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Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible,asyllabus (headnote)willbereleased,as isbeing done in connectionwith this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.SeeUnited Statesv.Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,200U.S.321,337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus

KINGETAL.v.BURWELL,SECRETARYOFHEALTH ANDHUMANSERVICES,ETAL.

CERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHEFOURTHCIRCUIT

No.14114. ArguedMarch4,2015DecidedJune25,2015ThePatientProtectionandAffordableCareActgrewoutofalonghis-toryof failedhealth insurancereform. Inthe1990s,severalStatessoughttoexpandaccesstocoveragebyimposingapairofinsurancemarket regulationsa guaranteed issue requirement, which barsinsurersfromdenyingcoveragetoanypersonbecauseofhishealth,and a community rating requirement, which bars insurers fromcharging a person higher premiums for the same reason. The re-formsachievedthegoalofexpandingaccesstocoverage,buttheyal-so encouraged people to wait until they got sick to buy insurance.Theresultwasaneconomicdeathspiral:premiumsrose,thenum-berofpeoplebuyinginsurancedeclined,andinsurersleftthemarketentirely.In2006,however,Massachusettsdiscoveredawaytomaketheguaranteed issueandcommunityratingrequirementsworkbyrequiringindividualstobuyinsuranceandbyprovidingtaxcreditstocertain individuals tomake insurancemoreaffordable. The combi-nationof thesethreereformsinsurancemarketregulations,acov-eragemandate,andtaxcreditsenabledMassachusettstodrastical-lyreduceitsuninsuredrate.TheAffordableCareActadoptsaversionofthethreekeyreforms

that made the Massachusetts system successful. First, the Actadoptstheguaranteedissueandcommunityratingrequirements.42U.S.C. 300gg,300gg1. Second, theActgenerally requires indi-vidualstomaintainhealthinsurancecoverageormakeapaymenttotheIRS,unlessthecostofbuyinginsurancewouldexceedeightper-centofthatindividualsincome.26U.S.C.5000A.Andthird,theAct seeks to make insurance more affordable by giving refundabletax credits to individualswithhousehold incomesbetween100per-

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centand400percentofthefederalpovertyline.36B.Inadditiontothosethreereforms,theActrequiresthecreationof

an Exchange in each Statebasically, a marketplace that allowspeopletocompareandpurchaseinsuranceplans.TheActgiveseachState the opportunity to establish its own Exchange, but providesthat the FederalGovernmentwill establish suchExchange if theStatedoesnot. 42U.S.C.18031,18041. Relatedly, theActpro-videsthattaxcreditsshallbeallowedforanyapplicabletaxpayer,26U.S.C.36B(a),butonlyifthetaxpayerhasenrolledinaninsur-anceplanthroughanExchangeestablishedbytheStateunder[42U.S.C. 18031], 36B(b)(c). An IRS regulation interprets thatlanguageasmakingtaxcreditsavailableonanExchange,26CFR1.36B2, regardless of whether the Exchange is established andoperatedbyaState...orbyHHS,45CFR155.20.

Petitionersare four individualswho live inVirginia,whichhasaFederalExchange. Theydonotwish topurchasehealth insurance.Intheirview,VirginiasExchangedoesnotqualifyasanExchangeestablishedbytheStateunder [42U.S.C.18031],sotheyshouldnotreceiveanytaxcredits. Thatwouldmakethecostofbuyingin-surance more than eight percent of petitioners income, exemptingthem from the Acts coverage requirement. As a result of the IRSRule, however, petitioners would receive tax credits. That wouldmakethecostofbuyinginsurancelessthaneightpercentoftheirin-come,whichwouldsubjectthemtotheActscoveragerequirement.PetitionerschallengedtheIRSRuleinFederalDistrictCourt. The

DistrictCourtdismissedthesuit,holdingthattheActunambiguous-lymadetaxcreditsavailable to individualsenrolledthroughaFed-eralExchange.TheCourtofAppealsfortheFourthCircuitaffirmed.TheFourthCircuitviewedtheActasambiguous,anddeferredtotheIRSsinterpretationunderChevron U. S. A. Inc.v.Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,467U.S.837.

Held:Section 36Bs tax credits are available to individuals in StatesthathaveaFederalExchange.Pp.721.(a)When analyzing an agencys interpretation of a statute, this

Court often applies the two-step framework announced inChevron,467U.S.837.ButChevrondoesnotprovidetheappropriateframe-work here. The tax credits are one of the Acts key reforms andwhether they are available on Federal Exchanges is a question ofdeep economic and political significance; had Congress wished toassign thatquestion toanagency, it surelywouldhavedonesoex-pressly. AnditisespeciallyunlikelythatCongresswouldhavedele-gated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in craftinghealthinsurancepolicyofthissort.It is instead theCourts task to determine the correct reading of

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Section36B. If thestatutory language isplain, theCourtmusten-forceitaccordingtoitsterms. Butoftentimesthemeaningoram-biguityofcertainwordsorphrasesmayonlybecomeevidentwhenplaced incontext. Sowhendecidingwhetherthe language isplain,theCourtmustreadthewordsintheircontextandwithaviewtotheirplace in theoverall statutory scheme. FDA v.Brown & Wil-liamson Tobacco Corp.,529U.S.120,133. Pp.79.(b)Whenreadincontext,thephraseanExchangeestablishedby

theStateunder [42U.S.C.18031] isproperlyviewedasambigu-ous.ThephrasemaybelimitedinitsreachtoStateExchanges.Butit could also refer to all Exchangesboth State and Federalforpurposes of the tax credits. If aState choosesnot to follow thedi-rective inSection18031 to establishanExchange, theAct tells theSecretary of Health and Human Services to establish such Ex-change.18041.AndbyusingthewordssuchExchange,theActindicatesthatStateandFederalExchangesshouldbethesame.ButState andFederalExchangeswould differ in a fundamentalway iftaxcreditswereavailableonlyonStateExchangesonetypeofEx-changewouldhelpmakeinsurancemoreaffordablebyprovidingbil-lions of dollars to the States citizens; the other type of Exchangewould not. Several other provisions in the Acte.g., Section18031(i)(3)(B)srequirementthatallExchangescreateoutreachpro-grams to distribute fair and impartial information concerning ...the availability of premium tax credits under section 36Bwouldmake little sense if tax credits were not available on Federal Ex-changes.TheargumentthatthephraseestablishedbytheStatewouldbe

superfluousifCongressmeanttoextendtaxcreditstobothStateandFederal Exchanges is unpersuasive. This Courts preference foravoidingsurplusageconstructionsisnotabsolute. Lamiev.United States Trustee,540U.S.526,536. Andrigorousapplicationof thatcanondoesnotseemaparticularlyusefulguidetoafairconstructionoftheAffordableCareAct,whichcontainsmorethanafewexamplesofinartfuldrafting.TheCourtneverthelessmustdoitsbest,bear-inginmindthefundamentalcanonofstatutoryconstructionthatthewordsofastatutemustberead intheircontextandwithaviewtotheirplaceintheoverallstatutoryscheme. Utility Air Regulatory Groupv.EPA,573U.S.___,___. Pp.915.(c)Given that the text is ambiguous, the Courtmust look to the

broader structure of the Act to determine whether one of Section36Bs permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that iscompatible with the rest of the law. United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v.Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.,484U.S.365,371.Here,thestatutoryschemecompelstheCourttorejectpetitioners

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interpretationbecause itwoulddestabilize the individual insurancemarketinanyStatewithaFederalExchange,andlikelycreatetheverydeathspiralsthatCongressdesignedtheActtoavoid.Underpetitionersreading,theActwouldnotworkinaStatewithaFederalExchange. Astheyseeit,oneoftheActsthreemajorreformsthetaxcreditswouldnotapply. Andasecondmajorreformthecov-eragerequirementwouldnotapplyinameaningfulway,becausesomanyindividualswouldbeexemptfromtherequirementwithoutthetax credits. If petitionersare right, therefore, only one of theActsthreemajorreformswouldapplyinStateswithaFederalExchange.The combination of no tax credits and an ineffective coverage re-

quirementcouldwellpushaStatesindividualinsurancemarketintoadeathspiral.ItisimplausiblethatCongressmeanttheActtoop-erate in this manner. Congress made the guaranteed issue andcommunityratingrequirementsapplicableineveryStateintheNa-tion,butthoserequirementsonlyworkwhencombinedwiththecov-erage requirement and tax credits. It thus stands to reason thatCongressmeantforthoseprovisionstoapplyineveryStateaswell.Pp.1519.(d)ThestructureofSection36Bitselfalsosuggeststhattaxcredits

arenotlimitedtoStateExchanges.Together,Section36B(a),whichallows tax credits for any applicable taxpayer, and Section36B(c)(1),whichdefines that termas someonewithahousehold in-come between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal povertyline,appeartomakeanyoneinthespecifiedincomerangeeligibleforataxcredit. Accordingtopetitioners,however,thoseprovisionsareanemptypromiseinStateswithaFederalExchange.Intheirview,an applicable taxpayer in such a State would be eligible for a taxcredit, but the amount of that tax credit would always be zero be-cause of twoprovisionsburieddeepwithin theTaxCode. Thatar-gument fails becauseCongress does not alter the fundamental de-tailsofaregulatoryschemeinvaguetermsorancillaryprovisions.Whitmanv.American Trucking Assns., Inc.,531U.S.457. Pp.1920.(e)Petitionersplain-meaningargumentsarestrong,but theActs

contextandstructurecompeltheconclusionthatSection36Ballowstaxcredits for insurancepurchasedonanyExchangecreatedundertheAct. Those credits are necessary for the Federal Exchanges tofunction like their State Exchange counterparts, and to avoid thetype of calamitous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid.Pp.2021.

759F.3d358,affirmed.

ROBERTS,C.J., delivered the opinion of theCourt, inwhichKEN-

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NEDY,GINSBURG,BREYER,SOTOMAYOR,andKAGAN,JJ.,joined.SCALIA,J.,filedadissentingopinion,inwhichTHOMASandALITO,JJ.,joined.

