Seegmuller 1

Jake Seegmuller

Hughes/Walcher

Capstone

14 March 2014

The Generalissimo and the Chairman

The end of World War II brought only a brief respite to a war-weary world. As the

nations of Europe sought to reclaim their empires following liberation from Nazi Germany, an

ideological struggle between the resurgent Soviet Union and United States took hold in both

Europe and the world at large. While armed conflict ended for peoples of Europe and the

Americas, civil war gripped the Republic of China. The end of Japanese occupation of mainland

China and the return of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to power in Nanking (the intended

capital of Nationalist forces prior to and during the Second Sino-Japanese War) saw a brief

period of peace between the Kuomintang (KMT)1 and the Communist Party of China (CPC)

adversaries led by Chairman Mao Zedong. By March of 1946 hostilities between the two

organizations resumed.

While American officials saw fit to distance themselves from direct intervention in the

Chinese Civil War, the Truman administration dispatched General Marshall to oversee a

conference "of representatives of the various political groups...including the [CPC]" in order to

bring about a "unification" of the country and an end to violence.2 Beyond the political

assistance, the Truman administration saw fit to transfer over $2 billion in "grants and credit" 1 The KMT, traditionally spelled as the Kuomintang under Wade-Giles and more recently as the Guomindang under Hanyu Pinyin, were often referred to as the Nationalists following the CPC-KMT split. 2 Marshall. Vol. 1, pg. 1; Ernest May. "When Marshall Kept the U.S. Out of War in China." pg. 1003.

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following the end of the War in the Pacific with an additional $1 billion in military and civilian

surplus according to Secretary of State Dean Acheson.3 Despite overwhelming support from the

United States in financial and indirect military assistance, the Nationalist government succumbed

to the technically inferior and globally isolated Communist forces led by Chairman Mao Zedong

in 1949. Leveraging the peasant population and unending guerilla attacks across the Chinese

countryside provided Mao and the CPC with a decisive advantage over the city-bound forces of

the KMT. As the officially recognized government of the country, the KMT struggled to reign in

hyperinflation from excessive borrowing and oversaw the collapse of the Chinese middle class

following the removal of Japanese forces in 1945. Institutional corruption coupled with vast

cultural disparities between the nominally Southern Chinese KMT and the uneducated peasant

population created a deeply seeded resentment of the Nationalist government by the

disenfranchised and overburdened peasant population. 4 As the KMT ceded control of the

countryside and abandoned the peasant population as done before throughout the history of

Imperial China, the CPC increasingly altered its ideology under the direction of Mao Zedong to

win the allegiance of the disenfranchised peasant population.

Objectives and Tentative Hypothesis

Throughout the research process, I will address the various issues surrounding the

essential question 'Why did the Nationalists, despite superior domestic resources and foreign aid,

fail to defeat the Communist forces?' I have divided these issues into factors of the economy

consequences of the Second Sino-Japanese War, military equipment and aid foreign assistance,

geography, and social support. Despite significantly greater resources and foreign assistance at

3 Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, Department of State Publication No. 3573 (Washington: G.P.O., 1949), pp. Xiv-Xvii. <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1949-acheson-china.html> 4 Ernest May. The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949. pg. 60-61

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their disposal, the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek's political and military leadership

failed to properly address the concerns of the peasant population and appropriately address the

rise of the Communist Party of China. The corruption and incompetence of the Nationalist party

throughout the course of the Civil War undermined the legitimacy of the Republic of China and

impeded the ability of the party to garner popular support.

Previous Research

Much has been written about the rise of Chairman Mao and the early years of the

communist regime, but the military struggle between the KMT and the CPC following the end of

the Second World War remains largely untouched. Examination of the final phase of the

Chinese Civil War initially presented a challenging task with most of the information and

analysis retrieved centered on the efforts of the CPC during the Second Sino-Japanese War and

the violence during the 1930s. Works uncovered during my research appear only tangentially

related on the surface; however, articles such as Diana Lary's "Drowned Earth" offer insight into

peasant distrust of the KMT in light of their tactics during the Second Sino-Japanese War. 5

General George C. Marshall's mission to China and the subsequent report offer a wealth of

knowledge regarding American activities in the country immediately following the Second

World War, and explain the rationale behind indirect American support following the end of

Marshall's tenure as Ambassador. Thunder Out of China by Theodore White and Annalee

Jacoby offers a compelling narrative of the early phases of the Chinese civil war and a fair

analysis of the two principle actors in the engagement.6 Conversely, Edgar Snow's Red Star over

China and Suzanne Pepper's Civil War in China provide detailed narratives on the political and

5 Diana Lary, "Drowned Earth: The Strategic Breaching of the Yellow River Dyke, 1938." War on History, 2001. 6 Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane and Associates, Inc., 1946).

