START DEPP Linking Preparedness Resilience &

Reponses (LPRR) Haiyan Case Study

Leyte, Philippines

Authors: Rebecca Murphy, Mark Pelling, Emma Visman &

Simone Di Vicenz

Image: Leyte post Haiyan: Reuters 2012

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Contents……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….2

Executive Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….2

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3

Context…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….....5

Disaster & Intervention………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….5

Methodology………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..7

Findings………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………10

Resilience Analysis……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..26

Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..30

Next Steps………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….31

References………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….32

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper outlines the Linking Preparedness Response and Resilience in Emergency Context (LPRR)

project’s Typhoon Haiyan case study. The Haiyan case study was a pilot for the Linking Preparedness,

Resilience and Response (LPRR) remote humanitarian research methodology. Here, Kings College

London facilitated a 4 day practical academic research training workshop for Help Age COSE in the

Philippines. The Help Age COSE team, accompanied by a local researcher from Ateneo de Manila

University went on to facilitate the research data collection. The project has three strands focusing

on; resilient informed humanitarian response, resilience informed conflict prevention and learning

and capacity building. Eight case studies of past humanitarian response interventions will be

explored in each of the focus countries.

On November 8th, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan, locally known as Typhoon Yolanda, hit the central part of

the Philippines (the Visayas Region). It was recorded as the most powerful typhoon to make landfall

killing over 6,000 people and displacing 4 million people (DEC Form 11a Phase 2 Narrative Plan

Philippines” of Help Age International).

The LPRR research team spent one week in Ormoc exploring the five core resilience principles:

community involvement, effective governance, acceptance of uncertainty, Spaces and places for

continuous learning and the existence of a high degree of social and economic equity. Data was

analysed thematically drawing out core aligning and opposing themes and perceptions around the

identified resilience variables and additional core factors.

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This case study recognises that community perception of resilience is dependent upon the context,

vulnerabilities and nuances of the community. This project recognises the term ‘community’ as a

collective group of at risk, exposed residents. For the community of Mahayag, resilience means

diversification of livelihoods, good access to information and communication systems, hard

engineering and infrastructure development and the need for legal access to land.

Major recommendations from the study suggest that a number of actions can be done before the

crises, during the immediate response and throughout the rehabilitation process to build long term

resilience. It is recommended that where possible INGO’s partner with local organisations who are

already present in high disaster risk areas. Here, the local context and vulnerabilities should be

understood, trust building with the community and local government, emergency response training

should be conducted with local partners, communication links with government, early warning and

information providers and community members and risk awareness should be built.

In the immediate response stage it has been found that filed staff and community members

recommended all NGO’s coordinating through one lead organisation, immediately integrating with

the government, ask the community want they need and what they want, train local volunteers on

the job to be emergency responders, adopt the community organising approach, conduct immediate

psycho-social trauma debrief with survivors and empower the community with cash for work

schemes and capacity building. Lastly, the rehabilitation phase is thought to be where the majority

of time can be spent reflecting upon and strengthening community resilience.

Furthermore, in reflection of Bene et al’s (2012) conceptualisation of resilience it is thought that the

Haiyan intervention and Mahayag community show clear examples of coping, stabilising and

adapting and signs of transformational resilience. This is demonstrated particularly in the elderly

person’s sector of the community. Here, the Help Age COSE intervention empowered the elders to

assert a new found power, place and purpose in the community. The community shifted from

perceiving the elders as a vulnerability to acknowledging them as having a specific capacity and role

in community resilience building. Ultimately it is thought that the Haiyan case study provides an

excellent pilot study to trial the remote research method.

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Typhoon Haiyan Intervention, Ormoc, Philippines

“We are still scared of the thunder” Community Member

1. Introduction

This case study aims to outline the strengths, challenges and recommendations shared by the

humanitarian staff, local partners, beneficiaries and other key stakeholders involved in the Typhoon

Haiyan response intervention. This paper does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the case

studies analysis of resilience building but aims to outline participants’ reflections and

recommendations. A second paper will be developed critically analysing the impact this example can

have on resilience building.

This paper is one of a collection of Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response in Emergency

Contexts (LPRR) case studies and analysis papers. LPRR is a START DEPP DfID funded 3 year,

consortium led project aimed at strengthening humanitarian programming for more resilient

communities. The consortium is led by Christian Aid and includes Action Aid, Concern Worldwide,

Help Age, Kings College London, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Saferworld and World Vision. The countries of

focus include Kenya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic Congo, Colombia, Indonesia and the

Philippines and cover a multi-risk profile. The project has three strands focusing on; resilient

informed humanitarian response, resilience informed conflict prevention and learning and capacity

building.

This report has been developed as part of the humanitarian strand which focuses on developing a

practical method for improved, resilience informed humanitarian response. In order to do this, eight

case studies of past humanitarian response interventions will be explored. Specifically this paper

focuses on Help Age and COSE’s Typhoon Haiyan Response (2013-2015).

Pilot

It is important to note that this Haiyan case study was a pilot case study for the remote LPRR

humanitarian research methodology. Methods and approaches were adapted and edited

throughout the data collection to increase the quality of research with regards to the research aims

and consortia’s requests. A final edit of the approaches will be done before taking this research

forward to the next remote case study.

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Purpose of Report

The purpose of this report is to communicate the humanitarian program strategy and the messages,

advice and perceptions coming from the disaster affected communities and the local field staff and

partners involved in the humanitarian response. Please note that this is not a comprehensive

analysis or advisory paper but makes up one of up to 10 case studies developed by the LPRR project.

A second analysis paper will be developed critically reflecting upon all of the case studies and a

practical tool for recommendations will be developed (by December 2017).

Audience

This paper is aimed the in country staff, key stakeholders and partners who supported the data

collection and the LPRR consortia. It acts as a communication tool to share all community and in

country perspectives. Every perception, thought and recommendation made throughout the data

collection is shared here. A process of critical analysis will take place in the next phase of the project.

The Context

The Philippines is one of the most disaster prone counties in the world and in 2012 had the highest

disaster mortality rate in the world (World Bank, 2011) (CNDR, 2012). The Philippines is exposed to

earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, extreme rainfall, extreme temperatures and tropical storms;

with over 20 typhoons entering the Philippines area of responsibility annually (PAGASA, 2010).

3. The Disaster

On November 8th, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan, locally known as Typhoon Yolanda, hit the central part of

the Philippines known as the Visayas Region. Typhoon Haiyan was recorded as the most powerful

typhoon to make landfall (Fishetti, 2013).