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NOTICE: Thisopinionissubjecttoformalrevisionbeforepublicationinthepreliminaryprint of theUnitedStatesReports. Readers are requested tonotifytheReporterofDecisions,SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,Wash-ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthatcorrectionsmaybemadebeforethepreliminaryprintgoestopress.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No.14114

DAVIDKING,ETAL.,PETITIONERSv.SYLVIA BURWELL,SECRETARYOFHEALTH

ANDHUMANSERVICES,ETAL. ONWRITOFCERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOF

APPEALSFORTHEFOURTHCIRCUIT [June25,2015]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of theCourt.ThePatientProtectionandAffordableCareActadoptsa

seriesofinterlockingreformsdesignedtoexpandcoverageintheindividualhealthinsurancemarket.First,theActbars insurers from taking a persons health into accountwhen deciding whether to sell health insurance or howmuchtocharge. Second, theActgenerallyrequireseachpersontomaintaininsurancecoverageormakeapaymenttotheInternalRevenueService.Andthird,theActgivestax credits to certain people to make insurance moreaffordable.Inadditiontothosereforms,theActrequiresthecrea-

tionofanExchange ineachStatebasically,amarket-place that allows people to compare and purchase insur-anceplans. TheAct gives eachState the opportunity toestablishitsownExchange,butprovidesthattheFederalGovernmentwillestablishtheExchangeiftheStatedoesnot.This case is about whether the Acts interlocking re-

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forms apply equally in each State nomatter who estab-lishestheStatesExchange.Specifically,thequestionpre-sented is whether the Acts tax credits are available inStatesthathaveaFederalExchange.

I A

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124Stat.119,grewoutofalonghistoryoffailedhealthinsur-ance reform. In the 1990s, several States began experi-mentingwithwaystoexpandpeoplesaccesstocoverage.Onecommonapproachwasto imposeapairof insurancemarket regulationsa guaranteed issue requirement,whichbarred insurers fromdenyingcoverage toanyper-son because of his health, and a community rating re-quirement,whichbarredinsurersfromchargingapersonhigher premiums for the same reason. Together, thoserequirements were designed to ensure that anyone whowantedtobuyhealthinsurancecoulddoso.The guaranteed issue and community rating require-

ments achieved that goal, but they had an unintendedconsequence: They encouraged people to wait until theygot sick to buy insurance. Why buy insurance coveragewhen you are healthy, if you can buy the same coveragefor the same price when you become ill? This conse-quenceknown as adverse selectionled to a second:Insurerswere forcedto increasepremiumstoaccount forthefactthat,moreandmore, itwasthesickratherthanthehealthywhowerebuyinginsurance. Andthatconse-quence fed back into the first: As the cost of insurancerose, even more people waited until they became ill tobuyit.This led to an economic death spiral. As premiums

rosehigherandhigher,andthenumberofpeoplebuyinginsurance sank lower and lower, insurers began to leavethe market entirely. As a result, the number of people

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withoutinsuranceincreaseddramatically.This cycle happened repeatedly during the 1990s. For

example, in 1993, the State of Washington reformed itsindividual insurancemarket by adopting the guaranteedissueandcommunityratingrequirements. Overthenextthreeyears,premiumsroseby78percentandthenumberof people enrolled fell by 25percent. By1999, 17 of theStates 19 private insurers had left themarket, and theremaining two had announced their intention to do so.Brief for Americas Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae1011.For another example, also in 1993,NewYork adopted

theguaranteedissueandcommunityratingrequirements.Overthenextfewyears,somemajorinsurersintheindi-vidualmarketraisedpremiumsbyroughly40percent.By1996, these reforms had effectively eliminated the com-mercial individual indemnity market in New York withthelargest individualhealthinsurerexitingthemarket.L. Wachenheim & H. Leida, The Impact of GuaranteedIssueandCommunityRatingReformsonStatesIndivid-ualInsuranceMarkets38(2012).In 1996, Massachusetts adopted the guaranteed issue

and community rating requirements and experiencedsimilar results. But in 2006, Massachusetts added twomorereforms:TheCommonwealthrequiredindividualstobuyinsuranceorpayapenalty,anditgavetaxcreditstocertain individuals to ensure that they could afford theinsurancetheywererequiredtobuy.BriefforBipartisanEconomicScholarsasAmici Curiae2425. Thecombina-tion of these three reformsinsurance market regula-tions, a coveragemandate, and tax creditsreduced theuninsuredrateinMassachusettsto2.6percent,byfarthelowest in theNation. Hearing on Examining IndividualState Experiences with Health Care Reform CoverageInitiatives in the Context of National Reform before theSenate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and

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Pensions,111thCong.,1stSess.,9(2009).B

The Affordable Care Act adopts a version of the threekeyreformsthatmadetheMassachusettssystemsuccess-ful. First, theActadopts theguaranteed issueandcom-munityratingrequirements.TheActprovidesthateachhealth insurance issuer that offers health insurance cov-erageintheindividual...marketinaStatemustacceptevery ... individual in the State that applies for suchcoverage. 42 U.S.C. 300gg1(a). The Act also barsinsurersfromcharginghigherpremiumsonthebasisofapersonshealth. 300gg.Second,theActgenerallyrequires individualstomain-

tainhealthinsurancecoverageormakeapaymenttotheIRS. 26U.S.C.5000A.Congressrecognizedthat,with-out an incentive, many individuals would wait to pur-chase health insurance until they needed care. 42U.S.C. 18091(2)(I). So Congress adopted a coveragerequirement to minimize this adverse selection andbroadenthehealthinsuranceriskpooltoincludehealthyindividuals,whichwilllowerhealthinsurancepremiums.Ibid. InCongresssview, thatcoveragerequirementwasessentialtocreatingeffectivehealthinsurancemarkets.Ibid. Congressalsoprovidedanexemptionfromthecov-eragerequirementforanyonewhohastospendmorethaneight percent of his income on health insurance. 26U.S.C.5000A(e)(1)(A),(e)(1)(B)(ii).Third,theActseekstomakeinsurancemoreaffordable

by giving refundable tax credits to individuals withhousehold incomes between 100 percent and 400 percentof the federalpoverty line. 36B. IndividualswhomeettheActs requirementsmaypurchase insurancewith thetaxcredits,whichareprovidedinadvancedirectlytotheindividualsinsurer. 42U.S.C.18081,18082.Thesethreereformsareclosely intertwined. Asnoted,

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Congressfoundthattheguaranteedissueandcommunityratingrequirementswouldnotworkwithoutthecoveragerequirement.18091(2)(I). Andthecoveragerequirementwould not work without the tax credits. The reason isthat,withoutthetaxcredits,thecostofbuyinginsurancewouldexceedeightpercentofincomeforalargenumberofindividuals,whichwouldexempt themfromthecoveragerequirement. Giventherelationshipbetweenthesethreereforms, theActprovided that theyshould takeeffectonthesamedayJanuary1,2014. SeeAffordableCareAct,1253, redesignated1255,124Stat.162,895;1401(e),1501(d),id.,at220,249.

CInadditiontothosethreereforms,theActrequiresthe

creation of an Exchange in each State where peoplecan shop for insurance, usually online. 42 U.S.C.18031(b)(1). AnExchangemaybecreated inoneof twoways. First, theActprovidesthat[e]achStateshall ...establish an American Health Benefit Exchange ... fortheState. Ibid. Second, if a State nonetheless choosesnot to establish its ownExchange, theAct provides thatthe Secretary of Health and Human Services shall ...establish and operate such Exchange within the State.18041(c)(1).The issue in this case is whether the Acts tax credits

are available in States that have a Federal ExchangeratherthanaStateExchange. TheActinitiallyprovidesthat tax credits shall be allowed for any applicabletaxpayer. 26 U.S.C. 36B(a). The Act then providesthat the amount of the tax credit depends in part onwhether the taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance planthrough an Exchange established by the State undersection1311ofthePatientProtectionandAffordableCareAct [hereinafter 42 U.S.C. 18031]. 26 U.S.C.36B(b)(c)(emphasisadded).

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The IRS addressed the availability of tax credits bypromulgating a rule that made them available on bothStateandFederalExchanges.77Fed.Reg.30378(2012).Asrelevanthere,theIRSRuleprovidesthatataxpayeriseligibleforataxcreditifheenrolledinaninsuranceplanthroughanExchange,26CFR1.36B2(2013),whichisdefinedasanExchangeservingtheindividualmarket...regardless of whether the Exchange is established andoperated by a State ... or by HHS, 45 CFR 155.20(2014). Atthispoint,16StatesandtheDistrictofColum-bia have established their own Exchanges; the other 34StateshaveelectedtohaveHHSdoso.

DPetitioners are four individuals who live in Virginia,

whichhasaFederalExchange.Theydonotwishtopur-chase health insurance. In their view, Virginias Ex-change does not qualify as an Exchange established bytheStateunder [42U.S.C. 18031], so they shouldnotreceive any tax credits. That would make the cost ofbuyinginsurancemorethaneightpercentoftheirincome,which would exempt them from the Acts coverage re-quirement. 26U.S.C.5000A(e)(1).Under the IRS Rule, however, Virginias Exchange

would qualify as an Exchange established by the Stateunder [42 U.S.C. 18031], so petitioners would receivetaxcredits. Thatwouldmakethecostofbuyinginsurancelessthaneightpercentofpetitionersincome,whichwouldsubjectthemtotheActscoveragerequirement. TheIRSRule therefore requires petitioners to either buy healthinsurance they do not want, or make a payment to theIRS.PetitionerschallengedtheIRSRule inFederalDistrict

Court. TheDistrictCourtdismissedthesuit,holdingthatthe Act unambiguously made tax credits available toindividualsenrolledthroughaFederalExchange.Kingv.

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Sebelius,997F.Supp.2d415(EDVa.2014).TheCourtofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 759 F.3d 358(2014). TheFourthCircuitviewedtheActasambiguousandsubjecttoatleasttwodifferentinterpretations.Id., at372. ThecourtthereforedeferredtotheIRSsinterpre-tation under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,467U.S.837(1984). 759F.3d,at376.The same day that the Fourth Circuit issued its deci-

sion, the Court of Appeals for the District of ColumbiaCircuit vacated the IRSRule in a different case, holdingthat theAct unambiguously restricts the tax credits toState Exchanges. Halbig v.Burwell, 758F.3d 390, 394(2014). We granted certiorari in the present case. 574U.S.___(2014).