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social struggle between the KMT and the CPC.7

In my research, I intend to unite the disparate efforts of scholars to explain the success of

Mao Zedong's revolutionary movement. Exploring the social, economic, and military factors

behind the communist victory will serve as the focus of my research. Rather than attempt to

examine a single battle or decision made by the CPC or KMT, an examination of public policy

and military activity will guide the research. Additionally, American foreign policy decisions,

and to an extent activities of the Soviet Union, will play a key role in the examination of CPC

success and KMT failure.

Method and Mechanics

The bulk of the research will be content analysis. The works of White & Jacoby,

Marshall, Pepper, Snow, and May (edited material included) offer the greatest concentration of

statistical and narrative material for exploration of the third phase of the Chinese Civil War.

Federica Felanti's "The New Life Movement" provides a fascinating and compelling account of

the KMT's social programs and the difficulty faced by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek's regime

in winning the favor of the peasant population during the Second Sino-Japanese War.8

Obviously Chinese names and events will permeate this paper, and I will attempt to utilize a

uniform system of Chinese Romanization known as Pinyin rather than the traditional Wade-Giles

or Tongyong Pinyin found in the Republic of China9. Often these differing transcriptions can

7 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle 1945-1949 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999). Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China: The Classic Account of the Birth of Chinese Communism (Grove Press, 1994). 8 Ferlanti, Federica. "New Life Movement." European Journal of East Asian Studies II (2012): 187-212. Ebsco Host. 9 At the time of writing, the Republic of China remains a separate legal institution occupying the island of Taiwan (Formosa) that claims jurisdiction over the People's Republic of China and "Outer Mongolia" (Mongolia) as well as several insignificant islands along the Chinese coast. Conversely, the People's Republic of China claims the ROC is a 'wayward province' and does not claim authority over Mongolia.

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lead to wildly different pronunciations and interpretations, and while Wade-Giles may dominate

the majority of historical literature, it is not the preferred method of transcription at present. In

excerpts and quotations utilizing Wade-Giles or Tongyong, I will maintain the integrity of the

source material while continuing to utilize standard Pinyin throughout the course of my own

narrative and analysis (e.g. Mao Tse-tung to Mao Zedong or Kuomintang to Guomindang).

Enter Sun Yat-Sen

The Qing Dynasty on the eve of 10 October 1911, known in both the People's Republic

and the Republic of China as Double-Ten Day, appeared on the verge of collapse. The

nineteenth century presented numerous military and political challenges to the Manchu rulers of

the Middle Kingdom. Two humiliating engagements with Great Britain, the ill-fated Boxer

Rebellion, and territory cessations to French, German, Russian, and Japanese interests earned the

century long span beginning with the First Opium War in 1839 the unfortunate moniker

"Century of Humiliation."10 While the KMT and CPC differed over their declaration of the

Century's termination, the period's roots in the rise of European influence over the Imperial Court

and key port facilities along the Chinese coast remained undisputed between the two parties. 11

Twenty percent of the Chinese population resided in urban areas. For the average Chinese

peasant, life in the rural countryside remained largely unaffected by the marvels of

industrialization and transfer of land ownership from the gentry to the populace in the western

world. With farms typically four acres in size and populated with only a few hogs, the Chinese

peasant farmer toiled away with primitive hand tools until either disease or exhaustion ushered in

10 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 70. 11 Alison Adcock Kaufman, "The 'Century of Humiliation,' Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order," Pacific Focus Volume 25, Issue 1, 1-6

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his demise.12 While the farmer toiled and waited for the moment to enact justice upon the landed

gentry and aloof central government, uprisings in urban China began to take their toll on the

Imperial Government.

The 10 October 1911 Wuchang uprising effectively ended Machu control of China, and

saw the establishment of the Republic of China in January of 1912. Transition from Imperial rule

to Republican control over the vast Chinese nation followed a tumultuous journey. Dr. Sun Yat-

sen's return to China and his brief tenure as President of the Republic of China saw little

accomplished. Warlords set about establishing individual zones of control across Northern

China while the newly anointed Republic of China (ROC) governed by the KMT struggled to

maintain order out of Nanjing13. In order to secure control over the warlords ravaging Northern

China, President Sun Yat-sen surrendered his Presidency to Qing dynasty general Yuan Shikai

under the promise of continued Republican reform in exchange for military support. Not

surprisingly, President Yuan became Emperor Yuan and stagnated any potential reform while

outlawing opposition groups including the KMT.14

Sun Yat-sen died before possessing the "opportunity to wield any effective" power over

the KMT or the Republic of China. His legacy left one of the few areas of ideological and

historical agreement between Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government and the Chairman Mao

