented.Adraw-downinforcestructuredoesnotnecessarilyequatetoaproportionaldrawdownofacommodity,andnotwocommoditiesaremeasuredinthesameway.

Class III.BulkfuelusebyU.S.andcoalitionforcessteadilyincreasedfromaninitialconsumptionof170milliongallonsin2003toapeakof1.1billiongal-lonsin2008duringthesurge.Thetotalconsumptionfor2009was853milliongallons.Attheheightofthesurge,therewerealmost30milliongallonsoffuelinstoragebagsthroughoutIraq.Onlyathirdofthatamountoffuelisonthegroundtoday.

Theexpeditionarysustainmentcommand(ESC)isresponsibleforkeepingthefuelflowingthroughouttheIJOAbybalancingthetasksofpredictingconsump-tionandorderingthecorrectamountsandtypes(JP8,diesel,orgasoline)fromthecorrectsources.ESCele-mentsreceivethefuel,conductqualitycontroltesting,storeit,andredistributeitthroughoutIraq.DuringOperationNewDawn,theanticipatedreductioninfuelconsumptionwillenableUSF–Itoremoveroughly50percentofthebulkstoragebagscurrentlyinplaceandreducefuelorderstotheDefenseLogisticsAgency.

Class V.Concurrently,thenumberofammunitionholdingareasinIraqdroppedbyovertwo-thirds,fromahighof19in2008to6in2010.In2003,therewereonly3.Oddly,thehighesttonnage(over14,000tons)ofammunitionwasin2005whiletherewereonly10storageareas.WhenUSF–Ihad19ammunitionstorageareas,only10,000tonsofammunitionwereonhand.

AsUSF–IreducestheonhandstocksofclassV,wewillreducethenumberofholdingareasproportionate-ly.USF–IammunitionmanagersworkedcloselywiththeESCtodevelopnewmodelsforclassVopera-tionalandsustainmentloads,sincenoexistingmodelsaccuratelyreflectedthecompositionoremploymentofadviseandassistbrigades(AABs)asopposedtobrigadecombatteams.Theforcemixesweredifferentbecauseofthefieldingofthemine-resistantambush-protectedvehicleandtheup-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicleinlieuofheavycombat

vehicles,andthemissionsconductedbyAABsvariedamong,andevenwithin,U.S.divisions.

Class IX.AttheheightoftheIraqsurge,over22supplysupportactivities(SSAs)operatedinIraq,stockingapproximately140,000totallinesofrepairpartsandotheritems.Becauseofthemassivereduc-tioninsupplystocks,sevenSSAslocatedatkeydis-tributionhubsremaininsupportoftheAABs.EachremainingSSAhasapproximately6,000lines—areductionofnearlytwo-thirds.TheremainingSSAswillbereducedevenfurtheraseachAABredeployswithnobackfill.

CriticaltothesuccessofclassIXoperationsfortheremainingmonthsinIraqistheabilitytodistributefromsupplyhubsto“spokes”andtopartneredbases.Thisconstantbalancingactwillbemorecompli-catedinthenearfutureasthelinesofcommunicationexpandbecausefewerassetsandunitswillbespreadoutoverthesamegeographicalarea.AcontinuedpartnershipwiththeIraqitruckingnetworkmayallevi-atesomeofthisproblembyincreasingthelocal-haulcapabilitytofillthegapinresources.

WedidmorethanjustfollowthePresident’sdirec-tiontoreducetheforcestructureto50,000personnelnolaterthan1September2010.Aswellasaccountingforandsuccessfullyretrogradingover25,000piecesofrollingstockand1.5millionpiecesofnonrollingstock,wereducedouroverallcommodityposturetobestsupporttheremainingforcesinsidetheIJOA.Thesemissionswereaccomplishedwhilesimultane-ouslyadvising,training,andassistingtheIraqiSecu-rityForces,partneringwiththemforcounterterrorismmissions,andsupportingthetransitionoftheDepart-mentofStateintothemissionlead.

ThePresidenthasmandatedthatallforces,equip-ment,andcommoditiesmustbeoutoftheIJOAby31December2011.Whatwejustdidwashard,butwhatwewilldoisgoingtobeharder.

TheUSF–IstaffandallofourpartnersarefullyengagedinmissionanalysistodeterminethebestwaytoexecutetheRDoF.Butremember,“Peopleworkingtogether,withoutconcernforwhowillgetthecredit,canaccomplishanything.”

briGadier General GustaVe f. perna is tHe coMMander of tHe arMy joint Munitions and letHality life cycle ManaGeMent coM-Mand and arMy joint Munitions coMMand. He preViously serVed as tHe director of loGistics, j–4, for u.s. forces-iraq. He Has a bacHelor’s deGree in business ManaGeMent froM tHe uniVersity of Maryland and a Master’s deGree in loGistics ManaGeMent froM florida institute of tecHnoloGy. He is a Graduate of tHe infantry officer basic course, ordnance officer adVanced course, loGis-tics executiVe deVelopMent course, support operations course, tHe arMy coMMand and General staff colleGe, and tHe industrial colleGe of tHe arMed forces.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 11

y1-yeartourinAfghani-stanasalogisticsofficerclearlyreinforcedtheimportanceofsomebasiclogisticsconcepts(suchascontrollinginven-tory,meetingoperationalrequire-ments,andtrackingdelivery)aswellasthesecurityassistanceandcooperationpracticesforsupportingourpartnersintheGlobalWaronTerrorism.

WhenIarrivedinKabul,IwasassignedtotheSecurityAssistanceOffice-Afghanistan(SAO–A),CombinedSecurityTransitionCommand-Afghanistan.Ihadnosecurityassistanceexperience,butIdidbringmorethan16yearsoflogisticsexperienceinvariousposi-tions,rangingfrommaintenancecompanycommandertosupportoperationsofficer.WhenIarrived,IwasassignedasthevehiclecommoditymanagerandtaskedwithquantifyingandqualifyingthevehiclerequirementsfortheAfghanNationalSecurityForces(ANSF)andacquiringthosevehiclestosupportthefightagainsttheTaliban.

Acoupleofmonthslaterasatransitiontookplace,theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)estab-lishedoperations,andpeoplemovedon,Ibecamethechiefoftheforeignmilitarysales(FMS)divisionresponsiblefortheacquisitionofallequipment,train-ing,andsustainmentrequirements,withabudgetof$13billion.Inthecomingmonths,myappreciationforandrelianceonmanyconceptsIlearnedovertheyearsatbrigade,battalion,andcompanylevelsaboutprocur-ing,fielding,andsustainingsystemsgrewgreatly.

DeterminingHowtoAccomplishtheMissionIhadmanyissuestocoverwhileIwasassigned

asFMSchief.ThecomponentsoftheANSF—theAfghanistanNationalArmy(ANA),AfghanNationalAirCorps,andAfghanistanNationalPolice(ANP)—

havetheirownspecificequipmentrequirementsthatsometimescrossoveramongtheagencies.Forexample,theyallrequirealighttacticalvehiclecapa-bility.Foremostineveryone’smindwasthebalancebetweenwiselyspendingthefundsatourdisposalandtheneedtogettherightequipmentprocured,intotheater,andissuedinatimelymannertoequiptheANA,AfghanNationalAirCorpsandANPaccordingtothefieldingplan.

Thissoundseasy,doesn’tit?Inmostcasesitwas.However,NATOTrainingMission-AfghanistanandCombinedSecurityTransitionCommand-Afghanistanwererequiredtofieldafightingforcewhileincon-tact.Thatiswhentheconceptof“simple”wentoutthewindow.InSAO–A,wehadtofigureouthowtoaccomplishtherequirementwhileinthefight.

DeterminingWhogetsWhatandHowMuchDetermininghowtooutfittheANSFwasacompli-

catedprocessthatstretchedacrossseveraldirectorates.TheCJ–7,astheforcegenerator,buildsthemodifi-cationtableoforganizationandequipmentor,asit

SecurityAssistanceFromtheLogisticsPointofView

by Major daniel M. Maloney

M

The author describes his experience as a logistician assigned to a security assistance office in Afghanistan.

The director of the Integration Cell, Security As sistance Office­Afghanistan, briefs the Afghan Na tional Army G–4 on the mission of the foreign mili tary sales division of the Security Assistance Office­Afghanistan.

12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

iscalledinDari,the“Tashkiel.”Thedocumentout-linesthepersonnelandequipmentrequirementsfromministrytocorpsandevendowntocommandoandspecialforcesunits.FortheTashkielandthesubse-quentbyproduct“AnnexK”(fieldingschedule),weinSAO–Acouldidentifynewunit-fieldingrequirementsandgaininsightintothetypeandquantityofequip-menttopurchasefortheANA.

SAO–Atooktheoperationalrequirementandmatcheditwiththeappropriateequipment.Ourmis-sionfocusedonmeetingtheoperationalrequirementandusedthefollowingconceptstoachievesuccess:o Acquiretherightequipment,training,andsus-

tainmentpackagestomeettheANSFoperationalrequirements(acquisition).

o Validateshipmentoftheequipmentandstatusoftrainingcontracts(tracking).

o AdviseandtraintheAfghansonthesecurityassis-tanceproceduresthatweusetoreducethecoalitionfootprintinthefuture(transition).

AcquisitionTheacquisitionofequipment,training,andsustain-

mentgoesbacktotheTashkiel.Whencoupledwith

onhandquantitiesandtheoperationalrequirement,theTashkielformsthegenesisoftheacquisitionprocess.SAO–AalsofoundthatworkingwithforcestructurewaschallengingbecausethenumberofANAper-sonnelgrewfrom134,000to171,000andtheANPpersonnelgrewfrom96,800to134,000.Thiscreatedachallengeinacquisitionbecausetheendstateforappropriatequantitieskeptincreasing.

Mostofthecrew-servedweaponsrequiredbytheANA(M249s,M240BsandM2s)hadtobeprocuredaheadoftheproductiontimeline.Bythewinterof2009,werealizedthatwewouldhavetodiverttheseweaponsystemsfromU.S.Armystockstosupporttheacceler-atedfieldingofnewANAunitstomeetthe171,000-manforcestructurebytheOctober2011deadline.Theproductiontimelinesforsomeofthoseweaponsystemscanbeanywherefrom12to18months.

Wecouldnotalwayspullavailablestockfromawarehousetomeetourrequirements.Requestingdiver-sionsnormallydrewinexpertisefromtheDepartmentoftheArmyG–4SystemSupportOfficeandG–8tofacilitatethediversionsandmanagethepriorities.Toidentifytherequirementsbytypeofequipmentandquantity,securityassistanceofficershadtomanagea

A “jingle” truck concludes its journey from the Port of Karachi, Pakistan, to Depot 2 in Kabul with a medium tactical vehicle purchased through the foreign military sales division.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 13

largeamountofinformationandplugintotheunitfieldingschedulethedistributionandonhandquanti-tiesofequipmentinthemaindepotsinKabul.

Oncethesecurityassistanceofficerknowswhattoorder,hemustplugtheinformationintotheAfghanistansecurityforcesfund,whichfundsour“pseudoFMS”casestobuyequipment,training,andsustainment.Theprocessiscalled“pseudoFMS”becausethemoneyforpurchasingequipment,training,andsustainmentfortheANAandANPcomesfromU.S.andcoalitiondonations.ThisisnecessarybecauseAfghanistandoesnothaveagrossdomesticproductcapableofpurchasingtheequipmentrequiredtodefeataninsurgency.

Acquiringtheequipmentisthefirststepinaphasedprocesstogettherightequipmentintothehandsofthewarfightertoensuresuccessonthebattlefield.Thetimelinessofthisprocessrequiresthesecu-rityassistanceofficertomaintainvisibilityandbeconsciousofthequantityandtypeofequipmentheisorderingandwhenitissched-uledtoarriveintheater.

SAO–AisworkinglocallytoachieveastableAfghanistanthrougheconomicdevelopment.Intheend,SAO–A’sgoalistoprovidetherightequipmentandsupporttomeetoperationalrequirementswhileincontact.Todate,wehavedonethisprudently,usingourresourcesresponsiblytooutfitanarmyandpoliceforcetofightaninsurgency.

TrackingWedevelopedwhatwascommonlyreferredtoasa

commonoperationalpicture(COP),depictingquanti-tiesandauthorizationsforequipmentgroupedintotheshoot,move,andcommunicatecategories.EachpieceofequipmentwastrackedtoshowthequantityonorderthroughFMS,whatwasonhandinKabul,andwhatwasalreadyissuedtounits.ThereportsthatfedtheCOPincludedthenetassetvisibilityreport,theCorpsInventoryManagementSystemreport,ourownFMSprocurementrecords,andtheSecurityCoopera-tionInformationPortal.

InFMS,twoprimarymeansofshippingequipmentareavailable.Sensitiveitems(weapons,radios,andammunition)areflowndirectlytoKabulInternationalAirport.Rollingstockandallotherequipmentare

usuallyshippedbysurfacefromconsolidationpointsintheUnitedStates(primarilytheDefenseDistribu-tionCenteratNewCumberland,Pennsylvania)andonwardtotheportofKarachi,Pakistan.Amixof“jingle”trucksandotherconveyancesmakesforatreacherousjourneyforthelocally-hiredtruckdriv-erswhofaceinsurgentsand,inthewinter,anearlyimpassableone-laneroadnetworkintoKabul.

TransitionAsSAO–ApreparesitsAfghancolleaguestotakeon

alargerroleintheacquisitionprocess,itisimperativetoprovidethemwithsomecommonacquisitionandsupplymanagementpractices.AlthoughcertainaspectsoftheacquisitionprocessinAfghanistanareunique,manyofthepracticesaresimilartothoseusedbytheU.S.military.Inventorymanagement,prudentacquisi-tionpracticesgroundedinmeetingoperationalrequire-ments,andaccountabilityaresomeoftheconceptsbeingpassedtotheAfghansinthetransitionprocess.

Toencouragethetransition,SAO–AstooduptheOfficeofSecurityCooperationwithadvisersspecifi-callytaskedtoprovidetheAfghanswithtoolsneces-saryforasmoothtransition.AsSAO–Acontinuestoevolve,eventuallytheentirecoalitionforcewilldrawdownandtheonlymilitaryentitytoremainwillbeSAO–A,whichwillbecometheOfficeofSecurityCooperation-AfghanistanandwillworkoutoftheU.S.Embassy.Atthattime,theAfghansshouldbedirecting,executing,andtrackingtheirownequipmentprocurement,trainingcontracts,andsustainment.Forthattohappen,itiscriticalforthesecuritycooperationpersonneltoteach,mentor,andthenstandbackandlettheirAfghancolleaguestakeoveracquisition.ItisclearthattheAfghanswishtohavethisresponsibility.

AlthoughworkinginSAO–Awassomewhatremovedfromtheworldoflogisticsstatus,fueldeliv-eries,ammunitionsupplypoints,andmaintenancereports,manysimilaritiescouldbefoundbetweentheprocessesthatguidesecurityassistanceofficersandlogisticians.Amongthesesimilaritiesareunderstand-ingrequirementsandacquisitionandmaintainingvis-ibilityofinboundequipment.Overall,acquisitionandsecurityassistanceisthecornerstoneofdevelopingourpartnersintheGlobalWaronTerrorismtoprovidenotonlyforourownfuturesecuritybutalsofortheirsta-bility,security,andprosperity.

Major daniel M. Maloney was tHe director of tHe inteGration cell, security assistance office-afGHanistan, wHen He wrote tHis article. He Holds a bacHelor’s deGree froM tHe uniVersity of tHe state of new york, reGents colleGe, and a Master’s deGree in orGanization froM tHe uniVersity of pHoenix. He is a Graduate of tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course, tHe coMbined arMs and serVices staff scHool, and interMediate leVel education.

14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

AOAP supplies and equipment are loaded on an Air Force C−5 transport bound for Southwest Asia. The PMO ensures that the labs are stocked with laboratory supplies to maintain continu­ous operations.

AOAP diagnostics are performed by certified evaluators. The oil analysis labora­tories in Southwest Asia analyze more than 113,000 Army aviation and combat equipment fluid samples annually.

TakingOilAnalysistoSouthwestAsia

by jackie e. carney

Oil analysis can improve equipment performance and save funds. Mobile laboratories allow the Army to bring this valuable capability to the field.

inceOperationBrightStarinEgyptin1987,theArmyOilAnalysisProgram(AOAP)hasrespondedtowarfighters’needsbydeployingmobilelaboratories.AOAP’smobilelaboratoriesprovidecontinuousregionalsupportforalldeployedunitsandequipmentintac-ticalenvironments.

AssoonastheLogisticsSupportActivity’s(LOGSA’s)AOAPPro-gramManagementOffice(PMO)atRedstoneArsenal,Alabama,isnoti-fiedthatanewlaboratoryisneededtosupportacontingency,thestaffimmediatelygetstowork.Thelabsaredeployedonaveryshorttime-line,leavingnoroomformistakes.Themostrecentlabdeployment—thedeploymentofamobilecontain-erizedfacilitytoCampMarmalinnorthernAfghanistanlastsummer—providesagoodexampleofhowtheAOAPPMOrespondsquicklyandinnovativelytosupporttheArmy’sneedsinthefield.

S

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 15

WhatIsOilAnalysis?Oilanalysisisthesamplingandanalysisofoilfor

variouspropertiesandmaterialsthatindicatewearorcontaminationinanengine,transmission,orhydraulicsystem.Samplingandanalyzingonaregularbasisestablishesabaselineofnormalwearandcanindicatewhenabnormalwearorcontaminationoccurs.

TheAOAPwasestablishedandimplementedbytheDepartmentoftheArmytomonitorcomponentwearandtheconditionofoil.Adetailedanalysisofengine,transmission,andhydraulicoilsenablesthewarfightertoavoidpotentialproblemsthatmayresultinmajorrepairsandequipmentdowntime.Oilanaly-siscanreducethefrequencyofoilchangesandtheconsumptionofoil,producingcostsavingsfortacti-calunitsandpromotingconservationoflubricationproducts.

Performingoilanalysisbecomesevenmorecriti-calinthedesertenvironment,whereequipmentisexposedtomuchharsheroperatingconditionsandincreasedoperatingtempo.Theoilanalysis,whichisperformedbycertifiedevaluators,identifiesifthedrivesystemsarecontaminatedwithsandoranyotherelementsintheoilthatwillcauseexcessivewearontheirinternalparts.

LaboratoriesinSouthwestAsiaTheAOAPPMOsupportstheoperationof22oil

analysislaboratoriesaroundtheglobe.FiveoftheselabsarecurrentlyoperatinginSouthwestAsiasupport-ingOperationNewDawninIraqandOperationEndur-ingFreedom(OEF)inAfghanistan.TheselaboratoriesarelocatedatCampArifjan,Kuwait;Balad,Iraq;andBagram,Kandahar,andCampMarmal,Afghanistan.Onelab,operatingatTikrit,Iraq,wasdeactivatedon30October2010toalignwithArmydrawdownopera-tionsinIraq.

Duringtheearlyphaseofcur-rentSouthwestAsiaoperations,oilanalysissupportwasprovidedbytwomobilelaboratoriescon-figuredinsideM971semitrailervansdeployedtothetheater.Asoperationscontinued,thenumberoflaboratorieswasincreasedtofivefixedfacilitiesinadditiontotwomobileunits.Thelatestoftheselaboratories,atCampMar-mal,wasstoodupinAugust2010inresponseto“OEFPlus-upIII”requirements.

SupportingOilAnalysisOperationsTheoilanalysislaboratories

inSouthwestAsiaanalyzemorethan113,000Armyaviationand

combatequipmentfluidsamplesannually.EnsuringthatthelabsareoperatingatpeakefficiencyiscriticalandisthetoppriorityoftheAOAPPMO.TheSouth-westAsialaboratorysiteleadercollectsthereadinessstatusforeachlabandprovidesittotheAOAPPMOfieldoperationsstaffdaily.Majoremphasisisplacedonensuringthatthelabs’diagnosticequipmentiswellmaintainedandrepairedquicklyintheeventofamal-function.

ThePMOensuresthatthelabsareresourcedandstockedwithenoughlaboratorysuppliestomaintainoperations24hoursaday,7daysaweek.Eachana-lyticalinstrumentoperatinginthelaboratoryrequireschemicalsandconsumableitemstoruntherequiredtests.Thechallengeistoensurethecontinuousavail-abilityoftheseitems.

TheAOAPPMOhasanestablishedandefficientprocessforgettinglargequantitiesoflabsuppliesshippedout.Forexample,morethan2,500itemswereshippedfromRedstoneArsenalduringarecent60-dayperiod.Toaccomplishthis,thePMOreliedheavilyontheresponsivenessofRedstoneArsenal’ssupplyanddistributionandtransportationorganizationstoprocesstheAOAPshipments.

Workingwiththeseorganizations,thePMOwasthefirstatRedstonetoimplementradiofrequencyidentificationtagtechnologytotrackitsshipmentsofsuppliesandequipment.Themanagersandteammem-bersworkingintheseorganizationsunderstandtheimportanceofgettingAOAPshipmentsonthegroundinSouthwestAsiaasquicklyaspossibleandareverysupportiveoftheAOAPmission.

DeployingtheNewLaboratoryThedeploymentofthenewlabatCampMarmal

demonstratedonceagainthechallengesofdeployingamobilelaboratorytobringoilanalysistoatheaterand

The first two mobile laboratories in Southwest Asia were configured inside M971 semitrailer vans. In this photo, the first mobile lab rolls off an aircraft on its way to the theater.

16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

theAOAPPMO’ssuccessinmeetingthewarfighter’sneeds.

Theprocessbeganwhenthecommanderofthe4thCombatAviationBrigadeinnorthernAfghanistanprovidedadvancenoticeoftheneedforanewlabora-torytosupportaviationandgroundcombatequip-mentanalysisrequirementsfortheOEFPlus-UpIIIbuildup.ThetwoAOAPlabsthatwerealreadyoper-atinginAfghanistancouldnotmeetthisrequirementbecausethemountainousterrainmadeitdifficultforthebrigadetoreachthem.TheArmyMaterielCom-mandexecutionorderrequiredthenewlabtobeinplaceandfullyoperationalnolaterthan30August2010.

ThePMO’sfirststepwastodeterminethemostexpeditiousandefficientapproachtomeettherequire-ment.ThePMOworkedwiththeArmyAviationandMissileCommand,theNationalGuardBureautheateraviationmaintenanceprogram,theNavymobilefacil-ityprogrammanager,andthePrototypeIntegrationFacilityatRedstoneArsenaltoobtainandprepareamobilecontainerizedfacilityfordeployment.

Gettingavirtual“turnkey”laboratorytomeettheurgentlabrequirementwasaviablesolution.Mobilecontainerswerealreadyconfiguredtomeetelectri-calpowerandenvironmentalrequirementsandonlyneededtheinstallationofanalyticalequipmentandinformationtechnologyinterfacewiring.Oncethe

The new mobile facility was up and running at Camp Marmal on 30 August to support the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade. The PMO configured a mobile containerized facility for the lab.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 17

facilitiesweredeliveredon15July,allinternalmodi-ficationswerecompleted,diagnosticsequipmentwasinstalledandtested,operatingsupplieswereprocured,andthelabwaspackedupandmadereadyforairtransporttoSouthwestAsia.

Thelaboratorywaspickedupbyacommercialaircarrieron9AugustandarrivedatCampMarmalon15August.AnAOAPfieldingteamalsodeployedinconjunctionwiththelab’sshipment.Soldiersfromthe401stArmyFieldSupportBrigadeandthe4thCombatAviationBrigadeassistedthefieldingteaminstandingupthelabattheCampMarmalsite.Thenewlaboratorywasoperationalandanalyzingsam-pleson30August.Thiswasagreatteameffort,con-sideringthatthelaboratorywasprocured,retrofittedfortheAOAPmission,fullytested,shippedfromthecontinentalUnitedStates,andstoodupinAfghani-stantosuccessfullymeettheArmy’sexecutionorderfieldingdate.

Inadditiontomeetingthecommander’surgentneedforanewlaboratoryinAfghanistan,thePMOdiscov-eredanotherveryflexible,mobile,deployableoption

thatcanbeusedtosatisfyfutureoilanalysisoperation-alneeds.Today,thelabismeeting100percentofthe4thCombatAviationBrigadecommander’soilsam-plingrequirementsandprovidingbrigadepersonnelconfidenceintheirequipment’sabilitytosuccessfullyaccomplishassignedmissions.

“Ourteamisveryexperienced,”explainsJoeSan-chez,LOGSA’sAOAPprogrammanager.“However,italwaysrequiresanexceptionalamountofteamworkandaveryintenselevelofefforttoprepareanddeploythesemobilelabsaroundtheglobetosupportourmili-taryoperations.”Withninesuccessfulglobaldeploy-mentsofmobilelaboratoriesoverthepast23years,includingtheCampMarmaldeployment,theAOAPPMOhasestablishedasolidtrackrecordforsupport-ingwarfighters’needs.

jackie e. carney is an arMy oil analysis proGraM specialist at tHe aoap proGraM ManaGeMent office at tHe loGistics support actiVity at redstone arsenal, alabaMa.

Shown is the interior of the new AOAP mobile laboratory facility at Camp Marmal, which meets 100 percent of the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade’s oil sampling requirements.

18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Thedeathsofseveralservicemembersasaresultisunacceptable,consideringthesimplesafetyproceduresthatcouldpreventsuchtragedies.

AddressingthePowerSafetyProblemCPSerrorsledDavidAebischer,theCommunica-

tions-ElectronicsCommand-LifeCycleManagementCommand(CECOM–LCMC)trailbosswiththe101stAirborneDivision(AirAssault)atFortCampbell,Ken-tucky,tobelievethatmanyservicemembersdonotknowhowtoemplacepowergridsproperly.Properlyinstallingpowergridscouldsavelivesandpreventelectricalfires.

AebischerpresentedanideatoCECOMInformationTechnologyFieldServiceBranch(IT–FSB)chiefBryan

ulletsandbombsarenolongertheonlyrisktobeinginawarzone.SomethingassimpleastakingashowerorwashingavehiclecanclaimthelifeofsomeonedefendingourNation.Theserou-tineactivitiescanbecomelifethreateningtoSoldiersbecauseofoverloadedcircuits,inadequateextensioncords,andimproperlyemplacedbreakerlinesinthepowersystem.SeveralSoldiershavediedfromelectro-cutioncausedbytheseproblems

ManySoldiersbelievethatsinceoutletsarereadilyavailable,sufficientelectricityisavailable.However,astechnologycontinuestoadvance,thecentralpowersolution(CPS)ortacticalpowergridsthatsupplypowertothesetechnologieshaveremainedunchanged.

B

CentralPowerSolutionTrainingCourseby daniel r. GracHanin

Soldiers from the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), learn to parallel two AN/MJQ 41B–41 60­kilowatt “B” model generators.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 19

Ayertocreateapowertrainingcourseforaninfantrybrigadecom-batteam(IBCT)CPStacticalopera-tionscenter(TOC),whichwouldbetaughtbyCECOMIT–FSBpowerproductioninstructors.