14.1 million people were affected, over 6,000 people were killed, more than 4 million people were

displaced and more than 1 million homes were either destroyed completely or damaged requiring

major repairs. Over 5.9 million workers were affected, with livelihoods destroyed or disrupted and

the total cost of damages is calculated at almost PHP 40 billion (GBP 536 million). This includes

approximately PHP 20 billion damage to infrastructure and PHP 20 billion damage to agriculture

(DEC Form 11a Phase 2 Narrative Plan Philippines” of Help Age International).

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4. The Intervention

Help Age International, along with its long term local partner, the Coalition of Services of the Elderly

(COSE) launched a 2-year intervention process addressed to provide assistance and resilience for

older people. The project aims included; rebuilding lives, livelihoods and resilience of older people,

their families and communities who were directly affected by Typhoon Haiyan. The intervention

targeted 60 barangays in Western Leyte, 40 barangays in Eastern Leyte and a further 10 barangays in

Medellin, Cebu. The intervention was divided into three phases, each of which have been mapped

out in detail on the following page:

1. Relief phase (November 2013-January 2014, 3 months):

2. Early recovery phase (February 2014 – April 2014, 3 months): The recovery support focused on

fewer impacted communities that had the least means to be able to recover alone. This lasted

for 6 months and phased into the rehabilitation phase as outlined in the table on the following

page.

3. Recovery / Rehabilitation phase (May 2014 – December 2015 – 20 months).

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Immediate Response (Relief

Phase): 3 Months

•Provision of food packs and hygiene kits ----- 8,003 beneficiaries

•Provision of shelter kits ---- 4,000 kits

•Provision of rice seeds and fertilizer - 7,930 bags of fertilizers / 5,680 bags of rice seeds

•Distribution of medicines through Mercy Malaysia ---- 15 boxes of antibiotics and generic medicines (380 kg)

•Unconditional cash transfers --- 10,225 beneficiaries

•Cash transfers for shelter repair ---6,200 beneficiaries

•Psycho social support to 1,800 patients and family members in Ormoc District hospital by COPAP leaders in partnership with Mercy Malaysia. 14 COPAP members dispatched to the affected areas

Early Recovery: 3 months

•Community needs Assessment (shelter and livelihood)

•Number of patients targeted in 12 municipalities: 1,520

•Health check-ups: 1, 645 patients reached from 39 remote barangays

•Cash transfers for shelter (additional 1, 553 beneficiaries)

•Livelihood support (cash transfer to 209 people and 291 older farmers)

•Protection and inclusion

•Cash grant for livelihood

•Provision of senior citizen’s id

•Radio program

•Provision of dynamo and solar powered radio to 650 older people

Recovery and Rehabilitation

Phase: 20 months

•Health and nutrition

•Promotion of healthy ageing, Psychosocial support for older people, Formation and development of community health volunteers, Establishment of wellness centers, Establishment of mobile health care servicess, Community health check-ups and provision of medicines, Geriatric training to local doctors and nurses, Basic life support and first aid training

•Livelihood

•Cash assistance - cash for food, cash for assets, cash for work, cash for tools, cash grant for livelihood, Diversification of livelihood activities E.G. mono-cropping, innovative farming, Training om diversified and innovative on and off farming activities, Training of model farmers, Establishment of a model farm and communal garden, Provision of OPO livelihood grants, Application of diversified and innovative livelihood activities

•Shelter

•Training the carpenters (build back better), Provision of carpentry tools and trained carpenters, Shelter construction and painting to build back better

•Protection and inclusion

•Continues Advocacy on the inclusion of older people, Establishing older persons associations, Formation of Ageing and disability task force (Adtf), Establishment of Helpdesk and training of volunteers to attend to cases of elderly abuses in the community, Support to the provision of senior citizen ids for rights entitlements, Support to the provision of Legal services, Strengthening of office of senior citizens’ affairs in 7 municipalities and strengthening of federation of senior citizens association, Community based Disaster Risk Reduction and management

Image 1: Intervention

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5. Research Methodology

This research is underpinned by Bene et al’s (2012) conceptual framework which outlines a resilient

system as one which is stable, flexible and able to cope with change. The LPRR research team spent

two weeks in Ormoc researching the Haiyan intervention.

Through Bene et al’s (2012) framework which has been integrated with the IRWG’s principles for

resilience in practice; five core resilience principles were explored:

1. Principle 1: There is community involvement, incorporating social values and appropriation

of local knowledge in resilience building projects

2. Principle 2: There is effective governance, supporting community cohesion and recognising

that resilient systems take a cross-scalar perspective

3. Principle 3: The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is accepted with

preparedness activities enabling flexibility to a range of future unexpected hazards

4. Principle 4: There are spaces and places for continuous learning

5. Principle 5: High degree of social and economic equity exists in systems. The non-equilibrium

dynamics of a system are acknowledged to support ‘bouncing forward and better’. Any

approach to building resilience should not work with an idea of restoring equilibrium

because systems do not have a stable state to which they should return after a disturbance.

5.1 Research Aims

The research aims and objectives of this case study are to show how humanitarian interventions

have been able to help enhance and not undermine the resilience of households at risk, through

disaster response and rehabilitation interventions. To map out successes, lessons learnt and

challenges and recommendations from field staff and community members.

5.2 Methods, Study Site & Sampling

Taking a triangulated approach this research adopted:

1. Semi structured interviews with key informants

2. Household interviews with community members

3. Focus group discussions with community members which included risk and resilience mapping

as the primary data collection methods.

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The case study site is located at a rural barangay called Mahayag, located just outside of Ormoc city

and has been selected by Help Age International as a good example of lessons learnt. Purposive

participant sampling was adopted in order to gain a diverse range of participants from different

sectors of the community as well as involving those who were direct beneficiaries and those who

were not.

Map 1: Mahayag in the rural outskirts of Ormoc city, Leyte Philippines Left: Map of Ormoc & Right:

Flood Risk Map of Mahayag

5.3 Data Analysis

Data has been analysed through thematic analysis, drawing out core aligning and opposing themes

and perceptions around the identified resilience variables and additional core factors. A further,

more in-depth phase of analysis will be conducted after all case studies have been captured.

5.4 Limitations

This typhoon Haiyan case study is a pilot study of the remote research methodology. It serves as an

excellent opportunity to trail the 4 day training package and data collection of the remote research

approach. Here a number of local partner staff have been trained on the theoretical foundations of

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resilience as well as the process, methods and skills of academic research and data collection. After a

three day training workshop the team were supported by a local researcher from Ateneo de Manila

University and went on to conduct the data collection themselves.

This approach is thought to serve two purposes; firstly to build the capacity of local partners and tie

into the learning and capacity building strand of the LPRR project and secondly to utilise the skills,

knowledge and the rapport that the local partners have with the community. It also provides an

excellent opportunity to capture a large range of case studies to compare and contrast. However a

number of limitations were also identified throughout this approach.

