Steger-Ideologies, Imaginaries, Ontologies

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/15691497-12341240

PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 brill.com/pgdt

P E R S P E C T I V E SO N G L O B A L

D E V E L O P M E N TA N D

T E C H N O L O G Y

Levels of Subjective Globalization: Ideologies, Imaginaries, Ontologies

Manfred B. StegerUniversity of Hawaii-Manoa and RMIT University, Australia

E-mail: [email protected]

Paul JamesRMIT University, Australia

E-mail: [email protected]

AbstractThe subjective dimensions of globalization have not received even close to the level of attention that has been paid to the objective dimensions of global interchange and extension. Seeking to rectify this neglect, we argue that the subjective dimensions of globalization can be conceptual-ized in terms of three dimensions or levels: ideologies, imaginaries, and ontologies. The Occupy Movement in several global locations seeks to challenge global capitalism as the dominant sys-tem of economics. At the ideological level, activists connected to Occupy tend to engage in fierce contestation of the global structuring of greed, thus exhibiting clear signs of global rebellion. However, the terms of debate and critique tend to become increasingly uncontested as we go deeper into examining the dominant social imaginary and the ontologies of modern time and space that underpin this general sense of the global. Occupy is clearly an important variant of justice globalism that has inspired scores of young activists to protest against increasing inequal-ity and the growing concentration of wealth in the hands of a tiny minority. Still, we suggest that this important alter-globalization movement often works within many of the same subjective frameworks and precepts as the market-globalist world that it criticizes.

KeywordsGlobalization, market globalism, justice globalism, ideology, global imaginary, ontology, resis-tance, Occupy Movements, modernity, postmodernity, global capitalism

IntroductionObjective phenomena of globalization, their patterns and processes, have been studied in extraordinary detail. Scholarly publications abound describing the flows and nature of global financial interchange, the movement of goods and people, and even the spread of global culture. By comparison, the subjective

18 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40

dimensions of globalization have not received even close to the level of atten-tion that has been paid to these objective dimensions of global interchange and extension. Seeking to rectify this neglect, we argue that the subjective dimensions of globalization can be conceptualized in terms of three dimen-sions or levels: ideologies, imaginaries, and ontologies.

We suggest that ideologies are the most rapidly changing and febrile of these levels. Social imaginaries tend to settle after initial contestation into a relative taken-for-granted commonsenseexcept when they come up against other deep-seated background understandings. Normative contestations also con-tinue at the deeper levels of subjective engagement associated with conjunc-tures of ontological diffference. Usually, such contestations add substantially to the intensity of concurrent ideological struggles. However, apart from contes-tations that move across ontological boundariesfor example, uprisings across the boundaries of modern and traditional understandings of authority and power as we have seen in the so-called Arab Springdissent and rebel-lion within the dominance of a single ontological frame tend to leave basic questions unasked.

This is the case even in relation to the contemporary Occupy Movement in several global locations as it seeks to challenge global capitalism as the domi-nant system of economics. At the ideological level, activists connected to Occupy tend to engage in fierce contestation of the global structuring of greed, thus exhibiting clear signs of global rebellion. However, the terms of debate and critique tend to become increasingly uncontested as we go deeper into examining the dominant social imaginary and the ontologies of modern time and space that underpin this general sense of the global. Occupy is clearly an important variant of justice globalism that has inspired scores of young activ-ists to protest against increasing inequality and the growing concentration of wealth in the hands of a tiny minority. Still, we suggest this important alter-globalization movement often works within many of the same subjective frameworks and precepts as the market-globalist world that it criticizes.

Setting Up the Steps in the AnalysisThe overwhelming focus of research into the phenomenon of globalization has been on the patterns of objective relations. Major works have been written on aspects of objective globalization from the consequences of containerization for global trade to the redefining efffects of the global intersection of biotech-nology and genomic sequencing of DNA (see Levison 2006; Thacker 2005). Dig-ital devices like tablets and smartphones, shipping containers, DNA sequences,

M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 19

human body parts, secondhand clothing, the English language, news cartels and pineapples, have all become increasingly part of global systems of produc-tion, trade, communication, and inquiry. In a relatively short time, thousands of books and articles have now been devoted to the economics and technolo-gies of globalization, the politics of globalization, and only secondarily the cul-ture of globalization.

However, globalization involves both the objective spread and intensifica-tion of social relations across world space, and the subjective meanings, ideas, sensibilities, and understandings, associated with those material processes of extension. Moreover, objective and subjective relations and meanings are bound up with each other. It is this ever-present dimension of the subjective that remains strangely neglected in globalization research (see, for example, Robertson 2009:121). This is not to suggest that subjective questions are not there in the background to many studies. Most interestingly, there is a small emergent series of studies on the culture of economics that have begun to bring the subjective dimension into contention. For example, an anthology called Frontiers of Capital has begun to document ethnographically the new subjects of financial capitalism, including the rise of symbolic risk-analysis as part of the social assessment work of the big banks (Fisher and Downey 2006). Another volume, Savage Economics, explores what it calls the cultural consti-tution of political economy (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010). They take forward the pioneering work of Angus Cameron and Ronan Palan in The Imagined Economies of Globalization, where they suggest that the narrations and stories about global economic relations are constitutive rather just secondary or super-structural (Cameron and Palan 2004). The same can be said in the domains of politics and culture. This is our starting point, then, and our aim is to under-stand why subjectivities carried in narratives, stories, descriptions, ideas and claims about meaning are sometimes contested and sometimes embedded in relatively taken-for-granted, long-run cultures of meaning and practice.

The first step in our analysis begins with the theme of ideologiespatterned clusters of normatively imbued ideas and concepts. Ideologies of globalization now pervade social life almost everywhere across the globe. At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, this might be a relatively unconten-tious claim, but there is still much to do in mapping the clusters of ideas that feed into various globalisms in the contemporary world and tracking the lines of historical development involving the globalization of ideas, values, and cul-ture (Steger 2009). This is the level at which contestation is most often ana-lyzed, but there are ways of doing this more systematically.

The second step involves taking seriously what happens to ideologies as they become embedded in the dominant commonsense of a period or a place.


