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112 bankarstvo 11 - 12 2011 SPREGA DRŽAVE I AKCIONARSKIH BANAKA U SRBIJI DO DRUGOG SVETSKA RATA - PRIMER IZVOZNE BANKE AD (II DEO) Rezime Ovaj tekst je posvećen analizi rada najvećih akcionarskih banaka u Srbiji do Drugog svetskog rata i njihovoj poslovnoj i personalnoj povezanosti sa zvaničnim državnim organima. U ovom delu, akcenat je stavljen na prilike u Srbiji i rad Izvozne banke a.d. nakon završetka Prvog svetskog rata i osnivanja Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije. Posebna pažnja posvećena je srpskim privrednicima i političarima angažovanim u njenom radu, koji su pokušavali da iskoriste sve prednosti nove, proširene države za unapređenje srpske spoljne trgovine kao i ključnim razlozima koji su to unapređenje komplikovali i onemogućavali. Ključne reči: spoljna trgovina, bankarstvo, Kraljevina SHS/Jugoslavija, izvoz JEL klasifikacija: G21, N24 Prof. dr Vesna Aleksić Fakultet za međunarodnu ekonomiju, Beograd [email protected] originalni naučni rad Rad primljen: 29.12.2011. Odobren za štampu: 10.01.2012. UDK 339.5.012(497.11)"18/19" ; 336.717(497.11)"18/19"

SPREGA DRŽAVE Rezime · akcionarskih banaka u Srbiji do Drugog svetskog rata i njihovoj poslovnoj i personalnoj povezanosti sa zvaničnim državnim organima. U ovom delu, akcenat

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SPREGA DRŽAVE I AKCIONARSKIH BANAKA U SRBIJI

DO DRUGOG SVETSKA RATA -

PRIMER IZVOZNE BANKE AD

(II DEO)

Rezime

Ovaj tekst je posvećen analizi rada najvećih akcionarskih banaka u Srbiji do Drugog svetskog rata i njihovoj poslovnoj i personalnoj povezanosti sa zvaničnim državnim organima. U ovom delu, akcenat je stavljen na prilike u Srbiji i rad Izvozne banke a.d. nakon završetka Prvog svetskog rata i osnivanja Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije. Posebna pažnja posvećena je srpskim privrednicima i političarima angažovanim u njenom radu, koji su pokušavali da iskoriste sve prednosti nove, proširene države za unapređenje srpske spoljne trgovine kao i ključnim razlozima koji su to unapređenje komplikovali i onemogućavali.

Ključne reči: spoljna trgovina, bankarstvo, Kraljevina SHS/Jugoslavija, izvoz

JEL klasifikacija: G21, N24

Prof. dr Vesna AleksićFakultet za međunarodnu

ekonomiju, [email protected]

originalni naučni rad

Rad primljen: 29.12.2011.

Odobren za štampu: 10.01.2012.

UDK 339.5.012(497.11)"18/19" ; 336.717(497.11)"18/19"

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Summary

This paper presents an analysis of activities of the major shareholding banks in Serbia up until the World War II, including their professional and personal connectedness with the official authorities. In this section, we focus on the circumstances in Serbia and the operations of Export Bank a.d. in the aftermath of the World War I and following the establishment of the Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia. Special attention is devoted to the Serbian entrepreneurs and politicians engaged in the bank’s operations, who did their best to utilize all advantages offered by the new, enlarged state to promote foreign trade of Serbia, with a highlight of the key reasons that complicated and hindered such promotion.

Key words: foreign trade, banking, Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia, export

JEL Classification: G21, N24

Prof Vesna Aleksić PhDSchool of International Economics, [email protected]

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE SHAREHOLDING BANKS IN SERBIA UP TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR - CASE STUDY OF THE EXPORT BANK A.D. (PART TWO)

original scientific paper

Paper received: 29.12.2011

Approved for publishing: 10.01.2012

UDC 339.5.012(497.11)"18/19" ; 336.717(497.11)"18/19"

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Uvod

Novoosnovana Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca "položajem je bila veza, most Evrope i Azije, srednjoevropskog, maloazijskog i bliskoistočnog prostora, otvorena prema Mediteranu i preko Dunava povezana sa Crnim morem" [B. Petranović, 31]. Ovakav njen položaj nije imao samo spoljnopolitički, već i ogroman ekonomski značaj u tadašnjoj Evropi. Bilo je stvoreno potpuno novo ekonomsko područje i po svojoj veličini i po svom kvalitetu. Radilo se o očiglednoj promeni, tačnije, dezintegraciji starog ekonomskog područja i prilagođavanju i postepenoj integraciji novog ekonomskog područja. Ta promena bila je skrivena iza poznatih političkih sukoba, posledica rata i inflacije, što bi značilo da po svojoj prirodi nije bila nimalo laka i bezbolna. Zapravo su nove ekonomske prilike u mnogome diktirale političke i socijalne pokrete i promene do kojih je došlo u novoj državi.

O d n o s p r e m a promenjenoj veličini tržišta potpuno se razlikovao u Srbiji i zemljama bivše Monarhije. Dok je kod prve, promena značila proširenje tržišta od 2,9 miliona stanovnika na četvorostruki broj, kod drugih je značila smanjenje, jer su i z tržišta koji je obuhvatalo 677.000 km2 prešli na tržište od 248.000 km2. "To je rodilo u Srbiji osjećaj ponosa koliko mnogo stvari mogu sada dobivati na domaćem tržištu, a u Sloveniji, Hrvatskoj i Vojvodini iznenađenje koliko malo stvari može domaće tržište dati. Ta samodopadljivost kod jednih, a potcjenjivanje kod drugih bit će korjen mnogih kasnijih napetosti" [R. Bićanić, 83]. Ipak, ne može se zanemariti činjenica da su Slovenija, Hrvatska i Vojvodina od zemalja sa pretežno agrarnim karakterom u bivšoj Monarhiji, gotovo preko

noći postale privredno najrazvijenija područja u novoj državi. Ovo se posebno odnosi na Hrvatsku, čija je relativna prednost bila najočiglednija, posebno na području bankovnog i finansijskog kapitala. Oko 1912. godine, tamo je bilo 1.039 kreditnih zavoda sa 131 milionom zlatnih kruna vlastitih sredstava, dok je u Srbiji u to vreme bio u istim institucijama kapital od 58 miliona zlatnih dinara. Potpuno je logična činjenica da je prvih godina posle rata u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji bilo koncentrisano 50% svog kapitala banaka u Kraljevini SHS [D. Mišić, 347]. Zagreb je iz istih razloga postao središte ekonomske moći, najveći industrijski i trgovački centar, odnosno središte najjače koncentracije kapitala, za razliku od Beograda u kojem je bila koncentrisana sva politička i državno zakonodavna moć.

Uzroke ekonomske euforije koja je zavladala u Kraljevini SHS odmah nakon osnivanja, vrlo lepo je izneo u jednom od svojih radova profesor Univerziteta i tada već bivši pomoćnik ministra finansija, dr Velimir Bajkić: "Lakomisleni optimizam je kapitalna odlika psihologije

naroda pobedilaca. Tako je bilo i sa Jugoslavijom. D o b r o raspoloženje usled pobede i usled stvaranja nove p r o s t r a n e O t a d ž b i n e , stvaralo je i na p r i v r e d n o m polju predstavu neograničene m o g u ć n o s t i . Duševno stanje zemlje bilo je a la hausse. K tome je

došla inflacija, koja je bila materijalni činilac poduzetničkog duha i velike i žive inicijative. Nacionalizirati preduzeća nije loša stvar, na protiv, ali su za neograničen optimizam bila nedovoljna sredstva, kojim su raspolagale jugoslovenske banke." [V. Bajkić, 220] U prvo vreme je zaista postojala neograničena mogućnost tržišta kapitala, s obzirom na ogromnu građevinsku delatnost u velikim gradovima, ekspoloataciju prirodnih resursa

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Introduction

The newly-established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes “was, due to its position, the connection, the bridge between Europe and Asia, central Europe, Asia Minor and Middle East, open towards the Mediterranean Basin and, via the Danube, linked to the Black Sea” [B. Petranovic, 31]. Such position was not significant only when it came to foreign affairs, but also entailed huge economic importance in the then Europe. A completely new economic area was created, both in terms of size and in terms of quality. This was an obvious change, more precisely, a disintegration of the old economic area and adjustment and gradual integration of the new economic area. This change was hidden behind the well-known political conflicts, repercussions of the war and inflation, which meant that it was by no means easy and painless in its nature. In reality, the new economic situation largely dictated the political and social movements and changes occurring in the new state.

