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Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report Project Number: 45157 November 2013
People’s Republic of China: Strengthening Institutional Reform and Capacity Building (Financed by TA 7862-PRC)
Sub-Project 1： Mineral Resources Taxation Reform in the People’s Republic
of China：Restructuring Incentive Mechanisms for Green Development
中国矿产资源税费制度改革：重构绿色发展的激励机制
Prepared by the Consultant Team of “Policy Study on Mineral Resources Taxation Reform in the People’s Republic of China” For Executing Agency: Ministry of Finance, People’s Republic of China
Implementing Agency: Tax Policy Department, MOF
This consultant’s report does not necessarily reflect the views of ADB or the Government concerned, and ADB and the Government cannot be held liable for its contents
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Sub-project 1 Synopsis of Final Report Mineral Resources Taxation Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Restructuring Incentive Mechanisms for Green Development
终期报告摘要终期报告摘要终期报告摘要终期报告摘要
中国矿产资源税中国矿产资源税中国矿产资源税中国矿产资源税费费费费制制制制度度度度改革改革改革改革：：：：重构绿色发展重构绿色发展重构绿色发展重构绿色发展
的激励机制的激励机制的激励机制的激励机制
Prepared by the Consultant Team of “Policy Study on China’s Mineral Resource Taxation Reform”
《中国矿产资源税费制度改革政策研究》咨询专家组
November 2013
2013 年 11 月
Consultant Team
咨询专家组
CHEN Zhiyong Professor, School of Public Finance and Taxation,
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law 陈志勇 中南财经政法大学财政税务学院教授
CAI Hongying Professor, School of Public Economy and Management, Hubei
College of Economics 蔡红英 湖北经济学院公共经济与管理学院教授
SHI Wenpo Researcher, Fiscal Studies Institute of Ministry of Finance 施文泼 财政部财政科学研究所研究所
XUE Gang Professor, School of Public Finance and Taxation, Zhongnan
University of Economics and Law 薛 钢 中南财经政法大学财政税务学院教授
XIE Hongtao Lecturer, School of Public Finance and Taxation, Zhongnan
University of Economics and Law 解洪涛 中南财经政法大学财政税务学院讲师
HU Kai Associate Professor, School of Public Economy and
Management, Hubei College of Economics 胡 凯 湖北经济学院公共经济与管理学院副教授
WEI Tao Lecturer, School of Public Economy and Management, Hubei
College of Economics 魏 涛 湖北经济学院公共经济与管理学院讲师
Project Officer
项目官员
KHOR Niny Economist, Asian Development Bank PRC Resident Mission 许霓妮 亚洲开发银行驻中国代表处经济学家
XU Sha Associate Project Analyst, Asian Development Bank PRC
Resident Mission 徐 莎 亚洲开发银行驻中国代表处助理项目分析师
Table of Contents
I. AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT OF MINERAL-RESOURCE TAXATION IN
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1
II. NATURAL RESOURCES TAXATION IN THE PRC: CURRENT SYSTEM 5
2.1 Lack of an overall definition for the tax and fee system 5
2.2 Consumption of natural resources little affected 8
2.3 Taxation provides little incentive for enterprises to accelerate technological
innovation and refine production processes 9
2.4 Lack of social and eco-compensation 11
III. EXPERIENCE FROM MINERAL-RESOURCES TAXATION ABROAD 13
3.1 Mineral-Resource Taxes and Free System Adaptive to Mining Production
Features 13
3.2 Different Instruments in Mineral-Resource Taxes and Free System 13
3.3 Core function in Mineral-Resource Taxes and Free System 14
3.4 Dynamic Mechanism in Mineral-Resource Taxes and Free System 14
3.5 Distribution Mechanism in Mineral-Resource Taxes and Free System 14
IV. OPTIONS FOR FUTURE MINERAL-RESOURCES TAXATION REFORM 16
4.1 Simplify and integrate the taxation and fee system for sustainable development
17
4.2 Mineral-resource taxes need to be significantly increased in accordance with
the exhaustion rate of resources 18
4.3 Taxation rates should be differentiated to preserve vital mineral resources and
minimize the destructive environmental consequences of mining. 20
4.4 Reform the distribution of resource taxes between the central local
governments 22
4.5 Formulate uniform regulations for the usage of resource taxes and enhance the
functions of resource taxes through budget means 23
4.6 Establish a trans-department fund supervisory system to strengthen supervision
of levies and expenditures of local resource taxes 24
4.7 Subsidize groups whose interests have been undermined, including local
residents 25
目目目目 录录录录 一、中国矿产资源税费制度的演变及现状一、中国矿产资源税费制度的演变及现状一、中国矿产资源税费制度的演变及现状一、中国矿产资源税费制度的演变及现状 26 二、中国矿产资源税费制度问题分析二、中国矿产资源税费制度问题分析二、中国矿产资源税费制度问题分析二、中国矿产资源税费制度问题分析 28 （一）矿产资源税、费体系缺乏统一功能界定 28 （二）从量征收方式导致资源税费宏观调控弱化 28 （三）当前资源税制无法激励矿业进行技术创新 29 （四）资源税制无法激励企业进行社会成本补偿 29 三、各国矿产资源税费的制度借鉴三、各国矿产资源税费的制度借鉴三、各国矿产资源税费的制度借鉴三、各国矿产资源税费的制度借鉴 30 （一）矿产资源税费制度应适应矿产资源产业特征 30 （二）矿产资源税费制度应该包括多环节、多类型的税费工具 30 （三）矿产资源税费制度建设应确定相应的核心税费 30 （四）矿产资源税费制度应保持动态机制 31 （五）矿产资源税费收入归属向地方政府倾斜 31 四、中国矿产资源税费制度的改革建议四、中国矿产资源税费制度的改革建议四、中国矿产资源税费制度的改革建议四、中国矿产资源税费制度的改革建议 32 （一）以资源税为核心整合税、费制度 32 （二）依据资源耗竭速度，全面提高矿产资源税费征收水平 33 （三）差别化设置税率，保护优质矿产资源，降低开采破坏程度 34 （四）改革中央与地方，地方省、市、县资源税费分成比例 35 （五）通过预算改革强化资源税费支出功能 35 （六）建立跨部门监管制度，强化地方资源税费征收、使用监管 36 （七）补贴改革中利益受损群体和矿区居民 36
1
I. AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT OF MINERAL-RESOURCE TAXATION IN
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) launched its policy of reform and opening
up, the country’s economic system has been transformed from a planned economy to
a market economy. Even though mineral resources continue to be state-owned,
private enterprises have been in a position to apply for exploration rights since the
1980s. Since then, both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprises have
been liable for the payment of mining taxes. The landmark event in the government’s
efforts to engage in reforms of the taxation system regarding mineral resources was
the Sate Council’s “Resource Tax Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of
China,” promulgated in 1984. The new regulations were passed as law and executed
on a national scale in 1986. The regulations continue to constitute the PRC’s
mineral-resources taxation framework. Table 1 lists taxable mineral resources and
taxation rates.
Table 1 Resource taxable items and range of tax rates (2010)
Taxable Items Range of Tax Rates
Crude oil CNY8–30 per ton
Natural gas CNY2–15 per cubic meter
Coal CNY0.3–5 per ton
Other non-metal ores CNY0.5–20 per ton or cubic meter
ferrous metal ores CNY2–30 per ton
Nonferrous metal ores CNY0.4–30 per ton
Salt
Solid salt
Liquid salt
CNY10–60 per ton
CNY2–10 per ton
Data source: State Taxation Administration
However, the passing and subsequent enforcement of mineral resource tax
laws in 1984 was just the beginning of a series of reforms. The second stage of
reforms for mineral-resource use and revenue collection took place in 1990s. As is
well known, the most distinctive feature of the PRC’s economic reforms in the 1990s
was privatization. However, the process of privatizing mining rights was problematic.
Among the leading problems was irrational extraction of resources. Extensive
exploitation to realize maximum profits has led to substantial wasted resources and
environmental destruction. As the Government of the PRC became aware of this, it
2
issued new regulations. In 1994, the State Council issued “The Mineral Resources
Compensation Fee Collection Regulation.” The regulation empowered the
government to collect a fee—similar to a resource tax. The formula for calculating the
payable fee accorded to sales volume, an appropriate eco-environmental rate of
compensation, and a fee based on the rate of mine recovery. Meanwhile, the Ministry
of Finance issued its “Management Approach for Mineral Resources Compensation,”
which clearly outlined the purpose of compensation fees for the use of mineral
resources—compensation for eco-environmental damage caused by mining, and
revenue for government resource-exploration expenditures. In fact, the definition of
the mineral-resources compensation fee is similar to that of a modern resource tax.
Figure 1 provides data on the growth of mineral-resource taxes and
mineral-resources compensation fees in recent years.
Another problem related to mineral-resource revenues is the loss of national assets.
Corruption is a continuing problem in the process of assigning both exploration and
mining rights. In the early 1990s, mineral rights were not assigned through the
public-competition system of bidding, listing and auction. Very often, local officials
worked in collusion with unscrupulous businesspeople, selling mineral rights cheaply.
