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Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. XLIV, No. 3, March 1984

Types, Tokens, and Propositions:Quine's Alternative to

Propositions

PAUL K. MOSER

Loyola University of Chicago

A notorious feature of Quine's philosophy of language is its rejection ofpropositions construed as abstract extra-linguistic items. The overarch-ing aim of this essay is to argue that Quine's assault on propositions isin part defective and can in part be turned against his own theory of

truth-bearers. Part I sets forth and begins assessment of Quine's majorobjections to the theory of propositions, viz., those concerned with theexplanatory value of propositions and the conditions of propositionalidentity. It argues, in brief, that those objections are either inconclusiveor apparently apply to Quine's theory of truth-bearers also. Part II pre-pares for the continuation of this argument by outlining Quine's theoryof sentence-types, his alternative to propositions as truth-bearers. Part

III then resumes assessment of Quine's alternative to propositions. Itsmajor concern is to determine whether sentence-types enjoy the kind ofclear-cut identity conditions that Quine requires of propositions. Theverdict, to anticipate, is negative, and this leads to one of the morals ofPart IV: Quine's objections to propositions, if successful, undermine hisown theory of truth-bearers also.

I

Proposition theorists have been known to argue that propositions areneeded as explainers in the following ways: (i) As the abstract extra-lin-guistic bearers of truth-value, they are needed to explain, for instance,how there can be truths which are currently undiscovered and are there-fore neither stated nor believed. Such truths, it is argued, cannot beidentified with statements, inscribed or uttered sentence-tokens, orbeliefs, and so must be abstract items such as propositions. (ii) As the

abstract objects of the propositional, or intentional, attitudes, proposi-tions are needed to explain how various individuals can believe, desire,

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or hope for the same thing, even if they do not share the same language.(iii) As the abstract meanings of sentences, propositions are needed toexplain how different sentences can be synonymous, even if those sen-tences occur in different languages.

Quine has argued at length that neither (i) nor (ii) nor (iii) can with-stand scrutiny. He rejects (i) mainly on the ground that everythingabout truth explained by propositions expressed by eternal sentences,i.e., sentences free of referential variation, can be explained by the eter-nal sentences themselves, so long as those sentences are construed asabstract sequences. And he rejects (ii) and (iii) principally because theyrun afoul of his indeterminacy thesis. (iii) assumes that there is a factabout synonymy in need of explanation, but Quine claims to haveshown in his argument for translational indeterminacy that there is nofact of the matter with respect to meaning. (ii) assumes that there is afact of the matter about intentional attitudes which needs to beexplained, but Quine again appeals to his indeterminacy thesis to denyany such assumption. Just as there is an indeterminacy of meaning, soalso there is an indeterminacy of intentional attitudes such as belief,desire, and hope.'

There is, however, a serious gap in Quine's arguments based on theindeterminacy thesis. For his version of the indeterminacy thesis is quiteunable to support the claim that there is no fact of the matter withrespect to meaning and intentional attitudes. Quine clearly intends hisindeterminacy thesis to be an ontological thesis based on argumentsshowing that truths at the level of mathematics and physics do notdetermine truths about meaning and intentional attitudes. For thedesired conclusion is that there is no fact of the matter with respect tomeaning and intentional attitudes.Z But none of his arguments for theindeterminacy thesis is able to support such an ontological thesis. Forinstance, the argument in chapter II of Word and Object, which isQuine's most complete argument for the indeterminacy thesis, providesat most an epistemological conclusion, viz., that translational truths are

On Quine's rejection of (ii) and (iii) see Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press,i960), pp. zoo-zo6, o09-i6, 2i9-2i, and "Ontological Relativity," in OntologicalRelativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, i969), pp. 26-30.On his rejection of (i) see Word and Object, pp. 2o8-9, and Philosophy of Logic(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 10-14.See, on this point, Word and Object, p. 73, Quine's "Reply to Chomsky," in Wordsand Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine, ed. D. Davidson and J. Hintikka(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, i969), p. 303, and idem, "Facts of the Matter," in Essays onthe Philosophy of W. V. Quine, ed. R. Shahan and C. Swoyer (Norman, Oklahoma:University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), p. i67.

