Sovereignty vs Autonomy What Solution for Xinjiang

Running head: Sovereignty vs Autonomy: What Solution for Xinjiang?

Sovereignty vs Autonomy: What Solution for Xinjiang?

Jérôme R. Torossian

University of International Business and Economics

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Self-introduction………………………………………………………………………Page 3

Introduction…………………………………………………………………................Page 4

Description of Xinjiang………………………………………………………………..Page 4-5

Xinjiang’s Geography…………………………………………………………………Page 5-6

Xinjiang’s Demography……………………………………………………………….Page 6

Xinjiang’s History ………………………………………………………………….....Page 6-7

Uyghur’s Independences……………………………………………………………....Page 7-8

Creation of Autonomous Regions in the PRC…………………………….. …………Page 8

Defending the Uyghurs……………………………………………………………......Page 9-10

The Threat of a Han Immigration in Xinjiang…………………………… …………..Page 10-11

Han’s Exploitation of Xinjiang’s Natural Resources………………………………….Page 11-12

China’s Xinjiang Policy: A Cultural Threat for the Uyghurs……………… …………Page 12

Defending China’s Territorial Integrity……………………………….. ……………..Page 12-13

Xinjiang’s Demographical Issue……………………………………………………...Page 13

National and International Threat…………………………………… …………….....Page 14

Xinjiang’s Strategic Importance for China……………………………… …………...Page 14-15

China’s Autonomous Region Policy……………………………………… ………….Page 15-16

Xinjiang’s Central Authority……………………………………………………. …....Page 16-17

Xinjiang’s Transformation and Inequality……………………………………………..Page 17

Right to Self-Determination as a last option…………………………………………. .Page 17-18

My Solution for Xinjiang………………………………………………………….…...Page 18-19

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Self-introduction

My name is Jérôme Raffi Torossian. I am a junior student at Loyola University Chicago pursuing

a double major in International Relations and Political Science, with a minor in International

Business. I am a French national with an Armenian background who got the opportunity since a

young age to travel and live in many different countries located in three distinctive continents.

These exceptional experiences along with my rich ethnic identity and the different cultures that I

have encountered made the person that I am today with a strong focus and interest in

International Relations and Politics. During my time in college, I have wrote many papers

concerning people’s right to self-determination such as the Kosovars in Kosovo, the Kurds in

Turkey, or the Armenians in the self-proclaimed republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. Before going to

China in the fall of 2015, I had no idea of how many ethnic-groups, except for the Tibetans,

China possessed. It is thanks to a Silk Road trip through Xinjiang that I have learned and began

to be interested about the region’s case. I had also the chance to discuss with many Uyghur

students in the cities of Kashgar and Urumqi about the province and the current issues. In

addition, I took a class about peoples of China during my time in Beijing, and this helped me

improve even more my understanding of the Uyghur and the Han communities.

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What's Wrong in Xinjiang, and How to Fix It?

Xinjiang, a province where formerly peoples from the western and eastern worlds used to

meet for trade, is nowadays representing the center of tensions between the Uyghur radicals and

the Han nationalists. After the Chinese Communist Party came in the region in 1949, this

western part of China saw a significant increase of Hans, who took command of the important

cities and jobs, and almost shifted the Uyghur majority. The conflict has intensified after the

discovery of many natural resources such as petroleum and gasoline. These findings angered

even more the Uyghurs as it resulted in an influx of more Hans and created a policy of

modernization in which they do not have the control of. Furthermore, the cultural and religious

differences between these two communities also play a role in the conflicts, especially after the

9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. According to some individuals in the Uyghur

community, the Han Chinese exploits their natural resources for the benefit of the eastern

regions. As many Uyghurs feel that they are treated as second-class citizens by the Chinese

government, some nationalists have the ambition to separate themselves from China using their

right to self-determination. My essay will not discuss whether or not Xinjiang should become a

sovereign nation-state and split away from China but it is to provide an objective analysis for a

neutral solution that will benefit both the Uyghur nationalists and the Chinese government. In the

end, I will develop an observation to support my argument to manage the conflict.