“Regulations for the Transfer of Mineral Exploration and Mining Rights” was legislated
to prevent further collusion of this kind in 1998. Since then, revenues from the transfer
of mineral exploration and mining rights have continued to rise. Total government
revenues from the transfer of mining rights reached CNY9.95 billion ($1.57 billion) by
Figure 1 Mineral resource taxes and
mineral resources compensation fee
(1995-2011)
Data: PRC Taxation Statistics Yearbook (2012)
100
millio
n Y
uan
3
2010. Meanwhile, total revenue from exploration-right transfers in the same period
reached CNY2.16 billion ($356 million). Besides these revenue streams, the new
regulations allow the government to collect the royalties for exploring and mining on
the basis of the land surface of the area that is being explored or mined after the rights
have been transferred, and the regulations also include a method for collecting the
royalties.
However, improved collection of exploring and mining royalties does not mean that
every problem is solved. The basic problem continues: whether the government
should collect rental tax after mining rights have been transferred and how much
should be collected. This issue was not so obvious when the price of mineral
commodities was low. However, in the case of oil, for example, prices have soared in
recent years, resulting in high profits for businesses that drill for oil. This has led to
criticism that such enterprises have not earned high profits due to operating efficiency
or capacity, but because they obtained their access to mineral resources at a
premium. For this reason, the government substantially raised tax rates in 2004. In
Shanxi Province and in Inner Mongolia, for example, the taxation rate for coal was
raised to between CNY2.3 per ton and CNY3.2 per ton. Meanwhile, in 2006, the
government began to collect duties on oil price. On 1 June 2010, the government
undertook a pilot reform to change unit duties on crude oil and natural gas into ad
valorem duties, with a 5% taxation rate in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
(Xinjiang).
4
In addition to the taxes and fees referred to above, some local governments have
established funds for sustainable development and industrial transformation, as is the
case in Shanxi Province. Special funds were also established to prevent water loss
and soil erosion, as well as to promote rehabilitation of the environment. Figure 3
shows the proportion of main mineral taxes and fees.
Figure 2 Mineral resource taxes and fees before reform
Data: PRC Land and Resources Statistics Yearbook (2012)
5
II. NATURAL RESOURCES TAXATION IN THE PRC: CURRENT SYSTEM
2.1 Lack of an overall definition for the tax and fee system
Theoretically, the authorities should levy “rental tax” on mineral resources on behalf of
the general public, since the public owns the resources. This makes the decision
about the amount of rent to be collected on resources important. An important factor to
bear in mind is that mineral resources are largely non-renewable. For this reason, the
authorities should use taxes collected to promote technological innovation, gradually
adopting t renewable resources and recycling technologies, reducing the consumption
of resources, or even avoid using non-renewable resources in the interests of social
development. Furthermore, taxes collected should also be used to rehabilitate
environments that have been adversely affected by exploitation of mineral resources.
A resource tax should also play the role of redistributing wealth, evenly distributing
collected taxes by appropriately adjusting them in response to mineral-corporation
profits, and subsidizing financially distressed families.
However, the current taxation system does not follow the above rules—even going so
far as to flout them. Table 2 reveals several problems in the current system of
mineral-resources taxation. At present, most mineral-resource taxation revenue is
incorporated into various levels of the government’s general budget, with a lack of
discipline. Meanwhile, most local governments are chiefly focused on urban
development, and are failing to take sustainable development into account, ignoring
Figure 3 Composition of mineral-resources,
rents, taxes, and fees (2011)
Data: Taxation Statistics Yearbook (2012)
6
national long-term, energy-consumption strategies and technological-innovation
strategies. A solution to this is for mineral-resource taxation revenues to be, at least in
part, distributed to the central government, so as to sustain an overall
technological-innovation strategy. Part of the taxation revenues could also be
distributed to local governments for environmental and ecological rehabilitation—and
for improving local social-welfare conditions.
Internationally, many countries have initiated tax reforms aimed at coordinating with
strategies for technological innovation. Germany, for example, launched an ecological
tax reform to fund research and development (R&D) and the application of
new-energy technologies in 1999. In 2005, the fund totaled €119.3 billion ($162.1
billion). In the same year, the German government gave approval for 102 projects
covering solar, wind, thermal energy, totaling €98 million ($133 million). Meanwhile,
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research invested €16 million ($21 million) in
an organic photovoltaics (OPV) project. and in 2009, the German initiatives helped to
establish the Desertec Industrial Initiative (DII) aimed at eventually establishing the
world’s biggest solar-energy project in Africa’s Sahara Desert, with expected projects
totaling €400billion ($544 billion) by 2050. In its 2008 budget, the German government
put aside €3.3 billion ($4.5 billion) for environmental protection, double the amount it
earmarked for environmental protection in 2005. Germany has also committed €500
million ($680 million) for the R&D of electric-powered vehicles.
7
Table 2 Mineral Resource Taxable items and Budget System (2010)
Type of taxes Collection
Agencies
Calculated taxes
Distribution
Ratio
between
central and
local
government
Budget items and
range of public
expenditure
Mineral
resource tax
Tax
officials
Sales volume * unit
tax rate
Local
government
revenues
General budget of
local governments
Mineral
resource
compensation
fee
Bureau of
State Land
&
Resources
Sales proceeds *
mineral-resource
compensation rate *
extract-recovery
rate coefficient
40% to central
government
Mineral-resource
exploration; special
budget control
Transfer price
of exploration
and mining
rights
Department
in charge of
geology and
mineral
resources
Cash payment after
rights’ transfer
20% to central
government
Special financial
account “Transfer
price and usage fee
for exploration and
mining rights”
Usage fee of
exploration and
mining rights
Department
in charge of
geology and
mineral
resources
CNY100 annually
per km2
50% to
provincial
governments,
10%, to
cities and
autonomous
prefectures,
40% to
counties
Special financial
account “Transfer
price and usage fee
for exploration and
mining rights”
Excess profit
duties on crude
oil
The
financial
department
[(Monthly price-55)
* rate levy-quick
calculating
deduction] * sales
volume * ton/barrel
* exchange rate
Central
government
Central General
budget
Shanxi
Province Coal
Sustainable
Development
Fund
Shanxi
Province
Financial
Department
CNY8.5 per ton Shanxi
Province
Environmental and
ecological recovery
and social
compensation for
example, urban
rehabilitation
8
2.2 Consumption of natural resources little affected
The current resource-taxation system, which is based on the theory of differential
rents, aims to equalize profits between mining companies, but fails to take the rarity of
non-renewable resources and the exogenous costs of exploitation into account. For
this reason, low mineral-resource taxes contribute to overall lowered government
revenues, due to the fact that mineral-resource taxes occupy a small portion of overall
tax revenues—just 0.6% of total tax revenues at present. This is despite the fact that
government has been gradually raising the unit rate for duties in recent years. Taxation
on coal resources have been gradually increased since 2004; oil and gas taxation
rates since, 2005; and non-metallic crude ore, ferrous-mineral crude ore and
non-ferrous mineral crude ore since 2006. In the case of coal, for example, taxation
rates have risen just 0.56%, while the price of coal in 2010 was four times higher than
its 1994 value (see Figure 4). With such a mismatch between coal prices and taxation
rates, taxes have little effect on coal prices: corporations can easily shoulder the
burden of the taxes, hence providing them little motivation to undertake environmental
resource replacement programs.
Figure 4 Coal-ore prices Index and Mineral
Resource Revenue Index
Note: Both coal prices and resource taxes are indexed, with 1994 as the base year.
All these factors indicate that mineral-resource taxes do not take into account the profit
differentials between corporations due to rents, location, transportation, storage,
difficulties in exploitation and necessary investment. An example is coal, the price of
which is rocketing. Meanwhile he price gap between different types of quality of coal is
widening—premium quality coal is currently as high as CNY1,000. Figure 2.shows the
current resource tax for coal is CNY3-5 per ton, which means the tax differential does
9
not reflect the differential in earnings. Since 2004, the resource tax for coal has been
increased several times, with the tax for on coking coal raised to CNY8 per ton, and
tax for other kinds of coal averaging CNY3 per ton. In other words, mineral-resource
tax is ineffective in terms of regulating differential earnings for coal. Taking a broader
view from 1990 to 2010, Figure 5 shows it is very difficult to see any impact on coal
consumption from mineral-resource taxes.
Figure 5 Energy consumption and
economic growth in the PRC
Data: China’s Statistics Yearbook (1990-2011)
2.3 Taxation provides little incentive for enterprises to accelerate technological
innovation and refine production processes
The ratified extract-recovery rate of mineral resources is determined by the national
administration. As for mining corporations with mining projects but no mining strategy,
the extract-recovery rate is decided by departments responsible for geology and
mineral-resource management at government levels above county-level. In practice,
the extract-recovery rate coefficient is relatively flexible, lacking disciplined, scientific
measurements, with the result that mineral-resource compensation is insufficiently
commensurate with resource consumption and utilization. The result of this is that
corporations tend to lack long-term strategies for resource exploitation, leading to
exploitation of superior and the easily accessed mineral resources, while lesser
quality and difficult-to-access resources remain unexploited. This is not only a waste
of available resources, but has also worsened the short supply of mineral resources.
Per-unit taxation severs the relationship between resource taxes and mineral
resource prices. In other words, the taxation rate is unrelated to mineral-resource
10
prices and the profits of mining corporations, encouraging unreasonable exploitation
by corporations and individuals, and discouraging the sustainable development of
mineral resources.
Given the profits earned by mineral corporations, R&D expenditures are relatively low.
