Securitatea Rusiei.pdf

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The Russian Security ouncilCAROLINA VENDIL

The Russian Security Council was created in an effort to achieve agreater degree of coordination in Russian security policy. Eversince, the Security Council has been accused of having become 'anew Politburo' or worse. However, Yeltsin's Security Coun cil farfrom justified these misgivings. O nly with the ascent to powe r ofPutin did the Security Council achieve deciding influence. Onlythen were the conditions favourable for the Security Coun cil tobecom e the focus of Russian security policy co ordination andformulation. It had developed a powerful adm inistrative structure,there were no serious competing security policy institutions, it wasnot the object of scapegoating and, most importantly, its secretaryenjoyed the confidence of the president.

Every state is confronted with the problem of coordinating security policy.Decisions must be based on accurate information and in a way whichensures that they are implemented. Both demands call for a substantialbureaucracy - a bureaucracy which may have not only the national interestclosest at heart. Often, this bureaucracy represents narrow institutionalinterests as well. This dilemma is of concern when the making of securitypolicy is considered. Neither Foreign or Defence M inistries nor the differentbranches of the Armed Fo rces stand above institutional trench warfare overinfluence and resources. For Ministers of Finance a particular issue may beprimarily a question of keeping w ithin the limits of a tight budge t while thesame decision for Ministers of Defence is framed in terms of equipment andconscripts. Furthermore, Ministers of Defence may be concerned withprotecting their organisations against other institutions wishing to take o vermilitary tasks. Ministers of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, may be of theopinion that the decision will affect vital international agreem ents. The wayin which ministers frame the issue will inevitably have consequences forwhich advice their respective ministries will give and which informationthey will provide.1 Foreign policy coordination, thus, requires a great dealof administrative engineering.

European Security, Vol.10, No.2 (Summer 2001), p p.67-94PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON


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68 EUROPEAN SECURITYThe Russian leadership has found itself very much at the heart of thedilemma of how to coordinate security policy. Russian ministries arerelatively large and independe nt institutions and the respective m inister hasoften made his career primarily within the same ministry. 2 This makesRussian ministers sensitive to institutional agendas and demands withintheir ministries. Furthermore, R ussia inherited a security policy in disarray

after the fall of the Soviet Union. 3 It proved difficult to break entirely withSoviet practices. Bureaucratic procedures remained to a considerable degreeunchanged and the new state leadership found itself dependent on theknowledge and experience that the former Soviet officials had acquired.The security policy go als of the new R ussian leadership tended to come intoconflict with many of the old practices that lived on within the bureaucracy.It is hardly surprising that coordination of security policy quickly bec ame aproblem for the Russian leadership. The general confusion around whatconstituted the o ver-arching goals of Russia security policy exacerbated thecoordination dilemma in the Russian case.In the Soviet Union, policy making in general and security policy inparticular was a highly centralised affair. Coordination took place primarily

through the Politburo. Other institutions within the Soviet system wereinfluential only to the degree that the Politburo gave them influence.4 Seenover a longer period, the main responsibility for a particular policy areacould change between different institutions. For example, the DefenceCouncil, in which the General Secretary of the CPSU was chairman, wasimportant when it came to defence policy making.5As General Secretary ofthe CPSU Gorbachev could decide to move a policy closer to his ownsupervision. This was the case when Gorbachev accorded a greater role insecurity policy making to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and theInternational Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. AsGorbachev wished to reduce military spending it was natural for him toensure himself of advice on security policy priorities, which em anated fromother sources than the military sector.6 Gorbachev also formed a SecurityCouncil, which was meant to take upon itself responsibility for securitypolicy making together with the Council of the Federation.7By the time ofthe fall of the Soviet Union, security policy making had thus becomeconsiderably less centralised and in somewhat of a flux.

A Russian Security Council was founded after Russia had become anindependent state.8 It quickly became one of the political institutions thatRussian journalists scrutinised suspiciously. Only tw o m onths after Yeltsinhad signed the new law on security, which gave the guidelines for theRussian Security Council, a Russian journalist claimed that it 'had becomethe new guiding force of soc iety'.9Ever since, the Russian Security Councilhas been accused of being - or running the risk of becoming - a new


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7 E U R O P E A N S E C U R I T YTABLE 1SECRETARIES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

NAM E APPOINTED DISMISSEDYurii Skokov 3 April 1992Yevgenii Shapo shnikov 11 June 1993Oleg Lobov 18 Sept. 1993Aleksandr Lebed 18 June 1996Ivan Rybkin 19 Oct. 1996Andrei Kokoshin 3 March 1998Nikolai Bordiuzha 14 Sept. 1998Vladim ir Putin 19 March 1999(Vladislav Sherstiuk, acting secretary) 9 Aug . 1999Sergei Ivanov 15 Nov. 1999Vladimir Rushailo 28 March 2001

10 May 199318 Sept. 199318 June 199617 Oct. 19962 March 199810 Sept. 199819 March 19999 Aug. 199915 Nov. 199928 March 2001

THE ORGANISATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCILThe Security Council is essentially a three-tiered institution, consisting ofits meetings, its apparatus and its interdepartmental commissions. Themeetings of the Security Council, where voting occurs on security policyissues, constitute its central dimension and are chaired by the President.Meetings of a lower rank also occur and are then referred to as 'worksess ions'. The Secretary initiates these work sessions, on which voting doesnot take place. The apparatus of the Security Council constitutes a secondtier. It gathers and analyses information in order to prepare the SecurityCouncil's meetings. Finally, the interdepartmental commissions of theSecurity Council are organs of coordination and consensus building. Thesecommissions are formed around security policy issues and function asorgans of coordination. They are either ad hoc or permanent and are mannedby representatives of the concerned ministries and government authorities.There is also a Scientific C ouncil attached to the Security Coun cil, which isresponsible for methodological development.The Meetings and Members of the Security CouncilMeetings have been held in the Security Council with varying regularity.Under Sergei Ivanov, meetings took place regularly and Putin was usuallypresent. By contrast, meetings took place more seldom during Bordiuzha'stime as Secretary of the Security Council and Yeltsin hardly ever attendedthem. All members of the Security Council are obliged to take part in itsmeetings and cannot delegate this task. Among the members, there is aninner circle consisting of about half a dozen permanent members with aright to vote. The ou ter circle consists of mem bers w ho do not have the right


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THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL 71to vote. The total number of members of the Security Council has variedfrom 15 mem bers up to 25 members in 20 00. The inner circle, however, hasconsisted of six mem bers since 1996 . This inner circle has includedapproximately the same posts since then: the President, Prime Minister,Secretary of the Security Council, Minister of Defence, Minister of ForeignAffairs and the Head of the FSB have been permanent members with theright to vote (see Table 2). Apart from the members of the Security Council,relevant experts or representatives of concerned government authoritiesmay be invited to take part in the meetings.16

TABLE 2PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

OFFICE NAMEPresident of the Russian Federation Vladimir PutinPrime Min ister of the Russian Federation Mikhail KasianovSecretary of the Security Council Vladimir Rush ailoMinister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor IvanovMinister of Defence of the Russian Federation Sergei IvanovHead of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Nikolai PatrushevSource: The Security Council of the Russian Federation on the Internet, Soslav SovetaBezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,Last accessed: 3 April 200 1, Last updated: 3 April2001, Address: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Personnels/Members.htm.After Putin had become president, the number of members of the SecurityCouncil increased substantially. One reason for this was the creation of theseven Federal Districts, which were to function as a superstructure for the89 territorial divisions of the Russian Federation. Seven PresidentialRepresentatives of the Federal Districts were appointed, all of whichbecame members of the Security Council - albeit not permanent members.Furthermore, the head of the General Staff, General Anatolii Kvashnin,became a member of the Security Council in 2000. This was the first timethe head of the General Staff was included. However, Kvashnin had beentaking part in the meetings of the Council earlier and had often presentedthe view of the General Staff on the progress of the reform of the ArmedForces and the situation in Chechnya.17 All in all, the Security Council hadgrown to include 25 members by the summer of 2000.The Apparatus of the Security Counc ilThe Secretary of the Security Council dominates the apparatus. Togetherwith the rest of the personnel, the Head of the Apparatus is appointed anddismissed by the Head of the Presidential Administration. However, thistakes place on the recommendations of the Secretary of the Security


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72 EUROPEAN SECURITYCouncil. The main functions of the Security Council apparatus are to gatherand analyse information in preparation for security policy meetings. Theapparatus also furnishes the Interdepartmental Commissions and theScientific Council of the Security Council with information. It draws up plansfor the work of the Security C ouncil and its interdepartmental com missions.18Already in 1994, the then Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, ValeriiManilov, emphasised the importance of information gathering and analy ses.Not least the fact that the apparatus has always had a directory forinformation security, bears witness to the weight that the Russian leadershiphas accorded to this function of the Security Council apparatus.

The staff of the Security Council grew only slowly during the first years.When the Security Council came into being in April 1992, its apparatuscons isted of about 80 peo ple. In 1994, its staff had increas ed to jus t over 100people. However, in January 1997 after Ivan Rybkin had taken over assecretary, the apparatus staff had grown to 207 people. In other words, asubstantial growth must have occurred under Oleg Lobov. When AndreiKokoshin bec ame Secretary of the Security Counc il, the staff of the DefenceCouncil and the Military Inspection was joined to the Security Councilapparatus. This meant a considerable influx of personnel. However,according to the instructions of the President, the staff should not increase toover 220. On 31 Ma y 200 0 the size of the staff was fixed at 176, only to beallowed to increase again in October the same y ear to 204 people.20There isevery reason to suspect that the number of staff will continue to be at around200 people unless the areas of responsibility of the Security Council e xpand.