The attitude towards the altered size of the market was utterly different in Serbia and the countries of the former Monarchy. In case of Serbia, this change implied the expansion of the market from 2.9 million inhabitants to four times that many, whereas in case of the other countries, it implied the reduction, since the market encompassing 677.000 km2 shrank to just 248.000 km2. “This generated a sense of pride in Serbia with how much may be found at the domestic market, whereas in Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina, this generated a surprise with how little can be provided by the domestic market. Such self-appeal on one side and underestimation on the other would be the root of many tensions to come” [R. Bicanic, 83]. Still, one cannot deny the fact that Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina almost overnight turned from predominantly agrarian countries of the former Monarchy into economically most developed areas in the new state. This particularly refers to Croatia, whose relative advantage was most obvious, especially when it comes to banking and financial capital. Around 1912, it had 1039 credit institutes with 131 million gold crowns of own assets, whereas at the same time the same institutions in Serbia had the capital

amounting to 58 million gold dinars. It is only logical that in the first years after the war 50% of the entire bank capital in the Kingdom of SCS was concentrated in Croatia and Slavonia [D. Misic, 347]. For the same reasons, the city of Zagreb became the heart of economic power, the biggest industrial and trade centre, i.e. the seat of the largest concentration of capital, as opposed to Belgrade, where the entire political and legislative power of the state was concentrated.

The causes of economic euphoria that overwhelmed the Kingdom of SCS immediately after its establishment were rather accurately depicted in a paper by a University professor and, at the time already the former Minister of Finance, Dr Velimir Bajkic: “Light-headed optimism is a chief characteristic of the psychology of the winning nations. This was true for Yugoslavia as well. The cheerful mood caused by the victory and the creation of a new, spacious Fatherland, also generated the perception of unlimited possibilities in the field of economy. The mental state of the country was a la hausse. Then came inflation, as a material factor of entrepreneurial spirit and intense and lively initiative. To nationalize companies is not a bad thing, on the contrary, but this limitless optimism was supported by limited funds that the Yugoslav banks had at their disposal.” [V. Bajkic, 220]. At first, the possibilities of the capital market really were limitless, given the massive construction activities in large towns, exploitation of the natural resources in the country, opening of new industrial companies, development of trade, and credit needs of the state and private entrepreneurs. The predominant opinion arose that in the then impoverished and barren country everything that is built and produced would sell like hot buns and be profitable. Purchasing power of the citizens was not taken into much consideration. The chances for large and quick profits were also increased by progressive inflation which occurred exactly as a result of this sudden economic prosperity of the country. The value of capital - invested in the form of loans and credits into the establishment of various industrial companies, construction of residential buildings (for renting) or purchasing of land for subsequent subdivision - dropped abruptly

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zemlje, otvaranje novih industrijskih preduzeća, razvoj trgovine kao i kreditne potrebe države i privatnih preduzetnika. Zavladalo je mišljenje da će u tada opustošenoj i ogoleloj zemlji sve što bude izgrađeno i proizvedeno imati dobru prođu, odnosno da će biti isplativo. O kupovnoj snazi naroda nije se mnogo vodilo računa. Šanse za velike i brze zarade pojačala je i progresivna inflacija koja se pojavila upravo kao rezultat ovog naglog privrednog prosperiteta zemlje. Vrednost kapitala, koji se u obliku zajmova i kredita investirao u osnivanje raznih industrijskih preduzeća, za zidanje zgrada za stanovanje (izdavanje pod zakup) ili zakupljivanje kompleksa zemljišta za parcelisanje, naglo je usled inflacije padala. Međutim, na neizbežni pad prevashodno bankovnog kapitala uticalo je i smanjenje ukupnih bilansa prečanskih novčanih zavoda za čitave tri četvrtine. Razlog je bio prelazak sa krunske na dinarsku monetu, a na osnovu odluke vlade Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca o unifikaciji novca, januara 1920. godine, kada je otpočelo povlačenje austrougarske krune koja je tada zamenjena dinarom u razmeri 1:4. Ipak, potrebnog domaćeg kapitala i pored sve nacionalizacije stranih preduzeća i banaka, nije bilo dovoljno [V. Aleksić, 20].

Ovo se svakako odnosilo i na Privilegovanu izvoznu banku, koja je tokom rata, zahvaljujući spretnosti svog rukovodstva, rad nastavila u Nišu, “kreditirajući svoje komintente, i pomažući izvoz naročito suvih šljiva i pekmeza. Kada je izvršena evakuacija, naša je Banka u Francuskoj izdavala zajmove našim izbeglicama, koji su bili u nevolji, i svakom ulagaču, bilo da je ostao u zemlji ili izbegao, ili onome koji je imao potraživanje, Banka je izlazila u susret, čim joj se prijavio. Pretpostavio se ovaj posao svakome drugom mnogo lukretivnijem” [Fond MTI, 1120-2104]. Zanimljivo je istaći da je uprava ove banke uspela da u ratnom vihoru spase sve svoje vrednosti, gotovinu, pa čak i svoju arhivu. Ipak, iz izveštaja sa Vanrednog zbora akcionara iz 1920. godine, vidimo da je gotovo svo osoblje ove banke učestvovalo u ratu iz kojeg se neki nikada nisu vratili, poput člana Nadzornog odbora dr. Lončarića, sekretara Milana Manojlovića i još dvojice službenika banke.

Izvozna banka a.d. i političko-ekonomske prilike u Kraljevini SHS

Privilegovana Izvozna banka je svoj rad nakon Prvog svetskog rata započela tek 1920. godine. U junu te godine održan je Vanredni zbor na kojem je rukovodstvo banke pre svega informisalo svoje akcionare o katastrofalnom stanju srpske trgovine, naročito izvozne. Iz izveštaja Upravnog odbora saznajemo da su merodavni činioci novoosnovane Kraljevine SHS pune dve godine imali problema da se saglase sa opštim uslovima oko izdavanja dozvola za izvoz, što je dovelo do toga da su donošeni protivurečni propisi koji su izazivali pometnju, dok je nedosledno postupanje oko izdavanja odobrenja za izvoz pojedinim privrednicima stvaralo opšte nezadovoljstvo. Ispostavilo se da su sve mere koje su na ovom planu donošene bile suprotne težnjama za normiranjem, što je bila osnovna odlika ekonomske politike Srbije pre rata. Uz to se javila i potreba za mnogo većim kapitalom za izvoznike u odnosu na predratni period jer su izvozni proizvodi bili i više od deset puta skuplji nego pre rata. Tako, dok je vagon pšenice nekada koštao 2.000 dinara, nakon rata njegova vrednost je otišla na 25.000 dinara; vagon suvih šljiva je koštao oko 4.000, a nakon rata 40.000 dinara. Upravo iz ovih razloga predloženo je da se bančin kapital poveća na 10 miliona dinara, a kao osnovni dugoročni cilj istaknuta je potreba da se od ove banke stvori „moćna i jaka izvozna ustanova, najmoćnija u Kraljevstvu, koja će u svim prilikama moći uspešno delovati, pomažući izvoznike i izvoznu trgovinu, i time odgovarati svome zadatku, predviđenom zakonom i statutom“ [Fond MTI, 1120-2104].

Upravo iz ovih razloga, predsednik Uprave banke Aca N. Z. Popović i potpredsednik Miloš Savčić, zajedno sa preostalim članovima stare uprave (D. Đukanovićem, H. Azrieliem, P. Tadićem, K. Đurićem, M. Perovićem, V. Pavlićevićem, J. Maričićem i M. Jovanovićem) odlučili su da svoje redove pojačaju novim članovima. Tako je nekadašnji državni komesar dr Vlada T. Marković, koji je sve do 1914. godine u ime države nadgledao rad banke, sada postao njen generalni direktor i član Upravnog odbora, zajedno sa Jezdimirom Đokićem, generalnim direktorom i velikim akcionarem Beogradskog

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due to inflation. However, the inevitable fall in value of mostly banking capital was also caused by the reduction in total balances of monetary institutes outside Serbia by not less than three quarters. The reason for this lay in the transition from the crown to the dinar currency, in line with the decision passed in January 1920 by the Government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes concerning monetary unification, when the Austro-Hungarian crown started to be replaced by the dinar in the 1:4 ratio. Nevertheless, despite the nationalization of foreign companies and banks, the necessary domestic capital was still scarce [V. Aleksic, 20].