Throughout its history, this region located at the center of Eurasia has been called by

many different names depending on the people occupying it. Indeed, for instance for the Han

Chinese people this province is called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or simply

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Xinjiang. This is often translated into English as “New Territory” or “New Dominion.”1 The

Americans would say that this region is the Far West of the People’s Republic of China.

However, for the local Uyghur community, this province is called as “Eastern Turkestan” or

even “Uyghuristan.”2 Two terms that are strictly refused by the Chinese government, which

prefers to eventually call it “Chinese Turkestan.” I personally view the name “Chinese

Turkestan” as to be somewhat controversial for the reason that Turkestan means the “land of the

Turks,” however; this territory is anything but ruled by the Turkic ethnic nationalities.

Xinjiang is a huge territory situated on the north-westernmost edge of the People’s

Republic of China. With its 1.6 million square kilometers, it is China’s largest province as it

represents one-sixth of China as a whole.3 In term of physical size, Xinjiang is the eighth largest

in the world, behind India but above Argentina. It is politically and economically crucial for

China, as it borders many different countries such as Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India as a pivot.4 The region is made up of two vast

deserts: the Taklamakan and the Gurbantünggüt, and it is surrounded by such high mountains as

the Altai, the Pamir and the Kharakunlun.5 Furthermore, Xinjiang is particular for the country as

it is home to Lop Nor, China’s only nuclear weapon test site. In addition, it possesses both the

second highest and second lowest places on earth. Consequently, its climate is drastic: varying

between cold in the winter and hot in the summer times, with typically no rain and brilliant

1 Starr, Frederick. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. New-York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p.62 Ibid., p.6 3 Ibid., p.294 Ibid., p.295 Xinjiang the Land and the People. Beijing: New Word Press, 1989, p.7-p.17

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sunshine.6 Because of its gigantic territory, Xinjiang is rich in natural resources, and it is not

surprising that former Premier Zhou Enlai called it “a land of treasures.”7

The demography of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is diverse since ancient times.

It had been the home of many different nationalities, but the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim minority,

is mainly located in south Xinjiang around the Tarim Basin. However, many other ethnic

nationalities also live in Xinjiang such as the Han, the Kazakh, the Kyrgyz, the Mongol, Manchu,

Hui and many more.8 Overall, there are about thirteen minority groups.9 In total, this region hosts

around 22 million people, which the Uyghurs make up 45% of the total population.10 It is

interesting to note that before the region was incorporated into the People’s Republic of China,

the Han Chinese population represented less than 6% of the 4 million in 1948.11 At that time, the

Turkic nationality was still predominant. It is in recent days that the region has seen a significant

increase of Han Chinese, which now accounts for around 40% of the current population. It is

believed that there are around 250,000 Hans that are migrating to Xinjiang each year.12

In order to understand more about the current issue, an overview of Xinjiang history of its

own is more than necessary. It was in this region that those traveling the Silk Road since

archeological times to exchange goods from the west and east of the Eurasia.13 As a result, many

6 Xinjiang the Land and the People. Beijing: New Word Press, 1989, p.197 Ibid., p.228 Ibid., p.1829 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.24410 Xinjiang the Land and the People. Beijing: New Word Press, 1989, p.18211 Blum, Susan; Jensen, Lionel. China Off Center. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p.7412 Moneyhon, Matthew. Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New Frontier”. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, No.3. 2002, p.14813 Xinjiang the Land and the People. Beijing: New Word Press, 1989, p.60

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people with different cultures and religions met here. Since Xinjiang was an interesting region

for many empires, it has been under the control of many different rulers. Yet, these holding by

imperial powers were often temporary.14 This western region did not constitute a political entity

until the Qing dynasty defeated the Mongolian Zungars in 1760 and put it under its control.15 As

a matter of fact, the name “Xinjiang” was first recommended by a Han Chinese General Zuo

Zongtang and thus adopted by the Manchu Qing Emperor in the late eighteen century.16 After the

Qing dynasty collapsed from a republican revolution in 1912, Yang Zengxin, a former Urumqi