Table 3 shows that of a total of 25,391 enterprises with R&D departments, just 139
coal mining and processing enterprises have R&D departments, while only 45
petroleum and natural-gas enterprises have R&D departments. Meanwhile, 31 ferrous
metal-ore enterprises have R&D departments, and 47 non-ferrous metal-ore mining
enterprises have R&D departments. The number of nonmetal-ore mining and
processing enterprises with R&D institutions is just 46.
Table 3: Mineral industries - R&D and profits
Industry
Number of
industrial
enterprises
above
designated
size
(unit)
Employees
at
year-end
(person)
Gross
industrial
output value
Number of
enterprises
with
R&D
departments
Number of
enterprises
with
R&D
activities
Total 429,378 25,391 36,387 87,420,647 5479795538
Mining and processing of coal 8,656 139 165 5,071.404 164,803,869
Extraction of petroleum and
natural gas 323 45 51 1,082,162 75,309,417
Mining of ferrous metal ores 3,916 31 54 587,834 38,418,671
Mining of non-ferrous metal
ores 2,386 47 74 499423 28466317
Mining and processing of
nonmetal ores 4,212 46 67 533,163 22,659,517
Mining of other ores 28 3,045 152,365
Data: PRC Statistics Yearbook of Industries, various years.
11
Table 3 (continued)
Industry New products Total assets Revenue New products Total
from principal profits
(CNY) (CNY) Business (CNY)
(CNY) (CNY)
Total 681,988,049 4,906,682,583 5,454,850,211 658,382,082 343,524,120
Mining and processing
of coal 7,853,257 238,948,930 175,548,189 9,949,776 22,187,187
Extraction of petroleum
and natural gas 177,876 148,324,143 78,303,711 179,734 19,058,954
Mining of ferrous metal
ores 128,813 32,908,705 36,402,500 127,545 4,461,308
Mining of non-ferrous
metal ores 716,191 25,160,663 2,886,8718 714,045 3,356,266
Mining and processing
of nonmetal ores 381,037 14,955,667 21,998,856 365,130 1,778,664
Mining of other ores 5,3124 155,071 6,284
Data: PRC Statistics Yearbook of Industries, various years.
2.4 Lack of social and eco-compensation
Mineral-resource industries have greatly contributed to the PRC’s economic
development, but they have also caused environmental pollution, triggering a series
of ecological and environmental problems. Meanwhile, areas that are endowed with
mineral resources provide the energy needs and manufacturing for infrastructure, but
when they are depleted of their natural resources, local governments are left with a
polluted environment and weakened economy, or the so-called “natural resource
curse.” In order to avoid continued mistakes of this nature, the government should
collect a natural-resources rent tax with the aim of protecting the environment and
internalizing the costs of environmental rehabilitation. Table 4 indicates the levels of
pollutants discharged, and the enterprises that are responsible for the lion’s share of
total discharges. Table 4 indicates ratios of industrial solid wastes utilized, showing
that mining industries tend to use less.
12
Source: PRC Mining Statistic Yearbooks, various years.
Currently, mineral-resource taxes in the PRC continue to target the owners, but
eco-environmental destruction and resource exhaustion are neglected. According to
preliminary statistics, the area of mineral-depleted mines has reached up to 1.349
million hectares nationally, resulting in 12,366 geological disasters, CNY16.63 billion
in economic losses, and 42.5 million deaths and injuries. Table 5 indicates that the
gap in funding required for environmental and ecological remediation has consistently
been increasing. Despite the fact that the central and local governments are
increasing efforts to rehabilitate mining environments, a huge gap in necessary
funding continues to act as a bottleneck to environmental rehabilitation. Meanwhile,
unnecessarily low mineral-resource taxation levels are undoubtedly, at least in part,
responsible for the present state of affairs.
Table 4 Mining industries: solid wastes discharge and treatment
Sector
Industrial
solid
wastes
generated
(10000
tons)
Hazardo
us
wastes
(10000
tons)
Industrial
solid
wastes
discharged
(ton)
Ratio of
industrial
solid wastes
utilized (%)
Output Value
of Products
Made from
Solid
Wastes(CNY1
0,000)
Total 225093.65 1586.75 4378876 66.6 17785034
Mining and processing
of coal 27,316.09 0.01 1,877,292 75.6 299,842
Extraction of petroleum
and natural gas 206.61 17.50 386 37.7 235,807
Mining and processing
of ferrous-metal ores 31,968.87 0.01 216,175 20.8 36,844
Mining and processing
of Non-ferrous-metal
ores
29,338.37 164.31 778,360 39.3 325,171
Mining and processing
of nonmetal ores 1,780.21 93.49 56,630 52.4 30,891
Mining of other ores 72.62 2,946 72.0 1,457
13
Table 5 Funding gap for environmental remediation
Year Funds for
environmental
remediation
from the central
government
(CNY100
million)
Funds for
environmental
remediation
from local
governments
(CNY100
million)
Total fund
(CNY 100
million)
Required
funds for
environmental
remediation
(CNY100
million)
Funding
gap
(CNY100
million)
2006 8.13 18.98 27.11 5,407.86 -5380.75
2007 11.06 29.53 40.59 6,645.26 -6604.67
2008 10.88 29.23 40.11 7,851.14 -7811.03
2009 36.06 36.06 72.12 8,522.57 -8450.45
2010 56.53 56.53 113.06 10,030.05 -9916.99
Data: PRC Mining Statistics Yearbook, various years.
III. EXPERIENCE FROM MINERAL-RESOURCES TAXATION ABROAD
In general, mineral-resources taxation systems in other countries share the following
characteristics. And we could absorb their experience to improve China’s taxation.
3.1 Mineral-Resource Taxes and Free System Adaptive to Mining Production
Features
Most of mineral resource is rare , exhaustible and of natural endowment. This means
the nationalism of mineral resource is natural. The industry of exploration and mining
that have a long-term production cycle is capital intensive and risky. Without higher
profit the social capital cannot enter the market. Certainly, government representative
of all people has a right to collect resource rent tax. However, too higher taxes will
reduce rate of profit in this industry. So the government always weights the equity of
mineral resource revenue distribution and the absorbing the enough capital into the
industry when the mineral resource taxation is designed . The good mineral resource
taxation should be a clever balanced choice, which also means the taxation is
complex and dynamic.
3.2 Different Instruments in Mineral-Resource Taxes and Free System
In most countries, At present, the main tax instruments levied on the
mineral-resources industry by developing countries are surface rentals, bonuses,
royalties, and resource-rent taxes.. The different tax or fee embodies the
government’s sharing right among the different productive operation. The mineral
resource taxes have the common taxes features, which means they are managed
14
as general budget items. Surface rental refers to the fee paid to the state for use of
land by enterprises engaged in mineral-resource operations. Royalties embodies
the national property right. Resource-rent tax refers to taxes levied directly on the
profits made from mineral resources, and it is also known as excess-profit tax, and
added-profit tax.In the strict sense, all of the taxes or fees are the rent in essence.
However, it is necessary to maintain the taxes in different form for the production
process includes exploration, mining, and refining.
3.3 Core function in Mineral-Resource Taxes and Free System
Although we could see there are different taxes forms among different counties, the
core tax should be integrated and set up. For the value of mineral resource is
uncertain and unpredictable, the auction price is unable to reflect the future
value. The only mineral tax cannot also resolve the distribution mechanism when the
price is fluctuating. Moreover the mineral resources become more and more important
for sustainable development of one economy. So a integrated mineral resource taxes
system should be set up with core aim to protect limited mineral resource s for
development.
3.4 Dynamic Mechanism in Mineral-Resource Taxes and Free System
From the evolvement of different countries’ mineral resource taxation, we could find
the tax rate raised with the increasing price of mineral resources. At the same time
the levying scope also become more and more broad. For example, new mineral is
founded, they will be brought into the taxes items. In addition, the dynamic contract
form could be adopted after the mining right has been transferred. In general, the
mineral resources taxation should keep dynamic.
3.5 Distribution Mechanism in Mineral-Resource Taxes and Free System
The distribution of the tax revenues from mineral resources is inclined to favor
regional governments, making it easier for them to provide services for
mineral-resource exploration and extraction, environment protection and the provision
of public goods. In terms of the relationship between central and sub-national
governments, in most countries, the central government has ownership of mineral
resources, but some countries, including Argentina and India, allow ownership of
mineral resources to be divided clearly between the central and sub-national
governments.
15
There are varying practices in terms of the ownership of mineral resources in
developing countries. Generally they are shared between the central and regional
governments, with regional governments holding a greater share than the central
government. This is the case in countries such as the Russian Federation, Brazil, and
Indonesia. However, in other countries, such as Kazakhstan and South Africa, all tax
revenues from mineral resources are assigned to the central government, while in
some other countries, such as Argentina, all revenues are distributed to regional
governments.
Table 6: Mineral Resource Taxes and Fees System in Some Countries
Country Tax instrument Tax rate Distribution
Russia
Mineral
extraction tax
(4.8%-17.5%).
46%-50% The three levels of government to share. The tax
revenue distribution ratio of mining tax of crude oil,
natural gas is: 40% federal, 30% federal subjects, 30%
belong to the local government tax revenue distribution
ratio; mining tax and other mineral resources are: 25%
to 25% federal, federal subjects, 50% belong to the
local government.
India
Royalty
(2%-13%),
mineral resource
tax, Dead rent
48%-52% According to the mineral resources ownership, dead
rent and royalty were also included in the federal
government and the state government.