The grow th of the staff of the apparatus is mirrored by the d evelopm entof the administrative structure of the Security Council. Few details areavailable on the early Security Council apparatus. Under Skokov, theapparatus cons isted of at least three directories. One directory was in charg eof information gathering and analysis. There were also two directoriesresponsible for strategic security and for planning and coordinationrespectively.

21 A directorate on economic security probably came intoexistence just after Oleg Lobov became Secretary of the Security Counciland the total number of directories had increased to six before he wasdismissed. These were all organised according to security policy arearesponsibilities. In other words the directory for planning and coordinationhad disappeared (or more probably bee n substituted for a Secretariat).22T hestructure of Sergei Ivanov's Security Council resembles that which haddeveloped under Lobov. A reorganisation of the Security Council wascarried out in December 2000 resulting in eight directories (see Figure 1).The number of directories have never been as high as under Ivanov, but theareas of responsibilities of the directories have remained more or less thesame.


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THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL 7FIGUREORGANISATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

CHAIRMAN(V. Putin)

SECURITY COUNCIL (MEETINGS)S ECRETARY(V. Rushailo)

INTERDEP. COM. ANDSCIENTIFIC COUNCILINT.DEP .

COM M IS S IONS121

L , . _ _.L _, IAPPARATUS S ECRETARIAT

SECURITYCOUNCIL

M E M B E R S

S C I E N T i n CCOUNCIL

HEAD OFAPPARATUS

DEPUTYS ECRETARIES

(7)

Dir. forStaleand SocietalSecurity

Dir. forSocial-EconomicalSecurity

Dir. forSecurityin NorthernCaucasus

Dir. forInformatioiSecurity

Dir. forInternationalSecurity

Dir. forDefence-IndustrialSecurity

Dir. forMilitarySecurity

Dir. forMilitaryInspection

Source: Presidential decree (No. 2078) published in Sobranie Zakonodatelstva RossiiskoiFederatsii,2001, No. 1, pp.437 -8.

The Secretary's influence is obvious from the regulations, which guide thework of the Security C ouncil. He is directly sub ordinated to the President anda permanent member of the Security Council. The regulation only guaranteesthe membership of the President and the Secretary in the Security Council.Furthermore, the Secretary recommends who ought to be permanent m embersand mem bers of the Security Council to the President. The Secretary informsthe President on security policy issues and suggests w hat the President shouldsay on security issues in his annual address to parliament.When it comes to the apparatus and interdepartmental commissions ofthe Security Council, the Secretary is in charge of the apparatus (thestructure of which he proposes to the President) and in charge of theformation and abolishment of the interdepartmental commissions of theScientific Council. He is also chairman of the Scientific Council of theSecurity Council (see below ). In addition to this, the Secretary su pplies thePresident with information on prospective candidates for high g overnm entalposts - something that constitutes an important source of inf luence.

The Secretary of the Security Council also recommends his owndeputies to the president. Under Sergei Ivanov, the number of deputy


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74 EUROPEAN SECURITYsecretaries of the Security Council increased to seven. Among these, twowere first deputy secretaries, compared to only one earlier. 24 The deputysecretaries are each acco rded an area of responsibility, w hich correspon ds toa security policy domain of a directory of the Security Council apparatus(see Table 3). For examp le, Vladimir Potapov, Deputy Secretary responsiblefor military security, played a central role in the decision to reduce theRussian Armed Forces. He often made statements on the reform of theArmed Forces and was D eputy Head of the expert commission in charge ofmilitary reform.25 In a similar way, Vladislav Sherstiuk played a prominentpart when the Information Security Policy Doctrine was published.26How ever, it is wo rth underlining that the deputy secretaries are not heads ofthe corresponding directories. Rather, they are responsible for a securitypolicy field - much in the same way as Deputy Prime Ministers of theRussian government are responsible for different policy areas.

The appointment of Sergei Ivanov as Minister of Defence on 28 March2001 led to changes in the staff of the Security Cou ncil App aratus. Vladim irRushailo, who had previously been Minister of Interior, became the newsecretary of the Security Council. Three deputy secretaries of the SecurityCouncil received new posts. First Deputy Secretary Mikhail Fradkovbecame D irector of the Federal Tax Police (FTP ). Depu ty Secretary A lekseiMoskovskii became Deputy Minister of Defence responsible for armamentsand procurement and Deputy Secretary Vladimir Vasil 'ev was appointedDeputy Minister of Interior. Only one new Deputy Secretary was appointedon 28 March 2 00 1: Viacheslav Saltaganov, who had previously held thepost of Director of the Federal Tax Police. In the Security CouncilSaltaganov w as to be responsible for security qu estions related to co rruptionand money laundering.27

TABLE 3DEPUTY SECRETARIES AND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER PUTINAREA OF RESPONSIBILITY . NAME 28 March 2001First Deputy Secretary (economic security) Mikhail Fradkov App. to FTPFirst Deputy Secretary (information security) Vladislav SherstiukDeputy Secretary (economic and industrial security) Aleksei Mosk ovskii App . to Mo DDeputy Secretary (military security) Vladimir PotapovDeputy Secretary (security in Northern Caucasus) Vladimir Vasil'ev App . to Mo lDeputy Secretary (international security) Oleg ChernovDeputy Secretary (societal and state security) Valentin SobolevDeputy Secretary (corruption) Viacheslav Saltaganov New from Mo lSources:Il ' ia Bulavinov and Yelena Tregubova, 'Druz 'ia prekrasen nash Sovtraz', KommersantVlast' (13 June 2000) pp. 14-1 7, The Security Council of the Russian Federation on theInternet, Rukovodstvo apparata Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Lastaccessed: 3 April 2001, Last updated: 3 April 2001, Address: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Personnels/Staff.htm, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 29 March 2001 and Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2June 2000, p .3.


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THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL 75THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMISSIONS AND THE SCIENTIFICCOUNCILAs in the case of the Security Council apparatus, there is little earlyinformation available on the role and number of the interdepartmentalcommissions. In early 1993, Skokov headed an interdepartmentalcommission on foreign policy.28 In other words, interdepartmentalcommissions under the auspices of the Security Council had begun to playa role at this point - although mainly as ad hoc institutions. Apart fromthe interdepartmental commission on foreign policy, there werecommissions for ecological security and combating corruption.29 Theinterdepartmental commission on information security was formed on 18December 1993 under Oleg Lobov.30He also initiated a comm ission whichwas to develop a concept of economic security.31 Furthermore, theinterdepartmental commissions became permanent under Lobov's tenure assecretary. According to Manilov, there were ten interdepartmentalcommissions in March 1994.32Among these, the commissions in charge offighting crime and corruption together with that in charge of informationsecurity w ere the most prom inent.33During Rybkin's time as Secretary, thework of the Securi ty Council became more planned and i tsinterdepartmental commissions and Scientific Council started to convenemore regularly.34

The central areas of securi ty responsibi l i t ies of the permanentinterdepartmental commissions have remained more or less unchanged.Since at least 1994, there have been comm issions on international security,on fighting crime and corruption, on information security, on defence ormilitary security, on defence military industrial security, on economicsecurity, on environmental security and on preserving the health of thepopulation. Furthermore, there have been commissions on constitutionalsecurity and on border policy since at least 1997.35In September 2000, the interdepartmental commissions were increased(see Table 4). Their num ber was fixed at 12, and certain com missions wererenamed. The newly-created interdepartmental commission was to handlequest ions of securi ty within the CIS. This, no doubt , signalled adetermination of the Putin administration to exercise a greater degree ofdirect influence over these q uestions.Since 2 April 2000, a committee of Security Council secretaries existswithin the framework of the Treaty on Mutual Security (the TashkentTreaty). All secretaries of the security councils of the signatory states aremem bers of this com mittee, which met for the first time in September 2 000.At the meeting, Sergei Ivanov made a statement on the importance of CIScooperation in order to combat international terrorism.36


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76 EUROPEAN SECURITYTABLE 4PERMANENT INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMISSIONS

AFTER SEPTEMBER 2000INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM ISSION NOTEOn CIS Problems New in Sept. 2000.On Constitutional Security Chang e of name in Sept. 2000.On Military Security Chang e of name in Sept. 2000.On Societal Security and Fighting Crime and Corruption Chang e of name in Sept. 2000 .On Defence Industrial Security Change of name in Sept. 2000.On Security in the Econo mic Sphere Chang e of name in Sept. 2000 .On Border PolicyOn Information SecurityOn International SecurityOn Ecological SecurityOn Preserving the Health of the PopulationOn Mobilisation and Mobilisation PreparationsSources: Presidential decree No. 1603 with accompanying regulation, published in Rossiiskaiagazeta, 12 September 2000, pp.4-6. See also The Security Council of the RussianFederation on the Internet, Mezhvedo mstvennye komissii Soveta BezopasnostiRossiiskoi Federatsii,Last accessed: 29 Jan. 20 01, Last updated: 22 ept. 2000, Address:http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Commissions/html.