Positionality of COSE

It is thought that the position of the local partner could impact upon the data collected, answers and

depth of discussion from the participants. The local partner explained that the Filipino population

are incredibly grateful of the support they get from the NGO’s therefore rarely offer negative

feedback or criticism. Given the questions were being asked by the NGO who implemented the

intervention it is thought that a more in-depth, honest and nuanced understanding of the

communities perceptions could have been captured if the research had been undertaken by the KCL

research team, as a neutral academic body.

Timeframe in relation to Haiyan

With the research being conducted at the same time as the two year anniversary of the typhoon it

was thought that the Haiyan case study would be a good opportunity to capture the community’s

perception with the disaster, intervention and events fresh in their mind. However in reflection it

could be thought to be a limitation for a number for reasons. First, the intervention was ongoing and

had not completed therefore it could only captured part of the story. Whilst the majority of the

intervention has been implemented the partners explained that a lot more work was needed to be

done.

Furthermore in comparison to the Ketsana focus groups and interviews it was clear that the

community members were still suffering from the effects of the trauma, making the discussion more

difficult and emotive. It is thought a longer period of time had passed the discussions may have been

more objective. On the other hand it provided an excellent and rare opportunity to capture the

perceptions, insights and emotions of the community and their feelings towards the disaster,

governments and NGO’s whilst the intervention was ongoing.

Preparedness of local partner & Selection of barangay

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Finally, it is thought that the lack of preparedness of COSE prior to the training and case study served

to limit the research. The selection of the community had been chosen due to the proximity to the

office and in reflection the local partner explained that it was a poor choice of barangays and did not

fully represent the intervention and a case study which illustrated a greater level of progress

towards building back better could have been chosen. The lack of preparation allocated for focus

group and household interview participant selection limited the study. This is thought to be a

combination of the lack of time that the COSE team had and the amount of pressure they were

under as it was towards the end of their intervention and a breakdown in communication at some

point between Help Age London, Help Age-COSE Manila and COSE in Ormoc. The partner staff

explained that they feel they could have given the research more thought and time if it had been

after the intervention had been completed in January.

6. Findings

This case study’s findings are outlined below and are divided into beneficiaries’ perception of

resilience, general recommendations and the five principles of resilience set out by the LPRR project.

6.1 Mayahag Residents Perceptions and Recommendations

First, the community’s perception of resilience has been explored through a community mapping

exercise. Communities’ perception of resilience is dependent on the nuances of the context. For the

residents of Mahayag resilience means diversified livelihoods, preparedness, land ownership, access

to information, hard engineering and external support from the government and INGO’s. During the

FGD’s the participants mapped out what they felt their community would look like if it was resilient.

A number of core resilience building themes were drawn upon by the community. Map 1 illustrates

the community’s idea of resilience.

Diversified livelihoods

First, the community focused on the importance of diversified livelihoods. The idea of an expanded

community garden was proposed, including root crops which were less likely to be destroyed in a

storm. Secondly, a pineapple farm was proposed to replace the loss of the coconut farm and the

development of a tourism office, complete with a villa near the lake was discussed. Pineapples were

chosen as a favoured livelihood as they take a shorter amount of time to produce in comparison to

coconut farms, yet are thought to be able to deliver a similar amount of profitable return that the

coconuts were providing pre-Haiyan and the community felt that there would be strong market

appeal for a new pineapple farm.

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Information & Communication

The community also acknowledge the importance of good access to information and communication

systems. The need for a reliable internet WI-FI connection was highlighted, this would allow the

community to create a website where weather warnings could be posted and the tourism villa could

be advertised. This would enable access to information and support the community’s advocacy

work which would lobby for more frequent and accessible weather updates and weather warnings

to be shared via the radio and internet. Once regular data could be accessed the community would

assign a team who would be in charge of keeping up to date with information, sharing information

and running early warning systems.

Preparedness

The community also outlined the importance of preparedness and capacity building for

strengthening resilience. It is strongly felt that trainings on both preparedness and response could

significantly enhance resilience. The community mapped out the need for a rescue team so that they

could ensure emergency first responders were at hand and in the community all the time. Here,

older people would be buddied up with a specific member of the rescue team so that they knew

they would be looked after if a disaster hit.

Hard Engineering & Infrastructure

Hard engineering and infrastructure development has also been highlighted as an integral part of

making the community resilient.

The participants explained that they would need:

1. A reinforced, well equipped evacuation centre

2. Strategically constructed bridges so they could cross the community in times of flooding

3. Riprap (stone) reinforced flood dyke to protect them

4. Paved roads so emergency services and aid could reach them

5. Concrete, multi-story houses to keep them safe a sheltered from storms.

Water Resources & Health Services

The community also highlight the need for a water tank to provide the community with a reliable

water source, working latrines, and a well-equipped health centre which would include a birthing

suit and a four wheel drive to be able to transport patients to the hospital.

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Independent yet connected

Lastly, the community feel that for them to be resilient they would need to be independent with

their own local community high school and a local super market. However, they would also be

connected to a support system of NGO’s, INGO’s and government offices where they could draw

support and advice from. Interestingly, the community explained that for them resilience would

mean that the INGO’s never left them but were always in contact in the background and ready to

support. The community explained how they trusted the INGOs and felt safe when they are present.

Land Rights & Ownership

Lastly, the community explained that one of the root causes that they feel (re)enforces vulnerability

and prevents resilience from being built is the fact that they are not the land owners. The

community rent the land that they have built their houses on from a very wealthy, local land owner.

The community feel that if they were able to legally own a plot of land together, then they would

feel more resilient and independent.

Image 2: The Community’s Future Resilient Mahayag Map

7. 8 Resilience Principles Findings

Next, the project staff, partners and local government officials involved in the project were

interviewed. Here, each participant have explained the crises and intervention, explored and

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critiqued each of the five resilience principle’s and mapped out core recommendations for

developing an intervention which could contribute towards longer term resilience building within

the Haiyan intervention.

Principle 1: There is community involvement, incorporating social values and

appropriation of local knowledge in resilience building projects

“We know we can’t dictate what the community should do. We always

consult the people” (Field Staff)

“I can very confidently say we engaged with a wide range of people in

the community” (Field Staff)

Field staff explained that in the first days of the response phase, whilst they are aware of the

importance and power of participation, they were unable to ask the community what they wanted.

The scale of the disaster meant that whilst they worked with the local government to collect local

knowledge and coordinate efforts they were unable to ask the community what they wanted as they

had to take the lead and deliver timely relief to meet immediate needs. This was a trade-off decision

that had to be made.

The devastation that Typhoon Haiyan created meant that everyone in the community needed

immediate relief. Therefore a blanket relief distribution was conducted for the whole community.

However field staff felt that the participation and cooperation of the local government and the

amount of local information they provided served to support and strengthen Help Age COSE’s

intervention.

