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RISK MANAGEMENT. Satrio Pratomo* Pusat Kajian dan Terapan Kesehatan dan Keselamatan Kerja Universitas Indonesia * BP Tangguh Sr. SHE Manager. Difinisi. RISK : The chance of something happening that will impact on objectives. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Satrio Pratomo*Pusat Kajian dan Terapan Kesehatan dan Keselamatan Kerja Universitas Indonesia
* BP Tangguh Sr. SHE Manager
DifinisiDifinisi RISKRISK:: The chance of something
happening that will impact on objectives.
RisikoRisiko:: Peluang untuk terjadinya sesuatu yang akan mempunyai dampak yang berpengaruh terhadap pencapaian tujuan.
HazardsHazards:: is a source of potential harm or a situation with the potential to cause loss.
BahayaBahaya:: adalah suatu sumber potensi kerugian atau suatu situasi dengan potensi yang menyebabkan kerugian/ kehilangan.
DifinisiDifinisi
PengertianPengertian
Risk = Hazards X Exposure X Probability
Hirarki PengendalianHirarki Pengendalian
Risiko di tempat kerja dikurangi dng. Prioritas sbb : Pengendalian Rekayasa (Engineering
Control)
Pengendalian secara Administrasi & Praktek pengoperasian (SOP) .
Alat Pelindung Diri (APD/PPE).
Aplikasi kebijakan menejemen & prosedur u/ memaksimalkan kesempatan dan meminimalkan kerugian (LOSS)
Aplikasi kebijakan menejemen, prosedur & praktek (practices) u/ Identifikasi, Analisa, Evaluasi dan Menangani risiko.
Menejemen dlm. Suatu iklim ketidak pastian.
Safety Safety : is managing risk to avoid or minimize loss or injury.
Pro- AktifSistimatisBerdasarkan Fakta-2 dan Analisa
LogikaMemperhitungkan kenyataan
kenyataan politis yg. Lain.
Why …..
Untuk memperbaiki pengambilan keputusan pd. Setiap tingkat mgm. Keputusan berdasarkan analisa,
ketimbang perasaan, keberanian.Untuk mencegah kejadian yg. Tidak
diharapkan/ tdk.direncanakan.Menejemen perubahan yg. Efektif.Membuat kesempatan yg. Paling
baik.
Hazards Analysis ToolsHAZOPFMEAFault TreesEven TreesDecision Trees JSA (Job Safety Analysis).
Tentukan Konteks
Identifikasi Risiko
Analisa Risiko
Evaluasi & Rangking Risiko
Treat (menangani) Risiko
Ass
ess
Ris
ks
Monitor&
Review
1
2
3
4
5
Hierarchy of Risk Reduction
ELIMINATION is more powerful than………
PREVENTION is more powerful than………
CONTROL is more powerful than………
MITIGATION is more powerful than………
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Analyzing Risk
MEDIUM
HIGH
LOW
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
A
B
C
DCon
sequ
ence
E
Reduced Risk
Reducing Risk
Emergency Response and other Barriers
Eliminate
Prevention, Engineering
Control (PassiveActiveOps.)
Mitigate (PassiveActiveOperational)
RESIDUAL RISK (Managed to ALARP)
HIGH
LOW
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
A
B
C
DCon
sequ
ence
E
Probability
1 2 3 4 5
A
B
C
DCon
sequ
ence
E
MEDIUM
DocumentBU maintain hazard registers with
corresponding risk ranking
What’s the purpose? Hazard Identification
What can go wrong?Consequence Evaluation
How bad? Frequency Estimation
How often?Risk Criteria and Assessment
So what?
Risk Tools Pyramid
Process
Business
Social Impact Assessment
Health Risk Assessment
Environmental Impact Assessment
Detail ProcessJob Safety Analysis
Task Risk Assessment
What if?
HAZID
FMEA
HAZOP
QRA
Major Accident Hazard Assessment
1.Tentukan konteks kegiatan
2.Apa yg. Akan terjadi ? Bagaimana dpt. Terjadi ?
3.Tentukan Kemungkinannya,& Konsekuensinya dan sekaligus tentukan tingkat risikonya.