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not verifiable, as they are not determined by all the objective, i.e.,behavioral, data. And the same is true of Quine's more recent elabora-tions on that thesis.3 His argument, at its best, proceeds from certainepistemological premises about unverifiability to the ontological con-

clusion that there is no fact of the matter with respect to meaning andintentional attitudes. Such an argument, it seems, requires either a ques-tionable verificationist premise or a controversial assumption thatmeaning is nothing more than overt dispositions to behavior. While thelatter assumption apparently begs the question against the propositiontheorist, the former is sufficiently controversial to require considerablesupport. As Quine fails to provide such support, there appears to be aserious gap in his argument. But if that is so, the proposition theorist isnot really threatened by Quine's argument purporting to undermine (ii)and (iii).

It would be quite premature, however, to infer that Quine's assaulton propositions is wholly innocuous. For Quine has raised two objec-tions that are logicaly independent of his indeterminacy thesis. The firstobjection is primarily ontological; the second, semantic:

(I) We are unable to specify the circumstances under whichpropositions are the same or are different.

(z) We cannot tell when two or more declarative sentence-tokensexpress the same proposition.

These two obstacles to rendering the theory of propositions satisfactoryshould not be confused, even if Quine occasionally runs themtogether.4

A plausible answer to the ontological query raised by (i) will givesense to saying when there is one proposition and when two. It seemsadequate, in this connection, to invoke what is often called Leibniz' lawconcerning identity. When the principle of the identity of indiscernibles,

See, e.g., Quine's "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation," Journal of Phi-losophy 67 (1970): i8o-8i, and "Ontological Relativity," in Ontological Relativity,

pp. 26-30. One of the clearest instances of Quine's shift from epistemological to onto-logical considerations occurs in Word and Object, p. 73. In that particular contextQuine definitely fails to justify such a shift.On objection (i) see Quine's "Speaking of Objects," in Ontological Relativity, pp.i8-zz, and idem, "On the Individuation of Attributes," in The Logical Enterprise, ed.A. R. Anderson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 3-13. On (z) seeQuine's Philosophy of Logic, pp. 3-7, and "Propositional Objects," in OntologicalRelativity, pp. 145-46. The kinds of identity conditions involved in (i) and (Z) arerequired by Quine's precept 'No entity without identity'. Quine offers some supportfor that precept in "Speaking of Objects," pp. 23-24.

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'Vx Vy[VF(Fx *-> Fy) -- x = y]', and the principle of the indiscernibility ofidenticals, 'Vx Vy[x = y -b VF(Fx *-> Fy)]', are conjoined, they serve theproposition theorist as a law of identity that provides logically neces-sary and sufficient conditions for propositional identity. This law, it

seems, can be applied to propositions as well as to any other entitiesunder scrutiny.

Arthur Pap, however, has argued against this view. He denies thattwo propositions are identical if they exemplify exactly the same prop-erties; for he believes that this Leibnizian principle leads to the unaccep-table conclusion that two sentences express the same proposition if onecan be substituted for the other salva veritate in any context.5 Papunfortunately does not explain just how it leads to this unacceptableconclusion, and it is very doubtful that it does. For, first, the Leibnizianprinciple of identity has no bearing whatsoever on the semantic ques-tion of two sentences expressing the same proposition, and, secondly, itinvolves more than just the truth-value of propositions. Given the natu-ral assumption that propositions exemplify certain properties in addi-tion to their truth-value, it is highly unlikely that the proponent of theLeibnizian principle is led to the unacceptable conclusion alleged by

Pap. Pap's objection apparently acquires plausibility only if we conflate(i) and (z) and assume that our answer to the ontological query raisedby (i) solves the semantic problem of (z) as well. But (i) and (z), con-trary to Pap's objection, should be kept distinct.