On the other-hand, the early recovery and rehabilitation phase provided the space for community

participation. Participants explained that a wide, diverse range of community members actively

engaged in the design of the recovery and rehabilitation project. Here, the community helped to

identify how they felt their community should bounce back. Both local knowledge and social values

were drawn upon throughout this phase. For example, the project prioritised rebuilding the

community chapel which the community had requested. Additionally, local knowledge was collected

through a Hazard Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (HVCA) process and there was already a

community Old People’s Association (OPA) in place which significantly enhanced the level and

quality of participation. Here, the community helped to identify who was most vulnerable and in

need of support. The community explained that this approach empowered them and made them

feel respected and in control.

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“The people are curious they want to be involved together. Even

younger members are active now they help each other and help out

too. They are more aware, they are more united. They created an

elderly persons organisation so much more united in an organisation

together” (Community Member).

The intervention focused on the elderly in the community. The older people were amazed as it was

the first time that they had experienced an intervention that focused specifically on their needs.

Additionally, the project engaged the rest of the community and drew upon the social value of a

deep level of respect for elders. The project encouraged youth volunteers to support the elderly and

provide assistance and company to those living alone, whilst learning local traditional knowledge

and oral histories from the community elders. As further discussed in principle two it is thought that

this also strengthened community cohesion and inclusion.

The project also involved a number of local businesses and private sector partners which offered

support and assistance. For example, the coconut farm cooperation offered loans and a local land

owner donated a large amount of money to help the community rebuild their houses.

“The empowerment aspects are very, very strong” Field Staff

When asked participants to rank the intervention’s effectiveness in implementing principle 1 into

the intervention’s phases; participants gave the emergency response phase a score of 2 out of 5 and

the rehabilitation phase a 4 out of 5 for participation. This is thought to show how participation

strengthened throughout the intervention over time.

Recommendations

In reflection of this, field staff and local community members made a number of recommendations.

First, before the crises get advance knowledge on the community from local partners; understand

the context and identify who is the most vulnerable, what the risks are and how to offer

preparedness support.

Secondly, coordinate more efficiently between donors, other INGO’s, local partners, the target

communities and the local and district government to ensure better combined efforts. It is

recommended that one NGO should lead all other NGOs in the community / area so that there is no

duplication.

Ensure both local and municipal levels of government are involved in the project design. The

government are the permanent structures in the community so should be involved from the offset.

Ensure the intervention is able to allocate a small portion of flexible funding in case something

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unexpected comes up along the way. Train local volunteers and local partners to ensure the

intervention has the capacity to carry on even after the INGO has left the community.

Where possible work in the area before a disaster and integrate the Community Organising Method.

It was clear that the community felt that participation was high and effective in the recovery and

rehabilitation phase because the community already had established a strong Older Persons

Association.

Principle 2: There is effective governance, supporting community cohesion and

recognising that resilient systems take a cross-scalar perspective

We are more prepared now. When typhoon Ruby came everyone

evacuated. It was not that strong but we stayed, all together in the

school. We were all together so we felt safe” (Community Member)

Secondly, participants reflected on the interventions’ links and impact on governance and

community cohesion at different scales. Participants feel that community cohesion was

strengthened when typhoon Haiyan hit and the intervention began. When the typhoon hit, everyone

came together, shared food and looked after one another. Participants feel that the intervention

specifically utilized and strengthened this community cohesion. This could be seen particularly in the

youth; the community explained that “the youth are now very involved in the community, whereas

before they were a nuisance and getting in trouble” (Community member).

The community feel that they slowly became more empowered throughout the response, recovery

and rehabilitation; they became more aware of their rights and how to organise and run their own

community. This was enhanced through the capacity building training sessions run by the

intervention. Therefore community governance and leadership is felt to have strengthened.

“Before they (older persons) were very lonely and isolated, especially

those without family, now they say they feel useful, values and part of

the community” (Field staff).

Specifically the elderly persons in the community feel strongly that their own community cohesion

had increased. Older people were now included in the community, the Older People’s Association

(OPA) registered their birthdays and ensured they received a community birthday present, the older

persons became a community in themselves and developed their own support system.

“I trust the barangay office that they will know what to do if there is

another one” (Community Member)

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Secondly, communication links were bridged between the local government and community. This

began when the typhoon hit. Community members explained that the barangay officer made sure

everyone was okay, had the community’s basic needs met and then put together a list of the most

vulnerable for the NGOs. A relationship between the people and government began to grow; the

government began to understand the community’s vulnerabilities, capacities and needs; specifically

the needs of the elderly. In turn, the community began to build confidence in communicating what

they wanted and expected from the government.

For example an interview with the barangay officer explained that he did not know most of the

community before the typhoon. Typhoon Haiyan meant that the barangay officer built a relationship

with the people; he built rapport and understanding, got to know everyone and worked together

with the community to figure out how the local government can better support the community. In

direct response to this, the community explained that they now trust the barangay officer to know

what to do if another disaster hit the community and trusted the local government that they would

be looked after if so. In reflection of the impact and focus the intervention had on principle 2, field

officers scored the immediate response as 1 out of 5 and 4 out of 5 for the rehabilitation phase for

strengthening community cohesion and governance.

Recommendations

The community and field staff went on to make a number of recommendations to strengthen the

intervention’s focus on community cohesion and good governance.

Government involvement

Again, a greater level of government involvement from the offset is recommended, including

agreeing a MOU between NGOs and local government to work together or through them when a

disaster strikes. In order to simplify this it was also recommended that the government identify one

focal point for NGO’s to connect and communicate with and work through when a disaster strikes.

Participants also recommend that the intervention should ensure it has a strong understanding of

relevant legislations and advocate for them to be put into practice such as the DRRM (2010)

legislation and the fact that 1% of local government funds should be specifically allocated to elderly

persons.

In addition participants request leadership training and capacity building for both community leaders

and the local government officials before a disaster strikes. The local government also request

capacity building around how they can communicate effectively and confidently with the national

government on what their community needs. Lastly, the community recommend that the local

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government should communicated more clearly about what they are doing in the community, how

they are preparing and building resilience and what was happening at the municipal and national

level too. The community request ongoing capacity building on how to advocate for, lobby and

negotiate rights, and draft proposals and community action plans.

Principle 3: The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is accepted with

preparedness activities enabling flexibility to a range of future unexpected hazards

We are more prepared now. When typhoon Ruby came everyone

evacuated. It was not that strong but we stayed, all together in the

school. We were all together so we felt safe” (Community Member)

It was clear that the community feel that Typhoon Haiyan was a wakeup call to the risks and

uncertainties that they were exposed to. The community and field staff explained that Haiyan made

DRR a new priority, disaster and climate information was and is now taken extremely seriously and a

new level of awareness around the severity and uncertainty of future risks is understood. The

community explained that they are impressed with the government who increased the amount of

information they were receiving and advocated for the idea that it is everyone’s responsibility to be

aware and prepare.