IITheAffordableCareActaddressestaxcreditsinwhatis

now Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code. Thatsection provides: In the case of an applicable taxpayer,thereshallbeallowedasacreditagainstthetaximposedbythissubtitle...anamountequaltothepremiumassis-tance credit amount. 26 U.S.C. 36B(a). Section 36Bthendefinesthetermpremiumassistancecreditamountas the sum of the premium assistance amounts deter-mined under paragraph (2) with respect to all coverage monthsofthetaxpayeroccurringduringthetaxableyear.36B(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 36B goes on todefine the two italicized termspremium assistanceamountandcoveragemonthinpartbyreferringtoaninsurance plan that is enrolled in through anExchangeestablishedby theStateunder [42U.S.C. 18031]. 26U.S.C.36B(b)(2)(A),(c)(2)(A)(i).ThepartiesdisputewhetherSection36Bauthorizestax

credits for individuals who enroll in an insurance planthrough a Federal Exchange. Petitioners argue that a

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FederalExchangeisnotanExchangeestablishedbytheStateunder [42U.S.C. 18031],and that the IRSRuletherefore contradicts Section 36B. Brief for Petitioners1820. The Government responds that the IRS Rule islawful because the phrase an Exchange established bythe State under [42 U.S.C. 18031] should be read toincludeFederalExchanges.BriefforRespondents2025.Whenanalyzinganagencysinterpretationofastatute,

we often apply the two-step framework announced inChevron, 467U.S. 837. Under that framework, we askwhether thestatute isambiguousand, if so,whether theagencys interpretation is reasonable. Id., at 842843.Thisapproachispremisedonthetheorythatastatutesambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Con-gresstotheagencytofill inthestatutorygaps. FDAv.Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159(2000). In extraordinary cases, however, there may bereason to hesitate before concluding that Congress hasintendedsuchanimplicitdelegation. Ibid. This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among

the Acts key reforms, involving billions of dollars inspendingeachyearandaffectingthepriceofhealthinsur-ance for millions of people. Whether those credits areavailableonFederalExchangesisthusaquestionofdeepeconomicandpoliticalsignificancethatiscentraltothisstatutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign thatquestion to an agency, it surely would have done so ex-pressly. Utility Air Regulatory Group v.EPA, 573U.S.___,___(2014)(slipop.,at19)(quotingBrown & William-son,529U.S.,at160).ItisespeciallyunlikelythatCon-gresswouldhavedelegatedthisdecisiontotheIRS,whichhasnoexpertiseincraftinghealthinsurancepolicyofthissort. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266267(2006). ThisisnotacasefortheIRS.Itisinsteadourtasktodeterminethecorrectreadingof

Section36B. If thestatutory language isplain,wemust

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enforceitaccordingtoitsterms.Hardtv.Reliance Stand-ard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010). But often-times the meaningor ambiguityof certain words orphrasesmayonlybecomeevidentwhenplacedincontext.Brown & Williamson,529U.S.,at132.Sowhendecidingwhetherthelanguageisplain,wemustreadthewordsintheircontextandwithaviewtotheirplaceintheoverallstatutoryscheme. Id., at133 (internalquotationmarksomitted). Ourduty,afterall,istoconstruestatutes,notisolated provisions. Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559U.S.280,290(2010)(internalquotationmarksomitted).

AWebeginwiththetextofSection36B.Asrelevanthere,

Section 36B allows an individual to receive tax creditsonlyiftheindividualenrollsinaninsuranceplanthroughanExchangeestablishedbytheStateunder [42U.S.C.18031]. Inotherwords,threethingsmustbetrue:First,the individualmust enroll in an insurance plan throughan Exchange. Second, that Exchange must be estab-lished by the State. And third, thatExchangemust beestablishedunder[42U.S.C.18031].Weaddresseachrequirementinturn.First, all parties agree that aFederalExchange quali-

fies as an Exchange for purposes of Section 36B. SeeBriefforPetitioners22;BriefforRespondents22.Section18031 provides that [e]ach State shall ... establish anAmerican Health Benefit Exchange ... for the State.18031(b)(1). Althoughphrasedasarequirement,theActgives the States flexibility by allowing them to electwhether theywant to establishanExchange. 18041(b).If theState chooses not to do so, Section 18041 providesthat the Secretary shall ... establish and operatesuch ExchangewithintheState. 18041(c)(1) (emphasisadded).

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By using the phrase such Exchange, Section 18041instructstheSecretarytoestablishandoperatethesame Exchange that the Statewas directed to establish underSection18031. SeeBlacksLawDictionary1661(10thed.2014)(definingsuchasThatorthose;havingjustbeenmentioned). In otherwords, State Exchanges and Fed-eralExchangesareequivalenttheymustmeetthesamerequirements, perform the same functions, and serve thesame purposes. Although State and Federal Exchangesare established by different sovereigns, Sections 18031and18041donotsuggestthattheydifferinanymeaning-ful way. A Federal Exchange therefore counts as anExchangeunderSection36B.Second, we must determine whether a Federal Ex-

change is established by the State for purposes of Sec-tion 36B. At the outset, it might seem that a FederalExchange cannot fulfill this requirement. After all, theActdefinesStatetomeaneachofthe50StatesandtheDistrict of Columbiaa definition that does not includethe Federal Government. 42 U.S.C. 18024(d). Butwhen read in context, with a view to [its] place in theoverall statutory scheme, the meaning of the phraseestablished by the State is not so clear. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S., at 133 (internal quotation marksomitted).After telling eachState to establish anExchange,Sec-

tion18031providesthatallExchangesshallmakeavail-able qualified health plans to qualified individuals. 42U.S.C. 18031(d)(2)(A). Section 18032 then defines theterm qualified individual in part as an individual whoresides in the State that established the Exchange.18032(f)(1)(A). And thats a problem: If we give thephrasetheStatethatestablishedtheExchangeitsmostnaturalmeaning,therewouldbenoqualifiedindividualsonFederalExchanges. But theAct clearly contemplatesthattherewillbequalifiedindividualsoneveryExchange.

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Aswe justmentioned, theAct requires allExchanges tomake available qualified health plans to qualified indi-vidualssomething an Exchange could not do if therewere no such individuals. 18031(d)(2)(A). And theActtellstheExchange,indecidingwhichhealthplanstooffer,toconsidertheinterestsofqualifiedindividuals...intheStateorStatesinwhichsuchExchangeoperatesagain,somethingtheExchangecouldnotdo ifqualified individ-uals did not exist. 18031(e)(1)(B). This problem arisesrepeatedly throughout the Act. See, e.g., 18031(b)(2)(allowingaStatetocreateoneExchange...forproviding... services to both qualified individuals and qualifiedsmallemployers,ratherthancreatingseparateExchangesforthosetwogroups).1These provisions suggest that the Actmay not always

usethephraseestablishedbytheStateinitsmostnatu-ralsense. Thus,themeaningofthatphrasemaynotbeasclearasitappearswhenreadoutofcontext.Third,wemustdeterminewhetheraFederalExchange

isestablishedunder[42U.S.C.18031].Thistoomightseem a requirement that a Federal Exchange cannotfulfill,becauseitisSection18041thattellstheSecretarywhentoestablishandoperatesuchExchange.Buthereagain,thewaydifferentprovisionsinthestatuteinteractsuggestsotherwise.TheActdefinesthetermExchangetomeananAmer-

ican Health Benefit Exchange established under section18031. 300gg91(d)(21). If we import that definition

1The dissent argues that one would naturally read instructionsaboutqualifiedindividualstobeinapplicabletotheextentaparticularExchangehasnosuchindividuals. Post,at1011(SCALIA,J.,dissent-ing).Butthefactthatthedissentsinterpretationwouldmakesomanypartsof theAct inapplicable toFederalExchanges ispreciselywhatcreatestheproblem.ItwouldbeoddindeedforCongresstowritesuchdetailed instructions about customers on a State Exchange, whilehavingnothingtosayaboutthoseonaFederalExchange.

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intoSection18041,theActtellstheSecretarytoestablishand operate such American Health Benefit Exchangeestablished under section 18031. That suggests thatSection 18041 authorizes the Secretary to establish anExchange under Section 18031, not (or not only) underSection 18041. Otherwise, the Federal Exchange, bydefinition,wouldnotbeanExchangeatall. SeeHalbig,758F.3d, at 399400 (acknowledging that theSecretaryestablishesFederalExchangesunderSection18031).This interpretation of under [42 U.S.C. 18031] fits

bestwith the statutory context. All of the requirementsthatanExchangemustmeetareinSection18031,soitissensibletoregardallExchangesasestablishedunderthatprovision. Inaddition, every time theActuses thewordExchange, the definitional provision requires that wesubstitutethephraseExchangeestablishedundersection18031. IfFederalExchangeswerenotestablishedunderSection 18031, therefore, literally none of the Acts re-quirementswouldapplytothem.Finally,theActrepeat-edly uses the phrase established under [42 U.S.C.18031] in situations where it would make no sense todistinguish between State and Federal Exchanges. See,e.g.,26U.S.C.125(f)(3)(A)(2012ed.,Supp.I)(Thetermqualified benefit shall not include any qualified healthplan ... offered through an Exchange established under[42 U.S.C. 18031]); 26 U.S.C. 6055(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I)(2012 ed.) (requiring insurers to report whether eachinsurance plan they provided is a qualified health planoffered through an Exchange established under [42U.S.C.18031]). AFederalExchangemaythereforebeconsideredoneestablishedunder[42U.S.C.18031].Theupshotofall this is that thephrase anExchange

established by the State under [42 U.S.C. 18031] isproperlyviewedasambiguous.Thephrasemaybelimitedin its reach to State Exchanges. But it is also possiblethat the phrase refers toall Exchangesboth State and

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Federalatleastforpurposesofthetaxcredits.IfaStatechoosesnottofollowthedirectiveinSection18031thatitestablish an Exchange, the Act tells the Secretary toestablish such Exchange. 18041. And by using thewords suchExchange, theAct indicates thatState andFederal Exchanges should be the same. But State andFederalExchangeswould differ in a fundamentalway iftax creditswere available only on StateExchangesonetypeofExchangewouldhelpmakeinsurancemoreafford-ablebyprovidingbillionsofdollarstotheStatescitizens;theothertypeofExchangewouldnot.2TheconclusionthatSection36Bisambiguousisfurther

supported by several provisions that assume tax creditswill be available on both State and Federal Exchanges.For example, the Act requires all Exchanges to createoutreach programs thatmust distribute fair and impar-tialinformationconcerning...theavailabilityofpremiumtax creditsunder section36B. 18031(i)(3)(B). TheActalsorequiresallExchangestoestablishandmakeavail-able by electronic means a calculator to determine theactual cost of coverage after the application of any pre-miumtaxcreditundersection36B. 18031(d)(4)(G). AndtheAct requires allExchanges to report to theTreasurySecretary information about each health plan they sell,

2Thedissentargues that thephrase suchExchangedoesnot sug-gestthatStateandFederalExchangesareinallrespectsequivalent.Post, at 8. In support, it quotes the Constitutions Elections Clause,whichmakesthestatelegislatureprimarilyresponsibleforprescribingelectionregulations,butallowsCongresstomakeoraltersuchRegu-lations. Art. I, 4, cl.1. No one would say that state and federalelectionregulationsareinallrespectsequivalent,thedissentcontends,soweshouldnotsay thatStateandFederalExchangesare. But theElectionsClausedoesnotpreciselydefinewhatanelectionregulationmust look like, soCongress canprescribe regulations thatdiffer fromwhattheStatewouldprescribe.TheAffordableCareActdoespreciselydefine what an Exchange must look like, however, so a Federal Ex-changecannotdifferfromaStateExchange.