Nezavisimaia gazeta warned that the reorganisation and the large num ber ofinterdepartmental commission were signs that the Security Council 'inpractice had replaced federal executive organs - mainly the Russiangovernment ' .37 Such warnings, however, ought to be taken with a pinch ofsalt. Actually, the number of interdepartmental commissions was onlyincreased by one and no radical change of the structure of the SecurityCouncil took place. Interdepartmental commissions have long played animportant role in the Security Council. Furthermore the comment aboverather displayed that the main weaknesses of the executive structures inRussia continued to haunt the Kremlin. As for other executive structures,the main problem for the Security Coun cil was not how the decision-mak ingstructure was organised but rather how to implement decisions. The maindifference between Yeltsin's and Putin's security councils is rather to befound in the increased influence of Sergei Ivanov under Putin - not inchanges in the Security Council apparatus or interdepartmental committees.In 1993, Yevgenii Shaposhn ikov first expressed the n eed for a scientificcentre attached to the Security Council. The Security Council 's ScientificCoun cil came into existence during the tenure of Shapo shnik ov's successor,Oleg Lobov, in November 1993 and was further regulated in early 1994.The chairmen of the interdepartmental commissions and experts of relevantfields are memb ers of the Scientific Co uncil. Its main task is to develop the


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THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL 77methodology of 'detecting, evaluating and predicting security threats'. Italso evaluates security projects and initiates research in the area of securitypolicy.38

In 1997, Yeltsin issued a new regulation on the Scientific Council. TheSecretary of the Security Council, as chairman of the Scientific Council,exercised con siderab le influence ove r its wo rk - not least since herecomm ended the regulations and composition of the S cientific Council.39In October 1999, a new presidential decree and regulation on theScientific Council further strengthened the position of the Secretary of theSecurity Council. According to the 1997 regulation, the President haddecided the schedule for meetings and the work plan of the ScientificCouncil. In October 1999, the regulation stipulated that the needs of theSecurity Council and its interdepartmental commissions would regulate themeetings and work of the Scientific Council. The Secretary of the SecurityCouncil would hence take the final decision on the planned meetings andactivities of the Scientific Council.40

YELTSIN'S SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIESYurii Skokov became the first Secretary of the Russian Security Council. Hehad previously worked within the military industrial complex and wasregarded as a politician of the conservative camp. Skokov was DeputyPrime Minister of the Russian republic before the fall of the Soviet Unionunder Prime Minister Ivan Silaev. Many believed that he would becomePrime M inister in Novem ber 1991, when Silaev left this post. Instead, hewas appointed 'advisor on federal questions'. Skokov's luck changed whenhe became responsible for formulating a new Russian security concept.Yeltsin signed a new law on security in May 1992, which defined theresponsibilities and competence of the Russian Security Council. Thedocument stipulated an influential role for the Secretary of the SecurityCouncil - a position reserved for Skokov.4' Parliament wielded certaininfluence over the Security Council, but Skokov regarded it to be primarilya tool for the President. At the first meeting of the Security Council on 20May 1992, Skokov claimed that its task was 'to assist the president'simplementation of thorough reforms'.42

Skokov was well aware of the fact that his own influence was entirelydependent on the President. '[My office] involves considerab le powers, butthis power is connected to the fact that I am to guarantee the president'swork. He cannot exercise his office on his own. He needs some kind ofapparatus. I am a memb er of this apparatus. '43Nevertheless, Skoko v did his best to increase its influence. Fo r exam ple,Skokov tried to form local divisions of the Security Council in the different


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78 EUROPEAN SECURITYregions of the Russian Federation.44 Skokov also tried to take over theformulation of foreign policy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Duringspring 1993 the 'basis for a foreign policy concept for the RussianFederation' was presented. It had been prepared in the Security Council. 45However, it turned out that the vaguely defined mandate of the SecurityCouncil could also work against it and its secretary. It was not a carteblanche for extraordinary powers. Indeed, the lack of clear instructionsallowed Yeltsin to refrain from discussing security policy issues in theSecurity Council.

From early 1993 the influence of Yurii Skokov decreased considerably.Through his far-reaching ambitions, Skokov had acquired influentialenemies within the Kremlin. These did all they could to thwart Skokov'splans - not least by refusing to procure information for the SecurityCouncil. Instead, Skokov had to rely on the information he could getthrough FAPSI (Federal Agency for the Protect ion of GovernmentCommunications) and other intelligence organs.46Meanwhile, Skokov had difficulties in controlling even his ownapparatus. Secret documents were leaked to the press together with detailsabout Skokov's confidential meetings.47 This Skokov might have survived,but w hen he refused to sign Yeltsin's decree on dissolving the parliamen t inMarch 1993, his dismissal from the Security Council was only a matter oftime.48 Meanwhile, the Security Council lost influence. Skokov was forcedto resign in June 1993, although rumours of this had circulated in Russianmedia during most of April and May.49Yeltsin's choice of new Secretary of the Security Council fell on M arshalof Aviation Yevgenii Shaposhnikov . He had becom e Minister of Defence ofthe Soviet Union after the Augu st Coup in 199 1. After the fall of the SovietUnion he was appointed Minister of Defence of the Community ofIndependent States (CIS) - a position which soon became void of content,as it became clear that all the CIS countries were forming their own armedforces. Shaposh niko v's am bition was to radically reorganise the work of the

Security Coun cil. He would not settle for a cerem onial function.50This much became clear as Shaposhnikov outlined how the SecurityCouncil ought to develop. He emphasised its coordinating role within thefield of secu rity policy and w ished to see a scientific c entre connected to theSecurity Coun cil.51Shaposhnikov's ambit ions soon came into confl ict with the plans ofother poli t icians. As Secretary of the Securi ty Council , Shaposhnikovfound it difficult to cooperate foremost with the then Russian Minister ofDefence, General Pavel Grachev, but also with the Minister of Interior,Viktor Yerin. In addition, the Supreme Soviet had refused to confirmShaposhnikov in the post of Secre ta ry of the Securi ty Counci l .


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THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL 79Shaposhnikov referred to this as a reason for his wish to resign on 10August 1993.52

Yeltsin did not accept Shaposhnikov's resignation until September.At about the same time it became clear that Yeltsin was determined tosettle the power struggle with the parliament once and for all. On 18September 1993 Oleg Lobov became the new Secretary of the SecurityCouncil - a man of unswerving loyalty to Yeltsin who would not opposeYeltsin's plans to curb the unruly Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin had tried tointroduce presidential rule twice before Sep tember 1993. In October 1992his plans had been discussed in the Security Co uncil for the first time. O neof the people who opposed him then had been Yurii Skokov. When Yeltsinin March 1993 announced his intention to introduce a 'special regimeuntil the power crisis has been resolved', Skokov went against himagain.53 When Yeltsin finally managed to curb the Supreme Soviet inSeptember 1993, Skokov was out of the way. 54 Yeltsin was free tointroduce a stronger presidency and Shaposhnikov became the lastSecurity Council Secretary who had to submit to the scrutiny and approvalof parliament.After September 199 3, the comp osition of the Security Council wasdecided entirely by the President. The fragile parliamentary control overthe power ministries was shat tered.35 Yeltsin's decision to keepShaposhnikov as Secretary of the Security Council in spite of theparliament's refusal to confirm him to this post bears witness to the factthat the Security Council had become a presidential tool rather than acoordinating organ between the executive and legislative branch alreadybefore October 199 3. Its Interdepartm ental Comm ission to Com bat Crimeand Corruption had played a role in discrediting Aleksandr Rutskoi in1993.56 However, the Security Council did not play a decisive role in theplanning of Yeltsin's intervention against parliament in September-October 1993.57 A meeting was held in the Security Council to decide onhow to implement the decree first on 28 September, a week after Yeltsin

had issued his decree 1400 to dissolve the Supreme Soviet. 58Oleg Lobov, like Yurii Skokov before him , was considered to belong tothe 'conservative camp' and had similarly strong ties to military industry.He had worked with Yeltsin for many years in Sverdlovsk and then forGosplan. He became First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister ofEconom y in April 1 993. He was of the view that Russia would benefitfrom a stronger state role in regulating the economy. When he took up hisposition as Secretary of the Security Council, he brought with him formercolleagues from the Ministry of Economy and Gosplan. It became clearthat he would put more emphasis on economic security than had been thecase before.59 He oversaw the development of a concept of economic


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80 EUROPEAN SECURITYsecurity and was in charge of a commission, which was set up toinvestigate the reasons behind the economic crash in October 1994. 60

Like Skokov, Lobov sought to strengthen his own influence through theSecurity Council. However, Lobov's time as Secretary soon becamedom inated by the first Chechen war. As will be discussed below, the centralrole of the Security Council in the management of the Chechen war meantthat other activities were neglected. As criticism against the Chechen warmounted, Lo bov 's posi t ion becam e more insecure. In the election cam paignfor the Russian presidency in 1996, Lobov became associated with the'party of war', from which Yeltsin chose to disassociatehimself.