This certainly referred to the Privileged Export Bank, which during the war, thanks to the resourcefulness of its management, continued its operations in Nis, “crediting its clients, and supporting export, in particular the export of prunes and marmalade. Once the evacuation was completed, our Bank in France issued loans to our refugees in trouble, and immediately responded to the requests of each investor, whether he remained in the country or fled, or had receivables. Such operations had priority over other much more lucrative ones” [Fund MTI, 1120-2104]. Interestingly enough, the management of this bank managed to preserve all its valuables, cash, even its archives intact despite the horrors of war. However, the reports from the Extraordinary Session of the shareholders held in 1920 indicate that almost all employees of this bank took part in the war actions, from which some never returned, like the Supervisory Board member Dr Loncaric, Secretary Milan Manojlovic and two other bank officers.

Export Bank a.d. and Political and Economic Situation in the Kingdom of SCS

It was only in 1920 that the Privileged Export Bank continued its operations after the World War I. In June that year the Extraordinary Session was convened, when the bank management informed its shareholders about the catastrophic position of the Serbian trade, in particular export trade. From the reports of the Board of Directors, we find out that for two years the competent officials of the newly-established Kingdom of SCS could not reach an agreement on general conditions for issuing

export permits, which led to the adoption of some contradictory regulations that caused a chaos, whereas the inconsistent procedures for issuing export permits to certain entrepreneurs caused widespread dissatisfaction. It turned out that all measures adopted in this field were opposed to the normative tendencies, which were the main characteristic of economic policy of Serbia before the war. In addition, there was a need for much higher amounts of capital for exporters, compared to the pre-war period,

because export products were ten times more expensive than before the war. For instance, a wagon of wheat that used to cost 2000 dinars increased its value after the war to 25000 dinars; a wagon of prunes used to cost about 4000 dinars, and after the war about 40000 dinars. This is why it was proposed for the banks’ capital to be increased to 10 million dinars, highlighting as the main long-term objective the necessity to make this bank “a powerful and strong export institution, the most powerful one in the Kingdom, which would in all circumstances be

Miloš Savčić

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kreditnog zavoda. S obzirom da je Miloš Savčić istovremeno bio i većinski akcionar Prometne banke iz Beograda, kao i da je predsednik Nadzornog odbora Mihajlo Dragićević istovremeno bio generalni direktor Prometne banke, možemo slobodno da zaključimo da je poslovanje najvećih srpskih privrednika od tada finansirano upravo preko ove tri banke.

Rukovodstvo Privilegovane Izvozne banke bilo je u veoma bliskim vezama sa onim delom srpske političke i privredne elite koja se zalagala za jaku Srbiju unutar novoosnovane Kraljevine SHS. Zbog toga ne treba da čudi činjenica da je odmah posle Prvog svetskog rata Izvozna banka bila viđena kao srpski pandan moćnoj Prvoj hrvatskoj štedionici u čijem su osnivanju, svojevremeno, na prvom mestu takođe bili nacionalno-politički interesi. Međutim, za razliku od svog hrvatskog takmaca koji je u svom posedu imao čak 37 industrijskih preduzeća i svojim kapitalom učestvovao većinski u još dve druge jugoslovenske banke [Jugoslovenski Kompas, 344], Izvozna banka je privilegijom dobijenom još 1901. godine bila obavezna da težište poslova usmeri na kreditiranje izvoza, što je na novoj privrednoj sceni predstavljalo ozbiljno poslovno ograničenje. S toga je uprava na redovnom Zboru, već u septembru iste godine, tražila od akcionara da podrže odluku da se Banka „prema potrebi i nahođenju“ odrekne svojih povlastica „od kojih nikada nije imala koristi“ [Fond MTI, 1120-2104]. U obrazloženju se ističe da je ona zbog ovih povlastica morala da plaća komesara Ministarstva trgovine i industrije 10.000 dinara svake godine, a da pritom povlastice nikada nije iskoristila. Odricanjem od ove privilegije ona je dobila pravo da proširi delokrug poslova, ali je zanimljivo da nikada

nije stala na stanovište da bi trebala da finansira industriju. Njen glavni izvor obrtnog kapitala i dalje su bili krediti po tekućim računima u zemlji i inostranstvu i po tome je ona ostala tipičan predstavnik srpskog bankarstva i nakon Prvog svetskog rata [Narodno blagostanje, 24]. Koliko se nade polagalo u njen budući rad pokazuje i činjenica da je za ovaj Zbor svoje akcije upisalo čak 245 akcionara, od kojih su najveći akcionari bili Aca N. Z. Popović i nekadašnji generalni direktor i član Uprave, Milorad Drašković. On se iz uprave Banke povukao 1914. godine kada je postavljen na položaj ministra građevina i saobraćaja, a za vreme povlačenja preko Albanije i nakon toga, obavljao je dužnost ministra vojnog. Po oslobođenju je postao poznat po geslu: “što je tolikom krvlju plaćeno, političari moraju očuvati” a da bi to i dokazao latio se položaja ministra unutrašnjih dela Kraljevine SHS. Već u julu 1921. godine, u 48. godini života, pao je upravo kao žrtva političkog atentata. U izveštaju Upravnog odbora iz 1922. godine između ostalog je zapisano: “Izvozna banka, koju je Drašković podigao, unapredio, i kojoj je otvorio put plodonosnog rada, zavijena je u crno. Ona nikada ne može zaboraviti, koliko je mnogo Drašković za nju učinio. Ona će se uvek sa dostojnim poštovanjem

sećati njega, svoga pametnoga, svoga visoko umnoga člana uprave. Hvala mu!” [Fond MTI, 1120-2104]

Period najvećeg uspona Izvozne banke a.d. 1922 - 1927

Veliki broj uglednih akcionara koje je Banka stekla nakon Prvog svetskog rata uticao je i na rad uprave. Oni su javno kritikovali izveštaje Upravnog odbora smatrajući ih suvoparnim i nedovoljno informativnim, zbog čega je već 1922. godine

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capable of operating successfully, assisting the exporters and export trade, thus completing its task, as prescribed by the law and the statute” [Fund MTI, 1120-2104].

For these very reasons, the President of the bank’s management, Aca N. Z. Popovic and the Vice-President, Milos Savcic, together with the remaining members of the former management (D. Djukanovic, H. Azriel, P. Tadic, K. Djuric, M. Perovic, V. Pavlicevic, J. Maricic, and M. Jovanovic) decided to reinforce their lines by accepting new members. Thus the former State Commissioner, Dr Vlada T. Markovic, who was up until 1914 in charge of supervising banks’ operations on behalf of the state, now became the bank’s Executive Director and a member of its Board of Directors, alongside Jezdimir Djokic, Executive Director and shareholder of Belgrade Credit Institute. Given that Milos Savcic was at the same time the majority shareholder of Prometna Banka in Belgrade, and that the Vice-President of the Supervisory Board, Mihajlo Dragicevic, was at the same time the Executive Director of Prometna Banka, we may conclude that the business of major Serbian entrepreneurs was from that point onwards financed through these three banks.