CPSTrainingCECOMIT–FSBcreatedthe

2-weektrainingcoursetoteachSoldierstoinstalltheCPSproperly,basedonmanyyearsofexperiencewithpowergenerationequipmentinthefield.AebischerandAyertar-getedtheSoldierswithintheTOCfortrainingbecauseCPSinstalla-tiondoesnotfallunderanymilitaryoccupationalspecialty.

TheAmericanTradeSchool(ATS)fromSt.Louis,Missouri,hasbeencontractedtoprovidetraining

alongsidetheCECOMinstructorsduringthefirstweekofthecourse.ATSprovidesitsbestinstructorsforthistraining.AlloftheATSinstructorsareveteransandtrulyenjoytrainingtheSoldiers.

Thefirstweekconsistsofinstructionin—o Electricalsafety.o Basicelectricaltheory,consistingofunitsofmea-

surement,electricalsymbols,electricaltheory,Ohm’sLaw,electricalmath,AC(alternatingcurrent)andDC(directcurrent)circuits,single-phaseand3-phasepower,computingneutralcurrent,loadcalculation,andloadbalancing.

o NationalElectricalCodeintroduction.o Sizingconductors,ampacity,andvoltagedrop.

o Circuitbreakersandfuses,tools,andtestequip-ment(suchasmultimeter,ammeter,andgroundresistancetester).Inthesecondweekofthecourse,thestudents

receivemorehands-onexperiencewithpowerplantsandelectricaldistributionsystems.Theweekcovers—o Groundingandbondingmethods.o Preventivemaintenancechecksandservices.o Safety.o Parallelingprocedures.[Parallelinggeneratorscre-

atesabackuppowersupply.]o Troubleshooting.o Powerplantemplacement.o Powerdistributionilluminationsystemselectrical

emplacement.o Connectingthepowergrid.o Thedifferencesbetweengeneratormodels.

The1st,2d,3d,and4thBrigadeCombatTeamsofthe101stAirborneDivision(AirAssault)andthe101stBrigadeSupportBattalionhavereceivedtheIBCTCPSTOCpowertraining.ThistraininghasalsobeenprovidedtoseveralotherunitsduringtheirJointReadinessTrainingCenterrotationsatFortPolk,Loui-siana.Currently,CECOMIT–FSBisprovidingallofthetrainingduringaunit’sBattleCommandSystemofSystemsIntegrationTrainingEventI.

AnyunitcanrequestthistrainingthroughCECOMIT–FSBbycalling(931)216–9944or(270)798–9208(DSN635–9208)orbysendinganemailtobryan.ayer@us.army.mil.

daniel r. GracHanin is a MeMber of tHe coMMunications-electronics coMMand inforMation tecHnoloGy field serVice brancH power production teaM at fort caMpbell, kentucky.

Students use a trailer­mounted support system tent as a classroom during their CPS TOC training. They learn extensive electrical theories and safety before engaging in the hands­on portion of the training.

20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

n30March2010,theExecutiveAdvisoryCom-mitteefortheJointSupplyChainArchitecture (JSCA)approvedthecommencementofphaseIIIofJSCA,arevolutionaryprogramprovidingenterprise-widevaluetothewarfighter.TheExecutiveAdvisoryCommitteeischairedbythePrincipalDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforLogisticsandMate-rielReadiness(L&MR)andtheDirectorforLogistics,J−4,theJointStaff,andincludesrepresentativesoftheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD),theservices,thecombatantcommands(COCOMs),theDefenseagencies,andweaponsystemprogramexecutiveoffices.

ThecreationofJSCAresultedfromtherecogni-tionthattheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)needstoimprovesupplychaineffectivenessandefficiencieswithintheservices,COCOMs,andDefenseagencies.Seniorlogisticsleadersacrossthestakeholdercom-munityhaveidentifiedthreecommonissuesaffectingthesupplychain.First,theDODsupplychainisnotconfigured(andtheplayersinthesupplychainarenotaligned)toachieve“enterprisewide”optimiza-tionofthesupplychainprocess.Second,theDODsupplychainlackscommonperformancemetricsthatcandrivebettercoordinationandalignment.Third,increasedemphasisontheDODsupplychainandtheneedforeffectivenessandefficienciesmakethetimingofJSCA’simplementationofgreatimportance.

OrganizationandfundingboundariesarecurrentlyhamperingtheDODsupplychainprocess.JSCAoffersameanstoknockdownthestovepipesthatinterferewitheffectivenessandefficiency.Itattemptstoincreasevisibilityofitemsintransitandininventory.Inshort,JSCAisamethodologyforlogisticsthatprovidesDODwithanenterprise-wide,end-to-endperspectiveforopti-mizingsupplychainprocessestomaintainandimprovematerielreadinessatthebestvalue.JSCAhasgainedthesupportoftheArmy’sseniorlogisticsleaders.

OriginsofJSCAJSCAisanOSDandJ−4initiativethattracesitsori-

ginstoamajorinnovationincommercialindustry:the

SupplyChainOperationsReference(SCOR)Modelcre-atedbytheSupplyChainCouncil.TheSCORisapro-cessreferencemodelthatprovidesastructuredapproachtodocumentingsupplychainprocesses.Itsfunctionistoultimatelyidentifybestpracticesandapplyriskmanagementtologisticsprocedures.TheSupplyChainCouncil,formedin1996,continuestoupdateandrevisetheSCOR,nowinversion9.0,andprovidethewidestpossibledisseminationofthemodel.

InMay2003,DODpublishedarevisedregulation,DOD4140.1−R,DODSupplyChainMaterielMan-agementRegulation,togoverntheconductofjointlogisticsforthefuture.DODDirective4140.1,SupplyChainMaterielManagementPolicy,mandatedthattheregulationwouldbeusedtoestablishtheprocessesforalllogisticsactivityinDOD.ThedirectiveanditssupportingregulationreflectedthethinkingofseniorleadersthatDODlogisticsprocesseshadtoadapttochangesintheevolvingglobalenvironmentaswellastobudgetpriorities.

Performance(intermsofmaterielreadiness)andcostarethetworecurringthemesthroughoutDODsupplychainpublications.Theyaretheindicesbywhichsuccesswillbemeasuredinimplementingprocessesandimprovingsupplychainmaterielman-agementsystems.Thegoalistohavearesponsive,consistent,andreliablesupplychainthatprovidesthehighestlevelofmaterielreadinessatthebestvalue.

In2007,theJ−4andtheOSDL&MRinitiatedthedevelopmentofJSCAasasupplychainmanagementframework.Theyrecognizedthatmanybenefitscouldbeachievedbysuccessfullycoordinatingandmanag-ingsupplychainpracticesacrossthedepartment.

TheJSCAprojectwasbrokendownintothreephases.PhaseIwasthedevelopmentofthearchitec-tureitself,inparticularthesupplychainprocessesandmetrics,andthe“buy-in”ofthekeystakeholders.ThisphasebasicallybuiltJSCAbasedonaconsiderationofexistingprocessessincetheArmy,Navy,andAirForcehadalreadyimplementedsomeoftheexistinglogisticsandfinancialsystemsoutlinedintheSCORprocess.

JointSupplyChainArchitectureby Mary P. FletcHer

O

The Department of Defense has used the Supply Chain Operations Model to develop a method for coordinating and managing supply chain practices across the Department and the services.

Thisarticleexpressestheviewsoftheauthor,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 21

PhaseIIwastheproofofconcept,underwhichoneweaponsystemwasevaluatedusingJSCAprocessesandperformancemeasurestovalidatetheefficacyoftheJSCAmethodology.PhaseIIIistheinstitutionaliza-tionphase:Weaponsystemdiagnosticswillbecon-ductedtoidentifyopportunitiesandcoursesofactiontocapitalizeonopportunitiesidentifiedinphaseII,alongwithnewlyacquiredopportunities.TheoutcomeofthisphasewilldeterminethefutureofJSCAacrossDOD.

TheSixKeyTenetsfortheDODSupplyChainTheJSCAprocessisguidedbysixmajortenets:

o InstitutionalizetheSCORModelthroughoutDODbymeansofJSCA.

o Establishoutcome-based,end-to-endperformancemeasures.

o ApproachdecisionsinawaythatoptimizesthetotalDODbudgetwhileimprovingreadiness.

o Donotoptimizethefunctionaloutputsofthesupplychainattheexpenseoftotalsystemeffectiveness.

o Createagovernanceprocessthatcanmeettheneedtofacilitate,align,andcoordinatethejoint,end-to-endsupplychain.

o Designpolicytoestablishaccountability,respon-sibility,consistency,andappropriateresourcestoensurebetterdecisionmakingfortheend-to-endsupplychain.

JSCAProcessesJSCAprovidesDODwithaprocessbywhichto

modelandadoptasnormalpracticetheperformanceelementsofthesupplychain.UsingtheSCORModel,JSCAisbrokendownintofivelevel1processes:plan,source,maintainandrepair,deliver,andreturn.Eachlevel1processhasassociatedprocesselementsthatfurtherdescribethesupplychaininastructuredman-ner.

Plan. Fiveprocesselementsconstitutetheplanpro-cessofJSCA:forecastingsupplyanddemand,identi-fyingrepairandmaintenancerequirements,planningretrogradeandredeploymentrequirements,definingsupplychainresourcesandoutputs,andplanningforinventory,warehousing,distribution,anddeployment.

Source. Thesourceprocessisbrokendownintofourprocesselements:identificationofsourcesofsup-ply,negotiationandselectionofsuppliers,receiptandverificationofmaterielandservices,andreleaseofpaymentformaterielandservices.

Maintain and repair. Thisprocessisdefinedas“theprocessofmaintainingassetsandeffectingcom-ponentrepairsattheintermediateanddepotlevelsofthesupplychain.[It]includestheutilizationandmanagementofcontractedrepairservices.”Thepro-cessisdividedintofiveprocesselements:finaliza-tionofengineering,developmentoftherepairandmaintenanceschedule,issueofmateriel,performance

ofrepairactivity,andreleaseofrepairedmaterieltoauserortoastockinglocation.

Deliver. Thedeliverprocessisconsideredthrough-outDODtobepartofthesourceprocessformaterieldeliveryfromprivatevendorsforstockageinstoragedepotstobedistributedlatertoDODcustomers.How-ever,therequisitionandorderentryprocessinitiatestheissueanddeliveryprocessforthesupplychain.

Return. Inthisprocess,thecustomerusestheplannedpolicies,businessrules,andinspectionofproductoperatingconditionsascriteriaforidentifyingandconfirmingthatmaterielisexcesstorequirementsordefectiveatspecificlocations.Italsoistheprocessofidentifyingtheappropriatesourcecontactforareturnauthorization.

JSCAMetricsMetricsformeasuringperformanceintherespec-

tiveprocessesandprocesselementsareessentialtotheJSCAprocess.JSCAstartedwiththethreecategori-calimperativesfortheDefenseLogisticsEnterprise:reliability,speed,andefficiency.Supportingmetricswereoutlinedforeachofthesethreetop-levelmetrics.Thesegroupsofmetricsevolvedintoametrics“hier-archy”thatencompassesrelevantmetricsinacompre-hensivemanner.Thepurposeofthismetricshierarchyistomeasureprocessoutcomesandenablebenchmark-ingwithinDODandbetweenDODandcommercialindustry.Cross-cuttingmetricswerealsoidentifiedtoclarifythemeasurementsofperformance.

Thetopthreeend-to-endmetricsarereliability,alsocalledperfectorderfulfillment(POF);speed,orcustomerwaittime(CWT);andefficiency,whichisequatedwithtotalsupplychainmanagementcosts(TSCMC).Allthreemetricsmustbeconsideredinbal-ancewhenleadersevaluatesupplychainperformance.Theyaredesigned,ultimately,toachievematerielreadinessatthebestvalue.

TheefforttodevelopandvalidatethemetricswasspearheadedbytheJSCAteam,ledbytheOSDL&MRandtheJ−4,andincludedrepresentativesfromeachservice’smaterielcommandandsubject-matterexpertsfromacademiaandprivateindustry.

Reliability (POF). Anorderisconsidered“per-fect”ifitisdeliveredintimetomeetthe“customercommitdate,”inthefullquantity,inthecorrectcon-dition,andwiththecorrectdocumentation.POFhasseverallevel2andlevel3metrics:ordersaredeliv-eredinfull,includingitemandquantityaccuracy;deliveryperformancemeetsthecustomercommitdate;documentationisaccurate;anddelivereditemsareinperfectcondition.POFdetermineshowreli-ablyacustomer’sorderisfilled.InSCORterms,itisa“customer-facing”metric.Itprovidesinsightintowhetherornotthesupplychaincanfulfillcustomerneedsconsistently.

22 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Speed (CWT). TheJSCAteamselectedCWTastheprimarymetrictomeasuretheDODsupplychain’sspeedinfulfillingorders.CWTmeasuresthesupplychain’sabilitytoquicklyrespondtocustomerdemand.CWTstartswhenacustomerplacesarequisitionandendswhenthecustomer’srequisitionisclosed.Thisattributeofresponsivenessisalso“customer-facing”inSCORmethodology.

CWTdetermineshowquicklytheendcustomerisserved.AnalysisofCWTisbrokenintosubsegmentsthatenableidentificationofproblemareas.UsingCWTenablesDODtobenchmark(compareitsperfor-mance)againstindustry.

Efficiency (TSCMC). TheJSCAteamselectedTSCMCastheprimaryefficiencymetric.Bystructuringthesupportingmetricstoalignwiththeprocesses,DODwillbeabletobenchmarkbothTSCMCandthesupport-ingmetricswithcommercialresults,whenapplicable.TSCMCincludestotalacquisitioncost,totaldeliverycost,totalmaintenancecost,andtotalreturncost.Thesecostsincludebothpersonnelcostsineachfunctionandmaterielcostsineachmetric.TSCMCenablesprogrammanagersandotherdecisionmakerstounderstandtheextenttowhichadjustmentstothesupplychainaffectcosts.UnlikePOFandCWT,thisattributeisconsideredtobe“internal-facing”inSCORmethodology.

Cross­cutting metrics. Toaccompanythethreeproposedtop-levelperformancemetrics,theJSCAteamidentifiedfivecross-cuttingmetrics:fillrate,percentageofretailordersfilledlocally,percentageofwholesaleordersfilledlocally,forecastaccuracy,andinventorydaysofsupply.Thecross-cuttingmetricsareinterconnectedandworkacrossthereliability,speed,andefficiencymetricstohelpidentifytherootcausesofDODsupplychainproblems.

JSCAProofofConceptTheprocesses,processelements,andmetrics

constitutetheframeworkforJSCA.DuringphaseI,theteamsuccessfullyvalidatedJSCAasavaluablemethodologyformakingsupplychaindecisionswithaholisticviewofsupplychainoperations.TheEACsupportedtheresultsofphaseIandgavethego-aheadforphaseII,theJSCAproofofconcept.

TheobjectiveofphaseIIwastoapplyJSCAweap-onsystemdiagnosticstoacross-serviceweaponsys-temtoseewhateconomiesandefficienciescouldbegained.ThesepotentialimprovementswereidentifiedasoperationalopportunitiesforJSCA.

TheH−60helicopterwaschosenfortheproofofconceptbecauseitisamatureandcomplexweaponsystemthatisusedacrosstheservices.ThehypothesisoftheprojectisthatJSCAprovidesDODwithanenterprise-wide,end-to-endperspectiveforoptimiz-ingDODsupplychainprocessesthatmaintainandimprovereadinessatthebestvalue.

Inadditiontobeingajointsystem,multiplevari-antsoftheH−60havealonghistoryofbeingusedforsustainmentoverseveralyears.Asaweaponsystemwithprovensuccessinthesupplychain,theH−60waswellsuitedtoevaluatetheend-to-endDODsupplychainfortheArmyandtheNavyandthedeliverpro-cessfortheAirForceH−60programs.

TheArmywaschosenastheleadagencybecauseithastheoverwhelmingmajorityoftheH−60fleet.TheNavyhasemployedaperformance-basedlogistics(PBL)strategyforitssustainmentsupport,sophaseIIhadalimitedimpactontheNavybecauseofthedura-tionandstructureofthecontract.

ThephaseIIprocesswasdividedintotwosegments.ThefirstwastheArmydetailedassessment,consist-ingofstakeholderinterviews,datacollection,processmappings,andinventoryofrelevantpolicies.Thesec-ond,knownastheopportunityanalysis,wastheidenti-ficationofmajoropportunitiesbasedonevaluationofJSCAmetrics.TheplanwastolookattheArmyfirstandthenatthecombinedservices.

RecommendationsforImprovementsTheopportunityanalysisledtheJSCAteamtomake

severalrecommendationsforoperationalimprovements.Thefirstistoimprovedifferentiationthroughoutthesup-plychain.InitialdatacollectionshowedJSCA’spotentialforidentifyingcertainsecondaryitemsas“NMCS[notmissioncapablesupply]driver”items.[Theseareitemsinshortsupplythatstopmaintenanceworkandthuspreventsystemsfromperformingassignedmissions.]TheoverallobjectiveistoreduceCWTfortheseNMCSdrivers.

ThesecondoperationalrecommendationofJSCAphaseIIistoimprovetheclassIX(repairparts)national-echelondemandplanningforecast.Thiswillresultinamoreefficientdistributionofinventoryandwillimprovematerielavailability.Aspartofthiseffort,theArmyMaterielSystemsAnalysisAgencyisstudy-ingcommercialdemand-forecastingmodelsforpoten-tialadaptationbyDODcomponents.

Athirdrecommendation,relatedtothesecond,istoimprovecollaborativedemandplanning.TheArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)isactivelyengagedwiththeDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA)inimplementingthisopportunity.Thefocusisonimprovingtheaccura-cyofdepotpartssupportforecastsexchangedthroughnewenterpriseresourceplanningsystemsdeployedwithineachcomponent.

Thefourthandfifthrecommendationsaretobal-ancerepaircapacitywiththerestofthesupplychainandtodevelopajointapproachtothecommercialindustrialbase.TheArmyContractingCommandandtheAMCG−3reviewedpastprocurementandrepairprogramsandidentifiedcommercialvendorsforpoten-tialfuturestrategic-sourcingallianceswiththeArmy.ThisprocessisbeingexpandedtoincludeAirForce

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 23

andNavyH−60spendingdata.ProcessesdevelopedforthesetworecommendationsarebeingcoordinatedwithDLA,whichhascentralizedclassIXprocurementresponsibilityforallDODcomponents.

Thelastoperationalrecommendationistoactivelymanagethereturnprocess.TheArmyhasmadeadedicatedefforttoreducetheturnaroundtimeforunserviceableretrogradeitemsfromtheatertoconti-nentalUnitedStatesrepairdepots.TheArmyLogisticsSupportActivityhasbeenessentialindevelopingandtrackingenhancedmanagementmetricsforthiseffort.

OnechallengefacedduringphaseIIwasthequal-ityandconsistencyofthedataobtained.PhaseIIIrequiredonesetofauthoritativedata.

ThemajoroutputofphaseIIwastodemonstratethatJSCAdatacollectionandevaluationisanapproachthatcanberepeatedforotherDODweaponsystems.

ThefindingsontheH−60helicopterhighlightedtheusefulnessandstrongpotentialbenefitsoftheJSCAmethodologytoDOD.HavingimplementedJSCAonabroadscalewiththefirstweaponsystem,itwasdecidedthatitwouldbebeneficialtogoaheadwiththethirdphaseoftheproject.

JSCAInstitutionalizationPhaseIII—theinstitutionalizationphase—ofJSCA

isnowwellunderway.Threemultiserviceweaponsys-temswerechosenforthephaseIIIproject:theclose-inweaponsystem(CIWS),theC−130aircraft,andtheHellfiremissilelauncher.Duringthisphase,DODexpectstofindcontinuedopportunitiesforimprovingthesupplychainandachievinggreatervalueinthesustainmentprocess.

ThreemajoroutcomeswereexpectedduringthefirstyearoftheinstitutionalizationofJSCA—o Createafoundationbydefiningend-to-endperfor-

mancemeasures,developingbenchmarkingmeth-odologyandtools,identifyingauthoritativedatasources,andconstructingabenchmarkingdatabase.

o EstablishacollaborativeprocessfortheH−60sup-plychainandoptimizeH−60networkinventorylevels.

o IdentifyopportunitiesandrecommendchangestoimprovesupplychainperformanceandreadinessfortheHellfirelauncher,CIWS,andC−130.DuringphaseIII,theperformancemetricsthatwill

beusedtomeasure,benchmark,andanalyzetheend-to-endDODsupplychainwereupdated,refined,andvalidated.Theobjectivesofthevalidationwereto—o Selecttheappropriatemeasuresforthenear-and

mid-termimplementationofJSCA.o Define,withagreatdealofspecificity,howthe

measureswillbecalculated.o Identifytheauthoritativedatasourceandspecific

dataelementsneededfromeachorganizationtocal-culatetheperformancemeasures.

Thefinalactionsofthisvalidationworkstreamincludefinalizingmetricsanddefinitions,socializingwithExecutiveAdvisoryCommitteemembers,andpreparingmetricsforincorporationintotheBench-markingGuide.

BenchmarkingBenchmarkingsupplychainperformanceisakey

functioninphaseIIIandacriticalstepincontinuous-lydrivingimprovementstoDOD’sjointsupplychain.

Benchmarkingistheprocessofcollectingspecificsupplychainperformancedataandusingthemtocomparetheperformanceofasupplychainagainstrelativelysimilarandbest-in-classsupplychains.Togainanunderstandingofwherethesupplychainisachievingexcellentresultsandwhereimprovementopportunitiesexist,performancedatawillbecollect-edbasedonthesupplychain’sspeed,reliability,andefficiency. Datavalidationiskeytotheeffort.

StandardperformancemetricswerecarefullyselectedduringphaseIIItoenablecomparisonsamongDOD’sweaponsystems.Performanceisbenchmarkedqualitatively,quantitativelybyper-formancemetrics,andbycomplexity.Thisthree-prongedbenchmarkingapproachenablesthecollectionandanalysisofperformanceinformationatthebusinesslevel,detailedlevel,andoperationslevel.(Theoperationslevelanalysiswillassessfac-torssuchasdistribution,transportation,andmanage-mentprocesses.)Thisbenchmarkingapproachassistsinsettinggoalsandtargetsaswellasdevelopinga“scorecard.”

TheJSCAmetricsunderwentapilottestduringtheweaponsystemdiagnosticphaseofphaseIII.ThemeasureswererefinedfromApriltoAugust2010,recommendationsforend-to-endDODsupplychainmeasureswereprovidedduringJunetoSeptember,andinstitutionalizationoftheperformancemeasuresisoccurringfromSeptember2010untilatimetobedetermined.

ThePerformanceMeasurementFramework(PMF)Planconsistedofthreesteps.Firstwasthedatacollectionprocess,duringwhichabenchmark-ingquestionnairewasalsocirculated.Secondwastheanalysisprocess,duringwhichdatawerenormal-izedandcomparedwiththesamplepopulation.Thirdwastherefinementprocess,inwhichtheJSCAteamidentifiedlessonslearnedandthePMFwasrevisedaccordingly.

Ultimately,DODwillbebenchmarkingagainstcivilianindustry.Thiswillalsorequireidentificationofspecifictargetsforspecificitemsandprocesses.Doestheperformanceofagivenitemneedtobe“adequate,”inthetop10percent,or“bestinclass?”D-cellbatteries,forexample,mayhavedifferenttar-getsthanhelicopterrotorblades.

24 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Someofthecurrentlimitingfactorsareimperfectbenchmarkingwithcommercialentitiesandlackofauthoritativedatasources.Inthecross-servicerealm,managementprocessesdifferacrosstheservices(forexample,PBLversusnon-PBL),andmetricsanddataavailabilityalsodiffer.OneofthepurposesofphaseIIIistoremovetheselimitingfactors.

JointApproachfortheIndustrialBaseAnotherprojectthatemergedfromphaseIIand

isbeingimplementedduringphaseIIIisthe“JointApproachfortheIndustrialBase.”ThisinnovationhaspowerfulimplicationsformaterielreadinessandcostsavingsinDODcontracting.Thekeyelementforsuccessiscollaborationamongtheservices,defenseagencies,andothersupplychaincompo-nents,includingtheSupplyChainExecutiveSteeringCommittee.Activitiesunderwayincludeanagree-mentbetweenDLAandtheArmytocollaborateontheworkstreamanddefinetheoutcomesofthiseffort.Onefocusofthiseffortwillbedemandplan-ningaccuracy.

JointSourcingWorkinggroupTheJointSourcingWorkingGroupwillcollabo-

ratetoimproveweaponsystemreadinessthroughinformationsharing,planning,andgovernanceonend-to-endlife-cyclesustainmentactivities.Thusfar,thegroup’smemberorganizationsincludetheDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforSupplyChainIntegration(SCI);theJ−4;theDLAJ−3/4;MarineCorpsHeadquartersInstallationsandLogis-ticsDepartment;theArmyContractingCommand;AMC’sAviationandMissileCommandandCorpusChristiArmyDepot;theArmyG−4;andDefenseLogisticsAgencyAviation.

TheJSCAWorkingGroupisthesupportingandimplementingorganization.ItiscochairedbytheSCIandtheJ−4,anditsmembersaretheservices,com-batantcommands,defenseagencies,OSD,andsys-temsprogrammanagementoffices,aswellasotherfunctionalanddomainexperts.

ItisimportanttonotethestakeholderbodiesconsultedontheJSCAefforts:theSupplyChainExecutiveSteeringCommittee,theProductSup-portExecutiveCommittee,theDistributionProcessOwnerGovernance,andthelogisticscomponentorganizationsoftheH−60,C−130,Hellfirelauncher,andCIWS.

JSCAadaptsacommerciallydevelopedandacceptedoperationsreferencemodelforoperationalusewithinDOD.Althoughsomesignificantpolicyandstatutorychallengescurrentlyexistinoperatingasingle,jointsupplychainacrossDOD,JSCAhelpsleadersandpractitionerstobetterdefinethe“trade

space”whenevaluatingthecostsandbenefitsofpro-cessorconfigurationchanges.

PhaseIofJSCAsawthecreationofJSCAandtheprocessmodel.Italsoaccomplishedsocializa-tionandbuy-inacrossDOD.PhaseIIvalidatedthebenefitsofJSCAandanunderstandingofsomeofitslimitations.Itresultedindevelopmentofanapproachthatcanberepeatedforweaponsystemdiagnostics.Finally,itprovidedasummaryofrecommendationsandend-to-endsupply-chaintenets.

TheweaponsystemdiagnosticphaseofphaseIIIwillfurtherdemonstratethevalueoftheJSCAmethodologyandinstitutionalizeprocessesaswellassocializeandvalidateprimary,supporting,andcross-cuttingmetrics.Thegoalistodevelopalong-termstrategyforcreatinggovernanceofthesystem.