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includingtheaggregateamountofanyadvancepaymentof suchcredit, [a]ny information ...necessary todeter-mine eligibility for, and the amount of, such credit, andany [i]nformation necessary to determine whether ataxpayer has received excess advance payments. 26U.S.C. 36B(f)(3). If tax credits were not available onFederal Exchanges, these provisions would make littlesense.Petitioners and the dissent respond that the words

established by the State would be unnecessary if Con-gressmeant toextend tax credits tobothStateandFed-eralExchanges.BriefforPetitioners20;post,at45.Butour preference for avoiding surplusage constructions isnot absolute. Lamie v.United States Trustee, 540U.S.526,536 (2004); seealsoMarx v.General Revenue Corp.,568 U.S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 13) (The canonagainstsurplusageisnotanabsoluterule). Andspecifi-callywith respect to thisAct, rigorous application of thecanondoesnot seemaparticularlyusefulguide toa fairconstructionofthestatute.TheAffordableCareAct containsmore than a few ex-

amples of inartful drafting. (To cite just one, the Actcreates three separateSection1563s. See124Stat. 270,911,912.)SeveralfeaturesoftheActspassagecontributedto that unfortunate reality. Congress wrote key partsof theAct behind closed doors, rather than through thetraditional legislative process. Cannan, A LegislativeHistory of theAffordableCareAct:HowLegislativePro-cedureShapesLegislativeHistory,105L.Lib.J.131,163(2013). And Congress passed much of the Act using acomplicated budgetary procedure known as reconcilia-tion,which limited opportunities for debate andamend-ment,andbypassedtheSenatesnormal60-votefilibusterrequirement. Id., at 159167. As a result, theAct doesnotreflectthetypeofcareanddeliberationthatonemightexpect of such significant legislation. Cf. Frankfurter,

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SomeReflectionsontheReadingofStatutes,47Colum.L.Rev. 527, 545 (1947) (describing a cartoon in which asenator tells his colleagues I admit this new bill is toocomplicated to understand. Well just have to pass it tofindoutwhatitmeans. ).Anyway, we must do our best, bearing in mind the

fundamental canon of statutory construction that thewordsofastatutemustbereadintheircontextandwithaviewtotheirplaceintheoverallstatutoryscheme.Util- ity Air Regulatory Group,573U.S.,at___(slipop.,at15)(internalquotationmarksomitted).AfterreadingSection36B along with other related provisions in the Act, wecannotconcludethatthephraseanExchangeestablishedbytheStateunder[Section18031]isunambiguous.

BGiven that the text isambiguous,wemust turn to the

broaderstructureof theActtodeterminethemeaningofSection 36B. A provision thatmay seem ambiguous inisolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statu-toryscheme...becauseonlyoneofthepermissiblemean-ingsproducesasubstantiveeffectthatiscompatiblewiththerestofthelaw. United Sav. Assn. of Tex.v.Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371(1988). Here, the statutory scheme compels us to rejectpetitionersinterpretationbecauseitwoulddestabilizetheindividual insurancemarket inanyStatewithaFederalExchange,and likely create thevery death spirals thatCongressdesigned theAct toavoid. SeeNew York State Dept. of Social Servs. v.Dublino, 413U.S. 405, 419420(1973) (We cannot interpret federal statutes to negatetheirownstatedpurposes.).3

3The dissent notes that several other provisions in theAct use thephraseestablishedbytheState,andarguesthatourholdingappliesto each of those provisions. Post, at 56. But the presumption ofconsistent usage readily yields to context, and a statutory termmay

16 KINGv.BURWELL

OpinionoftheCourt

Asdiscussedabove,CongressbasedtheAffordableCareAct on three major reforms: first, the guaranteed issueand community rating requirements; second, a require-mentthatindividualsmaintainhealthinsurancecoverageormakeapaymenttotheIRS;andthird, thetaxcreditsfor individualswithhousehold incomesbetween100per-cent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. In aState that establishes its own Exchange, these threereformsworktogethertoexpandinsurancecoverage.Theguaranteed issue and community rating requirementsensure that anyone can buy insurance; the coverage re-quirement createsan incentive forpeople todo sobeforethey get sick; and the tax creditsit is hopedmakeinsurancemoreaffordable. Together,thosereformsmin-imize ... adverse selection and broaden the health in-surance risk pool to include healthy individuals, whichwill lower health insurance premiums. 42 U.S.C.18091(2)(I).Under petitioners reading, however, the Act would

operate quite differently in a State with a Federal Ex-change. As they see it, one of the Acts threemajor re-formsthe tax creditswould not apply. And a secondmajor reformthe coverage requirementwould notapply in a meaningful way. As explained earlier, thecoveragerequirementappliesonlywhenthecostofbuyinghealthinsurance(minustheamountofthetaxcredits) isless than eight percent of an individuals income. 26U.S.C.5000A(e)(1)(A),(e)(1)(B)(ii). Sowithoutthetaxcredits, the coverage requirement would apply to fewerindividuals. Anditwouldbealot fewer. In2014,approx- meandifferentthingsindifferentplaces.Utility Air Regulatory Group v.EPA, 573 U.S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 15) (internal quotationmarksomitted).Thatisparticularlytruewhen,ashere,theActisfarfromachef doeuvre of legislativedraftsmanship. Ibid. Because the otherprovisions cited by thedissent are not at issuehere,wedonotaddressthem.

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OpinionoftheCourt

imately 87 percent of peoplewho bought insurance on aFederalExchangedidsowithtaxcredits,andvirtuallyallofthosepeoplewouldbecomeexempt.HHS,A.Burke,A.Misra, & S. Sheingold, Premium Affordability, Competi-tion, and Choice in theHealth InsuranceMarketplace 5(2014); Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars asAmici Curiae1920. Ifpetitionersareright,therefore,onlyoneof the Acts three major reforms would apply in StateswithaFederalExchange.The combination of no tax credits and an ineffective

coveragerequirementcouldwellpushaStatesindividualinsurancemarketintoadeathspiral.Onestudypredictsthat premiumswould increase by 47 percent and enroll-ment would decrease by 70 percent. E. Saltzman & C.Eibner, The Effect of Eliminating the Affordable CareActs Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces(2015). Another study predicts that premiums wouldincreaseby35percentandenrollmentwoulddecreaseby69 percent. L. Blumberg, M. Buettgens, & J. Holahan,The Implications of a Supreme Court Finding for thePlaintiff inKingvs.Burwell:8.2MillionMoreUninsuredand 35% Higher Premiums (2015). And those effectswould not be limited to individuals who purchase insur-anceontheExchanges.BecausetheActrequiresinsurerstotreattheentireindividualmarketasasingleriskpool,42U.S.C. 18032(c)(1), premiums outside theExchangewouldrisealongwiththoseinsidetheExchange.BriefforBipartisanEconomicScholarsasAmici Curiae1112.ItisimplausiblethatCongressmeanttheActtooperate

in thismanner. SeeNational Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, ___ (2012) (SCALIA,KENNEDY, THOMAS, andALITO, JJ., dissenting) (slip op.,at 60) (Without the federal subsidies ... the exchangeswould not operate as Congress intended and may notoperateatall.).Congressmadetheguaranteedissueandcommunityratingrequirementsapplicable ineveryState

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OpinionoftheCourt

in the Nation. But those requirements only work whencombined with the coverage requirement and the taxcredits. So it stands to reason that Congressmeant forthoseprovisionstoapplyineveryStateaswell.4Petitioners respond that Congress was not worried

about the effects of withholding tax credits from Stateswith Federal Exchanges because Congress evidentlybelieved it was offering states a deal theywould not re-fuse. Brief forPetitioners36. CongressmayhavebeenwrongabouttheStateswillingnesstoestablishtheirownExchanges, petitioners continue, but that does not allowthisCourttorewritetheActtofixthatproblem.Thatisparticularlytrue,petitionersconclude,becausetheStateslikely would have created their own Exchanges in theabsence of the IRSRule,which eliminated any incentivethattheStateshadtodoso.Id.,at3638.Section 18041 refutes the argument that Congress

believed itwasoffering theStatesadeal theywouldnot

4The dissent argues that our analysis show[s] only that the statu-toryschemecontainsaflaw,onethatappearedaswellinotherpartsoftheAct. Post,at14.Forsupport,thedissentnotesthattheguaran-teed issue and community rating requirements might apply in thefederalterritories,eventhoughthecoveragerequirementdoesnot.Id., at1415.TheconfusionarisesfromthefactthattheguaranteedissueandcommunityratingrequirementswereaddedasamendmentstothePublic Health Service Act, which contains a definition of the wordStatethatincludestheterritories,42U.S.C.201(f),whilethelater-enactedAffordableCareAct contains a definition of theword Statethatexcludestheterritories,18024(d).Thepredicateforthedissentspointisthereforeuncertainatbest.ThedissentalsonotesthatadifferentpartoftheActestablisheda

long-term-careinsuranceprogramwithguaranteed-issueandcommunity-rating requirements, but without an individual mandate or subsi-dies.Post,at14.Trueenough.ButthefactthatCongresswaswillingto accept the risk of adverse selection in a comparativelyminor pro-gramdoesnotshowthatCongresswaswillingtodoso inthegeneralhealth insurance programthe very heart of the Act. Moreover,Congresssaidexpresslythatitwantedtoavoidadverseselectioninthehealthinsurancemarkets.18091(2)(I).