Brazil
compensation
fee of mineral
resources
exploitation,
bonus,
Royalty(1%-10),
surface rent
45%-48% The mineral resources compensation fee is shared
among three level governments, of which 12% belong
to the federal government, 23% to the provincial
government, 65% belong to the local government.
Australia
Royalty, mineral
resource rent
tax, rental
31%-48% The state government is responsible for collection.
When exploring shelf mineral and oil and gas, royalty
should be paid to the federal government. The tax
according to the proportion of 4: 6 is shared by the
federal government and state government. Three sea
miles from coast mineral resources belong to the
federal government.
Canada
Mining right rent,
Mining tax or
Royalty
31%-46% The federal, provincial and local government levy
differently. The federal and provincial governments
collect tax on profit; local government collects the tax or
royalty in the form of economic rent.
Indonesia Mineral resource 52.2% Federal government collect, federal government
16
tax (1.5%-7%),
dead rent,
Royalty
sharing 20%，state government sharing 16%，local
government sharing 64%.
Kazakhstan
Bonus, mining
fee (2.8%-6%),
super-profit tax,
historical cost to
pay
compensation
46.1% central government collect，central government budget
revenue
Source: Otto, James M., Competitive Position of Mongolia’s Mineral Sector Fiscal System: the Case of a
Model Copper Mine, 2007
IV. OPTIONS FOR CHINA’S FUTURE MINERAL-RESOURCES TAXATION
REFORM
In contrast with developed countries, the PRC has failed to establish a tax policy that
coordinates the development of new energy sources and the recycling of renewable
resources. This needs to be a focus in terms of overall mineral-resource tax reforms.
The top priority is to build up a unified resource tax structure to support R&D, and
promote the use of the new energies.
According to recent research on the environment and natural-resource economics,
exhaustible resources are declining, and environmental costs are on the rise. The
exploitation of renewable resources has become inexpensive due to modern
technologies, but the future remains uncertain. Under such circumstances, the aims of
mineral-resource tax reforms are as follows: first, to raise the prices of resource
commodities, and curb the aggregate consumption of resources by increasing the tax
rate; second, to reform the resource-consumption structure, and expand the use of
recyclable resources through tax expenditures; third, to prevent losses and
inequitable distribution of state-owned natural-resource revenues, redistributing them
appropriately to compensate for social and environmental impacts; and fourth, to
promote R&D, and application of the new-energy technologies through the use of
subsidies, and by encouraging the development of environmental protection industry
to offset adverse environmental impacts.
17
4.1 Simplify and integrate the taxation and fee system for sustainable
development
• Integrate taxes and fees centered through resource taxes. This requires
abolishing the mineral-resources recovery guarantee fund, the sustainable coal
development fund in Shanxi Province, raw-ore ecological compensation in
Qinghai Province, the coal fund for local economic development in Xinjiang, as
well as other provincial-level fees, and bundling all local taxes and fees into a
resource tax. A concept plan for the first steps toward achieving this is presented
in Figure 6 below.
Figure 6 Integrated mineral-resource rent tax system
• Eliminate mineral-resources compensation and rehabilitate the environment
through resource taxes. Use differential taxation rates and preferential tax
policies to incentivize mining plants to implement R&D and advance their
technologies. Taxes previously levied for geological exploitation of further mineral
resources in important mining areas will retain its functions when it is
re-designated as a general resource tax. In order to ensure resource restructuring,
there will need to be a de-emphasizing of the current focus on mining and
smelting to the neglect of the adverse consequences of exploitation.
• Retain the costs and usage fees for mining and exploration rights. This will
require transforming local bidding, listing and auction practices for the transfer of
mining rights, eliminating transfer agreements and government allocations. Rather,
the costs and usage fees need to be put under the provincial public resources
management system. The allocation of all local mining rights should be overseen
by a provincial bidding center, and monitored by local departments governing land
18
and resources, as well as auditing and supervisory departments. Profits from
mining rights and exploitation should be set-aside as an independent source of
provincial revenue, and be used for national exploitation.
• Retain the special oil gains levies and expand their range. Due to the
fluctuation of international oil prices, and the lack of competition, as well as high
profits in the oil industry, the Government of the PRC should be entitled to the
industry’s surplus profits. In addition, a surplus-profit tax should be levied on rare
earths. The amount of the special oil-gain levy should correlate with profits. In the
case of a reasonable profit rate of 15% or less, the levy will not be applied, while
for profit rates of more than 15% and less than 30%, a reasonable levy rate should
be applied.
• Promote reforms for contract terms for the transfer of mining and
exploitation rights. Such reforms should lead to winning bids going to companies
with highly rated mining expertise rather than to enterprises quoting the highest
prices in the interests of protecting resources. In terms of the transfer of property
rights to oversees enterprises, surplus profits need to be itemized in order to
formulate a model contract for the transfer of mining and exploitation rights in line
with the PRC’s best interests.
• Expand the range of tax levies to include water resources, forests,
grasslands and marine resources, and urban land use. This is a measure that
could solve acute shortages of water, the waste of water and destruction of forest
and grasslands. The process should involve a gradual inclusion of resources other
than minerals into the range of resources subject to levies. Land resources, for
example, have become a serious roadblock in terms of the PRC’s economic and
social development. In order to improve taxation laws and regulations, and
facilitate the levying of taxes, land-use tax, and taxes on the occupation of land
should be integrated into the resource taxation system. After such reforms,
resource taxes should include the following six items: mineral resources, water
resources, land resources, forest, grasslands, and salt.
4.2 Mineral-resource taxes need to be significantly increased in accordance
with the exhaustion rate of resources
• All taxable items and tax-rate adjustments should be based on consumption.
According to a review of national mineral-resource protection carried out by the
Ministry of Land and Resources, information is available on existing stocks of
mineral resources, annual consumption, annual new exploitation, and annual
19
imports. What is needed is a long-term plan centered on the consumption of
non-renewable resources. This should be the basis for all taxable items and
tax-rate adjustments.
• The overall rate of taxation for coal should be determined according to the
aims of restructuring national resources. The ratio of coal in terms of overall
resource consumption should be decreased from a current 70%–60% by 2015
and to 40% by 2030. Considering the fluctuations in the price of coal, taxation on
coal during the 12th Five-Year Plan should be levied as an ad-valorem duty at the
rate of 12%–15%, and raised to 20% by 2030.
• Iron-ore tax taxation rates should be determined according to the aims of
protecting resources. In light of the overproduction of iron, and a situation in
which the GDP annual consumption of iron is, on average, 20% higher than that of
the developed countries, it is necessary to increase the efficiency of iron ore
usage. Currently, the tax on iron ore accounts for around 5% of the mineral’s price,
but the rate will be raised to 8%–10% between 2015 and 2020, and to 10%–15%
between 2020 and 2030.
• Tax on non-ferrous metals should be raised up to 5%–8% between 2015 and
2020, and to 8%–12% between 2020 and 2030. Non-ferrous metals, such as
copper, aluminum, lead, and zinc, are very important industrial materials, but due
to a shortage of stock, they need to be imported. According to statistics provided
by the Ministry of Land and Resources, the PRC’s consumption of copper in 2007
was 4.6 times higher than the global average, while the consumption of aluminum,
lead, and zinc, were all much higher than the global average. It is suggested that
reforms oversee the ad-valorem duties on such non-ferrous metals being raised to
5%–8% between 2015 and 2020, and to 8%–12% between 2020 and 2030. Rare
earths, tin, tungsten, stibium (antimony) are also essential strategic resources.
This has resulted in a situation in which rare earths in particular are
indiscriminately exploited. It is advised that the tax rate for such strategic
resources should be raised to 10%–15% between 2015 and 2020, and to 30% by
2030. Meanwhile, rare metals such as tantalum, niobium, platinum and titanium
have extensive military, medical, and precision-instrument applications. Stocks of
these rare metals are abundant, but waste is an alarming problem. Therefore, tax
rates should be adjusted up, increasing ad-valorem duties to 15%–20% between
2015 and 2020, and to 30% by 2030.
• The tax rate for phosphorus and silicon should be raised to 8% between
20
2013 and 2015 and to 10%–15% between 2015 and 2020. Ferrous metals such
as phosphorus play an important role in the production of phosphate fertilizers and
phosphatidic acid. Silicon can be used to manufacture glass, and silicon
equipment. Attapulgite and fluorite are important manufacturing materials.
Internationally, the United States has banned phosphorus exports, but continues
to import it. In the PRC, the Ministry of Land and Resources has listed phosphorus
as a vital mineral that has been unable to match national demand since 2010. To
protect such resources, the tax rate for phosphorus and silicon should be raised to
8% between 2013 and 2015, and to 10%–15% between 2015 and 2020.
4.3 Taxation rates should be differentiated to preserve vital mineral resources
and minimize the destructive environmental consequences of mining.
Based on ad-valorem duties, the tax burden of mineral resources should be based on
prices. However, the prices of mineral resources generally fail to reflect their rarity, the
difficulties involved in mining them, and the environmental damage caused by mining.
Tax rates need be graded in terms of the type of mineral, and the varying levels of
difficulty involved in mining it. The Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Land and
National Resources need to unify their taxation range. Meanwhile, local departments
of finance should establish differentiated taxable items and taxation rates according to
the type of mineral resources in question, so as to protect rare and strategically
important mineral resources.
Under the current PRC coal taxation system, per-unit coal taxation duties vary from
province to province. Following reforms of ad-valorem duties, the provinces will be
able to determine taxation rates based on the kind of resource, with the aim of
regulating the rate at which superior varieties of coal are mined, and in light of the
life-cycle of mines, and the provision of funds for environmental rehabilitation.