This is what might be called a social imaginary. During the last three or four decades, political ideologies articulating a global imaginary have become part and parcel of intensifying discursive networks enveloping our planet. Ideolo-gies of globalization have been used to rework, rethink and reframe various older isms such as capitalism, cosmopolitanism, internationalism, imperial-ism, and colonialism, which themselves have, in diffferent ways, and for signifi-cant spans of time, shaped the contested terrain in diffferent places of what it means to reach out and speak across the world. All of these thought-systems generated conflicting normative claims. Nevertheless, over the course of the twentieth century and into the present, these various -isms have become reinterpreted in terms of an emergent and changing global imaginary. At least within the Westalthough increasingly also dominant globallythese dynamics have remained firmly tied to the framework of modernity. Here we understand modernity as a (contingent) periodizing term, which names not the totality of a period within a particular spatial setting, but rather the uneven dominance of subjectivities and practices of the modern within and across overlapping spatial settings.1

This brings us to the third step in our analysis. The animating problem is invoked by the concept of the modern. If the concept of an imaginary names the most general way in which we imagine the social whole, then what issue does a concept such as the modern present us with? The concept is not an integrative term that names the social whole or captures the subjective projec-tion of meanings and values like that of the imaginary, but it is still general-izing and it does have a compelling subjective dimension. In the terms of the present approach, it requires us to extend the analysis to the categories of exis-tence that define such a condition of beingcategories such as time, space, embodiment, knowing, and performance. In order to understand the subjec-tive power of the modern, we need to gain a historically sensitive understand-ing of the modern as an ontological formation, including how it has come into intersection with other formations from the tribal-customary and traditional to the postmodern.

Changing Imaginaries and Competing Ideologies: The Dominance of the ModernThe codification of political ideologies developed in tandem with both the mas-ter concept of modernity and the specific attributes of what it means to be

1Thus, we agree with the impulse of recent studies emphasizing multiple modernities with-out necessarily accepting the way in which the unevenness of modernity is theorized. See, for example, Eisenstadt 2003.


modern following the French and American revolutions.2 The Enlightenment dichotomization of the sacred and the profane greatly aided this development. The carving out of a distinct secularizing space for politics buttressed liberalisms successful assault on the Churchs monopoly on shaping ideational structures of order.3 Competing with religious belief systems over political legitimacy, the principal ideologies of modernity evolved hand-in-hand with what John Stuart Mill called the sentiment of nationality.4 As has been well documented, the new conceptual framework of the nation constituted a powerful modernizing force. At the same time, the social form that the nation-state took was founded on a modern sense of spatiality, temporality and embodied. Modern spatial-ity framed the landscape in terms of demarcated bounded territories. Modern temporality allowed the nations to move forward as communities of fate in calendric time, with or without God. Nationhood found its embodied political expression in the transformation of subjects and into abstract modern citizens who laid claim to equal membership in their imagined community and insti-tutionalized their autonomy within the modern nation-state.

These became relative ontological certainties about what a nation was. Although the national imaginary had risen to dominance by the first decades of the twentieth century, this did not spell the end of political ideologies. Quite to the contrary, questions about who really counted as part of this citizenry and what, exactly, constituted the essence of the nation became the subject of fierce ideological debates and social struggles. Issues of where the boundaries of each territory lay became the bases of violence and war. Seeking to remake society according to the rising national imaginary, a restless citizenry exhib-ited a forward-looking attitude that became hallmark of modernity (see Ander-son 1991). What this narrative from contemporary history evinces is that ideologies tend to move in and out of contestation. Imaginaries move at a deeper level and, in diffferent ways, enter the commonsense of an age. Ontologiessuch as how we live temporally or spatiallyconstitute the rela-tively enduring ground upon which we walk.

In order to be legitimate within the expanding webs of Western (and increas-ingly globalizing) modernity, political communities had to be nation-states. Even the tribal and traditional communities at the edge of empirestill in significant ways constituted through other ontological forms than the moderntook on a layer of the modern, and sought themselves to become

2For a detailed exposition of this argument, see Steger 2008.3It would be a mistake to accept ideologys self-conscious image as secular. As Mark Juer-

gensmeyer has pointed out, there are significant structural and functional similarities between political and religious belief systems as both represent ideologies of order imparting coherence and authority on social life. See Juergensmeyer 2008:20.

4For a discussion of J. S. Mills reflections on the sentiment of nationality, see Steger 2008:44-57.


nation-states. The national gave the post-revolutionary social imaginary its distinct flavor in the form of factual and normative assumptions and taken-for-granted understandings in which the nationplus its afffiliated or to-be-afffiliated stateserved as the necessary framework of the political. By the end of the nineteenth century, the national imaginary had acquired alluring banner headlines and truth claims that resonated with peoples interests and aspirations. It thus bound them to specific ideological vision of community. Like-minded individuals were organizing themselves into clubs, associations, movements, and political parties with the primary objective of enlisting more people to their preferred vision of the national.

The ethico-political translation of the national imaginary occurred in terms of competing ideologies. Liberalism, for example, articulated the national imaginary as concrete political programs and agendas valorizing the profit-oriented production of mass commodities and the generation of meaning pri-marily on the basis of industrialization, consumption, individualism, and rational legalism. This is not to say that discursive frameworks of early modern periods did not generate narratives, metaphors, and framings of the global. Going back as far as the early sixteenth century, for example, an emergent class of intellectualscartographers, philosophers, and writersused cosmo-graphic images of the globus in competing narratives. One lineage used spheri-cal images to associate the early Atlantic empires to the past cultural glory of Imperial Rome. Another saw mapmakers projecting early forms of cosmopoli-tanism with cartouches of cultural diffference that might be considered as styl-ized precursors to the Family of Man (Cosgrove 2003).5

But the diffference in the early twentieth century was that the national had come to frame the sense of the social whole. Today, competing ideologies of globalization articulate a tangled, but generalizing, social imaginary, which, more readily than ever before, cuts across national, class, gender, race, state-based, geopolitical and cultural diffferences, postcolonial divides, and other social boundaries. This degree of generality and self-reflexivity was inconceiv-able in the nineteenth century or earlier. We do not mean to suggest that the latest phase of globalization processes has become uncontested, homogenous, or totalizing. Nevertheless, for all the debates, and for all the emergence of new localisms, a global imaginary is now on the rise (see Robertson 1992).6

5The Family of Man was a photographic exhibition first displayed at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, in 1955. It comprised photographs of the human condition from 68 countries. It toured the world for eight years.

