Red Oak Police Lawsuit

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THENORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

RICHARD BOONE II, COURIE BRYANT §GARY DOLLAR, JASON GORDON, §JAMES GROOM, RYAN PAYNE, §RODERICK ROBINSON and §J A M E S W H I T E , §

P l a i n t i f f s , §§§§ Civil Action No.

JURY

CITY OF RED OAK, TEXAS and §CRAIG RUDOLPH, Individually, §

D e f e n d a n t s . §

PLAINTIFFS' ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs RICHARD BOONE II, COURIE BRYANT, GARY DOLLAR, JASON

GORDON, JAMES GROOM, RYAN PAYNE, RODERICK ROBINSON and JAMES WHITE

(collectively "Plaintiffs") file this Original Complaint against Defendant CITY OF RED OAK,

TEXAS and Defendant CRAIG RUDOLPH in his Individual Capacity ("Rudolph")(collectively

"Defendants"), and would show as follows:

A. Parties

1. Plaintiff RICHARD BOONE II ("Boone") brings this action individually.

Plaintiff Boone resides in Ellis County, Texas and is employed by Defendant City as a police

officer.

2. Plaintiff COURIE BRYANT ("Bryant") brings this action individually. Plaintiff

Bryant resides in Ellis County, Texas and is employed by Defendant City as a police officer.

3. Plaintiff GARY DOLLAR ("Dollar") brings this action individually. Plaintiff

Dollar resides in Ellis County, Texas and is employed by Defendant City as a police officer.

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Case 3:13-cv-04477-L Document 1 Filed 11/07/13 Page 1 of 17 PageID 1

4. Plaintiff JASON GORDON ("Gordon") brings this action individually. Plaintiff

Gordon resides in Ellis County, Texas and is employed by Defendant City as a police officer.

5. Plaintiff JAMES GROOM ("Groom") brings this action individual. Plaintiff

Groom resides in Dallas County, Texas and was previously employed by Defendant City as a

police officer.

6. Plaintiff RYAN PAYNE ("Payne") brings this action individually. Plaintiff

Payne resides in Ellis County, Texas and is employed by Defendant City as a police officer.

7. Plaintiff RODERICK ROBINSON ("Robinson") brings this action individually.

Plaintiff Robinson resides in Dallas County, Texas and is employed by Defendant City as a

police officer.

8. Plaintiff JAMES WHITE ("White") brings this action individually. Plaintiff

White resides in Ellis County, Texas and is employed by Defendant City as a police officer.

9. Defendant CITY OF RED OAK ("City") is a municipality in the State of Texas.

Defendant City can be served via the City Manager, Todd Fuller at 200 Lakeview Parkway, Red

Oak, Texas 75154.

10. Defendant CRAIG RUDOLPH ("Rudolph") is an individual that may be served at

his residence. Given his prior status as Chief of Police, Plaintiffs have not included Defendant

Rudolph's address on this public filing.

B. Jurisdiction and Venue

11. This case is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C § 2000e et. seq.\ the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §2601 et. seq.; 42 U.S.C. §

1983; and 42 U.S.C. §1985(3).



12. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter according to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28

U.S.C. § 1343; 29 U.S.C. §2601 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §2000e; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 42 U.S.C.

§1985(3).

13. The court has jurisdiction over the state law claims regarding violations of the

Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Section 21.051 et seq. of the Texas Labor Code

("TCHRA) by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §1367.

14. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5(f)(3) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

occurred in this District.

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

15. Plaintiffs Boone, Bryant, Gordon and Robinson timely filed a charge of

discrimination against Defendant City with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

("EEOC").

16. Plaintiffs Boone, Bryant, Gordon and Robinson file this Original Complaint

within 90 days after receiving the notice of their right to sue from the EEOC.

D. Facts

17. From the start of each Plaintiffs' employment with Defendant City, Defendant

Rudolph created a hostile working environment based on racial, ethnic and gender discrimination

and retaliatory actions.

18. On several occasions, Defendant Rudolph told Plaintiff Boone and Plaintiff

Dollar that he did not want to hire female officers because he did not want to take the chance on

them having sexual relations on duty with male officers.



19. Moreover, Defendant Rudolph required Plaintiff Bryant to undergo tests and

requirements that white police officers were not required to undergo.

20. On one occasion, Plaintiff Bryant, an African American, logged onto his

computer and discovered a desktop picture of a dark-colored animated monkey in a police

uniform.