Circuit Intendant and Commissioner for Judicial Affairs, took the region under his rule.17 Yang

was pretty firm from preventing any influences entering his territory that he successfully

maintained his benevolent control over the region for sixteen years, thanks to the WWI that

engaged both Britain and Russia18 In 1928, Yang’s ruling ceased after a Coup D’état staged by a

pro-Soviet warlord who was in favor of the KMT government in Nanjing.19

In consequences, some Uyghur elites were twice successful in forming a semi-

independent state. After many rebellions against their “infidel” Chinese rulers, some Uyghurs

were able to establish on November 12, 1933 a short independent Eastern Turkistan Republic in

southern Xinjiang.20 They did not choose the name Republic of Uyghuristan for the reason that

this region was also the home of other Turkic minorities such as the Kyrgyzs.21 This state failed

14 Starr, Frederick. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. New-York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p.5615 Ibid., p.102-10316 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.9717 Ibid., p.16818 Ibid., p.183-18319 Ibid., p.18720 Ibid., p.20121 Ibid., p.203

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to receive international recognition by the Western powers and was soon defeated by Sheng

Shicai, a KMT warlord with the help of the Soviet Union.22 Yet, the Uyghurs found again the

power in 1944 to create a Second Eastern Turkestan Republic, with the help of the Soviet Union

against Sheng because of its betrayal to Stalin being assaulted by Hitler.23 This time, the puppet

Soviet state located on the northwestern side of Xinjiang was able to survive five years until all

of Xinjiang is peacefully united by the Communist People’s Liberation Army in 1949, with the

assistance of the Soviet Union as well.24 Miserably, Uyghurs lost their outstanding revolutionary

leaders in a plane crash on their way to Beijing by way of Soviet Union. Nowadays, some radical

Uyghurs see this as a form of imperialist conspiracy.

As the Soviet Union was also controlling a huge amount of land with many diverse ethnic

nationalities in its control, the Chinese Communist Government adopted its concept of

“nationality” to manage ethnic-national differences.25 However, this new China did not create

national republics in non-Chinese areas. Instead, it opted with a system of nationality regional

Autonomy by non-Han peoples at different administrative levels.26 Since then, the Communist

Party has to make sure that this “autonomy” was not to be mistaken for independence. Instead,

the CCP needed to be clear to the minorities that their territories are parts of China. Since the

majority of the people living in Xinjiang were Uyghurs and some of them had taken part in the

22 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.206-20723 Ibid., p.22524 Starr, Frederick. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. New-York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p.85-8625 Ibid., p.9126 Ibid., p.91

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Revolution, a unified Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was founded in October 1955.27 In

the 1990s, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a significant number of Uyghur nationalists

dissatisfied with the nominal autonomy declared their intention to separate themselves from

China. This reaction grew higher when the three former-soviet Muslim republics of Central Asia

gained their own independence in 1991. However, Jiang Zemin in Beijing, fearing that such new

independence of the neighboring states of Central Asia might destabilize the region, decided to

stop the nationalist’s demonstrations with harder hand.28 The culmination of the tension was the

209 bloody conflict in Urumqi and since then, a deadlock of demanding for autonomy vs. a harsh

stability maintaining as we see today.

As in this paper I am starting to defend the Uyghur population of Xinjiang, I would like

to say that according to the Article I of the Charter of the United Nations, all the peoples have the

right to self-determination, “to freely determine their political status and freely pursue economic,

social and cultural development.”29 Since the People’s Republic of China is a member of the

United Nations, I sincerely believe that China should know that self-determination is a human

right and one of the fundamental purposes and principles of the United Nations. From what I

have heard while interviewing some Uyghur students, Xinjiang, or as they call it “Eastern

Turkestan,” has actually never been part of China. They argue that it was “sadly” integrated into

Chinese control not until the 18th century. Through my research, I have read that forty years after

the Qing dynasty invaded Xinjiang; there were around 155,000 Han and Hui Chinese in the

27 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.24628 Starr, Frederick. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. New-York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p.118-11929 Article I of the Charter of the United Nations

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region while the Uyghurs were representing twice that number.30 Demographically, I found that