6For a book-length discussion of contemporary social formations using the metaphor of a global matrix of interconnected relations, see Nairn and James 2005.


Defining Ideologies, Imaginaries and OntologiesHow then can we better understand globalizations powerful subjective dynamics? As we have begun to outline, the thickening of global consciousness can be theorized by analyzing social life across three interrelated dimensions or layers: 1. ideas, meanings, sensibilities, and subjectivities as contested and decontested by various ideologies; 2. ideas, meanings, sensibilities, and subjec-tivities as felt in largely taken-for-granted social imaginaries; and 3. ideas, meanings, sensibilities, and subjectivities as embodied in relation to deep-seated social ontologies. Each of these three layers of lived subjectivity is con-stituted in practice at an ever-greater generality, durability, and depth. They can of course only be separated out as an analytical exercise, but our argument is that as analytical concepts they provide a useful way of tracking the chang-ing, contradictory and overlapping nature of subjectivities.

Globalization has been changingat times, even at revolutionary speedacross all of these three layers and in turn contributing fundamentally to basic social change. The deeper the process of change, however, the slower the ten-dency for the new pattern to take hold as dominant and encompassing. At the risk of oversimplifying our three principal concepts, we like to offfer the follow-ing minimal definitions:

1. Ideologies are patterned clusters of normatively imbued ideas and con-cepts, including particular representations of power relations. These con-ceptual maps help people navigate the complexity of their political universe and carry claims to social truth.

2. Imaginaries are patterned convocations of the social whole. These deep-seated modes of understanding provide largely pre-reflexive parameters within which people imagine their social existenceexpressed, for example, in conceptions of the global, the national, the moral order of our time.

3. Ontologies are patterned ways-of-being-in-the-world that are lived and experienced as the grounding conditions of the socialfor example, linear time, territorial space, and individualized embodiment.

Before we go on to talk about each of these three dimensions of the social in more detail, let us plot them schematically. As Table 1 shows, by shifting our attention from analyzing ideas to ideologies to imaginaries to ontologies, we move each time to a more abstract level of analysis. The first level, empirical analysis, is foundational to making any claims about the world (and it keeps coming back every time we want to make any claims). This requires collecting information and attending to the detail of change. However, to understand the


complexity of the patterns of those ideas, our analysis moves to study ideolo-gies as embedded in conjunctures of history and relate these ideologies to pat-terns of practice and meaning in terms of ways of acting. But to study ideologies in the context of patterns of subjective inter-relationship, we must examine broader patterns of social meaningour focus on social imaginaries. This works at a more abstract level of analysis again, where the analysis attempts to map ways of relating. Finally, to understand questions of human being is to study ontologies or foundational categories of existence: time, space, embodiment and so on.

Table 1

Levels of the Social in Relation to Levels of Theoretical Analysis

Levels of the social

Doing Acting Relating Being

Levels of analysis

I. Empirical II. Conjunctural III. Integrational IV. Ontological

Objects of analysis I

IdeasBeliefsIntuitions

Ideologies Imaginaries Ontologies

Objects of analysis II

Particulari-ties of practice and meaning

Patterns of practice and meaning

Production Exchange Communication Organization Enquiry

Patterns of inter-relationship

Face-to-face Agency-extended Object-extended Disembodied

Patterns of categorical projection

Corporeality Temporality Spatiality Performativity Epistemology

Objects of analysis III

General patterns of practice and meaning

Modes and subjec-tivities of practice and meaning

Modes and subjec-tivities of integra-tion and diffferentiation

Modes and subjectivities of Being

Tribal-customary Traditional Modern Postmodern


This analytical contextualization helps to put our three levels of subjective glo-balization into a larger perspective. Indeed our discussion below moves from examining ideologies of globalization to arguing that these ideologies can be understood more broadly as contributing to the emergent dominance of a global social imaginary. Then in the last section of the article we link these aspects to questions of the ontological dominance of the modern. This allows us to draw conclusions about the strengths and limitations of current alter-globalization movements such as Occupy as activists find themselves confined to the dominant frameworks of the world they criticize.

IdeologiesLike other major social phenomena, globalization is associated with patterns of ideas related to and about forms of material practice. As we have already expressed in various ways, the relationship between those practices and ideas are extraordinarily complicated and mutually constitutive. Just as the forma-tion of nations is associated with the ideologies of the national imaginarythat is, politically contested ideas about who should achieve the desired end of forging the natural connection between nation and stateprocesses of glo-balization are associated with ideologies expressing the global imaginary that both influence and make sense of practices. Here our key notion is that full-blown ideologies are patterned and conceptually thick enough to form rela-tively coherent and persistent articulations of the underlying social imaginary. One or two statements of contention do not an ideology make. Ideas, values and statements of contention must come together into a mature conceptual constellation to count as ideology.

But when does a political belief-system warrant the designation of a sepa-rate ideological family? What criteria should be used to determine that a rela-tively enduring constellation of ideas constitutes an ideology? Political theorist Michael Freeden suggests that political ideologies display unique features anchored in distinct conceptual morphologies. Resembling large rooms con-taining various pieces of furniture uniquely arranged in proximity to each other, ideologies are assembled around core concepts, adjacent concepts, and peripheral concepts. The resulting conceptual patterns constitute the unique fingerprint of political ideologies such as liberalism or socialism. Freeden then introduces three useful criteria for determining the degree of maturity that sets a full-blown ideology apart from a fledgling ideational clus-ter: first, its degree of uniqueness and complexity; second, its context-bound responsiveness to a broad range of political issues; and, third, its ability to


produce efffective claims in the form of conceptual chains of decontestation. Decontestation is the process by which ideas are taken out of the contest over meaning and thus are seen as truths by many people. In other words, these ideas become naturalized through attempts to reduce the indeterminacy and multiplicity of their linguistically expressed meanings to fixed, authorita-tive definitions and statements. Crucial in the formation of thought systems, such decontestation chains thus arrange core concepts in a pattern that links them to adjacent and peripheral concepts (Freeden 1996, 2003:54-5).7

In this sense, the elite codifiers of competing globalisms generate pressing and contested claims about what it means to live in a globalizing world. It may sound counter-intuitive to suggest that ideologies of global interconnection were prevalent even before the overt and contested recognition (the naming) of the importance of globalization as a condition of our age. But that is just to emphasize that ideas are not always directly expressed in relation to a self-reflexively named set of practices. What we can say, however, is that todays competing globalisms, like the previously dominant ideologies of the national imaginary, remain always contingent, arguable, and in tension with each other. Thus, they resist any easy analysis of their afffective power.