Image: Government Recovery Intervention

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Awareness & Risk Perceptions

Participants outline that before Haiyan, it was very challenging to convince the community to go to

the evacuation centres. A number of participants explained that they did not have any warning

about Haiyan and the few that did hear a warning were unaware of how bad it was going to be and

unaware of what to do with the information or where to evacuate to. Therefore very few people

evacuated to safe spots. Furthermore, participants explained that before Haiyan even if the

community had a EWS, no one would listen to it or believe it.

Now all weather warnings are taken very seriously and everyone knows what to do. This was seen

when typhoon Ruby hit in 2015, the communities effectively put into practice their preparedness

and response training. Participants explained that they are aware they need to ensure that this high

level of risk perception is sustained in the future.

“Some communities have done excellent things. We would like other

communities to learn from them” (Field Officer)

Preparedness

Furthermore participants outlined that preparedness was already a focus in the community but this

was geared towards small scale Habagat rains not typhoons the scale of Haiyan. The shock of Haiyan

has created an eagerness from the community to learn about risk and preparedness. “The

community initiated their own preparedness before any capacity building such as making their own

evacuation centres because it would be hard to leave their farms, but some would come down here.

They build their underground shelter where water cannot get in but the whole family can be

accommodated” (Field staff).

Before Haiyan hit, it was thought that people were aware of risks but it was superficial as nothing

was done. Now the community has a risk map, a contingency plan and an Early Warning System.

They are trained on emergency response; they know what to do, where to get information from and

how to prepare their households. This has made the community feel empowered, in control and

safer. In reflection of this, field staff gave the intervention a score of 2 out of 5 for the response

phase and 4 out of 5 for the rehabilitation phase’s focus on the community understanding and

acceptance of uncertainty and change in risk.

Recommendations

Community members and field staff went on to make a number of recommendations for how the

intervention could have strengthened the preparedness and the awareness of uncertain risks.

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A regular channel of information should be established between PAGASA and the community is

needed. There needs to be appointed people in the community who are responsible for keeping up

to date with information and sharing it with the entire community. Solar powered radios and

internet access could support this and the community recommended creating informational posters

regularly to inform the community.

More training and capacity building on household preparedness was recommended. Participants felt

that this should have been done at a greater scale as soon as the recovery phase began. Next,

organise the community and ensure everyone knows their role and responsibility before, during and

after a disaster. Teach everyone how to prepare before a storm, enable households to construct

mini household typhoon shelters. Apply for local government funding so that the community can

continue what they are doing even if the INGO is no longer present in the community. Lastly,

participants feel that there is a need to advocate for the government to put the 2010 DRRM

legislation fully into practice.

Principle 4: There are spaces and places for continuous learning

Next, the availability of spaces and places for learning at different phases of the intervention was

explored. Based on the understanding that resilience can only be built and maintained if effective

spaces and places for learning are established, participants reflected on the opportunities that they

had to reflect and learn throughout the intervention.

Before the intervention there was thought to be no formal place or space to reflect and learn

together. It was clear that creating these spaces and placed for learning was a key aspect of the

intervention. The community and field staff explained that apart from the immediate response, the

intervention provided lots of learning opportunities. Regular COSE seminars, trainings and

workshops provided formal places to learn and reflect. Furthermore initiatives such as the

communal garden provide an informal place and space to talk, reflect and share knowledge.

Participants explained that often this was where many problems and issues were discussed, shared

and solved and where community members found comfort, reassurance and friendship.

As the rehabilitation phase developed; child friendly spaces were created for children to learn whilst

the school was being rebuild, monthly Older People’s Association (OPA) meetings were conducted

and regular psycho-social support sessions were run to provide support, increase understanding and

deal with post Haiyan trauma. Furthermore participants explained that lots of learning is still being

done through the forums and spaces created by the intervention. In reflection of this the field staff

scored the project at a 0 for creating spaces and places for learning in the immediate response as

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this was not a focus whilst meeting basic needs and a 4 for the rehabilitation phase where it became

central to the intervention.

Recommendations

In reflection of the success of this focus on learning, a number of recommendations were made by

the participants. It is thought that the youth provide an excellent opportunity for learning and

capacity building. Getting the youth involved is thought to be a crucial community capacity that can

be harnessed. The youth have both the energy and time to commit to learning and represent the

next generation which has the potential to bring transformational change.

Equally the elders in the community are also highlighted as key participants for learning and capacity

building. Bringing together the older generation and the youth was highlighted as an innovation

which could empower and inform. Here, local, traditional knowledge can be shared by the elders

and passed on to the youth and can provide the energy for Disaster Risk Reduction and

companionship to the elders.

It is important to support the elders to ensure they have the information and a space and place to

share information and learn. Encourage regular meetings as this will empower both the older

generation and the young people. It will give them a purpose, a role and sense of belonging in their

community.

Cross-sector and community learning is also recommended with other communities and the local

government. It is felt barangay officers should have quarterly meetings with the community to share

information. Primarily, the community garden was highlighted as an excellent place for learning.

Lastly, the importance of awareness raising, capacity building and information sharing about psycho-

social support was highlighted. It is felt that training for volunteers and the survivors suffering from

trauma and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is incredibly important and often overlooked.

Ultimately resilience can never be effectively built if the underlying trauma and psychological and

emotional issues created by a disaster are not addressed.

Principle 5: A high degree of social and economic equity exists in systems. The non-

equilibrium dynamics of a system are acknowledged to support ‘bouncing forward and better’.

“Life is worse now. Before Yolanda the community had a good life with

many crops. After Yolanda things are worse, they are yet to bounce

back fully let alone better. We need more livelihoods there after the

coconut trees have been destroyed”. (Community Member)

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Still Stabilising

Participants explained that because of the timeframe (just two years after Haiyan) the community

has not yet bounced back but are still stabilising themselves. Participants explained that the

intervention has not been 100% successful in this.

It is thought that this is because different people in the community responded to the intervention in

different ways. Some embraced it to build resilience but others did not. However participants feel

that there is still hope due to the fact that the loan scheme is ongoing and psychological and moral

issues are being tackled.

Life was better before Haiyan

“Some people found it harder to bounce back. We could have done

better on this” (Field Staff)

A number of participants explained that life was much better before Haiyan and that they have not

yet been able to get their quality of life back to how it was before the disaster. Specifically the loss of

the coconut farms was the biggest long term damage to the community. The coconut trees take 10

years to fully mature and that the alternative livelihoods introduced by COSE were felt to have not

yet managed to be as successful as coconut farming was.