92% of the total population of the province was mostly Uyghurs while the Han Chinese

represented only less than 6% before the PRC.31 32 According to many Uyghurs and some foreign

observers, the Chinese government used the 2000 Great Development of the West campaign

mainly to attract as many Han Chinese as possible into the province.33 Nicolas Becquelin, a

French researcher, argued that the Chinese government promoted Xinjiang to the Han Chinese so

that the demographical change could increase the security and potentially reduce nationalist

tensions.34 It is worth to note that in terms of security, Beijing significantly maintained a

considerable military presence in Xinjiang.35 One of the Uyghur students that I have interviewed

declared that the Uyghurs are more closely related to the Central Asian peoples and nations than

to the Han Chinese and China. In addition, he added that his people do not share anything with

the Han Chinese, except the fact that they are currently living in the same country. Jiang Zemin

once said in 1990 that “if you haven’t been to Xinjiang, you’re not a good Han!”36 As a result of

this campaign, a large number of Han Chinese settled in the region and increased even more the

Han population, which currently accounts for 40% of Xinjiang’s total inhabitants.37

For many Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, the sharp increase of Han Chinese into

the region over the years has threatened their own cultures, traditions, and languages, especially

30 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 30631 Blum, Susan; Jensen, Lionel. China Off Center. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p.73-7632 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.30733 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.30834 Ibid., p.30835 Starr, Frederick. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. New-York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p.11936 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.31037 Ibid., p.307

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by imposing the Chinese language.38 These Muslim nationalities are complaining for the reason

that the Han Chinese are in possession of all the jobs and that usually the open positions are

primarily given first to the Han Chinese.39 Therefore, it makes it difficult for the Uyghurs to find

a work. For instance, the Uyghurs protest because they cannot work in any of the construction

sites located in the cities of southern Xinjiang because they are full of Hans.40 A worker from

Sichuan province declared to a Western reporter that the reason the Chinese do not hire any

Uyghurs is because “we cannot communicate with them. We don’t know their language […] The

locals don’t eat port nor rice.”41 I personally think that this explanation is not valid because from

my own experience I can tell that Uyghurs actually love rice. The non-Han Chinese argue that

this Han population growth also harms their native traditional way of life. With the mass Han

immigration in the region, especially in the cities, all the urban areas containing Hans are

transformed and modernized under the Chinese standard.42 I believe that this modernization plan

should be negotiated with the local population instead of being ordered by the Chinese

government. Moreover, the Uyghurs are strongly dissatisfied with the Han exploitation of

Xinjiang’s natural resources. This is the reason why many Uyghurs feel discriminated by the

Hans and have the impression of being treated as second-class citizens in the People’s Republic

of China.

38 Starr, Frederick. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. New-York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p.11839 Starr, Frederick. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. New-York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p.11840 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.30541 Ibid., p.30542 Ibid., p.308

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Indeed, Xinjiang has a large territory and possesses a significant amount of natural

resources such as oil, coal, and 118 kinds of minerals.43 I argue that these resources can be

helpful for economically developing the region. However, the natural resources of the province

are exploited by the Han Chinese and directly sent to the eastern regions of China for their own

benefits.44 So even though Xinjiang still benefits from these resources, its profit is not as high as

what the eastern Han regions receive.45

Chinese policy in Xinjiang radically violates Uyghurs right to freedom of religion,

expression, association, and assembly. One official document clearly prohibits parents and legal

guardians from “allowing minors to participate in religious activities.”46 Furthermore, it is

radically forbidden to study religious texts, celebrating religious holidays, or dress in agreement

with Islam.47 The Chinese government goes so far as to censor parts of the Koran and often

control mosques. In addition, state authorities are preventing the Uyghurs in doing the Ramadan

as they force those working in state-owned workplace to eat their lunches.48 Last January, the

Chinese police arrested Ilham Tohti, an Uyghur teacher from Minzu University, who was

particularly critical of the central government’s policy towards Xinjiang. This is a serious threat

culturally for the Uyghurs as it even restricts them from doing their most important pilgrimage to

Mecca.49

43 Xinjiang the Land and the People. Beijing: New Word Press, 1989, p.22-2844 Starr, Frederick. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. New-York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p.18845 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.29846 Grieboski, Joseph. Tension, Repression, And Discrimination: China’s Uyghurs Under Threat. Georgetown Journal on International Affairs, 2014. Web.47 Ibid.48 Ibid.49 Ibid.