4. Bandingkan thd. Kriteria yg. Telah ditentukan
5.Evaluasi pilihan penangannya, persiapkan rencana penangannya, laksanakan rencananya.
KonteksDifinisikan Ruang lingkupDifinisikan, keterpaparan risiko
secara umumAnalisa EvaluasiAmbil Tindakan (take action)Monitor
HHAZARDAZARD A ANALYSISNALYSIS(General definition)(General definition)
The identification of undesired event, that The identification of undesired event, that leads to the materialisation of the hazardleads to the materialisation of the hazard
The analysis of the mechanisms by which The analysis of the mechanisms by which those undesired event could occur those undesired event could occur
The estimation of the extent, magnitude The estimation of the extent, magnitude and relative likehood of any harmful and relative likehood of any harmful effectseffects
RISK
THE PRODUCT OF THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH AN EVENT IS ANTICIPATED TO OCCUR AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE EVENT OUTCOME
RISK = FREQUENCY x CONSEQUENCE
Hazard: An inherent physical or chemical characteristic of a material, system, process or plant that has the potential for causing harm.
Chemicals provide additional hazards due to the toxic, flammable, explosive, and reactive hazards.
Risk: For episodic events, risk is a function of probability and consequence.
Risk Analysis: Quantitative estimate of risk
Risk Assessment: Results of risk analysis are used to make decisions.
INDUSTRIAL RELATED DEFINITIONS
Safety Base procedure that was designed for minimizing the frequency and consequences of hazardous event and could be adjusted with the target for the activity concerned.
Safety Goals
Prevent: Death/injury to workers Death/injury to the general public
Damage to the facility Damage to surrounding property Damage to the environment
Industrial Accident
Many potential dangerous chemical substances (risk) Death or personal injury High potential magnitude of the occured explosion Financial loss occured after disaster accident (loss, damage or destruction of
property other than the product itself) Health-care – continuous exposure to error (impact)
$110M
$950M
$440M
$1.35BN
$300M
$0
$200M
$400M
$600M
$800M
$1BN
$1.2BN
$1.4BN
'98 '99 '00 '01 '02*
* 02 Loss Exceeding $50M include: Gas, plant fire, Kuwait $150M Refinery fire, Japan $ 75M Power station flood, Washington State $ 70M
FLIXBOROUGH, UK (1974) CYCLOHEXANEFLIXBOROUGH, UK (1974) CYCLOHEXANE INDUSTRIAL DAMAGES INDUSTRIAL DAMAGES28 Deaths, 128 Injures, $ 450 Million Lost28 Deaths, 128 Injures, $ 450 Million Lost
Hazard Evaluation
What is a hazard?
Hazard Evaluation PSIM relates to hazards that can cause “major accidents” (different from BP 8 Golden Safety Rules)
“Process” hazards………LEAKS, FIRES, EXPLOSIONS
“Logistics” hazards……SHIPS, RIGS, VEHICLES AND HELICOPTER COLLISIONS. BIG LIFTS (dropped objects)
“Natural” hazards………EARTHQUAKES, HURRICANES, LIGHTNING, EXTREME LOW TEMPERATURES, FOREST FIRES
“Security” hazards.……TERRORISM, SABOTAGE
Process safety disasters: new regulations
Flixborough UK 197427 fatalities
Phillips Pasadena US1989. 23 fatalities
Piper Alpha UK, 1988,167 fatalities
Algerian disaster, January 2004
Ship and rig collision hazards
Earthquake in Japan, Nov 2003
Unsafe spacing of storage tanks
Hazards of lightning
Hurricane damage to BP platform
Hazard Evaluation: key concepts
“Major accident”
Hazard identification……..risk assessment
Inherently safer design
“As low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP)
Safety critical equipment (SCE)
Hazard barrier diagramHAZARD
CONSEQUENCE
BARRIERSBARRIERS
ESCALATION CONTROLSESCALATION CONTROLS
TOP EVENT
HAZARD
CONSEQUENCE
BARRIERSBARRIERS
ESCALATION CONTROLSESCALATION CONTROLS
TOP EVENT
Recognizing Hazards
What are we trying to avoid?
• Barriers put in place between initiating event and accident
• Barrier failure/weakness visualized as holes
• Accident occurs when all barriers fail...