TheJSCAteamprovedtheutilityofJSCAbyusingittoidentifyareasofinefficiencyandopportu-nitiestocreateaneffectivesupplychain(efficiency,speed,andsupplychainreliability).Whileadditionalworkneedstobedonetoprescribespecificsolu-tionsfortheidentifiedissues,JSCAhasprovenusefulinidentifyingandprioritizingopportunitiesforimprovement.IncreasedemphasisontheDODsupplychainandtheservices’needforefficienciesandeffectivenessmakethetimingofJSCAgreatlyimportant.Finally,JSCAisdirectedtowardchangingthemindsetofDODlogisticians.

AproposedendstatefortheDODsupplychainisanestimateddeliverydatetothecustomerwithin24hoursofrequestanddeliveryofissueprioritygroup(IPG)1requisitionsanywhereintheworldin5dayswith95-percentreliability,IPG2requisitionsany-whereintheworldin15dayswith95-percentreli-ability,andIPG3requisitionsanywhereintheworldin30dayswith95-percentreliability.JSCAcanhelpmakethisareality.

Thesupportoftheservices,combatantcom-mands,anddefenseagenciesareneededtomaketheJSCAmethodologyarealityforDOD.Theresultsofimprovedmaterielreadinessatgreatervalueareanimperativeeffortinthefast-moving,rapidlychangingglobalenvironment.Bestpracticesaretheaim.Weowenothinglesstotheforce.

Mary p. fletcHer is an arMy senior fellow assiGned to tHe j−4, tHe joint staff. a 20-year Veteran of tHe air defense artillery brancH, sHe Has a bacHelor’s deGree froM tHe united states Military acadeMy and a j.d. deGree and an M.a. deGree in national security studies froM GeorGetown uniVersity.

tHe autHor would like to tHank joHn lafalce for contribut-inG to tHis article.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 25

embersofthe841stTransportationBattalionand276thTransportationDetachment(Auto-matedCargoDocumentation)loadedandtaggedthelargestsingleshipmentoftheGlobalWaronTer-rorismandtheIraqWarinlateApril2010.EquipmentconvergedonAPMTerminalsVirginiainPortsmouth,Virginia,byroadandrailtoprepareforitstransfertotheMiddleEast.Themassiveshipment,totaling1,191piecesofequipment,consistedofcontainerizedcargoandroll-ingstockofthe2dand3dBrigadeCombatTeams,101stAirborneDivision(AirAssault).

The276thTransportationDetachment(AutomatedCargoDocumentation),11thTransportationBattalion,locatedatJointExpeditionaryBaseLittleCreek-FortStory,Virginia,tracksanddocumentscargoandprovidesterminalservicesinfixed-portorlogisticsover-the-shoreoperations.

TheMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCommand(SDDC)calledonthedetachmentbecauseofitsabilitytodeployrapidlyanditsself-sustainingperson-nelandequipmentcomposition.SDDCalsocalledonthe841stTransportationBattalion,amovementcontrolbat-talionfromCharleston,SouthCarolina,thatisdesignedtosynchronizesurfacecargomovementsandprovidetrafficmanagementandsingleportmanagementfortheDepartmentofDefense(DOD).The276thand841sthaveworkedtogetheronvariousmissionsontheeasternsea-board,includingmovementsoutofPhiladelphia,Pennsyl-vania;PortsmouthandNorfolk,Virginia;andCharleston.

The597thTransportationGroupatFortEustis,Vir-ginia,coordinatedtheoperation,whichinvolved“stuff-ing”40-footshippingcontainerswithsmallerquadrupleandtriplecontainersandplacingintrusion-detectionradiofrequencyidentification(RFID)tagsoneach40-footcontainerforshipment.

SettingUpShopSoldiersofthe276thTransportationDetachmentand

841stTransportationBattalionenteredAPMTerminalsVirginiaearlyonthemorningof26AprilandmadetheirwaytothereceivingpointoftheArmyshipment.Soldiersbegantosetuptheirequipmentandpreptheirrostersandtechnicalequipmentwhiletheywaitedforthearrivalofthefirstpiece.

The276thmadeitsdeployableoperationscenter(DPOC)thecentralofficeandinformationcenterfortheoperation.KeypersonnelandtechnicalequipmentfilledtheDPOCandprovidedunityofcommandandacentrallocationforinformationgatheringandrecording.For15daysstraight,equipmentpouredintotheterminalandthe841stand276thworkedtogethertoorganize,track,stuff,andtagtheequipmentforonwardmovement.

The841stand276thuseWorldwidePortSystem(WPS)andin-transitvisibility(ITV)technologytotrackanddocu-mentequipment.WPSallowsoceanterminalstoaccountforandtrackthemovementofcargothroughaportanddocumentcargowithmanifests,transportationcontrolandmovementdocuments,andcustomspapers.WPSprovidesregionalcommanderswiththeinformationneededtoman-agethemovementofoceancargo.

ITVtechnologyisanetworkofservers,RFIDinterroga-tors,andRFIDtags.TheITVnetworkdevelopedforDODistheworld’slargestRFIDsystem.Thesystemisdesignedtoincreaseproductivity,reducecycletimes,decreasewarf-ighterwaittimes,andincreasesupplyconfidencewhilemeetingcommanders’needsfortotalassetvisibility.

TrackingtheShipmentDuringthisoperation,eachpieceofequipmentand

containerhaditsownuniqueRFIDtag.TheSAVISensorTagST–675providesnotonlyITVofcontainerlocationsbutalsothetimes,details,andlocationsofwhencontain-ersarecompromisedduringshipment.Acompromiseisanything,includingunauthorizedcontaineropeningsandcuts,holes,orpunctures,thatcandisruptthecon-tainer’sintegrity.Eachtagisequippedwithtemperature,humidity,shock,intrusion,andlightsensors.Thetaghasac-shapedclampthatallowstheelectroniccomponentsandsensorstobehousedinsideoftheshippingcontainerwhileonlythesmallantennacasingisexposedtotheele-ments.Thisdesignreduceswearanddamagetothetag.

The40-footcontainershadtheirownuniqueRFIDdesignations,too,withthesametypeoftagprovidinganadditionaltierofvisibility.Ifanytamperingortheftoccurredduringtransit,theSDDCaswellascommand-erswouldknowwhichequipmentwasaffectedbecauseeachsmallercontainertagcorrespondedwiththetagforitsparent40-footcontainer.

Whenfullydocumentedandreadyforloadout,theshipmentconsistedof639quadrupleandtriplecontainersloadedinto40-footcontainers,464piecesofrollingstock,andeighty-eight20-footmilitary-owneddemountablecon-tainers.Attheconclusionoftheoperation,allcargowastagged,stuffed,accountedfor,andmanifestedformovementoverseastoOperationIraqiFreedom.

captain kyle p. Mcnealy is tHe coMMander of tHe 276tH trans-portation detacHMent (autoMated carGo docuMentation), 11tH transportation battalion, at joint expeditionary base little creek-fort story, VirGinia. He is a siGnal officer and Holds a b.s. deGree in electrical enGineerinG froM tHe united states Military acadeMy. He is a Graduate of tHe siGnal basic officer leader course, tHe basic airborne course, and tHe air assault course.

PackingtheLargestShipmentoftheIraqWarby caPtain kyle P. Mcnealy

M

26 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

n2009and2010,theJointMultinationalReadinessCenter(JMRC)atHohenfels,Germany,builtafacilitywheredeployingunitscangainhands-onexperiencewithtacticalrecoveryoperations.Atthisfacility,unitsrevisitthefundamentalsofrecoverywithheavyemphasisonprecombatchecksandinspections.Soldiersreceivehands-ontrainingwithdamagedvehi-clesandconductrecoveryinasimulatedtacticalenvi-ronment.ThecombatrecoverytrainingsitedevelopedbytheAdlerobserver-controllertrainer(O/C–T)teamreflectstheJMRCcommitmenttoprovidedeployingunitswithasuperiortrainingexperience.

Recoveryoperationscanplayasignificantroleinunitoperationsand,insomecases,involvebrigade-levelattentionwhentheyrequirefires,air,andbat-tlespacecoordination.Therecoverytrainingprogrambeganinrecognitionofthisandinresponsetotheneedforrecoverycrewstogainvaluablehands-onexperi-enceinarealisticenvironment.

Therecoveryfacilitytrainingphilosophyfocusesonempoweringjuniorleaderstomakecriticaldecisionsonthegroundinresponsetovarioustrainingscenarios.Thisgivesunitsthecompetenceandconfidencetoper-formthesetasksunderfirewhiledeployed.Plannerscangainvaluableexperienceinmissionplanningforeventsoutsideoftherecoveryarenaandcreatemodelstovalidatethemilitarydecisionmakingprocess.

Trainingeventsemploytheresourcescommonlyassociatedwithacombattrainingcenter:realisticandrelevantscenarios,battlefieldeffects,demandingsce-narios,highstandardsforsuccess,andtheassistanceofdedicatedO/C–Tcadre.Thisarticleexplorestheapplicationofthesefeaturesastheyapplytopreparingrecoveryteamsandunitsfordeployment.

VehicleRecoveryModelsTheJMRCmodelfortrainingrecognizestwobasic

modelsforvehiclerecovery:towandplatform.Towrecoveryinvolvesanymethodofmovingavehicleinwhichatleastoneaxleassemblyisstillincontactwiththegroundandcapableofsupportingthevehicle’sweight.Thismayincludeflattowingifenoughofthevehicle’sdrivetrainremainsintact.

Whenacrewonlypullsthevehicle,suchasduringhastyrecoveriesfromengagementareas,itiscatego-rizedastowrecoveryforthepurposeofthisdiscussion.

ThiscouldincludealargevehiclesuchasanM984heavyexpanded-mobilitytacticaltruckwreckerdrag-gingadamagedM1151high-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicle(HMMWV),evenifbothaxlesaremissing.Insuchcases,vehicletowingonlyremovesthepersonnelandequipmentfromdanger,andplatformrecoverymustbeperformedimmediatelyafterward.

Althoughtowrecoveriesmaybedeliberateorhasty,allplatformrecoveryoperationsareconsidereddelib-erateactionsrequiringcoordinationandplanning.Coordinationandplanningmaytakeplacebeforethemission.Forexample,aunitcouldincludeaspartofitsequipmentapalletizedloadsystemorloadhandlingsystemplatformandrecoveryvehiclecapableofsup-portingtherecoveryofanup-armoredHMMWV.

TheAdlerO/C–Tteamemploysseveralmethodsandphasedtrainingforunitstobecomeproficientinvehiclerecovery.Thephasesincludecomprehensionofrecoverymethodsandequipmentfamiliarization,hands-onrecoverycompetence,andexecutionofacompleterecoverymission.

LeaderDevelopmentTrainingUnitsusuallybegintrainingrecoveryoperations

withinthefirstcoupleofdaysofarrivingatJMRC.Thetrainingbeginswithaleaderdevelopmentphasefocusedondoctrineanddevelopingsubject-matterexpertswithintheunit.AdlermaintenanceO/C–Tsevaluateleaders’comprehensionofrecoverymethodsandtheirunderstandingofdoctrinebyreviewingunitstandingoperatingprocedures(SOPs)andobservingSoldiertraining.Thismethodstressestheimportanceofdevelopingconfidenceandcompetencewithintheunitthroughfoundationbuildingandtaskrepetition.

Theunit’sSOPmustaddressdoctrineandassignedtasksforallpersonnelinvolvedwithrecoveryoperations,toincludemedicalprovidersandsecuritypersonnel.Thedocumentexistsasatemplateforleaderstoplanandexecuterecoverytasksrangingfromsimple,hastyopera-tionstocomplex,deliberateoperationswhileincontactwithenemyforces.Unitleadersresponsiblefortrain-ingthestandardsintheSOPmustdisplayproficiencythroughdiscussionanddemonstrationwiththeO/C–Ts.

Thisphaseoftrainingisgroundedintheprinciplethatunitleadersaretheonesbestqualifiedtotraintheirunitsandsupportdoctrineandregulations,which

I

VehicleRecoveryTrainingatJMRCby Major derek W. HoFFMan

The Joint Multinational Readiness Center has established a program to teach unit personnel to conduct recovery operations in a combat environment.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 27

identifythecommanderofaunitastheprimarytrain-er.Throughoutthisphase,tacticalaspectsofrecovery,suchasprecombatchecksandinspections,rehearsals,andtacticalmovementskills,aredemonstratedbyunitleaders.UnitleadersalsotrainSoldiersonthebasiccomponentsoforganicrecoveryequipment,includingapplication,maintenance,andsafety.

Thebenefitsofinitiatingtrainingusingthismodelaremultifold.Leadersintheunitgainconfidenceandlearnfrommistakesinalow-threatenvironment.Soldiersgainknowledgeandappreciationforstandards.LearningfromtheirsupervisorsbuildsSoldiers’trustandconfidence.Occurringearlyinthetrainingcycle,thismodelservesasanenablerforunitstoidentifytactics,techniques,andproceduresanddevelopthemfurtherduringtherotation.TheO/C–TteamclearlyestablishesitselfasthesupporterofArmydoctrineandasourceofinformationforunits.Monitoringunitleadersthroughdirectobservation,safetyverification,andmentorshipreinforcesthisrelationship.

Unitsalsopracticefundamentalskillsearlyintherotationandbuildhabitsthatwillservethemwellthroughoutdeployment.Thisisextremelyimportantinthecurrentenvironmentofrapidturnoverandinexperi-encefoundatjuniorlevels.Oncetheunitdemonstratesathoroughunderstandingoftheprocess,itmovestomorechallengingtraininginafieldenvironment.

Hands-OnTrainingInthemaneuvertrainingarea,recoverycrewsgain

exposuretoandproficiencywithindividualandcrew

skills.Thetrainingaidesusedincludewheeledcargotrucks,“replicate”vehicles,andbattle-losscombatvehicles.Thefirsthands-onphaseoftrainingallowsunitstopracticethestepsnecessarytoexecutesafe,deliberaterecoveryoperationsinanontacticalenviron-ment.Theintentofthisphaseistoprovideunitswiththetrainingaidesandterrainneededtosuccessfullyassessandperformrecoveryoperations.

Theterrainpresentsmultiplechallenges,includingoffsetrecoveries,amirepit,andhigh-angle(upto45degrees),long,unevendraglanes.Inthisenvironment,recoveryteamscanpracticeuntiltheyreachproficiency.Theabilitytotrainonthesesimpletaskscanresultinunitsreducingrecoverytimesonactualsituationaltrain-ingexercise(STX)lanesby75percentor1½hours.

JMRCalsousesreplicatevehiclesfabricatedbyalocalvendorfromhigh-graderolledsteelforrecoverytraining.Becauseeventhemostdurablevehicleswilldegradeafterrepeatedexposuretorollinganddrop-ping,thereplicatevehiclesweredesignedtoproviderealisticframesforrecoveryteamstopracticeinextremeconditions.

ThecurrentfleetofreplicatevehiclesatJMRCincludesamine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehicleandanM1126Strykerinfantrycarriervehicle.Botharebuilttogeneralsizeandweightrequirements,withtowpointsfoundwheretheywouldbeonactualvehicles.Theyareconstructedwithweldedinteriorbulkheadstowithstandrepeatedabuse.Thesmoothexteriorconstructionensuresthatrecoverycrewssolve

Soldiers prepare to tow a disabled vehicle during recovery training at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany. (Photo by SPC Ricky Lowes, VIPERS Visual Information Personnel Team, JMRC)

28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

eachproblemusingdoctrinalmethodsandestablishedtowpoints.

JMRCprovidesunitswiththeopportunitytoworkonbattle-damagedequipmentprocuredfromtheatersofoperation.Thisprocurementwasfacilitatedwiththeassistanceofprojectmanagersandtheatertransporta-tionagencies.ThecurrentinventoryincludesMRAPvariantsandaStrykerinfantrycarrier.Thevehiclesarenotasdurableasthereplicatesystems,buttheyproviderecoverycrewswiththeopportunitytoworkaroundauthenticsystemsandevaluatecompromisedvehiclesforimprovisedrecoverymethods.

Afulldayofnoncommissioned-officer-ledtrainingatthesiteusuallyprovidesunitswithenoughtimetoensurethatcrewsreachthenecessarylevelofprofi-ciencytomoveontothenextphaseoftraining.

RecoveryMissionPhasethreeofthetrainingistheSTX,whichpro-

videsunitswiththeopportunitytoexecuterecoveryoperationsasatacticalmission.Thisphaseincorpo-ratesbattlefieldeffectsthatincludeindirectfire,small-armsharassinganddirectfire,andgroundthreats.Mountedanddismountedroleplayersprovidetheunitswiththeopportunitytoexerciseescalationofforceandrulesofengagementprocedures.

Theunitresponsetothesescenariosdrivesreciprocalactionthatmayleadtoanescalationorde-escalationoftheevent.Whenengagedbyanidentifiedenemythreat,unitsmayalsoemployairsupportandindirectfiresup-porttocounterenemyactivity.Theeffectsofbothofthesearereproducedwithsimulatedindirectfireandliveaviationassets,includingmedicalevacuationassets.Trainedandcertifiedcombatlifesaversarealsogiventheopportunitytopracticetheirskillswhentreatingcasual-ties.However,toachievesuccessinthisphase,unitsmustgivecarefulconsiderationtotheplanningprocesslongbeforeexecutingthemission.

Informationconcerningtheoperationalenvironmentisprovidedthroughtwomethods.First,unitsreceivearelief-in-placein-brieffromtheJMRCcadre.Thisinitialbriefing,givenaspartofthereception,staging,onwardmovement,andintegrationprocess,providesunitswithgeneralbackgroundinformationontheenemysituation,adjacentandsupportingunits,andotheroperationaldata.

SubsequentcomplementaryinformationisfedthroughaseriesoffragmentaryordersgivenduringtheSTX.Eachfragmentaryorderdirectsunitstoperformspecificmovementoperationswith“bepreparedto”missionsthatincluderecoveryoperations.Atthistime,unitsatthebattalionlevelimplementthemilitarydeci-sionmakingprocessandorders-generatingprocesseswhilecompany-levelunitsbeginthetroopleadingproceduresprocess.Bothordersgenerationandtroopleadingproceduresmusttakeintoaccountfactorsandvariablesthataffectthemission.

Manyrecoveryoperationsconsiderationsaresimilartothoseforstandardmovementmissions.Recoveryoperationsplannersshouldconsider—o Situationalinformationconcerningtheterrain,with

imageryandenemysituationaltemplatesandoverlays.o Missionrequirementsthatidentifytherecoverytype.o Executioninformationfortheliaisonofficerto

coordinateaviationsupport.o Passageoflines,adjacentunitcoordination,actionson

theobjective,andspecialequipmentconsiderations.o Timelineinformationthatconcernsbattlespace

ownersbutpromptstheunittomakeconsiderationsalongthe“¹/³to²/³”ruleandschedulerehearsals.

o Additionalsupportassetsthatmayincludeheavy-liftassetsorsecurityelements.

o Informationmostoftenforgottenbutveryimportant,includingfrequencycutsheetsforbattlespaceown-ers,aviationunits,higherheadquarters,andmissioncommanders;reportingrequirements;andcommand-er’scriticalinformationrequirements.

Throughouttheoperation,staffandmis-sionelementsoftheunit

JMRC observer­controller train­ers instruct units on how to conduct a high­angle rollover recovery. (Photo by SPC Ricky Lowes, VIPERS Visual Informa-tion Personnel Team, JMRC)

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 29

mustenforcestrictreportingproceduresinordertomain-tainsituationalawarenessforthecommanderandensurethatallpossiblebattle-fieldenablersareusedformissionsuccess.

Asunitscompletetheplanningcycle,O/C–Tscloselymonitorthematalllevels.Aunit’sabilitytomanagetimeandresourcesinordertoexecuterecoverymissionsiscriticaltoitssuccesswhendeployed.Carefulconsiderationofsyn-chronizingexpectationsandclearlydefiningrolesandresponsibilitiesbecomesessential.Commanderscannotoveremphasizeorenforcetoostringentlytheneedforprecombatchecksandinspectionsatalllevelsandatcriticaltimesoftheoperation.Unitsthatmasterthesefoundation-buildingtaskswillmostlikelysucceedandexcelinrecoverytasks.

FutureDeploymentsFuturegrowthoftheJMRCvehiclerecoverypro-

gramincludesconstructingreplicatesofotherstandardwheeled-vehicleplatforms(suchastheup-armoredHMMWV,civilianline-haultractor,andmobiletacti-calvehicle)andarmoredvehicles(suchastheMRAPallterrainvehicle).Reasonablefabricationcostsmaketheseacquisitionsfeasibleforsupportingunithomestationtrainingaswell.

Theuseofreplicateequipmentalsorepresentsanenvironmentallyresponsibleapproachthatkeepshaz-ardousmaterialsoutoftrainingareas.Evencleanedandpurgedvehiclescandamagetheenvironmentintrainingareas.Repeatedrecoveryoperationsresultinbrokenpartsandlitterthatarenotalwaysrecovered.Overtime,thiscanleadtounsightlyareasandcostlyremediation.Fabricatedreplicatesprovideaclean,durable,affordable,andresponsiveoption.

Asadedicatedtrainingfacilitywithafull-timecadreofmaintenanceexperts,therecoveryfacilityalsopro-videsalocationforunitsthroughoutU.S.ArmyEurope(USAREUR)topracticerecoveryoperationsoutsideoftheirnormaltrainingcycles.Unitspreparingfordeploy-mentorsimplydesiringtoimprovetheirskillscanusethefacilitybetweenmajortrainingevents.Partner-shipagreementsbetweenJMRCandsustainmentunitsthroughoutUSAREURarealreadybeingestablishedtomaximizethistrainingopportunity.

TheideaofprovidingrecoverytrainingatJMRCbeganafewyearsagoinresponsetobattlefieldreali-ties,buttherecoverytrainingprogramwentthroughaperiodofrapidgrowthandconceptualdevelopmentin2010.Itnowrepresentsafocusedtrainingmodelgroundedinsystemdevelopmentforallparticipantsinrecoveryoperationsuptothebrigadelevel.

TheAdlerteamcontinuestodeveloptherecoveryoperationstrainingfacilityasthepremiertrainingfacilityinUSAREURandasaconceptforotherloca-tionstoemployandreapbenefitsfrom.Thefacilityrepresentsaflexiblemodelofresourcerequirementsandintensityforunitsto“traintowin.”

Major derek w. HoffMan is a support operations obserVer-controller trainer at tHe joint Multinational readiness center at HoHenfels, GerMany.

Soldiers use a “replicate” vehi­

cle to practice securing chains for recovering a vehicle. (Photo

by SPC Ricky Lowes, VIPERS Visual Informa-

tion Personnel Team, JMRC)

30 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

romJunetoDecember2008,IledaFrenchlogisticsoperationalmentorandliaisonteam(OMLT)inadvisingthe5thKandak,theAfghanlogisticsbat-talionservingthe1stBrigade,201stArmyCorps,AfghanNationalArmy(ANA).TheFrenchOMLTreplacedaU.S.embeddedtrainingteamatthebeginningof2008andretainedthefocusoftheU.S.unit’smission.TheOMLT’smissionwastoperform,sometimessimultane-ously,threefunctions:teach,advise,andtrain.

Inthisduty,theFrenchlogisticianmustbecomeamentor.ThekeytoanOMLT’ssuccessliesinchoosingmenwithadequatementalstrengthtostandalongsideAfghansoldiers—notonlyintrainingbutalsoincom-bat.Eveniffightingisnottheaimofthemission,itisaveryprobableconsequenceofthemissionofmentor-ing.Actually,inAfghanistan,Frenchlogisticianshavebeenservingas“fightinglogisticians”since2008.WithintheOMLT,everymemberoftheFrenchTrans-portationCorps,fromprivatetocolonel,iscommittedasafightinglogistician.

TheFrenchArmydeployeditsfirstOMLT(aninfantryone)in2007,andalogisticsOMLTwasdeployedthefollowingyear.Thislogisticsteamof30men(mostlynoncommissionedofficersandofficers)doesnotsupportotherOMLTsbutadvisesthe5thKandakeverydayandforeachoperation.

TheFrenchTransportationCorpshasexperienceinestablishinglogisticsbattalionsbybuildingmission-tailoredunitsoutofvariousspecialties,buttheOMLTconceptisnew.Theconceptisbasedonmilitaryassis-tancemissionsthatwerecarriedoutinAfrica,andtodaytheOMLTisthekeyelementingraduallybring-ingtheANAtoindependenceinsecuritytasks.

TheChoiceofMen:TheFirstCriterionofSuccessThechoiceofmenisincrediblyimportanttothe

missionbecausethemembersoftheteamwillspend1yeartogether(trainingforthemissionfor6monthsandcarryingitoutforanother6months).TheOMLT’scohesionisbuiltduringtheoperationaltraining,whichitselfmustbeconsideredasthefirstmission.

Duringthesemonthsoftrain-ing,whicharecrucialformis-sionsuccess,theteambuildsupitsmoralstrength.Thequalificationsrequestedfromeachindividualarenumer-ous,andtheirpsychologicalbalanceisfun-damental.Infact,theidealFrenchOMLTlogisticianmustdemonstratehardiness,afullspectrumoftechnicalcompetencies,emotionalsta-bilitywhilefacingstressfulcombatsituations,anopenmind(sinceAfghancultureiscomplex),andtheabil-itytospeakEnglishsinceanAfghantranslatorspeaksDariorPashtoandEnglishbutnoFrenchatall.Thesequalitiesmaynotexistinonesingleman.

However,inAfghanistan,thequalityoftrainingwasevidentinthecorrectnessoftheadvicegivendailytotheAfghansoldiersandespeciallyinthesuccessoftheoperationalmissions.Lessonslearnedrevealedthataperson’spsychologicalbalanceisthemostimportantqualityforacommitmentinthecontextoftheOMLT,butitisalsothemostdifficultonetojudge.

Mentoring:ANewFormofMilitaryAssistanceIncivilianlife,mentoringisanactivitycalled

coaching(eveninFrench),meaning“revitalizingan

F

AFrenchLogisticsOMLTinAfghanistan

by lieutenant colonel cHristoPHe barbe, FrencH arMy

French operational mentor and liaison teams advise and train Afghan National Army units and help them become more capable of independently securing their nation.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 31

ailingfirm.”AspartoftheOMLT,thementoringmis-sionisinnovativeandisbasedonthreetasks:o AdviseANAunitsineverydaylife,teaching,and

training.o AdviseAfghancommandersinplanningandusing

landorairsupportfromcoalitionforces.o Providethenecessarymeanstousecommandand

controlassetstoallowauthoritytobeimplementedandoperationstobecontrolled.Thedailytasksarecomplicatedbythefactthatthey

areintendedforamixofex-mujahidin,formerofficerstrainedbytheSovietsinthe1980s,andyoungpeopleinvolvedinaregulararmywhohavegoodoperationalabilitiesdespitelackingbasictechnologyskills.

