Map sho wing co nt est ed Islands

T he Asia- Pacif ic Jo urnal, Vo l 11, Issue 9 , No . 2, March 4 , 20 13.

China-Japan Territ orial Conflict s and t he US-Japan-China Relat ions in Hist orical and Cont emporaryPerspect ive 歴史的・現代的視野からみた中日領土問題と米日中関係歴史的・現代的視野からみた中日領土問題と米日中関係

An edit ed Japanese version is available

Yabuki Susumu int erviewed by Mark Selden

T ranslat io n by Rumi Sakamo t o and Mat t Allen

Mark Selden: In discussing t he US-China relat io nship o r Chimerica, yo u no t e t he 20 0 -st ro ng US delegat io n t hatvisit ed Beijing at t he very mo ment t hat t he US was t o ppling t he DPJ administ rat io n o f Hat o yama Yukio asevidence t hat t he US will no t back Japan in t he current disput e wit h China o ver Diao yut ai/Senkaku Islands.

Ho wever, t he US has made a number o f co nt radict o ry st at ement s, including so me suggest ing t hat it wo uld viewt he issue wit hin t he framewo rk o f it s o bligat io n t o defend Japan under t he Japan-US Securit y T reat y. Mo reo ver,t he US has mo ved aggressively t o insert it self int o o t her t errit o rial issues, no t ably t ho se invo lving t he clashbet ween China and Viet nam/Philippines in t he So ut h China Sea. T he sit uat io n is in fact vo lat ile. Ho w are we t ounderst and t he Diao yut ai clash in t he co nt ext o f wider t errit o rial co nf lict s in t he regio n?

Yabuki Susumu: The is sues o f the Senkaku Is lands and the Nansha Is lands and Xisha Is lands are symbo lic o f the fact that imperialJapan’s po s twar settlement is no t yet co mpleted. I think this is due to the limitatio ns o f Japanese and American po litical leadership.

1. Firs t, co ncerning the o rigin o f the Senkaku territo rial is sues , my viewis that:

a. Originally the Senkaku Is lands were part o f the three no rthern is landgro ups near Keelung po rt in Taiwan alo ng with the Huapin and Pangjiais lands that were lo ng asso ciated with Taiwanese fishermen andmerchants . Altho ugh Japan claimed so vereignty o f the uninhabitedis lands in January 1895 when Qing China was defeated in the Sino -Japanese War, given that the Treaty o f Shimo no seki makes no mentio no f these is lands , Japan co ns iders they have no thing to do with the Sino -Japanese War and the Shimo no seki Treaty. But fro m the Chineseperspective, the Senkaku Is lands were no thing but part o f the trans fer o fTaiwan to Japan in 1895. This is where the unders tanding o f the twoparties differs .

b. The trans fer o f Taiwan to Japan was acco mplished as a result o f theSino -Japanese War, but in accepting the Po tsdam terms in September

1945, the s ituatio n was res to red to the o riginal s ituatio n in which Taiwan, the Penghu is lands , Manchuria and the Ko rean peninsulawere returned to their pre-Japanese s tatus . Ho wever, the Senkaku Is lands , which were to be returned at this po int, were no treturned, and they have no t yet been returned fo r the fo llo wing reaso ns:

Firs t, a civil war was fo ught between the Co mmunis t and Natio nalis t go vernments ; the go vernment o f Chiang Kai-shek escaped toTaiwan and waited to co unter-attack the mainland. Fo r this reaso n, US military suppo rt was indispensable to the Chiang go vernmentand the Chiang go vernment welco med US military co ntro l.

Seco nd, the go vernment o f the Peo ple’s Republic aimed to liberate Taiwan, and saw the so lutio n to the uninhabited is land attachedto Taiwan as a part o f the o verall so lutio n to the Taiwan is sue.

Third, Japan, a defeated natio n, fo rgo t abo ut the uninhabited Senkaku is lands .

c. The territo rial is sues o f the Senkaku Is lands resurfaced at the time o f Okinawa’s revers io n to Japan in 1972. At that time, bo th theTaiwan and mainland go vernments claimed territo rial so vereignty. The Taiwan go vernment at the time had diplo matic relatio ns withthe US and fo cused o n nego tiatio ns with the US and it success fully clarif ied in diplo matic language that o nly adminis trative rightswere returned to Japan. At the po int o f Okinawa’s revers io n to Japan in 1972, the US saw the so vereignty o f the Senkaku Is landsmo s tly as a po int o f co nflict between Japan and Taiwan.

d. As a result o f Deng Xiao ping’s shift to the refo rm and o pening line, Taiwan’s eco no my was inco rpo rated into the mainlandeco no my, resulting in virtual eco no mic unificatio n. Fo r this reaso n, bo th sho res o f the Strait have develo ped “s tabilizatio n o n thebas is o f the s tatus quo , which is neither unificatio n no r real independence.” The territo rial so vereignty o f the Senkaku Is lands ,therefo re, mo s tly surfaced as a “Japan-China co ntradictio n” rather than Japan-Taiwan co ntradictio n. In 1992, Beijing included theSenkaku Is lands in the Law o f the Sea, and in the mid-1990s the Taiwan Strait Cris is o ccurred. The backgro und o f this was the ris ingTaiwanese independence mo vement, which has s ince beco me a thing o f the pas t. In its place, the Japan-China co ntradictio n hassharpened s ince 2012.

2. On the Nansha Is lands and Xisha Is lands

In March 1939, the Japanese empire inco rpo rated the Nansha (Spratly) Is lands and the Xisha (Paracel) Is lands within Taiwan’sKao hs iung city, but it lo s t them all in January 1946 in acco rdance with SCAPIN-677, which was is sued with the Po tsdam declaratio nand Japan’s unco nditio nal surrender. Fro m then o n, several co untries began to encro ach o n the Paracel and Spratly Is lands . TheSino -Japanese Peace Treaty s tated that, based o n the seco nd article o f the San Francis co Treaty, Japan reno unced all rights , titlesand claims to Taiwan (Fo rmo sa) and the Penghus (the Pescado res ) as well as the Spratly and Paracel Is lands . Co mpetitio n o ver theNansha and Xisha is lands intens ified after March 1988, when China and Vietnam clashed o ver Jo hnso n So uth Reef. In 1995 the

The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan FocusIn-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific...and the world.

Act ivist s f lying PRC and ROC f lags pro claimChinese/T aiwanese claims t o Diao yu/Senkakus.

Philippines and China had a co nflict o ver Mischief Reef, and in 2012 the Philippines and China had a co nflict o ver Panatag Reef.(Chimerica pp. 72-79).

While the Senkaku Is lands are co ntes ted by Japan, Taiwan and China, o thers co ntes t the Nansha and Xisha Is lands . But that all theseis lands were o nce part o f the Japanese empire sugges ts Japan’s respo ns ibility to reso lve the is sues . The o ld-s tyle militaris ticexpans io n is unacceptable and Japan has a s ignificant respo ns ibility to turn this regio n into a peaceful regio n. Despite its hugerespo ns ibility and its o bligatio ns , ho wever, Japanese awareness remains inadeqate. It is highly likely that The Minis try o f Fo reignAffairs (MOFA) altered the minutes o f the Tanaka-Zho u Enlai meeting o f 40 years ago (1972) and burned and des tro yed the minuteso f the So no da Sunao -Deng Xiao ping meeting o f 34 years ago (1978). They also rejected Pro fesso r Ishii Akira’s reques t fo rinfo rmatio n, claiming “no n-exis tence” as the reaso n. China has no t released the o fficial minutes o f the meeting, but ZhangXiangshan’s memo ir has been made public. This memo ir, said to have been based o n the minutes o f the meeting, po ints o ut thatthere was a de facto agreement to shelve the Senkaku Is lands is sues . Co ncerning the co ntent o f Japan-China summit meetings in1972 and 1978, China’s detailed reco rds are credible, whereas MOFA’s alteratio n o f the reco rd is no thing sho rt o f inexcusable ando utrageo us .

We mus t co nclude that Japan is respo ns ible fo r the 2012 Japan-China co nflict because its o rigin is the MOFA and Japanesego vernment’s o ne-s ided denial o f the his to rical fact that the Senkaku Is lands is sue was shelved 40 years ago . Putting the pas tas ide, ho w are we go ing to rebuild Sino -Japanese relatio ns? It is said that there’s no po int crying o ver spilt milk. It is clear as daythat the Senkaku pro blem is a pro duct o f imperialism, but in reality, with internatio nal territo rial pro blems , the s ide with effectiveco ntro l has an o verwhelming advantage. Once awakened, ho wever, the s leeping lio n canno t be put back to s leep. Japan has lo s tbo th principal and interes t due to its failure o f diplo macy. Despite the Japanese go vernment’s s tance that there is no territo rialrights is sue, the speeches Japan and China delivered at the United Natio ns mean that the wo rld no w kno ws that there is a territo rialdispute.

What is to be do ne no w? Fo r Japan, firs t o f all, it is necessary to co nfirm the co ntent o f the two Japan-China summit meetings andaccept the fact that China, to o , is ins is ting o n its territo rial rights . Then it is necessary to peacefully nego tiate a future arrangement.Two decades ago in the Taiwan Strait, in o rder to reso lve China-Taiwan relatio ns , the idea o f the “1992 Co nsensus” was invented.Based o n the assumptio n o f “One China,” the co ntinent interpreted China as the PRC, while Taiwan interpreted China as The Republico f China – an agreement predicated o n the idea o f “same bed, different dreams.” In o ther wo rds , the so vereignty is sue wastempo rarily shelved in favo ur o f peaceful co exis tence and eco no mic exchange. We need to learn fro m this wisdo m and create a new,deliberately ambiguo us keywo rd under which the so vereignty and territo rial rights o f the Senkaku Is lands can be subsumed. Fo rins tance, there co uld be a “o ne is land, two go vernments ” respo nse to “Senkaku-Diao yu,” wherein Japan might adminis ter the is landso n o dd days and China o n even days . What is required is the creatio n o f this type o f a “new co nsensus” based o n sharedadminis tratio n, the maintenance o f regio nal peace and o rder, and fair sharing o f reso urces .

3. On the US-Japan Security Treaty and the Senkaku Is lands

The co nflict o ver the Senkaku Is lands has s timulated a number o fdis cuss io ns as to whether the Japan-US Security Treaty (Ampo )applies to this regio n o r no t. At the time o f the Okinawa Revers io nAgreement, the Senkaku Is lands were returned to Japan alo ng withOkinawa, and s ince the Okinawan Is lands were subjected to theJapan-US Security Treaty, it is o bvio us that the Senkaku Is lands werealso included in this Treaty. There are reaso ns fo r the renewedinteres t in the ques tio n o f the Ampo Treaty and the Senkaku Is landsin the co ntext o f the o ngo ing co nflict. Firs t, the o verwhelming gro wtho f China’s military po wer co mpared to 40 years ago . US bases inOkinawa no w fall co mpletely within the range o f China’s miss ilenetwo rk. Thus fro m the perspective o f US-China military relatio ns ,security talks are an urgent matter, and they have already s tarted.

Ano ther po int is that dealing with co nflicts o ver uninhabited is landssuch as the Senkaku Is lands was no t part o f the o riginal o bjective o f

the Japan-US Security Treaty. Mo reo ver, the US has expressed its view many times that the co nflict o ver the so vereignty o ver theSenkaku Is lands is a matter between Japan and China, and that the US maintains neutrality. Next, the defence o f the is lands is theSDF’s jo b, no t a direct task o f the Japan-US Security Treaty. Las tly, putting the Japan-US Security Treaty into mo tio n requires thesuppo rt o f the US Co ngress , and it is do ubtful that the Japan-US Security Treaty can actually be applied to a co nflict o veruninhabited is lands . This po s itio n o f the US is utterly co mmo nsens ical, and I think Japanese right wingers ’ s trategy that attempts toreinfo rce the Japan-US Security Treaty by creating quas i tens io n aro und the Senkaku Is lands is far-fetched.

In o ut lining yo ur view o f Chimerica, yo u po int o ut t hat t he debt -ridden US no w needs Chinese co o perat io n t omanage t he wo rld. What in yo ur view are t he key illust rat io ns o f Chinese pro visio n o f t hat assist ance . . .part icularly in t he Asia-Pacif ic and Middle East /Cent ral Asia?

Mo st impo rtant is the fact that the US do es no t use its dependent s tates such as Japan in o rder to put pressure o n, o r hinder,China’s peaceful rise. To put it mo re co ncretely, the US do es no t impede China’s sea-lane security, which has beco me China’s mo s turgent o bjective fo r its external eco no mic develo pment. China is no t dependent o n the Middle Eas t fo r its crude o il to the extentJapan is ; but as with Japan, Middle Eas tern crude o il s till represents a large pro po rtio n o f China's o il requirements ; so the MiddleEas t as a regio n fo r crude o il supply is also impo rtant. In sho rt, China’s sho rt-term go al is eco no mic gro wth and the maintenance o fpeace in relevant regio ns to enable its eco no mic gro wth. China is ho ping that the US will reco gnise this go al and co o perate. ChinaThreat theo ries , which predict that China will seek wo rld hegemo ny o nce it achieves its eco no mic go als , lack a fo undatio n in reality.China currently has many po ints o f co nflict do mes tically and internatio nally, and has no ro o m fo r such an actio n.

Crit ics o f Japan’s excessive dependence o n t he US frequent ly cast fut ure pro spect s no t exclusively in t erms o f analt ernat ive Japan-China relat io nship, but in a bro ader appro ach t o Asian regio nal co o perat io n. What do yo u seeas t he pro spect s fro m t his perspect ive?

Prime Minis ter Hato yama’s idea o f Eas t As ian Co mmunity, tho ugh epo ch-making, miscarried because it remained merely an idea. Inthe pas t Japan pro po sed the Greater Eas t As ia Co -pro sperity Sphere, but s ince it was based o n military po wer it co uld no t avo idbankruptcy. The ideal fo rm o f eco no mic co o peratio n under the glo balised eco no my is eco no mic so lidarity based no t o n militarypressure but o n the principle o f auto no my whereby natio ns are free to jo in o r leave. Fro m no w o n, eco no mic co o peratio n in Eas tAs ia and So uth Eas t As ia based o n this type o f mo derate eco no mic liberalism will gro w. Neither Japan no r China no r the US sho uldseek to co ns truct an exclus ive eco no mic sphere o r attempt to exert excess ive influence o ver the regio n. It is vital that we find wayso f sus tainable develo pment by co o perating, and aim fo r eco no mic develo pment co nscio us o f the limit o f the earth’s natural

reso urcea and the enviro nment at large. The 21s t century needs to learn lesso ns fro m the 19 th and 20 th centuries , the centuries o f

war, and seek eco no mic gro wth based o n the new philo so phy o f symbio s is and co exis tence.

Let ’s lo o k furt her int o t he hist o rical o rigins o f t he China-Japan t errit o rial disput e o ver t he Senkakus in t heco nt ext o f Japan’s hist o rical annexat io n o f Okinawa, t he San Francisco T reat y, Okinawan reversio n t o Japan, andt he Ampo T reat y.