HAZARD
CONSEQUENCE
BARRIERSBARRIERS
ESCALATION CONTROLSESCALATION CONTROLS
TOP EVENT
Team exercise: barrier diagram
Turn to page 16 in your workbooks
Hazard barrier diagram
HAZARD
CONSEQUENCEBARRIERSBARRIERS ESCALATION CONTROLSESCALATION CONTROLS
TOP EVENT
Major accident
HARM TO
Death of two or more people
Long-term or widespread damage to the environment (up to 2 years)
Major costs or loss of revenue (> US$ 10 million)
Adverse headlines in international media: publicized prosecution
Major Hazard Risk MatrixNever heard
of in the world
Has occurred in the world but very unlikely
Incident has occurred in
BP
Incident has
occurred several
times in BP
Incident has
occurred several
times in the BU
Less than once in
10,000 years
Once every 1,000-
10,000 years
Once every 100-1,000
years
Once every 10-100 years
> Once every 10
years
Harm to People
Harm to Environmnt
BP Business
Impact
Reputation Damage 1 2 3 4 5
30+ fatalities
Long term damage to eco-system, poor potential for
recovery
>$1 billion
International media, BP forced to withdraw from region, public inquiry, loss of
A M H H H H
10-30 fatalities
Medium term damage to eco-
system, likelihood of
recovery within
$100 million - 1 billion
International media, regulator
intervention, major corporate
prosecution,
B M M H H H
1-10 fatalities
Change eco-system for up to
2 years with reasonable recovery
$ 10 million - 100 million
Headlines in international media, ongoing coverage in
national media, prosecution
C M M H H
Serious injury
Localised short-term change to eco-system,
good recovery potential
Potential for minor cost or
revenue impact to the BU
Headlines in national press and television,
possible prosecution by
regulator.
D M M H
First –aid / medical
treatment case, possible DAFWC
Change within scope of existing variability, can be
monitored
Negligible cost or revenue
impact
Mention in local press, queries by
regulatorE M M
CONSEQUENCE
PROBABILITY
Example of MAHA matrixNever heard
of in the world
Has occurred in the world
but very unlikely
Incident has occurred in BP
Incident has occurred
several times in BP
Incident has occurred
several times in the BU
Less than once in 10,000 years
Once every 1,000-10,000
years
Once every 100-1,000 years
Once every 10-100 years
> Once every 10 years
Harm to People
Harm to Environmnt
BP Business Impact
Reputation Damage 1 2 3 4 5
30+ fatalities
Long term damage to eco-system, poor
potential for recovery
>$1 billion
International media, BP forced to withdraw from region, public inquiry, loss of future access
A **** j,k,l d,e,f a
10-30 fatalities
Medium term damage to eco-
system, likelihood of recovery within 10
years
$100 million - 1 billion
International media, regulator intervention,
major corporate prosecution, punitive
fines
B ** * n,o,p,q,r,s,t g,h b,c
2-10 fatalities
Change eco-system for up to 2 years with reasonable
recovery potential
$ 10 million - 100 million
Headlines in international media, ongoing coverage in
national media, prosecution
C *** *** ** m i
Single fatality or serious injury
Localised short-term change to eco-system, good
recovery potential
Potential for minor cost or revenue
impact to the BU
Headlines in national press and television,
possible prosecution by regulator.
D **** ***** **** **
First –aid / medical treatment case,
possible DAFWC
Change within scope of existing
variability, can be monitored
Negligible cost or revenue impact
Mention in local press, queries by regulator E * ****** *** * ***
CONSEQUENCE
PROBABILITY
Cassia platform, Trinidad
Oil Gas
Banyan
Trinidad
Samaan AP
Teak A/EComplex
Poui AP
Immortelle
Flamboyant
Cassia
Amherstia
Atlantic LNG
30” NGC
Beachfield
Port-Of-Spain
GaleotaPoint
Samaan BD
Samaan CD
Teak D
18”
Teak BD
18”
16”
Mahogany
40” & 12”
Teak CD
Poui BD
Trinidad
GaleotaTerminal
36”
30” export gas riser beneath accommodation module. No subsea check or block valve. 60km pipeline to shore. Pressure 900psig. Condition of riser in splash zone unclear. Critical inspections and maintenance WOs overdue….HIGH RISK
ALARPR
I S
K
EFFORT
ALARP REGION
EX
PEN
DIT
UR
EProbability
1 2 3 4 5
A
B
C
DCon
sequ
ence
E LOW
HIGH
Reduced Risk
MEDIUM
Indonesia: major accident scenarios? Ship collision into manned platform
Fire from gas export riser between topside ESDV and sea surface, manned platform
Rupture of subsea oil pipeline
Lightning strike and fire of condensate tank
Pig launching / receiving leak / fire
Which is inherently safer?