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OpinionoftheCourt

refuse. Thatsectionprovidesthat,ifaStateelectsnottoestablishanExchange, theSecretary shall ... establishandoperatesuchExchangewithintheState.42U.S.C.18041(c)(1)(A). The whole point of that provision is tocreate a federal fallback in case a State chooses not toestablish its own Exchange. Contrary to petitionersargument,CongressdidnotbelieveitwasofferingStatesadealtheywouldnotrefuseitexpresslyaddressedwhatwouldhappenifaStatedidrefusethedeal.

CFinally,thestructureofSection36Bitselfsuggeststhat

tax credits are not limited to State Exchanges. Section36B(a)initiallyprovidesthattaxcreditsshallbeallowedfor any applicable taxpayer. Section 36B(c)(1) thendefinesan applicable taxpayer as someonewho (amongotherthings)hasahouseholdincomebetween100percentand 400 percent of the federal poverty line. Together,thesetwoprovisionsappeartomakeanyoneinthespeci-fiedincomerangeeligibletoreceiveataxcredit.According to petitioners, however, those provisions are

anemptypromiseinStateswithaFederalExchange.Intheir view, anapplicable taxpayer in suchaStatewouldbe eligible for a tax creditbut the amount of that taxcreditwouldalwaysbezero. AndthatisbecausedivingseverallayersdownintotheTaxCodeSection36Bsaysthat the amount of the tax credits shall be an amountequaltothepremiumassistancecreditamount,36B(a);and then says that the term premium assistance creditamount means the sum of the premium assistanceamountsdeterminedunderparagraph (2)withrespect toall coveragemonthsof the taxpayeroccurringduring thetaxable year, 36B(b)(1); and then says that the termpremiumassistanceamountistiedtotheamountofthemonthly premium for insurance purchased on an Ex-change established by the State under [42 U.S.C.

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OpinionoftheCourt

18031],36B(b)(2);and thensays that the termcover-agemonthmeansanymonth inwhich the taxpayerhasinsurancethroughanExchangeestablishedbytheStateunder[42U.S.C.18031],36B(c)(2)(A)(i).Wehaveheld thatCongress doesnot alter the funda-

mental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms orancillary provisions. Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.,531U.S.457,468(2001).Butinpetitionersview,CongressmadetheviabilityoftheentireAffordableCareAct turnon theultimateancillaryprovision:a sub-sub-sub section of theTaxCode. Wedoubt that iswhatCongressmeant todo. HadCongressmeant to limit taxcreditstoStateExchanges,itlikelywouldhavedonesointhe definition of applicable taxpayer or in some otherprominentmanner. Itwouldnothaveusedsuchawind-ingpathof connect-the-dotsprovisionsabout theamountofthecredit.5

DPetitioners arguments about the plain meaning of

Section 36B are strong. But while the meaning of thephrase anExchange established by the State under [42U.S.C. 18031]may seemplain when viewed in isola-tion,suchareadingturnsouttobeuntenableinlightof[thestatute]asawhole.Department of Revenue of Ore.v.ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 343 (1994). In thisinstance,thecontextandstructureoftheActcompelustodepart from what would otherwise be the most naturalreadingofthepertinentstatutoryphrase.

5The dissent cites several provisions that make[] taxpayers of all

Stateseligibleforacredit,onlytoprovidelaterthattheamountofthecreditmay be zero. Post, at 11 (citing 26U.S.C. 24, 32, 35, 36).Noneof thoseprovisions,however, iscrucial to theviabilityofacom-prehensiveprogramliketheAffordableCareAct.Noonesuggests,forexample, that the first-time-homebuyer tax credit, 36, is essential totheviabilityoffederalhousingregulation.

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Relianceoncontextandstructureinstatutoryinterpre-tationisasubtlebusiness,callingforgreatwarinesslestwhatprofessestobemererenderingbecomescreationandattemptedinterpretationoflegislationbecomeslegislationitself. Palmerv.Massachusetts,308U.S.79,83 (1939).For thereasonswehavegiven,however, suchreliance isappropriate in this case, and leads us to conclude thatSection36Ballowstaxcreditsforinsurancepurchasedonany Exchange created under the Act. Those credits arenecessaryfortheFederalExchangestofunctionliketheirState Exchange counterparts, and to avoid the type ofcalamitousresultthatCongressplainlymeanttoavoid.

* * *In a democracy, the power tomake the law restswith

thosechosenbythepeople. Ourroleismoreconfinedtosaywhatthelawis. Marburyv.Madison,1Cranch137,177 (1803). That is easier in some cases than in others.ButineverycasewemustrespecttheroleoftheLegisla-ture,andtakecarenot toundowhat ithasdone. A fairreadingoflegislationdemandsafairunderstandingofthelegislativeplan.Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve

health insurancemarkets, not to destroy them. If at allpossible,wemust interpret theAct inaway that is con-sistentwiththeformer,andavoidsthelatter. Section36Bcan fairly be read consistent with what we see as Con-gresssplan,andthatisthereadingweadopt.ThejudgmentoftheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfor

theFourthCircuitisAffirmed.

_________________

_________________

1Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No.14114

DAVIDKING,ETAL.,PETITIONERSv.SYLVIA BURWELL,SECRETARYOFHEALTH

ANDHUMANSERVICES,ETAL. ONWRITOFCERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOF

APPEALSFORTHEFOURTHCIRCUIT [June25,2015]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS andJUSTICEALITOjoin,dissenting.TheCourt holds thatwhen thePatientProtection and

Affordable Care Act says Exchange established by theStateitmeansExchangeestablishedbytheStateortheFederalGovernment.Thatisofcoursequiteabsurd,andtheCourts21pagesofexplanationmakeitnolessso.

IThePatientProtectionandAffordableCareActmakes

major reforms to theAmericanhealth-insurancemarket.Itprovides,amongotherthings,thateveryStateshall...establish an American Health Benefit Exchangeamarketplace where people can shop for health-insuranceplans. 42U.S.C.18031(b)(1). AnditprovidesthatifaStatedoesnotcomplywiththisinstruction,theSecretaryofHealthandHumanServicesmustestablishandoper-atesuchExchangewithintheState. 18041(c)(1).AseparatepartoftheActhousedin36BoftheInter-

nalRevenueCodegrantspremiumtaxcreditstosubsi-dize certain purchases of health insurance made on Ex-changes. The tax credit consists of premiumassistanceamounts for coveragemonths. 26 U.S.C. 36B(b)(1).Anindividualhasacoveragemonthonlywhenheiscov-

2 KINGv.BURWELL

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

ered by an insurance plan thatwas enrolled in throughan Exchange established by the State under [18031].36B(c)(2)(A). And the law ties the size of the premiumassistanceamounttothepremiumsforhealthplanswhichcoverthe individualandwhichwereenrolled inthroughan Exchange established by the State under [18031].36B(b)(2)(A). The premium assistance amount furtherdepends on the cost of certain other insurance plans of-feredthroughthesameExchange.36B(b)(3)(B)(i).This case requires us to decide whether someone who

buysinsuranceonanExchangeestablishedbytheSecre-tarygetstaxcredits. Youwouldthinktheanswerwouldbe obviousso obvious therewould hardly be a need forthe Supreme Court to hear a case about it. In order toreceiveanymoneyunder36B,anindividualmustenrollinaninsuranceplanthroughanExchangeestablishedbytheState.TheSecretaryofHealthandHumanServicesisnotaState. SoanExchangeestablishedbytheSecre-tary isnot anExchangeestablishedby theStatewhichmeanspeoplewhobuyhealth insurancethroughsuchanExchangegetnomoneyunder36B.Words no longer havemeaning if anExchange that is

notestablishedbyaStateisestablishedbytheState.ItishardtocomeupwithaclearerwaytolimittaxcreditstostateExchangesthantousethewordsestablishedbythe State. And it is hard to come up with a reason toincludethewordsbytheStateotherthanthepurposeoflimitingcreditstostateExchanges.[T]heplain,obvious,andrationalmeaningofastatuteisalwaystobepreferredtoanycurious,narrow,hiddensensethatnothingbuttheexigencyofahardcaseandtheingenuityandstudyofanacute and powerful intellect would discover. Lynch v.Alworth-Stephens Co.,267U.S.364,370(1925) (internalquotation marks omitted). Under all the usual rules ofinterpretation, in short, theGovernment should lose thiscase. But normal rules of interpretation seemalways to

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

yieldtotheoverridingprincipleofthepresentCourt:TheAffordableCareActmustbesaved.

IITheCourtinterprets36Btoawardtaxcreditsonboth

federal and state Exchanges. It accepts that the mostnaturalsenseofthephraseExchangeestablishedbytheStateisanExchangeestablishedbyaState. Ante,at11.(Understatement, thy name is an opinion on the Afford-ableCareAct!) Yet the opinion continues,withno sem-blance of shame, that it is alsopossible that thephrasereferstoallExchangesbothStateandFederal.Ante,at13. (Impossiblepossibility,thynameisanopinionontheAffordableCareAct!) TheCourtclaimsthatthecontextand structure of theAct compel [it] to depart fromwhatwouldotherwisebethemostnaturalreadingoftheperti-nentstatutoryphrase. Ante,at21.IwholeheartedlyagreewiththeCourtthatsoundinter-

pretationrequirespayingattention to thewhole law,nothoming in on isolated words or even isolated sections.Contextalwaysmatters. Letusnotforget,however,whycontextmatters:Itisatoolforunderstandingthetermsofthelaw,notanexcuseforrewritingthem.Any effort to understand rather than to rewrite a law

must accept and apply the presumption that lawmakersuse words in their natural and ordinary signification.Pensacola Telegraph Co.v.Western Union Telegraph Co.,96 U.S. 1, 12 (1878). Ordinary connotation does notalways prevail, but the more unnatural the proposedinterpretation of a law, themore compelling the contex-tualevidencemustbetoshowthat it is correct. Todaysinterpretation is notmerely unnatural; it is unheard of.WhowouldeverhavedreamtthatExchangeestablishedbytheStatemeansExchangeestablishedbytheStateor the Federal Government? Littleshortofanexpressstatu-torydefinitioncouldjustifyadoptingthissingularreading.