The management of the Privileged Export Bank had very close ties to that section of the Serbian political and economic elite that advocated the strong Serbia within the newly-established Kingdom of SCS. That is why it does not come as a surprise that immediately after the World War I, Export Bank was seen as a Serbian counterpart to the powerful First Croatian Savings Bank, whose establishment was, in its time, also motivated by nationalist and political interests. However, as opposed to its Croatian rival, which owned as many as 37 industrial companies and had majority capital share in two other Yugoslav banks [Jugoslovenski Kompas, 344], Export Bank was bound by a privilege received back in 1901 to focus the core of its operations on export crediting, which was, in the new economic environment, a serious operational restriction. Therefore, at the regular Assembly held in September the same year, the management asked the shareholders to support the decision for the Bank “pursuant to its needs and intentions” to renounce its privileges “from which it never gained any benefits” [Fund

MTI, 1120-2104]. The relevant explanation underlines that, on account of these privileges, the Bank had to pay 10000 dinars each year to the Commissioner of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, without ever actually utilizing the concerned privileges. By denouncing these privileges, the Bank obtained the right to expand its field of operations, but, interestingly enough, it never took the stance to finance the industry. Its main source of working capital were still loans per current accounts, extended locally and abroad, and this is what helped it remain the typical representative of Serbian banking even after the World War I [Narodno blagostanje, 24]. The hopes invested in the Bank’s future operations are best illustrated by the fact that 245 shareholders subscribed for shares at this Assembly, the largest shareholders being Aca N. Z. Popovic and the former Executive Director and member of Administration, Milorad Draskovic. He retired from the Bank’s management in 1914 when he was appointed Minister of Construction and Transport, and during the retreat across Albania, and after that, he held the position of Minister of Defence. After the Liberation, he became known for his motto: “What has been paid in so much blood, politicians must preserve”, and in order to prove this, he took the position of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Kingdom of SCS. Already in June 1921, at the age of 48, he fell victim to a political assassination. The Report of the Board of Directors from 1922, among other things, records the following: “Export Bank, raised, improved, and launched towards the path of fruitful work by Draskovic, is now in mourning. We will never forget how much Draskovic did for us. We will always, with due respect, remember him, the smart and ingenious member of our management. May he rest in peace!” [Fund MTI, 1120-2104].

The Pinnacle of Success of Export Bank a.d. from 1922 to 1927

A large number of reputable shareholders that the Bank attracted after the World War I exerted certain impact on the work of management. They publicly criticized the Reports of the Board of Directors, considering them to be dry and insufficiently informative,

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urađen novi izveštaj koji je pružao iscrpnu kritiku ekonomske politike Kraljevine SHS tog vremena. On je podnet Zboru akcionara 26. marta 1922. godine i u njemu su detaljno izneti svi problemi sa kojima se izvozna trgovina susretala tokom prethodne dve godine. Posebno se optuživalo Ministarstvo finansija koje je od Ministarstva trgovine i industrije preuzelo nadležnost nad izvoznom trgovinom, da je odugovlačilo sa promenom izvozne tarife zbog čega su mnogi izvoznici koji su kupili robu i pripremili je za izvoz predugo čekali da bi videli kakve će biti nove carinske stope. Istovremeno sa konačnim donošenjem izvozne tarife, Ministarstvo finansija je donelo i uredbu o ograničenju trgovine devizama i valutama, koje je bilo u direktnoj vezi sa izvozom. Pošto su u toj uredbi mnoga pitanja ostala neraščišćena, moralo je da prođe još neko vreme dok ona nije počela da se primenjuje. Na taj način, puna dva meseca izvoz žitarica i drugih artikala se uopšte nije obavljao ili se vršio samo u ograničenoj meri. Istovremeno, vojna ekspedicija prema Albaniji i mobilizacija vojske zbog graničnih problema sa Mađarskom „oduzela je trgovini uopšte, a naročito izvoznoj, i onaj inače maleni broj vagona, tako da je zbog toga izvozna trgovina zastala, i trgovci bili izloženi štetama, jer su vagoni puni suvom šljivom i drugom izvoznom robom istovarivani i upotrebljeni za vojsku... Izvoz valja favorizovati, ako se želi da se što više stranih deviza unese u zemlju, i vrednost našem nacionalnom novcu podigne. Izvoz zahteva saobraćajna sredstva brza i uredna, a od strane nadležnih na svoj zahtev nije pokazana potrebna pažnja. Izvozna trgovina kao i svaka druga

trgovina zahteva stabilnost vrednosti našeg dinara, međutim toga nije bilo ni prošle godine jer nije nikakvo radikalno sredstvo upotrebljeno za popravljanje i stabilizaciju kursa našeg nacionalnog novca.“ [Fond MTI, 1120-2104]

Izvozna banka se, kako stoji u ovom izveštaju, dosta uspešno bavila kupovinom, prodajom i izvozom žita, šljiva, kože, sena i drugih poljoprivrednih proizvoda. Ona je, da bi proširila svoj delokrug rada i uticaja na teritoriju Stare Srbije (Kosova i Metohije) i Makedonije, sporazumno sa Prometnom bankom iz Beograda, osnovala novu banku u Skoplju pod nazivom Izvozna i Prometna banka a.d. Takođe se, zbog „potrebnih veza i šljivarskih poslova orodila“ sa Valjevskom zadrugom i Čačanskom štedionicom, učestvujući u povišici akcionarskog kapitala ovih novčanih zavoda. Na samom kraju ovog izveštaja saznajemo da Izvozna banka od svog postojanja nikada nije više plasirala novac nego te 1921. godine, a sve zahvaljujući velikom broju akcionara koji su se odazvali prilikom povišice bančinog kapitala. Ispostavilo se da je taj odziv

bio toliko veliki da je Uprava bila prinuđena da izvrši značajno reduciranje upisanih akcija. Osim toga, ne treba da se zanemari ni činjenica da je zahvaljujući ogromnom ugledu i poverenju koje je uživala, Banka za svoje razgranate poslove dobila i dovoljno veliki kredit od Narodne banke Kraljevine SHS. „Najzad imamo blagodariti velikom poverenju koji naša banka uživa kod našeg sveta, koji nam je pružio ulozima mogućnost za što veće poslovanje.“ Sve je ovo predstavljalo odličan trenutak za povećanje akcionarskog kapitala banke na 30 miliona dinara, s tim što je uprava insistirala na tome da samo i jedino

Palata Izvozne banke, Terazije 5, projekat Danila Vladisavljevića, podignuta 1924. godineBuilding of the Export bank, 5 Terazije Street, project of Danilo Vladisavljević, built in 1924

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which is why already in 1922 a new report was prepared, offering a comprehensive critical analysis of the economic policy of the Kingdom of SCS at that time. It was submitted at the Shareholders’ Assembly on 26 March 1922, and it elaborated in detail on all problems that the export industry had had to face in the preceding two years. Particular accusations were thrown at the Ministry of Finance, which had taken over the jurisdiction over export trade from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, saying that there had been too much procrastination concerning the modification of export tariffs, which is why many exporters who bought their goods and prepared them for export waited too long just to see how high the new customs rates were going to be. When it finally adopted the export tariffs, the Ministry of Finance also passed a decree on limiting the trade in foreign exchange and foreign currency, which was directly related to export. Given that many issues in this decree remained unclear, some more time had to pass before it actually started to be implemented. Thus, for two full months the export of wheat and other items was at a complete standstill, or was conducted only to a limited extent. At the same time, the military expedition towards Albania and mobilization of army due to some borderline problems with Hungary “took those few wagons from trade in general, and from export trade in particular, which led to a standstill in export trade, and caused serious damage to traders, because the wagons full of prunes and other export goods were being unloaded and used for military purposes…Export should be favoured if we wish to increase the inflow of foreign exchange into our country as much as possible, and to raise the value of our national currency. Export requires swift and regular modes of transport, and the competent authorities have failed to pay due level of attention to our request. Export trade, just like any other trade, requires the stability of value of our dinar, but that was lacking last year, given that no radical means were used to improve and stabilize the rate of our national currency.” [Fund MTI, 1120-2104]

Export Bank, as states in this report, rather successfully dealt with purchase, sale and export of wheat, plums, leather, hay and other agricultural products. In order to expand

its scope of activities and its influence at the territory of Old Serbia (Kosovo and Metohija) and Macedonia, together with Prometna Banka from Belgrade, it established a new bank in Skopje under the name of Export and Prometna Banka a.d. Also, due to “necessary ties and plum-related business”, it became a partner of Valjevska Cooperative and Cacanska Savings Bank, by participating in the raise of equity of these monetary institutes. At the very end of this report, we find out that, since its establishment, Export Bank had never placed more money than in the year of 1921, all thanks to the large number of shareholders who responded to the increase of the bank’s capital. It turned out that this response was so intense that the Management was forced to perform considerable reduction in subscribed shares. Moreover, we should bear in mind the fact that, owing to the enviable reputation and trust it enjoyed, the Bank received a sufficiently large loan by the National Bank of the Kingdom of SCS to finance its branching operations. “We can finally thank the enormous confidence our bank enjoys with our people, whose investments enabled us an opportunity to expand our business as much as possible.” This was, all in all, an excellent moment to increase the equity of the bank to 30 million dinars, with the management insisting that only the present shareholders have the right to subscribe for new shares, “each shareholder receiving the number of shares equal to his present number of shares” [Fund MTI, 1120-2104].