We can allay Pap's worry most easily by construing propositions asextra-linguistic sequences. Given this view, the problem of proposi-tional identity raised by (i) can be solved by invoking the principle ofextensionality for sequences; thus:

PI. Proposition P,, (xl, x,, . . ., xn), is the same as proposition

PZ (YI Yzy . ., Yn) if and only if x1=y1, xz=yz, . ..X= yn.

The proposition theorist can adhere to the closure of PI, identifying aproposition P, and a proposition Pz just in case P, and Pz have exactlythe same constituents in exactly the same order, whether the constitu-

ents be relations, connectives, properties, or modalities.6

i See Pap, "Belief and Propositions," Philosophy of Science 24 (1957): l23-24.6 H.-N. Castafieda, for one, holds that propositions are extra-linguistic sequences. See

his "Relations and the Identity of Propositions," Philosophical Studies Z8 (1975): 243.Principle PI was suggested by Castafieda's article.

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My concern here is not to develop a theory of propositions, butrather to suggest how the proposition theorist can specify the kind ofidentity conditions required by Quine's objection (i). If either PI or theabove Leibnizian principle can serve that purpose, then the theory of

propositions does not fall prey to (i). And as Quine employs a principlemuch like PI to specify the identity conditions for sentence-types, hisalternative to propositions, it is doubtful that he can consistently faultthe proposition theorist who invokes PI to meet objection (i).

In any case, objection (i) can apparently be met much more easilythan (z). Objection (z), moreover, has an analogue that applies toQuine's theory of sentence-types. But before this can be argued, moreneeds to be said about Quine's own theory.

II

Given Quine's aversion to propositions as the objects of intentional atti-tudes, it seems that the linguistic theory of belief is a natural alternativefor him. Basic to that theory is the assumption that belief is always anattitude toward some sentence-token or other. Thus on that theory lin-guistic proficiency is a necessary condition of believing anything. Pro-ponents of the linguistic theory regard sentence-tokens as concreteinscriptions and utterances, and not as mental items. Belief, accord-ingly, is regarded as an attitude toward either physical objects of certainshapes or physical sound waves of certain patterns.7

But, as Quine apparently concedes, it is untenable to maintain thatconcrete utterances and inscriptions are always the objects of belief. Forthat view implies that there is belief only if the object of belief has been

uttered or inscribed. Such an implication is unacceptable principallybecause many of our beliefs have never been verbally expressed,whether by utterance or by inscription, nor will they ever be soexpressed. Contrary to the linguistic theory, such failure of verbalexpression neither precludes nor disturbs belief.

It makes sense to say, for instance, that Jones believes somethingaltogether unannounced, but it is difficult to see how the linguistictheory could accommodate such a statement. On that theory the state-

Two well-known proponents of the linguistic theory are Rudolf Carnap, Meaning andNecessity, zd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 53-63, and IsraelScheffler, The Anatomy of Inquiry (New York: A. A. Knopf, i963), pp. 'az-I1.Quine's comments on the linguistic theory, which are largely critical, are found inWord and Object, pp. z I 3-1 5, and in "Propositional Objects," in Ontological Relativ-ity, pp. 143-46. Additional discussion of the linguistic theory can be found in MichaelCorrado, "On Believing Inscriptions to Be True," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 36 (1975): 59-73.



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ment under consideration is analyzed as asserting the existence of a par-ticular inscription or utterance of which no sample is given in the state-ment itself. It may happen, however, that no such inscription or utter-ance exists or ever will; for believing, unlike saying, does not produce

either utterances or inscriptions.Quine has proposed that this problem be resolved by construing sen-tences as abstract linguistic forms or types, rather than merely as con-crete utterances and inscriptions, or tokens. On that proposal the exis-tence of a sentence is not compromised by failure of inscription andutterance. Clearly, however, if sentences are construed as classes ofinscriptions and utterances, then all sentences which are neither utterednor inscribed would reduce to one: the null class. There would thus beno distinctions among uninscribed and unuttered sentences.

Quine proposes, accordingly, that we take sentences as sequences, ina mathematical sense, of their successive characters. He construes asequence a,, a2,. . ., an as the class of the n pairs , ,

. And he takes each component character as as a class ofutterance or inscription events. Quine's proposal, therefore, is appar-ently that sentence-types be taken as sequences of abstract word-types.