1: Okinawa Revers io n and the Senkaku Is lands

a. The o ccupatio n o f the Senkaku Is lands in the co ncrete sense began with the Supreme Co mmander o f Allied Po wers Ins tructio n(SCAPIN) no . 677, o f which directives were co nfirmed in the San Francis co Peace Treaty in September 1951. Later in 1953, the UnitedStates Civil Adminis tratio n o f the Ryukyu Is lands (USCAR) Pro clamatio n no . 27 and Pro vis io ns o f the Go vernment o f the RyukyuIs lands no . 68 determined the bo undary o f the US adminis tratio n until the revers io n o f Okinawa. The bo undary was indicated withlatitudes and lo ngitudes , as “within the fo llo wing geo graphical bo undaries : 28 º no rth, 124 º 40 ’ eas t; thence 24 º no rth, 122 ºeas t; thence 24 º no rth, 133 º eas t; thence 27 º no rth, 131 º 50 ’ eas t; thence 27 º no rth, 128 º 18 ’ eas t; thence 28 º no rth, 128 º18 ’ eas t; thence 28 º no rth, 124 º 40 ’ eas t; thence to the po int o f o rigin.” The Senkaku Is lands are lo cated within this bo undary, butits name was no t specified.

b. In May 1972 with the Okinawa Revers io n Agreement Okinawa was returned to Japan. The bo undary o f Okinawa revers io n was basedo n the afo rementio ned geo graphical bo undary, and was indicated with latitudes and lo ngitudes: “28 º no rth 124 º 40 ’ eas t; 24 ºno rth 122º eas t l; 24 º no rth 133 º eas t; 27 º no rth 131 º 50 ’ eas t; 27 º no rth 128 º 18 ’ eas t; 28 º no rth 128 º 18 ’ eas t; 28 º no rth124 º 40 ’ eas t.” The Senkaku Is lands were within this bo undary, but their name was no t specified.

c. As is clear fro m the abo ve po ints 1 and 2, at the time o f Okinawa’s o ccupatio n as well as the time o f its revers io n, the nameSenkaku Is lands was never specifically mentio ned in the revers io n agreement between Japan and the US.

d. So vereignty and adminis trative rights in the Revers io n o f Okinawa

At the time o f Okinawa’s revers io n, Fo reign Minis ter Fukuda Takeo answered in the Diet as fo llo ws: “[Abo ut Kubajima/Huangwei Yuand Taisho jima/Chiwei Yu]The Senkaku Is lands have been used as sho o ting ranges fo r the US armed fo rces . While yo u havecriticized the exis tence o f the US sho o ting ranges o n the Senkaku Is lands , I’d like to urge yo u to see this as evidence that theadminis trative rights o ver the Senkaku Is lands will be returned to Japan in future, as o ur territo ry – a full territo ry.” (15 December1971, plenary sess io n o f Ho use o f Co uncilo rs )

Fukuda’s answer co ntains a s ignificant mis take. He is equating “o ur territo ry,” “full territo ry” and “adminis trative rights .” In o therwo rds , his unders tanding is that “adminis trative rights o f full territo ry will be returned to Japan.” Ho wever, the US at the timedis tinguished “so vereignty and territo rial rights ” fro m “adminis trative rights ,” fo r example, in the fo llo wing do cument. A US autho rityhas po inted this o ut, quo ting so me literature published in the co ntext o f current Japan-China co nflict o ver the Senkaku Is lands:“Washingto n has never reco gnized Japan’s so vereignty o ver the Diao yu Is lands , kno wn in Japan as Senkaku.” If the US didn’treco gnize so vereignty, then what did it reco gnize? The repo rt says , “the US reco gnizes o nly Japan’s adminis trative po wer o ver thedisputed is lands in the Eas t China Sea after the Okinawa Revers io n Treaty was s igned in 1971.” (US Co ngress io nal repo rt publishedSept 25, 2012). Acco rding to this repo rt, “in the Okinawa Revers io n Agreement s igned in 1971, the US reco gnized o nly adminis trativerights o f Japan o ver these disputed is lands in the Eas t China Sea.” Let me repeat. The US ins is ts that it returned o nly “adminis trativerights ” (which is differentiated fro m “so vereignty and territo rial rights ”) to Japan; but Fukuda’s answer says that no t o nlyadminis trative rights but also so vereignty and territo rial rights have been returned. I have dis cussed earlier the meaning o f thisdis crepancy. Fo r Japanese peo ple who had accepted Fukuda’s answer at face value, China’s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is landsmus t seem abrupt, and the US dis tinctio n between the two a betrayal. At the time o f nego tiatio ns o ver Okinawa revers io n, the secretpact caused a s candal, but the ambiguity o ver the Senkaku Is lands was ano ther hidden is sue. This is also the direct o rigin o f Japan-China co nflict at the present.

e. To day every Japanese perso n kno ws o f the Senkaku Is lands; but at the time o f revers io n even a high-level MOFA o fficial didn’tkno w where the US sho o ting ranges were lo cated. Fo r example, a go vernment delegate Izeki Yujiro co uldn’t answer abo ut thesho o ting ranges o n Kubajima: “that may be an is sue o f adminis trative agreement … I’ve heard so mething abo ut it… [s ilence] It is inthe So uth o f Okinawa, isn’t it? I do no t kno w abo ut that in any detail, either.” (Plenary sess io n o f Ho use o f Co uncilo rs , 15December) This is ho w the Senkaku is sue has been treated. We are no w paying fo r having allo wed this kind o f ambiguity o ver thisis sue.

f. The bas is o f Okinawa’s revers io n was the Supreme Co mmander o f Allied Po wers Ins tructio n 677 (29 January 1946). MacArthuris sued it half a year into his o ccupatio n adminis tratio n, and it s trictly defined the “bo undary o f Japan.” Territo ries o f “imperialexpans io n” were all taken away and Japan was defined to include the fo ur main is lands o f Japan (Ho kkaido , Ho nshu, Kyushu andShiko ku) and the appro ximately 1,000 smaller adjacent is lands , including the Tsushima Is lands and the Ryukyu (Nansei) Is landsno rth o f 30° no rth (excluding Kuchino shima Is land). Here “the Ryukyu (Nansei) Is lands no rth o f 30° no rth” meant that up toYakushima Is land in Kago shima prefecture was included in Japan. In o ther wo rds , To kara Is lands so uth o f Kuchino shima Is land wereexcluded.

2. Which areas were remo ved fro m the fo rmer Japanese empire?

(a) Utsuryo (Ullung) Is land, Lianco urt Ro cks (Takeshima/Do kdo Is land) and Quelpart (Saishu o r Cheju) Is land. Takeshima wasinitially remo ved, but the Japanese go vernment later nego tiated to delete the wo rd Takeshima fro m the do cument. Ho wever, So uthKo rea has held effective adminis tratio n to to day. (b) The Ryukyu (Nansei) Is lands so uth o f 30° no rth (including Kuchino shimaIs land), the Izu, Nanpo , Bo nin (Ogasawara) and Vo lcano (Kazan o r Iwo ) Is land Gro ups , and all the o ther o utlying Pacific Is lands[including the Daito (Ohigashi o r Oagari) Is land Gro up, and Parece Vela (Okino to ri), Marcus (Minami-to ri) and Ganges (Nakano -to ri) Is lands . As we can see fro m this , the area so uth o f Kuchino shima in the Amami Is lands was remo ved fro m Japan. Subsequently,the Amami Is lands were returned to Japan in December 1953; Ogasawara and Iwo jima is land returned in June 1968, and Okiwawaand the Dao to Is lands in May 1972. (c) the Kurile (Chishima) Is lands , the Habo mai (Hapo maze) Is land Gro up (including Suisho ,Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibo tsu and Taraku Is lands) and Shiko tan Is land were o ccupied by the fo rmer So viet Unio n, Russ ia, and are currentlydisputed.

Further areas specifically remo ved fro m the go vernmental and adminis trative jurisdictio n o f the Imperial Japanese Go vernment arethe fo llo wing: (a) all Pacific Is lands seized o r o ccupied under mandate o r o therwise by Japan s ince the beginning o f Wo rld War I.Included here are the Mariana is lands , which became Japan’s mandate territo ry when it was seized fro m Germany after Wo rld War I,as well as the Nansha and Xisha Is lands , which Japan inco rpo rated into Kao hs iung city o f Taiwan. (b) Manchuria, Fo rmo sa and thePescado res . Japan’s withdrawal fro m Manchuria and Taiwan is well kno wn. (c) Ko rea and (d) Karafuto . Repatriatio n fro m Ko rea andKarafuto are also well kno wn.

Abo ve were the areas that were remo ved fro m Japan. What abo ut the Senkaku Is lands? The o nly name mentio ned is Ryuku (Nansei)

Is lands , and there is no specific reference to the Senkakus . Later, Article 3 o f the San Francis co Peace Treaty said o f the Nansha andXisha Is lands:

“Japan will co ncur with any pro po sal o f the United States to the United Natio ns to place under its trus teeship sys tem, with theUnited States as the so le adminis tering autho rity, Nansei Sho to so uth o f 29º no rth (including the Ryukyu Is lands and the DaitoIs lands), Nanpo Sho to so uth o f So fu Gan (including the Bo nin Is lands , Ro sario Is land and the Vo lcano Is lands) and Parece Vela andMarcus Is land. Pending the making o f such a pro po sal and affirmative actio n thereo n, the United States will have the right toexercise all and any po wers o f adminis tratio n, legis latio n and jurisdictio n o ver the territo ry and inhabitants o f these is lands ,including their territo rial waters .”

Article 3 placed “so uth o f 29º no rth” i.e. the area so uth o f the Amami Is lands (which are lo cated to the so uth o f Yakushima) underthe US “trus teeship,” and the US had adminis trative rights o ver the area. Entrus ted with trus teeship, the US military es tablished theU.S. Civil Adminis tratio n o f the Ryukyu Is lands in 1953 and is sued USCAR 27, in which the bo undary o f Nansei Sho to was defined as“so uth o f 29º no rth.” The bo undary o f trus teeship was thus bas ically identical with the area o f Japan specified in SCAPIN-677 as wellas the San Francis co Peace Treaty that co nfirmed SCAPIN-677. The US unders tanding is that when Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972the US returned the adminis trative rights that it had been “entrus ted with” witho ut any change in the nature o f rights .

USCAR 27, which was is sued o n 25 December 1953, defined the “geo graphical Bo undaries o f the Ryukyu Is lands” o ver which the USmilitary had adminis trative rights as fo llo ws: Article 1. All is lands , is lets , ato lls , and ro cks and their territo rial waters s ituated withinan area bo unded by the s traight lines as belo w wo uld be under the jurisdictio n o f the US Civil Adminis tratio n o f the Ryukyu Is lands(USCAR) and Ryukyu go vernment. “28° no rth, 124°40 ’ eas t; thence to 24° no rth, 122° eas t; thence to 24° no rth, 133° eas t; 27no rth, 131°50 ’ eas t; 27 no rth, 128°18 ’eas t; thence 28° no rth, 128°18 ’ thence to the po int o f o rigin.” This is the bo undary o f the UStrus teeship and also the bo undary o f adminis trative rights that were returned to Japan when Okinawa reverted to Japanese rule. Thisbo undary is sho wn us ing latitudes and lo ngitudes , but the Senkaku Is lands fall within this bo undary. Thus the bo undary definitio n o fadminis trative rights o f the Senkaku Is lands that were returned to Japan was identical to that o f the1953 USCAR 27 and the OkinawaRevers io n Agreement. To make this po int clear, I attach the text o f “Agreed Minutes .”

In relatio n to the Revers io n Agreement Article 1, “The territo ries defined in paragraph 2 o f Article 1 are the territo ries under theadminis tratio n o f the United States o f America under Article 3 o f the Treaty o f Peace with Japan. As des ignated under USCAR 27, allis lands , is lets , ato lls and ro cks in an area bo unded by the s traight lines co nnecting the fo llo wing co o rdinates : 28º no rth , 124º 40 ’eas t ; 24º no rth , 122 º eas t ; 24º no rth , 133 º eas t ; 27º no rth , 131º 50 ’ eas t ; 27º no rth , 128º 18 ’ eas t ; 28º no rth , 128º 18 ’eas t ; 28º no rth , 124º 40 ’ eas t .”

As is clear fro m the abo ve, there is no evidence that the US was co nscio us o f the Senkaku Is lands when Okinawa came under USadminis tratio n, no r were their names specifically mentio ned when Okinawa reverted to Japan.

Ho wever, this is o nly at the level o f the text o f the final Agreement. In reality, the US reco rd sho ws that at the time o f the s igning o fOkinawa Revers io n Agreement, State Department o fficials and Japanese o fficials unders to o d that the area “include[ed] the SenkakuIs lands .” CRS Repo rt 2012 [“Senkaku (Diao yu/Diao yutai) Is lands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligatio ns ” (Co ngress Research Service,September 25, 2012)]. It mentio ns that at the time o f the s igning o f the Okinawa Revers io n Agreement several State Departmento fficials (Ro bert Starr, Acting Ass is tant Legal Adviser; Harriso n Symmes , Acting Ass is tant Secretary o f State; Ho ward McElro y,Co untry Officer fo r Japan) “asserted” at a co ngress io nal hearing that fo llo wing the s igning o f the Peace Treaty, “so uth o f 29º no rth” was “unders to o d” by the United States and Japan to “include the Senkaku Is lands .”

Thus this repo rt o n the o ne hand sugges ts that “adminis trative rights ” were returned to Japan; but when it co mes to the subject o f“so vereignty and territo rial rights ” it leaves so me ro o m fo r interpretatio n.

One co mmentato r fro m US co ngress io nal circles mentio ned my name and wro te: “Pro fesso r Yabuki is an ho nes t man. The JapanesePrime Minis ter ins is ts that “there is no do ubt that the Senkaku Is lands are Japan’s inherent territo ry in terms o f his to ry andinternatio nal law,” No da said. “There is no pro blem o f so vereignty.” He is lying to the Japanese peo ple."

Calling a prime minis ter a liar is pro vo cative but the po int this perso n is making is the fo llo wing: “(at the time o f the OkinawaRevers io n Agreement) China had no diplo matic relatio ns with US and Japan and the trans fer was do ne witho ut China’s co nsent.” Ino ppo s itio n to the Japanese claim that “China has no t asserted its territo rial rights till recently,” this co mment criticizes the o ne-s ided nature o f Japan’s claim by po inting o ut that China s imply didn’t have an o ppo rtunity to make such an assertio n until no w.

3. The Senkaku Is lands and the Japan-US Security Treaty

What do es the CRS Repo rt 2012 (25 Sept) sugges t? “The latitude and lo ngitude bo undaries set fo rth in the Agreed Minutes appearto include the Senkaku Is lands (Diao yu/ Diao yutai).” The Senkaku Is lands , ho wever, are no t explicitly mentio ned: "During Senatedeliberatio ns o n whether to co nsent to the ratif icatio n o f the Okinawa Revers io n Treaty, the State Department asserted that theUnited States to o k a neutral po s itio n with regard to the co mpeting claims o f Japan, China, and Taiwan, despite the return o f theis lands to Japanese adminis tratio n.”

It go es o n to say, “Success ive U.S. adminis tratio ns have res tated this po s itio n o f neutrality regarding the claims , particularly duringperio ds when tens io ns o ver the is lands have flared, as in 1996, 2010, and 2012. In sho rt, while maintaining neutrality o n theco mpeting claims , the United States agreed in the Okinawa Revers io n Treaty to apply the Security Treaty to the treaty area, includingthe Senkaku,Diao yu/ Diao yutai.”

The abo ve quo tatio ns reveal that the US has been engaged in do uble-dealing. The Security Treaty applies to “Okinawa, including theSenkakus ,” but the US maintains neutrality in relatio n to a co nflict o ver the Senkaku Is lands ’ so vereignty. What do es this mean inreality? Is the US go ing to defend the Senkaku Is lands , o r no t? My view is that the US will no t and canno t defend the SenkakuIs lands .

There are three reaso ns why the US will no t defend the Senkaku Is lands: firs t, the US will no t co mmit to a co nflict o ver so vereignty.In o ther wo rds , its prio rity in this ins tance is the maintenance o f neutrality. Next, the “primary respo ns ibility” fo r the defense o f theis lands sho uld be Japan’s ; and las tly, putting the Security Treaty into mo tio n requires co ns titutio nal pro cedure and Co ngress io nalappro val. If we co ns ider these three po ints , we mus t co nclude that this amo unts to saying that the “Japan-US Security Treaty will no tbe applied” in relatio n to a co nflict o ver uninhabited is lands like the Senkaku Is lands . And this has to be evaluated po s itively as aratio nal and calm judgement that cas ts the is sue in a wider perspective. Tho se who ins is t o n co nfro nting China’s military po wer by“reinfo rcing the Japan-US Security Treaty” are o n shaky gro und.

Two legal principles that suppo rt Japan’s territo rial claims to the Senkaku Is lands are said to be central principles o f internatio nallaw; but this is the lo gic o f imperialism and it is no t persuas ive fo r fo rmer co lo nies .

a. The Principle o f Occupatio . The backgro und to the emergence and acceptance o f the principle o f “o ccupatio ” in mo derninternatio nal law were the increas ing number o f co lo nies "acquired" by co lo nial po wers fo llo wing the “dis co very” o f new co ntinentsand new sea ro utes , and the attempts to mo no po lise internatio nal co mmerce. Behind internatio nal law, which aims to regulateinternatio nal behavio ur, there was o ften mo tivatio n to jus tify the actio n o f o ne's o wn co untry in the eyes o f o ther natio ns . No w,what is terra nullius? Terra nullius (no man’s land) in internatio nal law is no t limited to uninhabited land. “Even if there were alreadyso me inhabitants , if the land did no t belo ng to any co untry, it is regarded as terra nullius .” Africa prio r to its o ccupatio n by Euro peannatio ns is a go o d example. There were “primitive natives ” living there but no t having fo rmed “s tates reco gnised in internatio nal law”,these areas were co ns idered “terra nullius .” In the 19 th century, it came to be argued that “o ccupatio n” mus t mean actual lando ccupatio n and co ntro l. This gradually became a co mmo n practice o f the s tates , and by the latter half o f the 19 th century it wases tablished that the “o ccupatio ” in internatio nal law had to be effective. It is easy to guess , therefo re, that “o ccupatio ” ininternatio nal law is the lo gic o f the rule by imperial po wers . Such lo gic is clearly diff icult fo r fo rmer co lo nies to accept. In terms o fthe Senkaku Is lands , Japan saw them as “terra nullius ”, made a cabinet decis io n to “o ccupy” the is lands , and had this po s itio nreco gnised by the Wes tern imperial po wers . But China has claimed that they were no t “terra nullius ” and o ppo ses Japan.

b. The legal principle o f Es to ppel. Es to ppel is a principle under which if o ne party has acted o n the bas is o f the o ther party’ss tatement o r act, trus ting the latter, then the fo rmer party is precluded fro m asserting anything to the co ntrary o f that which hasbeen es tablished as the truth between the two parties .

As a principle o f go o d faith that sees pro mises as fo unded o n accumulated facts , “es to ppel” co ntains age-o ld wisdo m. When TanakaKakuei and Zho u Enlai agreed to res to re diplo matic relatio ns between the two co untries in 1972, Zho u used a Chinese saying: “Apro mise mus t be kept and result in actio n” to Tanaka, and Tanaka replied with a Japanese pro verb: “Trus t is the bas is o f everything.”This exchange mutually affirmed a pro mise based o n trus t and its fulfillment. No w let us replace “o ne party” in the afo rementio nedprinciple o f “es to ppel” with “China” and “the o ther party” with “Japan.” We no w end up with this sentence: “because o f China’ss tatement and actio n, Japan judged the Senkaku Is lands as terra nullius , trus ting China, and made a territo rial claim o n the bas is o fthe trus t. If this is the case, China is precluded fro m claiming [po s t facto ] that the Senkaku Is lands were no t terra nullius o r thatthey belo ng to China. No w what is wro ng with this?