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In contrast, Xinjiang should stay an autonomous region within the People’s Republic of

China for the reason that this province represents by itself one-sixth of China’s total land area.50

This consists a huge amount of land as its size could be viewed as if Great Britain, France,

Germany, and Spain were all combined as one nation. This province is significantly suitable as

the cropland covers an area of 3,333,330 hectares, and which an additional 11 million hectares

are waiting for reclamation.51 Moreover, the People’s Republic of China would suffer the loss of

its second largest pastureland.52 With its 1.3 billion people, China cannot afford to lose that much

land, especially when this area is full of useful resources for its economic development. In fact,

China would lose a significant amount of natural resources necessary for its national growth such

as petroleum and gasoline, which represents more than 25% of the national total.53 As Xinjiang

produces over 20 million tons of oil annually, it would mean that China would be deprived of its

fourth-biggest oil producing region.54 In addition, China would lose one-third of its total coal

reserves, which accounts to a total of 160,000,000 tons.55 Likewise, from the 145 kinds of

minerals found in China, Xinjiang possesses 118 of them.56 Furthermore, China would no longer

have Xinjiang’s 600,000 hectares of water, including 51 freshwater lakes larger than 5 square

kilometers.57 All of these losses could have a great impact on the Chinese economy.

50 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.451 Xinjiang the Land and the People. Beijing: New Word Press, 1989, p.2252 Ibid., p.2453 Xinjiang’s natural resources. China.org. Web. 29 Nov. 2015.54 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.30155 Xinjiang the Land and the People. Beijing: New Word Press, 1989, p.2756 Ibid., p.2657 Ibid., p.26

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Likewise, this question poses a demographic problem for the reason that Xinjiang is no

longer mostly Uygur as it was in the past. Indeed, after the CCP entered the region in 1949, the

Uyghurs saw their majority decreasing tremendously as the Han Chinese settled in the province.

Nowadays, the Uyghurs represent 45% of Xinjiang’s population while the Han Chinese account

for 40%.58 Independence could create a severe ethnic conflict between the two communities,

which could potentially lead into a full-scale war if China decides to protect its Chinese citizens

or a tragedy of ethnic cleansing as in 1947 between India and Pakistan.

In addition, the Uyghur’s independence in Xinjiang might represent a significant national

threat to China’s sovereignty. As the People’s Republic of China is home to 55 ethnic minorities

without counting the Uyghurs, the Tibetans and the people in Taiwan might even push harder to

ask for their own independence as well. At the same time, this threat would not only be Chinese,

but also become a global one, especially to the countries who have ethnic nationalities who ask

as well for their own freedom. For instance, I am mainly thinking about the Catalans in Spain,

the Kurds in Turkey, or even the Basques in France and in Spain.

The People’s Republic of China is a big country, which borders fourteen different

nations. The region of Xinjiang shares its frontier with eight countries, in which some of them

are unstable or are strategically and economically important, especially because of the Shanghai

Corporation Organization.59 In recent years, China has invested enormously in the region. I

mainly refer to the modernization of the large cities, and even about the 2006 oil pipeline

58 Ibid., p.18259 Blum, Susan; Jensen, Lionel. China Off Center. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p.73

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construction between Kazakhstan and China, which imports up to 20 million tons of Kazakh oil

annually.60 In the future, China has planned to build even more oil pipelines that would connect

China with the Central Asian nations. Therefore, this shows that China not only wants to keep,

but also strengthen its diplomatic relationship with the Central Asian nations, and sincerely do

not want to lose direct contact with these economic partners. In addition, the Chinese

government spent more money for the construction of a high-speed railway train that connects

the city of Lanzhou to Urumqi. Moreover, President Xi Jinping has recently launched the “One

Belt, One Road,” which consists in boosting China’s economy, essentially by building oil and

gas pipeline connecting China up to Western European countries.61 As a result, losing Xinjiang

as part of China is not even a question to argue on according to the Chinese government.