Word-types, on that proposal, are simply classes of word-tokens. Hencea sentence-type is a sequence of classes of inscribed and uttered word-tokens. 8

Being armed, then, with this notion of sentence-type, we can rephrasethe following sentence, for instance:

(3) Quine believes that Frege wrote the Begriffsschrift in I878.

as:

(4) Quine believes-true 'Frege wrote the Begriffsschrift in I878'.

On this analysis the objects of the intentional attitudes are simply eter-nal sentences taken as types rather than tokens. But there is a certainrelativity to language that (4) fails to make explicit. The linguistic formquoted in (4) may very well make sense in another language, and sensedifferent from that intended by (4). Thus (4) must be rephrased as:

(5) Quine believes-true in English 'Frege wrote the Begriffsschriftin I878'.

8 See, in this connection, Word and Object, pp. 194-95, and "Ontological Relativity" inOntological Relativity, pp. 41-4z. An alternative reading is that sentence-types aresequences of classes of letter-tokens or of phonemes. But even such alternative notionsof sentence-type must face the problems of Part III below.

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(5), however, is still an unsatisfactory analysis by Quine's lights, for itdepends on the notion of a language, in this case English. The troublewith that notion is that it, like the notion of proposition under scrutiny,lacks a satisfactory principle of individuation. It is, after all, very

difficult to specify precisely when languages count as identical or as dis-tinct.

Quine's theory of sentence-types, therefore, apparently does notenable him to provide a sentential analysis of the idioms of intentionalattitude. In Word and Object his strategy is thus to leave such idioms ina second-grade status, i.e., one of tolerable vernacular having no placein the austere idiom of scientific theory.9 But even though sentence-types cannot salvage the idioms of intentional attitude, they are invokedby Quine to serve as the vehicles of truth-value. Thus, given Quine'sstrictures, it must be asked whether they enjoy clear-cut identity condi-tions in their role as truth-bearers.

III

Quine has frequently expressed a preference for taking eternal sen-tences, construed as abstract linguistic types, as the bearers of truth."They are better than other sentences inasmuch as they are true or falseindependently of time, place, and utterance. And they are better thanpropositions, according to Quine, inasmuch as they have clear identityconditions. Given the principle of extensionality for sequences, any twosequences, and hence any two types, may be said to be the same if andonly if they have exactly the same constituents in precisely the sameorder. Thus sentence-types do not engender perplexities over the kind

of identity conditions mentioned in objection (i).But what about objection (z)? The analogous question for the pro-

ponent of Quine's theory is: What are the necessary and sufficient con-ditions for two or more linguistic expressions to be tokens of the same

See Word and Object, p. zzi, and "Speaking of Objects," in Ontological Relativity,pp. vl-24. Quine has outlined an alternative analysis of the idioms of intentional atti-

tude, one in terms of states of affairs construed as classes of possible worlds, in"Propositional Objects" in Ontological Relativity, pp. 147-55. But it is not clear thathe intends that analysis to be of more than heuristic value.See, e.g., Word and Object, p. zo8, "Propositional Objects," in Ontological Relativity,pp. 142-43, and Philosophy of Logic, pp. 13-14. In the latter work Quine alsoexpresses a preference for tokens as truth-bearers, but this complication does not affectthe subsequent argument. In fact, the following argument concerning type-identity oftokens can easily be applied to a theory of replicahood of tokens also. Hereafter, I shallbe primarily concerned with eternal sentences, but for brevity my examples of sen-tence-tokens will not always be free of referential variation.



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type? An adequate answer to this question is needed for a variety of rea-sons, one of which concerns our employment of sentences involvingdirect quotation. When one says, for instance, that Smith and Jones said'S' (where S is any linguistic expression), the truth of one's statement

depends in part on the type-identity of the relevant utterances of Smithand Jones. If the linguistic expressions uttered by Smith and Jones arenot tokens of the same type, then it is most likely that the sentence'Smith and Jones said 'S" will be false. But there is another, moreimmediate reason for Quine to answer the above question. He fre-quently castigates the proposition theorist for failing to answer a similarquestion, based on (z), with respect to propositions; so one wouldexpect Quine to have a satisfactory answer to the above question. Butdoes he?