There are two po ints : firs t, Japan’s evaluatio n o f the Senkaku Is lands as terra nullius ; seco nd, the co nclus io n that the Qing Dynas tydidn’t pro tes t o r that there was no pro tes t. The firs t po int can be rejected o n the bas is o f, fo r example, the letters o f Ino ue Kao ruand Yamagata Arito mo . It is clear that they had anticipated China’s pro tes t and were acting cautio us ly. On the seco nd po int, at thetime when China’s defeat in the Sino -Japanese War was beco ming o bvio us and when the cess io n o f Taiwan was imminent, who wo ulddis cuss the uninhabited Senkaku Is lands? This is a matter o f co mmo n sense. In sho rt, Japan claims that “o ccupatio n o f terranullius ” was decided in cabinet a few mo nths prio r to the Shimo no seki Treaty; in o ppo s itio n to this China claims that Japan’seffective rule o f the Senkaku Is lands was a part o f Taiwan’s Trans fer to Japan, and therefo re they need to be returned to Chinaacco rding to The Cairo Declaratio n.

4. Can the Japan-US Security Treaty guarantee the defence o f the Senkaku Is lands?

Japanese newspapers repo rted o n the 1s t December, 2012 that the US Senate had passed a bill affirming the US o bligatio n to

defend the Senkaku Is lands . Fo r ins tance, Kyo do News repo rted fro m Washingto n o n the 30 th No vember that the US Senate decidedto include an amendment to the Natio nal Defense Autho rizatio n Act fo r fis cal year 2013. Kyo do ’s interpretatio n o f this was that it“intended to keep China’s mo ves to assert its claim in check” and the senate was “in line with the s tance o f U.S. Pres ident BarackObama’s adminis tratio n, which had a clear po s itio n that “the Senkaku Is lands are subject to Article 5 o f the Japan-U.S. securitytreaty o bliging the US to defend Japan in case o f ho s tilities .” It further co mmented that “Sen. Jim Webb (Demo crat) who jo intlypro po sed the amendment with o ther senato rs , said the amendment isa s tro ng s tatement o f suppo rt fo r a vital ally in the Pacific-As ia regio n” and emphas ised the impo rtance o f the Japan-US Security Treaty. Are these co mmentaries accurate? It is a fact that theamendment passed, but ho w sho uld we interpret its meaning? This is quite diff icult. In o rder to accurately grasp the nuance o f theSenate’s reso lutio n we need to go back as far as the Okinawa Revers io n Agreement and examine what pro mises Japan and the USmade while being co nscio us o f China’s presence.

Let us firs t summarise the fo llo wing three main po ints o f the news article:

1. In the Plenary Sess io n o n the 29 th No vember, The US Senate appro ved theamendment to the Natio nal Defense Autho rizatio n Actfo r fis cal year 2013 (Octo ber 2012 – September 2013).

2. This amendment says that the US “ackno wledges the adminis tratio n o f the is lands by Japan.”

3. The abo ve “po s itio n” o f the US to “ackno wledge” will “no t be affected by the unilateral actio ns o f a third party [i.e. China o rTaiwan].”

Even after reading the abo ve three po ints , o nly a few Japanese wo uld be able to unders tand their meaning accurately. This isbecause o f the Japanese media’s habit s ince the US o ccupatio n and the revers io n o f Okinawa o f emphas iz ing co nvenient po intswhile leaving the truth ambiguo us . Since the English vers io n o f the Kyo do news is mo re accurate, I cite it belo w in its entirety. Buteven with the English vers io n, it is hard to unders tand the precise meaning o f this amendment. No w, what’s new abo ut this news? Too ur surprise, there is no thing new.

The true meaning o f this article is :

Japanese rights to the Senkaku Is lands are o nly adminis trative rights and do no t include so vereignty = territo rial rights . Thearticle co nfirms that the “US ackno wledges” this view, which it has maintained do mes tically and internatio nally. In o ther wo rds ,this article primarily co nfirmed the 40-year-o ld US po s itio n: the “separatio n o f so vereignty and territo rial rights .”

The US po s itio n explained abo ve will no t be affected by “China’s unilateral actio ns ” such as its claim o f so vereignty and o theractio ns (fo r example, anti-Japanese demo ns tratio ns o r sending patro l bo ats ). That is , this is merely an express io n that the “theUS will co ntinue the same po s itio n in the future.” In o ther wo rds , this is no thing but US indicatio n that its po s itio n “has no tchanged s ince the time o f the Okinawan revers io n” 40 years ago . So what has changed? This time the name o f the SenkakuIs lands , which was co mpletely hidden 40 years ago , is no w clearly s tated. That’s the o nly difference.

Many Japanese, fearful o f co nflict between Japan and China o ver the Senkaku Is lands , mus t have ho ped fo r the reinfo rcement o f theJapan-US Security Treaty, and mis takenly assumed that this wo uld be useful fo r the defense o f Japan. They mus t have mis takenlytho ught that the US, as Japan’s ally, wo uld surely help Japan acco rding to the pro vis io ns o f the Japan-US Security Treaty.Enco uraging such a misunders tanding is the true meaning o f this amendment. This largely remains lip service. Let me explain thisbelo w.

I will f irs t examine the Kyo do news repo rt and the seven po ints in the amendments . Firs t, Kyo do news . The essence o f the repo rt hasbeen intro duced earlier.

U.S. Senate reaffirms defense o f Senkaku Is lands under Japan-U.S. pact,WASHINGTON, No v. 30 , Kyo do

The U.S. Senate unanimo us ly appro ved Thursday anamendment s tating the Japanese-adminis tered Senkaku Is lands fall under thesco pe o f a bilateral security treaty and Washingto n wo uld defend Japan in the event o f armed attacks . While China claims the is landsin the Eas t China Sea, the amendment to the Natio nal Defense Autho rizatio n Act fo r fis cal 2013, in line with the s tance o f U.S.Pres ident Barack Obama’s adminis tratio n, is intended to keep China’s mo ves to assert its claim in check. Obama is expected to s ignthe bill after passage by the Ho use o f Representatives . Sen. Jim Webb, a Demo crat who jo intly pro po sed the amendment with o thersenato rs , said the amendment is a s tro ng s tatement o f suppo rt fo r a vital ally in the Pacific-As ia regio n. While s tating that theUnited States takes no po s itio n o n the ultimate so vereignty o f the Senkaku Is lands , the amendment ackno wledges theadminis tratio n o f the is lands by Japan, and also said the unilateral actio ns o f a third party will no t affect the U.S. ackno wledgement.Stating the United States is o ppo sed to any claimant’s effo rts to co erce o r threaten to use fo rce o r use fo rce in seeking to reso lveso vereignty and territo rial is sues in the Eas t China Sea, the amendment says the co untry reaffirms its co mmitment to the Japanesego vernment under Article V o f the 1960 Treaty o f Mutual Co o peratio n and Security. The amendment was co -spo nso red with abipartisan gro up o f senato rs , includingJo hn McCain, a Republican. The U.S.de fense autho rizatio n acthas o ften been amended o verdiplo matic is sues including sanctio ns agains t Iran o ver suspected develo pment o f nuclear weapo ns . Kyo do [Emphas is added.]

Next, let’s lo o k at the bio graphy o f Senato r Webb, who is the key figure behind the pro po sal o f this amendment. Over mo re than 40years , he has been a Marine Co rps o fficer, a defense planner, a jo urnalis t, a writer, a Department o f Defense executive, Secretary o fthe Navy as well as a bus iness co nsultant. We can co ns ider him an expert who is able to represent the US o n this matter.

Seven articles in the amendment are as fo llo ws .

SEC. 1246. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE SITUATION IN THE SENKAKU ISLANDS. It is the sense o f the Senate that —(1) the Eas tChina Sea is a vital part o f the maritime co mmo ns o f As ia, including critical sea lanes o f co mmunicatio n and co mmerce that benefitall natio ns o f the As ia-Pacific regio n; (2) the peaceful settlement o f territo rial and jurisdictio nal disputes in the Eas t China Searequires the exercise o f self-res traint by all parties in the co nduct o f activities that wo uld co mplicate o r escalate disputes anddes tabilize the regio n, and differences sho uld be handled in a co ns tructive manner co ns is tent with universally reco gnized principleso f cus to mary internatio nal law; (3) while theUnited States takes no po s itio n o n the ultimate so vereignty o f the Senkaku is lands ,[i.e. maintaining neutrality] the United Statesackno wledges the adminis tratio n o f Japan o ver the Senkaku Is lands; 4) the unilateralactio ns o f a third partywill no t affectUnited States ackno wledgement o f the adminis tratio n o f Japan o ver the Senkaku Is lands;[meaning that “actio ns such as sending Chinese patro l bo ats ” will no t affect “US ackno wledgement o f the adminis tratio n o f Japano ver the Senkaku Is lands .”] (5) the United States has natio nal interes ts in freedo m o f navigatio n, the maintenance o f peace ands tability, respect fo r internatio nal law, and unimpeded lawful co mmerce; (6) the United States suppo rts a co llabo rative diplo maticpro cess by claimants to reso lve territo rial disputes witho ut co ercio n, and o ppo ses effo rts at co ercio n, the threat o f use o f fo rce, o ruse o f fo rce by any claimant in seeking to reso lve so vereignty and territo rial is sues in the Eas t China Sea; and (7) the UnitedStates reaffirms its co mmitment to the Go vernment o f Japan under Article V o f the Treaty o f Mutual Co o peratio n and Security that“[e]ach Party reco gnizes that an armed attack agains t either Party in the territo ries under the adminis tratio n o f Japan wo uld bedangero us to its o wn peace and safety and declares that it wo uld act to meet the co mmo n danger in acco rdance with itsco ns titutio nal pro vis io ns and pro cesses ”. [Emphas is added.]

In this amendment, the Senkaku is lands are clearly named in articles 3 and 4 and are included in the “territo ries under theadminis tratio n o f Japan.” In the pas t the s tatus o f the Senkaku Is lands was left ambiguo us by us ing express io ns such as “it isunders to o d to be included.” This amendment is the firs t US law that specifically s tates the name o f the Senkaku Is lands , and this isthe meaning o f the amendment. As I see it, it is lip service.

As is clear fro m the abo ve articles 3, 4, and 7, we can co nfirm that there is no thing new in the co ntent o f the amendment. The o nlydifference is that article 3 and 4 each mentio ns the name “the Senkaku Is lands” o nce. In the Okinawa Revers io n Agreement this keywo rd was hidden; but the US po s itio n hasn’t changed s ince the time o f revers io n. The “third party” in the sentence “the unilateralactio ns o f a third partywill no t affectUnited States ackno wledgement o f the adminis tratio n o f Japan o ver the Senkaku Is lands ,” atleas t in this co ntext, seems to be an active check agains t “Chinese hegemo ny.” But there is a subtle his to rical fact here. 40 yearsago , at the time o f the Revers io n Agreement, the Taiwan go vernment was s till a “US ally” and was lo bbying the US Co ngress heavily.The ambiguity o ver the Senkaku is lands in the Revers io n Agreement was in fact a pro duct o f the Co ngress ’s co ns ideratio n to wardsTaiwanese lo bbying s trategies . We sho uld also remember that the PRC at the time was in ho s tile relatio nship with the US o ver theVietnam War. Thus the “US 40 years ago ” maintained a “neutral s tance” while being co nscio us o f the co nflict between its ally, Taiwan(The Republic o f China) and Japan. “To day’s US” no lo nger has diplo matic relatio ns with the Taiwan go vernment, and is co nscio us o fthe relatio nship with Beijing that emerged with the 1979 no rmalisatio n o f US-China relatio ns . In this co ntext it has reaffirmed itspo licy/directio n o f “maintaining neutrality” between “Beijing and To kyo .”

Let us no w read the Okinawa Revers io n Agreement (Agreement Between the United States o f America and Japan Co ncerning the

Ryukyu Is lands and the Daito Is land), which was s igned o n the 17th June, 1971. Article 1 paragraph 2 s tates : “Fo r the purpo se o f thisAgreement, the term “the Ryukyu Is lands and the Daito Is lands” means all the territo ries and their territo rial waters with respect towhich the right to exercise all and any po wers o f adminis tratio n, legis latio n and jurisdictio n was acco rded to the United States o fAmerica under Article 3 o f the Treaty o f Peace with Japan o ther than tho se with respect to which such right has already been returnedto Japan in acco rdance with the Agreement co ncerning the Amami Is lands and the Agreement co ncerning Nanpo Sho to and OtherIs lands s igned between the United States o f America and Japan, respectively o n December 24, 1953 and April 5, 1968 .”

Then ho w is this s tated in Article 3 o f the San Francis co Peace Treaty (September 8 , 1951)? Article 3 reads:

Japan will co ncur in any pro po sal o f the United States to the United Natio ns to place under its trus teeship sys tem, with the UnitedStates as the so le adminis tering autho rity, Nansei Sho to so uth o f 29º no rth (including the Ryukyu Is lands and the Daito Is lands),Nanpo Sho to so uth o f So fu Gan (including the Bo nin Is lands , Ro sario Is land and the Vo lcano Is lands) and Parece Vela and MarcusIs land. Pending the making o f such a pro po sal and affirmative actio n thereo n, the United States will have the right to exercise alland any po wers o f adminis tratio n, legis latio n and jurisdictio n o ver the territo ry and inhabitants o f these is lands , including theirterrito rial waters . [Emphas is added.]

As we can see fro m the abo ve, Article 3 determined that “Nansei Sho to so uth o f 29º no rth (including the Ryukyu Is lands and theDaito Is lands), Nanpo Sho to so uth o f So fu Gan (including the Bo nin Is lands , Ro sario Is land and the Vo lcano Is lands) and PareceVela and Marcus Is land” will be placed under the US trus teeship sys tem. Here “Nansei Sho to so uth o f 29º no rth” refers to thebo undary between the “To kara Is lands” and “Yakushima” in the no rth o f the To kara Is lands; no rth o f Yakushima became part o fJapan, and “To kara Is lands so uth o f Kuchino shima” came under US military trus teeship. Fro m this , it is clear that “so uth o fKuchino shima” was included in “Ryukyu Nansei Sho to .” Ho wever, the San Francis co Peace Treaty made no reference whatso ever towhat is lands co ns tituted the so -called “Nansei Sho to .” At that time, Japan had almo s t fo rgo tten abo ut the Senkaku Is lands . In 1953,

o r 2 years after the San Francis co Treaty, the US Civil Adminis tratio n o f the Ryukyu Is lands (USCAR) is sued USCAR 27, which definedthe bo undary o f Nansei Sho to as “so uth o f 29º no rth,” thus including the Senkaku Is lands within its adminis trative sphere. Thisdefinitio n o f “so uth o f 29º no rth” is identical to that in Article 3 o f the Peace Treaty; but again, the ques tio n o f whether the SenkakuIs lands were “included in the sphere o r no t” was no t clearly s tated. In o ther wo rds , bo th the “Supreme Co mmander o f Allied Po werIns tructio n 677 (29 January 1946)” and USCAR 27 (25 December 1953) s imply referred to a latitude – “so uth o f 29º no rth.” Neitherspecifically mentio ned the Senkaku Is lands by name – jus t as the 1971 Okinawa Revers io n Agreement, abo ve. Thus , s ince theimmediate po s twar perio d when Japan was divided into so uth and no rth with “29º no rth ” as the bo undary line, placing the so uthunder US military rule, until the 1971 revers io n, the name o f the Senkaku Is lands was never explicitly dis cussed between Japan andthe US.

No t o nly are the Senkaku Is lands absent fro m the text o f the Revers io n Agreement, they are also miss ing fro m the “Agreed Minutes ”(17 June 1971, Diplomatic Bluebook no . 16: pp. 479-482). It s imply explains that “the territo ries defined in paragraph 2 o f Article 1” are“the territo ries under the adminis tratio n o f the United States o f America under Article 3 o f the Treaty o f Peace with Japan.” In o therwo rds , what reverted to Japan were tho se “is lands , is lets , ato lls and ro cks ins ide a hexago n bo unded by the s traight linesco nnecting the fo llo wing co o rdinates : 28 º no rth 124 º 40 ’ eas t ; 24 º no rth 122 º eas t ; 24 º no rth 133 º eas t ; 27 º no rth 131 º50 ’ eas t ; 27 º no rth 128 º 18 ’ eas t ; 28 º no rth 128 º 18 ’ eas t ; 28 º no rth 124 º 40 ’ eas t . Because the specific names o f is landswere no t included, ins tead merely s tating latitudes and lo ngitudes , o rdinary readers have no clue as to whether the Senkaku is landsare included o r no t, and where this is s tated. Why were they treated in this way?

On the o ther hand, the fo llo wing interpretatio n also exis ts : when the Revers io n Agreement was s igned, the US State Departmentand Japanese o fficials “mutually unders to o d” that “Nansei Sho to at the time o f the s igning o f the Okinawa Revers io n Treaty”“include[d] the Senkaku Is lands .” Mark Manyin explains that this is in the reco rd o f US Co ngress io nal hearings in his “Senkaku(Diao yu/Diao yutai) Is lands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligatio ns ” (Co ngress io nal Research Service, September 25, 2012). This 10-pagerepo rt was based o n and expanded to do uble the length o f Larry Niksch’s o riginal 5-page repo rt, “Senkaku (Diao yu) Is landsDispute: The U.S. Legal Relatio nship and Obligatio ns ” (Co ngress io nal Research Service, 30 Sept 1996), and was published o neweek after aggress ive anti-Japanese demo ns tratio ns in 2012. It explains the US Co ngress ’s po s itio n o n the Senkaku Is lands indetail. While this repo rt is no t exactly the reso lutio n o f the Co ngress , it co ntains bas ic data that co ngressmen need in o rder toevaluate the is sue, and therefo re is an indispensable do cument fo r learning abo ut the US Co ngress ' current attitude. The subtitle o fNiksch’s repo rt is “The U.S. Legal Relatio nship and Obligatio ns ,” while that o f Manyin’s repo rt is “U.S. Treaty Obligatio ns .” The fo rmerwas published at the time o f the Taiwan Strait Cris is , and the latter explains the relatio nship between the bas ic po s itio n o f the USo n the Senkaku Is lands and US o bligatio ns due to the Security Treaty in the co ntext o f the co ntempo rary co nflict o ver the SenkakuIs lands .