Zedong's Chinese Communist Party. Sun's Three Principles of the People delivered over a series

of lectures in 1924 provided an ideological framework and path to governance. While Mao's

communists and Chiang's nationalist government disagreed over the form of governance and the

role of their respective organizations in the future of China, both parties agreed with the notion 12 White & Jacoby, 21-23 13 Nanjing, offered referred to as Nanking by British and American scholars in the first half of the 20th century, underwent translation changes like many Chinese cities and individuals from Wade-Giles to Hanyu Pinyin. 14 White & Jacoby, 34 & Kissinger, 87

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of Chinese sovereignty and Nationalism purported by the first of Dr. Sun's Three Principles.15

Claiming China required a Nationalist revival to avoid "tragedy...the loss of [the] country and the

destruction of [the Chinese race]."16 Across six lectures in early 1924, Dr. Sun suggested an

instilled sense of national unity and a rebuff of western influence throughout the country as a

centerpiece of the Chinese Republican project.17 While Communists and Nationalists agreed on

the need for a greater sense of Chinese national unity, the two parties interpreted Sun's plan for

democratic transition and the betterment of Chinese livelihood differently.

For Sun Yat-sen and his cohort in exile, livelihood and democratic transition occurred

under the strict authority of the KMT through a centralized planning scheme and a military

dictatorship. Like the Soviets, Sun advocated industrialization through urbanization with a

decidedly socialist bent; however, Sun discarded the notion of a Marxist "class struggle" while

accepting the need for state direction in economic matters. Cooperative landownership schemes

theoretically saw the end of the powerful landed gentry, but as observed by White and Jacoby

such efforts even after the nominal assumption of power by Nationalist forces following the

Northern Expedition saw negligible change for the largely landless peasant population under the

authority of the Nanjing government. By Chiang's account, the Three Principles extolled an

economic program "free of either Marxism or Russian Bolshevik pollution."18 Embarking on

such an ambitious program required centralized authority neither the KMT nor the nascent

Chinese Communist Party possessed prior to Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition.

Until Chiang Kai-shek's so-called Northern Expedition in 1926, the Republic of China remained

15 John F. Melby, The Mandate of Heaven Record of a civil war: China, 1945-1949, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 6-8 16 Sun, 6 17 Sun, 21 18Melby, 8; White & Jacoby, 45; Sun, 113-123; Chiang Kai-Shek, Soviet Russia in China A Summing-up at Seventy, (Toronto: Ambassador Books, 1965), 23.

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a largely ineffectual institution governing a limited area of China's southern provinces.19

Governance under the Three Principles required "a powerful government" before power could be

delineated between the administrative "machinery" and "the people." Beginning with a military

dictatorship (a phase Chiang Kai-shek elected to maintain after his assumption of power) and

transitioning through a single-party dictatorship into a full-fledged democracy, the proposed

system of government included four distinct rights of the people (suffrage, recall, initiative, and

referendum) while the government reserved the powers of administration and enforcement.20

For the Communists, Sun's "'bourgeois-democratic'" platform represented a stepping stone on the

path toward a "Socialist society" of the peasant and for the benefit of the peasant as purported by

a young Mao Zedong.21

Sun Yat-sen's death in March of 1925 placed great strain on the already tenuous alliance

between the Communist left wing of the KMT and the right wing headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

Trained in the Soviet Union22 and appointed to head the newly formed Whampoa military

academy, the future Generalissimo of the Republic of China had little patience for Mao and his

Communist cohort. Fearing that the CPC functioned merely as an extension of the Communist

International and by implication acted as agents of the Soviet Union, Chiang cautioned Dr. Sun

before his death that "[the] Russian Communist Party, in its dealings with China, [had] only one

aim...to turn the [CPC] into an instrument for its own use" and may "harbor sinister designs on

19 Melby, 9-10. 20 Melby, 8; Sun, 99-110 21 Snow, 99; White & Jacoby, 40 22 Chiang's brief visit to the Soviet Union under the direction of Sun Yat-sen represents a strange confluence of events. Directed by Sun Yat-sen to study the Soviet military and political system, Chiang remained ardently opposed to any introduction of communist influences within the KMT or the ROC as a whole. In his personal accounts, Chiang goes to great lengths to separate any ideological contamination of Sun's Three Principles by Marxist elements or even suggest power-sharing arrangements with the CPC. Despite his disdain for the Soviet system, Chiang modeled the military training program and many of the KMT's military tactics after that of the Soviet Union.

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China's other provinces."23 Chiang's communist paranoia certainly had foundation in the years

following Sun's death. Both Mao and Chiang recognized the role of Communist influences

within the "publicity and educational agencies" (propaganda department by Mao's account) of

the KMT.24

In order to secure his position of power over the KMT in the wake of Sun Yat-sen's

death, Chiang Kai-shek launched the Northern Expedition (an effort Dr. Sun had been attempting

to mount for years during his exile in Canton) with two objectives in mind. The warlords

occupying the areas outside of Canton numbered roughly 950,000 according to Chiang Kai-shek

with an effective strength "ten to one" against the combined KMT and Communist armies. The

first objective, shared by the KMT and the Communist left wing, required a sweep through

Yangtze Valley taking the Nationalist armies through Nanjing and eventually Shanghai.