The most efffective ideologueswe use this term in a neutral way referring to elite codifierssometimes reach across diffferent ideologies simultaneously in order to articulate broadly appealing political visions. At the same time, they also draw deeper down into the imaginary and ontological foundations of the social. For example, when, in July 2008, the then-American presidential candi-date Barack Obama spoke as a self-declared world citizen in Berlin, he oscil-lated between the national and global imaginary in his call to nations to work together for global progress. Consequently, he struggled to bring together into a singular vision various ideologies (liberalism, conservatism, social democ-racy, justice globalism) from both the national and global imaginaries:

Now is the time to build new bridges across the globe as strong as the one that bound us across the Atlantic. Now is the time to join together, through constant cooperation, strong institutions, shared sacrifice, and a global commitment to progress, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. It was this spirit that led airlift planes to appear in the sky above our heads, and people to assemble where we stand today. And this is the moment when our nationsand all nationsmust summon that spirit anew. (Obama 2008)

7The ideological function of fixing the process of signification around specific meanings was discussed as early as the 1970s by the French linguist Michel Pecheux and intellectuals associated with the French semiotic journal, Tel Quel. See Eagleton 1991:195-7.


Many strands of the Occupy Movement work within the same intersection of ideologies: justice globalism, liberalism, social democracy and so on. As a 2011 declaration of the Occupy Wall Street assembly puts it:

As one people, united, we acknowledge the reality: that the future of the human race requires the cooperation of its members; that our system must protect our rights, and upon corruption of that system, it is up to the individuals to protect their own rights, and those of their neighbors; that a democratic government derives its just power from the people, but corporations do not seek consent to extract wealth from the people and the Earth; and that no true democracy is attainable when the process is determined by economic power. (USLiberals.com 2012)

Applying Freedens three criteria to the ideational constellations we call glo-balisms, we find that some variants have over the last couple of decades come to form coherent and durable formations. Specifically, the following four vari-ants are conceptually thick enough to warrant the status of mature ideologies.

Market globalism constitutes todays dominant ideology. Its chief codifiers are corporate managers, executives of large transnational corporations, cor-porate lobbyists, high-level military offficers, journalists and public-relations specialists, intellectuals writing to large audiences, state bureaucrats, and politicians. These global power elites assert that, notwithstanding the cycli-cal downturns of the world economy, the global integration of markets along laissez-faire lines is not only a fundamentally good thing, but also represents the given outcome and natural progression of the human condition. The mor-phology of market globalism is built around a number of interrelated central claims: that globalization is about the liberalization and worldwide integra-tion of markets (neoliberalism); that it is powered by neutral techno-economic forces; that the process is inexorable; that the process is leaderless and anony-mous; that everyone will be better offf in the long run, and that globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world.8 This is the ideology that has been fundamentally attacked by the Occupy Movement, but it is clear that the presence of articulate people camping in the financial districts of the worlds global cities is not enough to bring down such a dominant ideology. Sustained contestation requires the lived and debated projection of powerful alternative ideological clusters, in this case most obviously, justice globalism.

Justice globalism, by comparison to market globalism, can be defined by its emphasis on equity, rights, sustainability, and diversity.9 Championed by forces of the political Left, it articulates a very diffferent set of claims suggesting

8For a sustained discussion and critical analysis of these claims that draws on hundreds of examples, see Steger, Globalisms, Chapter 3.

9For a comprehensive treatment of justice globalism, see Steger et al. 2013.


that the process of globalization is powered by corporate interests; that the process can take diffferent pathways; that the democracy carried by global pro-cesses tends to be thin and procedural; and that globalization-from-above or corporate globalization is associated with increasing inequities within and between nation-states, greater environmental destruction and a marginaliza-tion of the poor. Although the alter-globalization movement argues for an alternative form of globalization, it is globalization nevertheless. And as such, more than just another description of the world, the core concepts and central claims of justice globalism constitute, we suggest, one lineage in a family of contesting ideologies. That makes justice globalism akin to its main competi-tors in the sense that it draws upon a generalizing, deep-seated imaginary of global connectedness. Justice globalism is the main contesting constellation to market globalism, to the extent that the language of justice globalism, particu-larly around human rights discourses, has been incorporated into the heart of market globalism rhetoric.

The third constellation includes various religious globalismsusually, but not always, associated with the political Right. Evident in some variants of all three monotheistic religions, its most spectacular strain today is jihadist Islam-ism. Based on the populist evocation of an exceptional spiritual and political crisis, jihadist Islamists bemoan the contemporary age of jahiliyya (ignorance and pagan idolatry) and call for a renewed universalism of a global umma (a reworked meaning of a global Islamic community). One of the defining fea-tures of religious globalisms is that they draw on the intersection of two onto-logical formationsthe modern and the traditional. It has been this contradictory intersection of grounding forms that has given religious ideolo-gies their extreme intensity. Less radical forms of moderate Islamist global-ism, often linked to the Turkish model have gained ground during the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria, where political movements search for new combinations of Islamism and modern democracy.

A fourth variant, imperial globalism, has been weakening over the last two years as a result of various changes including the Obama administrations renewed multilateralism and the fracturing Washington Consensus in the wake of the Great Recession. Developing out of market globalism and still retaining some of its central features, imperial globalism is the publicly weak-est of these ideological clusters, even though for a time it informed the so-called Global War on Terror and the joint actions of the Coalition of the Willing spearheaded by the unilateralist Bush administration. Despite the waning influence of these hawks since the election of Barack Obama, imperial globalism still operates as a powerful background force to the extent that its central claimthat global peace depends upon the global economic reach


and military assertiveness of an informal American Empire or NATO-based zone of extensionis still taken for granted within many governing and elite circles. But imperial globalism cannot be confined to a single nation. Indeed, some commentators believe that a Chinese version of it might be just around the corner (see, for example, Halper 2010; Jacques 2009).