In Japan, ho wever, this impo rtant repo rt is rarely referred to . On the co ntrary Japanese po litics have been manipulated by o ne-s idedinfo rmatio n leaked by US go vernment so urces and certain Japan handlers . This is an alarming s ituatio n. Japan-China co nflict hasbeen used to manipulate public o pinio n in o rder to fo rce the deplo yment o f the Osprey in the face o f s tro ng o bjectio ns fro m thepeo ple o f Okinawa. In the lo ng run, this will weaken the bas is o f Japan-China and Japan-US relatio nships , and Japanese peo plesho uld be very cautio us .

Let me repeat my po int. At the time o f the s igning o f the San Francis co Peace Treaty, it was no t explicitly s tated whether the SenkakuIs lands were included in “Nansei Sho to ”. This co ntinued with the Revers io n Agreement, with no s tatement as to whether the SenkakuIs lands are included in the text o f Agreement. The Agreed Minutes o nly refer to latitudes and lo ngitudes . When it co mes to theques tio n o f whether the Senkaku Is lands were included amo ng the is lands that fall within such a vaguely defined area, all we kno w isthat the Japanese and US go vernment autho rities (such as Ro bert Starr, Acting Ass is tant Legal Adviser; Harriso n Symmes , ActingAss is tant Secretary o f State; Ho ward McElro y, Co untry Officer fo r Japan; Japanese o fficials ’ names are no t kno wn) “mutuallyunders to o d” that the area “includes the Senkaku Is lands .” And it o nly appears in the reco rd o f US Co ngress io nal hearings as theassertio n o f US Secretary o f State Ro gers and so me experts in the US Co ngress at the time.

Once we pursue the “truth o f the Japan-US agreement” in the Okinawa Revers io n Agreement in this way (putting as ide the no to rio ussecret pact o n Okinawa revers io n), the backgro und o f then Fo reign Minis ter Fukuda Takeo ’s s trange answer in the Diet beco mestransparent (see p. 5 abo ve).

In his s tatement, Fukuda is clearly saying that “a. as o ur full territo ry” the Senkaku Is lands ’ “b. adminis trative right will be returned toJapan,” thus equating a and b. Ho wever, the lo gic o f the US is a≠b.

Fukuda’s reply implies perhaps that he was telling a lie to the natio n pretending that he had misunders to o d. Whether it was amisunders tanding o r a lie, it is clear that the Japanese peo ple, who have been expo sed to such irrespo ns ible answers fro m theFo reign Minis ter, mis takenly believed that the return o f adminis trative rights meant the return o f so vereignty, and, directing theirdis co ntent to wards China, felt o ffended. Success ive Japanese go vernments are respo ns ible fo r the current co nflict o ver theSenkaku Is lands .

The 2012 repo rt explains the s ituatio n as fo llo ws: “An Agreed Minute to the Okinawa Revers io n Treaty defines the bo undaries o f theRyukyu Is lands and the Daito is lands ‘as des ignated under USCAR 27.’”

“Mo reo ver, the latitude and lo ngitude bo undaries set fo rth in the Agreed Minute appear to include the Senkaku Is lands(Diao yu/Diao yutai).”

I wo uld like to pay attentio n to this subtle express io n – “appear to include the Senkaku Is lands .” An Agreed Minute is written in a waythat even the US expert can o nly s tate that it wo uld “appear to include the Senkaku Is lands .” In o ther wo rds , the Agreed Minute iswritten in a way that do es no t specify the Senkaku Is lands by name.

“During Senate deliberatio ns o n whether to co nsent to the ratif icatio n o f the Okinawa Revers io n Treaty, the State Departmentasserted that the United States to o k a neutral po s itio n with regard to the co mpeting claims o f Japan, China, and Taiwan, despite thereturn o f the is lands to Japanese adminis tratio n.”

In sho rt, (1) in terms o f the co nflict o ver the so vereignty o ver the Senkaku Is lands , “the US maintains neutrality” but (2) theOkinawa Revers io n Agreement has certainly s tated that “the Security Treaty is applicable to the area including the Senkaku Is lands .”

There are o ther co nditio ns that res trict the US. US-China to tal trade value in 2011 was $500 billio n, o r 2.5 times larger than Japan-China trade. Mo s t o f China’s $3 trillio n fo reign currency reserves , which resulted fro m its trade surplus , are used to purchase USbo nds . Neither the US no r China wishes to lo se trade 2.5 times larger than trade with Japan; and they wish to co ntinueco mplementary eco no mic relatio ns in which “China’s under-co nsumptio n (o versaving)” co mpensates fo r “US o ver-co nsumptio n,”like the relatio nship between the “hard-wo rking ants ” and the “lazy grassho pper” in Aesop’s Fables. Fro m the US perspective, sho uld itever be pushed into cho o s ing between Japan and China, to “abando n Japan and cho o se China” is pragmatically far mo re beneficial.In additio n, the US and China bo th po ssess nuclear weapo ns . There is a danger o f even a small spark develo ping into a nuclear war.

In this co ntext, the Security Treaty is already a treaty in name o nly. Let us remember that in 1978, when Japanese Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs So no da Sunao vis ited China, Deng Xiao ping frankly to ld him that the Sino -So viet Military Alliance had already beco meno minal, and that this o pened up a path to wards the s igning o f a Sino -Japanese Peace Treaty.

Co ns idering the abo ve co nditio ns as a who le, “the US and China will no t and canno t fight.” The “mutually co mplementary anddependent s tructure” o f the larges t and seco nd larges t eco no mies in the wo rld under the glo bal eco no mic sys tem is no w co mpletelybuilt-in. Since the recent co nflict between China and Japan, there has been a remarkable increase in the number o f peo ple who ins is to n co nfro nting Chinese military po wer by “reinfo rcing the Japan-US Security Treaty.” The reality dis cussed in this paper po urs co ldwater o n tho se Japanese who ho pe to be able to depend o n the US.

Yabuki Susumu, Pro fesso r emeritus at Yo ko hama Univers ity, is o ne o f Japan’s leading specialis ts o n Mao Zedo ng, o n China-JapanRelatio ns , and o n Chinese eco no mic develo pment and geo po litics . His two mo s t recent bo o ks are ﾁャｲﾒﾘｶ―米中結託と日本の進路(Chimerica: US-China Co-dependence and Japan’s Way Forward) and 尖閣問題の核心. 日中関係はどうなる(The Co re o f the Senkaku Pro blem:What is to Beco me o f Japan-China Relatio ns .)

See also his interview with the Asahi “INTERVIEW: China-watcher Yabuki says Senkakus are a diplo matic mis take by Japan,” Dec 12,2012

And two interviews with Yabuki by Stephen Harmer at Fo rbes : Interview with Pro fesso r Yabuki o n the Senkaku/Diao yu Cris is and U.S.-China-Japan Relatio ns , Oct 3, 2012; and Japan and U.S. Igno red Chinese Signals and His to ry, Blundering into the Senkaku/Diao yuCris is , February 20 , 2013.

Mark Selden is an As ia-Pacific Jo urnal Co o rdinato r.

About the translators: Rumi Sakamoto and Matt Allen are coeditors of Popular Culture, Globalization and Japan. Both are Asia-Pacific Journalassociates.

Recommended citation: Yabuki Susumu interviewed by Mark Selden, "China-Japan Territorial Conflicts and the US-Japan-China Relations inHistorical and Contemporary Perspective," The As ia- Pacific Jo urnal, Vol 11, Issue 9, No. 2, March 4, 2013.

Articles o n related subjects :

• Richard Tanter, An Aus tralian Ro le in Reducing the Pro spects o f China-Japan War o ver the Senkakus/Diao yutai?

• Lio nel Fatto n, The Pando ra’s Bo x o f So vereignty Co nflicts : Far-reaching regio nal co nsequences o f Japan’s natio nalizatio n o f theSenkakus

• Ivy Lee & Fang Ming, Deco ns tructing Japan’s Claim o f So vereignty o ver the Diao yu/Senkaku Is lands

•Wani Yukio , Barren Senkaku Natio nalism and China-Japan Co nflict

• Gavan McCo rmack, Tro ubled Seas: Japan’s Pacific and Eas t China Sea Do mains (and Claims)

•Gavan McCo rmack, Small Is lands – Big Pro blem: Senkaku/Diao yu and the Weight o f His to ry and Geo graphy in China-JapanRelatio ns

•Wada Haruki, Reso lving the China-Japan Co nflict Over the Senkaku/Diao yu Is lands

•Peter Lee, High Stakes Gamble as Japan, China and the U.S. Spar in the Eas t and So uth China Sea

•Tanaka Sakai, Rekindling China-Japan Co nflict: The Senkaku/Diao yutai Is lands Clash

• Ko ji Taira, The China-Japan Clash Over the Diao yu/Senkaku Is lands

Created by Datamomentum

Ownership1 Japanese Name1 Chinese Name2,

Taiwan

Square kilo -

meters 1Maximum

Elevatio n3

meters

State 2012.9 .11 Uo tsuri-jima(魚釣島) Tiao -yu-t’ai(釣魚台)

Ho apin-san(和平山)

3.6 383

State 2012.9 .11 Minami-ko jima(南小島) Nan-hs iao (南小島) 0 .32 149

State 2012.9 .11 Kita-ko jima(北小島) Pei-hs iao (北小島) 0 .26 135

Private, Ko bi Sho GunneryRange 1972

Kuba-jima(久場島) Huang-wei-yu(黄尾嶼) 0 .87 117

State, Sekibi ShoGunnery Range 1972

Taisho -jima(大正島) Ch’ih-wei-yu(赤尾嶼) 0 .04 84

State Okino -kitaiwa(沖北岩) Pei-hs iao (北礁) 0 .05 28

State Okino -minamiiwa(沖南岩) Nan-hs iao (南礁) 0 .01 17

State To bi-se(飛瀬) no name 0.02 n. a.

Table 1 Name o f Senkaku/ Tiao -yu/Diao -Yu is lands

So urce: 1. Minist ry o f Fo reign Affairs, Japan, Japan’s Basic Position on the Senkaku Islands and Facts, Oct o ber 20 12.

2. Co mmit t ee o n Fo reign Relat io ns Unit ed St at es Senat e, Okinawa Reversion Treaty, Annex to Hearings, Oct o ber 27, 28 and 29 , 19 71. p. 5.

3. Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations, Universit y Hawaii Press, 20 0 0 .

T he Asia-Pacif ic Jo urnal, Vo l. 12, Issue 2, No . 3, January 13, 20 14 .

The Origins of t he Senkaku/Diaoyu Disput e bet ween China, Taiwan and Japan

中・台・日における尖閣・魚釣問題の起源中・台・日における尖閣・魚釣問題の起源Yabuki Susumu wit h an int ro duct io n by Mark Selden

This article intro duces Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) do cuments and Okinawa Revers io n Treaty Hearings o n the Senkaku dispute to clarifyJapanese, Chinese and United States po s itio ns o n the his to rical o rigins and co ntempo rary trajecto ry o f the Senkaku/Diao yu (hereafter, Senkaku) dispute.

Int ro duct io n

Yabuki Susumu, in a series of articles and talks, has rigorously mined the historical record of China (PRC/ROC)-Japan-US relations to illuminate the background to thedangerous conflict that presently threatens to bring war to the Western Pacific in the wake of Japanese nationalization of three of the Senkaku islands in September 2012.While other important issues add to the gravity of the conflict, including enlarged territorial claims by China, Japan and Korea in the form of advancing and defendingcompeting claims to ADIZ in the East China and South China Seas, Yabuki shows the long trajectory of competing claims over the Senkaku dispute and the evolving policiesof China, Japan and the United States in shaping it. Since so much of the international discussion of the issues has focused on China-Japan conflict, a particularly importantcontribution of the present paper is its clear presentation of US recognition at the highest levels of the significance of the competing territorial claims, and its maneuveringin negotiations with Taipei, Tokyo, and Beijing to shape the outcome.

The story can, of course, be traced back to earlier claims to the islands, including historical interactions involving Taiwan and Okinawan fishermen and Chinese tributarymissions, to Japanese claims to the islands, and to their disposition by the US in framing and implementing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The treaty set the stage forthe transfer of the Senkaku to Japan in 1972 at the time of the reversion of administrative rights to Okinawa. But the story told here pivots on the detailed negotiationsbetween Washington and Taipei in 1971 in the context of the US-China opening. What it shows is keen awareness of the Senkaku question by the ROC as early as 1970 inthe context of US preparation for the reversion of Okinawa, and preoccupation with the issue by both Kissinger and Nixon as they prepare the 1971 US-China opening atthe time of Ping Pong Diplomacy and discussions of PRC resumption of the UN Security Council Seat. An ROC Note Verbale to the State Department of March 15, 1971made the historical and contemporary case for Chinese possession of the Senkaku islands. Following close attention to its content, in the shadow of demonstrations overthe islands on Taiwan, Kissinger handwrote in the margin, “But that is nonsense since it gives islands to Japan. How can we get a more neutral position?” The authoritativelegal position of the US was given at the time of the Fulbright Hearings on reversion in the form of a memorandum of October 20, 1971 by Robert I Starr, Acting AssistantLegal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Noting the dispute over the Senkaku between China and Japan, it noted that “The United States believes that a return ofadministrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims (of ROC and/or PRC).” It would remainfor China and Japan to negotiate their disposition. At no time thereafter has the US legal position changed. MS

On September 11, 2013, the Japanese go vernment decided to natio nalize three is lets o f the Senkaku’s eight is land gro up.

The Chinese go vernment s tro ngly pro tes ted the natio nalizatio n o f the is lets to the Japanese go vernment, and o n September 15 published a white paper o n

the “Diaoyutai Issue.”1 On September 18 , o n the anniversary o f Japan’s seizure o f Manchuria in 1931, Chinese in a number o f cities demo ns trated in a so -called “o ne millio n demo ns tratio n.” So me o f the demo ns trato rs des tro yed sho ps and facto ries . Thus Japan-China relatio ns deterio rated to the lo wes tpo int s ince no rmalizatio n in September 1972.

On September 25, the United States published Senkaku (Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations.2 On September 28 , the Taiwan Go vernment

published a white paper titled, Riben Zhanju Diaoyu de Lishi Zhengju (His to rical Evidence o f Japanese Occupatio n o f Tiao yu).3 In Octo ber, the Fo reign Minis tryo f Japan anno unced Senkaku-shotō no Ryōyūken ni tsuite no Kihon- Kenkai (English vers io n: Basic Position on the Senkaku Islands and Facts), and asserted that ‘the

Senkaku Is lands are indisputably an inherent part o f the territo ry o f Japan in light o f his to rical facts and based upo n internatio nal law’.4

One year after the dispute erupted, the Beijing Olympic Co mmittee vo ted in favo r o f To kyo ho s ting the 2020 Olympics , and no n-go vernment level exchangesbetween bo th co untries began to no rmalize. Ho wever, po litical relatio ns remain fro zen and sho w no s igns o f thawing.

Why did Japanese-China relatio ns fall into this snare?

To answer this ques tio n, we mus t reco ns ider the Okinawa Revers io n Treaty o f so me 40 years ago .

SCENE One:

The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan FocusIn-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific...and the world.

So urce: Minist ry o f Fo reign Affairs, Japan, Japan’s Basic Position on the Senkaku Islands and Facts, Oct o ber 20 12.

WHIT E HOUSE MEET ING o f NIXON AND CHOW

On April 12, 1971, Ambassado r Cho w who was leaving his po s itio n to return to Taipei as Fo reign Minis ter vis ited the White Ho use. Because o f the vis it o fthe U.S. Ping Po ng Team to China, what was o riginally a co urtesy call to o k o n added s ignificance. Sho rtly befo re Cho w entered the ro o m, Nixo n andKiss inger dis cussed the vis it o f the U.S. ping po ng team to the PRC. Nixo n o bserved, “One interes ting thing that we’re saying go o dbye to him o n the day thatthe ping po ng team, waited, yo u kno w, ping po ng team makes the fro nt page o f The New York Times.” Respo nded Kis s inger, “They are very subtle tho ugh,

these Chinese.” Nixo n replied, “Yo u think it means so mething.” Kis s inger s tated, “No ques tio n.”5

Ambassado r Cho w began the meeting by thanking the Pres ident fo r his many co urtes ies and saying he wanted the Pres ident to kno w that he alwaysunders to o d that the Pres ident and I [Kis s inger] were the bes t friends o f China in this Adminis tratio n. The Pres ident said, “I want yo u to co nvey my warmes tgreetings to Generalis s imo and Madam Chiang. We will s tick by o ur treaty co mmitments to Taiwan; we will ho no r them. I said so in my State o f the Wo rld

Repo rt.6

The Pres identco ntinued, “On the UN membership is sue, so me o f o ur friends have deserted us . We are prepared to fight fo r yo u but we want to do it in aneffective way. I have many pro po sals o n vario us s chemes such as dual representatio n. I will make this decis io n, no t the State Department. So me peo plesay, let’s find a clever way o f do ing it, but there is no clever way o f being defeated. There is no change in o ur bas ic po s itio n, but there may have to be so meadaptatio n o f o ur s trategy. We, ho wever, befo re we make a decis io n want to talk to yo u.