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

YettheonlypertinentdefinitionhereprovidesthatStatemeans each of the 50 States and theDistrict of Colum-bia. 42 U.S.C. 18024(d). Because the Secretary isneitheroneofthe50StatesnortheDistrictofColumbia,that definition positively contradicts the eccentric theorythat anExchange established by the Secretary has beenestablishedbytheState.Farfromofferingtheoverwhelmingevidenceofmeaning

neededto justifytheCourts interpretation,othercontex-tual clues undermine it at every turn. To begin with,other parts of the Act sharply distinguish between theestablishment of an Exchange by a State and the estab-lishmentofanExchangebytheFederalGovernment.TheStates authority to set up Exchanges comes from oneprovision,18031(b);theSecretarysauthoritycomesfroman entirely different provision, 18041(c). Funding forStatestoestablishExchangescomesfromonepartofthelaw, 18031(a); funding for the Secretary to establishExchanges comes from an entirely different part of thelaw, 18121. States generally run state-created Ex-changes; the Secretary generally runs federally createdExchanges. 18041(b)(c). AndtheSecretarysauthoritytosetupanExchangeinaStatedependsupontheStates[f]ailure toestablish [an]Exchange. 18041(c) (empha-sisadded).ProvisionssuchasthesedestroyanypretensethatafederalExchangeisinsomesensealsoestablishedbyaState.Reading the restof theActalso confirms that,as rele-

vanthere,thereareonlytwowaystosetupanExchangeinaState:establishmentbyaStateandestablishmentbythe Secretary. 18031(b), 18041(c). So saying that anExchange established by the FederalGovernment is es-tablishedby theState goesbeyondgivingwordsbizarremeanings;itleavesthelimitingphrasebytheStatewithnooperativeeffectatall. Thatisastarkviolationoftheelementaryprinciplethatrequiresaninterpretertogive

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

effect, if possible, to every clauseandword of a statute.Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). Inweighingthisargument,itiswelltorememberthediffer-ence between giving a term a meaning that duplicatesanotherpartofthelaw,andgivingatermnomeaningatall. Lawmakers sometimes repeat themselveswhetherout of a desire to add emphasis, a sense of belt-and-suspenders caution, or a lawyerly penchant for doublets(aidandabet,ceaseanddesist,nullandvoid). Lawmak-ersdonot,however,tendtousetermsthathavenooper-ation at all. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174(1803). So while the rule against treating a term as aredundancyisfarfromcategorical,theruleagainsttreat-ing it as a nullity is as close to absolute as interpretiveprinciples get. TheCourts readingdoesnotmerely givebytheStateaduplicativeeffect;itcausesthephrasetohavenoeffectwhatever.Makingmattersworse,thereaderofthewholeActwill

comeacrossanumberofprovisionsbeyond36Bthatreferto the establishment of Exchanges by States. Adoptingthe Courts interpretationmeans nullifying the term bytheStatenot justonce,butagainandagain throughouttheAct. ConsiderforthemomentonlythosepartsoftheAct thatmentionanExchangeestablishedbytheStateinconnectionwithtaxcredits:

x The formula for calculating the amount of the taxcredit, as already explained, twicementions an Ex-change established by the State. 26 U.S.C.36B(b)(2)(A),(c)(2)(A)(i).

x TheActdirectsStatestoscreenchildrenforeligibilityfor [tax credits] under section 36B and for anyotherassistanceorsubsidiesavailableforcoverageob-tained through an Exchange established by theState. 42U.S.C.1396w3(b)(1)(B)(C).

x The Act requires an Exchange established by the

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

State to use a secure electronic interface to deter-mine eligibility for (among other things) tax credits.1396w3(b)(1)(D).

x TheAct authorizes an Exchange established by theStatetomakearrangementsunderwhichotherstateagenciesdeterminewhetheraStateresidentiseligi-ble for [tax credits] under section 36B. 1396w3(b)(2).

x TheActdirectsStatestooperateWebsitesthatallowanyone who is eligible to receive [tax credits]undersection 36B to compare insurance plans offeredthrough an Exchange established by the State.1396w3(b)(4).

x One of theActs provisions addresses the enrollmentofcertainchildreninhealthplansofferedthroughanExchange established by the State and then dis-cussestheeligibilityofthesechildrenfortaxcredits.1397ee(d)(3)(B).

It is bad enough for a court to cross out by the Stateonce. Butseventimes?Congressdidnot, by theway, repeat Exchange estab-

lishedbytheStateunder[18031]byrotethroughouttheAct.Quitethecontrary,clauseafterclauseofthelawusesa more general term such as Exchange or Exchangeestablished under [18031]. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.18031(k),18033;26U.S.C.6055.Itiscommonsensethatany speakerwho says Exchange someof the time,but Exchange established by the State the rest of thetime,probablymeanssomethingbythecontrast.Equating establishment by the State with establish-

mentbytheFederalGovernmentmakesnonsenseofotherparts of the Act. The Act requires States to ensure (onpain of losing Medicaid funding) that any Exchangeestablished by the State uses a secure electronic inter-

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

face to determine an individuals eligibility for variousbenefits (including tax credits). 42 U.S.C. 1396w3(b)(1)(D). HowcouldaStatecontrolthetypeofelectronicinterface used by a federalExchange? TheAct allows aState to control contracting decisions made by an Ex-change established by the State. 18031(f)(3). WhywouldaStategettocontrolthecontractingdecisionsofafederal Exchange? The Act also provides Assistance toStates to establish American Health Benefit Exchangesand directs the Secretary to renew this funding if theState ... ismaking progress ... toward ... establishinganExchange. 18031(a).DoesaStatethatrefusestosetupanExchangestillreceivethisfunding,onthepremisethat Exchanges established by the Federal GovernmentarereallyestablishedbyStates?Itispresumablyinorderto avoid these questions that the Court concludes thatfederal Exchanges count as state Exchanges only forpurposes of the tax credits. Ante, at 13. (Contrivance,thynameisanopinionontheAffordableCareAct!)It is probably piling on to add that the Congress that

wrote the Affordable Care Act knew how to equate twodifferenttypesofExchangeswhenitwantedtodoso.TheActincludesaclauseprovidingthat[a]territorythat...establishes ... an Exchange ... shall be treated as aState for certainpurposes. 18043(a) (emphasisadded).Tellingly, itdoesnot includeacomparableclauseprovid-ingthattheSecretary shallbetreatedasaStateforpur-posesof36BwhensheestablishesanExchange.Facedwith overwhelming confirmation that Exchange

established by the State means what it looks like itmeans, the Court comes up with argument after feebleargumenttosupport itscontrary interpretation. Noneofits tries comes close to establishing the implausible con-clusionthatCongressusedbytheStatetomeanbytheStateornotbytheState.TheCourtemphasizesthatifaStatedoesnotsetupan

8 KINGv.BURWELL

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

Exchange,theSecretarymustestablishsuchExchange.18041(c). It claims that the word such implies thatfederalandstateExchangesarethesame. Ante,at13.Toseetheerrorinthisreasoning,oneneedonlyconsideraparallel provision from our Constitution: The Times,PlacesandMannerofholdingElections forSenatorsandRepresentatives, shallbeprescribed ineachStateby theLegislaturethereof;buttheCongressmayatanytimebyLaw make or alter such Regulations. Art.I, 4, cl.1(emphasisadded). JustastheAffordableCareActdirectsStates to establish Exchanges while allowing the Secre-tarytoestablishsuchExchangeasa fallback, theElec-tionsClausedirectsstatelegislaturestoprescribeelectionregulationswhileallowingCongresstomakesuchRegu-lationsasafallback.Wouldanybodyrefertoanelectionregulationmade byCongress as a regulation prescribedbythestate legislature? Wouldanybodysaythata fed-eral election law and a state election law are in all re-spects equivalent? Of coursenot. Theword such doesnothelp theCourt onewhit. TheCourtsargumentalsooverlooks the rudimentaryprinciple thata specificprovi-siongovernsageneralone. Evenif itweretruethattheterm such Exchange in 18041(c) implies that federaland state Exchanges are the same in general, the termestablishedbytheState in36Bmakesplainthat theydifferwhenitcomestotaxcreditsinparticular.The Courts next bit of interpretive jiggery-pokery in-

volvesotherpartsoftheActthatpurportedlypresupposethe availability of tax credits on both federal and stateExchanges.Ante,at1314.ItiscuriousthattheCourtiswilling to subordinate the express words of the sectionthat grants tax credits to themere implications of otherprovisionswithonlytangentialconnectionstotaxcredits.Onewouldthinkthatinterpretationwouldworktheotherway around. In any event, each of the provisions men-tioned by the Court is perfectly consistent with limiting

9Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

taxcreditstostateExchanges.Oneofthemsaysthattheminimum functions of an Exchange include (alongsideseveral tasks that have nothing to do with tax credits)settingupanelectroniccalculatorthatshowstheactualcostofcoverageaftertheapplicationofanypremiumtaxcredit.42U.S.C.18031(d)(4)(G).WhatstopsafederalExchanges electronic calculator from telling a customerthathistaxcreditiszero?AnotherprovisionrequiresanExchangesoutreachprogramtoeducatethepublicabouthealth plans, to facilitate enrollment, and to distributefairandimpartialinformationaboutenrollmentandtheavailability of premium tax credits. 18031(i)(3)(B).What stops a federal Exchanges outreach program fromfairlyandimpartiallytellingcustomersthatnotaxcreditsareavailable? AthirdprovisionrequiresanExchangetoreport information about each insurance plan soldincludinglevelofcoverage,premium,nameoftheinsured,and amount of any advance payment of the tax credit.26 U.S.C. 36B(f)(3). What stops a federal Exchangesreportfromconfirmingthatnotaxcreditshavebeenpaidout?The Court persists that these provisions would make

little sense if no tax credits were available on federalExchanges. Ante, at 14. Even if that observation weretrue, it would show only oddity, not ambiguity. Lawsoften include unusual or mismatched provisions. TheAffordableCareActspans900pages;itwouldbeamazingif its provisions all lined up perfectly with each other.ThisCourtdoesnotreviselegislation...justbecausethetextaswritten createsanapparentanomaly. Michigan v.Bay Mills Indian Community,572U.S.___,___(2014)(slip op., at10). Atany rate, theprovisions citedby theCourt are not particularly unusual. Each requires anExchangetoperformastandardizedseriesoftasks,someaspects ofwhich relate in someway to tax credits. It isentirely natural for slightmismatches to occurwhen, as