For all their complexity as ideologies, and despite the obvious tensions between them and the diffferences across diffferent settings, these four global-isms are part of a complex, roughly-woven but patterned, ideational fabric that increasingly figures the global as a defining condition of the present while still remaining entangled in the national. People who accept their central claimswhether from the political Right or Leftinternalize the apparent inevitabil-ity and relative virtue of global interconnectivity and mobility across global time and space. However one might seek to understand global history, and whatever reversals we might face in the future, the perception of intensifying social interconnections have come to define the nature of our times. Even though proponents of justice globalism strenuously insist that another world is possible, they hardly question that growing global interdependence remains a central part of most, if not all, alternative futures. Indeed, one unmistaken sign of a maturing ideological constellation is that it comes to be represented in discourse as post-ideological. Another pitfall is to equate the death of one ideology of globalization either with its massive contestation, its changing rhetoric, or the spectacular rise of another opposing global ideology.

The dominant sense over the last decade seems to be that we are now sim-ply globalized and the question is what we are going to do about it at home and abroad. In Angela Merkels terms, International terrorism and the so-called asymmetrical threat posed by individuals who care nothing for their own livesthis is one of the darkest sides of globalization. But as little as we can abolish globalizationwhich I do not want to do, and which would be impossible even if one should desirewe must not slacken our effforts to fight the threats to our countrys law, security and freedom where they rise (Merkel 2010). National security is thus global. With the realization that the global finan-cial system was in danger of collapsing, the language subtly changed again and the emphasis shifted. As the Global Financial Crisis stretched far beyond Wall Street and Paternoster Square, the salience of again defending good forms of globalization was renewed. Barack Obama, in particular, has sought to con-vince his global audience that, Not only is it impossible to turn back the tide of globalization, but effforts to do so can make us worse offf (Obama 2008).

From a justice globalism perspective, the idea of inevitability tends to be put more tentatively and critically. Still, the acceptance, albeit reluctantly, of the broader reality of a globalized world reflects the powerful framework of the


global imaginary. As Peter Raven put it in his 2002 Presidential Address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Globalization appears to have become an irresistible force, but we must make it participatory and humane to alleviate the sufffering of the worlds poorest people and the efffec-tive disenfranchisement of many of its nations. Similarly, the International Labour Organization (ILO) recently emphasized that globalization forms the basic context of productive life. In parallel terms, its 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization begins with a sentence that frames all others: Considering that the present context of globalization...is reshaping the world of work in profound ways (International Labour Organization 2008:5; Raven 2002).

Social ImaginariesAs we noted in the Introduction, the various ideologies associated with global-ization have come to coalesce around a new sense of a global social wholea global social imaginary of profound, generalizing, and deep impact. A number of prominent social thinkers have long grappled with the notion that this is more than an ideologically-contested representation of social integration and diffferentiation. Claude Lefort, for example, argues that, In this sense, the examination of ideology confronts us with the determination of a type of society in which a specific regime of the imaginary can be identified (Lefort 1986:197).10 Cornelius Castoriadis takes the concept of the imaginary in a dif-ferent direction that provides, nonetheless, a useful means of indicating how we are not using the term in this article. For Castoriadis, the imaginary is that which expresses the creative excess of our human condition. It always exceeds the possibilities of the material conditions of life (Castoriadis 1991). Our use of the term is more akin to Pierre Bourdieus conception of the pre-reflexive habitusthat is, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as princi-ples which generate and organize practices and representations (Bourdieu 1990:53). And yet, the concept of the habitus is too normatively driven while the concept of the social imaginary has a stronger sense of the social whole or the general given social order. What is important to take from Bourdieu, however, is a sense of how patterns of practice and ideas can be seen to be objectively outside of the particular practices and ideas of persons, even as those patterns were generated subjectively by persons acting in and through the habitus.

10He is quoted here without our endorsement of the position that frames his approach.


Charles Taylor provides perhaps the most useful way forward in defining the social imaginary as, The ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations. These set the common-sense back-ground of lived social experience (Taylor 2004:23).11 In Taylors exposition, the modern social imaginary has been built by three dynamics. The first is the separating out of the economy as a distinct domain, treated as an objectified reality. The second is the simultaneous emergence of the public sphere as the place of increasingly mediated interchange and (counter-posed) the intimate or private sphere in which ordinary life is afffirmed. The third is the sover-eignty of the people, treated as a new collective agency even as it is made up of individuals who see self-afffirmation in the other spheres. These are three his-torical developments, among others, that are relevant to what might be called a modern ontological formation (of which more later), but listing such factors neither help us to define a social imaginary in general or to understand what we are calling the national imaginary and the global imaginary.

Our definition of the social imaginary contains another crucial insight, namely, that it constitutes patterned convocations of the lived social whole. The notion of convocation is important since it is the calling togetherthe gath-ering (not the self-consciously defending or active decontesting activity associ-ated with ideologies) of an assemblage of meanings, ideas, sensibilitiesthat are taken to be self-evident. The concept of the social whole points to the way in which certain apparently simple terms such as our society, we, and the market carry taken-for-granted and interconnected meanings. This concept allows us to define the imaginary as broader than the dominant sense of com-munity. A social whole, in other words, is not necessarily co-extensive with a projection of community relations or the ways people imagine their social existence. Nor does it need to be named as such. It can encompass a time, for example, when there exists only an inchoate sense of global community, but there is today paradoxically an almost pre-reflexive sense that at one level we as individuals, peoples, and nations have a common global fate. Put in difffer-ent terms, the medium and the messagethe practice of interrelation on a global scale and the content of messages of global interconnection and natu-ralized powerhave become increasingly bound up with each other.

As recently as forty years ago, notions of the social wholeincluding the marketwere stretched across relations between nation-states and would,

11This formulation dovetails to some extent with Antonio Gramscis (1978) notion of cultural hegemony.


therefore, have been seen as co-extensive with the nation-state. Hence, the then widespread use of the term international relations. When most sociolo-gists and political scientists analyzed society, they tended to assume the boundaries of the nationin the relevant literature this is referred to meth-odological nationalism (see Beck 2007:286-90).12 In other words, the social whole was a national imaginary that tended to be equated with the commu-nity of the nation-state. Now we find either that such concepts as society have become terms of ambivalence because they have become stretched between two contesting yet interdependent imaginaries: the national and the global.

To summarize: thus far, we have suggested that ideologies of globalization are part of an extended family that translate a generalized global imaginary into competing political programs and agendas. Moving to the final layer of our investigation of the dimensions of subjective globalization, we must grap-ple with ontological categories such as time and space.