Meanwhile, it is necessary to maintain flexibility for taxation rates. The special levy on
oil gains, which addresses fluctuations of international oil prices, should ensure that
local governments are entitled to surplus profits. The same principle should also be
applied to precious and rare metals. Local governments should have access to
surplus profits when the prices of resources exceed assigned prices.
21
Table 4.3 The PRC’s mineral-resource taxation-rate reform schedule
Mineral resource Mineral-resource
taxation-reform aims Reform schedule
2013-2015 2015-2020 2020-2030
METALS 金属矿金属矿金属矿金属矿
Iron（（（（铁铁铁铁）））） Manufacturing basic
materials
Adjust tax
rate to
5%–10%
Adjust tax
rate to
10%–15%
Copper（（（（铜铜铜铜）））） Encourage recycling Adjust tax
rate to
5%–8%
Adjust tax
rate to
8%–12%
Aluminum（（（（铝铝铝铝）））） Encourage recycling Adjust tax
rate to
5%–8%
Adjust tax
rate to
8%–12%
Lead（（（（铅铅铅铅）））） Zinc （（（（锌锌锌锌））））
Encourage recycling Adjust tax
rate to
5%–8%
Adjust tax
rate to
8%–12%
Lithium（（（（锂锂锂锂）））） Reserve, to take a leading
global position, for
optoelectronics and nuclear
industries
Adjust tax
rate to
5%–8%
Adjust tax
rate to
8%–10%
Tin （（（（锡锡锡锡））））Tungsten（（（（钨钨钨钨））））Stibium（（（（锑锑锑锑））））
rare earth （（（（稀土稀土稀土稀土））））Adopt a national strategy for
the development of new
industries
Adjust tax
rate to
8%–10%
Adjust tax
rate to
10%–15%
Adjust tax
rate to
15%–30%
Tantalum（（（（钽钽钽钽））））Niobium（（（（铌铌铌铌））））Platinum（（（（铂铂铂铂））））Titanium（（（（钛钛钛钛））））Molybdenum （（（（钼钼钼钼））））Nickel（（（（镍镍镍镍））））
Principle materials for military
purposes
Adjust tax
rate to
10%–15%
Adjust tax
rate to
15%–30%
Barium (钡钡钡钡)
Strontium (锶锶锶锶)
Potassium (钾钾钾钾)
Magnesium (镁镁镁镁)
Vanadium (钒钒钒钒)
Strontium, principle material
for rocket fuel, and
pharmaceutical industry;
vanadium, principle material
for steel alloys and
superconductors
Adjust tax
rate to
5%–15%
Adjust tax
rate to
10%–15%
Adjust tax
rate to
15%–30%
NON METALS 非金非金非金非金属矿属矿属矿属矿
22
Crude oil(石油石油石油石油) Adjust tax
rate to 5%
Adjust tax
rate to 8%
Adjust tax
rate to
10%–12%
Oilshale（（（（油页岩油页岩油页岩油页岩）））） Low tax rate to encourage
mining and refining
Adjust tax
rate to 2%
Adjust tax
rate to 3%
Adjust tax
rate to
3%–5%
Natural gas(天然气天然气天然气天然气) Adjust tax
rate to 5%
Adjust tax
rate to 7%
Adjust tax
rate to
7%–10%
Coal(煤煤煤煤) Adjust tax rate to decrease
consumption
Adjust tax
rate to 5%
Adjust tax
rate to
5%–15%
Adjust tax
rate to
15%–20%
Phosphorus (磷磷磷磷) Important strategic resource
for agriculture and other
industries
Adjust tax
rate to 5%
Adjust tax
rate to
5%–10%
Adjust tax
rate to
10%–15%
Silicon (硅硅硅硅) New-energy technology
material
Adjust tax
rate to
2%–3%
Adjust tax
rate to
5%–10%
Adjust tax
rate to
10%-15%
Salt (盐盐盐盐) Important resource for life
and industrial purposes
Adjust tax
rate to 3%
Adjust tax
rate to
3%–5%
Water resource：：：：mineral water;
ground water (矿泉矿泉矿泉矿泉水水水水 地下水地下水地下水地下水)
Decrease waste and abuse Adjust tax
rate to 2%
Adjust tax
rate to
2%–5%
Adjust tax
rate to
5%–10%
Land (土地土地土地土地)
subterranean heat （（（（地热地热地热地热））））
Integrate holding taxes on
urban and county land, as
well as farmland occupancy
tax
Adjust tax
rate to
3%–5%
Adjust tax
rate to
5%–8%
Grassland（（（（草原草原草原草原））））
forest （（（（森林森林森林森林)
Adjust tax
rate to
2%–3%
Adjust tax
rate to
3%–5%
4.4 Reform the distribution of resource taxes between the central local
governments
Gains from resources should be shared with the general public. The aim of
differentiated taxation according to revenues is to regulate the uneven distribution of
natural resources. In this sense, resource taxes should be shared taxes. With
reference to examples provided by other countries, the central government should
23
spend part of the revenue stream from resource gains on promoting new-energy
development and recycling metal resources. Since many local governments are to
some degree financially distressed, the distribution of tax between the central and
local governments should be set at a ratio of 20/80 respectively. After local taxation
restructuring has been undertaken, that ratio can be readjusted.
Mineral-resources compensation are distributed 50/50 between the central and local
governments, which results in inadequate expenditure in terms of national land and
resources, and substantial gap in terms of funds for environmental rehabilitation and
social compensation at a local level. To make matters worse, local funds for specific
purposes are often appropriated. It is suggested that the distribution rate be modified
to 80/20 between the central and local governments, and the provincial departments
of land and resources supervise the use of funds.
Currently, resource taxes are divided 30/30/40 at the provincial, city, and county levels.
For counties administrated by provinces, the rate is 60/40. Reforms will divide taxation
between the provinces and production bases, in favor of production bases. Due to
local financial variables, the revenue sharing ratio between the central and local
governments should be adjusted in the ranges of 50/50 to 30/70.
4.5 Formulate uniform regulations for the usage of resource taxes and enhance
the functions of resource taxes through budget means
Currently, both the central government and local governments have regulations
governing compensation for use of resources, regulations on exploration and mining
rights, regulations on levies, while Shanxi Province has a sustainable coal
development fund. However, the fund in Shanxi has suffered seriously from
appropriation. After reforms are implemented, unified regulations governing the use of
resource taxes should be established to facilitate future resource-tax legislation.
When it comes to regulatory measures, preserving resources and maintaining
sustainable development should be emphasized.
Special accounts for resource taxation at state, province, and city levels should be
established. Resource taxation should largely be used to promote technological
innovation in the development of new-energy and recycling energies. The drain of
exhaustible resources can be offset by future technological breakthroughs. At a
provincial level, resource taxes should be used more for resource exploration and
24
professionalizing key resource exploration ventures. Resource taxation on production
bases should be mainly used to rehabilitate the environment, and support industrial
transformation.
To achieve these results, resource taxation collected by the central government
should embrace the promotion of new-energy sources and technologies in its budget.
Local resource taxation should include the costs of rehabilitation in mining areas.
Meanwhile, other issues that need to be included in mineral-resource taxation reforms
include the well being of the local populations in mining areas, urban infrastructure,
and the development of new industries. The local National People’s Congress (NPC)
should audit all spending of funds.
Meanwhile, in response to policies adopted abroad, favorable tax policies should be
harnessed to encourage the mining ventures to invest in new and improved
technologies.
4.6 Establish a trans-department fund supervisory system to strengthen
supervision of levies and expenditures of local resource taxes
On the issue of serious appropriation of funds at a local government level, the system
of evaluation of local officials should be modified, taking into account responsible
approaches to mining, and comprehensive use of resources. Meanwhile, in terms of
reforms to the uses of resource-taxation budgets, the role of the local NPC in
monitoring special funds needs to be strengthened. In addition, local governments
need to provide more detailed information about how resource taxation is spent in the
interests of public transparency. .
On a related note, provincial ministries of land and resources need to establish
five-year plans for rehabilitating mining environments. This would involve local
governments reporting the details of their plans and required funds. In response,
provincial ministries should deliver special funds, with the aim of restoring mining
environments. Use of special funds should be monitored by both local departments of
land and resources, and by fiscal bureaus. Funds should be regularly audited to
ensure the efficiency of spending and the efficacy environmental rehabilitation.
In terms of fund spending, there should be a focus on how to recycle, monitor, and
store mining waste, as well as an emphasis on environmental rehabilitation of mining
environments. Part of collected resource taxes should be used to establish local
25
mechanisms to monitor environmental pollution and geological destruction. Such
evaluation, which should be closely related to the spending of collected resource
taxes, will collect regular information, while also evaluating the performance of
officials in departments of land and resources, and environmental protection, as well
as other local administrations.
4.7 Subsidize groups whose interests have been undermined, including local
residents
Rising resource taxation will have an impact on downstream industries in the form of
higher prices, which in turn will effect consumption and raise people’s living costs. In
the next steps involved in adjusting coal-taxation rates, emphasis should be paid to
increased costs imposed by electricity-generation corporations, and calculating the
impact price fluctuations have on consumption.