Retired General A leksandr Lebed enjoyed successes in the first round ofthe presidential election. In the event, Lebed came in third and Yeltsindecided to secure himself Lebed's support on the eve of the second round.Lebed became the new Secretary of the Security Council on 18 June 1996.This again brought the Security Council into the focus of attention, sinceLebed had far-reaching ambitions for it and for himself. Lebed initiallyseemed to be a favourite with Yeltsin, and Yeltsin vaguely implied thatAleksandr Lebed might be his successor to the presidency. Yeltsincategorically denies this in his memoirs, although he admits that he wasvery impressed with Lebed to begin with.61 However, Yeltsin was neverquite comfortable with the ambitious General Lebed at his side. Lebed wasclearly eyeing the presidency. He might have made a bigger impression onthe work and organ isation of the Security Council had he been m ore carefulin weaving his way through the Kremlin intrigues. During the autumn of1996 Lebed's posi t ion became increasingly insecure. He frequentlycriticised the government acquiring evermore enemies inside the Kremlin.His fate w as sealed w hen he , as it becam e clear that Yeltsin was to u ndergomajor heart surgery, demanded that Yeltsin hand over power. Yeltsin firedLebed in a live televised address in October 1 996 . It was obvious thatYeltsin intended to rein in the Security Council.Yeltsin decided to appoint Ivan Rybkin new Secretary of the SecurityCoun cil. Rybkin had becom e the first speaker of the State Duma in 1994 aschairman of the Agrarian Party. Over time, however, he had becomeincreasingly associated with Yeltsin's 'party of power'. His appointmentwas regarded by many as a sign that the Security Council was to bedemilitarised and more transparent than earlier. Rybkin early chose toprioritise internal security over international.63 Rybkin started work on anew secu rity policy concept, the focus of which be came internal security. InRyb kin's view, the security concept was to become the third most impo rtantdocum ent in the Russian Federation after the constitution and the civil code.However, when the concept was finally published in late December 1997,events had overtaken both Rybkin and his security policy concept.64 In


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THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNC IL 81March 1998, Andrei Kokoshin replaced Rybkin, and the security policyconcept was put aside. Two other documents which 'were practically ready 'in late 1997 (the information security concept and the provisional securityconcept) were no t published.65

Kokoshin had been appointed First Deputy Minister of Defence in 1992- the first civilian to occupy such a prominen t post within the M inistry ofDefence. Already under Gorbachev, as Deputy Head of the USA-CanadaInstitute, he had been a well-known debater on military issues. In lateAugust 1997, Koko shin became Secretary of the Defence Cou ncil and Headof the State Military Inspection.66 As Kokoshin took up his position in theSecurity Council, the Defence Council was abolished, while the StateMilitary Inspection became a directorate within the Security Council.Yeltsin gave Kokoshin a month to come up with a proposal for a neworganisation for the Security Council.67At the same time, it was decided thatthe Security Council would no longer handle the Chechen conflict. A'special government organ' was charged with the task of 'regulating thesituation in n orthern C aucas us' .68Instead, Koko shin was to concen trate onthe reform of the armed forces.69 Notwithstanding that Kokoshin developedthe analytical aspect of the work of the Security Council, its influencecontinued to be limited during his tenure. Kokoshin had to resign aftersiding with the Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov in a political powerstruggle.70

Nikolai Bordiuzha became the next Secretary of the Security Council.Bordiuzha had been Director of the Federal Border Guards. He had onlyoccupied the position of Security Council Secretary for a short time whenhe was also made h ead of the Presidential Adm inistration. How ever, it soonbecam e clear that Bordiuzha lacked the political skills necessary to survivein the Kremlin. Yeltsin's t rusted former head of the PresidentialAdm inistration, Sergei Yumashin, continued to play an imp ortant role in thebackground, and Yeltsin had serious doubts about Bordiuzha's abilities tocope.71Meanwhile, the influence of the Council continued to diminish. Thestructure and work processes of the Security Council remained largely thesame, but Yeltsin only rarely took part in its meetings. 72During Bordiuzha'stenure, the Security Council reached its low-water mark of influence onRussian security policy making. Bordiuzha was dismissed in March 1999.

Bordiuzha's successor to the post, Vladimir Putin, also combined hisnew assignment w ith another major responsibility - that as Director of theFSB. According to Deputy Secretary Oleg Chernov, the influence of theSecurity Council started to increase at about this time.73The development ofsecurity policy documents entered a new phase during Putin's tenure andsome were published shortly after Putin had become president. Yeltsin wasdeeply impressed with Putin in his capacity as Director of the FSB and


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82 EUROPEAN SECURITYSecretary of the Security Council and decided to make him his new PrimeMinister in August 1999. For just over three mon ths, First Deputy SecretaryVladislav Sherstiuk served as acting Secretary. A new permanent Secretaryof the Security Council was not appointed until 15 November 1999. Thenew Secretary was a trusted colleague of Putin, Sergei Ivanov.

CONSTRAINTS ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCILThe first year during which the Security Council existed was characterisedby the fuming conflict between the president on one side and the SupremeSoviet and Congress of People's Deputies on the other. The conflict wasresolved only after Yeltsin had dissolved the Supreme Soviet by force inOctober 1993. Until then, the parliament had certain influence over theSecurity Council. For example, the Congress had to confirm the Secretaryof the Security Cou ncil, and one of the first deputy chairmen of the Suprem eSoviet was a permanent member of the Security Council.74 According toSergei Filatov, First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and memberof the Security Council until January 1993, all defence and security po licyissues were first discussed in the parliamentary committees. Filatov thenagreed with the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet on what the parliament'sposition should be, and it was Filatov's task to convey this position at themeetings of the Security Council.75Nevertheless, even during this first year,the Russian Security Cou ncil increasingly beca me a tool for the president touse when he desired. The presidential dominance over the Security Councilwould become even more evident after October 1993.Competing Security Policy InstitutionsThe fact that the Security Council was a presidential organ did not stopYeltsin from regarding it as an institution that at times needed to be checkedby creating new security policy organs or increasing the influence of alreadyexisting ones. Usually, this occurred when the Secretaries of the SecurityCouncil displayed insufficient loyalty or entertained far-reaching powerambitions of their own. Yurii Skokov failed to support Yeltsin in the tug ofwar with the parliament and, consequently, the Security Council was no t themain instrument in Yeltsin's showdown with the Supreme Soviet. Lebednourished presidential ambitions of his own and this resulted in the creationof a rival Defence Council. The Security Council also lost influence whenits secretary proved we ak and did not enjoy the confidence of the president.This was the case when Nikolai Bordiuzha was Secretary. The SecurityCouncil became increasingly sidetracked while the Ministry of ForeignAffairs and Ministry of Defence acquired more prominent roles in securitypolicy formulation.


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THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL 83One of the institutions competing for influence was the PresidentialAdvisor on National Security Policy. Yurii Baturin held this post betweenJanuary 1994 and July 1996. He soon became influential within the securitypolicy field. Baturin only had a small staff at his disposal, but in 1994 therewere, rumo urs that Baturin h ad greater influence with the President.Whereas the Security Council prepared long reports, Baturin provided thePresident with easily comprehensible policy advice - usually compiled onone sheet of paper. This resulted in the Security Council becomingincreasingly regarded as 'an academic scientific research institute'. 76Secretary of the Security Council at this time was Lobov, who will not godown in history as a major security policy-maker.77 The Security Councilstill retained the overall responsibility for developing security policyconcepts and do ctrines, but Baturin remained a com petitor for influence asPresidential Advisor on N ational Security Policy until Lebed took over thisoffice when he became Secretary of the Security Council. 78Wh en Lebed becam e Secretary of the Security Council in July 1996, itsauthority increased together with that of Lebed personally. Lebed combinedthe office of Secretary of the Security Council with that of PresidentialNational Security Advisor. This was the first time that someone occupiedboth of these positions and it meant that the two security policy organs nolonger competed for influence on security policy within the presidentialadministration.79Lebed was behind the dismissal of General Pavel Grachevand the appointment of General Igor Rodionov as Minister of Defence.After a couple of days, Yeltsin's influential bodyguard, Major GeneralAleksandr Korzhakov, was fired together with the head of FSB MikhailBarsukov and First Deputy Prime Minister, Oleg Soskovets. The fieldseemed to be open for Lebed to consolidate his position.However, after a while it became clear that Lebed had landed in aclassical bureaucratic duel with Viktor Chernomyrdin over who was to bethe most influential politician in the Kremlin after Yeltsin. The strugglestood over who was to control appointments and who w as to have access to

the President.80 It soon became apparent that Lebed's position was not asstrong as it first had seemed - not least the creation of the Defence Councilwas a clear indicator of this.Lebed had expressed the wish to create a defence council, to which allthe troops of the various power ministries were to be subordinated.According to Leb ed's plans, this defence council would in turn be und er thejurisdiction of the Security Council.81 By that time, however, Yeltsin hadalready become wary of Lebed's demands for influence. Yeltsin did createa Defence Council, but made it independent of the Security Council.Furthermore, he gave the most prominent position in the Defence Councilto Chernomy rdin - he was to chair its meetings if the president was absent.