The construction of the Bank’s palace in Terazije Square no. 5 commenced in 1921, and it was planned to be finished already in the course of the following year, by which time the residential building for officers and warehouses in Marka Kraljevica Street were also supposed to be built. The Bank’s net profit amounted to almost 4 million dinars, hence, at the management’s proposal, 30 dinars were paid out per each share in the form of dividends (by 1925 the amount of dividend increased to 100 dinars per share). However, as much as the shareholders were satisfied with the operations of Export Bank itself, they could not but take a look at the circumstances in which, as one of the shareholders pointed out, the financial policy of the state was so catastrophic that “if the Bank

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dotadašnji akcionari imaju prava na upis novih akcija i to „koliko ko ima sadašnjih akcija dobiće toliki broj novih“ [Fond MTI, 1120-2104].

Te 1921. godine započela je i izgradnja bančine palate na Terazijama br. 5 za koju se verovalo da će biti završena već u toku sledeće godine, kada se računalo da će biti gotova i stambena zgrada za činovnike i magacini, koji su se gradili u ulici Marka Kraljevića. Čista dobit Banke bila je gotovo 4 miliona dinara, pa je na predlog uprave po svakoj akciji bilo isplaćeno 30 dinara na ime dividendi (do 1925. godine, visina dividende će biti 100 dinara po akciji). Ali, koliko god da su akcionari bili zadovoljni radom same Izvozne banke, nisu mogli a da se ne osvrnu na okolnosti u kojima je, kao što je istakao jedan od akcionara, finansijska politika države bila toliko katastrofalna da Banka „kada bi sada imala tih predratnih pet miliona zlatnih dinara akcionarskog kapitala, imala bi u stvari kapital od 100 miliona dinara. Međutim, sada, iako je uvećala svoj kapital i rezerve opet ona ima manje no pre rata“ [Fond MTI, 1120-2104].

Nezadovoljstvo pojedinih akcionara bilo je usmereno i na činjenicu da je Banka izdašno kreditirala privredne konzorcijume u čijim su upravama sedeli članovi Upravnog odbora Izvozne banke. Iako za ovako nešto nije postojalo zakonsko ograničenje, ipak je postojalo podozrenje akcionara da se na ovaj način favorizuju pojedine firme na uštrb drugih. Objašnjenje generalnog direktora, dr Vlade T. Markovića, kretalo se u pravcu da „Izvozna banka kredituje kako pojedince tako i razna društva i konzorcije. Ove druge radije i tim pre što daju veće i jače garancije i mogu apsorbovati i veće i jače količine novca odnosno dobiti veće kredite, da bi uopšte mogli raditi. Danas je pojedinac nemoćan da radi. Nemoćan je i onda kada se oslanja na banku. Ali udruženi pojedinci stvaraju mogućnost za dobar i uspešan rad. Izvozna banka se starala da stvara takva udruženja, konzorcije i u tome je uspevala. Ako u kakvom konzorcijumu ima i članova Upravnog odbora to nije ništa neobično. Glavno je da se svi komitenti tretiraju podjednako“ [Fond MTI, 1120-2104].

Ipak, nije bilo tako. Podozrenje akcionara o favorizovanju firmi pojedinih članova uprave samo je pojačano činjenicom da je posao oko izgradnje bančine palate na Terazijama dodeljen

građevinskoj firmi potpredsednika Izvozne banke, Miloša Savčića. Ova firma ne samo da je kasnila sa izgradnjom nego je, zbog poskupljenja građevinskog materijala i radne snage, pored ugovorene sume tražila od Banke i značajna dodatna sredstva. Usled pritiska nezadovoljnih akcionara, uprava je bila prinuđena da potraži mišljenje trojice profesora Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, a nakon veoma žive debate na Zboru akcionara, održanom 18. februara 1923. godine, doneta je i rezolucija kojom se daje ovlašćenje Upravnom odboru da bilo sudskim sporom ili poravnanjem reši problem, kako se izgradnja palate ne bi više odugovlačila. Predstavnici uprave su u „neformalnom“ razgovoru sa Milošem Savčićem ipak pristali da plate deo zatraženih dodatnih sredstava. Nova zgrada bila je završena taman na vreme da se u njoj održi Zbor akcionara, 17. februara 1924. godine, kome je, zbog bolesti predsednika Ace N. Z. Popovića, kao potpredsednik predsedavao upravo Miloš Savčić. Pokazalo se da posedovanje ove velike nepokretnosti u Beogradu nije popravilo raspoloženje i povratilo poverenje akcionara u rad Uprave. Nekako baš u to vreme, akcionarski kapital banke pojačan je kapitalom uglednih beogradskih Jevreja [Fond MTI, 1120-2104] koji možda nisu imali većinu, ali su uz velike pakete akcija članova Upravnog i Nadzornog odbora, omogućavali da se glatko i bez nepotrebnih turbulencija donose željene odluke.

Iako se kriza na relaciji uprave i akcionara Izvozne banke tada činila prevaziđenom, iz nje je već 1925. godine istupio Miloš Savčić, a na mesto potpredsednika bio je postavljen dr Vlada T. Marković. Iste godine iz Upravnog odbora banke istupio je nekadašnji predsednik Beogradske jevrejske opštine i poznati izvoznik Hajim Azriel kao i trgovac Panta Tadić (inače član uprave Neimar a.d. osnovane 1919. godine sa ciljem planske izgradnje naselja Kotež-Neimar na Vračaru). Iz Nadzornog odbora su gotovo u isto vreme izašli Mihailo Perović, poznati gvožđarski trgovac i Mihailo Đ. Milovanović, inspektor Ministarstva finansija, tada već u penziji. U razmaku od nepunih godinu dana umiru i dvojica najstarijih članova Upravnog odbora (Kosta M. Đurić i Dragutin N. Đukanović), kao i predsednik Nadzornog odbora Mihailo Dragićević. I pored toga, Izvozna banaka je baš tih godina slovila kao najjači

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now had those pre-war 5 million gold dinars of equity, it would actually have 100 million dinars in capital. However, at the time being, despite the increase in its capital and reserves, it still has less than before the war” [Fund MTI, 1120-2104].

The dissatisfaction of certain shareholders was also directed at the fact that the Bank was abundantly lending to commercial consortiums whose management included the members of Export Bank’s Board of Directors. Even though this was not prohibited by any law, the shareholders suspected that this way certain companies were being favoured at the expense of some others. Dr Vlada T. Markovic, Executive Director, explained that “Export Bank lends both to individuals and to various companies and consortiums. All the more to the latter given the bigger and stronger guarantees they can provide, and the higher amounts of money they can absorb, i.e. bigger loans they need to be able to operate in the first place. Today, an individual is powerless when it comes to work. He is powerless even when supported by a bank. But associated individuals generate opportunities for sound and successful work. Export Bank wanted to create such associations, consortiums and was successful in it. If such a consortium involves certain members of the Board of Directors, this is nothing extraordinary or unusual. The main thing is that all clients are treated equally” [Fund MTI, 1120-2104].

Nevertheless, this was not the case. The suspicion of shareholders concerning the favouring of companies by certain members of the management was only heightened by the fact that the task of constructing the Bank’s palace at Terazije Square was entrusted to the construction company owned by the Vice-President of Export Bank, Milos Savcic. Not only

was this company belated in the construction work but it also, due to the increased prices of building materials and workforce, in addition to the agreed amount asked from the Bank considerable additional funds. Under the pressure of dissatisfied shareholders, the management was forced to ask for professional opinion of three professors at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade, and following a rather heated discussion at the Shareholders’ Assembly, held on 18 February 1923, a resolution was passed, granting an authorization to the Board of Directors to solve the problem either by means of a lawsuit or a settlement, so that the construction of the palace would not be procrastinated any longer. Despite that, in an “informal” talk with Milos Savcic, representatives of the management agreed to pay a part of the requested additional funds. The new building was finished just in time to host the Shareholders’ Assembly, on 17 February 1924, which was due to the illness of President Aca N. Z. Popovic, chaired by no other than the Vice-President Milos Savcic himself. It turned out that the ownership of this large real estate in Belgrade did not improve the general mood or regain the trust of shareholders in the Management’s activities. It happened around that time that the bank’s equity was

supported by the capital of reputable Belgrade Jews [Fund MTI, 1120-2104] who did not have the majority share, but who together with the large packages of shares owned by the members of the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board, succeeded in getting the desired decisions made smoothly and without unnecessary turbulences.