AsateamleaderofthelogisticsOMLT,IdirectlyadvisedthecommandingofficeroftheAfghanlogistics

battalionandcooperatedwithhimintraininghisunitandpreparinglogisticsoperationstosupporthisinfantrybrigadeof3,000men.Eachofthe15FrenchmentorshadanAfghancounterpartineachlogisticsspecialtyofthe5thKandak,whichisessentialtoresupplyingthebrigade.ThebrigadesecuresHighway1,whichstretch-esover100kilometersoutofKabulandistheonlylogisticssupplylinelinkingthecapitaltoKandahar.

Mentoringisaboutadvising,showinganopenmind,proposing,suggesting,guiding,andlettingtheAfghanofficermakethefinaldecision.TrustbetweentheFrenchofficerandhisAfghancounterpartisfunda-mental.Thistakestimetoachieve,butthisrelationshipistheonlywaytosuccess.

TheFrenchofficermustnotbeasubstituteforAfghanauthority,orelsethemissionwillfail.Thementorisan

The 5th Kandak assembles before a major operation with its mentors in Wardak Province.

32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

adviseroratrainerbutnotasurrogate.Thefirstmonthofthemissionwasanobservationroundthatdeterminedtheresultofthemissionanditssuccess.Confidencewasgainedontheground,particularlyafter2weeksinAfghanistanwhenthefirstambushoccurredandourcapabilitiesweresuccessfullytested.

Convoys:TheFrenchTransportationCorpsatWarTheconflictinAfghanistanisawarwithoutaname

orfrontline,andlogisticianstravelacrossmanyuncon-trolledareas.TheANAisatwar,butthecoalitionforces,whichofficiallyarepresentonlyforassistance,

arenot.Theenemieshavenofrontlineandattackthelogisticsconvoysthroughoutthewholeareaofoperations.Thenotionsoffrontandreardonotexist.Itisamodernconflictinwhichlogisticianssupportthefarthestforwardoperationalbasesandensureresupplymissionsareeverywhere.

ThecurrentmissionsoftheFrenchOMLTsincludeaccompanyingthe5thKandakwhenresupplyingtheANAinfan-trybattalionsthatsecureHighway1.TheOMLTsandthe5thKandakdeliverfuel,engineeringequipment,andfoodandevacu-atethevehiclesdamagedincombat.

In6months,theOMLTsconductedabout100missionsthroughouttheprov-incesofLogar,Wardak,andBamyan.Theytraveledover100,000milesonthetrailsofAfghanistan.Themissionwasdifficult,andeachsoldierfeltthepressureofeachconvoy,whichturnedouttobecombined,andsometimesjoint,militaryoperations.Thedurationofsuchmissionsvariedfrom1dayto1week,buttheenemythreatandtheimprovisedexplosivedeviceambusheswereconstant.Thefirstenemythathadtobefoughtwastheroutine.Everyonehadtoremaincarefulfromthefirstdayofthemis-siontothelastoneandmasterthetactics,techniques,andprocedures.

WeshowedourAfghancounterpartsthateachFrenchlogisticianisafighterandthusearnedtheirtrust.Thepartnershiphasbeen

goingonfor2yearsnow.Thisexcitingmissionisagreatadventureforasoldier.Itputseveryone,whetherspecial-istorleader,privateorcolonel,intheroleofasoldierandafightinglogistician.ButthismissionisdangerousbecauseitmeansthattheFrenchsoldiersharesthedailymissionoftheAfghansoldier,whoisatwar.

lieutenant colonel cHristopHe barbe is tHe cHief of tHe frencH arMy loGistics adVanced course in bourGes, france, and a forMer loGistics operational Mentor and liaison teaM leader in afGHanistan. He Has a Master’s deGree in tHe History of international relations froM tHe uniVersity of la sorbonne in paris.

Above, a soldier in a French armored personnel carrier at the entrance to the Saalar Combat Outpost secures an area near Highway 1 during a refueling mission.

Below, a French light armored personnel carrier and two Afghan fuel tankers proceed in a convoy in the Bamiyan Mountains.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 33

perationalmentorandliaisonteams(OMLTs)are20-to25-SoldierteamscreatedunderanagreementamongNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)countriestomentorandcoachtheAfghanNationalArmy(ANA)inusingcoalition-providedbattlefieldenablers.TheJointMultinationalReadinessCenter(JMRC)atHohenfels,Germany,offersOMLTsfromallparticipatingnationstheoppor-tunitytopracticementoringandcoachingtechniqueswithANAstaffandcompanyrepresentatives.ThisarticledescribesthebasicstructureofOMLTtrainingatJMRCandsomeofthechallengesfacedduringtheOMLTtraining.

OMLTOrganizationOMLTsarriveatJMRCasacollectionofsenioroffi-

cersandnoncommissionedofficersstructuredtoplanandexecuteANAadvisorydutiesandtoassisttheANA

OperationalMentorandLiaisonTeamsasaForceMultiplier

by Major joHn F. jacques

O staffandcombatunitsinestablishingpeaceandmain-tainingstabilityintheirassignedareasofoperation.

OMLTsaretask-organizedintocompanymentorsandbattalionmentors.OMLTmentorscentertheireffortsonninemission-essentialtasksthatarepairedwithasetoftrainingobjectivesthatareassessedandevaluatedduringthetrainingexercise.AsadviserstoAfghansustainmentunits,OMLTsplayacriticalroleintrainingandadvisingunitsonhowtoprovideestimatesandcoordinateresourceswhileexecutingstafffunctions.OMLTsalsoserveastroopmentorstoensurethattheeffectiveexecutionofsecuritymeasuresenablestheemploymentoflogisticsassets.

StaffExercisesStaffexercisesfocusonbuildingacoordinatedteamto

synchronizetheresourcesneededtomeetmissionrequire-mentsthatsupportInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce

The Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany provides training for operational mentor and liaison teams from NATO countries working with the Afghan National Army.

A Slovenian operational mentor and liaison team provides security for a medical evacuation site during a situational training exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany.

34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

(ISAF)objectives.Eachstaffelementisresponsibleforcollectingdata,analyzingrequirements,andaligningresourcesinordertomeetmissionobjectives.OMLTstaffsmentortheirANAcounterpartstouseavailableassets,coordinatewithhigherlevelcommandandadjacentunits,fillvoidsinsustainmentrequirements,andsynchronizesustainmentmissions.

Troop-AdviserTrainingTroop-advisertrainingfocusesonensuringthatdistri-

butionofsustainmentrequirementscanbeaccomplishedeffectively.OMLTadvisersinthisrolewilladviseandmentortheirAfghancounterpartsontheuseofsustain-mentplatforms,effectivesecuritymeasurestotakeduringdistributionmissions,andbattlefieldenablerstoenhancesecurity.TheymentorANAsoldiersonperform-ingmedicalandcasualtyevacuationandcommunicatingtoensuresynchronizationofunitactivitieswithinagivenareaofoperations.Theaterguidanceandcurrenttactics,techniques,andprocedures(TTP)employedbyISAFarealsodiscussedandpracticedduringthistraining.

Classroom-BasedInstructionOMLTtrainingatJMRCisbasedona5-dayperiod

ofinstructionthatsolidifiesthedoctrinallybasedapproachtomissionexecutionandalignsoperationalprocedureswithNATOstandardsandrequirements.ClassesincludetheHMMWV[high-mobilitymulti-purposewheeledvehicle]EgressAssistanceTrainer (HEAT),theEngagementSkillsTrainer2000(EST2000), theCallforFireTrainer,andtheVirtualBattleSpaceSimulator(VBS2)simuator.

HEAT.HEATisofferedasa2-hourblockofinstructionandpracticalexercise.OMLTSoldiersarebriefedbyasubject-matterexpertandthenpermit-tedtomountthesimulatedHMMWVchassisasacrew—driver,truckcommander,andtwodismounts.(Nogunnerpositionisonthetrainer.)Thisorientationemphasizesevacuatingavehiclethathasrolledover.

EST 2000.EST2000isprogrammedfora4-hourblockoforientationandfollow-onexercise.OMLTmembersarebriefedonhowtousethetrainerandtheobjectivesofemployingaccurate,coordinatedsmall-armsfireduringasimulatedsquadexercise.OMLTmembersrotatethrougheachpositiononthefiringline,includingthesquadleader’sposition.Teammem-

bersaretaskedduringtheexercisewithdirectingratesoffire,employingsectorsoffire,andmanagingsus-tainedfirefrommountedanddismountedpositions.

Call for Fire Trainer.TheCallforFireTrainerisusedfor2-hourblockstotrainandreinforcetheinte-grationandtacticalemploymentofavarietyofindirectfireweapons.OMLTmemberstraininanimmersiveenvironmentasforwardobserversandareplacedina360-degreesimulatedbattlespacewithavarietyofsce-nariosthatenablethemtoidentifyandreacttosimu-latedthreatsusingtheskillsetsthatmustbehonedtoafineedge.

VBS2.VBS2isnormallyintegratedintoasitu-ationaltrainingexercise(STX)asacommunicationsandmountedland-navigationreinforcementtool.WhenOMLTsarenotengagedinSTXtraining,OMLTper-sonneloperatetheVBS2astheywouldtheirassignedcombatplatformsandcommunicationsequipment,fur-therreinforcingindividualrolesandcommunicationsresponsibilities.TerraincanbeprogrammedintothesimulatortoreplicatetheenvironmentthatOMLTscanexpecttoencountereitherinthetrainingareaorwhiledeployed.

Duringsimulationexercises,additionalstressorscanbeaddedtoscenariosthatgobeyondwhatcanbeintroducedinthephysicaltrainingenvironment.Opposingforces,aviationassets,indirectfire,andcomplexobstaclesareemployedbytheteamofVBS2technicalcoordinators,andscenariosarecarefullycraftedtosupportspecifictrainingobjectives.

TacticalTrainingTacticaltrainingconsistsofa7-daycourseofevalu-

ationbasedoncurrentNATOdoctrineandTTPfromthetheaterandtheplannedareaofoperations.Thefirst2daysoftrainingaredoneinareplicatedtrainingenvi-ronmentasatacticalexercisewithouttroops,with1dayofconductingtroop-leadingproceduresandprecombatchecksandinspections.Thisexerciseisfollowedbyascaled-downversionoftheSTXtrainingthatwillbe

A Greek adviser mentors an Afghan National Army role player in inte­

grating organic security with Afghan National Security Forces during a

situational training exercise.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 35

conductedoverthe5daysfollowingobserver-controllerandtrainerevaluationofeachOMLTteam.

ThisfirstlookateachOMLTbyitsassignedobserver-controllerandtrainerteamenablesanassess-mentoftheOMLT’sTTPandsubsequentinputtotheSTXplannerforthepaceanddifficultyoftrainingthateachOMLTwillfaceduringSTXtraining.

OMLTsarefirstbriefedonthetrainingobjec-tivesfortheparticularengagement,focusingonfourareasofconcern:counter-improvisedexplosivedevice(IED)operations,medicalrulesofengagement(whichincludemedicalevacuationprocedures),reactiontosustainedenemycontact,andsetupandoperationofeffectivetraffic-andentry-controlpoints.

Engagementsarethenresettoenableexecutionatcombatspeed.Basedonthedegreeofproficiencyexhibited,engagementscanberesettoenablefurtheremphasisonthebasicstoreachtrainingobjectivesortheintensityoftheengagementcanbeelevatedincre-mentallythroughtheuseofenablerstobuildonskillsthathavebeenmastered.

Counter­IED operations. OMLTsaregivenamapindicatingenemyactivitythroughouttheirplannedroutes.Theyconductenemyactivityandterrainanaly-siswhileenroutetotheirdestination.Whentravers-inganIED“hotspot,”OMLTsmusttakeappropriateprecautionsandlocatewell-hiddenIEDs.WhentheyfindanIEDemplacement,OMLTsmustestablishproperstandoffdistance,setupsitesecurity,andsub-mitaproperlydetailedrequestforexplosiveordnancedetachmentpersonnel.Theymustalsoalertthebat-tlespaceowneroftheobstacleanditslocation.

Medical rules of engagement.Trainingmedi-calrulesofengagementinvolvesamultifacetedapproachtointeractingwithreplicatedciviliancasual-ties.OMLTsarechallengedwithanengagementthatdemandsestablishingsitesecurity,usinganinterpreter,assessingwoundsandtriage,andcoordinatingwithbattlespaceownerstocontactadditionalANAperson-neltosupplementsitesecurityandprovidecasualtyevacuation.

React to contact.OMLTsarechallengedwithamultilayered,sustainedattackfromopposingforcesconsistingofmultipleelements.InitiatedbydisablinganOMLTvehiclethatrequiresahastyrecovery,thisengagementtrainsmanywarriortasksanddrills,includingshoot,move,communicate,survive,adapt,andassociatedbattledrills.Thisscenariofinisheswithrequirementstoestablishlandingzonesandprepareandexecutemedicalevacuation.

InthepracticalapplicationofthesetrainingandskillsetsattheSTX,OMLTsprovetobeacapableforcemultiplier.WhenanOMLT’sperformanceiscomparedside-by-sidetoatypicalU.S.Armyrotation-alunit,threedistinctdifferencescometolight:o Useofinterpreters.

o Mountednavigationskills.o Employmentoftroop-leadingprocedures.

Somedifferencescanbeattributedtothesenior-ityofOMLTpersonnel,theirskills,andtheirabilitytoquicklyanalyzesituationsandintegrateavailableassets.Generallyspeaking,unitscomingfromNATOcountriesoperateundersimilardoctrinalguidanceandOMLTadvisershavetakenthetimetoresearchISAFandothertheater-relatedguidance.

WhenOMLTsareoperatingoptimally,timeisspentprovidingadditionaltraininganddisseminatinginfor-mationtotheirANAcounterparts,enablinggreatersit-uationalawarenessandintegrationofideasandtacticsbetweenunits.TheseniorityofOMLTpersonneltendstoeliminatereluctancetoemploytheassignedOMLTinterpreterandANAroleplayers.OMLTsalsospendmoretimeandenergyduringtroop-leadingproceduresthanmostU.S.units,particularlyduringorderspro-ductionandbattle-drillrehearsals.

CulminationExerciseAttheconclusionofeachOMLTrotation,aninte-

gratedculminationexercisetakesplacethatrequiresOMLTsfromeachrepresentedbranch(maneuver,fires,andeffects;operationssupport;andforcesus-tainment)toperformintegratedstaffplanninginordertoreachcommonmissionobjectives.EachOMLTisresponsibleforplanningandemployingaschemeofmaneuver,intelligencepreparationofthebattlefield,internalsecurity,exploitationofcollectedintelligence,andsustainmentoperations.

SustainmentOMLTstaffsaretaskedwithidentify-inglogisticsrequirements,performinglogisticsesti-matestomeetforcerequirements,andaligningthoserequirementsagainstavailableassets(withtheimpliedtaskofrequestingfurthersupportifassetsonhanddonotmeetmissionrequirements).OMLTtroopadvis-ersmentorandassistingeneratingandexecutinganeffectivesecurityplanduringsustainmentoperations,rangingfromestablishingrefuelon-the-movesitesandmedicalandcasualtyevacuationtoconvoysecurityoftheirdistributionmissions.

ThetrainingandemploymentofeachadditionalOMLTmeansfurthersuccessforforward-deployedforcesassecurityandsupportrequirementsforOpera-tionEnduringFreedomcontinueinthefuture.OMLTswillcontinuetodotheirpartinensuringamorereadyandcapableANAastheyworktotraintheANAintheartofsustainablelogisticsoperations.

Major joHn f. jacques is tHe senior obserVer-controller for tHe distribution coMpany at tHe joint Multinational readiness center at HoHenfels, GerMany. He is a Graduate of tHe transpor-tation officer basic course and tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course.

36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heArmy’sweb-basedpropertyaccountabilityandtrackingsystem,PropertyBookUnitSupplyEnhanced(PBUSE),hasaugmenteditsassetvis-ibilityprocessbyincorporatinganautomatedtoolthatcantracktheuniqueitemidentifierofequipmentissuedtoSoldiers.Thisnewtraceabilitymeasureiscalleditemuniqueidentification(IUID)technology.

WhatIsItemUniqueIdentification?ThesimplestwaytounderstandIUIDistothinkofit

asagloballyuniqueserialnumber.Sometimes,onewillhearreferencetouniqueitemidentifier(UII).Techni-cally,IUIDisthesystemorprocessbywhichitemsaremarkedandregistered,whileUIIisthedatacontainedinthemarking.However,itiscommontohearIUIDusedtorefertoboththeIUIDprocessandtheUIIdataset.Unlikeserialnumbersthatmaybethesameforidenti-calitemsmanufacturedbydifferentcompanies,notwomilitaryitemswillcontainthesameUII.

WhyUseIUIDinPBUSE?UsingPBUSEtocaptureUIIdatafornewequipment

providestheArmyoveralltransparencyofthatequipment,frominitialfundingtofinalequipmentdelivery.Thisisacapabilitythatcurrentlyisbeingmanagedusingextensivespreadsheets.

Essentially,IUIDprovidesthecapabilitiestotrackcrit-icalassetsfromcradletogravebasedonthetypeofitemoritsvalue.IUIDisaccomplishedbymarkingeachquali-fyingitemwithapermanenttwo-dimensionaldatamatrixbarcodelabel.Thesepermanentmarkingswillbeusedforlogisticsandfinancialtrackingpurposes.ThedatamatrixisencodedwiththedataelementsneededtoconstructtheUII,whichisgloballyuniqueandunambiguous.

ThedataelementsrequiredtoformaUIIincludetheformatidentifier,themanufacturer’sidentification(CAGEcode),andtheitem’sserialnumber.Ifthemanu-facturerserializes[usesserialnumbers]withinapartnumber,thatdataelementwillalsobeencoded.[Acom-mercialandGovernmententity(CAGE)codeisafive-positioncodethatidentifiescompaniesthatconduct,orwanttoconduct,businesswiththeU.S.Government.]

WhatIsthePolicy?DepartmentofDefense(DOD)Directive8320.03,

UniqueIdentification(UID)StandardsforaNet-CentricDepartmentofDefense,dated23March2007,directs

ItemUniqueIdentificationTechnologyImprovingAssetManagement

by Pablo a. broWn and joHn e. laudan

T thatIUID“beusedtoenhancethecapabilitytogather,organize,andassessinformationonorganizations,mate-rielassets,people,andplacestoenabletheDoDCom-ponentstoperformtheirfunctions.”

AllArmyActivitiesMessage340/2009,ItemUniqueIdentification(IUID)CapabilitiesinProperty,dated14December2009,statesthe“UIIwillbeusedasthecommondatakeytosupportfinancial,acquisi-tion,supply,maintenance,andpropertyaccountabilitymanagementwithinourcurrentandfuturelogisticsautomatedinformationsystems(AIS).”

HowIstheUIIEnteredIntoPBUSE?ThenewfunctionalitytocaptureIUIDdoesnot

changeanyexistingPBUSEprocesses.TheUIIsup-plementsiteminformationalreadyresidentinPBUSE(suchaslineitemnumber,nationalstocknumber[NSN],andserialnumber)anddoesnotreplaceanyPBUSEdatafields.

UIIdatacancurrentlybeenteredintoPBUSEusingthreemethods.Thesethreemethodsdonotrequireuserinputotherthanscanningthebarcodelabel:o PBUSEAutomaticTransactionProcessInterface

(ATPI).o LogisticsSupportActivity(LOGSA).o PBUSEhand-heldterminal(HHT).

TheATPIprocessallowsfordataentryusinganextensiblemarkuplanguage(XML)document.ThisprocessprovidesthecapabilitytocapturemultipleUIIsonthesametransaction.TheUIIiswrittenintotheXMLdocumentatthesamelevelasserialnum-bers.Thisprocessiscommonlyusedbytheproductmanagerfornewacquisitionswhenissuingequipmenttoaunit.ATPIinstructionsandXMLexamplescanbefoundathttps://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/20987941.

LOGSAextractstheUII,NSN,andserialnumberforanassetfromvarioussources,includingtheDODIUIDregistry,andthenstoresthisinformationinitsdatabase.AnewPBUSEfunctionprovidesthecapabil-itytopullthisUIIinformationfromtheLOGSAIUIDCrossReferenceFile.

TheassetNSNandserialnumberstoredinPBUSEmustmatchexactlytotheassetrecordintheLOGSAdatabase.Whenamatchismade,PBUSEisthenabletoassociatetheUIItotheasset.Ifnomatchismade,therecordisskipped.Everynight,PBUSEwillattempttomatchexistingequipmentrecordswith

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 37

theLOGSAdatabase.ThePBUSEserialnumberrecordisnotupdatedifamatchtoanNSNandserialnumberisnotfoundorifthereisanyproblemwiththeUII.

TheHHTisacommercialoff-the-shelfscannerwithspecificPBUSEautomaticidentificationtechnology(AIT)softwareinstalled.TheHHTinter-actswiththePBUSEenter-priseserverthroughtheuseofadock-ingstationandtheAITclientonthelaptop.ThisAITfunctionpermitsuserstoperformautomatedinven-toriesandtoreceiveandscanbarcodesonincomingequipment.

PBUSEDocumentProcessingPBUSE’sdocumentprocessingfunctionenables

theusertoprocessreceipttransactions,initiatelateraltransfers(bothgainingandlosingunits),andinitiateassetadjustmentsbyusingtheHHTtoscananitem’sIUIDmarking.

SupplysergeantscannowusetheHHTtoscanUIIitems,toviewtheprimaryhandreceipt,andtoinitiatetheprocessfordocumenting—o MilitaryStandardRequisitioningandIssueProcedures

(MILSTRIP)receipts.o Lateraltransfers.o Found-on-installationitems.

OncethetransactionsareinitiatedontheHHTandaresynchronizedwiththeenterpriseserver,thesupplysergeantandpropertybookofficer(PBO)cantaketheappropriateactionsforeachtransactionthroughtheTransactionSuspenseListoptiononthePBUSEAITmenu.Unitsupplypersonnelwillreviewthesetrans-actionsbeforesendingthemtothePBOforprocess-ing.Onlyunit-initiatedtransactionsforpropertybookitemswillbevisibleatthePBOlevel.ThePBOthenhastheoptiontoview,reject,orpostthemornotifythegainingPBO.

TheDefenseacquisitionsystemwillbenefitfromtheintegrationofIUIDintoPBUSE.IUIDwillenableseamlesstraceability,financialtracking,andinteg-rityofequipment,therebyimprovingaccuracyandaccountabilitythroughoutthelife-cycleprocess,whichincludesfunding,distribution,equipmentfielding,andassetvisibility.

pablo a. brown was tHe systeM ManaGer for tHe property book unit supply enHanced at software enGineerinG center-lee wHen He co-wrote tHis article. He Holds a Master’s deGree in orGanizational ManaGeMent froM tHe uniVersity of pHoenix and a bacHelor’s deGree in business adMinistration froM liberty uniVersity. He is leVel ii certi-fied in proGraM ManaGeMent, inforMation tecHnoloGy, and life-cycle loGistics.

joHn e. laudan is a systeMs acquisition specialist workinG for software enGineerinG center-lee, wHere He is tHe project officer for tHe property book unit supply enHanced. He Holds a Master’s deGree in adMinistration froM central MicHiGan uniVersity and a bacHelor’s deGree in History froM canisius colleGe. He is leVel iii certified in proGraM ManaGeMent and in testinG and eValuation.

tHe autHors tHank cHief warrant officer 5 leslie carroll, cHris barbaGallo, lonna freeland, paul bedard, jerry GloVier, suHail ali, kelly duncan, and tony Meyer for tHeir Help in preparinG tHis article. questions about iuid and pbuse can be directed to tHe current software enGineerinG center-lee pbuse systeM ManaGer, joe burner, at williaM.burner@us.arMy.Mil or (804) 734−7855.

IUIDMarking

38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heaterProvidedEquipment(TPE)Plannerisaweb-basedautomationtoolthattheArmyimple-mentedinJanuary2010tofacilitaterapiddis-positionofnon-mission-essentialTPEintheIraqjointoperationsarea(IJOA).TPEPlannerautomatesthepre-viouslytime-consumingmanualvettingprocessforthe-aterlateraltransfer,redistribution,andturn-indecisions.

TPEismanagedandaccountedforbythe402dArmyFieldSupportBrigade(AFSB)andhandreceiptedtounitsintheIJOA.Aspartoftheresponsibledrawdownofforcesandthecorrelatingresponsibleresetofequip-ment,U.S.Forces-Iraq(USF–I)andU.S.ArmyCentral(ARCENT)arereleasingTPEforlateraltransfertootherunits,redistributiontootherunitsintheU.S.Cen-tralCommand(CENTCOM)areaofresponsibility,orreturntoCONUS-baseddepotsforreset.

TheManualProcessBeforeTPEPlannerwasimplemented,unitsin

IraqwouldsubmitaspreadsheetwiththeirproposedexcessequipmenttotheU.S.divisionovertheirareaofresponsibility.ThedivisionwouldinturnsubmittherequesttoUSF–I.TheUSF–IJ–4assetvisibilitysec-tionwouldcomparetheproposedequipmentliststoexistingrequirementsinIraqand,ifneeded,directthetransferofequipmentfromotherunitswithinIraq.

IftheequipmentwasnotrequiredwithinIraq,ARCENTSupportElement-Iraq(ASE–I)wouldcheckforexistingCENTCOMrequirements.IftherewerenoCENTCOMrequirementsfortheequipment,ArmyMaterielCommandlifecyclemanagementcommand(LCMC)representativeswouldprovideshippinginformationforthedepotthatcouldrepairtheequipment.

Unitspreadsheetswereprocessedintactateachlevel.OncethevettingprocesswascompletedtodecidewhetherTPEwasmissionessentialateachlevel,decisionsanddirectiveswerepublishedina

EnablingtheResponsibleDrawdownofForcesThroughtheTheaterProvidedEquipmentPlanner

by kellie Wade

T USF–Ifragmentaryorder(FRAGO).TheFRAGOpro-videdtheagreed-todispositionforallitems.Theunitcouldthentaketheequipmenttoa402dAFSBretro-gradepropertyassistanceteam(RPAT)yardandbegintheprocessofturningitin.

SettingUpTPEPlannerInthewinterof2008,AMC’sLogisticsSupport

Activity(LOGSA)beganbuildingtheTPEPlannertoassistMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq(whichmergedwithMulti-NationalForces-IraqtoformUSF–IinNovem-ber2009)inautomatingthenomination,disposition,andturn-inofTPEinordertoimprovevelocity,syn-chronization,andcentralizedvisibilityoftheprocess.

USF–IandASE–Iworkedthroughthesummerof2009totrimtimeoffthisprocess.Ultimately,disposi-tiontimewasreducedfrom19daysto7days,andtheFRAGOprocessingtimewasreducedfrom15daysto3days.Processingdispositionandbuildingreportsfromrunninglistsonspreadsheetswasverylaborintensive,andUSF–Ileaderswereskepticalthattheprocesswouldsupporttheincreasedloadthatwouldbegeneratedbytheresponsibledrawdownin2010.