I am sending Ambassado r Murphy to Taiwan; he is go ing there o n bus iness anyway, and the Generalis s imo sho uld talk to him as he talks to me. Taiwan andthe UN is a fact o f life fo r us and we will do no thing to give it up, but we have to be intelligent and we want to hear yo ur views .”

Cho w said, “We appreciate yo ur special attentio n; abo ve all, do n’t spread the impress io n that all is lo s t.” The Pres ident then asked me to explain the

cho ices o n China representatio n, and I summed up the memo randum that I had written to him o n the subject (co py attached).7

The Pres ident asked Cho w fo r his analys is . Cho w said, “We co uld s tick them o ut fo r Universality plus the Impo rtant Ques tio n.” I [Kis s inger] said, “Will the IQcarry and Universality lo se?”

Cho w said, “No , this depends o n ho w it is fo rmulated.” He then raised this is sue o f the Senkaku Is lands .8

It has to do with the pro tectio n o f the Chinese Natio nalis t interes ts . If Taiwan can do that, then intellectuals and o verseas Chinese will feel they mus t go tothe o ther s ide. The State Department s tatement ins is ting that this is part o f Okinawa has had vio lent repercuss io ns . This will get a mo vement o f o verseas

Chinese.9

The Pres ident said, “I want yo u to kno w that the relaxatio n o f trade that we are planning is mo s tly symbo lic; the impo rtant is sue is the UN. We will be verymuch influenced by what the Generalis s imo will think. As lo ng as I am here, yo u have a friend in the White Ho use and yo u sho uld do no thing to embarrasshim. The Chinese sho uld lo o k at the subtleties . Yo u help us and we will help yo u. I want Murphy to bring his repo rt perso nally to me. We will s tand firm as

lo ng as we can, but we mus t have an army behind us .10

**********************************************************************

Because Ambassado r Cho w Shu-kai raised very impo rtant ques tio ns , Kis s inger decided to meet him o nce mo re o n the same day at 3:31–3:47 p.m.11

Dr. Kis s inger said that he wanted to see Ambassado r Cho w briefly to express his perso nal sentiments o n ho w much he had enjo yed having Ambassado rCho w in Washingto n. He wanted, to o , to repeat the sentiments which had been expressed earlier by the Pres ident o n this same sco re.

Dr. Kis s inger then referred to what the Pres ident had said co ncerning mo ves which the U.S. might po ss ibly make to ward Co mmunis t China, indicating thatso me s teps might be taken this week. Ho wever, this had no thing to do with U.S. relatio ns with the GRC, and quite frankly, were undertaken in o rder to

prevent Russ ia fro m being the do minant co untry in dealing with Co mmunis t China. Ambassado r Cho w no ted that he co uld unders tand this .12

Co ntinuing, Dr. Kis s inger saidthat we had picked a few s teps which might be taken no w, such as travel. While we co uld let a few Chinese Co mmunis ts in, itwas do ubtful they wo uld be breaking do wn o ur do o rs asking fo r visas . Ambassado r Cho w again no ted that he co uld see o ur po int—the new s teps mightmake the Russ ians mo re amenable.

Nevertheless , he didn’t kno w if the Russ ians wo uld respo nd to this appro ach, and Peking wo uld be put in the middle between China, the U.S. and Mo sco w.Dr. Kis s inger agreed that there were limits to what the Russ ians co uld do . This was a very co mplicated game.

Ambassado r Cho w described the U.S. appro ach as a highly so phis ticated o ne, which co uldn’t be explained very eas ily to the peo ple o n Taiwan. He wo uldneed to repo rt to his Pres ident o n this matter in generalized terms .

Dr. Kis s inger po inted o ut that no o ne in Washingto n o uts ide o f a very few knew what was to be undertaken. In fact, a lo ng lis t had been presented, o f whichwe were taking but a few items . Ambassado r Cho w said that in the measures the U.S. was taking which affected his co untry, the unders tanding if no t thesuppo rt o f the Chinese peo ple was needed.

He described the s tro ng sentiments which vario us Chinese gro ups had with regard to a number o f is sues , particularly the ques tio n o f the s tatus o f SenkakuIs lets . The demo ns tratio n which had taken place in Washingto n o n April 10 was a case in po int—tho se demo ns trating had been scientis ts , engineers , andpro fess io nal peo ple and no t jus t s tudents .

The demo ns tratio n had co me o n all o f a sudden because these peo ple had beco me excited, and was symbo lic o f what they and the co untry wo uld s tand fo r.Ambassado r Cho w declared that he had been asked by Pres ident Chiang to take up the Senkaku ques tio n with the Pres ident and Dr. Kis s inger.

Dr. Kis s inger s tated that he was lo o king into the Senkaku matter, and asked Mr. Ho ldridge to fo rward a repo rt to him o n the is sues invo lved by April 13.Ambassado r Cho w, in co mmenting further o n the Senkakus , remarked that even when the Japanese had o ccupied Taiwan and the Ryukyus , legal mattersinvo lving the Senkakus had been handled by co urts o n Taiwan, and the fishing bo ats which went to the Senkakus had been fro m Taiwan.

Fro m the Japanese po int o f view, they didn’t care ho w the Senkakus were adminis tered. Fo r the Chinese tho ugh, the is sue o f natio nalism was deeplyinvo lved.

Ambassado r Cho w referred to the fact that there wo uld be so me decis io ns required with respect to the General Assembly next year and he ho ped that the“o ther s ide” (i.e., the Chinese Co mmunis ts ) co uld be kept o ut.

Whatever fo rmula was advo cated, the Chinese po s itio n had to be made tenable in the eyes o f the peo ple. Mo reo ver, regardless o f what was pro po sed, itwo uld be hard to sell. Ambassado r Cho w went o n to dis cuss the des irability o f likeminded natio ns in Eas t As ia wo rking mo re clo sely to gether.

He described ASPAC13 as so mething o f a so cial club o f the fo reign minis ters , who put fo rward differing views o n vario us subjects . The Ko reans and theJapanese, fo r example, were quite far apart o n many is sues . His idea was fo r co untries such as the ROC, Ko rea, Thailand and Vietnam to have mo re andclo ser co nsultatio ns . This wo uld no t be like a “mino r club,” but wo uld have a real purpo se in such things as military matters .

Such a gro uping, having mo re o r less o f a jo int s tand, wo uld make it eas ier fo r the U.S. to make military mo ves . The gro up co uld co me to the U.S. and saythat it wo uld back the U.S. up. If the fo ur go vernments co uld be go tten to gether, mo re planning co uld be undertaken o n is sues such as the UN, and aparallel appro ach maintained ins tead o f each go vernment go ing its separate way.

The U.S. wo uld be expected to be a benevo lent friend. It wo uldn’t necessarily be expected to act, and the o ther natio ns wo uld have to do things fo rthemselves , but the tacit backing o f the U.S. was needed. Rivalries had to be avo ided, s ince there were already eno ugh adversaries in the Co mmunis t andno n-Co mmunis t wo rlds .

Dr. Kis s inger remarked that in these days , anyo ne who s tands up to the Co mmunis ts co mes under attack; this was no t fro m the Co mmunis ts but fro mfello w citizens . Ambassado r Cho wreferred to the exis tence o f rumo rs that the U.S. was giving up, and o f the need to arres t the trend o f assuming that suchwas the case.

Dr. Kis s inger said that he agreed. We did no t believe that we had to demo ns trate o ur wisdo m and po litical sagacity by des tro ying o ur friends .

This was very much in the Pres ident’s mind. On the UN is sue, we wo uld send so meo ne to the ROC to explain o ur po s itio n, and wo uld need so me suppo rtfro m the ROC s ide. Dr. Kis s inger asked Ambassado r Cho wto explain to his Pres ident that o ur Pres ident was a true friend, and that there had to beunders tanding between the two .

Ambassado rCho w s tated that he wo uld lo o k upo n his ro le in Taiwan as Fo reign Minis ter as being o ne o f suppo rt fo r the U.S. po s itio n. He co ns ideredhimself very pro ud to have kno wn Dr. Kis s inger, who m he regarded as a friend.

He asked that Dr. Kis s inger allo w him the privilege o f co mmunicating directly with him. Dr. Kis s inger replied that he definitely wanted Ambassado r Cho w todo so . If Ambassado r Cho w sho uld write and let Dr. Kis s inger kno w his private reactio ns , this wo uld be a tremendo us help. He wanted Ambassado r Cho w tokno w that in his o pinio n, he, Ambassado r Cho w, had always co nducted his affairs here with dignity, and when in Taiwan sho uld feel he had two friends in theWhite Ho use.

If we were o bliged to do things which caused them pain, this wo uld be to the minimum extent po ss ible. He assured Ambassado r Cho w that we wo uld dono thing witho ut checking with the ROC. As far as o ur mo ves to ward the Chinese Co mmunis ts were co ncerned, they were mainly o f s ignificance with respectto the USSR and in respo nse to o ur o wn do mes tic s ituatio n.

Ambassado r Cho w said that he co uld see the U.S. po int o f view in bo th cases , altho ugh there were o f co urse ques tio ns raised with respect to mainlandChina.

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The fo llo wing day Kis s inger asked Mr. Jo hn H. Ho ldridge o f the Natio nal Security Co uncil Staff to check ROC’s Note Verbale.14

Jo hn H. Ho ldridge’s memo randum reads as fo llo ws:

Yo u asked fo r info rmatio n o n the Chinese claim to the Senkaku Is lets . The mo s t recent summary o f this was co ntained in a No te Verbale sent the StateDepartment by the Chinese Embassy o n March 15.

Its main po ints are as fo llo ws:

—As early as the 15th century Chinese his to rical reco rds co ns idered the Senkakus as the bo undary separating Taiwan fro m the independent kingdo m o f theRyukyus .

—The geo lo gical s tructure o f the Senkaku Is lets is s imilar to that o f o ther is lets asso ciated with Taiwan. The Senkakus are clo ser to Taiwan than to theRyukyus and are separated fro m the Ryukyus by the Okinawa Tro ugh at the end o f the Co ntinental Shelf, which is 2,000 meters in depth.

—Taiwanese fisherman have traditio nally fished in the area o f the Senkakus and called at these is lets .

—The Japanese Go vernment did no t include the Senkakus in Okinawa Prefecture until after China’s cess io n o f Taiwan and the Pescado res to Japan after thefirs t Sino -Japanese war in 1895.

—Fo r regio nal security co ns ideratio ns the GRC has hitherto no t challenged the U.S. military o ccupatio n o f the Senkakus under Article 3 o f the San Francis coPeace Treaty. Ho wever, acco rding to internatio nal law tempo rary military o ccupatio n o f an area do es no t affect the ultimate determinatio n o f itsso vereignty.

—In view o f the expected terminatio n o f the U.S. o ccupatio n o f the Ryukyu Is lands in 1972, the U.S. is reques ted to respect the GRC’s so vereign rights o verthe Senkaku Is lets and res to re them to the GRC when this terminatio n takes place.

Jo hn H. Ho ldridge’s Comment reads as fo llo ws:

As yo u can imagine, the Japanese Go vernment has a co mparable lis t o f apparently o ffsetting arguments and maintains s imply that the Senkakus remainJapanese. State’s po s itio n is that in o ccupying the Ryukyus and the Senkakus in 1945, and in pro po s ing to return them to Japan in 1972, the U.S. passes nojudgment as to co nflicting claims o ver any po rtio n o f them, which sho uld be settled directly by the parties co ncerned.

After reading this memo randum, Kis s inger immediately handwro te the fo llo wing co mment in the margin: “But that is no nsense s ince it gives is lands toJapan. Ho w can we get a mo re neutral po s itio n?”

In the writers ’ view, this is a very impo rtant co nversatio n which decided the fate o f the Senkaku/Diao yutai pro blem. Pres ident Nixo n and his aide Kis s ingerrealized the co mplex nature o f this dispute.

SECOND SCENE:

T EXT ILE NEGOT IAT ION AT T AIPEI BY D. KENNEDY

Three mo nths after the Cho w-Kiss inger meeting, Pres ident Nixo n dispatched Treasury Secretary David Kennedy to Taiwan to nego tiate the textile is sue. 15

Receiving a repo rt fro m Taipei, Ass is tant to the Pres ident fo r Internatio nal Eco no mic Affairs Peter G. Peterso n explained to Nixo n the nego tiatio n pro cessbased o n Kennedy’s repo rt.

1. Ambassado r Kennedy repo rted that the U.S. and Taiwan had reached so me preliminary unders tanding o n several majo r po rtio ns o f a five-year vo luntary

res traint pro gram fo r textiles , including a nine percent average gro wth rate fo r synthetic textiles and o ne percent fo r wo o l.16 Ho wever, several very serio us

po ints o f co ntentio n remain (base year figure and trigger mechanism fo r impo rts in catego ries no t specifically co vered in the agreement). Until they arereso lved, the nego tiatio ns are at an impasse.

2. Ambassado r Kennedy believes there is no give whatso ever in the U.S. indus try's po s itio n o n these is sues and there is so me s tro ng pressure fo r theindus try representatives to co me ho me. The Taiwan go vernment also has co mpelling reaso ns to be adamant. They see no reaso n why they sho uld no t ho ldo ut fo r terms at leas t as go o d as tho se that Japan is no w giving us unilaterally. They are also co ncerned abo ut being the firs t o f the three As ian co untriesto vo luntarily settle with us unless the terms are advantageo us . The Taiwan Go vernment feels it has taken a heavy beating fro m the U.S. in recent mo nths(o il mo rato rium, Two -China develo pments ) and that it wo uld lo se a great deal mo re internatio nal face if it were to settle fo r a disadvantageo us bargain.

3. Ambassado r Kennedy believes we have three alternatives :

(a) Go to Ho ng Ko ng and Ko rea with the agreement as it no w s tands and with an unders tanding with Taiwan (which they have agreed to ) that they will accepta base year figure and co nsultatio n mechanism that tho se two co untries are willing to accept. Ambassado r Kennedy rejects this appro ach s ince Ho ng Ko ngand Ko rea wo uld realize the pro blem we face with Taiwan and be in a po s itio n to exert leverage o n us to give in o n o ther matters to get what we need o n thebase year and the co nsultatio n mechanism.

(b) Return ho me no w and admit failure. Ambassado r Kennedy believes yo ur pres tige is o n the line in the textile and fo o twear is sues and that to fail co uldhave very serio us do mes tic and fo reign ramificatio ns (he believes the fo o twear nego tiatio ns wo uld co llapse if the textile nego tiatio ns were called o ff).While the indus try indicates it wo uld rather go ho me than give any further, he do ubts that wo uld be their feeling a few mo nths do wn the ro ad in the face o fto tally unres trained textile impo rts .

(c) Offer certain co ncess io ns to Taiwan. Ambassado r Kennedy feels the impasse can be bro ken witho ut disas tro us s ide effects fo r either o ur indus try o rthe Taiwan Go vernment. While the GRC s tressed the impo rtance o f certain military items (F–4s fo r example) Ambassado r Kennedy is co nvinced that the“o nly” way to reso lve the is sues is to withho ld turning the Senkaku Is lands o ver to Japanese adminis trative co ntro l under the Okinawa Revers io nAgreement.

4. Ambassado r Kennedy's argument o n the Senkakus was as fo llo ws:

“This is a majo r is sue in Taiwan with bo th do mes tic and internatio nal implicatio ns . If the U.S. were to maintain adminis trative co ntro l, it wo uld give the GRCa tremendo us public bo o s t s ince they have expressed themselves so fo rcefully o n the is sues .

Further, it wo uld be a very direct indicatio n o f o ur co ntinued interes t in and suppo rt fo r the GRC—and it wo uld be do ne at Japan's expense, a po int that isvital to o ur ability to pro ceed effectively with textile nego tiatio ns in Ho ng Ko ng and Ko rea and subsequently in Japan. Anno uncement o f such a decis io nallo ws the GRC to save face bo th at ho me (it takes the Vice Premier o ff the ho o k) and abro ad.

Taiwan co uld accept the current textile package in face o f Ho ng Ko ng and Ko rean pressure. “In additio n, such an act wo uld, in my o pinio n, pro vide a verybadly needed sho ck effect o n the Japanese. It wo uld indicate that U.S. acquiescence in all matters reques ted by the Japanese co uld no lo nger be taken fo rgranted.

“I can fully appreciate the o ppo s itio n which such a pro po sal will generate in certain quarters o f o ur go vernment. But I feel that this can and mus t be do ne.We accepted s tewardship o f these Is lands after Wo rld War II. Neither his to rically no r geo graphically are they a part o f the Ryukyus Chain co ntainingOkinawa.

Co nsequently, the GRC suffers a great lo ss o f face if we allo w Japan to gain adminis trative co ntro l o f them. Since po ssess io n o f the Is lands is s till indispute, there is every reaso n fo r the United States to maintain adminis trative co ntro l until such time as the dispute is settled.

Taiwan feels very s tro ngly that o nce Japan had adminis trative co ntro l there is abso lutely no po ss ibility o f their ever relinquishing that co ntro l. By no meansam I sugges ting that we hand the is lands o ver to Taiwan. Rather, I am s tro ngly reco mmending the wisdo m o f preserving the s tatus quo rather than allo wingJapan to assume adminis trative co ntro l with the great lo ss o f face this entails fo r Taiwan.

“I kno w o f no o ther actio n sufficiently impo rtant o r sufficiently dramatic to reso lve o ur textile pro blems specifically as well as to pave the way fo rreso lutio n o f several general internatio nal trade diff iculties . The s takes invo lved are very high which I fully realize. I realize, to o , that o nly the Pres ident canmake such a decis io n. Therefo re, I urge yo u in the s tro nges t po ss ible terms to present to him all the po tential benefits and ramificatio ns o f myreco mmendatio ns .”

