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Protection: A Theoretical View
Lt Col (retd) Jim Storr PhD
Introduction
Doctrine?
‘Command’ is defined as ' … the direction, coordination and control of military forces.'
‘Control’ is ‘the process by which a commander … organises, directs and coordinates the activities of the forces allocated to him…'
So Command = direction + coordination + control;
and Control = organisation + direction + coordination
Thus Command + = direction + coordination + 2 x control;
Control?
Why 'do' Force Protection?
• It keeps people alive; uninjured, healthy: – Humanitarian considerations– Morale – Commander's duty – Legal obligations
• Maintains operational effectiveness
Clausewitz
• How good is your early 18th Century German?
• Zweck • Mittel • Ziele
The Dialectic
• An interchange of Ends (aims) and Means
• Ways, Ends and Means?
• Also, an interchange between enemy and friendly forces
The Dialectic
Own Forces Enemy Forces
The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims
The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
The Dialectic
Own Forces Enemy Forces
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
Force Protection?
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
Preventing this
Force Protection?
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
To enable us to do this
Example 1: 1982
Example 2: BATUS and Digital Situational Awareness (SA)
• Better SA: Knowing where my tanks and his tanks are
• ... fewer of my tanks are lost because we know where the enemy is
• ... therefore more of my tanks cross the line of departure
• ... therefore I'm more likely to win; to win quicker; and to suffer fewer casualties.
Example 2: BATUS and Digital Situational Awareness
• Better SA: Knowing where my tanks and his tanks are
• ... fewer of my tanks are lost because we know where the enemy is
• ... therefore more of my tanks cross the line of departure
• ... therefore I'm more likely to win; to win quicker; and to suffer fewer casualties.
All just a wee bit 'Cold War'
Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Northern Ireland
• Improvements in countering IEDs keep soldiers alive
• ... but you can't stop terrorists inventing new kinds of bombs
• ... so you're always reacting? • The terrorist always has the initiative?
Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices in Northern Ireland
• But: – Link intelligence, tactics, organisations,
scientific advice, EOD policy, training, EW, ...
– Wargame– Couple them very closely into a very
responsive system – You can then react very quickly to changes
in the threat – ... and begin to predict, and even pre-empt,
changes in the threat
Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices in Northern Ireland
• And: – .... so you can begin to reduce the terrorist's
initiative – ... and he's no longer 'doing' terror – What do you call a terrorist who can't 'do'
terror?
Deductions
• Force Protection can have operational-level consequences
• You are removing, or at least affecting, his MEANS; and thus also his aims
The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
You are now doing this
The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
...and preventing him doing this
The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
What is this?
Countering IEDs
• A lot of very expensive technology? • The '10% / 30% / 60%' Rule • Deductions:
– 1: Minor unit tactics are twice as important as technology
– 2. Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it
Countering Irregular Activity
• A lot of very expensive technology? • The '10% / 30% / 60%' Rule • Deductions:
– 1: Minor unit tactics are twice as important as technology
– 2. Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it
Other Examples
• Urban and rural multiple patrolling • Helicopter top cover to rural foot patrols • Many of these measures are highly
asymmetric • They will not translate directly to other
theatres
Observation
Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres?
Observation
Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres?
Yes?
Observation
Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres?
Yes? No
Conclusions
1: The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
1: The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
Force Protection is not just about this
1: The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
It's also about this
1: The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
Which directly affects this
1: The Dialectic
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
Hence we can win
Deductions (2)
• Tactical Force Protection measures can have operational level consequences: They can deny the insurgent, or terrorist, the ability to achieve his aims; and hence contribute directly to operational success
Deductions (3)
• Issues such as minor unit tactics can be twice as important as technology
• Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it
• That requires suitable organisations and processes at the theatre, or campaign, level.
Questions?
The Dialectic
Own Forces Enemy Forces
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
The Dialectic
Own Forces Enemy Forces
Own Means
Own Aims Enemy Aims
Enemy Means