The samenesses relevant prima facie to type-identity are typographi-cal, or shape-, identity for inscribed tokens and phonetic identity, orsameness of pronunciation, for uttered tokens. Consider, however, thefollowing two tokens:

(6) Jones liebt.

(7) Jones leaped.The utterances due to my pronunciation of (6) and (7) may be phoneti-cally identical, but many of us would nonetheless refuse to endorsethose utterances as tokens of the same utterance-type. This refusal isprobably based on a tacit commitment to C. S. Peirce's thesis that dis-parity of sense entails disparity of type. In any case, phonetic identity isnot always countenanced as a sufficient condition of type-identity of

uttered tokens. It is conceivable, furthermore, that one and the samesequence of phonemes, or even of inscribed tokens, could function as atruth of physics, say, in English and as the contrary of that truth inanother language. This situation would leave us with an eternal sen-tence that is both eternally true and eternally false.

The easiest way to eliminate such a possibility is to relativize eacheternal sentence to a particular language. But there are at least twoproblems with that proposal. First, as already noted, the notion of alanguage is without a satisfactory principle of individuation. Thus,given Quine's strictures, it cannot be introduced to resolve the problemat hand. Secondly, the above proposal would be inadequate even ifthere were clear identity conditions for languages. For an eternal sen-tence in a particular language L can be ambiguous in L in such a waythat it is true on one interpretation but false on another.

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The first problem suggests that Quine cannot consistently salvage anyshape-phonetic criterion of type-identity by appealing to the notion of aparticular language. This problem, it seems, constitutes evidenceagainst any criterion of type-identity which involves only the factors of

shape-identity and phonetic identity of tokens. The second problem ismore serious, but provides similar evidence. It suggests that there maybe truth-bearers which are both true and false due to the intralinguisticambiguity of -their tokens. As Quine opposes any such suggestion, itmay be inferred that he would reject any criterion of type-identitywhich involves only physical features of tokens. What is needed, then, isa criterion which eliminates any ambiguity resulting in variation of thetruth-value of eternal sentences.

Perhaps a better clue to the circumstances under which tokens maybe said to be type-identical can be found in the verbal dispositions oflanguage-users. Consider the following two occasion sentences:

(8) Yellow paper is here.

(9) YELLOW PAPER IS HERE.

On the behaviorist criterion (8) and (9) may be regarded as two inscrip-tions of the same sentence-type just because they are verbal stimuliwhich stimulate a uniform behavioral reaction among normal lan-guage-users. That behavioral reaction is marked by a correlationbetween assent and the presence of yellow paper, and between dissentand the absence of yellow paper, on occasions where the sentence isqueried. A sign of assent involves the speaker's disposition to producethat sign whenever a sentence is queried in circumstances in which he

would be disposed to volunteer the sentence himself.Succinctly, then, the behaviorist criterion states that two inscriptions

i1 and i. are tokens of the same type if and only if in appropriate cir-cumstances i1 and iz stimulate uniform behavioral reactions amongnormal language-users. And the same point applies to linguistic utter-ances also. The behaviorist criterion requires, of course, that tokens besufficiently disambiguated before any type-ascription is made; fortokens which are obviously ambiguous would stimulate neither assentnor dissent. And such a requirement apparently gives the behavioristcriterion a major advantage over the shape-phonetic criterion.