Equipped with "discarded weapons of every conceivable manufacture" and staffed with "Russian

advisers," the strange collection of Nationalist and Communist revolutionaries constituting the

KMT army pushed through the Yangtze valley with relative ease. For their part, the

Communists under the direction of Zhou Enlai (often spelled Chou En-lai under Wade-Giles)

organized strikes in cities and rural areas ahead of Chiang's advance to disorient and unbalance

the entrenched warlords.25 With the first objective accomplished by spring of 1927, Chiang Kai-

shek began the second phase of the Northern Expedition: the extermination of the Communist

forces inhabiting KMT territory. Membership within the CPC became a crime punishable by

death under Chiang's explicit orders. The 12 April 1927 Incident or the Shanghai Massacre saw

hundreds of communist sympathizers executed, dual-members expelled, and Shanghai brought

23 Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, 17-19; White & Jacoby, 41; Snow, 99 24 Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, 23-25; Snow, 156-159 25 Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, 30-31; White & Jacoby, 38-39; Snow, 74-75

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under control of Chiang Kai-shek and his right wing elements of the KMT. With the alliance

between the KMT and the CPC brought to an abrupt end by Chiang Kai-shek, the period of civil

war began.26

Chiang's Consolidation of Power and the Rising Japanese Threat

Just as President Yuan Shikai turned on the KMT following the compromise arranged by

Sun Yat-sen, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek turned on the Communist left wing of the

Nationalist movement responsible for his ascent to power. Whether a sympathizer or a member

of the Communist party, Chiang made any association with Communist elements either political

or familial punishable by death. Capital punishment extended to the possession of Communist

literature or propagation of Communist ideology. For the Generalissimo extermination of the

Communist menace became a national priority for the fledging Republic. Embarking on a series

of purges across Communist strongholds, Chiang sought to weed out the perceived Soviet

influence over the Nationalist government and the people of China at large. With the support of

the United States government, German military training and equipment, and recognition by the

Soviet Union, the KMT all but quashed the Communist insurgency in the urban areas and forced

a retreat into the countryside. Communist forces led by Mao Zedong retreated from the Yangtze

Valley into the rugged, northwestern mountains of Shanxi Province and established a

government in Yen'an in October of 1935 just a year after the Long March.27

26 Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, 31-35; White & Jacoby, 40-42; Snow, 160-161 27 White & Jacoby, 45; Snow, 160-171;Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, 35-36; Melby, 9-10

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28

Areas of influence from1928-1937 with KMT in blue, CPC in red.

While Chiang engaged in his extermination program, the resource hungry Empire of

Japan set its eyes on the industrial heartland of Northwestern China's Manchuria in aftermath of

the Mukden Bridge Incident (or Liutiaohu Incident in Chinese). The planned destruction of the

railway bridge by Japanese Army officers instigated the subsequent invasion and occupation on

18 September 1931. With Manchuria firmly under the control of Japanese Army units, the

government sought to legitimize its hold over the region by installing the young Emperor Puyi of

the Qing Dynasty (a people native to the region). The Japanese invasion temporarily stalled the

ongoing conflict between Chiang's armies and the fractured militias fielded by the Communists,

but a united front against the Japanese wouldn't emerge in any capacity until the formal invasion

28 Overview map of Kuomintang control over China. From the History Department of the US Military Academy West Point. < http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/chinese%20civil%20war/chinese%20civil%20war%20pages/chinese%2>

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in 1937.

29

Chairman Mao's Long March

The Long March into China's northwestern provinces traversed thousands of miles

through rugged, mountainous terrain cost thousands of lives but ultimately saved the struggling

Communist Party. Under Mao's direction the remnants of KMT's left wing fled the Yangtze

Valley and embarked on an arduous journey across 6,000 miles beginning on 16 October 1934.

With Chiang's near million-man army in pursuit, Mao managed to force his way past fortified

crossings, ford rivers, outsmart ambushes laid by warlords sympathetic to the Nationalist regime,

and survive the harsh grasslands dominated by anti-Han Chinese minorities in the western

reaches of the country. Exact figures of Communist loses, and the importance of Mao's role in

29 Map of the Long March, 1934-1935. From the History Department of the US Military Academy West Point <http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/chinese%20civil%20war/chinese%20civil%20war%20index.htm>

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the Long March vary wildly, but the small collective of 30,000 peasants guarded by 6,000

soldiers, according to Snow, dramatically increased and decreased in size over the duration of the

journey. Chiang's "purge" saw the Communists restricted to a small area near Yen'an with Mao

assuming formal control over the CPC in favor of long-time leader Zhou Enlai.30

The Long March catapulted Mao Zedong from the position of an influential member of

the CPC to a man of legend. Chiang's inability to root out the Communists from their stronghold

in Yen'an coupled with the rising Japanese threat placed his position of leadership in jeopardy.