It is important to minimize the impact of reforms on overall demand, and achieve fair
distribution of incomes. The central Ministry of Finance should provide energy
subsidies to families with the lowest, low and medium incomes based on the five
categories of rural incomes, as defined by the Department of Statistics. In response,
provincial governments should design their own plans for providing appropriate
subsidies.
Special funds can be diverted from the central government’s resource-taxation
account to improve provision of heating in the North during the winter, establish
collective-heating systems at a county-level, and promote resource-friendly urban
projects. Consideration should be given to lowering heating costs for low- and
medium-income families.
If reforms of the coal-taxation system lead to rising electricity-generation costs, and
cause the price fluctuations, the ratio of electricity costs in terms of the overall costs
for small corporations should be taken into consideration across all industries, and
consideration should also be given to the effect on their profits. Action should be
undertaken to reduce their tax burden if they are affected.
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一一一一、、、、中国矿产资源税费制度的演变及现状中国矿产资源税费制度的演变及现状中国矿产资源税费制度的演变及现状中国矿产资源税费制度的演变及现状 改革开放以来，伴随中国经济由计划经济向市场经济过渡，在保持产权国有前提下，中国矿产资源勘探权和开采权开始了有偿使用制度转变，相关税费制度开始建立。1984 年出台了《资源税暂行条例》，1986 年在全国实施。这样一种以从量计征为主要方式、以级差调节为主要目的的资源税框架一直持续到 2010年。截止 2010 年，资源税向从价征收改革前税率表如表 1所示。 表 1 资源税税目税率表 (2010) 应税项目应税项目应税项目应税项目 税率税率税率税率 原油 8-30 元/吨 天然气 2-15 元/立方米 煤炭 0.3-5 元/吨 非金属矿 0.5-20 元/吨或元/立方米 黑色金属矿 2-30 元/吨 有色金属矿 0.4-30 元/吨 盐 固体盐 液体盐 10-60 元/吨 2-10 元/吨 数据来源: 国家税务总局 1994 年，考虑资源税无法满足国家矿业投入和矿区生态补偿，《矿产资源补偿费》制度得到建立。随后，为维护矿产资源的国家所有权，财政部和国土资源部于 1999 年 6 月出台了《探矿权、采矿权使用费和价款管理办法》，规定探矿权、采矿权使用费和价款按矿产资源的管理权限和属地原则由各级矿业管理部门收取。2000 年 11 月，国土资源部出台了《矿业权出让转让管理暂行规定》，为矿业权二级市场的建立奠定了法律基础。2006 年以来，资源税从量计征税率有过大幅提高，因此税收在 2006 年以后有了快速增长（如图 1）。
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图 1 矿产资源税与矿产资源补偿费 (1995-2011) 数据来源：中国税务年鉴（1996-2012) 总体而言，通过挂牌出让的探矿权、采矿权宗数、金额占所有出让数量比例仍较低，如 2010 年采矿权价款总出让收入为 99.25 亿元，而实际通过挂牌出让仅为 48亿元左右。探矿权、采矿权使用费征收数量较小，如 2010 年采矿权使用费仅为 1.396亿元。中央政府为保证经济增长速度，计划手段仍被采用，资源价格长期被调控压低。而相应的为弥补资源所在地的利益，一些地方性资源基金在各省开征。此外，2006 年起，针对资源类国有企业获得的高利润中央政府，强制提高这些企业上缴财政的利润额，对于石油类企业即为“石油特别收益金”。综合起来，目前中国的矿产资源税费制度主要包括资源税、矿产资源补偿费、石油特别收益金、探矿权、采矿权使用费与价款以及地方收费、基金等，具体分类框架见图 2，最近的征收规模见图 3：
图 2 改革前资源税、费制度体系
数据来源：根据财政部、税务总局、国土资源部文件法规整理
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二二二二、、、、中国矿产资源税费制度问题分析中国矿产资源税费制度问题分析中国矿产资源税费制度问题分析中国矿产资源税费制度问题分析
（（（（一一一一））））矿产资源税矿产资源税矿产资源税矿产资源税、、、、费体系缺乏统一功能界定费体系缺乏统一功能界定费体系缺乏统一功能界定费体系缺乏统一功能界定 中国资源税设计主要目的在于调节矿产资源品质差异导致的级差收入。在使用上，大多数地方政府将资源税纳入一般预算，在预算执行中，用于生态补偿的资金往往不能保证其专项使用。而资源税、矿产资源补偿费、石油特别收益金、探矿权、采矿权出让加框的并行征收，导致缺乏一个统一的资源税费使用规范。各种资源税、费在保护资源节约使用和可持续发展中的定位均被弱化。 （（（（二二二二））））从量征收方式导致资源税费宏观调控从量征收方式导致资源税费宏观调控从量征收方式导致资源税费宏观调控从量征收方式导致资源税费宏观调控弱化弱化弱化弱化 1986 年的资源税框架确定了资源税采用从量计征方式，从量计征导致了资源税在整个税收体系中所占相对比例逐渐变小。到 2011 年，资源税占宏观税负比例仅为 0.6%左右。从量计征也导致资源税对价格影响作用甚微，以煤炭资源税为例，在过去的 10余年中山西煤炭平均出厂价格从 150元左右上涨至 1000元左右。按照《中国煤炭工业年鉴》提供的煤炭价格指数数据，图 4给出了 1994
图 3 主要矿产资源税、费占比 (2011)
数据来源：中国税务年鉴、中国国土资源年鉴（2012)
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年来煤炭价格指数与资源税的相对指数的变化趋势①。较低的实际税率最终使得资源税丧失了对资源价格的影响，对资源消耗也无法产生调控作用。
（（（（三三三三））））当前资源税制无法激励矿业进行技术创新当前资源税制无法激励矿业进行技术创新当前资源税制无法激励矿业进行技术创新当前资源税制无法激励矿业进行技术创新 从资源税、费的使用情况看，绝大多数矿产资源税作为部门预算，用于矿业勘探技术和支持矿业企业发展。作为专项资金的矿产资源补偿费用于企业排污技术改造和矿山的生态恢复。这种采用政府补贴激励矿业企业技术研发和环保投入的作用由于资源税、费数额较小，其作用也被弱化。以《中国工业年鉴》公布的矿业企业 2010 年的研发和利润状况为例。从中可发现规模以上矿业企业的平均利润率并不低，总体约为 6%。煤炭类更高达 13%。但令人惊讶的是，这些企业中有研发机构或研发活动的企业数量非常少，其中有研发机构的企业占总企业数量不足 6%，有研发活动的企业不足 8.5%。 （（（（四四四四））））资源税制无法激励企业进行社会成本补偿资源税制无法激励企业进行社会成本补偿资源税制无法激励企业进行社会成本补偿资源税制无法激励企业进行社会成本补偿 矿产资源开发过程中不可避免要占用、破坏大量的土地，产生环境污染，并引发一系列的生态问题。目前我国的矿产资源开发补偿税费政策主要是对所有者权益的补偿，而缺少对生态环境、资源耗竭的补偿。 矿业企业在污水治理上近年取得了不错的效果，但在废气和固体废弃物的处理和二次利用上投入较少，造成的危害较大。有毒固体废弃物的产生量已非常多， ①
煤炭价格指数按照《中国煤炭工业年鉴》提供的数据，并以 1994年为 100，以后年度与其相比，至 2010年指数值为 440，而资源税指数也是与当年煤炭价格比值，至 2010年为 20。
图 4 煤炭资源税价格指数与煤炭价格指数
数据来源：中国煤炭工业年鉴（1995-2011）