21. In January 2012, Plaintiff Boone complained to Defendant Rudolph regarding the

unsanitary conditions at the city jail, which posed a risk to officers and inmates. Defendant

Rudolph responded "they are in jail, f— em." It was apparent to Plaintiff Boone that Defendant

Rudolph did not appreciate Plaintiff Boone's complaints.

22. In March 2013, Defendant Rudolph used the term "nigger" while talking to

Plaintiff Boone, Plaintiff Dollar and Plaintiff Gordon to describe what he termed "misdemeanor

murder", which, according to Defendant Rudolph, means that when an African-American is

killed, a thorough investigation is not conducted by the City of Red Oak's police department.

23. Defendant Rudolph likewise disciplined Plaintiffs Robinson and Bryant for

actions for which he did not discipline white police officers.

24. On a number of occasions, Defendant Rudolph interrogated Plaintiff Payne

regarding his deployment to Afghanistan often referring to the "towel heads" in that country.

Defendant Rudolph also asked Plaintiff Payne if one of the detainees in custody at the police

station was the same '"nigger' that was breaking into houses." Plaintiff Payne expressly

opposed the use of said terms by Defendant Rudolph.

25. In March 2013, during a meeting with Plaintiff Boone and Plaintiff Gordon,

Defendant Rudolph stated "I don't know which is worse, your kid showing up with a nigger or

being a faggot?" Plaintiff Boone and Plaintiff Gordon both expressly objected to Defendant



Rudolph's use of these words by telling Defendant Rudolph that they objected to the use of those

terms because they had African-American and/or homosexual family members and/or friends.

Defendant Rudolph responded that he "stuck [his] foot in his mouth."

26. A few days after this meeting, Defendant Rudolph stopped Plaintiff Gordon in the

hallway and commented that he heard Plaintiff Gordon was the founding member of the Black

Peace Officer's Association in Lancaster, Texas. Defendant Rudolph told Plaintiff Gordon that

he would "let it slide this time."

27. Thereafter, Defendant Rudolph, with the assistance of others on the police

department management team, began a campaign of harassment, intimidation and retaliation

against Plaintiff Boone and Plaintiff Gordon.

28. In March 2013, Plaintiffs began voicing their concerns regarding the police

department's use of a particular gun, the SR911. While on-duty and off-duty, Plaintiffs

expressed that the guns had not been adequately tested; that the guns were unsafe for the citizens

and officers; that the police officers had not received adequate training to use the guns; and using

the guns would put officers in danger.

29. Thereafter, Lieutenant Nicki Flores ("Flores"), at the direction of and in

conspiracy with Defendant Rudolph, began interrogating Plaintiffs regarding their concerns.

Flores told Plaintiff Payne that only one person could have an opinion in the police department—

Defendant Rudolph. Flores reminded Plaintiff Payne that "back in the day, officers were

terminated for voicing their concerns."

30. Importantly, Defendant Rudolph and several Lieutenants did not complete the

required training to carry the SR911. Plaintiff Boone expressed his concerns about this to

Defendant Rudolph and to Flores. Specifically, Plaintiff Boone expressed his concerns that not

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only were these officers in danger, but also other officers in the field who relied upon these

untrained officers would also be endangered.

31. On or about April 8,2013, Plaintiff Groom started working for Defendant City.

32. On or about May 8, 2013, Flores verbally reprimanded many officers, including

Plaintiffs, for voicing their concerns regarding the SR911.

33. On or about May 10, 2013, Defendant Rudolph verbally chastised Plaintiff Payne

for expressing his concerns over the SR911 and demanded that Plaintiff Payne turn in his badge.

Defendant Rudolph sent Plaintiff Payne home with instructions to think about whether Plaintiff

Payne wanted to work for Defendant City. Defendant Rudolph warned Plaintiff Payne that he

too would be thinking about whether he wanted Plaintiff Payne to work for Defendant City.

34. On or about May 17, 2013, as a new officer, Plaintiff Groom voiced his concerns

regarding his ability to safely use his SR911 due to his lack of training.

35. On or about May 21, 2013, Plaintiff Groom voiced his concerns regarding the

SR911 and difficulties he was having while practicing with the gun.