Inthefallof2009,LOGSAplacedliaisonoffi-cers(LNOs)inUSF–IandASE–I,inBaghdadandKuwait,aspartoftheAMCresponsibleresettaskforce(R2TF).Theseofficersfacilitatedrequirementsgenerationandconductedproof-of-principletestingtodemonstratetheinitialoperationalcapability,training,andimplementationofTPEPlanner.TPEPlannerwasimplementedthroughoutIJOAon11January2010.

TheTPEPlannerProcessOneofthereasonstheUSF–IJ–4andASE–I

decidedtouseTPEPlannerwastostopworkingbatchrequestsandgetreal-timedispositiontotheunits.TPEPlannerstreamlinesthismanualprocess,displaysthedispositionofeachindividualitem,andpostseach

A new tool improves the disposition of non-mission-essential equipment by automating the lateral transfer, redistribution, and disposition processes.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 39

item’sstatusinthereportssectionofthetoolassoonasadecisionismade.

ThedispositionprocessforTPEPlannerbeginswhenunitsmanuallyconducttheirinternalvettingtodeterminenon-mission-essential,orexcess,equipment.Thisequipmentlistissenttothebrigadelevelmanu-allyonaspreadsheet.

ThebrigadeleadersaretheinitiatorsintheTPEPlannerprocess.BrigadepointsofcontactlogintoLOGSA’swebportal,accessTPEPlanner,andviewtheequipmentthatisontheunit’sderivativeunitidentificationcodehandreceipt.Thesedataarepopu-latedinTPEPlannerthroughadirectfeedfromProp-ertyBookUnitSupply-Enhanced.Theuserselectstheidentifiedexcessequipmentandhitsthesubmitbutton,andthedataarepostedonthedivision-levelscreen.TheU.S.divisionG-4looksacrossitsunitsanddirectsalateraltransferifoneofitsunitsneedstheequipmentorselects“turn-in”ifnooneneedstheequipment.

USF–IandASE–Ithenhavethesamedecisionpointsinthetool.WhenASE–Ideterminesthattheequipmentisnotneeded,itisconsideredexcesstotheaterneedsandthedataaresenttoboththeAMCLCMCandRPATscreens.

LCMCsuseTPEPlannertoprovidetheDepartmentofDefenseactivityaddresscodesneededtoshipitemsthatarenotessentialequipmenttotheaterneedstodesignatednational-levelsourcesofrepair.TheRPATyardpersonneluseTPEPlannertoseewhatnon-mis-sion-essentialequipmentisexpectedineachyardandtoidentifyequipmententeringandexitingtheyard.RPATyardpersonnelusethisinformationtoforecastworkloadsandtorelievecapacityfrictionpointsduringsurgeperiods.

Unlikethepreviouslymanualspreadsheetprocess,inwhichvisibilityofthedecisionsoccurredonlyafterthecorpsFRAGOwasgenerated,TPEPlannergivesvisibilityofdecisionsateachstepinthevettingpro-cess.Foritemsthatarependingadecision,usersandmanagerscanseeatwhatlevelthedecisionispendingandforhowlong.

Thelateraltransferandturn-indirectivereportinTPEPlannerpopulatesimmediatelyafteralateraltransferorredistributiondecisionismadeatanyleveloraftertheLCMCrepresentativeprovidessource-of-repairshippinginformationforitemsthataretheaterexcess.ThisgivesanyonewithbasicLogisticsInfor-mationWarehouseaccesstheabilitytoviewdispo-sitionsintheNon-SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetworktoolandreceiveinstructionsasthedecisionsaremadeinsteadofwaitingforallitemstobemovedthroughthesystemandreleasedinaSecureInternetProtocolRouterNetworkFRAGO.

TheonlinedispositionprovidedthroughTPEPlan-nerhasresultedina96-percentreductionindisposition

FRAGOs,andunitsnowreceivedispositionofitemsinanaverageof4days.

TPEPlannerTrainingandImprovementsBeforeimplementingTPEPlanner,LOGSAprovided

hands-ontrainingtoparticipantsfrom4brigades,16USF–ICorpsseparateelements,3divisions,the13thExpeditionarySustainmentCommand,andthe402d

AFSB’stheaterpropertybookofficesandRPATs.Thetrainingconsistedofa2-to-4hourblockofinstructiononhowtoapplyforandreceiveaccesstoTPEPlannerandhowtooperatescreensinsideofthetool.Deskguideswerecreatedandreleasedalongwiththeimplementationorderinpreparationforago-livedateof11January2010.

Sinceimplementation,LOGSAcontinuestoworkonemergingrequirementsfrombrigadecombatteams,U.S.divisions,USF–I,ASE–I,andthe402dAFSBandcon-tinuestoimproveTPEPlannerinordertostaycurrentwithitsusers’needs.A“projectedturn-indate”isnowavailablethatletsunitsestimatewhenequipmentwillbecomeavailableforturn-in.ThisallowsrequirementsofficerswithinUSF–IandASE–Itoprojectequipmentavailabilityforthesourcingoftheaterrequirements.Anotherrecentfeaturedisplaysthedocumentassociatedwitheithertheturn-inorlateraltransfersoviewerswillseetheactualtransaction.

TPEPlannerhasstreamlinedthedispositionpro-cessinordertofacilitaterapidprocessingofdisposi-tioninstructionswithin72hoursforequipmentthatisdeclarednon-mission-essential.ItprovidesvaluetotheArmybyautomatingthetheater’scurrentlymanualprocessusedtovetlateraltransfer,redistribution,anddispositiondecisionsfornon-mission-essentialTPE.TPEPlannerimprovesprocessvelocity,synchronizesactionsatalllevels,centralizesvisibilitybydocumentingdeci-sionsanddirectivesatalllevelsintailoredreports,andprovidesvisibilityoftheequipmentthatisdueinto,at,andleavingtheRPATyards.Theseimprovementsassistinforecastingworkload,capacity,andtransportationrequirements.

LOGSA’snextstepistoexportthistooltoOpera-tionEnduringFreedomforuseinthecombinedjointoperationalarea.

kellie wade is an aerospace enGineer in tHe propulsion oper-ability brancH of tHe aViation enGineerinG directorate, arMy aViation and Missile researcH, deVelopMent and enGineerinG center, arMy researcH, deVelopMent and enGineerinG coMMand. sHe Has an M.s. deGree in cHeMical enGineerinG froM auburn uniVersity, an M.s. deGree in business adMinistration froM texas a&M uniVersity-texarkana, and a b.s. deGree in cHeMistry froM claflin uniVersity. sHe Holds depart-Ment of defense acquisition, tecHnoloGy and loGistics leVel iii cer-tifications in systeM planninG, researcH, deVelopMent, and enGineerinG (sprde)-proGraM systeMs enGineerinG, sprde-systeMs enGineerinG, and life-cycle loGistics.

40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

NowHiring:QualityNCOsNeededtoLeadSoldiers

by lieutenant colonel sean M. Herron

oldiersarethelifebloodoftheArmy,andArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)unitsaretheheartthatprovidesSoldierstotheArmy.ThetrainingbattalionsthroughoutTRADOCareessentialtosustainingtheArmy’sabilitytofight.TheydothisbytakingAmerica’ssonsanddaughtersandmakingthemSoldierswhoaretacticallyandtechnicallyprofi-cient,instilledwiththeArmyvaluesandwarriorethos,andreadytocontributetotheirfirstassignedunits.

TrainingSoldiersisnotaneasytaskandrequiresmuchdedicationfromacadreoftop-notchSoldiers,primarilynoncommissionedofficers(NCOs).Tomeettheuniquedemandsplacedonthecadre,TRADOChasimplementedtheCadreResilienceProgramtoensurethatthecoretrainingbaseremainsstrong.

AStrongTrainingBaseThemissionofTRADOCtrainingbattalionsisto

providetheArmywithtrainedSoldiers.Theprocesstogetthemthereisnotquickoreasy.After10weeksofbasiccombattraining,Soldiersgotoadvancedindi-vidualtraining(AIT),wheretheylearntheirmilitaryoccupationalspecialties(MOSs).Oncetheyhavedem-onstratedtheirskillsbymeetingMOSqualificationstandards,passingarecordedArmyphysicalfitnesstest,anddemonstratingthebehavioranddisciplineexpectedofaSoldier,theygraduateandmovetotheirfirstunitofassignment.

Thisprocessissuccessfulbecauseofthededica-tionanddeterminationofthecadrethattrainstheseSoldiersfromwake-uptolights-outeverytrainingday.TRADOCisnotaplacewhereleaderscan“takeaknee”fromthepaceoftheoperationalArmy.Thehoursarelong,therequirementsaremany,andtheworkloadisheavy.However,TRADOCassignmentsofferthebestandbrightestleaderstheopportunityforchallenging,important,andrewardingjobsthathavealastingimpactonthefutureoftheArmy.

Justastheheartmustbestrongtopumpbloodtotheextremities,thetrainingbasemustbestrongto

S ensureanuninterruptedflowofSoldierstotheopera-tionalArmy.Inordertoremainstrong,thetrainingbasemusthavequalityNCOsasdrillsergeants,AITplatoonsergeants,andcourseinstructors.ThequalityoftheNCOhasadirectcorrelationwiththequalityoftheSoldierarrivingatthefirstunitofassignment.

TheNCOswhohavespenttimeinTRADOCassignmentsoftenfindthatthejobispersonallyandprofessionallyrewarding.Thisleadershipexperienceisdirectlylinkedtohigherperformanceinfutureassign-mentsandtheabilitytousecreativeandadaptivesolu-tionstofutureproblemsinthetacticalenvironment.AftercompletingtheirTRADOCassignments,theseNCOsreturntotheoperationalArmywithhonedlead-ershipskills,bettertime-managementandadministra-tiveskillstobemoreeffectiveandefficientintheirfuturepositions,andanewlevelofprideintheprofes-sionalismoftheArmyandtheNCOcorps.

OrdnanceCadreOrdnanceSchoolcadremembershavetheoppor-

tunitytoworkinworld-classtrainingfacilitiesandlabswithstate-of-the-artequipmentwhiletrainingfutureordnanceSoldiers.The2005BaseClosureandRealignmentCommissionReportmandatedthattheOrdnanceSchoolmovetoFortLee,Virginia.ThatdecisionallowedtheOrdnanceCorpstobringitsschoolintothe21stCentury.

TheOrdnanceSchoolcampus,nowpartoftheSus-tainmentCenterofExcellence,isdesignedtocreateacomprehensivelearningandtrainingenvironment.ItcombinesbothtechnicalandtacticaltrainingtoensurethatthegraduatingSoldiershaveearnedtherighttoweartheOrdnanceregimentalcrestandaretrulyreadytomakeapositivecontributionwhentheyjointheirfirstunits.

TheCadreResilienceProgramInearly2010,trainingbattalionstransitionedfrom

usingtheCadreWellnessProgramtotheCadreResil-ienceProgram,whichisinlinewiththeArmy’sfive

The Army Ordnance School uses the Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Cadre Resilience Program to ensure its cadre members are the best they can be.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 41

dimensionsofstrength:physical,emotional,social,spir-itual,andfamily.TRADOCcapitalizedonitsrecentlygraduatedMasterResilienceTrainerCourseplatoonser-geantstoguidethedevelopmentoftheprogram.

WhileeachTRADOClocationoffersuniquechal-lenges,the143dOrdnanceBattalionsuccessfullyimplementedthecomponentsoftheCadreResilienceProgramattheOrdnanceSchoolbyfocusingontheArmy’sfivedimensionsofstrength.

Physical. Thephysicaldimensiondealswithper-formingandexcellinginphysicalactivitiesthatrequireaerobicfitness,endurance,strength,healthybodycomposition,andflexibilityderivedthroughexercise,nutrition,andtraining.Inthisdimension,thecadreareaffordedtimetoconductphysicalreadinesstrainingontheirownandanyinjuredcadrememberisgiventimeandresourcestorehabilitatefromaninjury.

Emotional.Theemotionaldimensionisaboutapproachinglife’schallengesinapositive,optimisticwaybydemonstratingself-control,stamina,andgoodcharacterthroughpersonalchoicesandactions. TheOrdnanceSchoolensuresthatitprovidesthecadrewithworkloadpredictability,flexibilityfortimeoff,andminimaldisruptiontofamilylife.

Toimproveandmaintainthecadremembers’emo-tionalwell-being,thebattalioncommandsergeantmajorcontinuallyreviewsdutyrosterstoeliminateredundantduties.NCOsintheretirementprocessandwhonolongerdirectlycontactSoldiersaretheprimarystaffdutyNCOs.Thebattalionalsoconductsquarterlysensingsessionswiththecadreandusescommandclimateandequalopportunitysurveystolookforareasthatneedimprovement.Thebattalionalsoencouragescadremembers’attendanceatprofessionalmilitaryeducationcoursestoensurethattheyfollowtheiropti-malprofessionaldevelopmenttimelines.

Social.Thesocialdimensioninvolvesdevelop-ingandmaintainingtrusted,valuedrelationshipsandfriendshipsthatarepersonallyfulfillingandfoster-inggoodcommunication,includingacomfortableexchangeofideas,views,andexperiences.The143dOrdnanceBattaliondifferslittlefromoperationalunitswhenitcomestosocialactivities.Eachunitholdsholidayandteam-buildingfunctionsaswellashailandfarewells.SinglecadremembersalsohavetheopportunitytoattendeventsgearedtowardsingleSoldiers.

Spiritual.Thespiritualdimensionfocusesonstrengtheningasetofbeliefs,principles,orvaluesthatsustainanindividualbeyondfamily,institutional,andsocietalsourcesofstrength.Theunitministryteams(UMTs)inthetrainingbaseareengagedinattendingtotheneedsofthetraineesandthecadreandareacor-nerstoneoftheCadreResilienceProgram.

The143dOrdnanceBattalionUMTdevelopsactivi-tiesusingelementsofArmyculture,suchasphysical

fitness,espritdecorps,andcompetition,todrawSol-diersintothegarrisonchapelprogramandencouragespiritualgrowth.TheUMTregularlyholdstheSpiritualFitnessChallenge,whichisaseriesofarduousphysi-calfitnesseventswithafocusonspiritualstrengthandendurance.

OrdnanceSchoolcadremembersarealsogiventheopportunitytoattendprayerbreakfastsandluncheonsconductedbythebattalionandgarrisonUMT.TheseeventsremindSoldiersofsharedfaithandspiritualvalues.Asisthetradition,Soldiersofallfaithsbreakbreadandpraytogether.

Family.Thefamilydimensionisaboutbeingpartofafamilyunitthatissafe,supportive,andlovingandthatprovidestheresourcesneededforallfamilymemberstoliveinahealthyandsecureenvironment.Thecareofcadreincludescaringfortheirfamilies.The143dOrdnanceBattalionstrivestoensurethatallcadremembersandtheirfamilieshaveaccesstofamilyreadinessgroups.

ThebattalionalsooffersannualretreatsformarriedcouplesandsingleSoldiers.Inthesummerof2010,theUMTconductedamarriedcouplesandsingleSoldierretreatattheTurfValleyResortinEllicot,Maryland.Thecurriculumwasbasedoncomprehen-sivewellnessandfocusedondevelopingspiritualdis-cipline,physicalfitnessandhealth,andmentalbalanceandwellness.Thiseventincludedcadremembersandtheirspouses.

TheCadreResilienceProgramisoneofthemostimportantinitiativesthatbattalionandcompanylead-erscanoffertopromotethecadre’sabilitytogrowandthriveinthefaceofchallengesandtobouncebackfromadversity.TheOrdnanceSchooltrainingbattal-ionsremaincommittedtoimprovingSoldierandfam-ilyresiliencethroughoutthiseraofpersistentconflict.

Ittakesaspecialtypeofleadertodoajobwherethechallengesarenewandexcitingeveryday.BeingabletotrainnewSoldiersandpersonallyhaveanimpactontheArmyisexactlywhatmanytrainingunitcadremembershavewantedfortheircareers.

TheOrdnanceSchooliscommittedtonurturingwell-trained,disciplined,andphysicallyfitSoldierswholivetheArmyvaluesandwarriorethos.TheOrdnanceSchoolisagreatplacetoserveandagreatplacetobeanOrdnanceSoldier.PleasecontacttheschoolthroughtheSustainmentKnowledgeNetworkformoreinforma-tionabouthowtojointheOrdnanceSchoolranksortoaskquestionsabouthowwecanbetterserveyou.

lieutenant colonel sean M. Herron is tHe coMMander of tHe 16tH ordnance battalion, 59tH ordnance briGade. He Has a b.s. deGree froM oHio state uniVersity, an M.a. deGree in orGanizational ManaGe-Ment froM tHe uniVersity of pHoenix, and a Master of Military arts and science deGree froM tHe arMy coMMand and General staff colleGe.

42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

TrainingAmmunitionSupplySoldiersWhileDeployed

by caPtain tHeodore l. ZaGraniskiand cHieF Warrant oFFicer 2 Gary n. carr

neofthebiggestchallengesfacingcompany-levelleadersismilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)training.Withtheincreasesinoperat-ingtempo(OPTEMPO)broughtaboutbytherapiddeploymentandredeploymentofsustainmentforces,companycommanders,firstsergeants,andtheirwar-rantofficerexpertsoftenhaveagreatdealtoteachtheirjuniorSoldiersandofficersandnotenoughtimetoteachit.

Trainingdistractionsareaconstantrealitywhenalogisticscompanyofanysortmustbalancevitalgarrison-supportmissions,essentialtraining,andthemanyday-to-daytasksandrequirementsthatfaceanyArmyunit.Inevitably,eachcompany’sleadershipteammustmaketoughdecisionsaboutwhentotrain,whattoteachtheirSoldiers,andhowtoteachit.

Veryfewsustainmentunitsintoday’sArmyhavetheluxuryofconductingmethodicalanddeliberateMOStrainingwithsufficientresourcestomeetalltrainingobjectivesindetail.LogisticscompaniesacrosstheArmyoftenlackthetime,internalexperience,andtan-gibleresourcesneededtoconductcomprehensiveindi-vidualandcollectivetraining.Companiesincombatsustainmentsupportbattalions(CSSBs)inparticularlackalloftheseessentialtrainingcomponentswhileathomestationbecausetheyaredesignedtoprovidesupportatthewholesalelevel.Thesecompaniesaresohighlyspecializedandoperateatsuchelevatedechelonsthatacorpsconsistingofmorethan100,000Soldiersusuallycontainsonly1CSSBconsistingof5to7companies.

Manylogisticscompaniesalsofaceachallengeinlocatingexpertinstructorstotraintheskillsandtasksrel-evanttotheirSoldiers’MOSs.WhiletheArmysuffersnoshortageofsustainmentexperts,mostoftheindividualswhowouldbeidealMOSteachersarecurrentlyservinginIraqorAfghanistanoratotherhazardouslocations.

Thisarticleisbothasummaryandaguide.Ononehand,weintendtoprovidedetailedexplanationsoftheMOStrainingmethodsusedbythe664thOrdnanceCompanyduringOperationIraqiFreedom09−10.Thecompany’sintentwastobuildwell-roundedMOS89Bammunitionspecialists.Toaccomplishthis,thecompany’sleadersdesignedanMOStrainingprogram

O

totrainSoldiersandNCOstosafelyandconsistentlycompleteeveryindividualandcollectivetaskoftheirMOSandskilllevel.Thecompany’smethodsmaynotberevolutionarywhentakenindividually,butasfarasweknow,theyhavenotbeensimultaneouslyimple-mentedwithinasingleArmycompanyduringacom-batdeployment.

Ontheotherhand,thisarticleisofferedtoallcur-rentandfuturelogisticscompanyleaders(officer,warrantofficer,andenlisted)inthesincerehopethatbyapplyingsimilarmethods,theircompaniescanbuildwell-roundedsustainmentSoldiersthroughouttheforce.Althoughtheammunitionspecialist’sjobmaynotseemtohavemuchincommonwiththatofashower/laundryandclothingrepairspecialist,themethodsweoutlinecanbemodifiedtoprovideallforcesustainmentSoldierswiththeMOStrainingtheydemandanddeserve,eveniftheonlyplacetodosoisinacombatenvironment.

AmmunitionSupplyTrainingChallengesForanumberofreasons,MOStrainingproblems

areexacerbatedintheareaofammunitionsupplysup-port.First,ammunitionsupplyisaverysmallMOS;therearefewerthan10ammunitionsupplycompaniesonactiveduty,andfewerthan130warrantofficersareassignedMOS890A,ammunitiontechnician.

Second,ammunitionsupplySoldiersandnoncom-missionedofficers(NCOs)possesscertainskillsinhighdensitythatarehardtofindinmaneuver,fires,andeffectsandoperationssupportunits(forexample,fork-liftandrough-terraincontainerhandleroperatorquali-fications).Athomestation,thevehicleoperatorskillsoftheaverageammunitionsupplySoldierareinhigh

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 43

demand,makingitparticularlychallengingforcompanyleadersto“protect”theirtimeforMOStraining.

Third,althoughmanysustainmentunitshaveexperi-encedadjustmentstotheirmissionsetswhileathomestation,fewunitshaveexperiencedthewidespreadchangesthathaveaffectedammunitionsupplycom-panies.ManyfacilitiesinsidetheUnitedStatesthatwererunbyammunitionsupplycompaniesbeforetheGlobalWaronTerrorismhavebeentransferredtociviliancontractors.Whilethispracticehasguaranteedcontinuityofhome-stationoperationswhenanammu-nitionsupplycompanydeploys,ithasalsohinderedMOStrainingbyseparatingammunitionSoldiersfromthemostnaturalplacesandsituationsinwhichtocon-ductthattraining.

ThehighlycomplexnatureofthewarsinIraqandAfghanistanhascreatedasituationinwhichanordnancecompanycanfinditselfdoingthejobofatotallydif-ferentsortofunit.AmmunitionsupplycompanieshaveservedinbothAfghanistanandIraqinawidevarietyofjobsoutsideoftheirMOSs,includingrolestradition-allysetasideforthemilitarypolice,motorizedinfantry,transporters,andmechanics.Inafewcases,companieshaveevenreceivedchangestotheirprimarywartimemissionswhileintransittoSouthwestAsiaorduringtheirfinalprecombattraininginKuwait.Forthe664thOrdnanceCompany,theonlyammunitionsupplycompa-nybasedatFortHood,Texas,onlyourarrivalatourfinaldeployeddestinationnearAnNasiriyah,Iraq,endedourdiscussionsaboutthenatureofourwartimemission.

Takingintoconsiderationallofthesedisparatefac-tors,theaverageammunitionsupplySoldierorNCOprobablydoesnothaveenoughMOStrainingbeforedeployingintocombat.Inthe664thOrdnanceCompany,

forexample,thecompanyleadersrecognizedearlyonthatacollectivedeficitinpredeploymentMOStrainingcouldnotbemadeupsolelythroughon-the-jobtraining(OJT).BycombiningtheprinciplesofOJTwithsomeuniquemethods,however,itbecamepossibletogivemostcompanypersonnelthebreadthanddepthofMOStrainingtheywouldneedtobesuccessfulduringtheircurrentdeploymentandinfutureammunitionsupplyassignments.

TrainingInternallyAttheendofJanuary2009,the664thOrdnance

CompanyassumedresponsibilityoftheContingencyOperatingBase(COB)Adder-Tallilammunitionsup-plypoint(ASP)atCOBAdder.TheCOBAdderASPisamongthelargestammunitionsupplyactivitiesinIraq.Itdirectlysupportsnearly100customerunitsthroughanetworkofassociatedammunitiontransferandholdingpointsthroughoutsouthernIraq.TheASPalsoreceivesammunitionfromandshipsammunitiontootherammunitionsupplyactivitiesthroughoutIraq,Kuwait,andAfghanistan.

Asustainmentoperationofsuchremarkablescopedemandsasignificantamountoftechnicalknowledge,MOSskills,agility,andstaminafromtheSoldiersandleaderschargedwithrunningit.UponarrivingatCOBAdder,the664thhadplentyofagilityandstamina,butitneededMOStraininginordertobuildtechnicalknowledgeandskills.

Tobridgethegapinknowledgeandskills,wecre-atedaninnovativecross-trainingprogramforallMOS89BSoldiersandNCOsinthecompany.TheprimarypurposeofthisprogramwastoshareandteachasmuchknowledgeaspossibleamongallofourSoldiersacrossallfiveareasofASPoperations:stockcontrol,movementcontrol,shipping,receiving,andstorage.Toadministerthisprogramtothelowestpossiblelevel,thefullsupportandengagementofourNCOswouldberequired,especiallyattheplatoonandsectionlevels.

Thecompanywasfortunatetohaveahandfulofstaffsergeants(andoneseasonedsergeant)withpreviousammunitionexperiencewhenitarrivedatCOBAdder.WespreadtheirexperienceoutbyassigningthemtopositionsofresponsibilityineachofthefiveareasofASPoperations.Consequently,eachstaffsergeantpositionwasimmediatelyfilledbysomeonewhowas

Soldiers assigned to the 664th Ordnance Company demonstrate proper repackaging of munitions in an austere environment at the receiving pad of the Contingency Operating Base Adder­Tallil ammunition supply point near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. The photo shows Soldiers assembling and marking makeshift storage crates (background), wrapping and protecting munitions for storage (left and center), packing munitions into crates to protect them from the elements (right), and banding the crates to prevent pilferage and make handling less dangerous.

44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

generallyfamiliarwiththatarea’sjob.Insomecases,theASPevenhadanexpertintheslotwithawealthofexperiencetoshare.Thesepersonnelweremoreorlesspermanentlyassignedtotheirspecificareathroughoutthecompany’sdeployment.

Thus,nomatterwhereSoldiersworkedintheASP,aresidentexpertwouldalwaysbesupervisingthemandwouldberespon-sibleforteachingthemtheskillsneededforthatparticulararea.

Atthispoint,acasualobservercouldarguethat,thusfar,thecross-trainingpro-gramappearstobeasimpleapplicationofOJT.Therealinnovationofthecompany’scross-trainingsystem,however,camewhenwerecog-nizedthatevenwell-educatedSoldierscanfallvictimtocomplacencybyworkinginthesamejobdayinanddayout.Tocombatthatpossibility,wedecidedtorotateourjuniorNCOsandSoldiersonanoffsetscheduleamongthreeofthefiveareasoftheASP,namelyship-ping,receiving,andstorage.Theothertwoareas,stockcontrolandmovementcontrol,wouldalsoseeSoldierrotationbutofadifferentsort,aswewillexplainbelow.