Although the crisis between the management and shareholders of Export Bank seemed

dr Vlada T. Marković

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izvoznik suvih šljiva u zemlji i ustanova preko koje je izvezeno najviše žitarica u poređenju sa ranijim godinama. Zahvaljujući Narodnoj banci raspolagala je dovoljnim novčanim sredstvima, pa iako joj je glavni posao bio da kreditira izvoznike ona je vršila kreditiranja i ostalih privrednika [Fond MTI, 1120-2104].

U pozadini ovog uspeha, polako je na površinu izlazilo saznanje o dugogodišnjem lošem poslovanju deviznog odeljenja Banke, pa se u izveštaju Nadzornog odbora za poslovnu 1926. godinu ističe da je „tokom pregleda rada ovog odeljenja konstatovano da su izvesna zaduženja ovog odeljenja izostala kao npr: zaduženje kamatom, zateznim spornim kamatama, nekim spornim sumama itd. pa je sada sve to dovedeno u red“ [Fond MTI, 1120-2104] kao i da je direktor tog odeljenja bio prinuđen da podnese ostavku. Međutim, pojedini akcionari bili su slobodni da na odgovornost pozovu i generalnog direktora banke dr Vladu Markovića, ističući nelogičnost da on istovremeno bude i član uprave. Iako je generalni direktor pokušavao da objasni da „kontrolu u banci ne vrši Direkcija, jer je njezin rad predviđen u čl. 47. statuta... “ kao i da „nju ne vrši ni Upravni odbor, jer je dužnost Upravnog odbora da upravlja poslovima bančinim u granicama statuta i zakona o akc. društvima... “, sasvim je sigurno da ni njegova tvrdnja da „kontrolu vrši Nadzorni odbor, ali ni on nije mogao znati da je pređašnji direktor deviznog odeljenja zadržavao kod sebe izvesnu korespodenciju i dokumente, na osnovu kojih je trebalo zaduživati Devizno Odelenje“ [Fond MTI, 1120-2104], nije ubedila ulagače. Usledile su privatne tužbe pojedinih akcionara Izvozne banke Ministarstvu trgovine i industrije zbog sumnje da Uprava zarađuje na razlici u kursu

hartija od vrednosti kao i da nedovoljno precizno objašnjava način na koji vrši otpise propalih potraživanja.

Da su ovo bile prelomne godine u poslovanju Izvozne banke govore i mnoga druga dokumenta iz tog vremena [Fond MTI, 1120-2104]. Tako u spisku akcionara za poslovnu 1927. godinu vidimo da više nema jevrejskog kapitala u banci kao i da mnogi dotadašnji članovi uprave više nisu vlasnici većinskog paketa akcija, poput dr Vlade T. Markovića. Nešto definitivno nije bilo u redu sa poslovanjem banke, o čemu govori i podatak da se u toku 1928. godine „zbog bolesti“ sa mesta predsednika Upravnog odbora povukao Aca N. Z. Popović, kojeg je na tom mestu zamenio poznati srpski privrednik Milan M. Jovanović. Na mesto potpredsednika je, umesto dr Vlade Markovića iste godine postavljen Ljuba M. Mihailović, nekadašnji diplomata Kraljevine Srbije i narodni poslanik Demokratske stranke.

Radilo se zapravo o vešto zataškanom potencijalnom skandalu vezanom za poslovanje zeta Ace N. Z. Popovića, Steve Vuča. Naime, kao sin nekadašnjeg člana Upravnog odbora Đorđa Vuča, Steva Vučo je posle Prvog svetskog rata preuzeo očevu trgovinu kožom, a nešto kasnije, 1924. godine, otvorio je zajedno sa Đokom Tanaskovićem (sinom nekadašnjeg člana Uprave Steve Tanaskovića), fabriku za štavljenje kože u Zemunu. U početku je fabrika uspešno radila, ali zbog činjenice da se nije vodilo računa o kreditima koji su uzimani, naročito od Izvozne banke, dug se svake godine sve više uvećavao. Tako je te 1928. godine, pred samu ekonomsku krizu, dug ove fabrike iznosio 8 miliona dinara, a kamata 12%. Uprava banke bila je pod pritiskom ulagača prinuđena da, nakon smene svojih čelnika, traži od firme „Đorđe Vučo“ i fabrike Steve Vuča i Đoke Tanaskovića povraćaj pozajmljenih sredstava. Kako oni to nisu mogli, došlo je do prinudne prodaje celokupne nepokretne imovine sva četiri sina Đorđa Vuča, čime je dug banci bio vraćen [M. Kostić, 61-62]. Godine 1931, na inicijativu nove uprave, Aca N. Z. Popović bio je postavljen za doživotnog počasnog predsednika Izvozne banke. Dr Vlada Marković se godinu dana kasnije potpuno povukao iz Banke uz navodnu i nikad dokazanu otpremninu od milion dinara i ta tema će zaokupljati pojedine ulagače na

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to be resolved, Milos Savcic left the bank already in 1925, to be succeeded by Dr Vlada T. Markovic at the position of Vice-President. The same year the Board of Directors was left by the former president of Belgrade Jewish Community and a well-known exporter Hajim Azriel, and by a tradesman Panta Tadic (also the member of the management of Neimar a.d., established back in 1919 with the task of a planned construction of the residential area Kotez-Neimar in Vracar). Almost at the same time, the Supervisory Board was left by Mihailo Perovic, a famous ironmonger, and Mihailo Dj. Milovanovic, inspector within the Ministry of Finance, then already retired. Within less than a year, two of the eldest members of the Board of Directors passed away (Kosta M. Djuric and Dragutin N. Djukanovic), along with the President of the Supervisory Board Mihailo Dragicevic. Despite that, it was in these years that Export Bank was considered the biggest exporter of prunes in the country and the institution via which the largest amounts of wheat had been exported, compared to the preceding years. Thanks to the National Bank, it had sufficient funds at its disposal, and although its main task was to lend to exporters, it also extended loans to other types of entrepreneurs [Fund MTI, 1120-2104].

In the background of this success, what slowly came to surface was the knowledge of the long-standing wrongdoings of the Bank’s FX department, hence the report of the Supervisory Board for the business year of 1926 underlines that “the regular supervision of this department’s operations revealed that certain charges on account of this department had been lacking, such as, for instance: charging with interest, disputable penalty interest, some other disputable amounts, etc, and that now all these had been corrected” [Fund MTI, 1120-2104], and that the head of the concerned department was forced to submit his resignation. However, certain shareholders took the liberty of indicating the accountability of the Bank’s Executive Director Dr Vlada Markovic, underlining that it was inappropriate for him to be a member of the management at the same time. Although the Executive Director tried to explain that “the control in the Bank isn’t conducted by the Directorate, given that its activities are prescribed by Article 47 of the Statute…”, and

that “the control isn’t to be conducted by the Board of Directors either, because the duty of the Board of Directors is to manage the Bank’s business within the limits defined by the Statute and the Law on Shareholding Companies…”, it is completely certain that his claim that “the control is conducted by the Supervisory Board, but it could not have possibly known that the former Head of the FX Department retained certain correspondence and documents based on which the charges on account of the FX Department were to be made” [Fund MTI, 1120-2104] - failed to convince the investors. This was followed by private complaints of certain shareholders of Export Bank directed towards the Ministry of Trade and Industry, fuelled by their doubt that the Management makes profit on the difference in the securities’ prices, and that its explanation of the manner in which the bad receivables were written-off was insufficiently precise.

That these were the crucial years for the operation of Export Bank is also supported by other documents from this period [Fund MTI, 1120-2104]. Thus the list of shareholders for the business year of 1927 shows that there was no more Jewish capital in the Bank and that many current members of the management were no longer the owners of majority shares packages, like Dr Vlada T. Markovic. Something was definitely wrong with the Bank’s operations, which is further confirmed by the fact that in the course of 1928 Aca N. Z. Popovic, “due to ill health”, retired from the position of President of the Board of Directors, to be succeeded in this position by the well-known Serbian entrepreneur Milan M. Jovanovic. Instead of Dr Vlada Markovic, that same year, Ljuba M. Mihailovic, former diplomat of the Kingdom

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Zborovima akcionara dugi niz godina [Fond MTI, 1120-2104].