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84 EUROPEAN SECURITYThe second most important post went to Yurii Baturin as Secretary of theDefence C ouncil. Lebed was included only as a member of the new council.Neither did the General Staff become subordinate to the Defence Council.82Several of the members of the Defence Council were also members of theSecurity C ouncil and it soon became ap parent that the Defence Council hadbeen created mainly in order to make Lebed's position more insecure and,by implication, that of the Security Council as well.Scapegoating the Security Cou ncil becomes 'Ministry of C hechnya'An additional reason for the diminished role of the Security Council becamethe fact that it was m ade the scapegoat of the first failed Chechen camp aign.One of the main tasks of the Security Council has always been to handleregional conflicts. The situation in Northern Caucasus was discussed at oneof its sessions in early 1993.83 At that time, a commission for problems ofsecurity in the Northern Caucasu s probably existed unde r the supervision ofthe Security Council.84 In charge of this was Sergei Shakhrai, who has beenpointed out as one of the main advocates of the war in Chechnya.

The Security Council certainly landed in the limelight thanks to its rolein the war in Chechnya. Baturin did not take part in the meetings of theSecurity Council after the decision to intervene militarily in Chechnya, andfor a while it seemed as if the Security Council had finally outplayed theNational Security Advisor on the security policy arena. Paradoxically,however, the prominent role the Security Council played in the war inChechnya diminished its influence as a coordinating organ for securitypolicy in a larger context.The decision to intervene was formally taken at a Security Councilsession on 29 November 1994.85 It is, of course, difficult to determineexactly how this happened. Deputy Secretary Valerii Manilov claimed thatthe decision was unanimous. In his view, all decisions in the SecurityCouncil were taken in consensus since there was a general agreement onwhat constituted the Russian strategic interest.86However, the then M inister

of Justice Yurii Kalmykov gave a different version of the decision tointervene militarily in Chechnya. Ka lmykov resigned in protest and claimedthat Yeltsin had not allowed any discussion in the Security Council on theChechen issue until there had already been a vote on the issue. Othermem bers of the Security Council wh o were against a military solution w ereYevgenii Primakov, then head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR),and Vladimir Shumeiko, then chairman of the Federation Council. 87 Theclaim that there was 'general agreement' thus deserves to be somewhatqualified.In his memoirs, Yeltsin also claims that the decision was unanimous inthe Security C ouncil. There was no protocol of the meeting, which had been


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THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL 85prepared by demanding expert opinions from different ministries andauthorities. Yeltsin also mentions that there was 'additional analyticalmaterial' advising against a military intervention.88Acco rding to Yeltsin, hegave the details of the various arguments for and against. 'And the collectedopinion was unanimous: we could not stand aside and watch thedisintegration of our country. '89 The different accounts of the controversialdecision to send troops in to Chechnya highlight the difficulties indetermining the ro le the Security Council played at this time. To say that thedecision was madeinthe Security Co uncil is evidently not the equivalent ofclaiming that the decision was made by the Security Council. Mostprobably, the Security C ouncil was ab ove all used as a tool for the Presidenton this occasion - not least to warrant a degree of legitimacy for thecontroversial decision to intervene militarily on Russian territory.

The reputation and au thority of the Security Counc il was affected by thefact that the decision emanated from there. In January 1995 there wererumo urs of a hidden palace coup having taken place inside the Kremlin -the Security C ouncil was to have taken over con trol of the country from thegovernment.90It was hardly surprising that such rum ours gained p revalence,as the Russian military campaign appeared more and more disastrous. On25 January 1995, the Security Council announ ced that the military phase ofthe military operation in Chechn ya was over, even though it was obviou s toeveryone that fighting was still taking place.91Manilov refused to agree thatthe Security Council was responsible for the lack of military successes inChechnya. In his view, it was responsible for the coordination of securityorgans in Chechnya, not for the operational activity.92

Another setback for the standing of the Security Council came with thefailed attempt to rescue the hostages taken by Chechens at a hospital inBudennovsk in 1995 as a result of which two members of the SecurityCoun cil were forced to resign from their respective p osts.93It was clear thatthe Security Council had become closely associated with the first Chechencampaign.The S ecurity C ouncil continued to play a crucial role in decision makingon Chech nya - not least since the unruly repu blic's status was a problem tothe Russian leadership. Moscow could not claim to be in control of theterritory and needed to coordinate its policy tow ards Chec hnya. Th e bulk ofboth civilian and military decision making on Chechnya was made in theSecurity Council. As the conflict in Chechny a wen t on, the Security Councilwas also handed the responsibility for trying to find a way ou t of the costlywar.94 Managing the Chechen question demanded the overwhelming part ofthe resources of the Security Council, and the developm ent of new securitypolicy documents progressed only slowly.During Rybkin's tenure as Secretary, the Chechen conflict continued to


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86 EUROPEAN SECURITYdominate the agenda of the Security Council. Viktor Chernomyrdinespecially mentioned the peace negotiations in Chechnya as a high priorityfor the Security Council when he introduced Rybkin as its new Secretary.95Ivan Rybkin later claimed that the Securi ty Council became ' theorganisat ional mechanism which took decisions on the confl ict inChechnya'96 and the council started to go under the nickname of 'theChechen Ministry'.97 The toll that the war in Ch echnya took on the au thorityof the Security Council and its administrative resources diminished itsinfluence considerably.

THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER PUTINSergei Ivanov was appointed Secretary of the Securi ty Council inNovember 1999 while Putin was still Prime Minister. Like Putin, he hadearlier worked within the KGB and later the FSB. In a book built oninterviews with Putin, Putin mentioned Ivanov as the person that he felt akinship with and trusted the most.98 While Putin was Prime Minister andacting President of Russia, Ivanov 's profile and that of the Security C ouncilwas relatively modest. This changed entirely after the presidential electionin March 2000. Ivanov rapidly became one of the most influential men inMoscow.

Among the former secretaries of the Security Council, only AleksandrLebed may be argued to have kept as high a profile as Ivanov. In sharpcontrast to Lebed, however, Ivanov enjoyed the confidence of the Presidentand was regarded as less of a maverick by the Kremlin establishment.Ivanov also took over a well-oiled Secu rity Council apparatus, which thenew President was well acquainted with and had learnt to depend upon.Putin, as former Secretary of the Security Council and w ith a past within theKGB and FS B, continued to be provided with information from the SecurityCouncil - information in a form, which he was familiar with and used toabsorbing.The Security Council structures acquired an unprecedented influenceafter Vladimir Putin became President. Evidence suggests that foreignpolicy w as formulated in the Security Coun cil and that the Foreign M inistryund er Igor Ivanov mainly was responsible for the imp lementation of foreignpolicy. Not least Sergei Ivanov's frequent interviews on foreign policy andhis many trips abroad strengthened this impression. 99 No Secretary of theSecurity Council had earlier had such a prominent role in foreign policy,although many had nurtured the ambition.100The Security Council also directed the implementation of the militaryreform. Already Kokoshin was given the overal l responsibi l i ty forreforming the Armed Forces, but he never came close to acquiring the far-


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THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUN CIL 87reaching authority that was bestowed upon Sergei Ivanov. Ivanov carriedout inspection on the spot of all military districts and Russian fleets duringAugust - O ctober 2000. He also chaired the expert comm ission, whichwas appointed to prepare the decision on reduction and reforms of theArmed Forces. This expert commission, in which all the concerned powerstructures were represented, had met 17 times before a final decision wasmade.102 Sergei Ivanov anno unced the decision on reductions after a m eetingin the Sec urity Coun cil.103 There were also speculations in Russian p ress thatthe Security Council had become the 'uniting link' between the presidentand the 12 power structures.104

Another sign of the increased influence of the Secu rity Council was th efact that the work with preparing security policy documents received animportant boost after Putin had become President. In January 2000 a newSecurity Policy Concept was adopted. According to Sergei Ivanov, it wasabove all the economic situation, which had changed dramatically andprompted an updated version of the Security Policy Concept of 1997.' 05Inreality, the concept differed on several points from that of Rybkin'spublished in 1997. Only a few of these points dealt with the economicsi tuat ion. Although the new concept contained obscuri t ies andinconsistencies, it probably mirrored a degree of consensus that had beenreached within the security policy elite.106

Three other documents (two doctrines and a foreign policy concept)were adopted the same year as the Security Policy Concept and gave theimpression that the Russian leadership had approached a more coherentview on security. All three docum ents were prepared d uring P utin's time asSecretary of the Security Council. On 21 April 2000, a new militarydoctrine was adopted as well as, a couple of months later, a new foreignpolicy concept.107 In June 2000, an Information Security Policy Doctrinewas adopted at one of the Security Council 's meetings.10 8 This documentraised concerns not least within the Russian liberal press, since the d octrinecontained wordings, which put the future of the freedom of the press intodoubt.109 All of these documents were mainly signals to the surroundingworld and the concerned Russian authorities rather than instructions to befollowed. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the Security Cou ncil m anagedto produce a set of security policy docum ents, which m ade up an internallycoherent structure, where the overarching docum ent was the Security Po licyConcept. Even more importantly, these documents were not outdated whenthey were published, as in the case of Rybkin's Security Policy Concept of1997.

The reshuffle of ministers and security officials, which took place on 28March 20 01 , reduced the influence of the Security Co uncil. It lost itsinfluential secretary, Sergei Ivanov, and it seems unlikely that Vladimir


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88 EUROPEAN SECURITYRushailo will be able to reach Sergei Ivanov's degree of influence oversecurity policy. Although Putin will probably continue to rely on theSecurity Council for information and analysis of security policy, someresponsibilities will in effect leave the realm of the council. Sergei Ivanovwill, as Minister of Defence, take with him the responsibilities for militaryreform - an area that the Security Council earlier was deeply involved in.