Yet there are obstacles to rendering the behaviorist criterion satisfac-tory, even if we overlook for now the well-known problems with thebehaviorist notions of assent and disposition. A major obstacle is raisedby what Quine calls 'socially stimulus analytic sentences'. These aresentences to which every speaker in our linguistic community is dis-

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posed to assent under all circumstances; for in learning to understandsuch sentences one learns to assent to them. The behaviorist criterionapparently has the counterintuitive implication that all such sentencesare tokens of the same type. And the same point applies as well to many

sentences traditionally called 'necessary truths' and 'logically equivalentsentences'. The true sentences of elementary mathematics, for instance,would always, it seems, stimulate uniform assent from normal lan-guage-users; for it is hard to imagine a situation in which a normal lan-guage-user would assent to some of those sentences but reject or with-hold assent to others. But it seems that 'One plus one equals two' and'Two plus two equals four', for example, are indeed tokens of differentsentence-types, if any tokens are. It is doubtful, however, that thebehaviorist criterion can preserve such an obvious distinction.

But perhaps the behaviorist can accommodate the problem sentencesby introducing a requirement such as receptual similarity, i.e., physicalsimilarity of impact on the sensory surfaces, regardless of behavior. Ineffect this move revives at least part of the shape-phonetic criterion byconjoining it with the behaviorist criterion. The objective here is to pro-vide criteria which assign tokens such as 'One plus one equals two' and

'Two plus two equals four' to different types. This can easily be accom-plished by introducing shape-similarity as a necessary condition oftype-identity of inscriptions and phonetic similarity as a necessary con-dition of type-identity of utterances. We would thus have the followinghybrid principle:

H. Two tokens t1 and tZ are type-identical if and only if t, andtZ stimulate uniform behavioral reactions among normal lan-

guage-users and are characterized by receptual similarity.

The major trouble with H is that it eliminates one problem only bycreating a more serious one. Given H, tokens (8) and (9), being typo-graphically dissimilar, no longer qualify as type-identical. Surely that isan unacceptable consequence of H. Furthermore, due mainly to idio-lects and dialects within any given linguistic community, the correspon-ding utterances of any inscription will vary considerably among lan-

guage-users. The sentence 'Snow is white', for instance, will bepronounced differently by a language-user with a British accent and onewith a Texas accent. Those utterances, accordingly, may be phoneti-cally dissimilar and hence,' on the basis of H, should be regarded astokens of different types.

It seems, however, that British and Texas utterances of 'Snow iswhite' are tokens of the same type if any linguistic expressions are. Per-

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haps, therefore, we should concur with A. N. Prior's appeal to a"certain fairly fixed series of sounds" as the determinant of type-iden-tity." The problem, however, is that such an appeal to approximablephonetic norms is wide open to criticisms. As the notion of an approx-

imable phonetic norm is laden with vagueness, it would sanction anynumber of counterintuitive type-ascriptions. In short, Prior's criterionlacks the rigor ordinarily required of criteria of identity. Without muchdifficulty, admittedly, most English language-users would in fact recog-nize that the corresponding British and Texas utterances of 'Snow iswhite' are tokens of the same type. But this concession is merely a plati-tude regarding linguistic practice; it says nothing about criteria fortype-identity of tokens. The problem at hand, however, is not one oflinguistic practice. For theoretical purposes the circumstances underwhich tokens may be said to be type-identical must be delineated. SincePrior's criterion does not clearly do so, it must be judged unacceptable.

At times Quine appears to concur with Prior's view that phoneticnorms solve the problem at hand. He views phonemes as short segmentsof the norms of linguistic utterances, yet he proposes that we think ofeach phonetic norm as the class of events which are occurrences of it.

But now we are faced with the question concerning the circumstancesunder which two tokens may be said to be members of the same pho-netic (or notational) norm. Surely the introduction of phonetic andnotational norms does not solve the problem of type-identity of tokens;it simply shifts that problem to one of norm-identity of tokens. Hencethe appeal to phonetic and notational norms cannot be accepted as anadequate solution to the problem of type-identity of tokens.

There is still another behaviorist criterion of type-identity that shouldbe mentioned. Whereas the above behaviorist criterion relied on anquery of the form 'True?, False?', the present criterion involves thisquery: 'Same sentence-type?'. Two or more tokens are type-identical,on this criterion, if and only if all normal language-users respondaffirmatively to the latter query about those tokens. This criterion ispreferable to the earlier criteria, for it neither assigns all logically equiv-alent tokens to the same type nor requires that type-identical tokens

have shape- or phonetic identity. In addition, the present criterionavoids any talk of phonetic and notational norms.

