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Northern Ireland: Peace or Stalemate?

by Richard English

Introduction

Despite some political tension and turbulence, Northern Ireland enjoyed comparativetranquillity for most of the period between its foundation in 1921 and the eruption of'the Troubles' in the late 1960s. In 1967, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Associationwas formed to pursue equality of treatment for Northern Ireland's Catholic minority.Of particular concern were the issues of housing, employment, electoral democracy,and policing. Civil Rights marches raised tensions between those who supported themovement's agenda and those who opposed it, perceiving it to represent an attempt toundermine the state.

Since this period Northern Ireland has remained a nation divided between unionists

and republicans.

Direct ruleTension resulted in violence involving republicans, loyalists, and the increasinglyembattled forces of the state. British soldiers had been sent to the province in 1969 tomaintain order, and by 1972 the situation was so dire that the Northern Irelandgovernment at Stormont in Belfast was prorogued. From then onwards, the regionwould be governed by direct rule from Westminster. But successive Londongovernments pursued solutions to the conflict and initiated various schemes to thateffect. The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 involved the establishment of a power-sharing Executive comprising unionists and nationalists, with an ill-defined Council ofIreland involving representatives of Northern Ireland and of the Republic of Ireland.This latter provision enraged many unionists/loyalists who resented Republic ofIreland intrusion into Northern Irish politics and the loyalist Ulster Workers' Strikeof 1974 brought down the Executive.

A role for Dublin was also central to the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement between the UKand Republic of Ireland governments. This accord provided a consultative role forDublin in the affairs of Northern Ireland, establishing an intergovernmental

conference representative of the two states. This Agreement met with broad nationalistapproval, but annoyed unionists who had not been consulted and who were angered bythe involvement of Dublin in Northern Ireland's affairs. The Agreement sought toreassure nationalists that there would be no change to the constitutional position ofNorthern Ireland without majority consent. But this constitutional guarantee failed toconvince unionists that the London government could be relied on to maintain theunion between Northern Ireland and Britain.

The 1990s peace processSimilar problems of trust or the lack of it reappeared in the 1990s Peace Process.

This in a sense built on the logic of the Anglo-Irish Agreement: London and Dublinwould work together to try to encourage nationalists that peaceful means could enablethe achievement of their ambitions, while reassuring unionists that they had nothing to

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fear. The Dec 1993 Downing Street Declaration by the UK and Irish Prime Ministers John Major and Albert Reynolds, respectively reflected the approach.Considerable rhetorical ground was conceded to nationalists, coupled with reassurancethat the union of Northern Ireland and Britain was safe as long as the majority inNorthern Ireland wanted it to remain so.

The Peace Process involved sustained efforts to draw political representatives ofparamilitary groups republican and loyalist into constitutional talks. A significantbreakthrough appeared to have emerged in 1994 when both the Irish Republican Army(IRA) the main republican paramilitary organization and a combined body ofloyalist groups declared a ceasefire. But during the period of the IRA ceasefire, whichlasted from August 1994 to February 1996, it proved impossible to get all parties tothe negotiation table. The British government and unionists were particularlyconcerned about the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. They argued that ifparamilitaries were indeed intent on peaceful methods, then they would have no

objection to handing over their weapons, and that if they were not intent on peacefulmethods then they should not be admitted to talks. Mutual mistrust over such issuesprevented the development of meaningful dialogue, and during 1996 paramilitaryviolence (which had never totally disappeared, even during the ceasefire) began toescalate.

The Peace Process, while still bedevilled by mistrust between the different parties,began to move forward following a second IRA ceasefire (July 1997). The new UKLabour government set a deadline of Thursday 9 April 1998 for a cross-partyagreement to be thrashed out. On 10 April 1998 (Good Friday) the multiparty talks

were concluded, and the Northern Ireland Political Talks Document was released. Thepeople of Northern Ireland were to give their verdict on the proposed settlement in areferendum on 22 May; a parallel referendum would be held in the Republic of Irelandon the issue of proposed amendments to those clauses of the Irish constitution that layclaim to the territory of Northern Ireland.

The result of that referendum was a vote of 71.12% in favour. Mo Mowlam, theNorthern Ireland Secretary, said 'This is a majority of both communities. It is three toone saying let's move forward'.

Among the principal elements of the agreement were the devolution of a wide range ofexecutive and legislative powers to a Northern Ireland Assembly, in which executiveposts would be shared on a proportional basis; the establishment of a NorthSouthMinisterial Council, accountable to the Assembly and the Irish Parliament; and aBritishIrish Council to bring together the two governments and representatives ofdevolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. There would alsobe a new BritishIrish Agreement to replace the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in1985.

The agreement also included a range of measures to enhance the proper protection ofbasic human rights, to reduce the profile of security measures and emergencylegislation, and to consider an appropriate policing service. It established a clear


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process for the decommissioning of weapons and the means to achieve thedecommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years of the referendum, andcommitted both governments to put in place mechanisms to provide for an acceleratedprogramme for the release of prisoners.

ProspectsDespite the considerable optimism engendered by the agreement reached on 10 April1998, many crucial areas of disagreement remained to be resolved. Nor, despiteevidence of majority approval for the deal over Northern Ireland as a whole, did itcommand the support of all strands of Unionist and nationalist opinion. On theUnionist side, hard-line elements strongly opposed the deal, most notably Ian Paisley'sDemocratic Unionist Party and the Protestant Orange Order. The issue ofdecommissioning of paramilitary weapons also remained problematic; in the aftermathof the agreement the IRA were swift to reiterate that they were still not prepared tohand over their weapons, the latter being a high priority for the Unionists.

However, it would be wrong to be too pessimistic about Northern Ireland politics.Compared with many other ethnic/religious conflicts, the levels of violence tend to below and, for many people in the region, life is largely unaffected. Moreover, it maywell be that within a generation, demographic, economic, and other changes will meanthat the conflict disappears.

Many solutions to the political problems of Northern Ireland have been suggested,including a united Ireland, joint authority over Northern Ireland between London andDublin, repartition, full integration into the UK, an independent Northern Ireland, and

a federal Ireland. However, each of these has obvious and significant drawbacks, andnone is likely at present to have much chance of success.

Moreover, the main constitutional political parties the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)and the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) are divided fromone another in a way that makes the building of middle ground difficult. And thereremains the fact that the two main communities in Northern Ireland possessfundamentally irreconcilable ambitions. Only time will tell whether the 1998 PoliticalTalks Document can form the basis of a lasting peace.

Related Articles:Anglo-Irish AgreementIrish Republican ArmyNorthern IrelandSocial Democratic and Labour PartySunningdale AgreementUlsterUlster Unionist Party

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