Similarly, foreign policy formulation is likely to fall outside the areas ofresponsibility of the Security Council with the departure of Sergei Ivanov.M eanwh ile, the Security Council will be forced to concentrate much ofits resources on 'problems in Northern Caucasus', as it has again beenassigned the overarching responsibility for the situation in Chechnya. 0Already on 29 March 2001, a first meeting on the situation in Chechnyatook place in the Security Council. This means that the Security Councilwill once again run the risk of becoming a scapegoat, if the situation inChechnya does not improve.

CONCLUSIONThe often-made comparison between the Security Council and the Politburois deceptive, since the conditions for decision making have changedconsiderably since the fall of the Soviet Union. Instead, the comparison withthe American N ational Security Council (NSC) is mo re interesting. W ithinboth the American and Russian political systems the President's role insecurity policy making is clearly dominant. Both the Russian SecurityCouncil and the Am erican NSC are institutions which specialise in an alysisand preparation of decisions. Neither of the institutions is entirely immuneagainst external criticism. In the case of the Russian Security Council, thehostage crisis in Budennovsk resulted in a loss of authority. In the case ofthe NSC, the Iran-Contras scandal resulted in a public scrutiny of the affairsof the NSC and to certain changes in its organisation. The most interestinglikeness is to be found in the role played by the Russian Secretary of theSecurity Council and the American National Security Advisor. In bothcases, his influence with the President is a determining factor for theinfluence that the respective councils receive.

The Russian Security Council certainly began to play the coordinatingrole it was meant to play within security policy formulation after Putinbecame President. In addition to this, the influence the Security Councilbegan to wield over formulation of security policy was unprecedented inRussia. By the t ime Putin came to power, the apparatus andinterdepartmental commissions of the Security Council had developed intoa potentially powerful structure. It was no longer the scapegoat of the warin Chechnya, and Putin chose to prioritise the Security Council over other


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THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL 89competing security policy institutions. Most importantly, however, itsSecretary, Sergei Ivanov, had access to the President and quickly assumedresponsibilities to an extent that no Secretary of the Security Council hadbefore. This did not signify that the Security Cou ncil had usurped po wer inRussia or that it had become a new Politburo, as many feared. The centralsource of influence was still the Russian President - the Security Councilhad simply displayed its ability to fill a most important function when Putinso desired.

NOTES1. Nils Andrn,Skerhetspolitik:Analyser och tillmpningar [Security Policy: Analyses andApplications] (Stockholm: Norstedts juridik 1997) pp.98-9 and Samuel P. Huntington,Th eCommon Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (NY: Columbia UP 1961)pp.1-14.2. Eugene Huskey,Presidential Pow er in Russia(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 1999) pp.10 3-7.3. William J. Derleth, 'Th e Evolution of the Russian Polity: The Case of the SecurityCouncil' , Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29/1 (1996) pp.4 3-4 and CharlotteWagnsson, Russian Political Language and Public O pinion on the W est, NATO andChechnya: Securitisation Theory Reconsidered(U. of Stockholm 2000) pp.53-6.4. Jeffrey Checkel, 'Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russ ia's Changing Foreign Policy 'in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (eds.) The Making of F oreign Policy in Russia and

the New States of Eurasia (London: M.E. Sharpe 1995) p.43, Karen Daw isha, 'Th e Limitsof the Bureaucratic Politics Model: Observations on the Soviet Case', Studies inComparative Communism 13/4 (1980) pp.300-26, Harriet Fast Scott, 'The SovietDecision-mak ing Process for National Security Policy ' in Robert L. Jr. Pfaltzgraff (ed.)National Security Policy: The Decision-making Process (Medford; CT: Archon Books1984) p.6 and Adam B . Ulam, 'Anatomy of Policymaking' in Robbin F. Laird and Erik P.Hoffmann (eds.)Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World(NY: Aldine 1975) pp.111-12.5. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed F orces of the U SSR (Boulder, CO:Westview Press 1979) pp.97-9 , Ellen Jones,Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the SovietMilitary(London: Allen & Unwin 1985) pp.1- 10 and Jeffrey Richelson,Sword andShield:The Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger 1986) pp.47-9.6. Mark Kramer, 'The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet ForeignRelations and National Security Policy',Soviet Studies 42/3 (1990) pp.43 8-44 1. See alsoRobert W. Kitrinos, 'International Department of the CPSU', Problems of Communism33/5 (1984) p.59 and Neil Malcolm, 'Foreign Policy Making' in Neil Malcolmet al.(eds.)Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: OUP 1996) pp.103-4.7. Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noge e, The Foreign Policy of Russia: ChangingSystems, Enduring Interests (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 1998) p.124.8. Yeltsin had created a Security Council of the RSFSR - probably chiefly inspired byGorbachev's Security Council.9. Sergei Parkhom enko 'Nekii Skoko v' [A certain Skok ov],Nezavisimaia gazeta, 31 July1992,p.2.10. The Security Council was referred to as a 'super min istry' in Sergei Parkhom enko 's article'Bezopasnost'v poslednei instantsii' [Security in the last instance] in Nezavisimaia gazeta,4 Aug. 1992, p.2, and as 'an administrative super monster' in Mikhail Khodarenok's article'Zadumano radikal'noe usilenie soveta bezopasnosti' [Plans to radically strengthen theSecurity Council] in Nezavisimaia gazeta,28 Sept. 2000, p.3.The comparison to a junta appeared in Mikhail Sokolo v's article 'Vsia vlas t' sovetambezopasnosti' [All power to the Security Councils] in Segodnia, 12 Jan. 1995, p.3.The comparison with the Politburo is more frequent and has been discussed in EllenJones and James H. Brusstar, 'M oscow 's Emerging Security Decisionmaking System: The


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90 EUROPEAN SECURITYRole of the Security Council', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 6/3 (Sept. 1993)pp.346-7,Vladimir Kosarev and Yurii Gladkevich, 'Sovety bezopasnosti',Profil25 (3 July2000) p.12 and Mark A. Smith The Security Council(RMA Sandhurst, Conflict StudiesResearch Centre 1997), C94 p.3 . For comparisons with the Politburo, see for exampleBBCSummary of World Broadcasts (hereafter BBC SWB), SU/1444 (28 July 1992), B/4, theinterview with Sergei Manilov, 'Mezhdu SB i politbiuro - nichego obshchego' [There isnothing in common between the Security Council and the Politburo], Izvestiia, 16 Feb.1995, p.4, in another interview with Manilov, 'Vysshii kriterii - blago Rossii ' [Higheststandards for Russia],Krasnaia Zvezda,28 June 1994, p.2, and Denis Babichenko's article'U sovbeza otnyne dlinnye ruki ' [The hands of the Security Council will reach far],Segodnia,27 Dec. 1997, p.3.

11. See Nicolai N. Petro and Alvin Z. Rubinstein,RussianForeignPolicy: From Empire to Nation-State(NY: Longman 1997) p.108 and Smith,The Security Council(note 10), C94 pp.3-4.12. Henry Kissinger,The White House Years(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and MichaelJoseph 1979) p.47.13. Ibid. p.48.14. Ibid.15. Security Council of the Russian Federation, Sostav Soveta Bezopasnosti RossiiskoiFederatsii, Last accessed: 31 Aug. 2000, Last updated: 6 July 2000, Address:http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Personnels/Members.htm.16. Presidential decree (No. 949) on the Security Council with accompanying regulation,published inRossiiskaia gazeta,5 Aug. 1999, p.4.17. Vladimir Yermolin, 'Vtoraia voennaia figura' [The second military chessman], Izvestiia,14 June 2000, p.1 .18 . Presidential decree (No. 294) and regulation on the apparatus of the Security Council,published in Sobranie Zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii,1998, No. 14, pp.2984-89.See also the decree (No. 949) with accompanying regulation, published in Rossiiskaiagazeta,5 Aug. 1999, p.4.19. Interview with Valerii Manilov, 'The Security Council without a security classification',Moscow News,No. 23 (10-16 June), 1994, p.2.20 . Huskey,Presidential Power in Russia(note 2) p.74,BBC SWB,SU/1404 (11 June 1992),B/4,interview with Valerii Manilov in 'Vysshii kriterii - blago Rossii' [Highest standardsfor Russia],Krasnaia Zvezda,28 June 1994, p.2, 'Reorganizatsiia soveta bezopasnosti RFzavershena' [The reorganisation of the Security Council of the Russian Federation iscompeted], Nezavisimaia gazeta, 21 Jan. 1997, p.2, Denis Babichenko, 'Dva soveta -khorosho, a odin - luchshe' [Two Councils are very well, one is better],Segodnia,4 March1998,p.1 , presidential decree no. 989 published inRossiiskaia gazeta, 2June 2000, p.3 andpresidential decree no. 1770 on the website of the Russian Security Council, Ukazprezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation],accessed on 14 Dec. 2000, last updated 1 June 2000, on the Internet, www.scrf.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/989.html.