Described as a strange pseudo-kidnapping by Chiang Kai-shek and a near coup d'état by Mao

Zedong, on 12 December 1936 a cadre of Nationalist military officers and associated warlords

removed Chiang Kai-shek from his residence in Nanjing and issued an ultimatum that Chiang

either cooperate with the CPC or his captors would try and execute him. While the exact details

of the exchange remain in question, particularly personal exchanges between Mao and Chiang,

the kidnapping of the Generalissimo demonstrated a lack of confidence in his abilities from his

fellow Whampoa military academy officers to adequately lead the country. Attempts by the

Communists to form a "United Front" with the KMT in aftermath of the Japanese incursion into

Manchuria and a demand for the creation of another puppet state in Northern China failed due in

no small part to Chiang's refusal to cooperate with the Communists.31

With the second United Front formed, Chiang and Mao Zedong became reluctant allies

against the increasingly aggressive Japanese Empire. The terms of their arrangement called for

the integration of the CPC regular forces into the KMT controlled National Revolutionary Army

(NRA), abolition of CPC soviets in the countryside, and total fealty from Communist forces to

30 White & Jacoby, 45; Snow, 190-193, 200-205; Chiang, 44-45 31 Snow, 380-385; White & Jacoby, 46;Chiang, 50-2

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Chiang Kai-shek in operations against Japan. In the formation of this United Front, the

Generalissimo managed to set aside his general consternation for his Communist opposition until

1941 when general hostilities resumed between the opposing factions. The cooperation between

the KMT and CPC went no further than resistance against Japan. Chiang continued to receive

support from German military advisers and equipment for use against the CPC throughout the

United Front period, but the Generalissimo honored his agreement with the CPC and began

equipping his northern armies for eventual conflict with the Japanese.32

Commencement of General Hostilities with Japan

War with Japan came under the same suspicious auspices of the Japanese seizure of

Manchuria six years before with the Mukden Bridge Incident. A skirmish at the Marco Polo

Bridge on 7 July 1937 between an unscheduled Japanese night patrol in Beijing and the

Nationalist garrison provided the Japanese government with a pretext for war. Japanese

advances across the Chinese mainland pushed the Nationalist government out of Beijing by the

end of July with the capital of the Republic of China at Nanjing in Japanese hands by 13

December 1937. Aside from the protracted battles at Shanghai and the two-month siege of

Wuhan by Japanese forces, the National Revolutionary Army under the authority of Chiang Kai-

shek lost every major engagement with the Japanese Kwantung Army and eventually stalled

their advance into the Chinese interior at Wuhan. Through sheer manpower expenditure and

brute force, the NRA cost the Kwantung Army over 100,000 soldiers out of nearly 350,000

soldiers engaged at Wuhan. While the Chinese regular and irregular forces lost a quarter of their

million-man force, the Japanese eventually overran the defenders in January of 1938 and

32 Chiang, 52-55; White & Jacoby, 47, 75

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essentially expelled the Chinese armies into the countryside.33

34

Extent of Japanese Occupation of Mainland China

Trapped within China's urban areas, the Japanese army would not attempt any major

offensives until 1944 with notable success. With the Japanese contained, the fragile alliance

forged between the CPC and the KMT collapsed in 1941 following the New Fourth Army

Incident. The agreement reached between the CPC and the KMT prior to the Second Sino-

Japanese War broke down without continued Japanese advances across the Chinese mainland.

While the order of battle for the New Fourth Army incident remains in question, the refusal of

the New Fourth Army (NFA) to obey orders from Chiang Kai-shek's faction of the NRA and the

eventual skirmish saw a break in military cooperation between the CPC and KMT forces. By 33 White & Jacoby, 48-56 34 Japanese Occupation, 1940 From the Department of History at United States Military Academy West Point. <http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/Chinese%20Civil%20War/ChineseCivilWar04.gif>

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Chiang's account, the NFA's betrayal was part of a larger scheme of Communist activity in

opposition to government forces. The CPC viewed the NFA as another betrayal of Chiang's

word with Communist accounts depicting an ambush and slaughter of NFA forces without

provocation. Once more Chiang's paranoia possessed foundation as Communist forces began

expanding their significantly diminished influence following their relocation to Yen'an in 1935.35

Leveraging rural discontent with the Guomindang government, the CPC instituted the

land reform promised by the KMT. Under the KMT, and now the co-opted CPC, plan rents

would constitute 37.5% of crops produced and taxes at 8% of land value. Unfortunately for the

long-suffering peasants, these land reforms never saw widespread implementation across KMT

controlled areas. The Communists, however, instituted reforms in areas where peasant desire

exceeded opposition and was sufficiently protected from Japanese occupation or incursion.