36. On or about May 22, 2013, Defendant Rudolph terminated Plaintiff Groom.

Notably, Defendant Rudolph failed to provide Plaintiff Groom with a reason for the termination

and classified Plaintiff Groom's termination as a "General Discharge", a classification only used

when police officers are terminated for cause. This classification has affected Plaintiff Groom's

ability to obtain another job. Notably, Defendant City failed to even be present at the hearing

regarding Plaintiff Groom's classification, instead choosing to force Plaintiff Groom to retain

counsel and appeal this classification.

37. On or about May 23,2013, in the presence of Plaintiff Boone, Defendant Rudolph

falsely accused Plaintiff Groom of damaging his SR911.



38. On or about May 24, 2013, Defendant Rudolph asked Plaintiff Boone to rum in

his resignation, but Plaintiff Boone refused. Defendant Rudolph could not provide Plaintiff

Boone with a reason for his request for Plaintiff Boone to resign.

39. In late May 2013, many of the Plaintiffs experienced shift changes.

40. Moreover, all of Plaintiffs have been, harassed, intimidated, ostracized and

ridiculed. The harassment has been so severe, some of the Plaintiffs have sought medical

treatment. In fact, Plaintiffs Boone and Dollar had to take leave under the Family Medical Leave

Act due to health concerns.

41. All of the Plaintiffs filed grievances regarding the above-referenced concerns with

the City.

42. Plaintiff Bryant and Plaintiff Robinson filed Charges of Discrimination with the

EEOC.

43. After the filing of these EEOC charges, Defendant City began investigating the

allegations made by Plaintiff Bryant and Plaintiff Robinson. However, neither Defendant City

nor Defendant Rudolph launched an investigation beyond the official investigation concerning

Plaintiffs Bryant and Robinson's EEOC charges.

44. In the course of this investigation, many of the Plaintiffs were harassed about their

knowledge and opinions concerning the above-noted allegations. For example, many of the

Plaintiffs were approached by other members of the police department and asked to sign a letter

supporting Defendant Rudolph. When they refused to do so, they were further ostracized by

their superiors and fellow officers, who likewise continued to intimidate Plaintiffs for not

cooperating. One Plaintiff was told that "heads were going to roll" over the complaints filed

against Defendant Rudolph.



45. At the onset of the City's investigation into the allegations made by Plaintiffs, the

officers filing the grievances were subjected to intensive and intrusive interrogation by the City

Attorney. Said interrogations, operating under the guise of "interviews," were demanded

pursuant to city policy. Said interviews invaded the personal lives of the complaining officers

and were inexcusably intrusive, arbitrary, and many of the questions asked of Plaintiffs during

their interrogations had no relevance whatsoever to Bryant and Robinson's allegations of racial

discrimination.

46. The City further ordered some of the complaining officers to submit themselves

for polygraph examinations and interrogated them during the examinations as if they were the

harassers or offenders rather than the victims. The polygraphs were performed in a room so

small that their attorney could not be present during the examination, in violation of an

agreement between counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants before the polygraphs took place. One

attorney for the Plaintiffs objected on numerous occasions to the content of the questions being

asked and the conduct of the polygraph operators towards the officers. Plaintiffs' counsel had an

agreement as to the nature, scope and questions to be asked during the polygraph. The polygraph

operators and Defendants ignored the agreement. In spite of the conduct of the operators, based

upon information and belief, all Plaintiffs passed their polygraph examinations and Defendant

Rudolph failed his.

47. As of the filing of this Complaint, all of the Plaintiffs who are still employed with

Defendant City continue to be harassed, intimidated, ridiculed and retaliated against by City

officials. Some have attempted to reach out to superiors, command staff and other officers and

their attempts have been rebutted.



E. Count 1—Racial Discrimination under Title VII and TCHRA

48. Plaintiffs Bryant and Robinson incorporate by reference all of the allegations

made in the preceding paragraphs.

49. Plaintiffs Bryant and Robinson are employees within the meaning of Title VII and

TCHRA and belongs to a class protected under the statute, namely they are African-American

men.

50. Defendant City is an employer within the meaning of Title VII and TCHRA.

51. Defendant City intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs Bryant and Robinson

because of their race by creating a racially hostile work environment. Specifically, Plaintiffs

Bryant and Robinson belong to a protected group, were subjected to unwelcome verbal and

physical conduct constituting harassment, which harassment was based on race, the harassment

complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

52. Plaintiff Bryant's and Plaintiff Robinson's immediate supervisor, Defendant

Rudolph caused this racially-hostile work environment.