OntologiesWe use ontologies here as a shorthand term referring to the most basic fram-ing categories of social existence: temporality, spatiality, corporeality, episte-mology and so on. These are categories of being-in-the-world, historically constituted in the structures of human interrelations. To talk of being in this way does not imply a given or unchanging human essence, nor is it confined to the generation of meaning in the sphere of selfhood. If questions of ontology are fundamentally about matters of being, then everything involving being human is ontological. Still, we are using the concept more precisely to refer to categories of existence such as space and time that on the one hand are always talked about, and, on the other, are rarely interrogated, analyzed, or historically contextualized except by philosophers and social theorists. A brief illustration of the themes of time and space will help bring this largely taken-for-granted connection between ontological categories and globalization to the surface.

Let us start with the ontological category of spatiality. It is crucial, since glo-balization is obviously a spatial concept. Indeed, the academic observation that to globalize means to compress time and space has long entered into public discourse. However, to be more historically specific, contemporary glo-balization is predominantly lived through a modern conception of spatiality

12For a Beck-inspired attempt to inject a cosmopolitan imagination into the social sciences, see Delanty 2009.


linked to an abstracted geometry of territory and sovereignty, rather than as a traditional cosmological sense of spatiality held together by God, Nature or some other generalized Supreme Being (see Sassen 2006). This is a claim about forms of dominance rather than a simple epochal shift from or replacement of an older form of temporality.13 It accords with Jan Nederveen Pieterses view of globalization generating new hybrid or mlange modernities anchored in changing conceptions of time and space (Canclini 1995; Nederveen Pieterse 2009). For example, those ideological codifiers who espouse a Jihadist or Pen-tecostalist variant of religious globalism tend to be stretched between a mod-ern-territorial sense of space and a neotraditional sense of a universalizing umma or Christendom, respectively. In this neotraditional understanding, then, the social whole exists in, prior to, and beyond, modern global space.14

On the other hand, we also find instances of ambiguous modern spatialities sliding into postmodern sensibilities that relate to contemporary globaliza-tion. Take, for example, airline advertising maps that are post-territorial (post-modern) to the extent that they show multiple abstract vectors of travellines that crisscross between multiple city-nodes and travel across empty space without reference to the conventional mapping expressions of land and sea, nation-state and continental boundaries. To such a backdrop and with no global outline, an advertisement for KLM Airlines assures potential customers that, You could fly from anywhere in the world to any destination (Holland Herald 2002). Our point here is that one comfortably knows how to read those maps despite the limited points of orientation, and one also knows that they are global before reading the fine printanywhere in the world. At the same time, dominant representations of global spatiality often retain some modern features. But even for those (one example is Google Earth released in June 2005), we no longer need the old-style icons of planet Earth to know that the local and the global are deeply interconnected. Another promotion close to the aforementioned KLM advertisement presents us with a picture of a country lane and an old-fashioned British mail box. These images are used as the back-drop to the slogan, Its all about picking up your Email anywhere. Nothing has to be said about the web being worldwide or the metal mail box with the royal emblem of Elizabeth Regina II (ER) being anachronistically local-national.

13Thus, while sympathetic to the idea of post-modernity understood in relation to a gradual and uneven shift from a national to a global imaginary, we are sceptical of Martin Albrows (1996) claim that the evolution of the global imaginary occurs beyond modernity.

14See Gill 2002:177-99 for a discussion of diffferent dominant sensibilities of space in rela-tion to Heideggers distinction between world, earth, and diffferent ontologically-framed worldviews.


People living at the transition from a national to a global imaginary simply know how to read these images.

The ontological category of temporality is also important to the contempo-rary global imaginary even if the notion of time does not seem to be con-tained in the concept of globalization. Modern time is the demarcated, linear, and empty time of the calendar and clock. But the ontological sense that time passes second-per-second is a modern convention rather than being intrinsically natural, scientifically verifiable, or continuous with older cosmo-logical senses of time. Modern time is abstracted from nature, and verifiable only within a particular mode of modern scientific enquirythe Newtonian treatment of time as unitary, linear and uniform. It reached one of its defin-ing moments in 1974 when the second came to be measured in atomic vibra-tions, allowing the post-phenomenal concept of nanosecondsone-billionth of a second.15

This sense of time-precision has been globalized as the regulative frame-work for electronic transactions in the global marketplace. It drives the billions of transactions on Wall Street just as much as it imposes a non-regressive dis-cipline on the millions of bidders on eBay. This then is our first point: a modern sense of time has been globalized and now overlays older ontologies of tempo-rality without fully erasing them. Our second point is that ideological codifiers tend to draw upon an assumed connection between modern time and global-izing processes to project their truth claims, which linked together such con-cepts such progress, effficiency, perfectibility, and just-in-time. Indeed, concepts of time and the global are commonly used by market globalists to sell high-end commodities, from expensive watches and clothes to computers, mobile phones, and digital devices. Take, for example, an advertisement for New Yorks Columbus Circle clothing stores: 6.10pm. Think globally. Act Styl-ishly. These words are linked to an image framed by the outlines of a clock that show a woman jumping out of a taxi to go shopping (Where New York 2005). This image-text makes sense when you consider that the eight most commonly-used words in the English language today are time, person, year, way, thing, man, world (Australian 2006). And, of course, English itself is being globalized!

In this context, let us note that we employ the concepts of the traditional, the modern and the postmodern as provisionally useful designations of ontological diffference.16 Traditionalism can be characterized as carrying

15Postmodern time, including the time of relativity and quantum physics does not move in this way. According to Einsteinian relativity, for example, it moves in relation to the speed of the participant through space.

16For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see James 2006.


forward prior ontological forms from customary tribalism, but reconstituted in terms of universalizing cosmologies and political-metaphorical relations.17 An example here is the institution of the Christian Church. It may have modern-ized its practices of organization and become enmeshed in a modern monetary economy, but the various denominations of the Church, and most manifestly its Pentecostal variations, remain deeply bound up with a traditional cosmol-ogy of meaning and ritual. The truth of Jesus is not analytically relative or a question of modern proof. In this sense, a return to traditionalism character-izes many of the expressions of contemporary religious globalisms.