Peasant support for the communist cause swelled their ranks throughout the course of the war

with Japan due in no small part to their efforts at land reform and the pressures of guerilla

conflict. The collapse of the Second United Front also brought upon a KMT blockade of CPC

controlled areas in northern China. Cut off from fellow Communist cells by government troops

and the irregular lines formed between Japanese and Chinese forces, the Communist armies and

peasant population found themselves squeezed between the ruthless Japanese Kwantung Army

and the equally cruel National Revolutionary Army.36

While the CPC's influence grew, the KMT began to stagnate. Conflict with the CPC and

sustained conflict with the Japanese drained the KMT of experienced officers from the

Whampoa Military Academy and those that survived remained fiercely loyal to Chiang Kai-shek

35 Chiang, 65; White & Jacoby, 75, 200, 251 36 Pepper, 229-234; White & Jacoby. 202-205

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leaving the incompetent Generalissimo unchallenged in his dominion over the KMT. With the

Chinese isolated from key coastal cities such as Shanghai and Hong Kong by Japanese forces,

the economy fell into a tailspin with frightening levels of inflation and government expenditures

far outpacing revenues. The displaced and vulnerable populations under KMT control saw

prices increase "over two thousand times between 1937 and August 1945" and heavy taxes

burdens placed upon rural peoples often fell prey to corruption by tax collectors and

mismanagement of grain distribution. While food production remained largely unaffected

throughout the course of the war, strikes and labor disputes quintupled from the onset of the war

through its end in 1945. Strikebreaking enacted by both the Japanese in occupied and in KMT

controlled territory did little to engender support from the population for the Nationalist

Government.37

Eventually, American involvement in the Pacific would roll back Japanese gains across

the vast ocean and compel the Imperial government to scale back its operations within Mainland

China. The dissolution of the Second United Front between the Communists and Nationalists

spelled a land scramble between the two factions once the war came to its conclusion in August

of 1945. While the Cairo Conference in November of 1943 declared the return of all Japanese

occupied territories to the Republic of China, the implementation of the Cairo Declaration

proved difficult in the aftermath of the war. At the time of the conference, the Communist threat

within Mainland China appeared containable; moreover, the recognition of the ROC by the

USSR and all other great powers ignored the concerns of the CPC forces operating in the

northern provinces of the country. By 1945, however, the situation had changed. At the onset of

the conflict in 1937, the Red Army consisted of 85,000 men-at-arms with governance of "one

37 Pepper, 95-101; Arthur N. Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 22-30

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and a half million people in an area of 30,000 square miles." By the summer of 1944, their

numbers and area of control swelled considerably. With over a million regular forces in

comparison to the KMT's two and a half million, the CPC now controlled 300,000 miles "of

Chinese soil...inhabited by 90,000,000 people" with assistance from two million partisan

troops.38

Chiang's attempts to combat the growth of Communism proved fruitless throughout the

course of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Civil War once it resumed in 1947. In response

to the CPC's application of land reform and intense political and cultural reeducation during the

conflict with Japan, Chiang and the Republic of China instituted the New Life Movement

(NLM). Rather than address concerns of the peasants, the NLM targeted urban and middle class

members of Chinese society in an attempt to carry out the mandate of People's Livelihood from

Sun Yat-sen's three principles. Through restrictions on food consumption, consumer goods, and

promotion of a Christian lifestyle (Chiang was an avowed Methodist), the NLM sought to

reorder Chinese society around a warped, western ideal required of the people "for the survival

of the nation." Beyond the social engineering, the NLM engaged in massive fund raising

campaign and coordinated relief efforts in areas ravaged by Japan. The movement proved a

stabilizing force and even saw some of the rampant illiteracy present in KMT areas addressed,

but the policies failed to provide the popular support the Nationalist government desperately

needed to ensure its survival following the end of hostilities with Japan.39

Russia's entrance into the Pacific Theatre proved brief albeit significant for the course of

the Civil War festering in Mainland China. Soviet seizure of Manchuria from Japanese forces

38 White & Jacoby, 199-202; Herbert Feis, The China Tangle The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953). 103-115, 355-360 39 Ferlanti, 187-212

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put the increasingly paranoid Generalissimo in a difficult situation. With the CPC now

administering an equally sized and equipped army to that of his own, the President of the

Republic of China demanded the removal of Soviet forces from the Chinese industrial heartland

and the surrender of all Communist forces to the KMT. While the Soviets continued to abstain

from openly supporting the Chinese Communists, Stalin saw fit to handover the Manchurian

region to Chinese communists rather than the obstinate Generalissimo of the Republic of China.

While low level skirmishes between the Communists and Nationalists would continue in the

aftermath of the Second World War, the United States managed to broker a general peace

between the two warring factions with the arrival of General Marshall.