" See Prior, The Doctrine of Propositions and Terms, ed. A. Kenny and P. Geach(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976), p. 36. Prior's strategy broachesthe subject of phonetic norms, which Quine has discussed in Word and Object, pp.

85-90.

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Nonetheless, there are some remaining problems. One problem is dueto the notion of a normal language-user. This notion must be relativizedto a particular linguistic community if the above criterion is to be tena-ble. For we cannot expect the normal monolingual Greek language-

user, for instance, to concur with normal English language-users abouttype-identity of English tokens. But how are we to individuate linguisticcommunities? This question poses a problem that is just as difficult asthat of type-identity. The above criterion, moreover, is very uninforma-tive as it stands. For it says nothing about the question that is mosttroublesome, viz.: Why do normal English language-users, for instance,regard certain linguistic tokens as type-identical rather than others?Thus for present purposes it is not very helpful to appeal to our presentlinguistic practices.

Such problems are apparently avoided by a more promising criterionthat specifies type-identity in terms of functional properties of tokens. Itmay appropriately be called the conventionalist criterion.

The first preliminary is to note that an extensional context is gener-ally devoid of mentioned (as opposed to used) tokens, of tokens refer-ring to intentional attitudes, and of modal terms. Next the notion of

functional equivalence must be defined:Di. Utterances or inscriptions t, and t2 are functionally equiva-

lent = Df. t, and tZ are interchangeable salva veritate in exten-sional contexts.

And we need a definition of the term 'acceptable transcription':

Dz. Inscription i is an acceptable transcription of utterance u = Df.

the standardized canons of pronunciation for English inscrip-tions and of transcription for English utterances sanction alanguage-user in moving from u to i and conversely.

The inscription 'hair', for instance, is an acceptable transcription of theEnglish utterances arising from its correct pronunciation and even ofthe English utterances arising from the correct pronunciation of 'hare'.Of course a language-user will acquire expertise in pronunciation and

transcription of English tokens only through training that involves imi-tation of skilled language-users; and this platitude is perfectly compati-ble with Dz. Dz also permits that just one inscription can serve in cer-tain circumstances as an acceptable transcription of two or moreutterances of different English dialects.

Now the necessary and sufficient conditions of type-identity of utter-ances can be stated. Being functionally equivalent and having the same

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acceptable transcriptions are necessary and jointly sufficient conditionsof type-identity of utterances. Hence:

Ci. English utterances u, and uZ are tokens of the same type ifand only if u, and uz are functionally equivalent and haveexactly the same acceptable transcriptions.

Ci permits that utterances from different dialects may be type-identical.British and American pronunciations of 'snow', for instance, can qual-ify as type-identical utterances, just because those utterances, eventhough phonetically disparate, have exactly the same acceptable tran-scriptions (e.g., 'snow', 'SNOW') and are interchangeable salva veritatein extensional contexts.

A similar criterion is needed for type-identity of inscriptions. But firsta definition of 'homophone' must be given:

D3. Inscriptions i1' and iz are homophonous = Df. i1 and i serveas acceptable transcriptions of exactly the same utterances.

The inscriptions 'sea' and 'see', for instance, are homophonous, eventhough typographically disparate. Being homophonous and being func-

tionally equivalent are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions oftype-identity of inscriptions. Hence:

Cz. English inscriptions i, and i) are tokens of the same type ifand only if i, and iz are functionally equivalent and homo-phonous.