21 . Jones and Brusstar, 'Moscow's Emerging Security Decisionmaking System' (note 10)p.364 and William J. Derleth, 'The Evolution of the Russian Polity: The Case of theSecurity Council',Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29/1 (1996) p.47.22 . Presidential decree No. 1024, published inRossiiskaia gazeta, 16 July 1996, p. 4. As lateas Oct. 1995, however, there existed a directory for strategic evaluation and prognoses anda directory for securing the work of the Security Council ( upravlenie obespecheniiadeiatel nosti SB), Rossiiskie vesti, 18 Oct. 1995, p.1.23 . Presidential decree (No. 949) with accompanying regulation, published in Rossiiskaiagazeta,5 Aug. 1999, p.4.24 . Presidential decree No. 989, published inRossiiskaia gazeta,2 June 2000, p.3.25 . Ilia Bulavinov, 'Vladimir Putin uvolil Sergeia Ivanova' [Vladimir Putin transferred SergeiIvanov to the reserve],Segodnia, 10 Nov. 2000, p. l.26 . See his interviews in Krasnaia zvezda, 24 Jan. 2001, pp.1,2 and Nezavisimoe voennoeobozrenie,13-19 Oct. 2000, p.7 (certain of Sherstiuk's answers in the two interviews areidentical).


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T H E R U S S I A N S E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L 9 127 . Lidiia Andrusen ko and Liudmila Romanova, 'Pervaia revoliutsiia Putin a', Nezavisimaiagazeta,29 M arch 2001 , pp.1 , 3.28 . Vladislav Chernov, 'Natsio nal'ny e interesy Rossii i ugrozy dlia ee bezo pasno sti' [Thenational interests of Russia and the threats to her security], Nezavisimaia gazeta,29 April1993,pp .1, 3.29 . Derleth, 'The Evolution of the Russian Polity' (note 21) p.49.30 . BBC SWB,SU/1899 (19 Jan. 1994), B/5.31 . Mikhail Berger, 'Ideia ekonomicheskoi bezopasnosti voskreshaet prizrak starogoGosplana' [The idea of economic security resurrects the ghost of the old Gosplan],

Izvestiia, 2April 1994, pp .1, 2.32 . RFE/RL News Briefs,7-11 March 1994, p.2.33 . See for examp le, 'SB zanimalsia prestup nost'iu' [The SC took on crime ], Nezavisimaiagazeta,4 March 1994, p.1 andBBC SWB,SU/1939 (7 March 1994), B/6 and SU/1945 (14March 1994), B/3.34 . Denis Babich enko's articles 'U sovbeza otnyne dlinnye ru ki ' [The hands of the SecurityCouncil will reach far],Segodnia,27 Dec. 1997, p.3 and 'Dva soveta - khorosh o, a odin -luchshe' [Two Councils are very well, one is better],Segodnia,4 March 1998, p.l.35 . RFE/RL News Briefs, 7-11 March 1994, p.2, Presidential decree No. 1037 withaccompanying regulation, published in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2 Oct. 1997, pp.3-5 andpresidential decree No. 1603 with accompanying regulation, published in Rossiiskaiagazeta, 12 Sept. 2000, pp.4-6 .36 . Kirill Kireev, Sekretar' sovbeza RF prizval svoikh kolleg k sovmestnoi bor'be smezhdunarodnym terrorizmom, StranaRu, Last accessed: 11 Oct. 2000, Last updated: 29Sept. 2000, Address: www.strana.ru/print/970148769.html. See also StranaRu, SergeiIvanov: Strany DKB SN G sozdadut obshchie voennye sily dlia bor'by c terrorizmom idrugimi ugrozami ,StranaRu, Last accessed: 24 Nov. 2000, Last updated: Not specified.,Address: www.strana.ru/print/973184847.html. The signatory states of the Tashkent Treatyin 1992 were Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.Azerbaijan, G eorgia and Belarus later also jointed the Treaty. Earlier, it had becom e know nthat the CIS Ministry was to be shut down. This was announced in May 2000. Policytowards the CIS was to be handled within the Foreign Ministry, which already had adepartment for the CIS, see Vladimir Zemskii, 'Vazhneishii element sotrudnichestva' [Themost important element of cooperation],Nezavisimaia gazeta,p.10.

37 . Mikhail Khodarenok, 'Zadumano radikal'noe usilenie soveta bezopasnosti' , [A radicalstrengthening of the Security Council is planned],Nezavisimaia gazeta,28 Nov. 2000, p. l.38 . Valerii Aleksin, 'Glavn ye ugrozy bezopasnosti Rossii - vn utrenn ie' [The main threats toRussia's security are internal],Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie,No. 12 (7-1 3 April), 2000,p.3.39 . Presidential decree No. 814 with accompanying regulation, published in Rossiiskaiagazeta,7 Aug. 1997, p.4.40 . Presidential decree No . 1317 with accompanying regulation, published in Rossiiskaiagazeta,7 O ct. 1999, p.3.41 . Ibid.42 . Boris Sherman, 'Sovet bezopasnosti provel pervoe zased anie' [The Security Council hasheld its first meeting], Nezavisimaia gazeta,21 May 1992, p.2.43 . BBC SWB,SU/1444 (28 July 1992), B/5.44 . Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society,2nd ed. (London: Routledge 1996) p.146.See also Mikhail Sokolov 'Vsia vlast' sovetam bezopasnosti' [All power to the SecurityCouncils],Segodnia, 12 Jan. 1995, p.3.45 . The foreign policy concept was presented by Vladislav Chernov, first deputy head of theSecurity Council Directorate for Strategic Security in an article, 'Natsional'nye interesyRossii i ugrozy dlia ee bezopasno sti' [The national interests of Russia and the threats to hersecurity],in Nezavisimaia gazeta,2 9 April 1993, pp.1 , 3.46 . Timothy J. Colton, 'Boris Yeltsin: All-Thumbs Dem ocrat' in idem and Robe rt C. Tucker(eds.)Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership(Oxford: Westview Press 1995) p.67 and EugeneHuskey,Presidential Power in Russia(note 20) pp.76-77 .


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92 EUROPEAN SECURITY47. Aleksandr Golovkov, Tret'ia opora ierarkhii' [The third buttress of the hierarchy],

Nezavisimaia gazeta 29 June 2000, p.1.48 . Boris N. Yeltsin,The View from the Kremlin (trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick) (London:HarperCollins 1994) p.206.

49. Suzanne Crow, 'Processes and Policies',RFE/RL Research Report 2/20 (1993) p.52.50. Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee,The Foreign Policy of Russia(note 7) p.127

and Vitalii Marsov, 'Tainaia igra v Kremle prodolzhaetsia' [The secret game in the Kremlincontinues],Nezavisimaia gazeta 12 Aug. 1993, p.1.51. BBC SWB SU/1744 (19 July 1993),B/2-3.

52. BBC SWB SU/1729 ( 1 July 1993), i,BBC SWB SU/1731 (3 July 1993), C2/4, Ivan Rodin,'Deputaty ne utverdili sekretaria soveta bezopasnosti [The deputies did not confirm thesecretary of the Security Council],Nezavisimaia gazeta 1 July 1993, p.2 and MikhailSokolov, 'Vsia vlast' sovetam bezopasnosti' [All power to the Security Councils],Segodnia 12 Jan. 1995, p.3.53 . Yeltsin's address inRossiiskie vesti 23 March 1993, pp. 1-2.

54. Alexander Rahr, ' Power Ministries Support Yeltsin', RFE/RL Research Report 2/40(1993) pp.8-9.55 . Ibid. p.11.

56. BBC SWB SU/1771 (19 Aug. 1993), i, SU/1781 (31 Aug. 1993),B/2-3.Later corruptioncharges against individual politicians and officials have also been analysed in the SecurityCouncil. See for example the Skuratov case in 1999, which is discussed later in this article.57 . Smith,The Security Council(note 10) C94 p.11.58 . Rossiiskie vesti 30 Sept. 1993, p.l .

59. Mikhail Berger, 'Ideia ekonomicheskoi bezopasnosti voskreshaet prizrak starogoGosplana' [The idea of economic security resurrects the ghost of the old Gosplan],Izvestiia 2 April 1994, pp.1, 2.

60. Donaldson and Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia (note 50) p.127 and Huskey,Presidential Power in Russia(note 20) p.78.61 . Boris N. Yeltsin, Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia vospominaniia vpechatleniia...(Moscow: Izdatelstvo AST 2000)pp.71,72.

62. Harold Elletson,The General Against the Kremlin: AlexanderLebed:Power and Illusion(London: Little, Brown 1998) pp.273-6 and Yeltsin,Prezidentskii marafon (note 61)pp.76-7.63 . Mikhail Lantsman, 'Novomu sekretariu SB ochertili krug polnomochii' [The range ofauthoritities has been outlined to the new secretary of the SC],Segodnia 22 Oct. 1996, p.2.

64. Presidential decree, No. 1300, with accompanying concept was published inRossiiskaiagazeta 26 Dec. 1997, pp.1, 4- 5.65 . Denis Babichenko, 'U sovbeza otnyne dlinnye ruki ' [The hands of the Security Councilwill reach far],Segodnia 27 Dec. 1997, p.3.

66. Viktor Litovkin, 'Andrei Kokoshin poluchil ogromnye polnomochiia' [Andrei Kokoshinhas received enormous authorities],Izvestiia 30 Aug. 1997, p.2.