40

Japanese and Communist Areas of Occupation

40 Situation at the End of World War II. From United States Military Academy West Point Department of History. < http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/Chinese%20Civil%20War/ChineseCivilWar05.gif>

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The Marshall Mission and the Last Chance at Peace

While Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek argued over the fate of China, the United States

found itself facing a new enemy in the aftermath of the Second World War. The ideological

conflict between Western Capitalism and Soviet Communism reached from the devastated fields

of Europe to the former colonies of European powers, and now the shattered Chinese nation.

While the Soviet Union remained openly opposed to Mao's peasant revolution, Soviet action

within Manchuria coupled with their seizure of Outer Mongolia (present day Mongolia)

antagonized already strained relations between Chiang's anti-communist government and Stalin's

regime. While the Yalta Agreement mandated Soviet support for the Republic of China, the

USSR did little to impede CPC gains in Manchuria or activities along the Sino-Soviet border.41

Previous efforts by the United States to assist China focused exclusively on combating

the Japanese Kwantung Army and coordinating efforts with the British in Burma. General

Stillwell headed the Chinese effort in the Southern Burma campaign in the spring and summer of

1944 with unexpected success by American accounts. Chiang's efforts, on the other hand,

proved less fruitful. Wavering commitment on the part of his men and poor leadership, a staple

of Chiang's tenure as Generalissimo, saw the Allied attempt to push against Japan through China

thwarted. Despite substantial American equipment through lend-lease, which Chiang decried as

insufficient, the KMT armies failed to achieve their objectives under the Generalissimo's

leadership while other allied leaders saw great gains against the Japanese over the course of the

campaign. Both sides found themselves frustrated with one another. Chiang accused the

41 Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, 92-94; Feis, 240-254

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Americans of poor support and interfering with his anti-communist campaign by incorporating

CPC forces into the Yunnan campaign in larger Burmese theater. The United States, particularly

President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs, threatened to cut off Chinese assistance if the

Generalissimo refused to cooperate with Stillwell. Additionally, the United States began making

overtures for another united government against the Japanese and the foundations for a coalition

government following the war that would serve as the primary focus of General George

Marshall's mission in 1945.42

General George C Marshall traveled to China with two objectives. The first called for the

formation of a "united and democratic" Chinese government made up of Nationalists and

Communists. His second objective as directed by President Truman required Chinese

sovereignty over Manchuria as "confirmed at the Cairo Conference and in the Yalta Agreement

and the Sino-Soviet" Treaty of Friendship. Marshall operated with a broad degree of latitude

from the American government to accomplish these objectives. Utilization of American forces

to oversee the handover of Manchuria, "induce or compel concessions by the government, by the

Communists, and by other factions" in order to form the united government, and revoke aid,

material or otherwise, in order to achieve his objectives. 43 Marshall's frustrations began almost

immediately upon his arrival. Chiang remained intractable with the Communist position,

demanding total submission of the CPC to the KMT and expulsion of Communist influences.

The greatest tool in Marshall's arsenal lay in his ability to control American aid to all

parties, namely the Nationalists. By January of 1946, Marshall secured a broad peace between

the two warring factions and established a dialog committee between the CPC and the KMT with

42 Feis, 166-177; White & Jacoby, 214-225 43 Feis, 420-421; Marshall Vol I, 1-5

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himself serving as chair. Troop movements and military maneuvers by both sides were strictly

prohibited by the Cessation of Hostilities Order issued in January of 1946. While both sides

managed to avoid general conflict during Marshall's tenure, Mao and Chiang repeatedly

antagonized one another particularly over the Soviet withdrawal scheme in Manchuria and

Chiang's refusal to provide concessions to his CPC counterparts. During a brief leave of absence

in April, Marshall's tenuous peace fell victim to CPC ambitions in Manchuria and one of the first

incidents of Chinese and Soviet cooperation alluded to earlier. While the two factions scrambled

for control over the Manchurian region, Chiang directed his forces to engage CPC forces in

Harbin and Kirin in May of 1946.44

Chiang's assault on Communist strongholds further destabilized the situation. A month-

long peace hastily erected by Marshall in June of 1946 delayed open conflict while the

Generalissimo continued to make demands of the CPC. While Marshall struggled to maintain

the June truce, Zhou Enlai, on behalf of Mao Zedong, and Chiang Kai-shek continued to spar

over the future of China's government and the composition of her military. Marshall advocated a

mostly Nationalist army made up of fifty KMT divisions and ten CPC divisions with an

integrated command structure and a government modeled on the administrative Yuan advocated

by Sun Yat-sen decades earlier. Efforts at negotiation proved fruitless with Chiang's

belligerence straining relations with the United States and the Communists displeased with the

continued shipments of UNRRA supplies and American material to Chiang's government in

Nanjing.45

By September of 1946, Marshall's frustrations reached a fever pitch. Both the CPC and