Modernism carries forward prior forms of being, but fundamentally recon-stituting (and sometimes turning up-side down) those forms in terms of technical-abstracted modes of time, space, embodiment and knowing. Time, as we noted above, becomes understood and practiced not in terms of cosmo-logical connection with a capital C but through empty linear time-lines that can be filled with the details of the past and present as well as events made by us with an eye toward a better future. Indeed, one of the key dynamics of modernity is the continuous transformation of present time by political designs for the future. The consciousness of modernity arose as a vision that human beings can create community in a new image (Delanty 2009:8). What has changed with the emergence of the global imaginary is not this modern-ist vision itself, but the sense that community or society now refers to the entire world as much as to a particular nation. Modern space is territorial-ized and marked by abstract lines on mapswith places drawn in by our own histories. Modern embodiment becomes an individualized project separated out from the mind and used to project a choosing self. And modern knowing becomes an act of analytically dismembering and re-synthesizing information. In practice, modernism is associated with the dominance of capitalist produc-tion relations, commodity and finance exchange, print and electronic commu-nication, bureaucratic-rational organization and analytic enquiry.

Postmodernism, too, carries forward modern forms of being while at the same time altering ontological categories in the direction of new ideas and sensibilities of simultaneity, real-time, deterritorialization, relativization, and virtuality. We thus resist linear considerations of postmodernity as a stage that replaces the modern. We agree with Nestor Garcia Canclini that it is preferable to conceive of postmodernism as a mode of problematizing

17Customary tribalism is defined by the dominance of particular socially-specific modalities of space, time, embodiment, and knowing that can be characterized by analogical, genealogical, and mythological practices and subjectivities. This, for example, would include notions of genea-logical placement, the importance of mythological time connecting past and present, and the centrality of relations of embodied reciprocity.


the ideologies, imaginaries, and ontologies of modernity established within traditions it attempted to exclude or overcome (Canclini 1995:9). In todays globalizing world, we find diffferent formations of traditionalism, modern-ism and postmodernism in complex intersection with each other. In spite of these continuities, however, it would be a serious mistake to close ones eyes to the formation of new ideas, meanings, sensibilities, subjectivities. This nov-elty is perhaps most obviously in the proliferation of the prefix neo that has attached itself to nearly all major isms of our time: neoliberalism, neocon-servatism, neo-Marxism, neofascism, and so on. In this article, we have sug-gested that there is, in fact, something new about political ideologies: a new global imaginary is on the rise. It erupts with increasing frequency within and onto the familiar framework of the national, spewing its fiery lava across all geographical scales. Stoked, among other things, by technological change and scientific innovation, this global imaginary destabilizes the grand political ide-ologies codified by social elites during the national age. Thus, our changing ideational landscape is intimately related to the forces of globalization.

Similarly, the prefix post has in the last few decades taken hold of many isms: post-Marxism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and so on. Some of these may not be full-blown political ideologies, but the ubiquity of this prefix clearly attests to peoples awareness of having moved post something. This marker may not be modernity per se, but it certainly looks like a new chapter of human history in which the modern sense of the now is increasingly linked to a growing global consciousness.

Concluding Remarks: The Limitations of the Occupy MovementIdeologies of globalization make up an ideological family. Despite the exis-tence of multiple points of contestation, these globalisms function as the polit-ical translators of an emergent global imaginary riding on slow-moving and intersecting ontologies. We contend that people from various socio-economic backgrounds around the world are developing a sense that their basic social categories, including the person and the nation, exist within in a social whole called planet earth, the world or the globe. The global imaginary remains in continuing intersection with prior dominant imaginaries such as the national and the sacred order of things, but is slowly reframing them. As the eruptions of the global continue to sear these conventional modes of understanding, they not only change the worlds economic infrastructure, but also transform our sense of self, identity, and belonging. This has profound consequences for politics, including the politics of protest and contention.


This is not to suggest, as Amitai Etzioni speculates, that we are witnessing an emerging global normative synthesis (Etzioni 2004:214-44). Our point is less utopian. Normative contestations around the national continue, but they tend to occur in the context of what Saskia Sassen sees as the collapse of the conventional nested hierarchies of scale that used to separate the global from the local, national, and regional (see, for example, Sassen 2007). Today, all of these formations, including the latest global rebellions from Wall Street to Tahrir Square contest the dominant terms of the global while at the same time internalizing and projecting the global as a common frame of reference. As the national and the global continue to rub up against each other in myriad settings and on multiple levels, they produce new tensions and compromises within a changing sense of modernity. At the same time diffferent ontological formations intersect in complex ways. Older traditional and tribal ontologi-cal formations continue to ground the lives of many people, and a postmod-ern layer of temporality-spatiality has recently emerged. Nevertheless, the modernread and reinterpreted through processes of globalization as both an objective and subjective set of social processesstill provides the dominant evolving social frame through which people around the world make sense of their complex lives.

This taken-for-granted dominance of the modern is on display in the various manifestos of the Global Occupy Movement. While the ideology of justice glo-balism provides much conceptual coherence, it also limits Occupys political reach and depth. In a recent version, published in the British newspaper the Guardian, Occupy manifesto begins thus:

We are living in a world controlled by forces incapable of giving freedom and dignity to the worlds population. A world where we are told there is no alternative to the loss of rights gained through the long, hard struggles of our ancestors, and where success is defined in opposition to the most fundamental values of humanity, such as solidarity and mutual support. Moreover, anything that does not promote competitiveness, self-ishness and greed is seen as dysfunctional. But we have not remained silent! From Tunisia to Tahrir Square, Madrid to Reykjavik, New York to Brussels, people are rising up to denounce the status quo. Our efffort states enough! and has begun to push changes forward, worldwide. (The Guardian 2012)

This statements emphasis is firmly on modern and universal rights. The mod-ern ideology of freedomalong with the more ontologically ambiguous notions of dignity and solidarityprovides its point of departure. This sin-gular dominance of the modern becomes clear in the long list of demands that follow. Practicality dominates and there is not a single demand for relief from the ontological dominance of modern practices and subjectivities that abstract,


codify, rationalize and objectify our lives. Though the ideals and demands made by Occupy are laudable, they are not that much diffferent in form from the Millennium Goals of the United Nations. Instead, for example, of arguing for a remaking of the contemporary dominant relationship between culture and nature that has seen much of humanity alienated from nature as a source of being, the manifesto demands the creation of international environmental standards, mandatory for countries, companies, corporations, and individuals. Ecocide (willful damage to the environment, ecosystems, biodiversity) should be internationally recognized as a crime of the greatest magnitude. Instead of challenging the fetishism of consumption and the centrality of growth capital-ism that has among other things contributed to a dual global crisis of work intensification and labor redundancy, the manifesto demands that a technical solution around suffficient income be put in place: Every human being should have access to an adequate income for their livelihood, so we ask for work or, alternatively, universal basic income guarantee (ibid.).