10 KINGv.BURWELL

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

here, lawmakers draft a single statutory provision tocover different kinds of situations. Robers v. United States,572U.S.___,___(2014)(slipop.,at4).Lawmak-ers need not, and often do not, write extra languagespecifically exempting, phrase by phrase, applications inrespecttowhichaportionofaphraseisnotneeded. Ibid. Roamingevenfartherafieldfrom36B,theCourtturns

totheActsprovisionsaboutqualifiedindividuals. Ante, at1011. QualifiedindividualsreceivefavoredtreatmentonExchanges, although customerswho are not qualifiedindividualsmayalso shop there. SeeHalbig v.Burwell,758F.3d 390, 404405 (CADC2014). TheCourt claimsthattheActmustequatefederalandstateestablishmentof Exchanges when it defines a qualified individual assomeonewho(amongotherthings)livesintheStatethatestablished the Exchange, 42 U.S.C. 18032(f)(1)(A).Otherwise, the Court says, there would be no qualifiedindividuals on federal Exchanges, contradicting (for ex-ample) the provision requiring every Exchange to takethe interests of qualified individuals into accountwhen selecting health plans. Ante, at 11 (quoting18031(e)(1)(b)).Pureapplesauce.Imaginethatauniver-sitysendsaroundabulletinremindingeveryprofessortotake the interests of graduate students into accountwhensettingofficehours,but thatsomeprofessors teachonly undergraduates. Would anybody reason that thebulletin implicitly presupposes that every professor hasgraduate students, so that graduate students mustreallymeangraduateorundergraduatestudents?Surelynot. Just as one naturally reads instructions aboutgraduate students tobe inapplicable to theextentapar-ticular professor has no such students, so toowould onenaturally read instructionsaboutqualified individuals tobeinapplicabletotheextentaparticularExchangehasnosuch individuals. There is no need to rewrite the termStatethatestablishedtheExchange inthedefinitionof

11Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

qualified individual, much less a need to rewrite theseparate term Exchange established by the State in aseparatepartoftheAct.Leastconvincingofall,however,istheCourtsattempt

touncoversupport for its interpretationinthestructureof Section 36B itself. Ante, at 19. The Court finds itstrange thatCongress limited the tax credit to stateEx-changes in the formula for calculating theamount of thecredit, rather than in theprovisiondefining the range oftaxpayerseligible forthecredit. HadtheCourtbotheredtolookattherestoftheTaxCode,itwouldhaveseenthatthe structure it finds strange is in fact quite common.Consider, for example, themanyprovisions that initiallymaketaxpayersofallincomeseligibleforataxcredit,onlytoprovidelaterthattheamountofthecreditiszeroifthetaxpayersincomeexceedsaspecifiedthreshold.See,e.g., 26U.S.C. 24 (child tax credit); 32 (earned-income taxcredit);36(first-time-homebuyertaxcredit). Orconsider,for an even closer parallel, a neighboring provision thatinitiallymakestaxpayersofallStateseligibleforacredit,onlytoprovidelaterthattheamountofthecreditmaybezero if the taxpayers State does not satisfy certain re-quirements. See 35 (health-insurance-costs tax credit).OnebeginstogetthesensethattheCourtsinsistenceonreading things in context applies to established by theState,buttonothingelse.Forwhatitisworth,lawmakersusuallydrafttax-credit

provisions the way they doi.e., the way they drafted36Bbecause the mechanics of the credit require it.ManyAmericansmovetonewStatesinthemiddleoftheyear. Mentioning state Exchanges in the definition ofcoveragemonthratherthan(astheCourtproposes)inthe provisions concerning taxpayers eligibility for thecreditaccounts for taxpayerswho live inaStatewithastateExchange forapartof theyear,butaStatewithafederal Exchange for the rest of the year. In addition,

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

36B awards a credit with respect to insurance planswhich cover the taxpayer, the taxpayers spouse, or any dependent ...of the taxpayerandwhichwereenrolled inthrough an Exchange established by the State.36B(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). If Congress had men-tioned state Exchanges in the provisions discussing tax-payers eligibility for the credit, a taxpayer who buysinsurance from a federal Exchangewould get nomoney,evenifhehasaspouseordependentwhobuysinsurancefromastateExchangesayachildattendingcollegeinadifferentState.ItthusmakesperfectsenseforExchangeestablishedby theState toappearwhere itdoes, ratherthanwheretheCourtsuggests. Evenifthatwerenotso,ofcourse,itslocationwouldnotmakeitanylessclear.TheCourthasnotcomeclosetopresentingthecompel-

ling contextual case necessary to justify departing fromtheordinarymeaningof the termsof the law. Quite thecontrary, context only underscores the outlandishness ofthe Courts interpretation. Reading the Act as a wholeleavesnodoubtabout thematter: Exchange establishedbytheStatemeanswhatitlookslikeitmeans.

IIIForitsnextdefenseoftheindefensible,theCourtturns

to the Affordable Care Acts design and purposes. Asrelevant here, the Act makes three major reforms. Theguaranteed-issue and community-rating requirementsprohibit insurers from considering a customers healthwhendecidingwhethertosellinsuranceandhowmuchtocharge, 42U.S.C. 300gg, 300gg1; its famous individ-ual mandate requires everyone to maintain insurancecoverage or to pay what the Act calls a penalty, 26U.S.C. 5000A(b)(1), and what we have nonethelesscalledatax,seeNational Federation of Independent Busi-ness v.Sebelius,567U.S.___,___(2012)(slipop.,at39);and its tax creditshelpmake insurancemoreaffordable.

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

The Court reasons that Congress intended these threereformstoworktogethertoexpandinsurancecoverage;andbecausethefirsttwoapplyineveryState,somustthethird. Ante,at16.This reasoning suffers from no shortage of flaws. To

beginwith,eventhemostformidableargumentconcern-ing the statutes purposes couldnot overcome the clarity[of] thestatutes text. Kloeckner v.Solis, 568U.S. ___,___,n.4(2012)(slipop.,at14,n.4).Statutorydesignandpurpose matter only to the extent they help clarify anotherwise ambiguous provision. Could anyone maintainwithastraightfacethat36Bisunclear?Tomentionjustthe highlights, the Courts interpretation clashes with astatutorydefinition,renderswordsinoperativeinatleastseven separate provisions of the Act, overlooks the con-trast between provisions that say Exchange and thosethat say Exchange established by the State, gives thesamephraseonemeaning forpurposesof tax creditsbutanentirelydifferentmeaningforotherpurposes,and(letus not forget) contradicts the ordinary meaning of thewordsCongressused. Ontheothersideoftheledger,theCourt has come up with nothing more than a generalprovisionthatturnsouttobecontrolledbyaspecificone,ahandfulofclausesthatareconsistentwitheitherunder-standingofestablishmentbytheState,andaresemblancebetween the tax-credit provision and the rest of the TaxCode. Ifthatisallittakestomakesomethingambiguous,everythingisambiguous.Having gone wrong in consulting statutory purpose at

all,theCourtgoeswrongagaininanalyzingit.Thepur-poses ofa lawmustbe collected chiefly from itswords,not from extrinsic circumstances. Sturges v. Crown-inshield,4Wheat.122,202(1819)(Marshall,C.J.).Onlyby concentrating on the laws terms can a judge hope touncovertheschemeof the statute,ratherthansomeotherschemethatthejudgethinksdesirable.Likeitornot,the

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

expresstermsoftheAffordableCareActmakeonlytwoofthe three reforms mentioned by the Court applicable inStates that do not establish Exchanges. It is perfectlypossible for themtooperate independentlyof taxcredits.Theguaranteed-issueandcommunity-ratingrequirementscontinue to ensure that insurance companies treat allcustomersthesamenomattertheirhealth,andtheindi-vidualmandatecontinuestoencouragepeopletomaintaincoverage,lesttheybetaxed.The Court protests that without the tax credits, the

number of people covered by the individual mandateshrinks, and without a broadly applicable individualmandate the guaranteed-issue and community-ratingrequirements woulddestabilize the individual insurancemarket. Ante, at 15. If true, these projections wouldshowonlythatthestatutoryschemecontainsaflaw;theywould not show that the statute means the opposite ofwhatitsays. Moreover,itisaflawthatappearedaswellin other parts of theAct. A different title established along-term-care insurance program with guaranteed-issueand community-rating requirements, but without anindividualmandateorsubsidies. 80018002,124Stat.828847(2010). Thisprogramnevercameintoeffectonlybecause Congress, in response to actuarial analyses pre-dictingthatthe[program]wouldbefiscallyunsustainable,repealedtheprovisionin2013.Halbig,758F.3d,at410.How could the Court say that Congress would neverdream of combining guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements with a narrow individual mandate,when it combined those requirementswithno individualmandateinthecontextoflong-term-careinsurance?Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Ser-

vicesoriginallyinterpretedtheActtoimposeguaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements in theFederalTerritories,eventhoughtheActplainlydoesnotmaketheindividualmandateapplicablethere. Ibid.;see26U.S.C.

15Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

5000A(f)(4); 42U.S.C. 201(f). This combination, pre-dictably, [threw] individual insurance markets in theterritoriesintoturmoil. Halbig, supra,at410.Respond-ingtocomplaintsfromtheTerritories,theDepartmentatfirst insisted that it had no statutory authority to ad-dresstheproblemandsuggestedthattheTerritoriesseeklegislative relief fromCongress instead. Letter fromG.Cohen, Director of the Center for Consumer Informationand Insurance Oversight, to S. Igisomar, Secretary ofCommerce of the Commonwealth of Northern MarianaIslands (July 12, 2013). The Department changed itsmind a year later, after what it described as a carefulreview of [the] situation and the relevant statutory lan-guage. Letter from M. Tavenner, Administrator of theCentersforMedicareandMedicaidServices,toG.Francis,Insurance Commissioner of the Virgin Islands (July 16,2014). HowcouldtheCourtpronounceitimplausibleforCongress to have tolerated instability in insurancemar-kets inStateswith federalExchanges,ante, at 17,wheneven the Government maintained until recently thatCongressdidexactlythatinAmericanSamoa,Guam,theNorthern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the VirginIslands?Compounding its errors, theCourt forgets that it isno

moreappropriatetoconsideroneofastatutespurposesinisolation than it is to consideroneof itswords thatway.Nolawpursuesjustonepurposeatallcosts,andnostatu-toryschemeencompassesjustoneelement.Mostrelevanthere, the Affordable Care Act displays a congressionalpreference for state participation in the establishment ofExchanges:EachStategetsthefirstopportunitytosetupits Exchange, 42 U.S.C. 18031(b); States that take upthe opportunity receive federal funding for activities ...related to establishing an Exchange, 18031(a)(3); andtheSecretarymayestablishanExchange inaStateonlyas a fallback, 18041(c). But settingup and running an