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而这些固体废弃物的二次利用（或处理）比例相对较低，大多采用了堆存或直接排入自然环境的处理方法。在二次利用率上，有色金属矿业企业对固体废弃物二次利用率非常低，这既浪费了资源，又对环境产生了极大危害。通过税收和财政补贴的双重手段有利于纠正这些外部性。这也要求在设计资源税和环境税制度时，考虑外部性产生的危害及其治理资金缺口。 三三三三、、、、各国矿产资源税费的制度借鉴各国矿产资源税费的制度借鉴各国矿产资源税费的制度借鉴各国矿产资源税费的制度借鉴 从各国矿产资源税费改革的实践进程与制度设计来看，专家组得出以下几点基本特征： （（（（一一一一））））矿产资源税费制度矿产资源税费制度矿产资源税费制度矿产资源税费制度应适应应适应应适应应适应矿产资源矿产资源矿产资源矿产资源产业特征产业特征产业特征产业特征 矿产资源的稀缺性和可耗竭性，矿业活动的高风险、高投入和长周期等，决定了矿产资源税费制度的复杂性和动态性。一个较为合意的矿产资源税费制度，既要保证政府能够从矿产资源活动中分享到合理的收入份额，同时也要保护和激励投资者的积极性，促进矿产资源行业的持续、健康发展。 （（（（二二二二））））矿产资源税矿产资源税矿产资源税矿产资源税费制度应该包括多环节费制度应该包括多环节费制度应该包括多环节费制度应该包括多环节、、、、多类型的税费工具多类型的税费工具多类型的税费工具多类型的税费工具 虽然目前各国实行的矿产资源税费制度有所不同，但通行的税费制度都包括地面租金、红利、权利金、资源租金税等等。其中，红利、权利金等反映了国家作为矿产资源所有者的经济租金，资源税是国家作为社会管理者、以政治权力所征收的税收，而地面租金等则是政府向特定对象提供服务所相应收取的费用。这套税费制度结合使用了多种税费工具，覆盖了矿产资源勘查、开发和利用活动的全过程。 （（（（三三三三））））矿产资源税费制度建设应确定相应的核心税费矿产资源税费制度建设应确定相应的核心税费矿产资源税费制度建设应确定相应的核心税费矿产资源税费制度建设应确定相应的核心税费 目前各国对矿产资源课征的专门税费中，处于核心地位的是红利、权利金和资源税。这三种手段各有优缺点。就红利而言，如果对一个矿藏的价值认定不存在不确定性，那么通过拍卖开采权取得红利，政府可以中性地攫取到最大的租金收益。然而在现实中这种确定性并不存在，在矿业项目的存续期内面临的风险始终在不断变化，因此拍卖价格可能会与项目的实际收益情况存在较大的差异。权利金是一种收取租金的简单办法，管理简便且能提供稳定的收入，但是权利金增加了矿产资源开采的成本，会对矿产资源的回采率造成负面影响。相比权利金而
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言，资源税是一种更中性的手段，运用这一工具，政府也可以从利润超高的项目中获得更高的收益。因此，政府必须搭配运用各种税费工具，相互间以长补短。 （（（（四四四四））））矿产资源税费制度矿产资源税费制度矿产资源税费制度矿产资源税费制度应保持应保持应保持应保持动态动态动态动态机制机制机制机制 从矿产资源税费制度的发展演变来看，各国矿业部门的税负高低、矿产资源的租金高低与矿产市场状况相关联。在矿产资源价格上涨之时，政府相应增税，以分享资源价格上涨所带来的收益。在资源价格疲软之时，则通过调低税率等激励措施减轻企业税负，促进矿业发展。因此，构建一个与市场密切相连、可以迅速进行动态调整的税费制度是有必要的。 （（（（五五五五））））矿产资源矿产资源矿产资源矿产资源税费税费税费税费收入归属向地方政府倾斜收入归属向地方政府倾斜收入归属向地方政府倾斜收入归属向地方政府倾斜 由于矿业行业整体的利润率都较高，大多数发展中国家的矿产资源行业综合税负都在 40%以上，部分国家甚至高达 60%以上。在矿产资源税费收入的归属上，总体来看是世界各国还是以中央和地方共享为多，并且地方分享比例较高。具体情况见表 2： 表表表表 2222 部分国家矿产资源税费负担与收入归属部分国家矿产资源税费负担与收入归属部分国家矿产资源税费负担与收入归属部分国家矿产资源税费负担与收入归属 国家国家国家国家 税费工具税费工具税费工具税费工具 有效税负有效税负有效税负有效税负 收入归属分配收入归属分配收入归属分配收入归属分配 俄罗斯 矿产开采税（4.8%~17.5%）、 46%~50% 三级政府分享。其中原油、天然气矿产开采税的税收分配比例是：40%归联邦、30%归联邦主体、30%归地方政府；其他矿产资源的矿产开采税的税收分配比例是：25%归联邦、25%归联邦主体、50%归地方政府； 印度 权利金（2%~13%）、一般税费、死租费 48%~52% 根据矿产资源所有权归属不同，死租费和权利金也分别归属联邦政府和邦政府所有； 巴西 矿产资源开采经济补偿费、红利、权利金（1%-10%）、地面租金 45%~48% 矿产资源开采经济补偿费属三级共享，其中 12%归联邦政府，23%归省级政府，65%归地方政府； 澳大利亚 权利金、资源租金税、租金 31%~48% 州政府负责征收。但大陆架矿产及油气的开采应向联邦政府缴纳权利金，三海里范围之内的资源由联邦政府委托临近的州政府管理，所征收税收按照 4 : 6 的比例由联邦政府和州政府共享。三海里之外的矿产资源归联邦政府所有相应的税收也归联邦政府； 加拿大 矿业权租金、采矿税或 31%~46% 联邦、省和地方三级征收。联邦和
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权利金 省政府对采矿经营的利润征收所得税；地方按采矿税或权利金的形式征收经济租金； 印度尼西亚 一般性税费（1.5%~7%）、死租费、权利金 52.2% 联邦政府负责征收。三级共享，中央政府占 20%，省级政府占 16%，地方政府占 64%； 哈萨克斯坦 红利、矿产开采费（2.8%~6%）、超额利润税、补偿历史成本的支付 46.1% 中央政府征收，中央预算收入； 资料来源：Otto, James M., Competitive Position of Mongolia’s Mineral Sector Fiscal System: the Case of
a Model Copper Mine, 2007
四四四四、、、、中国矿产资源税费制度的改革建议中国矿产资源税费制度的改革建议中国矿产资源税费制度的改革建议中国矿产资源税费制度的改革建议
对照其他发达国家，中国尚未建立起适应新能源发展战略和资源循环使用战略的税收政策体系。未来的资源税改革应承担起推动社会经济转型的应有功能，而当前最为首要的目标在于建立起统一的资源税体系，推动技术创新引导下的能源转型。
按照资源和环境经济学的最新研究，耗竭性资源的全球储量日益下降，由此带来的环境成本不断增加。为应对这种危机，人类不断的探索新技术希望用可再生资源代替耗竭性资源。然而，到目前为止，依靠生物能源和太阳能等新能源尚不能支持目前的人类经济规模。且未来的技术创新具有不确定性。基于此，中国的矿产资源税改革更应立足可持续发展的目标，其改革应坚持以下方向：其一，利用资源税提高资源价格，控制社会对资源高消耗的产品、服务的需求。第二，通过税制改革和补贴政策，鼓励对可再生能源、清洁能源的利用，鼓励金属产品的回收利用。第三，资源税税收收入首先用于矿业开采中的环境破坏恢复和社会补偿，使自然资源收益能为社会共享。第四，利用税收收入支持国家能源和资源技术创新计划，引导新的矿业开采技术采用，降低生态破坏。
（（（（一一一一））））以资源税为核心整合税以资源税为核心整合税以资源税为核心整合税以资源税为核心整合税、、、、费制度费制度费制度费制度
1.取消矿产恢复治理保证金、煤矿转产发展基金、山西煤炭可持续发展基金、青海省原生矿生态补偿费、新疆维吾尔自治区煤炭地方经济发展费，以及其他省级立法基金收费项目，伴随资源税率的提高，将原有地方收费并入资源税。 2.停征“矿产资源补偿费”。将矿产资源补偿费中的生态恢复补偿功能赋予
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资源税，促进矿企工艺改进的功能用差别税率和税收优惠政策代替。矿产资源补偿费并入后，合理提高资源税征收比例。原所征资金用于重要矿区带的地质勘察和外围找矿部分，在资源税下保持其使用用途不做改变，以保证矿业结构调整，改变我国矿业发展重开采和冶炼、轻勘探的现状。 3.保留“探矿权、采矿权价款”、“探矿权、采矿权使用费”收费项目，改革现有矿权出让招、拍、挂制度，废除协议转让、政府划拨等地方政府做法。将其纳入省级公共资源出让管理系统，所有地方矿权出让招标均由省招投标中心组织、国土资源部门、审计监察部门负责监督。探矿权、采矿权收入纳入省财政专户，使用方向主要用于国家事业单位的勘探业务经费。 4.保留石油特别收益金，并扩大其征收范围。由于国际油价的波动性，石油、石化行业的非竞争性、高利润等特征，国家应保留享有超额利润权利。并且，考虑将超额利润税扩大至其他稀有金属矿产业。并建议收益金征收与利润挂钩，对于利润率小于或等于 15%的，由于是正常回报，征收率应为零；对于利润率大于 15%但小于等于 30%的，制定一个正常征收率。 5.推动“探矿权、采矿权”出让合同方式改革，在统一招标基础上，考虑矿产资源开采中保护资源的目标，代替最高出价中标为综合开采能力高企业中标。同时，借鉴国外产权出让合约条款，将超额利润分享条件明确其中，制订适合我国国情的“探矿权、采矿权”出让合约范本。 6.扩大征收范围,逐步将水资源、森林、草场海洋资源、城镇土地使用税等纳入或并入征税范围。根据我国国情，应将水资源、森林资源和草场资源纳入征税范围, 以解决我国日益突出的水资源短缺与缺水浪费并存及森林、草场资源的破坏问题。待条件成熟后，还应将其他资源纳入征收范围。土地资源现已成为制约我国经济社会发展的重要因素。为了使相关税收法律制度更加规范、完善并有利于税收的征管，应将土地使用税、耕地占用税统一并入资源税中，成为资源税的 1个税目。 改革后的资源税应包括以下 6个税目：（1）矿产资源；（2）水资源；（3）土地资源；（4）森林资源；（5）草原资源；（6）盐。 （（（（二二二二））））依据资源耗竭速度依据资源耗竭速度依据资源耗竭速度依据资源耗竭速度，，，，全面提高矿产资源税费征收水平全面提高矿产资源税费征收水平全面提高矿产资源税费征收水平全面提高矿产资源税费征收水平