53. Defendant City failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent, cure and correct any

racially harassing behavior, even after the original complaint was filed.

54. In addition, Defendant City's negligence led to the creation and/or continuation of

the racially-hostile working environment. Specifically, Defendant City failed to prevent racial

harassment from occurring at the workplace by, but not limited to the following: failing to

monitor the workplace; failing to provide an adequate system for registering racial harassment

complaints; failing to respond to racial harassment complaints; and discouraging complaints

from being filed.



F. Count 2—Retaliation under Title VII and TCHRA

55. Plaintiffs Boone, Bryant, Gordon and Robinson incorporate all of the allegations

made above. Under 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a), it is an unlawful employment practice for an

employer to discriminate against any of its employees because that employee filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the EEOC or because the employee opposed a practice that violates Title

VII.

56. Defendant City retaliated and/or discriminated against Plaintiffs Bryant and

Robinson for their Charges of Discrimination.

57. After Plaintiffs Bryant and Robinson filed their Charges of Discrimination,

Plaintiffs Bryant and Robinson suffered materially adverse employment actions. Said material

adverse employment actions would not have occurred "but for" the filing of their Charges of

Discrimination.

58. Defendant City retaliated and/or discriminated against Plaintiffs Boone, Bryant,

Gordon and Robinson for opposing practices and actions that violate Title VII.

59. After said Plaintiffs opposed Defendant Rudolph's use of racially and sexually

hostile and harassing language, said Plaintiffs suffered materially adverse employment actions.

Said material adverse employment actions would not have occurred "but for" their opposition to

actions that violate Title VII.

60. Defendant City's wrongful conduct also violates TCHRA.

G. Count3-FMLA

61. Plaintiffs Boone and Dollar incorporate by reference all of the allegations made

above.

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62. Plaintiffs Boone and Dollar are eligible employees within the meaning of the

FMLA. Plaintiffs Boone and Dollar were employed by Defendant City for at least 12 months

and for at least 1,250 hours of service during the previous 12-month period. See 29 U.S.C.

§2611(2).

63. Plaintiffs Boone and Dollar were entitled to 12 work weeks of leave during the

period of January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013 because they or a close family member

suffered a serious health condition.

64. Plaintiffs Boone and Dollar gave their employer at least 30 days' notice before the

date the leave was to begin and/or practicable notice when the leave was needed.

65. Plaintiffs Boone and Dollar provided Defendant City with information that they

were unable to perform the functions of their job, the medical necessity for leave and the

expected duration of the leave.

66. It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate or retaliate against an employee for

engaging in FMLA-protected activity. 29 U.S.C. §2615(a)(l and 2).

67. Plaintiffs Boone and Dollar engaged in FMLA-protected activity by requesting

and taking leave and Defendant City discriminated and/or retaliated against Plaintiffs Boone and

Dollar for engaging in FMLA-protected activity.

68. As a result of Defendant City's unlawful actions, Plaintiffs Boone and Dollar have

suffered economic losses and mental anguish, and will continue to suffer such losses in the future.

H. Count 4-First Amendment Retaliation (Free Speech) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983

69. All Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the allegations made above.

70. Defendants violated Plaintiffs' right to free speech guaranteed by the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution.



71. Specifically, Plaintiffs made statements that involved a matter of public concern

and that are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.

72. Plaintiffs' interest in making these statements outweighs any interest of Defendant

City in promoting the efficient operation and administration of government services.

73. Plaintiffs' speech was a substantial and motivating factor in Defendants' actions

against Plaintiffs, including the termination of Plaintiff Groom.

74. The aforementioned adverse employment actions and harassment occurred

because Plaintiffs exercised their right to free speech on a matter of public concern under the

United States Constitution.

75. The aforementioned deprivations were done under color or state law, ordinance,

regulation and custom or usage. Defendants are liable because their actions were committed

while acting under color of state law. Defendants knew or should have known and/or were

deliberately indifferent to, the violation of Plaintiffs' rights.

76. Defendant City is liable because Plaintiffs' injuries were caused by the

unconstitutional actions of municipal policymakers and/or a municipal policy. Specifically, the

actions taken against Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to termination, were taken by officials

with final policymaking authority.

77. Defendant Rudolph is liable because the law regarding First Amendment

retaliation, as alleged supra, is clearly established and Defendant Rudolph knew or should have

known that taking the subject actions were a violation of Plaintiffs' clearly-established

constitutional rights.