44 Marshall Vol I, 101-104; Melby, 109-127 45 Melby, 144-153; Marshall Vol I, 110-114, 136-150; Chiang, 108-114; May, 60-61

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the KMT discarded further attempts at negotiation despite Marshall's continued presence within

the country. Chiang's determination to rid the Republic of China of the "communist

international" and Mao's ardent belief in a China united under the Communist banner made

further negotiation impossible. An assault on Kalgan, a key city for the CPC, by KMT forces

during further negotiations effectively ended Marshall's tenure as Ambassador and chief

negotiator. Prior to his departure, Marshall warned Chiang of the unsustainable nature of his

urban defense strategy pointing out the Japanese failure to do and the effectiveness of Mao's

forces. As usual, the Generalissimo refused to accept outside opinion and continued undeterred.

Chiang's defense of cities strategy mirrored that of the Japanese during their tenure in China. By

Mao's own admission an urban campaign allowed "profit from...industries, finances, and

manpower in captured areas and with them to augment their own insufficient strength;" however,

Mao's "unfettered control of rural areas" allowed the Communist guerillas to circumvent

Nationalist strong points and provide sufficient agricultural supplies for the tens of millions

under their care. By some accounts, the citizens themselves preformed many of the acts

attributed to CPC forces. By disrupting telegraph lines, destroying rail ties, and refusing to

cooperate with government demands the rural citizenry made clear its intention to support the

Communist regime over the increasingly unpopular Nanjing government.46

Following Marshall's departure Dr. John Leighton Stuart arrived in January of 1947 and

became the chief American diplomat in the divided country. With attempts at diplomacy

between the two parties no longer a possibility, Stuart focused his energies on supporting the

ailing Nationalist regime. While the battles continued in the countryside and the cities under

Chiang's authority found themselves besieged by Communist forces, the economic situation

46 Melby, 152-178; Chiang, 122-130; Marshall Vol I, 260-309, 424-440; Eric Jardine. "The Insurgent's Response to the Defense of Cities." Autumn 2010, 4 & 11.

Seegmuller 24

began to worsen considerably. Within a month the Chinese National Currency (CNC) inflated

spectacularly from 7,700 to18,000 for 1 USD due largely to currency speculation from January

to February 1947. Chiang's appointment of his son as economic Czar of Shanghai saw mass riots

and a general collapse of the city's economy that made "the German post-World War I inflation

look like a passing fancy." Much like his father, Chiang Ching-kuo operated with a heavy hand

and without the expertise required to accomplish his tasks. By summer of 1947 student riots and

food riots within KMT controlled areas began seriously weakening the legitimacy and authority

of Chiang's Republic of China. American diplomats concluded that the systemic corruption

within the KMT and excessive mismanagement of resources spelled doom for the regime.47

Even the full weight of economic assistance from the United States and associated

powers for the Republic of China seemed insufficient to sustain the collapsing KMT

government. While aid from the United Nations, United States, and "large Canadian credit"

propped up a select few within the Nationalist government, very little reached the general

population and provided the investment and industrialization the Republic of China so

desperately required. Corruption already rampant within the Nationalist party, increased

dramatically as goods and material poured into the country. Chiang demanded further assistance

of the United States by 1948 as the economic situation continued to deteriorate and the CPC

continued to make military gains in the north and solidify their hold in Manchuria. In a final act

of desperate support, the United States Congress provided $338 million over 12 months with

$125 million in special grants for Truman's discretion under the China Aid Program of 1948.48

The Republic of China collapsed under the weight of Chiang's arrogance and the

47 Melby, 179-200, 272;Pepper, 126-130 48 May, 86; Melby, 250

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demands of the peasants the Nationalist regime ignored for the duration of their truncated rule of

the country. No final, decisive battle between the Nationalists and the Communists would be

fought to determine the fate of the country. Rather a culmination of decades of incompetence,

corruption, and mismanagement, exacerbated by the Second Sino-Japanese War, saw the

Nanjing government expelled from their territories in Northern China and pushed out of the

Mainland over the course of a year until the retreat to Formosa (Taiwan) in December of 1949.

While Chiang retreated to Formosa, Mao Zedong set about establishing the new government in

Beijing. On 1 October 1949 at Tiananmen Square, Chairman Mao Zedong declared the

formation of the People's Republic of China with its capital at Beijing rather than the city of

Nanjing.

While Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took center stage in the rise and fall of the

Nationalist party, the Communist Party of China drew its own successes and failures from a far

more diverse collection of individuals and groups. Both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai functioned

as the heart and mind of the CPC, respectively. Mao functioned as the enigmatic leader and hero

of the Long March while Zhou fulfilled the role of policy maker and negotiator when dealing

with the United States or the KMT. Ultimately, the ability of the Communists to leverage the

local population in spite of limited resources and foreign isolation proved more than sufficient to

achieve victory over Chiang Kai-shek's government.