Shipping, receiving, and storage training.Inship-ping,receiving,andstorage,ateamofSoldiersandsergeantsworkeddirectlyundertheguidanceoftheirstaffsergeantforapproximately3months.Duringeachrotation,thestaffsergeanttaughthisSoldiersandsergeantsthroughexample,informalinstruction,guid-ance,andformalprofessionaldevelopmentclasses.Alloftheinstructionfromeachstaffsergeantfocusedexclusivelyonhisareaofexpertiseandincludedalargeamountofhands-ontrainingworkingwithammunitionandthetoolsofthetrade.Whenitcametimetorotate,thestaffsergeantsremainedinplaceandeveryoneelseunderthemwasshiftedtoanewareaintheASP.Theentiretrainingcyclethenbeganagain.

Thisshiftofpersonnelwascarriedoutthreetimesduringthecompany’s12-monthdeployment.Thisamountedtoonecompleteround-robinrotationforevery89BSoldierandsergeantintheASP.TheASP’saccountableofficeranticipatedthatmovingeveryoneatthesametimewouldhaveanegativeimpactonthemission,sohedecidedbeforethefirstpersonnelshifttostaggertherotationscheduleforsergeantsandSoldiers.

Afterapproximately2monthsand3weeksinaparticulararea,thesergeantsrotatedinaround-robinfashiontoanotherarea.Thiswasacriticalandchal-lengingtimeforoursergeantsbecausetheywerestill

responsiblefortheactionsandaccomplishmentsoftheirSoldiersattheirpreviousstation,buttheywerealsoexpectedtobecomefamiliarwiththesupervisoryresponsibilitiesattheirnewstations.ThistransitionperiodalsoallowedthesergeantstolearnwhatwasexpectedoftheirSoldiersfromthejuniorenlistedandstaffsergeantalreadyworkingattheirnewstation.

BystaggeringtherotationofNCOsandSoldiers,thecompanyalsoalloweditsjuniorNCOstobuildtheirownknowledgebasebeforebeingexpectedtosuperviseandinstructtheirpersonnel.Afteraboutaweekofthesergeantslearningontheirown,itwastimefortherestoftheSoldierstorotate.

Ingeneral,thisstaggeredrotationschemeworkedwell.Theaccountableofficerreceivedpositivefeed-backfrombothSoldiersandNCOs.Theonlydraw-backtomovingNCOswithouttheirSoldierswasthatsomesergeantsfelttheylosttouchwiththeSoldiersforwhomtheywereresponsible.Thiswasparticularlyfeltintheareaof“Soldierissues”—ablankettermforthemanyadministrative,financial,personal,medical,andotherproblems(largeandsmall)thateveryindi-vidualhastoworkthroughfromtimetotime.

Inhindsight,webelievethatthebenefitsofstag-geredrotationoutweighedthecosts.Inthefuture,otherunitsmightbeabletomitigatethe“Soldierissues”frictionbysettingasideaportionoftheday(30to60minutes)orweek(3to6hours)forNCOswhoarelearningawayfromtheirformationstomeetwiththeirSoldiersandcatchupontheissues.

Stock control and movement control training.Meanwhile,wedecidedtominimizeSoldierturnoverinstockcontrolandmovementcontrolandreducerotationsinthoseareas.AttheCOBAdderASP,suc-cessinstockcontrolandmovementcontrolrequired

An ammunition specialist assigned to 664th Ordnance Company conducts an ammunition

inventory and updates an ammunition stores slip in a storage container at the COB Adder­

Tallil ammunition supply point.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 45

patience.Ittookalongtimetomastercomplextasksandbuildstrongworkingrelationshipswithawidevarietyofpeopleoutsidethecompany.So,toreducethefrictioninherentintheturnoverofcomplex,extremelycritical,low-densityjobs,thecompanydecidedthatexposingMOS89BSoldierstostockcon-trolandmovementcontrolwasasecondaryconcern.

Thecompanyalsodecidedearlyontomaintainaone-to-onestudent-instructorratiowhenselectingindividualsforstockcontrolandmovementcontrolcross-training.SincethestockcontrolNCO-in-chargehad6yearsofstockcontrolexperienceinboththeArmyandtheNavy,thecompany’sseniorleaderswantedtoensurethatourMOS89Bsergeantsreceivedasmuchinstructionandpersonalattentionaspossibleduringtheirlimitedstaysinthestockcontroloffice.SowebroughtinourbestjuniorammunitionsergeantsoneatatimetoworkalongsideourfourMOS89A(ammunitionstockcontrol)Soldiers.

Forsimilarreasons,eachofthetwopermanentlyassignedNCOsinmovementcontrol(bothstaffser-geants)receivedonejuniorSoldieratatimetoworkforthem.Thislikewisepreservedaone-to-oneratio.ItalsoallowedcompanyleaderstohandpickthoseNCOsandSoldierswhowouldcross-trainoutsidetheirMOS.Mostrotationsthroughstockcontrollastedabout2months;movementcontrol(withasomewhatlowerOPTEMPO)sawrotationslasting3to4monthseach.

Theminimumnumberofpeopledetailedtocross-traininstockcontrolandmovementcontrolminimizeddisrup-tionofregularASPoperationssincethecompanyfirstandforemosthadtomaintainitsabilitytoaccomplishthemission.ThiswasbynomeansduetoanydeficiencyonthepartofourMOSs89BSoldiers.Althoughmanyofthemwouldhavehadnoproblemlearningthestockcontrolormovementcontroljobs,wekeptinmindthatMOS89AandMOS88N(movementcontrol)donothavetheexactsameskillsetsasMOS89B.Thatmeantthatrotatingper-sonnelthroughstockcontrolormovementcontrolwould

actuallyreducetheamountofMOStrainingthoseSol-diersreceived.Inall,aboutadozenofourmostadaptableSoldiersandsergeantslearnedabouteitherstockcontrolormovementcontrolduringourdeployment.

Theaggregateaffectofourentirecross-trainingpro-gramontheknowledgeandskilllevelofourSoldiersandjuniorNCOswaspronounced.Companymemberswithoutanypreviousammunitionsupplysupportexpe-rienceleftCOBAdderwithawidevarietyofpracti-calexpertiseandlessonslearned.Ratherthanseeingonlyaverynarrowlaneoverthecourseofa12-monthdeployment,eachindividuallefttheASPwithenoughknowledgeandskillstodoallMOS89Bjobsathisskilllevel.Thecompany’sMOStrainingprogrammettheoriginalintentandbuiltwell-roundedMOS89Bammunitionspecialists.

TrainingExternallyRatherthansatisfyingourselveswithtrainingonly

ourownpersonnel,wealsoappliedourrotationalmethodtoMOS89Aand89Bpersonnelfromotherunits.Providingtrainingopportunitiestoammunitionspecialistsandsergeantsfromotherformationswasmorethanjustaperfectchancetoimproverelationsbetweenthecompanyandourcustomerunits;italsohelpedMOS89Aand89Bpersonnelcapitalizeonarichtrainingenvironmentwithlotsofexpertiseattheirfingertips.Someofthecompany’s“students”fromoutsideunitshadbeenintheammunitionsupplyfieldforyearswithouthavingeverworkedinanammuni-tionsupplyactivityatanylevel.ProvidingMOStrain-ingtothoseSoldierswasespeciallyrewarding.Afterall,whereelsebutatanASPcouldtheyreceiveit?

ThroughregularbusinesscontactsthroughoutthesouthernhalfofIraq,logisticsleadersinotherforma-tionsbegantohearaboutthecross-trainingprogramattheCOBAdderASP.Unlikethe664thOrdnance

An ammunition specialist from the

664th Ordnance Company receives hands­on rough­terrain container

handler operator’s training at the

COB Adder­Tallil ammunition supply point.

46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Company,mostunitshaveanexceptionallylowdensityoftheammunitionsupplyMOS.Mostbrigadecombatteams,infact,areauthorizedonlyasinglesectionofMOS89Bpersonnel(6to12individuals).

Beforelong,unitsoutsideourbattalionwerecon-tactingustorequestassistanceintrainingtheirMOS89Aand89Bpersonnel.Theserequestspresentedtheirownchallengesbecausenotwounitswantedtogainexactlythesameknowledgeorskills.

Generallyspeaking,theASPaccountableoffi-cerwouldmaintaincontactwiththeofficerorNCOrequestingthetraining.Therequestorspecifiedwhatskillsshouldbeemphasizedduringhisunit’straining.Oneunitwantedtoknowmoreaboutthepaperworkrequiredtoprocessammunition;anotherwantedtoexposeitspersonneltothehands-ontasksinherentintheirMOS;otherswantedtogainasmuchknowledgeofshippingaspossible.Theonlywaytoexecuteatrainingplantosatisfytherequestorwastocustomizetheexperience,sothatiswhatthe664thdid.

OurexternaltrainingprogramaccepteduptofourMOS89Aor89Bpersonnelatatime.MostofourvisitingpersonnelwereMOS89B.Eachgroupoffourvisitorsspentatotalof2weeksattheASP.Thevisi-torsweresplitupandrotatedthroughfourareas:stockcontrol,shipping,receiving,andstorage.Thestudentsspentabout3daysateachstation,buttheywerenotsimplysentoutontheirown.Eachstudentwaspairedwitha664thOrdnanceCompanySoldierorNCOofequalrankandshadowedthatpersonuntilitwastimetomoveontothenextstation.

Forexample,avisitingsergeantwouldbepairedwithaseriesofsquadleadersateachstationinordertolearnwhatwasexpectedofanammunitionsergeantduringeachtypeofoperation.Anammunitionspecialist,ontheotherhand,wasassignedasamemberofthesquadateachstation,andhewouldbetaughtwhatourjuniorSoldiersweredoingateachspot.Sometimes,rotationswereeventailoredtofitthespecificrequestsofaparticulargroupofvisitors,addingorsubtractingtimeatparticularstations.

Throughthiscreativeapproach,MOS89BSoldierswhohadneverworkedinanASPreceivedfull-immer-sionammunitionsupplytraining.Thevisitorswerenotexpectedtomeetconcretelearningobjectives;theexternaltrainingprogramwasallaboutraisingtheirawarenessabouttheirownMOSandshowingthemthebasicsofhowthetasksoftheirMOSandskilllevelwereconductedatourASP.Althoughitadmit-tedlytakesmuchmorethan3daysperstationtolearnthedetailsofthejob,ourexternaltrainingprogramofferedtheseSoldiersandNCOsthefoundationofwhatshouldbeanongoinglearningprocess.

ThetimespentbyourvisitorsattheCOBAdderASPprovidedreal-lifeexperienceinammunitionsupplyoperations.Wealsoexposedsmallgroupsofourowncustomerstoreal-worldammunitionsupply

supportinacombatenvironmentattheASPlevel.Ourvisitorsleftwithfirst-handknowledgeofhowcertainprocessesmustbestreamlined(butnotbytak-ingshortcuts)tomeetthetimestandardssetbytheArmyandtherealitiesofcombatsustainmentinIraq.

Someofourstudentswhoweresomewhatfamiliarwithammunitionsupplyoperationsattheirhomestationsevenlearnedthat,althoughanASPinIraqcannotbeaperfectmatchtoammunitionsupplyoperationsbackintheUnitedStates,itispossibletocloselyreplicatethemostessentialsafetyandaccountabilitypracticesrequiredbyArmyregulationsatanyASP,regardlessofitslocation.

Perhapsmostimportantly,wewereabletoexposeMOS89BSoldiersandNCOstothewaythatASPoperationsareaccomplishedinaforward-deployedlocation.TheresponsesofindividualswhohadthetimeandopportunitytoshadowusattheCOBAdderASPwereoverwhelminglypositive.

Trainingincombatcannotfullyreplacetrainingathome.Bytrainingincombatwiththeresourcesandexpertisethatwereavailableatthecompanylevelandbelow,the664thOrdnanceCompanybuiltanagileteamofammunitionsupplyprofessionalswhowerecapableofrunningahighlydynamicandcomplexASPinanextremelytoughenvironment.ThecompanyalsobroughteachofitsenlistedmembersuptoalevelofMOScompetencethattheycouldnothavereachedbyremaininginonlyonejobfortheentiredeployment.Ratherthanonlytrainingonepersononshippingandanotherpersononstorage,thecompanytaughtbothareas,andmore,tobothpeople.

Thecompanythususeda12-monthdeploymenttosouthernIraqtoprepareMOS89BSoldiersandNCOsforanyammunitionsupplysupportjobattheirskilllevel,regardlessofwhichpartofanASPtheymightbeassignedtonext.Throughsimilartrainingmethodsappliedbydedicatedcompanyandplatoonleadersdur-ingfuturedeployments,itwillbepossibletocreateavaluableandversatileforceofsustainmentSoldiersforthebenefitoftheentireArmy.

captain tHeodore l. zaGraniski is tHe supply and serVices officer for tHe 377tH tHeater sustainMent coMMand at naVal air sta-tion joint reserVe base new orleans, louisiana. froM july 2008 to april 2010, He serVed as tHe coMMander of tHe 664tH ordnance coMpany. He Has a b.a. deGree in History froM leHiGH uniVersity and is a Graduate of tHe field artillery officer basic course and tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course.

cHief warrant officer 2 Gary n. carr is tHe contractinG officer’s representatiVe for tHe 1st tHeater sustainMent coMMand at caMp arifjan, kuwait. He preViously serVed as an aMMunition tecHnician witH tHe 664tH ordnance coMpany and as tHe accountable officer at tHe continGency operatinG base adder-tallil aMMunition supply point. He Has a b.s. deGree in criMinal justice froM Madison uniVersity.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 47

hecombinedeffortsofU.S.SoldiersandtwolocalnationalcontractorsatContingencyOperat-ingBase(COB)AdderledtotheearlycompletionoftheCOB’sscrapmetalseparationandsegregationmis-sion.ThemissionrequiredpersonnelatCOBAddertoseparateandsortabout75acresofscrapmetalandotherdebris.ThemetalwastheaccumulationofitemsdatingasfarbackasthePersianGulfWarof1990to1991.

BreakingDowntheMissionTheprojectwasbrokendownintothreephases.In

thefirstphase,theteamidentifiedandsortedthediffer-entmaterialsatthesite.Inthesecondphase,theteamremovedallsteel,andinthethirdphase,theremainingdebriswashauledoffsitetodesignatedlocations.

Theprojectinvolvedapproximately60personnelworkingonadailybasis.TheteamwasmadeupofU.S.SoldiersandcontractworkersfromAlZaidiCompanyandRawa’aCompany,whoworkedfromMondaytoFri-day.“Towardtheendoftheproject,SoldierswouldcomeinonSaturdaysandSundaystoaccomplishthemission,”saidSergeantFirstClassJasonHellstrom,theengineeroperationsnoncommissionedofficerforthe1stInfantryDivisionandU.S.Division-South.“NoneoftheSoldierscomplainedonebit.Theywantedtogetitdone.”

CleaningUptheScrapMetalAccordingtoMajorTewannaMarks,anengineerwith

U.S.Division-SouthinIraq,“TheoriginalprojectiontocleanupAdderwasfromFebruarytoJuly[2010].”Sol-dierscompletedthemissionon25May2010,reducingthemission’scompletiontimeby60days.

Markssaidthefirsttimeshevisitedthesite,stacksofscrapmetalwerepiledmorethan12feethigh.Dur-ingtheinitialphaseoftheproject,shecheckedonthesiteacoupleoftimesaweektoensuretheoperationwasgoingwell.

Astheprojectprogressed,thepersonnelandtheoper-ationbecamemoreefficient.“Towardtheend,therewas

a2-weekperiodwhereIdidnotgoto[COB]Adder,”Markssaid.“WhenIreturnedafterthose2weeks,Iwasamazedtoseethattheareawasflatdesert.”

Hellstromsaidthatoncetheprojectwasunder-way,progresstookplacerapidly.“Whenitstarted,theprojectmovedalittleslow,”Hellstromsaid.“Aboutmid[way]totheendofFebruaryiswhentheprojectreallybegantopickup.”

WhatSoldiersLeftforIraqisIttook15weeksforU.S.Soldiersdeployedtothe

baseandthetwolocalcontractorstosortthematerialsintheCOBAdderscrapyardintoafunctioningscrapseparationandsegregationarea.

TheCOBalsohasascrapsegregationandrecyclingcenterthatIraqiscanusetoemploylocalsandearnrevenue.

“Personnelon[COB]Addercanbringtheirscraptothecenterandhaveitsegregatedinsteadofjustdumpingitalltogether,”Markssaid.“Itisalegitimateoperation.Itfunctionswell.”WhenthebaseisreturnedtotheIraqis,thisprojectwillcontinuetorunandwillhelpeasethetransition.

WiththeguidanceandsupportfromU.S.Division-Southleaders(specificallyBrigadierGeneralRandalDragon,thedeputycommandinggeneralforsupport,1stInfantryDivision),themissionwascompletedfasterthanexpected.Attheendoftheproject,theprojectteamleaderreportedthattheteamhadremovedapproximately333tonsofwood,8,353tonsoftrash,and11,088tonsofscrapmetal.

serGeant jaMes kennedy benjaMin, usar, is assiGned to tHe 305tH Mobile public affairs detacHMent, 9tH Mission support coMMand, at fort sHafter, Hawaii. tHe unit is currently deployed to basra, iraq, and supports tHe u.s. diVision-soutH, 1st infantry diVision public affairs office.

CleaningUpContingencyOperatingBaseAdder

by serGeant jaMes kennedy benjaMin, usar

T

A 15­week mission turned an uncontrolled dumping ground at Contingency Operating Base Adder into a functioning scrap separation area.

48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

MRAP’sFutureWiththeArmyby Major dale b. WoodHouse

incefiscalyear2006,theDepartmentofDefense(DOD)hasspentsignificantfundsonthemine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehiclepro-gram.Despitethisinvestment,DODoriginallywasnotconsideringthisvehicleaspartofitsplanforbrigadecombatteam(BCT)modernization.BudgetconstraintsandtheMRAP’sprovensuccessinIraqandAfghanistanhavepromptedDODtotakeaharderlookathowthisvehiclefitsintotheservices’future.

TheFutureCombatSystemTheFutureCombatSystem(FCS)program,launched

in2003,wasavisionformodernizingBCTswithanarrayofvehiclesandintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceplatforms.FCSwasdescribedasbeinga“systemofsystems”capableoffull-spectrumoperations.

TheMRAPvehiclewasnotpartoftheoriginalFCSprogram.AccordingtoaCongressionalResearchServicereportbyAndrewFeickert,“Mine-Resistant,Ambush-Protected(MRAP)Vehicles:BackgroundandIssuesforCongress,”in2009,SecretaryofDefenseRobertGatesdirectedtheArmytoincludetheMRAPinitsFCSplans.

ThepricetagofFCS,over$160billion,washardfortheArmytoreconcileunderbudgetconstraints,sosev-eralalternativeplanswereproposedtoreplaceit.

ThesealternativeswererevealedtoCongressinaJune2009CongressionalBudgetOfficestudy,“AnAnalysisoftheArmy’sTransformationProgramsandPossibleAlternatives.” Mostofthealternativeplanssoughttodecreasethecostoftheprogrambyincorporatingupgradedcombatvehiclesandplatformsinthecurrentfleetinlieuoffundingthehigh-pricedFCSvehicles.

FCSTransitionstoArmyBCTModernizationAccordingtoaDODpressreleasedated23June

2009,duringthebudgetaryprocessforfiscalyear2010,SecretaryGatesexpressedconcerns“thattheportionoftheFCSprogramtofieldnewmannedcombatvehiclesdidnotadequatelyreflectthelessonsofcounterinsurgen-cyandclosequarterscombatinIraqandAfghanistan.”

AnacquisitiondecisionmemorandumcanceledtheFCSBCTprogramandreplaceditwith“amodern-izationplanconsistingofanumberofseparatebutintegratedacquisitionprograms”calledtheBrigadeCombatTeamModernizationPlan.

S IncorporatingtheMRAPIncludingtheMRAPintheFCSBCTprogramand

nowtheBrigadeCombatTeamModernizationPlanwasasoundmoveonthepartofDODbothfromthebudget-aryperspectiveandfromapracticalperspectivewithinthedomainsofdoctrine,organization,training,materiel,leadershipandeducation,personnel,andfacilities.

AccordingtoFeickert’sreport,morethan15,000MRAPsarebeingusedinIraqandAfghanistan.TheMRAP’ssuccessinoperationsanditssurvivabilityfromattacksfromminesandimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)areduemainlytoitsuniquev-shapedhulldesignandarmorplating.ThisdesignisneitherradicalnornewsincetheSouthAfricanDefenseForcehasbeenusingitforyears,butincorporatingthisvehicleintoU.S.operationsisnewandcontinuestobeadevelopmentalprocess.

StaffmembersattheCenterforArmyLessonsLearnedatFortLeavenworth,Kansas,aresupportingdoctrinedevelopmentrelatedtotheMRAP.Thecen-ter’sstaffisresponsibleforcapturinglessonslearnedinthefieldandproducingwrittenproductsthatassistdeployedSoldiersandthosetrainingfordeploymentinincorporatingtactics,techniques,andprocedures.ThisdoctrinealsohelpsunitstoadjusttheirorganizationinpreparationfordeploymentandincorporatetheMRAPintotheirformations.

MoreVehiclesEqualsMoreTrainingAsunitsreturnfromdeploymentandbeginthepro-

cessofresettingforthenextpossiblemission,theuseofMRAPvehiclesinunit-leveltrainingandqualifica-tionswillbecomestandard.

AccordingtoFeickert,“TheArmyplansonallo-cating702MRAPsfortraininginadditiontothe50MRAPsalreadydesignatedfortrainingdrivers.”ThisincreaseinavailablevehiclesfortrainingwillensurethatnewSoldiersarrivingatunitsthatarepreparingtodeploywilltraininthebasicskillsetsneededtomain-tainandoperateMRAPvehicles.

TheincreaseinvehiclesavailablefortrainingwillalsoallowMRAPtrainingtobeincorporatedintoleadertrainingprograms,suchasofficerbasicandcareercoursesandbranch-specificnoncommissionedofficercourses.

The mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle has proven its worth in Iraqand Afghanistan, prompting leaders to include it in brigade combat teammodernization plans.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 49

ThenextgenerationofwarriorsandleaderswilltrainonMRAPsreturningfromtheoperationalfleet.Theonlydifferenceatthetrainingcentersistheadditionofanewsimulatordevelopedtoaddresstheshortfallinthenumberofvehiclesavailablefortraining.NowMRAPsimulatorsthatwereusedinlieuofvehicletrainingwillinsteadbeusedtopreparestudentsbeforetheygetbehindthewheel.Wehavethepersonnel;wejusthavetogetthemtrained.

FuturePlansfortheMRAPInanAugust2009CongressionalResearchService

reportontheMRAP,FeickertlaidouttheU.S.Army’splanfortheMRAP:

AsU.S.forcesbegindrawingdowninIraq,theArmyandMarinesplantoputthemajorityofMRAPsintoprepositionedstocksatvariousover-seaslocations,shipanumberbacktotheUnitedStatesfortraining,andplaceanumberintologis-ticsandrouteclearanceunits.OutoftheArmy’seventual12,000Iraq-basedMRAPs,theArmyplanstouseonly2,675inoperationalunits.

ItwouldseemthattheArmyhasanabundanceofthematerielandfacilitiesneededtoincorporatetheMRAPintofutureplans.TheproblemarisingnowisthatSecretaryGatesisdirectinganincreaseinthenumberofMRAPsslatedtoreplaceplannedFCSvehi-clesinoperationalunitsandadecreaseinthenumberofMRAPsgoingintopre-positionedstocks.

TheArmyandtheMarineCorpsareworkingtobal-ancethisguidancewiththeircurrentplans.AccordingtoFeickert,SecretaryGatesis“concernedthattheFCSprogramdidnotincludearoleforMRAPsandimplied

thatthereneededtobeagreaterroleforMRAPsintheArmy’svehiclemodernizationplan.”

Toaddresstheseissues,theArmyhasreplacedtheFCSprogramwiththeArmyBrigadeCombatTeamModernizationPlanandincludedMRAP.Justasexist-ingsystems,suchastheStryker,couldbeusedtoreplacetheagingM113fleetintheBCTs,MRAPscouldbeusedtoreplacehighlyvulnerablevehicles.Aspartofthenewplan,theMRAPwillreplacevehicles,likethemilitarypoliceup-armoredhigh-mobilitymul-tipurposewheeledvehicleandmultipurposetransportvehiclesusedforlogisticsconvoys.

DODhasspent$26.815billionontheMRAPpro-gramsincefiscalyear2006.Thissignificantinvest-mentinavehiclefamilyshouldbeincorporatedintotheArmy’sBrigadeCombatTeamModernizationPlan.AlthoughtheMRAPwasnotpartoftheoriginalFCSprogram,itsdesignbridgesacapabilitiesgapinIraqandAfghanistan.PlacingMRAPsinstoragewouldbelikeparkingallthetanksafterOperationDesertStormandthenpullingthemout12yearslaterforOperationIraqiFreedom—itwoulddecreasethevehicles’effec-tiveness.SecretaryGatesismovingtheArmyintherightdirectionbyinsistingonincorporatingMRAPsintofutureArmyplanstoupgradeBCTs.

Major dale b. “woody” woodHouse is an arMor officer and a forMer Marine and is currently attendinG tHe arMy coMMand and General staff colleGe. He Holds b.a. deGrees in GoVernMent and econoMics and is a Graduate of tHe arMor officer basic course, scout platoon leader course, field artillery captains career course, and inforMation operations qualification course. He also Has been selected to attend tHe scHool of adVanced Military studies.

Mine­resistant ambush­pro­

tected (MRAP) vehicles are pre­

pared in an Army Materiel Com­mand fielding

area in Afghani­stan before they are delivered to

Polish forces. MRAPs have

been in the Army’s inventory since fiscal year

2006 but have only recently

become a part of brigade combat

team moderniza­tion plans. (Photo

by Sharon L. Strickland, 401st

AFSB)

50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heimportanceofriversandwaterwaysinworldhistorycannotbeignored.Theyhaveprovidedwaterfordrinkingandagriculture,actedashigh-ways,andformednaturalboundaries.InMesopotamia(modern-dayIraq),theTigris,theEuphrates,andtheShattal-Arab(whichflowsfromtheconfluenceoftheTigrisandEuphratestothePersianGulf)aretheprimaryrivers.DuringtheMesopotamianCampaigninWorldWarI,theseriversprovideddrinkingwater,facilitatedlogisticsandfiresupportactivities,anddirectlyaffectedtroopmovements.

Duringthecampaignfrom1914to1918,BritishandOttomanTurkishforcesusednewtechnologytoaugmenttraditionalwaysofoperatingwithintheregion.Riversteamers,railroads,andmotorizedvehiclesoperatedsidebysidewithtraditionalwatercraftandlandconveyances,formingalinkbetweenthepastandthepresent.

BasraTheancientportofBasra,homeofthelegendarySinbad,

haslongbeenanimportantaccesspointintoMesopotamia.SittingastridetheShattal-Arab,itprovideseasyaccesstothePersianGulffromtheinteriorandtotheTigrisandEuphratesriversfromthePersianGulf.DuringWorldWarI,forOttomansinIraqandforlocals,Basraactedasapointofentry,wheresuppliesfromtheoutsideworldwereunloadedfromoceangoingshipsandsentupriveronlocalwatercraft.

