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Book Reviews
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ISBN 0-231-13752-4 (hb), $25.50, 15.50
John Searle has made important contributions to a number of
subfields ofphilosophy, including philosophy of language,
philosophy of mind, andphilosophy of the social sciences. Although
the title of his latest book may elicitthe expectation that it
treats the very interesting and relatively unexploredquestion of
how neurobiological theories of free will might affect
ourunderstanding of political power, in fact the two topics are
kept entirely separatefrom each other.
This volume contains versions of two lectures that were
originally deliveredand published in France. The first, Free Will
as a Problem in Neurobiologypresents Searle's attempt to lay out
what might be called a roadmap towardspeace between the
neurobiological approach to the study of mind and thedoctrine of
metaphysical human free will. The second lecture, Social
Ontologyand Political Power summarises the ideas about the ontology
of social reality hedeveloped earlier in The Construction of Social
Reality (1997) and applies them to theanalysis of the notion of
political power. The two lectures are preceded by a thirty-five
page introduction (Philosophy and the Basic Facts), which sets out
to showhow they fit into Searle's larger project of creating the
framework for acomprehensive and naturalistic philosophical system,
that is to say, a systemwhose solutions to philosophical problems
are solidly based on the results ofresearch in the empirical
sciences.
I was disappointed by this book. Eric Kandel's blurb on its back
coverclaims that it provides a broad introduction to the complete
Searle, and many,no doubt, hoped that Freedom & Neurobiology
would serve as a continuation and
update of Searle's very well-received 1984 Reith Lectures
(published under thetitle Minds, Brains, and Science). In fact,
while the book can be useful as acomprehensive outline of his ideas
for people who are already well acquaintedwith his work, it is much
too dry and sketchy to serve as an introduction for theuninitiated.
There is little evidence in it of the imaginative thinking that
gave theworld the Chinese Room thought experiment. It is difficult
to assess thearguments that Searle makes in this book because they
are so often incomplete orabsent, replaced with bibliographical
pointers to his other, more substantial books.
For all Searle's talk about naturalism, he has practically
nothing to say thatis related to actual developments in
neurobiological science. The book could have
been just as easily written back in the old days when
philosophers made furtivereferences to c-fibres in the hope of
making materialist theories of mind soundmore scientific.
Tellingly, Searle writes: The solution to the philosophical
mind-body problem seems to me not very difficult. However, the
philosophical solutionkicks the problem upstairs to neurobiology,
where it leaves us with a very difficultneurobiological problem
(p.40). Unlike his nemesis (Daniel Dennett), Searle hasnothing to
tell us about how neurobiology might actually go about solving
this, itsvery difficult problem.
On a more positive note, at least the book does give us a
tantalising glimpseof the direction in which Searle would like to
go to find a solution to the problem
of the material brain giving rise to a metaphysically free will.
He seems to thinkthat there is no real difference between
compatibilism and the idea that freedom ismerely an illusion,
rejecting both ideas while admitting that most neurobiologistswould
feel that this is probably how the brain actually works (p.62). His
ultimate
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Book Reviews
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argument against such views is evolutionary: An enormous
biological price ispaid for conscious decision making To suppose
that this plays no role ininclusive fitness is not like supposing
the human appendix plays no role. It would be more like supposing
that vision or digestion played no evolutionary role
(p.70). How, then, can a material brain give rise to a
metaphysically freeconsciousness? Searle borrows Roger Penrose's
suggestion that theindeterminancy found in nature by the standard
interpretation of quantummechanics can serve as the theoretical
deus ex machina that creates a place forfreedom in nature. Searle
is well aware that the sheer randomness associated withquantum
indeterminancy cannot serve as a direct model for the indeterminate
yetresponsible free will he associates with conscious human agency.
He suggests thatwhile the indeterminancy associated with
micro-quantum level descriptions of the brain will carry over to
the holistic system level where consciousness andfreedom are to be
found, the randomness of the micro-quantum level will fail tomake
that passage. How does random indeterminancy at the micro level
becomenon-random indeterminancy at the macro level? Searle does not
tell us. Perhaps hebelieves it is another question best left for
scientists to ponder.
Berel Dov Lerner
Western Galilee College,
Akko, Israel, [email protected]
Raymond Geuss
Philosophy and Real Politics
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008, pp. viii +
116
ISBN: 978-0-691-13788-9 (hb), $19.95, 11.95
In just over a hundred pages Geuss manages to shake the
foundations of, and theway we normally approach, Political
Philosophy. Such a feat is meritorious in itself
and it may turn this short book into a little classic of our
times, as politicalphilosophers will certainly feel the need to
either elaborate or refute Geusss ideas.
This book is the result of Geuss expanding a lecture he gave at
theUniversity of Athens in April 2007, entitled (Lenin), Rawls and
PoliticalPhilosophy; it is divided into two parts. In Part I Geuss
draws much of hisargument from Lenin, Nietzsche and Weber in
advocating Realism in PoliticalPhilosophy. Geuss argues that a
Realist Theory has to account for three elements:Lenins who whom?
(i.e. Who what to whom for whose benefit? (p.25);Nietzsches timing
and skill in decision making (i.e. ... on performing
potentiallyfar-reaching political action only at a specified right
moment, neither too early
not too late (p.32); and Webers legitimacy of political action
(i.e. Thelegitimatory mechanisms available in a given society
change from one historicalperiod to another...the total set of
beliefs held by agents, the mechanisms forchanging beliefs, or
generating new ones (p.35). In Part II Geuss attacks head -on