Inequality

Participants explained that those who had family overseas could send them money to rebuild their

homes, thus making them more resilient. This highlights the importance of social capital, family

connections and economic inequality in the community.

Furthermore, the rehabilitation phase of the project was specifically focused on the most vulnerable;

in this case the elderly peoples in the community. The local partner recognised the scale and

capacity of their organisation and felt that they could only do so much. Help Age COSE explained

how they focused in the most vulnerable, marginalised and excluded part of the community; the

elderly. They recognised the non- equilibrium dynamics and focuses its efforts on building the most

vulnerable up; the elderly, to strengthen resilience and bounce back better. This is still is still thought

to be in progress and will take time and ongoing work from the community and local partner.

Potential to bounce back better

However participants explained that a number of initiatives did show potential for the community to

bounce back better. First, it is felt that the capacity building around risk awareness, Disaster Risk

Reduction and vulnerability conducted with the government served to significantly strengthen local

governance in the barangay. Secondly, livelihoods were diversified so community members were no

-Page 23-

longer entirely reliant on one source of income. The construction of the community health care

centre has addressed a welfare gap that the government were unable to address and capacity

building around typhoon resilient construction, along with cash transferred empowered community

members and provided them the opportunity to re-build their houses better.

Hope & Empowerment

“We lost our hope when Yolanda hit” (Community Member)

“Psycho social support is an essential area of learning and capacity

building our staff, volunteers and communities still need.

Understanding what trauma is and how to deal with it needs to

happen before an individual can think about building their resilience.

You need to bring them back first.” (Field officer)

Lastly, participants outlined that there is a divide in the community; some say that eventually the

intervention will have provided enough support to build back better, however others explain that

life was much better before Haiyan and feel like they have lost hope. Field staff explained that this

concept of hope is extremely important. A loss of hope demotivates and disempowers. Those who

feel they do not have a better quality of life to look forward to can be more resistant to work with

local partners to better themselves. Participants explain that this feeling of hopelessness can often

be linked to the trauma of the disaster which is something critical that requires psycho-social

support to address.

Field officers have given the intervention a score of 1 out of 5 for the response phase and 3 out of 5

for the rehabilitation phase for addressing the underlying inequalities and bouncing back better.

Image: Community Members explain they have not yet bounced back

-Page 24-

Recommendations

In reflection of this, a number of recommendations were made by participants to strengthen

interventions’ attempt to tackle inequality and build communities back better. First, include local

knowledge and help the community to develop long term plans. Empower the community with

capacity building, training and cash transfer or cash for work schemes.

Include the government from the offset and hand responsibility over to the government after the

immediate response so that the government takes responsibility for the recovery and rehabilitation

of the community. Lastly, create and maintain community hope, map out a vision and hope for the

future and empower the community to believe a better quality of life is achievable. Ensure enough

psycho-social support is provided to address trauma and loss of hope.

8. Challenges

In reflection of all of these findings and recommendations, participants mapped out what they feel

the biggest challenges were with regards to developing and implementing a humanitarian response

which can effectively strengthen community resilience.

1. The short term nature of the funding. It is felt that 2 years is not strong enough to fully recover

the community from such a large scale disaster, let alone build back better or transform way of

life to be more resilient.

2. Donor restrictions. It is felt that donors need to understand that humanitarian response

interventions are fast paced and what is developed in an initial proposal immediately after the

disaster may not be the highest priority at month two or three. Situations change rapidly in

these contexts and we should not be limited or constrained by keeping to what we initially

planned. We should be allowed the flexibility to learn as we conduct the intervention, reflect

and adapt what we are doing.

3. Lack of local partner emergency response training or experience. It was COSE’s first time

managing a large scale humanitarian response so it was a major challenge. Field staff feel that

they had a lack of expertise and experience because our work is usually on community

organising and advocacy. The COSE team explained that they were unfamiliar with the process

of humanitarian response which was thought to lead to delays and times where COSE proposals

did not match the communities’ views or desires.

4. Human resources & challenges with volunteers. Additionally, field staff explained that they had

huge challenges with their volunteers doing needs assessments. Due to the scale of the disaster

they did not have the capacity to do all the assessments themselves so employed volunteers to

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do so. However, often the volunteers would get tired and instead of visiting everyone and seeing

where the houses where and who was elderly and living alone, they would sit outside the

barangay officers house and ask the local government instead.

5. Local Government. Participants feel that the local government became a significant challenge to

manage. The government approach to planning is used to dealing with just one person making

decisions; they do not have the capacity skills or patience to work together and effectively

implement a joint effort. It is thought that politicians would favour their supporters as appose to

focusing on the most vulnerable.

6. High staff turnover. The high turnover of staff due to larger INGO’s offering better salaries was a

significant challenge. A number of staff were trained by Help Age COSE but then moved to bigger

organisations. A lack of staff meant that the Help Age COSE team were overstretched.

7. The weather. The weather made logistics and access to communities extremely challenging.

8. The local market became a significant challenge for community members. The intervention

facilitated a loan scheme for farmers to start replanting their crops; however traders began

dictating the price on this newfound demand.

9. Jealousy. Some elderly persons became unhappy, upset and jealous that they were not selected

for COSE support. Effective communication and needs based justification needed to be

implemented.

10. Trauma. Lastly, it is felt that some people had not got over the disaster. A large proportion of

the community showed signs of trauma, where unmotivated and had lost hope for a better

future.

9. General Recommendations

Finally a number of general recommendations were made by participants such as:

1. Ensure local organisations are trained on emergency response and have the right tools to assess

the community and the right human resources to do the assessment.

2. Raise awareness.

3. Ask the community what they want.

4. Ensure that the intervention includes financial support such as cash transfers or cash for work.

5. Adopt the community organising approach and ensure a community committee is developed.

6. Work with and through the local government and link into their bottom up funding.

7. Develop basic infrastructure such as roads for emergency services to be able to access

communities

8. Empower the community to feel independent, hopeful and in control of decision making.

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Box 1 Recommendations for Resilient Informed Humanitarian Response

Immediate Response Phase Recovery & Rehabilitation

Phase

1. Get advance knowledge on the community from

local partners; understand the context, identify

who is the most vulnerable, what the risks are and

how to offer preparedness

2. Ensure local partners have been trained in

emergency response

3. Develop basic infrastructure; roads, medical

centres, early warning systems and evacuation

centres

4. Set up the community organising approach.

Organise the community and ensure everyone

knows their role and responsibility before, during

and after a disaster.

5. Conduct preparedness training and set up an

EWS

6. Bridge communication links between community

and local government

7. Bridge communication links between community

and PAGASA

8. Provide leadership training for community

leaders and government officials

9. Build a relationship with the local government

and develop a disaster MOU beforehand

10. Raise awareness of and tie interventions into

legislations such as the 2010 DRRM legislation

11. Bring together the older generation and the

youth and do capacity building together to

empower and inform.