5. Henry Kis s inger is lo o king into the backgro und o f the Senkaku Is lands dispute and will be able to repo rt to yo u at o ur meeting this afterno o n o n whatwo uld be invo lved in no t turning o ver the Senkaku Is lands to Japan at this po int.

**********************************************************************

Hearing Ambassado r Kennedy’s pro po sal, Nixo n, Kis s inger and Peterso n gathered at Camp David to make a final decis io n. The result was delivered toAmbassado r Kennedy immediately.

FRUS do cument 134. Backchannel Message Fro m the Pres ident’s Ass is tant fo r Internatio nal Eco no mic Affairs (Peterso n) to Ambassado r Kennedy, in Taipei17

sho ws the pro cess ho w Nixo n’s decis io n was delivered to Go vernment o f Taiwan.

―Washingto n, June 8 , 1971, 1229Z. Eyes Only fo r Amb Kennedy, Taipei fro m Peter Peterso n.

After lengthy dis cuss io n, the Pres ident’s decis io n o n the Is lands is that the deal has go ne to o far and to o many co mmitments made to back o ff no w.18 I

(Peterso n) sho wed yo ur wire (Kennedy) o n this and even reread po rtio n dealing with its impo rtance.19

The Pres ident was deeply regretful that he co uld no t help o n this , but he felt that the decis io n was s imply no t po ss ible. The Pres ident has ins tructed me totell yo u that he will send a senio r military representative in Augus t to review with GRC in “a favo rable and fo rthco ming way” impo rtant defense

po ss ibilities .20

I’ve explained that this makes final nego tiatio ns no w very diff icult but decis io n is Augus t vis it because o f need to do this while Co ngress is o ut in Augus t.No t to co mplicate yo ur life further but I jus t talked with Ro ger Milliken who says that indus try here was abo ut to decide to ask everyo ne to co me backbecause deal no w being talked abo ut co mes up to 2.7 billio n o ver the term, which is half billio n up fro m 2.2 billio n o r 7-1/2 percent increase wo rked o uthere o n the 1970 base that Milliken says was the ceiling.

Also , Milliken repo rts Mills will say that he can get deal fro m o ther co untries s imilar to Japanese which will wo rk o ut co ns iderably better than deal yo u have

o ffered.21

Harry Dent and I suspect that Mills may have sugges ted he will suppo rt quo ta bill as part o f his o wn po litical o bjectives . Bryce Harlo w co nfirms fro m highso urces that Mills has made so me kind o f co mmitment to suppo rt quo ta bill next spring. Apparently, the 2.7 billio n that indus try representatives thereagreed to s trikes them as to o much here in this co untry and that 2.2 billio n was the ceiling.

I have jus t called Milliken to say that the Pres ident wo uld certainly appreciate their s taying with us in this effo rt and if it breaks up no w it wo uld be hard toreco ns titute the effo rt. He said they felt that likeliho o d is go o d eno ugh fo r quo ta legis latio n that they wo uld pro bably take their chances and co me ho meno w.

My reco mmendatio n is that yo u tell GRC that deal mus t be at a vo lume level that yo u can get indus try to really accept and that this is impo rtant eno ugh tous that we will have to review defense and o ther carro ts and s ticks in o rder to achieve it.

Then I wo uld go o n and s tart in o ther two co untries and let GRC s tew abo ut po tential U.S. actio ns . If indus try says they want to co me back to U.S., I’d beinclined to go o n anyway and see what it takes in o ther two co untries to get deal indus try wo uld accept.

I think it wo uld be better if indus try wo uld s tay but it’s no t essential. My reaso ning is that if yo u can get deal that so unds reaso nable no t o nly to so me o f

パリ日本大使館発 愛知・ロジャース会談に関する極秘電報

(1971年6月9日) 1971年6月9日パリ日本大使館発、極秘、大至急。

本大臣[愛知]とロジャース長官との会談は、9日午前9時半より、約2時間にわたり、当地、米大使館の大使執務室で行われたが、会談中沖縄返還協定関係についての要旨以下の通り。(出席者は、わが方、赤谷[源一、国連]大使、吉野[文六、米国]局長、栗山[尚一、条約局法規]課長。米側、ペダソン[Ri cha rd F. Pederso n, 国連]大使、エリクソン[Ri cha rd A. Ericso n、国務省東アジア太平洋局日本]部長、マクロスキー[Ro bert J. McClo skey 国務省報道官])。

(1)冒頭、ロジャース長官より、大部分の問題は既に解決を見ているが、若干の点についてお話したいとして、まず尖閣諸島問題につき、国府は、本件に関する一般国民の反応に対し、非常に憂慮しており、米国政府に対しても、国府から圧力をかけてきているが、本件について日本政府がその法的立場を害することなく、何らかの方法で、

the indus try but also the public, then I think we are far better o ff than having appeared to have failed and o nly Pres idential alternative wo uld be to suppo rtwhat co uld be a disas tro us , wide-ranging quo ta bill o n many catego ries o r veto and s till lo se textile suppo rt.

If we do n’t make any deal, it certainly wo uld seem to hurt the Pres ident a lo t and help po litical o ppo nents equally. I’ve explo red this with to p advisers and all

agree that the bes t deal we can make is a lo t better than no ne at all. Do yo ur bes t o n this bas is .22

The Pres ident deeply appreciates what yo u are do ing.23

T HIRD SCENE:

PARIS MEET ING BET WEEN SECRET ARY OF ST AT E ROGERS AND FOREIGN MINIST ER AICHI ON OKINAWA REVERSION T REAT Y

On June 9 , 1971, Secretary Ro gers and Fo reign Minis ter Aichi ho ld final meeting at Paris U.S. Embassy. Ro gers “s tro ngly urging GOJ to dis cuss is sue withGRC prio r to s ignature o f Okinawa Agreement o n June 17. Ambassado r Nakayama sent an extremely secret telegram to To kyo .

It reads as fo llo ws:

Regarding Senkaku (So vereignty) Pro blems GOC is quite anxio us abo ut peo ple’s reactio n, and pressured Washingto n no t to revert to Japan. Washingto nwishes Japan to help them, and nego tiate with GOC witho ut diminishing Japan’s o wn legal rights . They wo uld reques t Japan to begin talks as early aspo ss ible.

Minis ter Aichi replied to Ro gers that Japan will do it after s igning the treaty, as in the case o f the explanatio n o f Jo int Statement o f Sato -Nixo n in 1969. Wehave ample co nfidence to deal with GOC, Washingto n need no t wo rry abo ut it. (尖閣諸島問題につき、国府は、本件に関する一般国民の反応に対し、非常に憂慮しており、米国政府に対しても、国府から圧力をかけてきているが、本件について日本政府がその法的立場を害することなく、何らかの方法で、われわれを助けていただければありがたいと述べ、例えば、本件につきなるべく速やかに話合を行うというような意志表示を国府に対して行っていただけないかと述べた。これに対し、本大臣より、基本的には米国に迷惑をかけずに処理する自信がある。国府に必要とあらば話をすることは差支えないが、その時期は返還協定調印前ということではなく、69年の佐藤・ニクソン共同声明の例にならい事後的に説明をすることとなろうと答えた)

Judging fro m Aichi’s wo rds to Ro gers , Japan’s Fo reign Minis try did no t pay much attentio n to this pro blem. Mo fa seems to have regarded lightly GOC’ss tro ng demand and the nego tiatio n pro cess between GOC and Washingto n.

On the co ntrary, Ro gers acco mpanied spo kesman McClo skey to Paris after ‘Chiang asked that the U.S. Go vernment catego rically s tate at the time o f thes igning o f the Okinawa revers io n agreement that the final s tatus o f the is lands had no t been determined and sho uld be settled by all parties invo lved.’

The writer believes that Nixo n and Kis s inger fully reco gnized that the Senkaku so vereignty is sue was related with the Taiwan pro blem and co uld co mplicateupco ming talks with Premier Zho u Enlai.

In the event, the Okinawa Treaty was s igned witho ut any co ntact with GOC.

Co py o f the Original Material No .877, Fro m Ambassado r Nakayama to Fo reign Minis try, To kyo

われわれを助けていただければありがたいと述べ、例えば、本件につきなるべく速やかに話合を行うというような意志表示を国府に対して行っていただけないかと述べた。

これに対し、本大臣より、基本的には米国に迷惑をかけずに処理する自信がある。国府に必要とあらば話をすることは差支えないが、その時期は返還協定調印前ということではなく、69年の佐藤・ニクソン共同声明の例にならい事後的に説明をすることとなろうと答えた。

(2)次にロジャース長官より、六五の使途につき日本政府のリベラルな解釈を期待するとの発言があり、これに対し、本大臣よりできる限りのリベラルな解釈をassure[保証]すると述べた。

(3)請求権問題に関連してロジャース長官は、本大臣の書簡を必要とする旨述べたので、本大臣より、本書簡は公表されざるものと了解してよろしきやと、と念を押したところ、ロジャース長官は、「行政府としては、できるだけ不公表にしておくよう努力する所存なるも、議会との関係で、これを発表せざるをえない場合も、絶無ではない」と答えた。よって

本大臣より、本件書簡の表現ぶりについては、既に東京において一応合意に達した旨連絡を受けているが、これが公表される可能性があるというのであれば、表現も、より慎重に考えたいと述べた。ロジャース長官は 、 日本政府の立場も理解できるので、米側の法的な要件をみたしつつ、日本側の立場をも配慮した表現を発見することは可能と思うと述べた。

(4)本大臣より、本日長官の返事をいただく必要はないが、返還協定の発効日を4月1日とすることを沖縄県民が一致して強く要求しており、日本政府としても、その事実に大きな関心を有するものであることをお伝えしたい旨述べた。これに対し、ロジャース長官は、それは全く不可能ではないにしても、極めて困難であり、過早に協定発効日を論ずることは議会の反発を招くということも考慮しなくてはならない。しかしながら、沖縄県民および日本政府の意のあるところを考慮したいと答えた。

(5)次いで、本大臣より、調印日につき、わが方の国内事情を考慮し、一昨日もお話しした通り、ぜひとも17日

に決めていただきたいと述べたところ、ロジャース長官は、本件については議会との関係上、われわれとしては慎重にならざるをえず、かかる観点からすれば、17日は決して最適の日とは思わない。しかし、日本側の事情を考慮し、17日調印にふみ切ることとした。

本日右を発表することおよび、署名字観は、ワトン時間午前4時、東京時間午後9時とすることに異論はないと答えた。よって、本台紙ンより、本件は、今回の会談において自分が最も重要視していた問題であり、17日調印にふみきられたことについて感謝する旨述べた。(了)

FOURT H SCENE:

MEET ING BET WEEN KISSINGER AND ROC AMBASSADOR CHOW.

After half a year s ince s igning the Okinawa Revers io n treaty the Republic o f China (GOC) Fo reign Minis ter vis ited the U.S. and held a year-end meeting with

Dr. Kis s inger. FRUS do cument 180 . Memo randum o f Co nversatio n is the reco rd o f their co nversatio n.24 The co nversatio n was held at Key Bis cayne, Flo rida,December 30 , 1971, 10:30 a.m. Participants are Dr. Henry A. Kis s inger, Cho w Shu-kai, Fo reign Minis ter, Republic o f China Directo r Cheng, Republic o f ChinaHis Excellency, James Shen, Republic o f China Ambassado r to the United States and Co leman S. Hicks , no tetaker.

The co nversatio n began with light banter amo ng the participants .

Cho w: It is very nice o f yo u to take the time to see us here in Key Bis cayne. I have jus t co me fro m Japan and yo u, o f co urse, will be meeting the Japanesein San Clemente. I have three ques tio ns that I wo uld like to ask yo u. Firs t, ho w secure is Taiwan fro m Co mmunis t attack? Seco nd, will yo u press us tonego tiate with Peking? And number three, I wo uld like to raise matters regarding co nfis catio n o f pro perty. The Japanese are very excited abo ut theseco ncerns .

Kissinger: Well, I wo n’t tell yo u anything until the Ambassado r pro mises to invite me to ano ther Chinese dinner. (Laughter)

Cho w: What we are seeking is reassurance fro m yo u abo ut these matters . We are co ncerned that the Co mmunis ts can gain co ntro l o f the air.

Kissinger: Let’s settle the defense ques tio n firs t. At my press co nference in No vember I co mmented that o ur defense co mmitment was unimpaired.25 Ihave also said that to Cho u En-lai, and o ur defense co mmitment has no t been affected by o ur dealings with Peking. If yo u are attacked, we will co me toyo ur defense. Perso nally, I do n’t think China can maintain co ntro l o f the air.

Cho w: But we are in a s ituatio n where the quantity and quality o f the Co mmunis t military capacity is go ing up and o ur impress io n is that the militaryass is tance pro gram is s tanding s till. This results in a change o f the military balance.

Kissinger: There has been no s to ppage o f o ur military ass is tance pro gram to the Republic o f China.

Cho w: This is enco uraging but there is co ncern abo ut it.26

Kissinger: Can yo u give me particular items? I will check into it.

Cho w: We are interes ted in excess equipment, F–104s , tanks and so fo rth. We do no t seek o ffens ive weapo ns .

Kissinger: I can reassure yo u that no s teps have been taken to limit the military ass is tance pro gram to the Republic o f China.

Cho w: There are rumbles in the lo wer levels at the State Department abo ut tie-ups in the pro gram.

Kissinger: Lo o k, the lo wer levels o f the State Department are pro ne, as yo u have pro bably seen, to take credit whenever it is due so meo ne else but at thesame time to undermine suppo rt fo r Pres idential po licies . The Pres ident has a warm perso nal feeling fo r the Republic o f China. The s teps we have takenwith the Co mmunis ts have been necessary. They are co ld-blo o ded, calculated diplo matic mo ves . They have no thing to do with sympathy.

Cho w: Well, I ho pe yo u can s tir things up o n this military ass is tance pro gram.

Kissinger: I tho ught everything was in no rmal channels . What did Ro gers say when yo u talked to him this mo rning?

Cho w: (unintelligible)

Kissinger: I, o f co urse, do n’t kno w the exact details abo ut the military balance between yo u and the Co mmunis ts , but perso nally I do n’t believe that the

Co mmunis ts have the capacity to use their military fo rce o uts ide their bo rders . But if so . . .27 Co leman, get Co lo nel Kennedy to lo o k into this matter.

Cho w: Ano ther is sue relates to the submarines .

Kissinger: I appro ved that two mo nths ago .

Cho w: All the key matters relate to training. Secretary Ro gers appears to be apprehens ive abo ut this .

Kissinger: We have appro ved this . Why wo uld it be in o ur interes t no t to go ahead and do it? Of co urse we will do it.28

Cho w: The next is sue I wo uld like to raise with yo u is the handling o f the Senkaku Is lands . When yo u talk to the Japanese in San Clemente, may Ienco urage yo u to co ns ider o ur po s itio n? The Japanese watch very carefully the U.S. ro le in the Pacific and seek co nsultatio n with yo u. We have a diff icultdo mes tic po litical s ituatio n regarding the Is lands . Peking wants to develo p an anti-American campaign o n Taiwan. We need help fro m o ur friends . TheIs lands do n’t make any difference to Japan but they do to the peo ple o f Taiwan. Perhaps yo u co uld dis cuss these withered pieces o f ro ck—there is no o ilthere—with the Japanese.

Kissinger: We will raise it with the Japanese.

Cho w: We ho pe to keep them quiet abo ut it.

Kissinger: Yo u do n’t want the Is lands back; yo u jus t want to avo id a big fuss abo ut them, is that right?

Cho w: Yes , that’s right. It is like Outer Mo ngo lia. The Japanese have an interes t in Outer Mo ngo lia. If we were o n the Mainland, we might be o ver-sens itiveabo ut Outer Mo ngo lia and Tibet. The impo rtant thing is that they remain po litically auto no mo us .

Kissinger: Yo u are interes ted in Tibet. (Laughter)

Cho w: In o ur bilateral relatio ns we will co ntinue to play it co o l. We have to ld the Japanese that, fo r ins tance, we will trade with everyo ne. We will even tradewith the so cialis t co untries like Eas t Germany. We wo uld rather trade, o f co urse, with o ur friends , but . . .

Kissinger: Will yo u nego tiate with the Mainland?

Cho w: No .

Kissinger: Peo ple have asked me o ften abo ut my co mments o n this in my press co nference at the end o f Octo ber. To be ho nes t, I tho ught that myco mments wo uld be helpful to yo u. I was trying to remo ve that item fro m the agenda in Peking during the Pres ident’s vis it. What I indicated was a po licy o fallo wing the Mainland and Taiwan to settle the pro blem po litically themselves , witho ut the use o f fo rce. Yo u will get no pressure fro m us to settle thismatter as lo ng as Pres ident Nixo n remains in o ffice. I think this is the bes t po ss ible fo rmula fro m yo ur perspective. If we were to say that we wo uld no taccept a po litical so lutio n, the result wo uld be a big internatio nal incident—pro blems at the United Natio ns ; in sho rt, a big is sue. As lo ng as no pressure isput o n yo u fo r a po litical settlement, why isn’t this fo rmula the bes t po ss ible po licy?

Shen: When yo u say that it is an internal Chinese affair that gives the impress io n tho ugh that yo u are washing yo ur hands o f it.

Kissinger: I didn’t say that we were washing o ur hands o f it. I said merely that we wo uld put no pressure o n yo u to make a po litical settlement and that wewo uld to lerate no fo rce o n the part o f either s ide in reso lutio n o f the dispute. It seems to me to be a very practical so lutio n. Regardless , I do n’t think thatZho u En-lai will reno unce fo rce. He isn’t abo ut ready to ask us to act as an intermediary in this matter.