FortheBritish,thecitycontrolledoilexportsfromtheGulfregion.In1914,theoilfieldsofsouthernMesopotamiaprovidedthebulkoftheoilfortheRoyalNavy.Toprotectthisresource,asmallBritishforce,consistingmostlyofunitsfromtheBritishIndianArmy,capturedthefortatAlFaoon6November1914.Twoweekslater,theBritishcap-turedBasra.Afterthat,therewasahiatusinmajoractions.

SinbadwouldhavefoundBasrain1914littlechangedfromthedaysofthemedievalAbbasidEmpire.Thecityconsistedmostlyofsmallpatchesofhigh,drygroundsurroundedbylow-lyingmuddyareasandtheShattitself.Intherainyseason,though,eventheraisedareasflooded.Eveninidealconditions,movementwithinthecitywasdifficult.

Thedearthofmotorizedrivercraftcomplicatedmove-ment.Oceangoingshipswereforcedtoanchorinthemiddle

RiversofLife,RiversofDeath:TheWorldWarIMesopotamianCampaign

by MicHael yarborouGH

T

Geographic factors such as mountains, rivers, and climate can help or hinder military operations. A good example of this is the World War I conflict between the British and the Ottoman Turks in what is now Iraq, where rivers in the desert limited offensive flexibility but provided channels for support.

oftheriverandawaitunloadingbyacoupleofArablight-ersthatregularlyservicedonlytwoshipsevery3weeks.Wharfs,warehouses,andalltheothernecessaryinfrastruc-tureofamodernportwerecompletelylacking.

Inshort,givenitsconditionin1914,BasracouldnothavebeenaworseplacefortheBritishtobaseanarmy.However,withtheBritishArmy’sinitiallimitedobjectivesofprotectingtheoilfields,thesmallforcewassufficient.Nopreparationoreventhoughtwasgiventosupportingalargerforce.Asaresult,whentheBritishMesopotamianExpeditionaryForcebeganmajoroperationslaterinthewar,itsufferedmanylogisticshandicaps.

DrinkingWaterNeedlesstosay,thedesertconditionsofIraqmake

militaryoperationsmoredifficultbecauseoftheneedtostaynearfreshwatersources.Today,thepresenceofmotorizedvehiclesandairplanesenablesforcestobesuppliedvirtuallyanywhere.Thatwasnotthecasein1914.AlthoughcarsandtruckswereusedextensivelyineverytheaterduringWorldWarI,theyneverformedmorethanhalfofthetotalsupplytrainineventhebestsuppliedareas.

InMesopotamia,whereeverythingwasalwaysinshortsupply(forbothsides),motorvehicleswerenotevenaremoteoption.HistorianA.J.Barker,inhis1967bookThe Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign of 1914−1918,notesthatBritishplannersinIndiagavelittleconsiderationtotheneedforwatercartstoMeso-potamia.Ottomanforcesalsolackedsufficientmeanstotransportwateroverlargedistances.

Asaresult,boththeBritishandOttomanlandforceswereforcedtofollowthemadlywindingTigrisandEuphrates,exceptwherealoopintherivercouldbeavoidedbyashortmarch.Theneedtostayneartheriv-ersisoneexplanationforwhymostofthebattleswerefoughtneartherivers.Barker’sbookispepperedwithexamplesofthirstbecominganissuewhensoldiersstrayedfromtheriver.

Duringengagements,theconcernforstayingclosetowatersourceswasparticularlyserious.AtthebattleofEsSinnon28September1915,whichledtothecapture

©MichaelYarborough2011.Reproductionforpersonalandeducationalpurposesisauthorized.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 51

ofKut,BritishMajorGeneralSirCharlesVereFerrersTownshendsentsomeofhismen5to10milesawayfromtheTigristoflanktheTurkishpositions.(KutalAmarawasatownlocated100milessoutheastofBagh-dadinabendoftheTigris.)

Afteranightmarchandadayoffighting,thetroopswereexhausted,havinggonewithoutwaterexceptforthecontentsoftheirwaterbottlessincethenightbefore.Barkernotes,“Likethemen,theanimalswerenearlymadwiththirst,”andconsequentially“anumberofmulesmadeadashfortheclosestmarsh,becameboggeddowninthemud,andwerequicklysnipedbytheTurks.”

Becauseoftheinabilitytotransportsufficientwaterfarfromtherivers,mostoperationswerenotabletotakefulladvantageoftacticalsituationsfordiversionaryandflank-ingmaneuvers.

TransportationRivershavetraditionallybeentheeasiestandmosteffi-

cientmeansoftransportingbulkyshipments.MartinVanCreveld,inSupplying War: Logistics from Wallerstein to Patton,makesthepointthatin17thcenturyEuropestra-tegicmobilitywasseverelylimitedbyrivers—notbecauseofdifficultiesincrossingthembutbecausetheyweretheprincipalhighwaysforheavygoods.Theobviousfactthatriversdonotgoeverywhereacommandermightwishmeantfreedomofactionwasseverelycurtailed.

TheTigrisandtheEuphrateswerenoexceptiontothisfact,andthepresenceofmuddy,marshyterrainoutsidetherivers’immediatevicinitiesonlyincreasedthechallengeofmovingarmies(aswellasthechallengeofobtainingsuf-ficientdrinkingwater).Exceptduringtheworstperiodsoftherainyandfloodseasons,thesemarshescouldbenegoti-atedbymenandhorses,buthaulingheavyequipmentwasoutofthequestionthroughouttheyear.Inthisrespect,theBritishandOttomanarmiesmerelyadoptedlongestab-lishedmeansofmovingheavyequipmentintheregion.

Inusingtherivers,bothsidesadaptedmoderntechnol-ogytothenaturalconditions.Nativecraft,whosedesignshadremainedvirtuallyunchangedforcenturies,weresupplementedwithoil-andsteam-poweredcraftwheneverpossibleformovingmenandequipment.

Poweredgunboatsalsoformedanintegralpartofthecampaign.Gunboatsnotonlyprotectedsuppliesbutwentontheoffensive:Sinceoperationswereconfinedtotheriverbanks,theyfrequentlyprovidedfiresupportforinfantryoperations.BritishgunboatssuchastheHMSEspiegleandHMSFireflyparticipatedinmanyoffensiveactions,buttheywereoftendelayedbyhiddensandbarsandOttoman-laidriverobstructions.

Themajorrestrictingelementforbothsideswasachronicshortageofmodernboatsofeverykind.ThisshortagebecamepainfullyevidentastheMesopotamianExpeditionaryForceattemptedtomountareliefofGen-eralTownshend’sforcesbesiegedatKutinearly1916.ThelackofrivercraftmeantthattheBritishreliefwasunabletorapidlypitanoverwhelmingforceofmenandequipmentagainsttheOttomanbesiegers.

DespiteseveralvaliantattemptstobreakthroughOtto-manlines,Townshend,withhismenstarving,surrenderednearly10,000BritishandIndiansoldierson29April1916aftera5-monthsiege.Themajorityofthesecap-tivesdiedofstarvation,exhaustion,disease,orcrueltybytheirTurkishcaptors.

ThefallofKutfinallyspurredtheBritishtoaddresstheirtransportationproblemsintheMesopotamianthe-ater.Additionalmotorizedgunboatsandsupplyboatswereaddedtothefleet,andalternativesweresought—primarilyarailroadfromBasratothefront.TheOtto-manswereunabletosupplynewboatsandtheironlyavailablerailroadendedinBaghdad,sotheycouldnotreplacetheirlosses.Themostmoderntransportationtech-nologiesofthetime—automobilesandairplanes—weremostlyusedforreconnaissanceandplayedlittletonoroleinlogistics.Sorivertransportationremainedthepri-marymeansofconveyance.

OncetheBritishresolvedtheirtransportationprob-lems,theywereabletobringsuperiornumbersagainsttheirOttomanadversaries,whomtheypushedbackintonorthernIraqbyNovember1918.

RiversasTacticalBarriersTheTigrisandtheEuphratesalsoweretacticalbarri-

erstomovement.Theshortageofrivercraftandbridgesmeantcommandershadtopaycarefulattentiontohowtheydeployedtheirforcesbecause,intheheatofbattle,shiftingforcesacrosstheriverswasdifficultandtimeconsuming.Asaresult,commandersfacedchallengesincapitalizingontacticalopportunitiesandrepositioningforcestomeetunexpectedcontingencies.Althoughonlyseparatedbyariver—andashallowoneatthat—forcesonoppositesidesoftheTigrisduringcombatmightaswellhavebeenseparatedbyanocean.

DuringthebattleofEsSinn,GeneralTownshendsuc-cessfullydeceivedtheTurksintothinkinghewouldattackontherightsideoftheriverwhileheactuallyplannedtoattackontheleft.AftertheTurkshadtakenthebaitandtransferredthebulkoftheirreservestotherightandwereunabletospeedilycrossthembackover,Townshendlaunchedhismainattackontheleft.ThisforcedthemainTurkishforcetoretreattopreventbeingsurrounded.ThesegamesofdeceptioncharacterizedmuchofthefightinginMesopotamiaduringWorldWarI.

TheTigris,Euphrates,andShattal-ArabwaterwaysdefinedthebattlespacefortheBritishandOttomanforcesduringtheMesopotamianCampaignofWorldWarI.Theneedforwaterandtransportationmeantthatbattleswerealsofoughtneartheserivers.Theywere,quiteliter-ally,bothriversoflifeandriversofdeathfortheBritish,Indian,andOttomansoldiersinvolved.

MicHael yarborouGH is a Historian at tHe arMy center of Military History. He Holds a bacHelor’s deGree in History and pHilosopHy froM jaMes Madison uniVersity and a Master’s deGree in History froM GeorGe Mason uniVersity.

52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

CreatingaKnowledgeManagementCultureattheArmySoldierSupportInstitute

by stePHan d. Wilcox

hecreationofaknowledgemanagementculture,fromtheinceptiontothedeliveryofaworking,results-orientedsystem,requiresleaderinvolve-ment,customerbuy-inandsupport,andsupportfromtheArmyEnterpriseArchitecture.Italsorequiresadis-tinctculturalshiftandtheabandonmentofthetechnol-ogycomfortzoneinwhichmostpeopleareensconced.

ThecreationoftheArmySoldierSupportInstitute’s(SSI’s)knowledgemanagementculturewasnoexception.WhileSSI’svariousorganizationsworkedhardtodevelopproductsfortheirconstituentsandinnovativewaystodobusiness,informationandprocesseswerenotbeingsharedthroughoutthecommand.SSIwasalsoplaguedwithredundanciesandincompatibilities(bothinternalandexternal).Andnoteveryonesawtheneedtochange.

IdentifyingKnowledgeManagementNeedsSSI’sleaderswerecriticaltoinstitutingaknowl-

edgemanagementculture.SeniorleaderstookabroadlookacrossthecommandandrecognizedtheneedforacollaborativeenvironmentofbothexplicitandtacitknowledgeforSoldiersandcivilians.TheSSIcom-mandinggeneral,whowasdirectlyinvolvedintheeffort,identifiedthequalificationshewantedinSSI’sknowledgemanagementchief.Helookedforsomeonewithexperienceininformationtechnology,softwareapplications,andtheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)trainingmodel.

Oncetheknowledgemanagementteamwasinplace,itsfirstassignmentwastoassesscurrentsystems,processes,andtrackingmethods.Theobjectivewastoeliminateredundanciesandincreaseproductivity.Therapidassessment,whichtookapproximately30days,uncoveredmultipleissuesthataffectedday-to-dayfunctions,theintegrityoftheeducationalsystem,andorganizationalefficiency.Amongtheissueswere—o Systemsandprocessesthatwereindividual

solutionsinsteadofSSIstandardequipment,applications,orprocedures.

o Apublicwebsitethatofferedvisitorsonlygeneral

T informationandnootherbenefits.o Severalsystemsforthedeliveryofdistributive

learningthatdidnotalwaystrackstudents’officialcreditsforcoursecompletions.

o Asharedlocalareanetworkdrivethathadreacheditsstoragelimitandcouldnotbeaccessedfromoffpost.

o Uncertaintyaboutwhetherinstructorswereusingthesamecoursematerials(causedbytheuseofvariousstoragemethodsinsteadofonecommonrepository).

o Thepervasiveuseofmanualprocesses,includingprintingpapercopiestosubmitworkandadministrativeactions.

o Afailuretosharegoodsystemsamongtheindividualschoolsanddirectorates.

o Alackofmethodsforcollectingtacitknowledge.

CreatingtheKnowledgeManagementCultureAftercarefulconsideration,SSI’sleadersdecided

touseArmyEnterpriseArchitecturesystemstocon-solidatetheknowledgemanagementaspectsofallSSIunits.Bychoosinganenterpriseapproach,SSIloweredcostsandeliminatedcertainresourcerequire-ments.Mostimportantly,itcreatedasingleportalaccessiblebyallSSIorganizations.Thisconsolidationhaspaidtremendousdividendsinrecentmonths.

Theknowledgemanagementteamstartedbycon-vertingSSI’spublicwebsitestomatchtheArmystan-dardandmakingthemportalstoallSSIsystemsandprocesses.ThecommandthenselectedBlackboardasthemediumtodelivercoursetestingmaterialsandreportoninstitutionaltraining.ThecommandchosetheArmyLearningManagementSystemforalldistrib-utedlearning.

TheknowledgemanagementteamimplementedtheTRADOCSharePointsystemasthemediumforcol-laboration.Thisonechangehadthelargestimpactonthecommandandtheinculcationofaknowledgemanage-mentculture.Bycreatingacentralrepositoryforinstruc-tionalmaterialsthatisaccessibletoallpersonnel,SSI

The Army Soldier Support Institute recognized that it needed to improve its knowledge management processes and made the changes necessary to start sharing information more efficiently and effectively.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 53

canensurethatinstructorsareteachingthesameinfor-mation.Coursedeveloperscanfieldupdatesinweeksinsteadofmonths,andSharepoint’sworkflowcapabilityreducesapprovaltimefromweekstodays.Evenuserswhoareawayfromtheofficecankeepprojectsmovingforward.

Perhapsmostimportantinaneraofconstantopera-tions,SSIcannoweasilytappeopleworldwidetocollaborateonlessonslearned—anessentialfactorinkeepingcoursematerialsandtrainingrelevant.BecausegraduatescanreachbacktoSSI,smallunitshavebegunusingthesystemasatrainingresourcewhileinthefield.

SharePointalsohelpedthecommandtorefineitsprocesses.Forinstance,throughInfoPath,SSIhasautomatedcommonactionsandrequests.AG–3tasksitenowallowsreal-timeinput.Thecommandalsoaddedaninformationtechnologyhelpdeskandtaughtself-helpstepstoreduceworkordersandimproveindividualperformance.PersonnelattendquarterlyknowledgemanagementworkinggroupstoshareideasandsolutionsthroughoutSSI.

TheSharePointsitewascreatedinMarch2009,andinitialtrainingwascompletedinApril.(Trainingfornewpersonnelornewtechniquesoccursquarterlyandisprovidedbyin-housesubject-matterexperts.)Eachdirectoratehasadministratorrightsandisresponsibleforitsownsite.Today,SharePointisthoroughlyinte-gratedintoSSIoperations,andknowledgemanage-mentisintegratedintotheSSImindset.

Knowledgemanagementisneverstatic.SSIiscurrentlyassessingitsknowledgemanagementplanagainsttheArmyLearningConcept2015andwillmodifyitasnecessary.SSIalsoisconductinganacross-the-boardevaluationtoimprovedesignsandfunctions.ThecommandwillsoondeployonSharePointatacitknowledgesystemthatiscurrentlyusedatFortBragg,NorthCarolina.

BestPracticesandLessonsLearnedBasedonSSI’sexperience,thebestpathforinsti-

tutingasuccessfulknowledgemanagementculturefollowsthesesteps:leadershipacknowledgementandbuy-in,assessmentofcurrentstatusandneeds,designofaholisticsolution,developmentofasolution,implementation,andevaluationandrefinement.Takingastepoutoforder—say,developingasolutionwithouthavingconductedathoroughassessment—increasesthechancesforanincompleteorfailedeffort.

Whenestablishingaknowledgemanagementcul-ture,knowledgemanagementmanagersandproponentsshould—o Makesuretheirleadersunderstandthepurposeof

knowledgemanagement,andbepreparedtoshowtangiblebenefitsfromknowledgemanagementinitiativesandprocesses.

o Producepolicylettersthatdemonstratetheleaders’interestintheproject,andgetthewholeorganizationonboard.

o Decideoncoresystems,andbecomeexpertatthem.(Newtoolsareablessing,butthetrainingandacceptancetimeforend-userscandefeatthepurpose.)

o LeverageArmyenterprisesolutionsbecausetheyinvolvenocosttotheorganization,makemodificationsmucheasiertoexecute,andstreamlineassistancefromotheragencies.Theenterpriseoftencanprovidetrainingandsupportpackages,aswell.

o Buildthemodelknowingthattherequirementswillchange,andusetheArmyLearningConcept2015asanexample.

o IncludenotonlyknowledgemanagementtrainingbutalsosoftwareapplicationtrainingintheSoldierandciviliantrainingplan.

o Assigntasks,responsibilities,andownershipatthelowestlevel.

o Includeeveryoneintheeffortsothatgoodideasaresharedandpoorprocessesareeliminatedbeforetheybecomecommon.

o GetthesupportofG–6knowledgemanagementchampionstoensurethattheknowledgemanage-mentcultureisdeployedinatimelymanner.

o Attendasmanytrainingseminarsaspossible,inpersonoronline.Seeingothermethodsandpracticescanonlybenefittheorganization.

o Usethefeedbackmechanismsthatareavailableineverysystemtoidentifytherefinementsthatareneeded.

o Createatrackingsystemformodificationssothatthecommanderhasaccuratedatatouseinmakingdecisions.

o Bepreparedforpushback(changeisdifficult),andbepreparedtoshow“brightspots”ofsuccess.

o Recognizeknowledgemanagementchampions.Tangibleresultsdeservetangiblerewardsandacknowledgement.Manypeoplearecompetitive;takeadvantageofthisfact.

Themetamorphosisintoaknowledgemanagementculturehasbeenfairlyquickandisdueinparttoleaderemphasis(includingacommandpolicymemorandum)andthestaff’srecognitionofthepotentialbenefits.

Knowledgemanagementisnotafad.Itisheretostay,anditisanextremelypowerfultool.SSIismoreeffectiveandefficientthaneverbefore,andithasnotyetmaximizedthebenefitsofknowledgemanage-ment.EveryleveloftheArmyandtheDepartmentofDefensemustembraceknowledgemanagement.WeoweittotheSoldiers,Sailors,Airmen,Marines,andtaxpayerstogetthemostoutofourorganizations.

stepHan d. wilcox is tHe knowledGe ManaGeMent officer at tHe recruitinG and retention scHool, arMy soldier support institute.

54 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

RaisingMechanicSkillstoIndustryStandards

by cHieF Warrant oFFicer 2 MattHeW r. Mccaslin

ncriticalsituationswhencombatequipmentmustbereturnedtothefight,waitingonpartscanbedetrimentaltoacommander’sabilitytomaneuveronthebattlefieldandwinincombat;itcanevencostthelivesofU.S.Soldiers.TheArmy’scurrentopera-

I tionalenvironmentoftenresultsinmechanicsbeingconstrainedbyalimitedoroverburdeneddistributionnetwork,whichhasledtoshortfallscausedbylongleadtimesinreceivingreplacementparts.WiththeArmyspreadaroundtheworld,unit-levelpartsprocurement

isnotalwaysaseasyasstoppingatthenearestsupplysupportactivity.Sometimesmaintainersmustfocusonrepairingmajorassembliesandplaceastrongemphasisonproperfaultdiagnosis.

Duringthepast10yearsofcon-flict,theArmyhaslearnedhowimportantwarriortasksanddrillsareandhasreactedbyemphasizingthatallSoldiersareriflemenfirst.Wearelearningfromcurrentoper-ationsthattechnicalproficiencymaybejustasimportant.However,mechanicsarrivingatunitstodayoftenarenotcompetenttechnicianspreparedtotackleadvanceddiag-nostics,andunitsdonothavetheresourcesandtimerequiredtotraintothislevel.

Moderncomputerizeddieselenginesarenotjustintrucks.TheyarethedrivingforcebehindtheArmy.Computer-controlledenginespowerourgenerators,transporta-tionequipment,fightingvehicles,materials-handlingequipment,andmarineequipment.Dieselengines

The Army needs mechanics with skills beyond those taught in advanced individual training. Private-sector certification programs offer a solution.

An Army mechanic assigned to the 1st Battalion, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, checks the engine fan on a high­mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle while working in the motor­pool vehicle maintenance section at Multinational Base Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan. (Photo by TSgt Michele A. Desrochers, USAF)

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 55

movetheArmy.Theseenginesarenottheblacksmokepuffersofagenerationago.

ManyoftheArmy’scurrentengineshaveadvancedmechanismslikestackedpiezoelectricwafersintheirinjectionsystems,variablegeometryturbochargers,andaccelerometerpilotcontrolunits.Thesemodernenginesarecomputer-controlledmonsterswithsignificantcapa-bility.Buttheyrequireatechnicianwhoiswelltrainedtoservice,maintain,andtroubleshootthem.

TheNeedtoIncreaseProficiencyAstheArmysettlesintothemodularforcestructure,

mechanicsfromseveralmilitaryoccupationalspecial-ties(MOSs)havebeenstreamlinedintoa“super”mechaniccalledthe91B,wheeledvehiclemechanic(MOS91B).TheArmymechanichasbecomeamul-ticapablemaintainerwhoisrequiredtotroubleshootusingadvancedonboarddiagnosticsandincreasinglycomplex,interconnectedvehiclesystems.

Yearsago,aSoldierwithabasicunderstandingofenginetheorycouldrepairahigh-mobilitymultipur-posewheeledvehicle.Withtoday’sequipment,aSol-diermustbeaproficienttechnicianwhounderstandshowinformationisbeingfedintothecomputerfromseveralsensorsandwhoisfamiliarwiththedifferentvehiclesystemsthatcouldcreatethesymptomheisdiagnosing.

Modernvehiclescanhaveasmanyas50micropro-cessorsonboard.Themodernmaintainermustbeabletousesophisticateddiagnostictrouble-codescannersandtheninterpretandapplythedatageneratedbythescannerstorepairtheequipment.Onthebattlefield,maintenanceSoldierswithouttheseskillslimitopera-tionsinaustereconditionsbyextendingdown-timescausedbyimproperlydiagnosedfaults.Thisisaseveredetrimenttocommanderswhoneedtheirstate-of-the-artequipmentreturnedtothefightquickly.

Civiliantradeschoolsformechanicsare1to2years;theArmyisgraduatingmechanicsevery13weeks.ItistimefortheArmytorevolutionizetechnicaltrainingtomeettheneedsofthecombatantcommander.

ArmyVocationalTrainingDuringfiscalyear2009,theArmyconducted

theArmyVocationalTrainingProgram(AVOTEC).ThroughAVOTEC,aSoldiercouldattendtrainingatacivilianvocationalortechnicalschoolandpursueanon-degree-relatedcertification.AVOTECcouldbeusedasamodelforafuturemulticapable,“maintainer-warrior”advancedindividualtraining(AIT).

ManyofthecertificationsofferedthroughAVO-TECwereintheautomotivetechnicalfield.Thesecivilianprogramsuseabuilding-blockapproachthatstartswiththefundamentalprinciplesofsystemoperationandprogressesgraduallytocomplexdiag-nosticandserviceprocedures.Thecoursescoverthelatestdevelopmentsintheautomotivefield,includinganonboarddiagnosticssystem(OBDII),enhancedemissionstesting,misfiremonitoring,andantilockbrakingsystems.

AVOTECalsooffereddieselcertificationthatcov-eredindepthinstructionondieselenginetheoryanddesign,engineperformance,lubricationsystems,induc-tionexhaustandafter-treatmentsystems,hydrostatictransmissions,heavy-dutytorqueconverters,powertrainprinciples,antilockbrakingairsystems,andmuchmore.

AutomotiveServiceExcellenceTheNationalInstituteforAutomotiveService

Excellence(ASE)isanonprofitorganizationthatadministersexamsthatstressknowledgeofjob-relatedskills.ASE’stestsareindustry-drivenandaregroupedintospecialtiesthatcovervirtuallyeveryon-highwayvehicleservicesegment.

AlthoughASEcertificationisavailabletoSoldiers,itisnotwidelyusedorpursued,eventhoughtheArmypaysformostofthecredentialingcosts.ASEtestsaredesignedtoguaranteeamechaniciscompetenttoperformtospecificstandardsestablishedbytheentireautomotiveindustry.Soldierswhoworkonthesamelevelofcompli-catedequipmentasciviliantechniciansshouldmeetthatminimumstandard.However,mostSoldiermechanics,ifforcedtotakethetests,wouldnotbeabletopass.

AVOTECwasorganizedaroundtheASEautomo-biletestareasandcorrelateddirectlywithstandardssetbytheNationalAutomotiveTechniciansEducationFoundation(NATEF).TheAVOTECcurriculumwasdesignedtoeducateamechanictothecompetencylevelrequiredtobeabletoefficientlyandaccuratelydiagnosemodernequipment.Uponcompletion,stu-dentsreceivednationallyrecognizedcertificationfromcommunitycollegesandtechnicaltradeschools.

AVOTECPossibilitiesWhileAVOTEClasted,itwasverysuccessfuland

manyArmymechanicsreceivedcertificationintheirfield.TheprogramlostfundingfromCongressinfiscalyear2009,butthelessonlearnedwasthatthistypeof

The Army mechanic has become a multicapable

maintainer who is required to troubleshoot using

advanced onboard diagnostics and

increasingly complex, interconnected vehicle

systems.

56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

tradeschooltrainingshouldbeintegratedfullyintotheArmy’strainingprogramformechanics.Thiswouldben-efittheArmyinseveralways:o Soldierrecruitingincentivesfortechnicalfields

wouldbeincreasedbecause,whileintheArmy,theSoldierswouldreceiveaccreditationthatwouldcorrelatedirectlytothecivilianworld.

o TheArmycouldrelylessoncontractorstoprovidemaintenancesincetheirownmechanicswouldhavetheexpertiseneededtorepairmodernequipment.

o Commanderswouldenjoyincreasedreadinessratesbecauseofproperfaultdiagnosis.

o Maintenancecostswouldbereducedasaresultofincreasedtroubleshootingaccuracy.Theadditionalcostsforthespecializedtraining

couldbeoffsetusingadistance-learningprogram.Tra-ditionaltradeschoolintheautomotivefieldisatleast1yearlongandoften2years.TheArmycouldreducethistimebyusinganonlineclassroom.Studentsofdistancelearninghavecomparabletestscorestoclass-roomstudents,andthestudent-to-instructorratiocanbeincreasedgreatlyonline.Byusingadistancelearningprogram,in-classtimecouldbereducedbyasmuchas50percent.