1. Coordinate more efficiently between donors,

other INGO’s, local partners, the target

communities and the local and district

government to ensure better combined efforts.

It is recommended that one NGO should lead all

other NGOs in the community / area so that

there is no duplication.

2. Include both local and municipal levels of

government from the offset

3. Ask the community what they want.

4. Train local volunteers and local partners on the

job from the offset

5. Adopt the Community Organising Approach

6. Immediately implement psycho-social support

to address grief and trauma

7. Empower the community with capacity

building, training and cash transfer or cash for

work schemes.

8. Do immediate psycho social trauma debrief

with community

1. Continue to raise awareness of and tie

interventions into legislations such as the

2010 DRRM legislation

2. Train the community on local

government advocacy and the local

government on national government

advocacy

3. Integrate the rehabilitation into a

government bottom up funding scheme

4. Continue with ongoing psycho-social

support for trauma and grief

5. Include local knowledge and help the

community develop long term plans.

6. Ensure psycho-social support is a

prominent aspect of the project embedded

in and aligned to culture (in this case though

faith platforms)

Before the Crises

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8. Resilience Critical Reflections

Bene et al’s (2012)’s conceptual framework outlines a resilient system as one which is stable, flexible

and able to cope with change. Community resilience is underpinned by collective action, community

cohesion, good leadership and support (Bene et al, 2012). Here, resilient systems and communities

are absorptive, adaptive and transformative. They are able to withstand shocks, adapt to and

transform with change. Table 3 (below) maps out the activities and actions that could be thought to

illustrate signs of absorbing and coping with shock, adapting to risk and transforming to build

resilience.

Absorb Adapt Transform

Community cohesion – rallying together to cope

Sharing food, shelter, look after each other’s children, checking everyone was safe, starting house repairs together.

Wider support network – government, local NGO’s.

Changed livelihoods

Learnt how to prepare, how to communicate with government and advocate for their needs effectively

Success story – next typhoon Ruby, the new risk perception and actions

Elderly people were now included in community, empowered, looked after and recognised as having a role and capacity in society.

This section aims to discuss the five resilience principles mapped out in the methodology have been

drawn upon to understand the nuances and complexities of the community and the stages of the

intervention.

Principle 1: There is community involvement, incorporating social values and

appropriation of local knowledge in resilience building projects

Reflection on the findings it is felt that with regards to principle 1, the response phase of the project

focused primarily on stabilising the community and rapidly meeting basic needs for coping. Field

officers explained that due to the fast paced nature of the response they were unable to effectively

engage with the community. They did however gather local knowledge from the local government.

The rehabilitation phase on the other hand does show clear signs of both adaptation and

transformation. The recovery and rehabilitation phases of the intervention focused heavily on

participation to incorporate local knowledge and social values. If analysing the community as a

whole one could plot the scale of resilience to be around the adaptation mark. The community

increased their risk awareness, knowledge and understanding of risk and preparedness. They

decided how they would like to diversify their livelihoods and actively engaged with COSE to guide

the intervention.

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However, if focusing directly on the elderly persons in the community it could be argued that this

high level of participation and involvement in the intervention created opportunities for

transformational resilience to develop. The elders explained that it was the first intervention that

focused on their needs; through this high level of engagement they felt they built their confidence,

increased their knowledge and awareness, had the chance to share their local knowledge, were able

to be seen in the community as having their own capacities, value and purpose.

The elders were empowered, newly respected and reintegrated into community life. It is thought

that tackling and overcoming the community perception that elders are vulnerable and unable to

contribute to community; Disaster Risk Reduction and resilience building helped elders to transform

their individual resilience and contributed towards transforming the community’s resilience as a

whole.

Principle 2 Effective governance, supporting community cohesion and recognising

that resilient systems take a cross-scalar perspective

Secondly it is felt that the disaster and intervention increased community cohesion and governance

and acknowledged and raised awareness of the need to take a cross scalar approach to building

resilience. Again, it was clear that the immediate response phase focused primarily on stabilising the

community and helping them cope by meeting immediate needs. The community explained that

they felt they adapted well as they came together, supported and looked after one another from the

offset. They build social capital, community cohesion and developed relationships, networks and

support systems that they could fall back on; from community organising committees to the

livelihoods cooperatives that were offering loans.

The intervention engaged directly with the local government and drew upon their local knowledge

to guide the immediate response. However it was clear that they information the local barangay

officer had was often lacking detail, unreliable and misinformed. The barangay officer explained that

before Haiyan he was not really present in the community as the community wanted to be

independent.

The rehabilitation phase however could have showed greater signs of adaptation and

transformation. The community continued to adapt their social networks and social capacity to work

together to build back their community. The local government bridged gaps with the community and

began to be more present and understanding of the people’s needs. The intervention directly

engaged with the community and government to build the people’s confidence in understanding

their rights and how to communicate their needs. Furthermore the local government’s increased

knowledge and enabled a stronger foundation for barangay officers to take issues and advocate for

-Page 29-

changes at the municipal level. Here, it was clearly acknowledged that DRR and resilience building

was a cross scalar issue. These aspects of the intervention are thought to have provided the ability to

transform local governance to be more participatory, accountable and aware.

Principle 3: The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is accepted with

preparedness activities enabling flexibility to a range of future unexpected hazards

Again it is felt that whilst during the response phase the focus of the intervention was on stabilising

the community and meeting basic needs, the disaster itself created a new level of risk awareness, a

newfound understanding of risk uncertainty and change and a new motivation to prepare for future

risks. The shock of the super typhoon and the amount of destruction and trauma it caused created a

space for Disaster Risk Reduction to be taken more seriously throughout both the communities and

government.

The recovery and rehabilitation phases built upon this new level of awareness and understanding

and showed signs of adaptation. Risk information was now taken very seriously and training and

capacity building taught community members how to prepare and what to do in the event of a

disaster. The community explained that before Haiyan nobody would listen to the warnings from

PAGASA and they would never evacuate but Haiyan changed. For example, when typhoon Ruby hit

the following year, everyone in the community felt they knew how to prepare and had evacuated to

the evacuation centre; thus showing clear signs of adaptation of behaviour to risk. However it is felt

that more work needs to be done to raise awareness and training of future multi-hazard

preparedness in order to enable transformational resilience to take off.

Principle 4: Spaces and places for continuous learning

Furthermore, spaces and places for ongoing learning are thought to be a significant success of the

Haiyan intervention; particularly the importance of finding the informal spaces for learning such as

the communal gardens. Once again the immediate response was unable to focus on learning, the

scale of the disaster and capacity of COSE meant meeting basic needs and saving lives had to be

focused on. Participants explained that before Haiyan there were no community spaces or places to

learn together however intervention is thought to have dramatically changed this.