Our point here is not to consider modern life-ways are necessarily bad, but as an unremitting, colonizing and dominant formation that is skewing how we live as humans. Thus perhaps one of the most diffficult questions of our global age is how to balance our ontological and integrational needs. The global justice movement is yet to address the layers of subjective globalization in reflexive and systematic ways that shed light on the nature of the global imaginary, and, most markedly, the profound ontological dominance of the modern. It is this uncontested subjective and objective ground that gives neo-liberal market globalism much of its strength. Unless Occupy and other global justice movements address these deeper subjective levelsand not only the objective practices associated with themthey will limit themselves to a mere expression of utopian hopes for the overthrow of what they do not like. Eman-cipatory practice, however, requires global justice activists to set up the ideo-logical, imaginary and ontological conditions indispensible for the creation of another world.

ReferencesAlbrow, M. 1996. The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity. Cambridge: Polity.Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities, rev. ed. London: Verso.Beck, U. 2007. The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails. Theory,

Culture & Society. Vol. 24. No. 7-8:286-90.Blaney, D. L. and N. Inayatullah. 2010. Savage Economics: Wealth, Poverty and the Temporal Walls

of Capitalism. London: Routledge.Bourdieu, P. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 53.


Cameron, A. and R. Palan. 2004. The Imagined Economies of Globalization. London: Sage Publications.

Canclini, N. C. 1995. Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. p. 9.

Castoriadis, C. 1991. The Imaginary Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.CNN.com. Retrieved April 23, 2009 (http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/24/obama.words/

index.html).Cosgrove, D. 2003. Globalism and Tolerance in Early Modern Geography. Annals of the Associa-

tion of American Geographers. Vol. 93. No. 4:852-70.Delanty, G. 2009. The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press. p. 8.Eagleton, T. 1991. Ideology: An Introduction. London: Verso. pp. 195-7.Eisenstadt, S. N. 2003. Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities, 2 vols. Leiden and Bos-

ton: Brill.Etzioni, A. 2004. The Emerging Global Normative Synthesis. The Journal of Political Philosophy.

Vol. 12. No. 2:214-44.Fisher, M. S. and G. Downey, eds. 2006. Frontiers of Capital: Ethnographic Reflections on the New

Economy. Durham: Duke University Press.Freeden, M. 1996. Ideology and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. 2003. Ideology: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 54-5.Gill, G. 2002. Landscape as Symbolic Form: Remembering Thick Place in Deep Time. Critical

Horizons, 3.2: 177-99.Gramsci, A. 1978. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Quentin Hoare

and Geofffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers.Halper, S. 2010. The Beijing Consensus. New York: Basic Books.Holland Herald. May 2002.International Labour Organization. 2008. ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globaliza-

tion. ILO Geneva. p. 5.Jacques, Martin. 2009. When China Rules the World. New York: The Penguin Press.James, P. W. 2006. Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism. London: Sage Publications.Juergensmeyer, M. 2008. Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, From Christian

Militias to Al Qaeda. Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 20.Lefort, C. 1986. The Political Forms of Modern Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 197.Levison, M. 2006. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World

Economy Bigger. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Merkel, Angela. Statement on the German armed forces mission in Afghanistan delivered in the

German parliament on Thursday, April 22, 2010. Retrieved July 11, 2012. (http://www.nato.diplo.de/contentblob/.../RegErklBKin220410_eng.pdf).

Nairn, T. and P. James. 2005. The Global Matrix: Nationalism, Globalism, and State Terrorism. Lon-don: Pluto.

Nederveen Pieterse, J. 2009. Globalization and Culture: A Global Melange. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Obama, B. Renewing American Competitiveness speech in Flint, Michigan. June 16, 2008. Retrieved June 7, 2009. (http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=Obama-Speeches.ask).

Oxford English Dictionary project English Corpus. Australian, June 23, 2006.Raven, P. H. 2002. Science, Sustainability, and the Human Prospect. Science. Vol. 297. No.

5583:954-8.Robertson, R. 1992. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage.


. 2009. Diffferentiational reductionism and the Missing Link in Alberts Approach to Global-ization Theory. International Political Sociology. 3.1:121.

Sassen, S. 2006. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

. 2007. A Sociology of Globalization. New York: W. W. Norton.Steger, M. B. 2008. The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution

to the Global War on Terror. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 44-57.. 2009. Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the 21st Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman

& Littlefield.Steger, M. B., J. Goodman, and E. K. Wilson. 2013. Justice Globalism: Ideology, Crises, Policies. Lon-

don: Sage.Taylor, C. 2004. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham: Duke University Press. p. 23.Thacker, E. 2005. The Global Genome. Cambridge: MIT Press.The Guardian. May 11, 2012. Retrieved July 11, 2012. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis

free/2012/may/11/occupy-globalmay-manifesto).USLiberals.com. September 30, 2011. Retrieved July 11, 2012. (http://usliberals.about.com/od/

socialsecurity/a/Declaration-Manifesto-Of-Occupy-Wall-Street-Movement.htm).Where New York. May 2005.

/ColorImageDict > /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict > /JPEG2000ColorImageDict > /AntiAliasGrayImages false /CropGrayImages true /GrayImageMinResolution 150 /GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /Warning /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages true /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict > /GrayImageDict > /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict > /JPEG2000GrayImageDict > /AntiAliasMonoImages false /CropMonoImages true /MonoImageMinResolution 550 /MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /Warning /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /MonoImageResolution 2400 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict > /AllowPSXObjects false /CheckCompliance [ /PDFX1a:2001 ] /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError false /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox false /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile (GWG_GenericCMYK) /PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName () /PDFXTrapped /False

/Description > /Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (1.0) ] /OtherNamespaces [ > /FormElements false /GenerateStructure false /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles false /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged /UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UseDocumentBleed false >> ]>> setdistillerparams> setpagedevice

Documents

Steger-Ideologies, Imaginaries, Ontologies