Osnivanje filijale Izvozne banke a.d. u Tirani

Novi poslovni zamah Banka je dobila tek 1934. godine, kada je vlada Kraljevine Jugoslavije odlučila da, u cilju intenziviranja političkih i ekonomskih veza sa Albanijom, finansijski podrži otvaranje jedne domaće filijale u Tirani. Dobre političke veze nove uprave Izvozne banke, naročito bivšeg diplomate Ljubomira Mihailovića i jednog od najbogatijih srpskih izvoznika Ljubomira Saračevića i pojedinih članova vlade, omogućile su da izbor padne upravo na ovu banku [Fond MTI, 1120-2104]. Osim osnovnih finansijsko-privrednih funkcija, pred Banku su postavljeni i značajni politički zadaci. Kako je inače svaka privredna aktivnost Jugoslavije u Albaniji bila motivisana političkim razlozima, Banka je trebalo da bude posrednik za ostvarivanje državnih spoljnopolitičkih interesa i centar okupljanja onog dela albanske privredne i političke elite koja je prijateljski bila naklonjena prema Jugoslaviji, a sve u cilju slabljenja italijanskog uticaja na ovim prostorima. Za uzvrat, država je garantovala Banci da će biti zaštićena od eventualnih gubitaka i svakog rizika u poslovanju [S. Mišić, 125-145]. Ona se posebnim sporazumom od 24. aprila 1934. godine, obavezala da će za račun nove filijale otvoriti kredit po tekućem računu kod Poštanske štedionice, u iznosu od 8 miliona dinara i još dva miliona dinara za režijske troškove u tranšama od po 500 hiljada dinara [Fond IB, 152-2]. Ovaj sporazum je imao i ozbiljne nedostatke jer njime nije bilo obuhvaćeno pitanje kreditnih poslova, ni modela kredita koji bi se mogli primenjivati u Albaniji, kao ni vrste poslova koje je filijala morala, a koje je zapravo mogla da radi, niti ko snosi rizik rada filijale i u kojoj meri. Na ovo su ukazivali ulagači banke kada su, u februaru 1935. godine, na Zboru akcionara bili upoznati sa detaljima sporazuma. Posebnu pažnju poklanjali su neregulisanom odnosu sa drugim učesnicama u ovoj političko-ekonomskoj akciji sa Albanijom, poput Privilegovanog a.d. za izvoz zemaljskih proizvoda (skr. Prizad) [Fond MTI, 1120-2104]. Upozorenja su, međutim, stigla

kasno. Izvozna banka je već 6. maja 1934. godine svečano otvorila svoju filijalu u velelepnoj građevini u samom centru Tirane.

Osnovni problem sa kojim se ova filijala suočila na samom početku rada bio je potpuni zastoj u trgovinskoj razmeni između Albanije i Jugoslavije. Kako su uvozno-izvozni poslovi bili osnovni preduslov za njen rad, filijala, kruto se držeći sporazuma sa vladom, nije smatrala za svoju dužnost da sama obavlja bilo kakve trgovačke poslove, već je smatrala da zapravo indirektno, platnim prometom treba da olakša trgovinu dve zemlje. Istovremeno, kao veliki problem u radu pokazala se nabavka potrebnih deviza. Filijala je morala da ih kupuje na crnoj berzi po znatno višem kursu, a prodaje na bazi ciriškog pariteta, odnosno 10% jeftinije. Da bi izbegla gubitke nastale zbog razlike u kursu, obraćala se i centrali u Beogradu i Ministarstvu finansija, predlažući nacrt novčanog kliringa između dve zemlje kojim bi se regulisao transfer gotovog novca. Iako je centrala Banke prihvatila ovaj predlog, ministar finansija ga je odbio, pa su problemi nabavke novčanih sredstava i regulisanja platnog prometa ostali nerešeni do kraja 1934. godine. Zato ne treba da čudi da tokom prve kalendarske godine ova filijala nije pokazala značajne rezultate već se ispostavilo i da je poslovala sa osetnim gubitkom. „Razapeta između očekivanja države i straha da će na nesigurnom albanskom tlu biti izložena riziku za sopstvena sredstva, ona se povukla u pasivnost. Izvozna banka je smatrala da je samim činom otvaranja filijale u Tirani ispunila obavezu prema državi. Subvencionirana od države i pod njenim pokroviteljstvom, ona nije pokazivala želju da samostalno posluje, već je očekivala da inicijativa potekne od jugoslovenske vlade“ [S. Mišić, 125-145]. Sa druge strane, jugoslovenski zvaničnici su očekivali da će filijala preuzeti inicijativu za oživljavanje i proširivanje obima poslova. Nesklad koji se na taj način stvorio između onoga što je banka smatrala svojim poslom i onoga što je vlada od nje očekivala, vremenom je postajao sve veći. Na to su se nadovezivali i problemi koje je filijala imala sa proitalijanski orjentisanom Albanskom narodnom bankom, koja je zahvaljujući mreži svojih filijala uspevala da za sebe veže značajni deo albanske privredne elite, a onima koji su bili zainteresovani za saradnju sa filijalom

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of Serbia and a Member of the Parliament on behalf of the Democratic Party, was appointed Vice-President of the Board of Directors.

This was actually all part of the shrewdly hushed-up potential scandal concerning the business ran by Steva Vuco, the son-in-law of Aca N. Z. Popovic. Namely, as the son of Djordje Vuco, former member of the Board of Directors, after the World War I Steva Vuco took over his father’s leather trade, and somewhat later, in 1924 opened a tannery in Zemun, together with Djoka Tanaskovic (son of the former Management member Steva Tanaskovic). At first, the factory operated with success, but due to the fact that not much attention was paid to the taken loans, especially the ones extended by Export Bank, the loan kept increasing year by year. Thus in 1928, at the brink of economic crisis, this factory’s debt amounted to 8 million dinars, with 12% interest. Under the pressure of its shareholders, and after the replacement of its top management, the Bank was forced to demand the company “Djordje Vuco” and the factory owned by Steva Vuco and Djoka Tanaskovic to return the borrowed funds. Given that they were not able to do so, the entire immovable property of all four sons of Djordje Vuco was foreclosed, whereby the bank’s debt was repaid [M. Kostic, 61-62]. In 1931, at the initiative of the new management, Aca N. Z. Popovic was appointed the lifelong honorary President of Export Bank. One year later Dr Vlada Markovic completely retired from the Bank, with the alleged and never proven one million dinar severance, which would be the topic of much interest for certain investors at the Shareholders’ Assemblies in the years to follow [Fund MTI, 1120-2104].

Establishment of the Subsidiary of Export Bank a.d. in Tirana

It was only in 1934 that the Bank gained new professional momentum, when the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in order to intensify political and economic ties with Albania, decided to financially support the opening of a domestic subsidiary in Tirana. Due to excellent political ties of the new management of Export Bank, in particular of the former diplomat Ljubomir Mihailovic and one of the richest Serbian

exporters Ljubomir Starcevic, along with some members of the Government, the choice fell on this Bank [Fund MTI, 1120-2104]. In addition to the basic financial and commercial functions, the Bank was faced with some important political tasks. Given that each commercial activity of Yugoslavia in Albania was typically motivated by political reasons, the Bank was supposed to act as the intermediary for accomplishing the Government’s foreign policy interests and be the centre for gathering of that part of the Albanian economic and political elite which had amicable inclinations towards Yugoslavia, all with the aim of weakening the Italian influence in this region. In return, the Government guaranteed the Bank to be protected from potential losses and any business risk [S. Misic, 125-145]. By means of a special agreement as of 24 April 1934, it committed to opening a loan per current account with the Postal Savings Bank, in the amount of 8 million dinars, in the name of the new subsidiary, along with two million dinars for overhead expenses in 500 thousand dinar tranches [Fund EB, 152-2]. This agreement had some serious drawbacks, given that it did not cover the issue of lending operations; credit models that might be applied in Albania; the types of operations that the subsidiary had to do and was actually able to do, or who was to bear the risks of the subsidiary’s operations and to which extent. All these issues were underlined by the bank’s shareholders when, in February 1935, at the Shareholders’ Assembly, they were introduced to the details of the agreement. Special attention was drawn to the non-regulated relationship with other participants in this political and economic venture with Albania, like the Privileged Institute a.d. for Export of Agricultural Products (abbr. Prizad) [Fund MTI, 1120-2104]. The warnings were, however, given too late. Already on 6 May 1934, Export Bank ceremonially opened its subsidiary in a grandiose building in the centre of Tirana.