In your teams find 5 differences between these cans and decide which design is the safer.
Which is inherently safer?
Stainless steel wet gas line
Carbon steel dry gas line
Inherent safety design (ISD) concepts
• Eliminate or reduce quantities of hazardous materials
• Minimize potential leak/ignition sources
• Use corrosion resistant materials• Separate people from hazardous
materials• Preference for simple over complex
Inherent safety offshore: exercise
Manning Platform orientation
Location of crane Location of risers
Approach routing of pipelines Welded-in versus flanged valves
Platform layout: separation / segregation Minimisation of hydrocarbon inventory
Pressure rating of process piping and equipment Location of riser ESD valves and design of actuators
Tangguh Platform Inherent Safety Goals
Minimise inventory Minimise potential leak paths Minimum corrosion by use of suitable materials Minimise erosion & intervention by minimizing sand production Minimise spec. breaks and relief systems Maximise natural ventilation Keep the design and operating activities simple Use best available technology Minimise helicopter flights Minimise processing Maximise reliability Eliminate fabric maintenance Minimise inspection, maintenance and intervention Minimum number of wells Casing and well internals to last for lifetime w/o services and well
entry Eliminate hazardous well activities Max design such platform incidents do not endanger drilling rigs Minimise Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) Minimise manning requirement
Platform inherent safety features
No hydrocarbon processing to reduce leaks and inventories
Open layout and grated decks to increase gas
dispersion
No helicopters philosophy to minimise hazards
No platform power generation to avoid
hazardous storage and operations
Pig launcher optimization to
avoid line blockage
NUI with no overnight accommodation to avoid
personnel exposure
CRA piping to eliminate corrosion
Topsides rated for WHSP to simplify and avoid overpressure
Deluge challenge to simplify and avoid congestion and maintenance
$2.0 Billion in losses
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT CASE
On the night of the July 6th 1988, aseries of explosion ripped the Pipper Alpha Platform appart, kiliing 167 people and only 61 people survived
Daily incidental Statistics
OSHA FAR FR
Chemical Industry 0.49 4Steel Industry 1.54 8Coal Mining 2.22 40Agriculture 4.53 10
Staying at Home 3Traveling by Car 57 17 x 10
-5
Rock Climbing 4000 4 x 10 -5
20 Cigarettes / day 500 x 10-5
Struck by Meteorite 6 x 10 -11
Struck by Lightning 1 x 10-7
Fire 150 x 10 -7
Run over by Car 600 x 10-7
*
* 50% by chemical exposure
FAR Fatal Accident Rate fatalities per 1000 employees and entire life = 108 h exposure
FR Fatality Rate per person per year (exposure poorly defined)
OSHA Occupational Safety & Health Administrationincidence rate per 100 worker years = 200,000 h exposure
Chemical Plant Accidents
Fire High Low Intermediate
Explosio Intermediate Intermediate High
Toxic Release Low High Low
RiskHazard
Fatalities
HazardEconomic
Loss
None
Property Damage
Injury
Disabled1
100
500
10.000
Accident Pyramid
None
Defeating Accidents
Step Desired Effect
Initiation Diminish Grounding, bondingInerting
Explosion proof electricalGuardrails and guardsMaintenance proceduresHot-work permits
Human factors designProcess design
Awareness properties chemicals
Propagation Diminish Emergency material transferReduce inventories of flammablesEquipment spacing and layout
Nonflammable construction materialsEmergency shut-off valves
Termination Increase FirefightingRelief systemsSprinklers
Emergency shut-off valves
PROCEDURESTEPDESIREDEFFECT