Article 27 from the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that

“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to

such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their

group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own

language.”62 China signed this treaty, but it is still not ratified by the government. Yet, the

country adopted a constitution in 1954, in which it declares that all the different nationalities

should not suffer from discrimination and oppressive acts.63 In addition, it says that they are free

to use their own language and preserve their customs and traditions.64 Likewise, it authorizes the

60 Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.30161 Mibfelder, Philipp. China’s New Silk Road Initiative Will Boost The Global Economy. The Huffington Post, 2015. Web.62 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ohchr.org. 1966, Part 3, article 2763 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. e-chaupak.net. 1954, Chapter 1, article 364 Ibid.

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minorities to live in a given territory where they can use their right to regional autonomy.65

However, minority rights remain a significant issue in China. Matthew Moneyhon, an expert on

the problem, argues that China’s policy towards ethnic nationalities shows a “give and take”

procedure between the government and the autonomous regions.66 Moneyhon’s “give and take”

argument is that the government gives nationalities the rights to have their autonomy and

administer their internal affairs, but that the Chinese government takes them back as any

regulation “shall be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for

approval.”67 Therefore, the powers given to Xinjiang are in fact under the control of Beijing.

Hurst Hannum, a professor of International Law, gives interesting criteria acceptable for

an autonomous region such as Xinjiang.68 First of all, Xinjiang should have an independent local

legislative body whose regulations should not need the approval of the state. Article 116 of the

1982 Constitution and article 19 of the 1984 Law on Regional National Autonomy both state that

regional directives need the approval of the Standing Committee of the National People’s

Congress. Next, the chairman of the region should be chosen locally.69 Article 17 of the LRNA

says that the designated person should belong to the national who have regional power.70 While

65 Ibid.66 Moneyhon, Matthew. Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New Frontier”. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, No.3. 2002, p.13767 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. npc.gov.cn. 1982, Section 6, article 11668 Moneyhon, Matthew. Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New Frontier”. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, No.3. 2002, p.14269 Ibid., p.14270 Law on Regional National Autonomy. China.org.cn. 1984, Chapter 2, article 17

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the current chairman is a Uyghur whose name is Shohrat Zakir, he was still chosen by Beijing.71

Furthermore, the region should have its own local judiciary system. Even though article 27 of

LRNA gives the right to use the region’s language in courts, the previous article proclaims that

local courts “shall be supervised by the Supreme People’s Court.”72 This demonstrates that the

Xinjiang’s judicial courts are not independent of Beijing’s authority. Lastly, the region should be

in full autonomy and governance as arranged between the central and autonomous governments.

However, the central government still has power over Xinjiang as it has the final decision on any

local regulations. This shows that the central government does not totally accept any kind of

autonomy in Xinjiang and remain the main power.

I personally believe that it is unacceptable that Xinjiang’s ethnic nationalities are being

considered as foreigners in their own land, and that they do not benefit, in contrast to the Han

Chinese, of the natural resources of their region. All of the cities that are inhabited by the Han

Chinese are transformed and modernized under the Chinese standards. I was able to see that on

my own when I traveled to Urumqi last summer. The Uyghur architecture and heritage are

disappearing progressively because of this modernization plan and the large Han migration.

According to one of the Uyghur student that I have interviewed, most of the high officials and

military officers in Xinjiang are all Han Chinese. In addition, it is mostly the Chinese people who

are in control of all of the jobs while the Uyghurs and other ethnic nationalities remain

concentrated in the traditional work such as agriculture and livestock. Moreover, the central 71 Moneyhon, Matthew. Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New Frontier”. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, No.3. 2002, p.14272 Law on Regional National Autonomy. China.org.cn. 1984, Chapter 2, article 16

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authorities always give preference to Chinese people rather than local nationalities in order to

access to jobs, education, or even health care. The Uyghur language is not even useful in order to

find a job, unless if it is a work in farming or husbandry. In addition, I have heard through my

interview that Xinjiang is also known for some people as to be the “Siberia of China” for the

reason that the Chinese government has built many camps for criminals and political prisoners.