The main problem that this subsidiary had to face at the very beginning of its operations was the complete standstill in trading exchange between Albania and Yugoslavia. Given that export-import transactions were the main precondition for its operation, the subsidiary, rigidly abiding by its agreement with the Government, did not consider it its duty to

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Izvozne banke stvarala je ozbiljne smetnje u radu. Uz već postojeće probleme, baš u toj prvoj godini rada filijale došla je i tragedija koja je obezglavila jugoslovensku državu. Atentat na kralja Aleksandra u Marseju, oktobra 1934. godine, bio je samo početak potpune defanzive Jugoslavije, naročito u Albaniji. Stoga ne čudi što su jugoslovenske vlasti iskoristile pravo predviđeno sporazumom od 24. aprila 1934. godine i već u februaru 1935. otkazali ugovor sa Izvoznom bankom [Fond MTI, 1120-2104]. Ona je ipak nastavila da radi, a sa državom je ponovo potpisala sporazum u decembru 1935. godine. Da bi motivisala filijalu da se više angažuje, država je predvidela i posebne novčane nadoknade od 100 hiljada dinara. Međutim, i pored svih nastojanja da razvije poslove, filijala Izvozne banke nije više nije imala nikakvih šansi u Albaniji. Tokom 1936. godine potpisano je čak dvanaest sporazuma ekonomsko-finansijske prirode između Albanije i Italije, koji su rezultirali osnivanjem novih banaka sa italijanskim kapitalom i razgranjavanjem mreža filijala postojećih italijanskih banaka. Svoje šaltere je definitivno zatvorila polovinom 1939. godine u vreme kada je Albanija, nakon italijanske okupacije, već izgubila sve atribute nezavisnosti [S. Mišić, 125-145].

Slični scenario desio se i Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, dve godine kasnije. Uprava Izvozne banke na čelu sa Ljubomirom Saračevićem kao predsednikom i ono malo preostalih akcionara, trudila se da tokom tih ratnih godina makar provizorno održi nekakav privid rada. Pojedine članove Uprave, uključujući i samog Saračevića, to će stajati zatvora nakon završetka rata i dolaska socijalističkih vlasti. Što se tiče sudbine same banke, ona je po naređenju novih vlasti 11. novembra 1946. godine bila spojena sa Beogradskom zadrugom, Jadransko-podunavskom bankom i Beogradskom trgovačkom bankom, u novu Jugoslovensku izvoznu i kreditnu banku a.d. koja je i u novom političko-ekonomskom poretku nastavila da radi na sakupljanju slobodnih novčanih sredstva, da kreditira privredu, naročito njen društveni sektor i da obavlja izvoz i uvoz državi i društvu neophodnih proizvoda.

Literatura:

Knjige i članci / Books and academic articles1. Aleksić, Vesna S, Banka i Moć, Socijalno-

finansijska istorija Opšteg jugoslovenskog bankarskog društva a.d. 1928-1945, Stubovi kulture, Beograd, 2002.

2. Bajkić, Velimir, Naše bankarstvo, u: "Letopis Matice Srpske", knj. 313, Novi Sad, 1927, 219-220.

3. Bićanić, Rudolf, Ekonomske promjene u Hrvatskoj izazvane stvaranjem Jugoslavije 1918, u: "Prilozi za ekonomsku povijest Hrvatske", Zagreb, 1967.

4. Mišić, Dušan, Pregled jugoslovenskog novčarstva i bankarstva, u: "Nova Evropa", god. 1923, Zagreb, 1923, 347.

5. Kostić M. Milivoje, Uspon Beograda I, Beograd, 1994, str. 61-62

6. Mišić, Saša, Filijala Izvozne banke u Tirani 1934. godine, u: “Tokovi istorije”, Časopis Instituta za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1-2/2006, Beograd, 2006, 125-145.

7. Petranović, Branko, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918 - 1941, Prva knjiga, Beograd, 1988.

Neautorizovana izdanja / Non-copyrighted publications1. Jugoslovenski Kompas, Financijalni dio 1919,

1920, Zagreb, 1921, 141, 344;2. Analiza bilansa, „Narodno blagostanje“, god.

II, br. 4, Beograd, 1930, 24

Izvori / Sources1. Arhiv Jugoslavije, Fond Ministarstva

trgovine i industrije (65) [Fond MTI, 1120-2104]

2. Arhiv Jugoslavije, Fond Izvozne banke a. d. (152) [Fond IB, 152-2]

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conduct any trading transactions by itself, but instead believed that it should indirectly, by means of payment transactions, enable easier trade between two countries. Simultaneously, the procurement of necessary foreign exchange proved to be a huge problem in the course of its operations. The subsidiary had to buy foreign exchange at the black market at a considerably higher rate, and to sell them based on the so-called Zurich parity, i.e. 10% cheaper. In order to avoid the losses occurring due to the rate differential, the subsidiary addressed both its head office in Belgrade and the Ministry of Finance, proposing a draft of money clearing between the two countries, which would regulate cash transfers. Although the Bank’s head office accepted this proposal, the Minister of Finance rejected it, hence the problem of raising finance and regulation of payment transactions remained unsolved until the end of 1934. This is why it should not come as a surprise that in the first calendar year this subsidiary achieved no considerable results, and it even turned out to have operated with substantial losses. “Torn between the expectations of the Government and the fear of its funds being exposed to risks at the unsafe Albanian ground, it retreated into passivity. Export Bank believed that by the act of opening a subsidiary in Tirana itself, it fulfilled its obligation towards the Government. Subsidized by the Government and under its auspices, it exhibited no desire to operate independently, but instead expected the initiative to be launched by the Yugoslav Government” [S. Misic, 125-145]. On the other hand, the Yugoslav officials expected the subsidiary to start the initiative for revival and expansion of its scope of operations. The discrepancy thus created between what the bank considered to be its job and what the Government expected from it only increased over time. This was accompanied by the problems that the subsidiary experienced with the pro-Italian Albanian National Bank, which managed to attract a considerable part of the Albanian economic elite through its branch network, and which placed some serious stumbling blocks in the path of those expressing interest in cooperation with the Export Bank’s subsidiary. In the very first year

of the subsidiary’s operation, the already existing problems were followed by the tragedy that decapitated the Yugoslav state. The assassination of King Alexander in Marseille, in October 1934, marked the beginning of the complete defensive of Yugoslavia, especially in Albania. Therefore, it is not so surprising that the Yugoslav authorities used their right prescribed by the agreement as of 24 April 1934, and already in February 1935 terminated the agreement with Export Bank [Fund MTI, 1120-2104]. It continued its operations, nevertheless, and signed the agreement with the Government again in December 1935. In order to motivate the subsidiary to engage more, the Government envisaged special pecuniary bonuses in the amount of 100 thousand dinars. However, despite all the endeavours to develop its business, the Export Bank’s subsidiary no longer stood any chances in Albania. In 1936 there were as many as twelve agreements of economic and financial nature, signed between Albania and Italy, resulting in the establishment of new banks with Italian capital, and expansion of the network of the existing Italian banks. The subsidiary finally closed its doors in mid 1939, at the time when Albania, following the Italian occupation, already lost all the attributes of independence [S. Misic, 125-145].

Similar scenario occurred in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, two years later. The Export Bank’s management, led by Ljubomir Saracevic as President, along with the few remaining shareholders, during those war years did their best to preserve at least some appearance of work. This would cost certain members of the Management, including Saracevic himself, a prison sentence following the end of the war and the arrival of the socialist regime. As for the fate of the Bank itself, on 11 November 1946, at the order of the new authorities, it was merged with the Belgrade Cooperative, Jadransko-Podunavska Banka and Belgrade Trading Bank, into the new Yugoslav Export and Credit Bank a.d., which continued to operate in the newly-established political and economic environment, raising free monetary funds, crediting economy, in particular its social sector, and conducting export and import of the products required by the state and the society.