Shen: The las t thing anybo dy wo uld be interes ted in wo uld be having yo u act as an intermediary.

Kissinger: It is impo rtant to do a little Chinese thinking here, to lo o k at the matter in a co mplicated light. This is sue will co me up at the UN year after year.We will co ntinually say that o ur po licy is to to lerate no use o f fo rce in settling the po litical matter. What can go wro ng?

Shen: But we need desperately to maintain o ur defense capacities . If they lag, it might lead the Co mmunis ts to a miscalculatio n.

Kissinger: We have already talked abo ut the defense matters . Perso nally, I do n’t see a military capacity by the Mainland Chinese which wo uld be effectiveagains t yo u. They are no t abo ut ready to use their air fo rce agains t yo u. They are to o scared o f the Russ ians ; why wo uld they bo ther to take yo u o n? Yo ukno w, a hundred miles o f water to cro ss is quite diff icult.

Cho w: But they might use tricks . They might link this is sue to the priso ners o f war o r the Vietnam pro blem. Of co urse, we kno w that yo u are smart eno ughno t to be taken in.

Shen: Peo ple o n Taiwan are co ncerned. What we are co nfro nting here is largely a psycho lo gical ques tio n.

Kissinger: Whatever materials are in the military pipeline o n o ur sys tems pro gram, we will deliver o n. To be frank, I do n’t kno w the details o f exactly whatis , but, Mr. Fo reign Minis ter, when yo u were Ambassado r in Washingto n, we did what yo u wanted, didn’t we? What yo u needed, we gave yo u. Yo u appear tothink that the Co mmunis ts are quite flexible. I do n’t. I believe that their do mes tic pro blems are very serio us , that they will no t reno unce the use o f fo rce inthe Taiwan is sue, and also that they will no t use Vietnam to pressure us o n a po litical settlement.

Cho w: There are many rumo rs abo ut . . .

Kissinger: Yes , o f co urse, I hear all these rumo rs . There is o ne that I made a deal with Cho u in China that we wo uld withdraw tro o ps fro m Taiwan befo re hisvis its . Have we? Let me ask yo u this : Have we withdrawn any tro o ps? I certainly do n’t think so , to the bes t o f my kno wledge. There may have been so mero tatio ns , but no withdrawals .

Cho w: (The Fo reign Minis ter made so me co mments abo ut General Barnes 29 which were no t intelligible.)

Kissinger: Yo u get all the s to ries that aren’t true.

Cho w: (The Fo reign Minis ter dis cussed so me aspect o f dealing with the Japanese—mo re was no t unders tandable.)

Kissinger: We will talk to Sato and Fukuda in San Clemente and attempt to res train their activities in the Is lands . Yo u s tick to yo ur guns and be sure tokeep us info rmed o n all yo ur dealings with the Co mmunis ts .

Shen: We have certainly learned o ur lesso n. We have talked to the Pres ident three times , to the Vice Pres ident o nce.

Kissinger: Yo u have sho wed great dignity and character. Of all the so ns-o f-bitches in the wo rld, yo u are the las t o f all who deserve what has happened thisyear.

Cho u: Thank yo u very much fo r taking the time to meet with us to day.

Kissinger: Yo u mus t unders tand that what we do , we do with a heavy heart. We do n’t do it to betray o ur friends . We take actio ns visà-vis the Co mmunis tso nly because tho se actio ns are required.I assure yo u again that yo u will get no pressure fro m us o n any po litical deal with the Mainland.

At this point the party retired from Dr. Kissinger’s villa and began to walk back to the hotel, where the Chinese boarded their vehicle. During the walk, Dr. Kissinger spokewith the Foreign Minister about several problems. Dr. Kissinger emphasized again his impression that the formula of no-military action, but an openness to politicalaccommodations, was the best possible formula for the Chinese Nationalists. On the UN issue, he acknowledged that the United States had engaged in what turned out tobe a bad strategy vis-à-vis the timing of the second return from China. He indicated that he thought a two-week delay would have been possible had the matter beenhandled more properly. General comments were made about the Japanese vis-à-vis the United States; their touchiness on the China trip, their trading role with Taiwan,

etc.30

FIFT H SCENE:

OKINAWA REVERSION T REAT Y, HEARINGS BEFORE T HE COMMIT T EE ON FOREIGN RELAT IONS UNIT ED ST AT ES SENAT E

On Octo ber 27, 1971, the U.S. Senate Co mmittee o n Fo reign Relatio ns o pened at 10 .15 a.m., in ro o m 4221, New Senate Office Building. Senato r J. W.Fulbright chaired, saying: The treaty co mes befo re us agains t a backdro p o f s trained United States -Japanese relatio ns , s temming primarily fro m many lo ngsuppressed eco no mic tens io ns and aggravated by the develo pments o f the pas t few mo nths regarding China. The United States has no w s tated that itseeks to no rmalize relatio ns with the Peo ple’s Republic o f China, a change in policy apparently taken without consultation with Japan. And the Peo ple’s Republichas no w been seated as the representative o f China in the United Natio ns . These impo rtant s teps naturally have a subs tantial impact affecting U.S. securityinteres ts thro ugho ut As ia, including Okinawa. In co ns idering the revers io n treaty, the co mmittee will be interes ted in examining the general effect o f thetreaty o n United-States -Japanese relatio ns as well as its implicatio ns fo r U.S. treaty co mmitments and security interes ts in As ia.”

As Fulbright said, as the United States has no w s tated that it seeks to no rmalize relatio ns with the Peo ple’s Republic o f China, the Japanese go vernmento ppo sed the Peo ple’s Republic o f China being seated as the representative o f China in the United Natio ns in the las t minutes .

Opening St at ement by J. W. Fulbright reads:

To day the co mmittee o pens its public hearings o n the Okinawa Revers io n Treaty. The treaty represents the end o f an era in United States -Japan relatio ns . Itsettles the las t remaining majo r is sues between the two co untries aris ing o ut o f Wo rld War II, returning to Japan the remaining o ccupied territo ry which hasbeen pro mised it. Ratif icatio n o f this treaty wo uld remo ve the las t ves tige o f o ccupying po wer s tatus no w held by the United States and wo uld fo rmalize arelatio nship o f equality between the two s tates . In his letter transmitting the treaty to the Senate, the Pres ident has urged that the return o f Okinawa “isessential to the co ntinuatio n o f friendly and pro ductive relatio ns between the United States and Japan.”

The treaty co mes befo re us agains t a backdro p o f s trained United States -Japanese relatio ns , s temming primarily fro m many lo ng suppressed eco no mictens io ns and aggravated by the develo pments o f the pas t few mo nths regarding China. The United States has no w s tated that it seeks to no rmalizerelatio ns with the Peo ple’s Republic o f China, a change in po licy apparently taken witho ut co nsultatio n with Japan. And the Peo ple’s Republic has no w beenseated as the representative o f China in the United Natio ns . These impo rtant s teps naturally have a subs tantial impact affecting U.S. security interes tsthro ugho ut As ia, including Okinawa. In co ns idering the revers io n treaty, the co mmittee will be interes ted in examining the general effect o f the treaty o nUnited States -Japanese relatio ns as well as its implicatio ns fo r U.S. co mmitments and security interes ts in As ia.

We are very pleased this mo rning to welco me the Secretary o f State, William P. Ro gers , who will initiate the presentatio n o f the adminis tratio n’s po s itio n. IfI may add, Mr. Secretary, speaking perso nally, altho ugh there has been much criticism o f the actio n o f the United Natio ns and I regret that o ur po s itio n wasno t fully suppo rted, nevertheless I perso nally feel that this actio n o ver a lo ng perio d may pro ve to be beneficial to the po licies o f this adminis tratio n. And Iam no t a bit dis co uraged as to the future o f yo ur effo rts to bring abo ut much better relatio ns with China and the res t o f the wo rld.

St at ement o f Ho n. William P. Ro gers, Secret ary o f St at e; Acco mpanied by U. Alexis Jo hnso n, Under Secretary o f State fo r Po litical Affairs reads asfo llo ws:

Thank yo u very much, Mr. Chairman; I appreciate tho se remarks . Mr. Chairman and members o f the co mmittee, I am here to day to explain why thisadminis tratio n co ns iders it very impo rtant that the Senate sho uld advise and co nsent to the ratif icatio n o f the agreement between the United States andJapan. The agreement, s igned o n June 17, 1971, pro vides fo r the return o f the Ryukyu Is lands to the adminis trative co ntro l o f Japan. This agreement can, Ibelieve, truly be called an his to ric do cument. It wo uld reso lve the las t majo r U.S.-Japanese is sue aris ing fro m Wo rld War II. The agreement pro vides fo r thereturn to Japanese adminis tratio n o f an area which has been his to rically asso ciated with Japan and who se po pulatio n s tro ngly des ires to be united o nceagain with its native land. The Ryukyus are also an area o f s ignificant s trategic impo rtance to the United States . The agreement takes full acco unt o f thisagreement and its related arrangements wo uld pro tect and pro mo te the U.S. security interes ts in the Far Eas t. Deputy Secretary Packard will dis cuss itssecurity aspects in greater detail in his tes timo ny.

Amo ng 61 po ints which Ro gers raised and answered to Senates ques tio ns , I will intro duce three po ints ; No .4 Japan’s Retentio n o f Res idual Autho rity,No .5 Reco gniz ing o f Japan’s Res idual Autho rity, and No . 17 So vereignty o f Senkaku Is lands .

No . 4 Japan’s Ret ent io n o f Residual Authority

On September 5, 1951, in presenting the draft o f the peace treaty to the Peace Co nference, Ambassado r Jo hn Fo s ter Dulles no ted that so me o f the alliedpo wers had urged that the treaty require Japan to reno unce its so vereignty. Others had pro po sed that the is lands be res to red co mpletely to Japan. “In theface o f this divis io n o f allied o pinio n,” Ambassado r Dulles said, “the United States felt that the bes t fo rmula wo uld be to permit Japan to retain residualsovereignty, while making it po ss ible fo r these is lands to be bro ught into the United Natio ns trus teeship sys tem, with the United States as adminis tering

autho rity.” It was decided at that time that altho ugh the United States had lo ng-term security interes ts in the Ryukyus , the “peace o f reco nciliatio n,” whichwe and mo s t o f o ur allies so ught with Japan, wo uld be vitiated by the is lands ’ enfo rced, permanent detachment fro m Japan. The “residual sovereignty” fo rmulawas clearly des igned to co nvey the tho ught to Japan and to the wo rld that altho ugh the United States was o bliged to retain co ntro l o f the Ryukyustempo rarily fo r security reaso ns , what had been Japanese territo ry was no t being permanently detached fro m Japan and the principle o f no U.S. territo rialacquis itio ns as a result o f war was being o bserved.

No .5 Reco gniz ing o f Japan’s Residual Authority

In December 1953, the United States returned the no rthern po rtio n o f the Okinawa Is land chain, the Amami Is lands , to Japanese jurisdictio n. In June 1957Pres ident Eisenho wer and Prime Minis ter Kishi reaffirmed “Japanese residual sovereignty” o ver the Ryukyus . In June 1961, Pres ident Kennedy and PrimeMinis ter Ikeda did likewise. In March 1962, in co nnectio n with an executive o rder co ncerning the adminis tratio n o f the is lands is sued o n the bas is o f a U.S.Go vernment task fo rce s tudy o f the Ryukyus po licies and pro grams, Pres ident Kennedy reco gnized the Ryukyus “to be a part o f the Japanese ho meland.” Headded that he “lo o ked fo rward to the day when the security interes ts o f the free wo rld will permit their res to ratio n to full Japanese so vereignty.” InNo vember 1967, Pres ident Jo hnso n and Prime Minis ter Sato met in Washingto n and agreed o n the es tablishment o f an adviso ry Co mmittee to the HighCo mmiss io ner “to pro mo te the integratio n o f the Ryukyus with Japan and thus help to minimize the s tresses that wo uld acco mpany revers io n.” Pres identJo hnso n also s tated at the time that he “fully unders to o d the des ire o f the Japanese peo ple fo r the revers io n o f the is lands .” The Pres ident and the PrimeMinis ter agreed to co nduct jo int and co ntinuo us review o f the s tatus o f the Ryukyu Is lands , “guided by the aim o f returning adminis trative rights o ver theseis lands to Japan. This left Okinawa, the Daito Is lands , and the mo re so utherly is lands in the Ryukyu Archipelago as the o nly territo ries lis ted under Article IIIo f the peace treaty, which were s till under U.S. adminis tratio n. Finally, Pres ident Nixo n and Prime Minis ter Sato , in their co mmuniqué o f No vember 1969,anno unced that “The two Go vernments wo uld immediately enter into co nsultatio ns regarding specific arrangements fo r acco mplishing the early revers io n o fthese is lands witho ut detriment to the security o f the Far Eas t, including Japan. “The Pres ident and the Prime Minis ter,” the co mmuniqué co ntinued, “agreedto expedite the co nsultatio ns with a view o f acco mplishing the revers io n during 1972, subject to the co nclus io n these specific arrangements with thenecessary legis lative suppo rt.”

Thus Japan’s “residual sovereignty” o ver Okinawa has been reco gnized by every American Pres ident and every U.S. adminis tratio n s ince the end o f theo ccupatio n. The agreement befo re yo u, Mr. Chairman and members o f the co mmittee, the agreement befo re yo u and its related arrangements are thelo gical and timely culminatio n o f an his to ric pro gress io n set in mo tio n o ver 20 years ago .

―Thus , the autho r co ns iders that the revers io n o f Okinawa is widely reco gnized by the Allies and by the wo rld o pinio n. The pro blem is the so vereignty o f theSenkaku Is lands . Regarding this pro blem po int No . 17 o f Ro gers ’ explanatio n reads:

No .17 So vereignt y o f Island Senkaku

Fulbright said: There is this tro ubleso me ques tio n that I have seen in the paper and I wo ndered if yo u wanted to co mment o n it. I believe it co ncerns theis land o f Senkaku. Is that left as is witho ut an attempt to determine its so vereignty? There was a piece in the paper the o ther day indicating that there maybe so me difficulty o ver the so vereignty o f that is land.

Secret ary Ro gers replied, Mr. Chairman I am glad yo u asked that ques tio n because we have made it clear that this treaty do es no t affect the legals tatus o f tho se is lands at all. Whatever the legal s ituatio n was prio r to the treaty is go ing to be the legal s ituatio n after the treaty co mes into effect.

T he Chairman. In any case, that is no t a reaso n to o bject to this treaty, whatever o ne may think abo ut it. Is that co rrect?

Secret ary Ro gers. That is right. That is co rrect.

T he Chairman. It do es no t affect it.

Regarding Japan’s Retentio n o f Residual Aut ho rit y there were several ques tio ns . What is the co ncept o f Residual Aut ho rit y? Is it a legal co ncept o rjus t po litical maneuvering?

After all, the fo llo wing letter by Ro bert I Starr, Acting Ass is tant Legal Adviser fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific affairs is the legal po s itio n o f the U.S. Go vernment.

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Department o f State,

Washingto n, D.C., Octo ber 20 , 1971.

Ro bert Mo rris , Esq.,

Rice & Rice,

Mercantille Dallas Building, Dallas , Tex.

Dear Mr. Mo rris : Secretary Ro gers has asked me to reply to yo ur letter [Ro bert Mo rris ] o f September 28 , 1971, co ncerning the claim o f Grace Hsu too wnership o f the Tiao yutai, Huang Wei Yu, and Chih Yu is lands . We assume that yo u that by “Huang Wei Yu”and “Chih Yu”, yo u refer to Huang-wei-chiao andChih-wei-chiao , two is lets in the Tiao -yu-tai gro up. The Japanese names fo r these two is lands are respectively Ko bi-sho and Sekibi-sho , and the entiregro up is kno wn in Japanese as the Senkaku Is lands . Under Article o f the 1951 Treaty o f Peace with Japan, the United States acquired adminis trative rightso ver “Nansei Sho to ” so uth o f 29 degrees no rth latitude. This term was unders to o d by the United States and Japan to include the Senkaku Is lands , whichwere under Japanese adminis tratio n at the end o f the Seco nd Wo rld War and which are no t o therwise specifically referred to in the Peace Treaty. Inacco rdance with unders tandings reached by Pres ident Nixo n and Prime Minis ter Sato o f Japan in 1969, the United States is expected to return to Japan in1972 the adminis trative rights to Nansei Sho to which the United States co ntinues to exercise under the Peace Treaty. A detailed agreement to this effect,o n the terms and co nditio ns fo r the revers io n o f the Ryukyu Is lands , including the Senkakus , was s igned o n June 17, 1971, and has been transmitted to theSenate fo r its advice and co nsent to ratif icatio n.

The Go vernment o f the Republic o f China and Japan are in disagreement as to so vereignty o ver the Senkaku Is lands . Yo u sho uld kno w as well that thePeo ple’s Republic o f China has also claimed so vereignty o ver the is lands . The United States believes that a return o f adminis trative rights o ver tho seis lands to Japan, fro m which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims (o f ROC and/o r PRC). The United States canno t add tothe legal rights Japan po ssessed befo re it trans ferred adminis tratio n o f the is lands to us , no r can the United States , by giving back what it received,diminish the rights o f o ther claimants . The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Is lands and co ns iders that any co nflicting claims to the is landsare a matter fo r reso lutio n by the parties co ncerned. I ho pe that this info rmatio n is helpful to yo u. If I can be o f any further ass is tance, please do no thes itate to let me kno w.

Sincerely yo urs ,

Ro bert I Starr,

Acting Ass is tant Legal Adviser

fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific affairs .