The recovery and rehabilitation phase strongly focused on learning and capacity building and

created formal spaces and places for training around livelihoods, Disaster Risk Reduction and

preparedness as well as informal spaces where the community could come together, talk and share

knowledge such as the communal gardens. It was thought that the communal gardens provided the

space for community members to share information and weather warning, share tips on

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preparedness and talk through the trauma as part of the psycho-social support program for

addressing trauma. This is thought to show signs of both adaptation and transformation as the

community adapts and transforms the way in which it is organised and interacts with one another.

Principle 5: High degree of social and economic equity exists in systems. The non-

equilibrium dynamics of a system are acknowledged to support ‘bouncing forward

and better’. Any approach to building resilience should not work with an idea of

restoring equilibrium because systems do not have a stable state to which they

should return after a disturbance.

Lasyly, it is felt that the community and field staff recognised that there was a level of economic and

power inequality in the community. However, the community explained that because typhoon

Haiyan impacted everyone in the same way, it brought the community together; they became equal

as they all lost everything, together. The immediate response phase of the intervention did not focus

on addressing underlying inequalities as the devastation of the disaster meant that everyone needed

assistance. A blanket relief aid distribution was delivered where everyone in the community was

reached equally.

However, the recovery and rehabilitation phase focused solely on the most vulnerable sector of the

community; the elderly. The intervention worked to address the inequality that left elders

marginalised and excluded from society. This was well received and successful; the elders developed

confidence, empowerment and decision making skills. The community began to respect the elders as

a capacity in the community with skills and knowledge to share. The youth began spending time with

the elders and the elders were reintroduced to society and valued in the community. It is felt this

shows a transformational change in tackling underlying inequalities and marginalisation. It facilitated

changing mind sets, perceptions and behaviour to build resilience.

Despite this, the field officers and community members all explained that due to the short time

frame since the disaster, the community was still focusing on bouncing back and felt that they had

not yet managed to recover their quality of life to before the disaster occurred. Lastly, trauma,

anxiety and depression were outlined as core challenges which held the community back from

bouncing back better or building resilience. A loss of hope, low motivation and inability to envisage a

better future all served to hold the community back from successfully transforming their community

to be resilient to future risks. Again psycho-social support, services and programs were highlighted

as a necessity not a luxury of any disaster response intervention.

Overall it was clear that the community still had a long way to go in bouncing back, let alone

bouncing back better after typhoon Haiyan. However the intervention showed strong signs of

-Page 31-

integrating the five resilience principles and the field staff appeared confident that with time the

communities would indeed bounce back better and work towards achieving transformational

resilience. It is acknowledged that typhoon Haiyan was thought to be one of the most destructive

typhoons and at the time of this research it has only been two years since the disaster and the

intervention had no yet finished.

9. Conclusions

In conclusion the Help Age and COSE Typhoon Haiyan response has proved to be an excellent pilot

case study for the remote research method of the LPRR humanitarian strand. The COSE team were

enthusiastic and committed to putting their research training into practice. With the help of our

local researcher from Ateneo University the team produced in-depth data for analysis.

It is clear that the Haiyan intervention included a number of project aspects required for effective

resilience building. However it is felt that just two years after the crises and with the program still

ongoing it is too soon to effectively assess the interventions’ impact on resilience building in the

community.

It can be thought that the case study provided an example of Bene et al’s (2012) AAT resilience

framework with the people of Mahayan explaining how they coped and worked together to absorb

the shock and adapt to be more resilient for the next typhoon. Furthermore the governments’

response to typhoon Haiyan and the way in which the local government became more visible,

interactive and trusted in the community showed shows signs of more transformational change and

resilience building.

Ultimately it has been found that resilience cannot be affectively built or strengthened unless the

most vulnerable and marginalised people in the community are empowered. For the community of

Mahayag this was the community elders. The intervention effectively empowered, engaged and built

the capacity of the older people in the community. The elders were supported to build a new found

level of respect, place and purpose in the community. They built social networks, diversified

livelihood’s and created spaces and places to pass on their local knowledge to community members,

NGOs and the government. It is thought that this could also represent a transformation within the

community.

The Haiyan intervention further validated the Ketsana case study finding that resilience can mean

different things for different communities depending on the context, issues and nuances. For

Mahayag this means strengthened and diversified livelihoods, increased access to information,

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increased levels of preparedness, hard engineering and development such as reinforced flood dykes,

concrete houses and bridges and a water supply. It also meant land ownership, a community high

school and market. The community wanted to be independent yet connected. They wanted to have

all the resources and knowledge to look after themselves yet be well connected and know where

and how to ask for help and support.

The case study further supports the argument that was identified in the Ketsana case study; being

present in the community and working with a local partner can significantly increase the

interventions ability to link together preparedness, response and resilience. However the case study

also highlights the issue of trade-offs and questions if resilience building should be thought about

when responding to basic needs or whether this phase should purely focus on stabilising the

community. Interestingly the community expressed the fact that knowing Help Age and COSE are

present in the community takes away a lot of stress and anxiety. The community would like to keep

its connections to Help Age international and know that they can call on them for support in times of

crises.

Lastly, trauma, anxiety and depression were outlined as core challenges which are thought to serve

to hold the community back from bouncing back better or building resilience. A loss of hope, low

motivation and inability to envisage a better future all served to hold the community back from

successfully transforming their community to be resilient to future risks. Again psycho-social

support, services and programs were highlighted as a necessity not a luxury of any disaster response

intervention.

Next steps

Next a further 6 case studies will be captured from Kenya, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, DRC and

Colombia. Finally a global approach for resilient informed humanitarian response will be developed,

piloted and rolled out. For any questions please contact Becky Murphy the LPRR Resilience Learning

and Capacity Building officer at rmurphy@christian-aid.org.

Images

The first image on the cover page was shared by Help Age International’s local partner COSE and

taken by Reuters.

All other images are of the Mahayag community and were taken by Becky Murphy at Christian aid

throughout the November/December 2015 research trip

-Page 33-

References

Bene, C., Wood, R., Newsham, A., Davies, M., (2012) Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny?

Reflection about the Potentials and Limits of the Concept of Resilience in Relation to Vulnerability

Reduction Programmes, IDS, 405

Help Age and COSE’s Typhoon Haiyan Response Project Report (2013-2016).

World Bank (2011) The Philippines Climate Risk and Adaptation County Profile, Online Resource

Available at:

http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/home.cfm?page=country_profile&CCode=PHL&ThisTa

b=Overview

CNDR (2012) Typhoon Haiyan Project Proposal