Dailyhomeworkusingthevirtualclassroomtosupplementandreinforcetrainingobjectiveswouldincreaseknowledgeretentionandcontributetoreducedtrainingtime.AcombinationofNATEFstandardsandtrade-school-styletraining,supplementedwithhome-workinanonlineclassroom,couldcreatea6-monthtechnicalschoolthatproduceshighlyqualifiedmechanics.

CertifyingMechanicsasTrueTechniciansToensurethatmechanicsarepreparedtorepair

modernequipment,certificationshouldbeanAITgraduationrequirement.ASEcertificationisathird-party,unbiasedendorsementthataSoldierhasclearlydemonstratedproficiencyinasubjectarea.Instruc-torsteachthesubjectratherthanthetest,andstudentsgraspaconceptratherthantestanswersbecausetheyhavenoforeknowledgeofthetestquestions.ToreachtheproficiencylevelrequiredtopassASEexams,Sol-diersalreadyinthefieldwoulduseavirtualclassroomtotakecourseslikethoseprovidedbyAVOTEC.

AlongwiththeASEcertification,anapprenticeshipprogramshouldbedevelopedwiththeU.S.Depart-mentofLabor.Withthisprogram,onceinthefield,mechanicswouldlogtheirhoursworkingin16dif-ferentareas,suchasenginesandbrakes.Dependingonthetechnicaleducationlevelandexperience,eachmechanicwouldlogfrom2,000to8,000hoursofhands-onworkinordertocompletetheprogram.Non-commissionedofficerswouldserveasexperiencedandskilledjourneymenwhoteachthepracticalskillsthatarelearnedonthejob.

Theschoolhousetrainingwouldbefollowedupinapracticalwayusingastructured,systematicprogramofsupervisedon-the-jobtraining.Theloggedhourswouldbeverifiedbythesupervisor,whowouldalsomonitortheSoldiers’proficiencyineacharea.Uponcompletionoftheprogram,theSoldierwouldreceivehisjourneymanmechanic’slicensefromtheDepart-mentofLabor.ThiscertificationisclearlyidentifiedandcommonlyrecognizedthroughouttheindustryandwouldvalidatetheSoldier’sskillset.

Usingthird-partyaccreditationtocertifythatSol-diersarepreparedforwhattheywillfaceinthefieldisnotanewidea.ArmynetworkoperatorsandmedicsbotharerequiredtoreceivecivilianaccreditationinordertobeMOScertified.Ithasproventoworkwell;ourmedicalfacilitiesandsystemnetworkscontinuetobethebestofanyArmyintheworld.

Oneunit,the551stInlandCargoTransferCompanyinKorea,adaptedacertificationprogramattheunitlevel.Thecompanyhad11Soldiersenrollintechnicalcertificationcoursesand15signupforASEtesting.Usingweeklystudygroupstohelpthemprepare,20percentofthemechanicsearnedASEcertifications.Undertheapprenticeshipprogram,3SoldiersreceivedDepartmentofLaborcertificationsand15areactivelyenrolled.

Acertificationprogramsimilartotheoneusedbythe551stInlandCargoTransferCompanyneedstobephasedintoAIT.Theprogramwouldalsoserveasaruletomeasuremaintenancecollectivetasksinsupportofaunit’smission-essentialtasklist.Itwouldtake2to4yearsforeachmechanictologtherequiredhands-onhoursineachworkareaandcompletethejourney-man’scertification.Thesetaskscouldbetrackedandusedtogaugethemaintenancesection’sabilitytosup-porttheunit’smission.

After10yearsofcombat,unitsarelearningthattheirmechanicsneedtofocusasmuchonMOSskillsastheydoonwarriortasksanddrills.CommandersonthegroundneedtechnicallycompetentSoldierswhomeettheneedsofourverycomplexcurrentoperationalenvironment.Theunit-levelArmylackstheresourcestotraintothisproficiencylevel.Main-tenancetrainingintheArmyneedstobemodeledaftertheindustrytrainingsystemandmeetNATEFstandards.Itistimeforamuch-neededoverhauloftheArmy’smaintenancetrainingprogram.

cHief warrant officer 2 MattHew r. Mccaslin is tHe bat-talion Maintenance officer for tHe 4tH battalion, 1st special forces Group (airborne), at joint base lewis-MccHord, wasHinGton. He is a national institute for autoMotiVe serVice excellence certified tecHnician witH a Vocational certification as a Modern autoMotiVe tecHnician, and He is a journeyMan certified truck MecHanic witH tHe u.s. departMent of labor.

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 57

The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What We Can Do About It. JoshuaC.Ramo,Little,BrownandCom-pany,NewYork,2009,279pages.

JoshuaC.Ramo’sbook,The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What We Can Do About It,hasbeengivenconsid-erableattentionwithintheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommandforitsprojectionofaglobalfuturechar-acterizedbyacceleratinganduncontrollablechange,surprise,andunpredictability.Ramocontendsthatthe“AgeoftheUnthinkable”willbearevolutionaryeraofsurpriseandinnovationwheresmalleventscanhavemomentousconsequencesfortheglobalcommunity.

Tosurvivethisage,Ramosuggeststhatwewillneedtothinkandactlikerevolutionaries,orelsewewillbecomevictimsoftherevolution.Ramo’sidealrevolutionariesarequick-thinkingandfast-actinginsurgentswhowageconstantwaragainstanarrayofever-presentthreatstotheirexistence.“Newworld”thinkingdemandsacceptanceofthebasicunpredict-abilityofthecomingglobalorderand“junking”ofthetraditionalnoncreativethinkingreminiscentofthe“oldworld.”

FundamentaltoRamo’snewworldthinkingistheadoptionof“deepsecurity,”arevolutionary“wayofseeing,thinking,andactingthatacceptsgrowingcomplexityandceaselessnewnessasgivens.”Deepsecurityhasthreeelements:nonlinearthinking,con-text,andresiliency.Nonlinearthinkingisthemostcriticalelement,sinceaccesstotheothertwo(con-textandresiliency)dependsonone’swillingnesstothinkinanonlinearfashion.

Whilelinearthinkingderivesfromthescientificmethod,criticalthinking,andthelogicalapproachthatvaluesobjectivity,nonlinearthinkingisrelativetoone’spointofviewandmovesinmultipledirec-tionsfrommultiplestartingpoints,eschewingthepossibilityorthenecessityofobjectivity.Ramoasso-ciateslinearthinkingwithhierarchicalorganizationswheredecisionsandinformationoriginateatthetopandmovedownwardverticallyandnonlinearthinkingwithdiversity,globalization,multiplepointsofviews,andhorizontal“flattenedorganizations.”

Ramocontendsthattherewillbe“norightfinalviewoftheworld.”Likeotherscaughtinthepost-moderntrap,Ramoleaveshisreaderswithnogoodreasontobelievehisview.Infact,thisstatementcon-stitutesthegreatparadoxofhisbook.Theefficacyofnonlinearthinkingdecreasesinrelationtotheaccep-tanceofRamo’slinearthought.

InregardtotherelationshipbetweentheUnitedStatesandIran,Ramomaintainsthat“swarming

itwithdifferentpolicies,presentsaradicallynewkindofdiplomaticpressurethatisbothresponsiveandflexible,thatdoesn’tcountonanycertainties.”Statementslikethisconvincereadersthat“nonlinear-ity”istheresultofRamo’sdesiretodrawacrowdratherthanagenuineformofpsychosocialbehavior.IfIranianpoliciesarenotaftersomecertainty,whybother?Oncethereaderblowsthroughthepoppsy-chology,Ramoissimplypresentingdifferentstrate-gies,eachofwhichbegsforsomemeasureoflinearcertainty.

Ramostatesthatresiliencywilldefinesecurityinthe21stcentury.Insteadofthelinearapproachthattriestoanticipateeverypossiblecontingency,aresilientnonlinearapproachensuresadaptabilityandsurvival.Resilientpeopledevelopstrong“immunesystem[s]”thatenablethemto“bounceback”fromthechaoticandindeterminatenatureofthenewage.Theyareamoralandbelievethereisnoonerightwayofthinkingordoing.Changeforthemisconstantandawasteofenergytoresist.Theyreadythemselvesforatimewheneveryonewilllivebytheirownrulesorbeforcedtolivebytherulesofsomeoneelse.

IfRamo’snihilisticvisionofthefutureholdstrue,thenonresilientwillbecomethewreckageofbygonecivilizations.Forthemorehopeful,Ramofailstosubstantiatethepremiseofhisbook—thatthereissomethinguniquelyspecialaboutthenewage.Muchofthestrengthofhisargumentliesinanecdotalevi-dencegeneratedtoconvincereadersthatheisawiseandtenuredworldtravelerwhohastalkedtotherightpeople.

Lineartruthbetold,strandsofRamo’sthoughtcanbetracedbacktotheintellectualmoodattheturnofthe20thcenturyamongSocialDarwinistslikeWil-liamGrahamSumnerwhomadeglibassertionsaboutthe“survivalofthefittest”andthesappyintentofCongresstointerferewiththelibertyofmineopera-torsemploying10-year-oldboys.HenryAdams,Sum-ner’smorethoughtfulcontemporary,worriedaboutthe“lawofacceleration”thatwaswhirlingsocietyoutofcontrolandcausingittobreakintoanincalcu-lablenumberofpieces.Hethoughtitmight“requireanewsocialmind”toputitallbacktogether,buthesawnothingtosuggestthemindwouldnotreact.Hewascertain,however,that“itwouldneedtojump.”

Theminddidjump,andthereisnogoodreasontobelieveitwillnotdosoagain.Ramoisnotthefirsttoexperiencetheconfusionanduncertaintyofaworldinrapidorevenunpredictabletransition,norwillhebethelast.

stepHen e. bower, pH.d., is tHe coMMand Historian at tHe arMy soldier support institute at fort jackson, soutH carolina.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

FunctionalArea90OfficiallyReplacedbyLogisticsBranchasPartofLogisticsOfficerChanges

On14September2010,theArmyG–1publishedNotificationofFutureChangeO–1010–02,“DeletionofFunctionalArea(FA)90(Logistics);Establish-mentofBranch(BR)90(Logistics)andRevisionofBranch88(TransportationCorps),Branch91(Ordnance),andBranch92(Quartermaster)”toDepartmentoftheArmyPamphlet611–21,MilitaryOccupationalClassificationandStructure.

Thisnotificationofficiallyestablishesthedocu-mentationoflogisticianpositionsandisanongo-ingaction,continuingfromtheestablishmentoftheLogisticsbranchon1January2008.

Thesignificantchangeslistedinthisnotificationincluderevisingtheareaofconcentration(AOC)specificationsfor90A(Logistics).Allcaptaintocolonelpositionsdocumentedinauthorizationdocu-mentsastransportation(88A,88B,88C,and88D),ordnance(91A),andquartermaster(92Aand92F)willbetransferredtoAOC90Awiththecurrentbasicfunctionalbranchlistedasthesecondarycodeeffec-tiveonandafter1October2011.Thisisforallcom-ponents.

PersonnelinthegradeofcaptainwhocompletetheCombinedLogisticsCaptainsCareerCourses(CLC3)(ActivedutyorReservecomponentcourses)willbetransferredtoAOC90AandwillretaintheirbasicbranchastheirsecondaryAOC.

Transportationpersonnelinthegradeofcap-tainwhohavenotcompletedCLC3oranylogisticsReservecomponentcaptainscareercoursewillbereclassifiedtoAOC88AintheinterimandthenwillbereclassifiedtoAOC90Awithbranch88asthemilitaryoccupationalspecialtycodeuponcompletionofoneofthetwoabovecourses.

Anotherprovisioncallsforallremainingperson-nelinthegradesofmajorthroughcolonelwhoarecurrentlyclassifiedastransportation,ordnance,andquartermasterofficerstobereclassifiedtoAOC90AandretaintheirbasicbranchasthesecondaryAOCpositionofthemilitaryoccupationalspecialtycode.Thisactionwillbecompletednolaterthan30Sep-tember2011andincludesallcomponents.

Fortheremainingtransportationofficersinthegradeoflieutenant,AOCs88B(trafficmanagement),88C(marineandterminaloperations),and88D(motor/railtransportation)aredeletedandalloffi-cerswillbetransferredtoAOC88A(transportationgeneral).

Quartermasterofficerspecificationsfor92A(quar-termastergeneral)willalsoberevised.ThenoticedeletesAOC92F(petroleumandwater)andestab-lishesR8,petroleumandwater,asaskillidentifierassociatedwithAOC90A.Thealreadyexistingskill

identifiersR9,aerialdeliveryandmaterielofficer(rigger),and4V,mortuaryaffairs,willtransfertobeassociatedwithAOC90Aaswell.

Therefore,effective1October2011,allauthoriza-tionsforlogisticsofficersinthegradesofcaptainthroughcolonelwillappearonauthorizationdocu-ments(tablesoforganizationandequipmentortablesofdistributionandallowances)as90A.

Requirementsforfunctionalpositionswillremain.However,afunctionalbillet,suchasamaintenanceofficer,willbelistedontheauthorizationdocumentas90A91.Theauthorizationforapetroleumopera-tionsofficerwillbedocumentedas90A92R8.

Formoreinformation,contactLieutenantColonelKimberlyDarbyattheLogisticsBranchProponencyOffice,ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommandandSustainmentCenterofExcellence,bycalling(804)734–0315.

ArmyHospitalShelvesPaperProcessesforDigitalSupplySysteminAfghanistan

InAugust,the31stCombatSupportHospital(CSH)atCampDwyer,Afghanistan,becamethefirstArmyfacilityinSouthwestAsiatousetheDefenseMedicalLogisticsStandardSupport(DMLSS)sys-tem—anautomatedmedicallogistics(MEDLOG)systemusedtosupportinventorymanagementandpropertyaccountabilityinmedicaltreatmentfacili-ties.ThesystemwasemplacedwiththehelpoftheDMLSSfieldingteam,composedofrepresentativesfromMedicalCommunicationsforCombatCasualtyCare(MC4)andthe6thMedicalLogisticsManage-mentCenteratFortDetrick,Maryland.

DMLSSprovidedtheCSHbettervisibilityandmanagementofitsmedicalsuppliesandsupplychain,aswellasthecapabilitytoprocessthousandsoftransactionselectronically.Withthisnewsystem,the31stCSHimproveditsbusinessprocessesandshelvedoldmethodsthatusedpaperforms.

SergeantFirstClassEnocSantos,amemberoftheDMLSSfieldingteam,saidthatprocessesweremuchdifferentbeforeDMLSS.“Everymorning,medicalpersonnelthroughoutthehospitalandremoteloca-tionshand-carriedordersonpaperformstothemedi-calsupplysection,”Santossaid.“Cliniciansfilledtheordersbywalkingtheaislesliketheywereataneigh-borhoodgrocerystore.Theypulledtheitemsorderedandadditionalsuppliesjustincase.Ifawardranlowonsupplies,someonewalkedtothemedicalsupplysectiontorestock.”

Thesteadystreamofcliniciansthroughthemedi-calsupplysectionmadestockmanagementdifficult.Interruptionscauseddelaysinreorderingsupplies,

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 59

andMEDLOGpersonnelregularlywalkedtheaislestoupdatethelevelsofprovisionsonhand.

BeforeimplementingDMLSS,theMC4teamcon-ductedawall-to-wallinventorythatfurtherprovedtheneedforadigitalmanagementsystem.Theremotetreatmentfacilityhadenoughmedicalsup-pliesonhandtofillordersfordozensoftreatmentfacilitiesthroughoutAfghanistan.

AftertheinstallationofDMLSS,ordersweresub-mittedelectronically.Inoneweek,theunitdigitallyprocessedmorethan1,500transactions,comparedtotheapproximately900ithadaveragedbeforeusingDMLSS.

Thesystemenablesanewproactivebusinessmodelthatallowscustomersinremotelocationstoreceivesuppliesdirectly.Previously,theCSHreceivedorders

andthenroutedsuppliesforwardtotheselocations.ThischangereducedtheinventorystoredbytheCSH.

WithDMLSSempoweringhospitalwardstomanagetheirownstockwithoutvisitingthesupplysection,userscanfocusmoretimeonpatientcare.DMLSSalsoprovideswardstaffwiththecapabilitytosearchelectronicallyforsuppliestoborrowfromotherhospitalwardsifordersaredelayed.

Commandersresponsibleforsupplymanagementandoversighthavealsogainedanadvantagethroughbettervisibilityoftheglobalsupplychain.DataenteredintoDMLSSfeedsintotheJointMedicalAssetRepository.Itservesastheroll-upreportingtoolformedicalsupplymanagement,similartohowtheJointMedicalWorkstationhelpswithmedicalcaresurveillance.

NewWarfighterTrainingSupportPackagesAvailableFromtheArmySoldierSupportInstitute

TheArmySoldierSupportInstitute(SSI)atFortJackson,SouthCarolina,hasreleaseditsfirstthreewarfightertrainingsupportpackages(WTSPs)oncollectivetasks:“PlanTheaterPostalSupport,”“PerformDisbursingOperations,”and“ConductCasualtyOperations.”

TheWTSPsareavailableonS1Netathttps://forums.bcks.army.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=1128699;FinancialManagement(FM)Netathttps://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/622772(underFMTraining);andattheArmyTrainingNetwork(ATN)websiteathttps://atn.army.mil.

TheseWTSPsprovidebasicknowledgeofmaildelivery,financialdisbursingoperations,andcasualtyoperations.Thetrainingmaterialswithineachpackageincludethecollectivetasks,supportingindividualtasks,lessonplans,MicrosoftPowerPointslides,practicalexercisesandsolutions,handouts,andreferencematerials.IndividualsmustbeArmyKnowledgeOnlineaccountholdersinordertoaccessthesetrainingmaterials.

InJanuary2010,theSSITrainingDevelopmentDirectorateembarkedonamissiontodevelopWTSPsfortheAdjutantGeneral(AG)andFMcollectivetasks,withtheobjectiveofprovidingstandardizedtrainingproductsforallAGandFMunitstouseinconductingsectionandteamtraining.“PlanTheaterPostalSupport”and“PerformDis-bursingOperations”wereselectedasthefirstWTSPstobedeveloped,basedonfeedbackobtainedfromfieldunitsduringtheSilverScimitar

pROFESSIONAL DEVELOpMENT

trainingexerciseandaDecember2009FMTrainingSummit.

TheseWTSPscanbeusedcollectivelyorindividuallytoassistAGandFMSoldiersingaining,maintaining,andimprovingtheirtechnicalproficiencytoperformtheindividualandcollectivetasksrequiredtoaccomplishtheirwartimemission.

WTSPsareintendedtosupplementtheunits’approvedcombinedarmstrainingstrategy.BecauseWTSPshavenosetsequenceormandatedrequirementtotheWTSPs,unittrainersandleadersshouldfirstassessthetrainingstatusoftheirtraineestoselecttheappropriatestartingpointandtopicsfortraining.

OneattributeoftheseWTSPsthatishelpfultoReservecomponent(RC)unitsistheestimated“academichours”providedforeachlessonplanandallocatedbytrainingsessions.AlthoughRCunitsusethesamecombinedarmstrainingstrategyasActivecomponentunits,theseallocatedacademichourscanserveasaguidelineforschedulingtechnicaltraining.RCunitsmustacknowledgewhentheymayrequireseveraldrillperiodstocompleteaspecifictask.

TheSSIstaffcontinuestoworkonfutureWTSPs,including“CasualtyLiaisonTeamActivities,”“ProvidePostalServices,”“PerformTransientPersonnelAccountability,”and“ConductCommercialVendorOperations.”AstheWTSPsbecomeavailable,theywillbepostedinboththeFMandS1NetandontheATNnetwork.

FormoreinformationonSSIWTSPs,contactChandra.Coleman@conus.army.milorcall(803)751−8287.

60 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

“TheuseofDMLSShelpsseniorleadershiptobettermanagetheglobalMEDLOGefforts,”Santossaid.“Sincecommandershavevisibilityoftheentiresupplychain,theycantakeactiontorectifyavarietyofissues,rangingfromtransportationproblemstomovingcriticalsuppliestoanotherpartoftheater.”

OperationVictorySweepContinuesEffortsToUseArmyResourcesWisely

TopurgeexcessequipmentfromCampBasra,Iraq,andreallocateittofillneedselsewhere,the1stInfantryDivisionandmobileredistributionteamsiniti-atedOperationVictorySweepon1November2010.CaptainDavidShaffer,thesupplyandservicesofficer-in-charge,saidthedivisionaccomplishedthemissionbyreevaluatingunits’excessassetsandreducingthenumberoffuturesupplypurchases.

“VictorySweepisacontinuationelementofOpera-tionCleanSweepOne,”Shaffersaid.“It’satheater-widemissioncomprisedofmobileredistributionteamsinspectingandconsolidatingallexcesssuppliesatindividualsites,thenreintegratingthemforforwardmovement.”

AccordingtoSchaffer,inlessthanaweek,theredistri-butionteamatCampBasrawasabletoclear45contain-ersandreintegratednearly$200,000worthofsupplies.

RedistributionteamsbeganthefirstVictorySweepoperationsinApril.“InApril,wedrewexcesspropertyfromtheentirebaseandprocessedseveralcontainersfulltothebrimof[vehicleequipment],rangingfromnutsandboltstoaxlesfortacticalvehicles,includ-ingafewengines,”observedCaptainAndreaSo,thelogisticsofficerofHeadquartersandHeadquartersBattalion,1stInfantryDivision.“Itreturnedmorethan$5million…tothesupplysystem.”

Theearly2010missionandaSeptembermissionreenteredassetsintothesupplysystemvaluedatnearly$7.5million,accordingtoSo.Itemsnotneededongroundwillbeshippedtowarehouses,whichmaybe

The 319th Transportation Company non­commissioned officer­in­charge of the mobile redistribution teams for Opera­tion Clean Sweep inspects excess supplies with a chief petty offi­cer from River­ine Squadron 1 in Basra, Iraq, on 4 November. (Photo by SPC Raymond Quin-tanilla, 305th MPAD)

AUSAToHostInstituteofLandWarfareSustainmentSymposiumandExposition

TheAssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmy(AUSA)InstituteofLandWarfareSustainmentSymposiumandExpositionisscheduledtobeheldfrom10to12May2011attheGreaterRichmondConventionCenterinRichmond,Virginia.Formoreinformationortoregister,visittheAUSAwebsiteatwww.ausa.org.

Upcoming Event

MARCH–ApRIL 2011 61

Writing for Army SustainmentIfyouareinterestedinsubmittinganarticletoArmy Sustainment,hereareafewsuggestions.Beforeyou

beginwriting,reviewapastissueofArmy Sustainment;itwillbeyourbestguide.Thenfollowtheserules:oKeepyourwritingsimpleandstraightforward(tryreadingitbacktoyourselfortoacolleague).oAttributeallquotes.oIdentifyallacronyms,technicalterms,andpublications(forexample,FieldManual[FM]4–0,Sustainment).oDonotassumethatthosereadingyourarticlearenecessarilySoldiersorthattheyhavebackgroundknowledge

ofyoursubject;ArmySustainment’sreadershipisbroad.oSubmissionsshouldgenerallybebetween800and4,000words.(ThewordlimitdoesnotapplytoSpectrum

articles.SpectrumisadepartmentofArmySustainmentintendedtopresentresearched,referencedarticlestypicalofascholarlyjournal.)

InstructionsforSubmittinganArticleoArmySustainmentpublishesonlyoriginalarticles,sopleasedonotsendyourarticletootherpublications.oObtainofficialclearanceforopenpublicationfromyourpublicaffairsofficebeforesubmittingyourarticleto

ArmySustainment.Includetheclearancestatementfromthepublicaffairsofficewithyoursubmission.Excep-tionstotherequirementforpublicaffairsclearanceincludehistoricalarticlesandthosethatreflectapersonalopinionorcontainapersonalsuggestion.

oSubmitthearticleasasimpleMicrosoftWorddocument—notinlayoutformat.Wewilldeterminelayoutforpublication.

oSendphotosandchartsasseparatedocuments.MakesurethatallgraphicscanbeopenedforeditingbytheArmySustainmentstaff.

oSendphotosas.jpgor.tiffiles—atleast300dpi.Photosmaybeincolororblackandwhite.PhotosembeddedinWordorPowerPointwillnotbeused.

oIncludeadescriptionofeachphotosubmittedandacronymdefinitionsforcharts.oSubmityourarticlebyemailtoleeealog@conus.army.milorbymailto—

EDITORARMYSUSTAINMENTARMYLOGISTICSUNIVERSITY2401QUARTERSRDFTLEEVA23801–1705.

Ifyoumailyourarticle,pleaseincludeacopyonCDifpossible.

Ifyouhavequestionsabouttheserequirements,pleasecontactusatleeealog@conus.army.milor(804)765–4761orDSN539–4761.Welookforwardtohearingfromyou.

usedtofillrequisitionselsewhereinIraqorAfghani-stan.ItemsnotserviceablewillgoforrepairsortotheDefenseReutilizationandMarketingOffice.

VictorySweepnotonlyre-allocatesresources.AccordingtoSo,VictorySweepisalsopreparingthebasesinU.S.Division-SouthforeventualclosureandtransfertotheGovernmentofIraq.

TeamAidsCampBuccaBaseClosureAbaseclosureassistanceteam(BCAT)comprising

logisticianstrainedinbaseclosureprojectspreparedthe1stInfantryDivisiontohandoverCampBucca,

Iraq,totheIraqigovernment.TheBCATworkedwiththeengineersandlogisticsshopstoanswerquestionsfrommilitaryunitsandciviliancontractorsregardingaccountabilityandequipmentandinfrastructure.

Tasksincludedintheclosureweremovementoftroopsandcivilians;initial,preliminary,andfinalstageplanningbybaseenvironmentalspecialists;athoroughinventoryofmilitary-andcontractor-ownedequipment;andthereductionoffood,laundry,andInternetservices.

TheCampBuccabaseclosurebeganinApril2010withthetransferoftheTheaterInternmentFacility.Thebasewascompletelytransferredtothegovern-mentofIraqinDecember.

PERIODICALS POSTAGEAND FEES PAIDAT PETERSBURG VIRGINIAAND ADDITIONAL CITIES

ISSN 2153–5973DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYARMY SUSTAINMENTUS ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY2401 QUARTERS ROADFORT LEE VIRGINIA 23801–1705

Official Business

o TheArmyOutofBalanceo ClassIV:FromManufacturertoFOBo SuppliesFromtheSkyo The307thBSBandIraqiArmyLogisticso ExpandingLogisticsCapacityo SustainmentBrigadeForwardMedicalOperationso SpecialOperationsLogisticsSupporto The1stSustainmentBrigadeSustainmentOperationsCentero BuildinganAircraftWhileinFlighto WhyLogisticiansFailatKnowledgeManagemento NorthernDistributionNetwork

Coming in Future Issues