1.根据国土资源部的全国矿产资源普查资料，明确各矿产资源的现有储量、年消耗量、年新探明储量，年进口量，制定长远性的不可再生资源使用规划，矿产资源税各税目税率的调整应以此为根本依据。 2.煤炭资源总体税负的确定应以中国的能源结构调整目标为依据，根据煤炭在整体资源消耗的比例从目前 70%，到 2015年调整为 60%，到 2030 年调整为 40%
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的调控目标，另考虑煤炭的需求价格弹性等因素，“十二五”期间煤炭资源税改为从价征收，税率应设定为 12%~15%，到 2030 年应调整为 20%。 3.铁矿石资源税负的确定应以促进资源节约为目标，根据我国钢铁产能过剩以及单位 GDP 钢铁消耗量超过发达国家平均水平的 20%左右。未来提高铁矿石利用率，应在目前铁矿石资源税占销售价格 5%的水平基础上，在 2015—2020 年逐步提高至 8%~10%，在 2020—2030 年间提高到 10%~15%。 4.有色金属矿铜、铝、铅、锌为工业重要原料,我国储量较低，需大量进口。根据国土资源经济研究所的数据，我国 2007年单位 GDP中铜消耗量为世界平均水平的 4.6倍，铝、铅、锌的单位 GDP消耗量也都远远高于世界平均水平。根据调控目标，铜、铝、铅、锌在 2015—2020 年从价税率设定为 5%~8%，2020—2030年税率逐步提高到 8%~12%。 5.稀土、锡、钨、锑为我国重要的战略资源，尤其是稀土开采浪费严重，建议在 2015—2020 年税率提高到 10%~15%，到 2030 年税率逐步调整到 30%左右。 6.钽、铌、铂、钛、钼等稀有金属及合金广泛用于军事、医疗、精密仪器等工业。我国储量丰富，但开采浪费严重。建议从高适用税率，尽快适用从价征收税率在 2015—2020 调整为 15%~20%，2030 年调整至 30%。 7.其他非金属矿中的磷是重要的磷肥、磷酸的生产原料，硅是玻璃、光伏新能源硅材的重要原料，凹凸棒石（坡缕石）、萤石均是重要的工业原料。从国际环境看，美国近年强制停止磷矿出口，而变为进口。国土资源部已将磷矿资源列入 2010 年后不能满足国民经济发展需求的重要矿种之一。为了保护国内资源，建议 2013—2015年提高磷、硅等非金属矿资源税率至 8%，2015—2020 年将税率提高至 10%~15%。 （（（（三三三三））））差别化设置税率差别化设置税率差别化设置税率差别化设置税率，，，，保护优质矿产资源保护优质矿产资源保护优质矿产资源保护优质矿产资源，，，，降低开采破坏程度降低开采破坏程度降低开采破坏程度降低开采破坏程度
1.资源税从价计征后，税负与销售价格相关，但矿产品售价不能全部反映资源的稀缺性、开采难易程度、开采造成的生态环境破坏外部性成本。因此，应根据具体矿种内不同等级、不同开采工艺矿进一步差别化税率。根据以往大矿种内部的分类标准，设定差别化税目税率。设定原则应以保护稀有矿种、优质矿藏为目的。 2.针对目前的煤炭资源税改革，从量计征方式下各省煤炭矿种等级分类标准不一。改为从价计征后，各省可根据以往分类标准，设置差别税率。其依据以调节优质煤矿的开采速度为主，并结合矿山的开采生命周期，生态恢复补偿资金需求等因素。 3.各矿种税率应保持动态性。针对国际油价波动设置的石油特别收益金保证
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国家享有部分超额利润。建议对于贵金属和稀有金属开采企业类比石油特别收益金，征收超额利润税。设置一定价格门槛，当高于门槛价格时，通过超额利润税体现国家对国有资源超额经济租的分享。 （（（（四四四四））））改革中央与地方改革中央与地方改革中央与地方改革中央与地方，，，，地方省地方省地方省地方省、、、、市市市市、、、、县资源税费县资源税费县资源税费县资源税费分成比例分成比例分成比例分成比例
1．按照资源收益全社会共享原则，以及调节区域资源不均的财政收入差异原则，资源税应设置为共享税。参照其他国家经验，中央政府应从资源税收益一定比例支持新能源技术发展和金属资源回收利用 。考虑目前地方财政困难情况，中央地方分成比例以 2：8左右为宜。未来地方税结构调整后，这一比例可适时进一步提高。 2.目前一些省份资源税按照 3：3：4 在省、市、县三级财政分配，对于省直管县按照 6：4 比例在省县间分成。按照我国省直管县的改革方向，建议将资源税分成改为省与资源所在县（市）分成，分成比例应向资源所在地倾斜，考虑地方财政的差异性，中央规定比例省、县（市）间范围为 5：5和 3：7间。 （（（（五五五五））））通过预算改革强化资源税费支出功能通过预算改革强化资源税费支出功能通过预算改革强化资源税费支出功能通过预算改革强化资源税费支出功能
1.资源税费的主要功能体现在支出方面。目前，中央和地方政府分别制订了《矿产资源补偿费使用管理办法》、《探矿权、采矿权使用费管理办法》、《山西省煤炭可持续发展基金征收使用管理办法》等法规，但现实中资金挪用现象严重②。资源税改革整合地方收费和基金项目后，应制订统一的《矿产资源税费使用管理办法》，为未来的资源税立法做好准备。在使用管理上突出强调资源税费在保护资源、实现可持续发展的功能。 2.统一设立中央、省（市）级“资源税费”收支预算科目，国家资源税费分成收入应重点支持国家“新能源”和“资源回收利用”技术创新战略。依靠未来的技术突破，弥补耗竭性资源的消耗。省本级分成除满足国土资源部门行政支出外，应加大找矿投入，作为引导资金，进一步促进重点资源勘探业的产业化，如对页岩气勘探的支持。资源所在地收入分成重点弥补采矿造成的生态、社会损失，并支持产业转型。 3.为实现以上功能，配合中央层面的资源税使用，可以在一般预算目级科目中增加新能源技术开发支出。配合地方层面的使用，可在一般预算对应科目中 ②
山西省审计厅在 2008年省本级预算执行审计中，对煤炭可持续发展基金征收管理情况进行了专项审计。发现 13个市、县级地税征收单位通过 17个带有过渡户性质的银行帐户存放煤炭可持续发展基金，年末滞留 15.01亿元,占全年入库总额的 33.63％，至 2009年 3月底,仍有 2.63亿元未入库；煤炭可持续发展基金征管、稽查、焦炭外运查验工作不到位，制度不完善，大量焦炭未出具基金已缴证明就对外运输销售，按照省焦炭集团公司资料测算有 17.55亿元基金漏征。
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增加矿区生态恢复治理支出。同时，按照矿区居民健康及其他社会补偿、城市转型基础设施建设、发展新产业专项等需要增加预算目级科目。各目级科目的资金分配使用纳入地方当年预算接受人大审计。 4.考虑到现有预算科目中，已包含对采掘业的补贴支出。考虑与国外的补贴制度对应，建议在征收制度中，配套税收优惠政策，鼓励矿业企业改进生产工艺。 （（（（六六六六））））建立跨部门建立跨部门建立跨部门建立跨部门监管制度监管制度监管制度监管制度，，，，强化地方资源税费征收强化地方资源税费征收强化地方资源税费征收强化地方资源税费征收、、、、使用监管使用监管使用监管使用监管
1.针对地方政府对资源税费挪用的严重现实情况。一方面，尽快改善地方官员政绩评价体系，对于矿产资源产地县（市），应在考评中加入资源合理开采、综合利用指标。同时降低 GDP考核压力。另一方面，结合资源税费的预算细化改革，强化地方人大在专项资金中的监管作用。并且，资源所在县（市）的预算应就矿产资源税费使用进行更详尽的公共信息披露，让当地公众参与预算监督。 2.各省国土资源部根据本省规划制定 5 年期矿山环境恢复治理目标，各矿山所在地根据此目标上报计划和资金需求，省财政部门向地方根据计划下发“矿山环境治理恢复”专项资金，当年地方资金使用由地方国土资源局和财政局监管，定期审计资金使用绩效和环境恢复状况。 3.在环境恢复治理资金使用中，重点促进采矿排放物的循环利用工程建设、采矿废弃物的监测、安全贮存工程建设、采矿造成的地质形态破坏恢复。 4.在资源税收入中，应重点安排资金用于建立全国县（市）级矿山所在地的环境污染、地质破坏的监测系统。配合资源税支出项目的绩效考核，定期汇总监测数据作为地方国土资源部门、环保部门和地方政府行政官员的政绩考核指标。 （（（（七七七七））））补贴改革中利益受损群体和矿区居民补贴改革中利益受损群体和矿区居民补贴改革中利益受损群体和矿区居民补贴改革中利益受损群体和矿区居民
1．基于提高矿产资源税费负担水平的改革会通过价格因素影响下游制造业，进而影响居民消费结构，导致居民生活成本有所上升。建议根据下一步的煤炭资源税率调整，重点调查发电企业成本上升状况，并估算若电价随着浮动，对居民消费的最终影响。 2.为减少对总需求的影响，并体现改革的收入分配作用。针对煤炭资源税改革，在中央财政层面，按照统计部门的城镇、农村五等份收入分类，对最低、低、中低收入家庭进行能源价格补贴。各省制定补贴的具体原则和补贴方式。 3.可从中央资源税账户中拨付专项资金，结合北方的冬季供暖管网改造，县级城镇集体供暖工程建设，作为引导资金，推动资源节约型城市化示范工程。并考虑供热过程中对低收入家庭采取低收费方式进行政府补贴。 4.若煤炭资源税改革引起发电成本上升，并导致电价浮动。应分行业调查小
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微企业用电能耗在生产成本中的比重。以及对这些企业的利润影响。选取适当时机，降低其他税种税负，作为补偿。