Cz permits, of course, that inscriptions characterized by different spell-ings can be tokens of the same type. The tokens 'recognize' and'recognise', for instance, are type-identical according to Cz, as they arefunctionally equivalent and serve as acceptable transcriptions of exactlythe same utterances. If this is a problem at all, it is not a serious one. Czcan easily be modified to preclude type-identity of inscribed tokenswhich are functionally-equivalent and homophonous but spelled differ-ently. The strategy, in brief, would be to restrict Cz to letter-tokens andthen to build up from there to word-tokens and sentence-tokens. But we

need not bother with the details here.There are some noteworthy advantages to the conventionalist criteria

Ci and Cz. Cz allows that certain inscriptions with different shapes,such as (8) and (9), can be tokens of the same type. Analogously Ciallows that Texas and British utterances of (8), for instance, can betokens of the same type, even though such utterances are phoneticallydisparate. Thus, according to Ci and Cz, idiolects, dialects, and idio-



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syncrasies of handwriting do not necessarily preclude the possibility oftype-identity of tokens. To that extent, those criteria are compatiblewith the standard notion of type-identity of linguistic tokens. More-over, it is arguable that with suitable modifications those criteria need

not be restricted to the English language; that they can determine type-identity of tokens in any non-idiographic language which comprisesboth utterances and corresponding inscriptions.

There are, however, at least two obstacles to rendering those criteriasatisfactory. First, Ci and Cz explicitly involve the notion of a particu-lar language. But that notion, according to Quine, does not enjoysufficiently clear identity conditions and thus cannot be invoked to clar-ify the notion of type-identity. The reliance of Ci and Cz on that trou-blesome notion is, unfortunately, not merely incidental; for the talk ofstandardized canons of transcription requires an appeal to some lan-guage or other. Secondly, Ci and Cz are exceedingly restricted in appli-cation. They have no application, for instance, to idiographic lan-guages, non-spoken languages, or unwritten languages (e.g., languagesof thought). But surely our criteria of type-identity should be relevant tothe tokens of such languages. Ci and Cz, then, are clearly unacceptable

- even on Quine's strictures - and are apparently beyond simplerepair. They are thus on a par with the several unacceptable criteriaalready examined.

IV

Something should be said, in conclusion, about what has been accom-plished. Part III made a concerted, but ultimately unsuccessful, effort to

provide Quine with an acceptable answer to our earlier query abouttype-identity of tokens. If successful that effort would have enabled usto recommend Quine's theory of truth-bearers over that of the proposi-tion theorist, at least with respect to the kind of identity conditionsrequired by Quine's objection (z). Part III assessed five criteria of type-identity which appeared prima facie to be plausible and which are com-patible with Quine's general philosophy of language. Each of the five, Iargued, is definitely wanting. There are, of course, other criteria avail-able, e.g., Peirce's synonymy criterion and various non-behaviorist psy-chological criteria. But given his aversion to synonymy and mentalismQuine cannot take advantage of such criteria.

It does not follow, of course, that Quine's theory of sentence-types isunsalvageable. But it may be inferred that until we have adequate cri-teria for type-identity of tokens Quine's theory of truth-bearers mustremain at the problematic level of the theory of propositions, at least

with respect to the kind of identity conditions required by (z). Or, put

374 PAUL K. MOSER


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positively, the theory of propositions is really no worse off than Quine'stheory of sentence-types with respect to (z).

Moreover, if the second half of Part I is correct, then Quine's sen-tence-types fare no better than propositions with respect to any identity

conditions. For that section gives us reason to believe that if Quine canprovide an answer to the ontological objection (i), with respect to sen-tence-types, then so can the proposition theorist, with respect to propo-sitions. Since the proposition theorist can invoke principle PI, Quine'stheory of truth-bearers is actually on no better footing than the theoryof propositions with respect to the identity conditions mentioned in (i).And since the same is true with respect to (z), the problem of identityconditions cannot be used to recommend Quine's sentence-types overpropositions.

Overall, then, we have evidence to conclude, first, that Quine has notsuccessfully shown that propositions are devoid of explanatory value;secondly, that Quine's employment of (z) against the proposition theo-rist can be turned against his own theory of truth-bearers; and, finally,that the problem of identity conditions raised by (i) can apparently beresolved without much difficulty by the proposition theorist. Hence,

Quine's assault on propositions apparently is defective in part andnumbers among its victims his own theory.'"

I am grateful to Arnold Cusmariu, John Post, and William Young for helpful com-ments on earlier versions of this paper.


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