67 . Viktor Litovkin, 'Kokoshin stal i Rybkinym, i Baturinym odnovremenno' [Kokoshinbecame both Rybkin and Baturin at the same time], Izvestiia 4 March 1998, p.l and DenisBabichenko, 'Dva soveta - khorosho, a odin - luchshe' [Two Councils are very well, oneis better],Segodnia 4 March 1998, p. l. Yeltsin's decree (No. 220) on the abolition of theDefence Council and subordination of the State Military Inspection to the Security Councilwas published inRossiiskaia gazeta 4 March 1998, p.3. Kokoshin was handed the task toreorganise the Security Council in the same decree.68 . 'V gorakh i odinochnyi vystrel rozhdaet lavinu' [Even a single shot gives rise to anavalanche in the mountains],Rossiiskaia gazeta 26 May 1998, p.l .

69. Decree No. 220, published inRossiiskaia gazetaon 4 March 1998, p.3. See also Litovkin,'Kokoshin stal i Rybkinym' (note 67).

70. Yeltsin,Prezidentskii marafon(note 61) pp.227-8.71 . Ibid. pp.252-5.72. Aleksandr Golovkov, 'Tret'ia opora ierarkhii' [The third buttress of the hierarchy],

Nezavisimaia gazeta 29 June 2000, p.1.


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T H E R U S S I A N S E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L 9 373 . Roun dtable discussion on the role of the Security Cou ncil, 'Rossiia sosredotoc hivaetsia'[Russia concentrates],Nezavisimaia gazeta,3 Aug. 2000, p.4.74 . Jones and Brusstar, 'Mo scow 's Emerging Security Decisionm aking System ' (note 10)pp.346-9.75 . Interview with Sergei Filatov, ' Chto znachit zashch ishchat' russk ikh? Vvesti voiska inachat' voinu?' [ What is to defend Russians? To bring in troops and start a war? ],Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 Sept. 1992, pp.1, 3.76 . Aleksand r Shal'nev, 'Glavnee generalo v' [Ahead of the gener als],Izvestiia, 8 June 1994,p.477 . Aleksand r Golovkov, 'Tret'ia opora ierarkhii' [The third buttress of the hierarchy],Nezavisimaia gazeta,29 June 2000, p.1 .78 . 'V kosmos startuet Yurii Baturin ' [Yurii Baturin takes off into space ],Izvestiia, 13 Aug.1998, p.2.79 . Yurii Baturin was Yeltsin's security policy advisor between June 1993 and June 1996.80 . Ivan Rodin , 'Protivostoianie prem 'era i sekretaria SB ' [Confrontation between the PrimeMinister and secretary of the SC],Nezavisimaia gazeta,11 July 1996, p.2.81 . Donaldson and Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia (note 50) pp.128-9.82 . Pavel Fel'geng auer, 'Sovet oborony kak soveshc hatel'nyi organ' [The Defence Council asa consultative body ],Segodnia,27 July 1996, p.1.83 . BBC SWB,SU/1587 (15 Jan. 1993), B/5 -6.84 . Suzanne Crow, 'Processes and Policies', RFE/RL Research Report 2 (20 1993) p.49 andJones and Brusstar, 'Moscow's Emerging Security Decisionmaking System' (note 10)p.355.85 . Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power(New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1998)p.92 and Mark A. Smith, Chechnya: The Political Dimension (RMA Sandhurst, Conflict

Studies Research Centre 1995) pl4, p.6.86 . Interviews with Manilov, 'Mezhdu SB i politbiuro nichego obshche go' [There is nothingin common between the Security Council and the Politburo], Izvestiia, 16 Feb. 1995 andInterview with Valerii Manilov, 'The Security Council without a security classification',Moscow News,No. 23 (10 -16 June), 1994, p.2.87 . Huskey,Presidential Power in Russia(note 2) p.79.88 . Yeltsin, Prezidentskii marafon(note 61) p.67.89 . Ibid. p.70.90 . Mikha il Sokolov, 'Vsia vlast' sovetam bezopasno sti' [All powe r to the Security Councils]Segodnia, 12 Jan. 199 5, p.3 .91 . Lieven, Chechnya(note 85)p.121.92 . Interview with Sergei Manilov, 'Mezhdu SB i politbiuro - niche go obsh cheg o' [There isnothing in common between the Security Council and the Politburo], Izvestiia, 16 Feb.1995,p.4.93 . Pavel Shinkarenko, 'Krem l' perevodit strelki chasov na mir v Che chne ' [The Kremlin haschanged the timetable for peace in Chechnya],Rossiiskie vesti,31 A ug. 1995, p.1 , Lieven,

Chechnya (note 85) p. 124 -6 and Petro and Rubinstein,Russian Foreign Policy (note 11)p.103.94 . Pavel Anok hin, 'I mirnaia diplomatiia mozhet byt' reshite l'noi ' [Peaceful diplomacy mayalso befirm],Rossiiskie vesti,30 Aug. 1995, p.1 and Pavel Shinkarenko, 'Kreml' perevoditstrelki chasov na mir v Chechne' (note 93).95 . Mikhail Lantsman, 'Novom u sekretariu SB ochertili krug polnomo chii' [The range ofauthoritities has been outlined to the new secretary of the SC],Segodnia,22 Oct. 1996, p.2.96 . Ivan P. Rybkin,Consent in Chechnya, Consent in Russia(Lytten Trading & Investment Ltd1998) p.47.97 . Denis Babichen ko, 'U sovbeza otnyne dlinnye ruk i' [The hands of the Security Councilwill reach far],Segodnia, 27 Dec. 1997, p.3.98 . Natalia Gevorkian, Andrei Kolesnikov and Natalia Timak ova, Ot pervogo litsa. Razgovorys Vladimirom Putinym, Vagrius, Last accessed: 16 March 2000, Last updated: Notspecified., Address: http://www.vagrius.com/html/books/putin/puting19.htm.99 . See for example interviews 'Glavnye ugrozy bezopasnosti Rossii - vnu trenn ie' [The main


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94 EUROPEAN SECURITYthreats to Russia are internal] Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 7-13 April 2000 and'Rossiiu tesniat- no ne vytesniat' [Russia is pushed. But will not be pushed out]Rossiiskaiagazeta, 16 March 2000, p.7, where Sergei Ivanov laid down the general guidelines forRussian security policy and foreign policy.100. Skokov tried to formulate foreign policy as did Lobov, see above.101. Interview with Sergei Ivanov, 'Strategiia bezopasnosti Rossii ' [Russia's security strategy],Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie,1-7 Dec. 2000, pp.1, 4.102. Interview with Sergei Ivanov, 'Strategiia bezopasnosti Rossii ' [Russia's security strategy],Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 1-7 Dec. 2000, pp.1, 4 and Il'ia Bulavinov, VladimirPutin uvolil Sergeia Ivanova' [Vladimir Putin transferred Sergei Ivanov to the reserve],Segodnia, 10 Nov. 2000, p.1 .103. Pavel Felgenhauer, 'Kremlin Vows To Downsize Army',Moscow News,No. 44-45, 15-21Nov. 2000, p.2. See also Oleg Odnokolenko, 'Armiia obrechena' [The army is doomed],Segodnia,28 Sept. 2000, pp.1, 2.104. Vadim Solov'ev, 'Rossiia ne raozhet vesti bol'shuiu voinu' [Russia cannot conduct a largewar], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 17-23 Nov. 2000, p.1 . See also MikhailKhodarenok, ' Dvenadtsatiboiarshchina v sovete bezopasnosti' [Twelve boyars' rule inthe Security Council],Nezavisimaia gazeta,9 Nov. 2000, p.2.105. Valerii Aleksin, 'Sekretar' Soveta bezopasnosti RF rasstavliaet aktsenty' [The secretary ofthe Security Council determines the accentuation],Nezavisimaia gazeta,16 March 2000,p.2.106. Aleksandr Gol'ts, 'Doktrina Ivanovykh',Itogi29 (18 July 2000) pp.12-13.107. The Military Doctrine was presented by first deputy head of the General Staff,Col. Gen.Valerii Manilov, inKrasnaia Zvezda,26 April 2000, p.4 and in Nezavisimaia gazeta, 25April 2000, pp.1,8. The doctrine was published inRossiiskaia gazeta,25 April 2000, pp.1,5-6. The Foreign Policy Concept was published inRossiiskaia gazeta, 11 July 2000, p.5.108. The Information Security Doctrine was published in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 28 Sept. 2000,pp.4-6 .109. See for example Svetlana Ofitova, 'Zhurnalistami teper' zanimaetsia Sovbez' [TheSecurity Council will now occupy itself with the journalists], Segodnia, 13 Sept. 2000, p.3.,Yelena Lankina and Svetlana Ofitova, 'Informatsionnaia opasnost [Information threat],Segodnia, 14 Sept. 2000, p.2 and Victor Yasmann, Special report: Russia s NewInformation Security Doctrine: A Threat to Freedom and Democracy, RFE/RL, Lastaccessed: 28 Sept. 2000, Last updated: 20 Sept. 2000, Address: http://www.rferl.org/security watch//2000/09/9-180900.html.110. Ilia Maksakov, 'Severnomu Kavkazu budet udeleno bol'she vnimaniia', Nezavisimaiagazeta,29 March 2001, pp. 1, 2.