I. Count 5-First Amendment Retaliation (Redress of Grievances)Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $1983

78. All Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the allegations made above.



79. Defendants violated Plaintiffs' right to free speech guaranteed by the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

80. Specifically, Plaintiffs filed grievances with Defendant City and said grievances

are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.

81. Plaintiffs' grievances were a substantial and motivating factor in Defendants'

actions against Plaintiffs, including in the termination of Plaintiff Groom.

82. The aforementioned adverse employment actions and harassment occurred

because Plaintiffs exercised their right to free speech and filed grievances with Defendant City.




deliberately indifferent to, the violation of Plaintiffs' rights.

84. Defendant City is liable because Plaintiffs' injuries were caused by the

unconstitutional actions of municipal policymakers and/or a municipal policy. Specifically, the

actions taken against Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to termination, were taken by officials

with final policymaking authority.

85. Defendant Rudolph is liable because the law regarding First Amendment

retaliation, as alleged supra, is clearly established and Defendant Rudolph knew or should have

known that taking the subject actions was a violation of Plaintiffs' clearly-established

constitutional rights.

J. Count 6-Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection)Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983

86. Plaintiffs Bryant and Robinson incorporate by reference all of the allegations

made above.



87. Defendants violated Plaintiff Bryant's and Plaintiff Robinson's right to equal

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

88. Specifically, Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs Bryant and

Robinson because of their race by creating a racially-hostile work environment. Specifically,

Plaintiffs Bryant and Robinson are African-American, were subjected to unwelcome verbal and

physical conduct constituting harassment, which harassment was based on race, and the

harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.




deliberately indifferent to, the violation of Plaintiff Bryant's and Plaintiff Robinson's rights.

90. Defendant City is liable because Plaintiff Bryant's and Plaintiff Robinson's

injuries were caused by the unconstitutional actions of municipal policymakers and/or a

municipal policy. Specifically, the actions taken against Plaintiffs Bryant and Robinson were

taken by officials with final policymaking authority.

91. Defendant Rudolph is liable because the law regarding equal protection based on

race, as alleged supra, is clearly established and Defendant Rudolph knew or should have known

that taking the subject actions was a violation of Plaintiffs' clearly established constitutional

rights.

K. Count - 42 U.S.C. §1985(3)

92. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the allegations made above.

93. Defendant Rudolph and at least two (2) other City officials conspired against

Plaintiffs for the purpose of depriving, directly and/or indirectly, Plaintiffs of the equal



protection of the laws, or of equal privileges under the laws; and acted in furtherance of the

conspiracy whereby Plaintiffs were denied their First Amendment rights (Free Speech and

Redress of Grievances).

L. Damages

94. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs suffered the

following injuries and damages:

a. Plaintiff Groom - back pay (wages for off-duty jobs); and

b. All Plaintiffs - compensatory damages (including past and future mental

anguish).

M. Attorney Fees and Costs

95. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under Title VII, 42

U.S.C. §2000e-5(k); the Family Medical Leave Act; and 42 U.S.C. §1983.

N. Jury Demand

96. Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs request a

trial by jury on all issues.

O. Prayer

97. For these reasons, Plaintiffs ask for judgment against Defendants for the

following:

a. actual damages;

b. compensatory damages;

c. prejudgment and post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law;

d. reasonable attorney's fees;

e. costs of suit;P L A I N T I F F S ' O R I G I N A L C O M P L A I N T 1 5


f. equitable relief;

g. injunctive relief;

h. liquidated-damages within the meaning of the FMLA; and

i. any and all other damages to which they are entitled.



Respectfully submitted,

Ramsey Hill

C. RamseBar No.

Justin A. HillState Bar No. 240579028584 Katy Freeway, Suite 105Houston, TX 77024Phone:(713)489-7577Fax: (888) 858-1452Email: [email protected]: [email protected]

Melissa Morales FletcherState Bar No. 24007702Lawrence Morales IIState Bar No. 24051077The Morales Firm115 E.Travis, Suite 1530San Antonio, Texas 78205Phone:(210)225-0811Facsimile: (210) 225-0821Email: [email protected]: [email protected]

Rodney RamseyState Bar No. 24040103Law Office of Rodney Pat Ramsey201 E. Main Street, Suite 203Waxahachie, Texas 75165Phone:(972)935-9111Fax: (972) 935-0224Email: [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs



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Red Oak Police Lawsuit