I have always been in favor for people’s right to self-determination; however, I think that

in that case this right should be used as a last option for the Uyghurs. Indeed, the vast majority of

the Uyghur people do not actually want to separate themselves with China as this country is

significantly growing economically. Having an independent Xinjiang might not be the best

solution for the Uyghurs as they would be entirely isolated and would have no direct link to the

sea. In addition, many new generations of Hans Chinese were also born and live in that land, and

they probably do not want to reside in another country than China. Let’s imagine a second if

Xinjiang becomes a new Central Asian nation-state. What type of nation will it be? Will it be a

democratic or a repressive regime? Having oil and gas as natural resources to grow a country’s

economy is certainly good, but will Xinjiang become like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan or even

Azerbaijan? Will the people of Xinjiang truly benefit from these resources or will they profit

only a few individuals or a single family? These are the main concerns that can change the future

of a newborn state with plentiful of natural resources in the negative direction.

Ultimately, the vast majority of the Uyghur people ask the Chinese to comply with their

Uyghur and Muslim identity, ideally in a “Uyghuristan” which would have a real degree of

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autonomy while still being united with China. I argue that the main solution in order to stop the

conflict between the Uyghur radicals and the Han nationalists is by totally eliminating the

discrimination over the Uyghur people such as in the religious context or in the daily life in

general. The Uyghurs, not only the Han Chinese, should have a voice when it comes to the

modernization of the region for the reason that they are a majority and they do not feel like Hans.

In fact, the Uyghurs have a culture, a religion, a perception of the world in which they cannot

comply with the Chinese modernization model without renouncing to their identity. In addition,

the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese should equally benefit from Xinjiang’s natural resources.

These resources should evenly contribute to the development of the province, in the cities and in

the countryside, and not just largely sent to the eastern regions. The use of Chinese should not be

the only language required in order to find a job in the cities, and I suggest that some schools

teach Chinese and Uyghur to the children of Xinjiang. In order to represent the majority of the

people at the regional level, the central authorities should consist of both 50% Uyghur and Han

Chinese officials. Lastly, the Chinese government should cease its policy of promoting the Han

migration into Xinjiang in order to make the Chinese a majority compared to the Uyghurs. I

sincerely believe that if the Uyghur population is treated fairly like the Han Chinese, the desire

for independence would cease tremendously as they would not feel as being viewed as second-

class citizens. The People’s Republic of China is home to 56 ethnic nationalities, and all of the

citizens of this country should receive the same treatment and live in peace and harmony.

Overall, if the Chinese government gives more rights to their Uyghur compatriots, China would

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gain the Uyghur’s loyalty, and the Xinjiang issue would not only be resolved, but the country as

a whole would benefit the most from this reform.

Bibliography

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. e-chaupak.net. 1954. Web. 2 Dec. 2015.

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. npc.gov.cn.1982. Web . 2 Dec. 2015.

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Blum, Susan; Jensen, Lionel. China Off Center. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.

Print.

Grieboski, Joseph. Tension, Repression, And Discrimination: China’s Uyghurs Under Threat.

Georgetown Journal on International Affairs, 2014. Web. 3 Dec. 2015.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ohchr.org. 1966. Web. 2 Dec. 2015.

Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy. China.org.cn. 1984.

Web. 2 Dec. 2015.

Moneyhon, Matthew. Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New Frontier”. Asian

Pacific Law & Policy Journal, No.3, 2002. Web. 3 Dec. 2015.

Mibfelder, Philipp. China’s New Silk Road Initiative Will Boost The Global Economy. The

Huffington Post, 2015. Web. 2 Dec. 2015

Millward, James. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New-York: Columbia University

Press, 2007. Print.

Starr, Frederick. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. New-York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. Print.

Xinjiang’s natural resources. China.org. Web. 29 Nov. 2015.

Xinjiang the Land and the People. Beijing: New Word Press, 1989. Print.

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Documents

Sovereignty vs Autonomy What Solution for Xinjiang