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

Exchange involve significant burdensmeeting strictdeadlines, 18041(b), implementing requirements relatedtotheofferingofinsuranceplans,18031(d)(4),settingupoutreach programs, 18031(i), and ensuring that theExchange is self-sustaining by 2015, 18031(d)(5)(A). AStatewouldhavemuch lessreason to takeon thesebur-densifitscitizenscouldreceivetaxcreditsnomatterwhoestablishesitsExchange.(NowthattheInternalRevenueService has interpreted 36B to authorize tax creditseverywhere, by the way, 34 States have failed to set uptheir own Exchanges. Ante, at 6.) So even if makingcredits available on all Exchanges advances the goal ofimproving healthcare markets, it frustrates the goal ofencouraging state involvement in the implementation oftheAct. Thisiswhatjustifiesgoingoutofourwaytoreadestablished by the State to mean established by theStateornotestablishedbytheState?Worst of all for the repute of todays decision, the

Courts reasoning is largely self-defeating. The CourtpredictsthatmakingtaxcreditsunavailableinStatesthatdonotsetuptheirownExchangeswouldcausedisastrouseconomic consequences there. If that is so, however,wouldntoneexpectStatestoreactbysettinguptheirownExchanges?AndwouldntthatoutcomesatisfytwooftheActsgoalsratherthanjustone:enablingtheActsreformsto work and promoting state involvement in the Actsimplementation? TheCourtprotests that theveryexist-ence of a federal fallback shows that Congress expectedthatsomeStatesmightfailtosetuptheirownExchanges.Ante, at19. So itdoes. Itdoesnot show,however, that CongressexpectedthenumberofrecalcitrantStatestobeparticularly large. The more accurate the Courts direeconomicpredictions,thesmallerthatnumberislikelytobe. ThatrealitydestroystheCourtspretensethatapply-ing the lawaswrittenwould imperil theviabilityof theentireAffordableCareAct. Ante, at 20. All in all, the

17Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

Courtsargumentsaboutthelawspurposeanddesignarenomoreconvincingthanitsargumentsaboutcontext.

IVPerhapssensingthedismalfailureofitseffortstoshow

thatestablishedbytheStatemeansestablishedbytheStateortheFederalGovernment,theCourttriestopalmoff the pertinent statutory phrase as inartful drafting.Ante, at 14. This Court, however, has no free-floatingpower to rescue Congress from its drafting errors.Lamie v.United States Trustee,540U.S.526,542(2004)(internal quotationmarks omitted). Onlywhen it is pa-tentlyobvioustoareasonablereaderthatadraftingmis-takehas occurredmay a court correct themistake. Theoccurrenceofamisprintmaybeapparentfromthefaceofthe law, as it is where the Affordable Care Act createsthreeseparateSection1563s.Ante,at14.ButtheCourtdoes not pretend that there is any such indication of adrafting error on the face of 36B. The occurrence of amisprintmayalsobeapparentbecauseaprovisiondecreesan absurd resulta consequence somonstrous, that allmankindwould,withouthesitation,uniteinrejectingtheapplication. Sturges, 4Wheat., at 203. But 36B doesnot come remotely close to satisfying that demandingstandard. It is entirely plausible that tax credits wererestricted to state Exchanges deliberatelyfor example,in order to encourage States to establish their own Ex-changes. We therefore have no authority to dismiss thetermsofthelawasadraftingfumble.Let us not forget that the term Exchange established

bytheStateappearstwicein36BandfivemoretimesinotherpartsoftheActthatmentiontaxcredits.Whatarethe odds, do you think, that the same slip of thepen oc-curredinsevenseparateplaces?NoprovisionoftheActnone at allcontradicts the limitation of tax credits tostateExchanges.AndasIhavealreadyexplained,usesof

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

thetermExchangeestablishedbytheStatebeyondthecontextoftaxcreditslookanythingbutaccidental.Supra,at6. Iftherewasamistakehere,contextsuggestsitwasa substantivemistake in designing this part of the law,notatechnicalmistakeintranscribingit.

VTheCourtsdecisionreflectsthephilosophythatjudges

shouldendurewhateverinterpretivedistortionsittakesinordertocorrectasupposedflawinthestatutorymachin-ery. Thatphilosophy ignorestheAmericanpeoplesdeci-siontogiveCongress [a]lllegislativePowersenumeratedintheConstitution. Art.I,1. TheymadeCongress,notthisCourt,responsibleforbothmakinglawsandmendingthem. This Court holds only the judicial powerthepower to pronounce the law as Congress has enacted it.We lack the prerogative to repair laws that do notworkoutinpractice,justasthepeoplelacktheabilitytothrowusoutofofficeiftheydislikethesolutionsweconcoct.Wemust always remember, therefore, that [o]ur task is toapplythetext,nottoimproveuponit. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Indus-tries Corp.,493U.S.120,126(1989).Trying to make its judge-empowering approach seem

respectful of congressional authority, the Court assertsthat itsdecisionmerelyensuresthattheAffordableCareAct operates the way Congress meant [it] to operate.Ante, at 17. First of all, whatmakes the Court so surethat Congress meant tax credits to be available every-where? OuronlyevidenceofwhatCongressmeantcomesfrom the termsof the law,and those termsshowbeyondall question that tax credits are available only on stateExchanges.Moreimportantly,theCourtforgetsthatoursisagovernmentof lawsandnotofmen. Thatmeansweare governed by the terms of our laws, not by theunen-actedwillofourlawmakers. IfCongressenactedintolaw

19Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

somethingdifferentfromwhatit intended,thenitshouldamendthestatutetoconformtoitsintent.Lamie,supra,at542. Inthemeantime,thisCourthasnorovinglicense...todisregardclearlanguagesimplyontheviewthat...Congress must have intended something broader. Bay Mills,572U.S.,at___(slipop.,at11).Even less defensible, if possible, is the Courts claim

thatitsinterpretiveapproachisjustifiedbecausethisActdoesnotreflectthetypeofcareanddeliberationthatonemightexpectofsuchsignificantlegislation.Ante,at1415. Itisnotourplacetojudgethequalityofthecareanddeliberation thatwent into thisoranyother law. A lawenacted by voice vote with no deliberation whatever isfully as binding upon us as one enacted after years ofstudy, months of committee hearings, and weeks of de-bate. Much less is itourplace tomakeeverything comeoutrightwhenCongressdoesnotdoitsjobproperly.ItisuptoCongresstodesignitslawswithcare,anditisuptothepeopletoholdthemtoaccountiftheyfailtocarryoutthatresponsibility.Rather than rewriting the law under the pretense of

interpretingit,theCourtshouldhaveleftittoCongresstodecidewhattodoabouttheActslimitationoftaxcreditstostateExchanges. IfCongressvaluesaboveeverythingelse the Acts applicability across the country, it couldmaketaxcreditsavailableineveryExchange.Ifitprizesstate involvement in the Acts implementation, it couldcontinue to limit tax credits to state Exchanges whiletakingotherstepstomitigatetheeconomicconsequencespredicted by the Court. If Congress wants to accommo-datebothgoals,itcouldmaketaxcreditsavailableevery-where while offering new incentives for States to set uptheir own Exchanges. And if Congress thinks that thepresent design of theActworkswell enough, it could donothing. Congress could also do something else alto-gether,entirelyabandoningthestructureoftheAffordable

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SCALIA,J.,dissenting

CareAct. TheCourtsinsistenceonmakingachoicethatshould be made by Congress both aggrandizes judicialpowerandencouragescongressionallassitude.Just ponder the significance of the Courts decision to

takematters into itsownhands. TheCourts revisionofthelawauthorizestheInternalRevenueServicetospendtensofbillionsofdollarseveryyearintaxcreditsonfed-eralExchanges. Itaffects thepriceof insurance formil-lionsofAmericans. ItdiminishestheparticipationoftheStatesintheimplementationoftheAct.Itvastlyexpandsthe reach of the Acts individual mandate, whose scopedepends in part on the availability of credits. What aparodytodaysdecisionmakesofHamiltonsassurancestothe people of New York: The legislature not only com-mands the purse but prescribes the rules by which thedutiesandrightsofeverycitizenaretoberegulated.Thejudiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over ... thepurse; no direction ... of the wealth of society, and cantakenoactiveresolutionwhatever.ItmaytrulybesaidtohaveneitherFORCEnorWILLbutmerelyjudgment. TheFederalistNo.78,p.465(C.Rossitered.1961).

* * *Todays opinion changes the usual rules of statutory

interpretation for the sake of the Affordable Care Act.That, alas, is not a novelty. In National Federation of Independent Business v.Sebelius,567U.S.___,thisCourtrevisedmajor components of the statute in order to savethem from unconstitutionality. The Act that Congresspassed provides that every individual shall maintaininsurance or else pay a penalty. 26 U.S.C. 5000A.ThisCourt,however,sawthattheCommerceClausedoesnotauthorizeafederalmandatetobuyhealthinsurance.So it rewrote the mandate-cum-penalty as a tax. 567U.S., at ______ (principal opinion) (slip op., at 1545).TheActthatCongresspassedalsorequireseveryStateto

21Citeas: 576U.S.____(2015)

SCALIA,J.,dissenting

acceptanexpansionof itsMedicaidprogram,orelserisklosing all Medicaid funding. 42 U.S.C. 1396c. ThisCourt, however, saw that the Spending Clause does notauthorizethiscoercivecondition. Soitrewrotethelawtowithhold only the incremental funds associated with theMedicaid expansion. 567 U.S., at ______ (principalopinion) (slip op., at 4558). Having transformed twomajor parts of the law, the Court today has turned itsattentiontoathird. TheActthatCongresspassedmakestaxcreditsavailableonlyonanExchangeestablishedbytheState. ThisCourt,however,concludesthatthislimi-tationwouldprevent therestof theAct fromworkingaswellashoped. Soitrewritesthelawtomaketaxcreditsavailable everywhere. We should start calling this lawSCOTUScare.PerhapsthePatientProtectionandAffordableCareAct

willattain theenduringstatusof theSocialSecurityActortheTaft-HartleyAct;perhapsnot.ButthisCourtstwodecisions on the Act will surely be remembered throughthe years. The somersaults of statutory interpretationtheyhaveperformed(penaltymeanstax,further[Medi-caid] payments to the State means only incrementalMedicaidpaymentstotheState,establishedbytheStatemeans not established by the State)will be cited by liti-gantsendlessly, to theconfusionofhonest jurisprudence.Andthecaseswillpublish foreverthediscouragingtruththattheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesfavorssomelawsoverothers,andispreparedtodowhateverittakestoupholdandassistitsfavorites. Idissent.

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