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This is the mo s t impo rtant legal s tatement o f the U.S. Go vernment o n the so vereignty o f the Senkaku is lands . The United States has co ntinued to maintainthis po s itio n s ince the ratif icatio n o f the Okinawa Revers io n Treaty, typical examples being China’s Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S.Interests, No vember 12, 20 0 1 and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations, Sept ember 25, 2012.

Unfo rtunately, mo s t Japanese peo ple, including so -called experts o n internatio nal pro blems , kno w no thing abo ut these U.S.-Taiwan nego tiatio ns and theirresults . The resulting misunders tandings o f the co nditio ns o f Revers io n Treaty sus tain Japanese natio nalism.

Japan made co ncess io ns to reach a bas ic agreement with Taiwan o ver fishing rights aro und the disputed Senkaku Is lands , a deal that willlikely rile China. Under the agreement, which co uld be anno unced as early as April 10 , Taiwanese fishing bo ats are pro hibited fro m enteringJapan's territo rial waters within 12 nautical miles o f the Senkaku Is lands in the Eas t China Sea, acco rding to so urces . Ho wever, they cano perate in the rich fishing gro unds o uts ide the territo rial waters .

To kyo and Taipei plan to set up a jo int co ntro l co mmittee to arrange the fishing fleet s izes o f bo th s ides , the so urces said. Mo s t o f the areathat will be under jo int co ntro l lies so uth o f 27 degrees no rth latitude, eas t o f the Japan-China median line and no rthwes t o f the bo undaryclaimed by Taiwan. The area also includes part o f the waters no rth o f the Yaeyama Is lands and so utheas t o f the bo undary claimed by Taiwan, arich fishing gro und that Taipei is eager to harves t. The Senkakus , a gro up o f five uninhabited is lets and reefs , are adminis tered by Japan butalso claimed by bo th China and Taiwan, which call them Diao yu and Diao yutai, respectively. Taiwan also lays claim to fishing rights in watersaro und the Senkaku Is lands . China has called o n Taiwan to fo rm a unified fro nt agains t Japan o ver the Senkakus is sue. "Co mpatrio ts o n bo ths ides o f the s trait mus t jo intly preserve so vereignty o ver the Diao yu Is lands ," a spo kesman fo r the State Co uncil o f China's Taiwan AffairsOffice said.

Ho wever, Japan’s co ncess io ns o n fishing rights to Taiwan have driven a wedge between China and Taiwan and prevented a po ss ible unifiedfro nt o ver the territo rial dispute. "Sovereignty cannot be divided, but resources can be shared," Taiwan Pres ident Ma Ying-jeo u said. Neither To kyono r Taipei plans to mentio n the sovereignty issue in the agreement. The waters aro und the Senkaku Is lands are co ns idered traditio nalo perating areas fo r Taiwanese fishermen. With the bluefin tuna fishing seaso n beginning in April, a delay in the agreement with Japan co uldhave caused an upro ar amo ng Taiwanese fishermen. The part o f the Eas t China Sea clo se to the Senkaku and Yaeyama is lands in OkinawaPrefecture is a pro lif ic fishing gro und that has attracted many fishing bo ats fro m Japan, Taiwan and China. That is also an area whereexclus ive eco no mic zo nes claimed by the three s ides o verlap. The lack o f a fisheries pact has meant that many Taiwanese fishing bo ats havebeen seized by Japan Co as t Guard cutters . The fisheries talks between To kyo and Taipei s tarted in 1996, were halted in 2009, and resumed in2012. THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

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Appendix: T he Lesso ns o f Japan-T aiwan agreement o n f ishing right s aro und t he Senkaku/Diao yu Islands

The Asahi repo rted ‘Japan, Taiwan agree o n fishing rights aro und Senkakus ’, o n April 10 , 2013 as fo llo ws;

In thewriter’sview o ne o fthe mo s timpo rtantfacts isthat thePRC did no ts tro nglyo ppo se theJapan-Taiwanfishingagreement.This is a

backgro und fact that is eas ily fo rgo tten, but it is very impo rtant fo r future arrangements with the PRC.

A co ncept that pro vided the bas is fo r Japan-Taiwan nego tiatio n is Dr. Ma Ying-jeo u’s thes is that " Sovereignty cannot be divided, but resources can beshared." Dr. Ma Ying-jeo u’s Harvard Law Scho o l dis sertatio n is titled, Trouble over Oily Waters: Legal Problems of Seabed Boundaries and Foreign Investments inthe East China Sea, December 1980. The reaso n why this agreement has been success fully co ncluded is that neither To kyo no r Taipei plans to mentio n thesovereignty issue in the agreement.

Applying Ma Ying-jeo u’s thes is to the Japan-China Senkaku Co nflict, Japan’s effective co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands sho uld be respected, while, at thesame time, the ROC’s and the PRC’s underlying claims o f the so vereignty o f Diao yutai sho uld also be respected. Japan sho uld no t reject ROC and PRCclaims o n so vereignty o f the Senkaku/Diao yutai Is lands . We need a new formula fo r peace in the Eas t China Sea.

This is a revised vers io n o f an article prepared fo r the inaugural meeting o f the Eas t As ian Maritime Co o peratio n Fo rum (EAMCF) at BEXCO Co nventio nCenter o n December 19 , 2013, spo nso red by Sea Po wer League o f the Republic o f Ko rea (SPLRK) and Seo ul Natio nal Univers ity As ia Center (SNUAC).

Yabuki Susumu, Pro fesso r emeritus at Yo ko hama Univers ity, is o ne o f Japan’s leading specialis ts o n Mao Zedo ng, o n China-Japan Relatio ns , and o nChinese eco no mic develo pment and geo po litics . His two mo s t recent bo o ks are ﾁャｲﾒﾘｶ―米中結託と日本の進路 (Chimerica: US-China Co-dependence and Japan’sWay Forward) and 尖閣問題の核心. 日中関係はどうなる(The Co re o f the Senkaku Pro blem: What is to Beco me o f Japan-China Relatio ns .)

See also his interview with the Asahi “INTERVIEW: China-watcher Yabuki says Senkakus are a diplo matic mis take by Japan,” Dec 12, 2012

And three interviews with Yabuki by Stephen Harmer at Fo rbes : Interview with Pro fesso r Yabuki o n the Senkaku/Diao yu Cris is and U.S.-China-JapanRelatio ns , Oct 3, 2012; and Japan and U.S. Igno red Chinese Signals and His to ry, Blundering into the Senkaku/Diao yu Cris is , February 20 , 2013; and MarkSelden at the As ia-Pacific Jo urnal http://japanfo cus .o rg/-Yabuki-Susumu/3906 .

Mark Selden is Senio r Research Asso ciate, Co rnell Univers ity and an As ia-Pacific Jo urnal Co o rdinato r.

Recommended Citation: Yabuki Susumu and Mark Selden, "The Origins of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute between China, Taiwan and Japan," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12,Issue 2, No. 3, January 13, 2014.

No t es

1 Diaoyutai shi zhongguo guyou de lingtu, Guo wuyuan bao dao -bango ngshi.

2 Co ngress io nal Research Service Repo rt, Repo rt fo r Co ngress , CRS 7-5700, by Mark E. Manyin

3 Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs , Republic o f China.

4 http://www.mo fa.go .jp/mo faj/area/senkaku/

5 Memo randum o f Co nversatio n, So urce: Natio nal Archives , Nixo n Pres idential Materials , NSC Files , Bo x 1025, Pres ident/HAK Memco ns , Memco n—thePres ident, Kis s inger, and Amb. Cho w Apr. 12, 1971. To p Secret; Sens itive; Eyes Only. The Pres ident’s Daily Diary indicates that Cho w met with the Pres identfro m 11:31 a.m. to 12:05 p.m. and that Emil Mo sbacher, Chief o f Pro to co l fo r the Department o f State, was also present. (Ibid., White Ho use Central Files )

The co nversatio n was reco rded by the White Ho use taping sys tem. The s tatements in quo tatio n marks are actually paraphrases . (Ibid., White Ho use Tapes ,Reco rding o f co nversatio n between Nixo n and Kis s inger, April 12, 1971, 11:28 a.m.–12:41 p.m., Oval Office, Co nversatio n No . 477–3)

6 Apparent reference to the “Seco nd Annual Repo rt to Co ngress o n United States Fo reign Relatio ns ,” February 25, 1971, in Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp.219–345.

7 Pro bable reference to an April 9 memo randum fro m Kis s inger to Nixo n; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vo l. V, Do cument 344. See also Do cument 167 inthis vo lume.

8 Japanese-American nego tiatio ns o ver Okinawa sparked renewed Chinese interes t in the Senkaku Is lands (Tiao yutai o r Diao yutai in Chinese). Cho w gave a4-page aide mémo ire to Green o n September 16 , 1970 , o utlining ROC o bjectio ns to Japanese so vereignty o ver the is lands . (Natio nal Archives , RG 59 ,EA/ROC Files : Lo t 75 D 61, Subject Files , Petro leum–Senkakus , January–September 1970). Sho esmith summarized repo rts o f s tudent demo ns tratio ns inTaipei agains t Japanese co ntro l o f the Senkaku Is lands and no ted: “The Embassy believes that the initiative fo r the demo ns tratio ns has co me fro m thes tudents rather than the go vernment. But the latter pro bably has given tacit appro val o ut o f reluctance to o ppo se the fruits o f yo uthful patrio tism and itso wn dis satis factio n o ver o ur China po licy and o il explo ratio n mo rato rium.” (Memo randum fro m Sho esmith to Green, April 17; ibid., Lo t 75 D 76 ,Petro leum–Senkakus , January–March 1971) There were also s tudent pro tes ts in the United States and Ho ng Ko ng. The White Ho use tape o f the April 12meeting indicates that Cho w emphas ized that the final dispo s itio n o f the Senkakus sho uld be kept o pen, and that this is sue was a measure o f the ROC’sability to pro tect itself. He emphas ized the symbo lic impo rtance o f the is lands . (Ibid., Nixo n Pres idential Materials , White Ho use Tapes , Reco rding o fco nversatio n between Nixo n and Kis s inger, April 12, 1971, Oval Office, Co nversatio n No . 477–3)

9 After Cho w left the Oval Office, the Pres ident remarked that Cho w was co rrect o n the need to co ns ider the po litical views o f o verseas Chinese. (Ibid.)

10 Nixo n remarked that he wo uld no t raise the is sue o f the U.S. po s itio n in public, but, if asked, wo uld say that it had no t changed. He also emphas ized thatMurphy’s vis it wo uld be private, with no press co verage, and that Murphy wo uld repo rt to the White Ho use, no t the Department o f State. Finally he urgedCho w to be “mum” abo ut the United Natio ns is sue until after Murphy vis ited Taiwan. (Ibid.) The White Ho use also wanted to limit speculatio n by U.S.o fficials co ncerning po licy to ward China. An April 14 memo randum fro m Kis s inger to the Acting Secretary o f State reads in its entirety: “In the wake o frecent develo pments , the Pres ident has asked that all subs tantive co mments by U.S. o fficials , including respo nses to fo rmal press inquiries , backgro unds tatements o n and o ff-the-reco rd remarks and guidance to Po s ts abro ad, co ncerning U.S. relatio ns with the Peo ple’s Republic o f China be cleared with himthro ugh my o ffice.” (Ibid., NSC Files , Bo x 521, Co untry Files , Far Eas t, China, Vo l. VI)

11 Memo randum o f Co nversatio n, So urce: Natio nal Archives , Nixo n Pres idential Materials , NSC Files , Co untry

Files , Far Eas t, China, Vo l. VI. Co nfidential. Sent fo r info rmatio n. Drafted o n April 14. The meeting was held in Kis s inger’s o ffice. In an April 14 co veringmemo randum, Ho ldridge sugges ted that no further dis tributio n be made. Kis s inger initialed his appro val. (Ibid.) Kis s inger and Cho w met fro m 3:31 to 3:47p.m. (Library o f Co ngress , Manuscript Divis io n, Kis s inger Papers , Bo x 480 , Miscellany, 1968–1976, Reco rd o f Schedule)

12 During April 1971 there were s igns that the Republic o f China had accepted the U.S. po s itio n. Kearns repo rted that he spo ke privately with Chiang Ching-kuo after a dinner at McCo naughy’s ho me in Taipei. He paraphrased Chiang as fo llo ws: “It is necessary fo r us to publicly o ppo se actio ns taken by theUnited States Go vernment that favo r the Chinese Co mmunis ts . Ho wever, we wish the Pres ident to kno w that we unders tand the necess ity o f taking suchactio ns at this time.” Chiang asked that his message be relayed to the Pres ident, and Peterso n fo rwarded it o n April 17. (Memo randum fro m Kearns toPeterso n, April 15, and memo randum fro m Peterso n to Nixo n, April 17; bo th in Natio nal Archives , RG 59 , S/S Files : Lo t 73 D 443 and William P. Ro gers ’Official and Perso nal Papers , White Ho use Co rrespo ndence)

13 As ian and Pacific Co uncil.

14 So urce: Natio nal Archives , Nixo n Pres idential Materials , NSC Files , Bo x 521, Co untry Files , Far Eas t, China, Vo l. VI. Co nfidential. Sent fo r info rmatio n. Ano tatio n o n the memo randum indicates Kis s inger saw it o n April 23, 1971.

15 Memo randum Fro m the Pres ident’s Ass is tant fo r Internatio nal Eco no mic Affairs (Peterso n) to Pres ident Nixo n. So urce: Natio nal Archives , Nixo nPres idential Materials , White Ho use Special Files , Pres ident's Office Files , Bo x 12, Pres ident's Handwriting Files . Secret. Sent fo r actio n. A no tatio n o n thememo randum indicates the Pres ident saw it. This trip was arranged in early May. See Do cument 121. Overall trade po licy to ward the natio ns o f Eas t As ia isdo cumented in Fo reign Relatio ns , 1969–1976, vo lume IV.

16 Attached but no t printed is a message sent via backchannel by Kennedy to Peterso n o n June 7. A relatively co mplete reco rd o f the Sino -American textilenego tiatio ns is in Natio nal Archives , Nixo n Pres idential Materials , White Ho use Special Files , Staff Member and Office Files , Peter Peterso n, Bo x 1, 1971,Textile Nego tiatio ns (cables ).

17 So urce: Natio nal Archives , Nixo n Pres idential Materials , White Ho use Special Files , Pres ident’s Office Files , Bo x 87, Memo randa fo r the Pres ident. Secret;Eyes Only.

18 Nixo n, Kis s inger, and Peterso n met at Camp David fro m 3:25 to 4:10 p.m. o n June 7. (Ibid., White Ho use Central Files , Pres ident’s Daily Diary) Acco rdingto a draft telegram to Ro gers by U. Alexis Jo hnso n: “Henry Kis s inger s tepped into the breach with material that I supplied him, and las t night [June 7]o btained the Pres ident’s decis io n that we wo uld no t change o ur po s itio n o n the Senkakus . Ho wever, this po ints up the heat that GRC is bringing to bear o nus and in turn in so me degree pro bably reflects the heat that GRC is feeling o n a subject which it neglected fo r so lo ng.” (Ibid., RG 59 , U. Alexis Jo hnso nFiles : Lo t 96 D 695, No dis Chro no 1971) Kis s inger and Jo hnso n dis cussed the Senkaku Is land is sue by telepho ne o n the mo rning o f June 7. Jo hnso ns tated: “The principle that we are applying is that we received the is lands fro m Japan fo r adminis tratio n and are returning them to Japan witho ut prejudice tothe rights—no po s itio n between the two go vernments o n it.” (Memo randum o f co nversatio n between Kis s inger and Jo hnso n, June 7, 10:35 a.m.; ibid.,Telco ns , May–June 1971)

19 See Do cument 133 and fo o tno te 2 thereto .

20 In an Octo ber 5 memo randum to Haig, Ho ldridge wro te that Peterso n’s o ffice had co ntacted him to no te that no military ass is tance miss io n had beendispatched to Taiwan. He no ted, “Given Ambassado r Kennedy’s pro mise to the GRC, and given the do ubts likely to be raised in their mind by anyco ns iderable po s tpo nement o f the survey miss io n, we sho uld mo ve ahead reaso nably so o n to send a suitable o fficer to Taiwan.” Haig’s handwrittenco mment o n the bo tto m o f the memo randum reads: “Cripes Jo hn—this is dynamite. In any event we sho uld wait till we see ho w textiles co me o ut.”(Natio nalArchives , Nixo n Pres idential Materials , NSC Files , Bo x 522, Co untry Files , Far Eas t, China, Vo l. IX)

21 Representative Wilbur D. Mills (D–Arkansas ) was the ranking member o f the Ho use Ways and Means Co mmittee.

22 On June 7 Kennedy to ld Chiang Ching-kuo o f the decis io n o n the Senkaku Is lands . Chiang asked that the U.S. Go vernment catego rically s tate at the timeo f the s igning o f the Okinawa revers io n agreement that the final s tatus o f the is lands had no t been determined and sho uld be settled by all partiesinvo lved. (Backchannel message fro m Kennedy to Peterso n, June 9; ibid., White Ho use Special Files , Staff Member and Office Files , Peter Peterso n, Bo x 1,1971, Textile Nego tiatio ns (cables )) In a June 10 memo randum to Kis s inger, Jo hnso n no ted that Ro gers had raised this is sue with Japanese Fo reignMinis ter Aichi at their meeting in Paris o n June 9 . (Ibid., RG 59 , U. Alexis Jo hnso n Files : Lo t 96 D 695, Kis s inger, Henry, 1971) On June 12 Peterso n info rmedKennedy, who was in Seo ul, that Ro gers had appro ached Aichi, “s tro ngly urging GOJ to dis cuss is sue with GRC prio r to s ignature o f Okinawa Agreement o nJune 17.” He also no ted that a Department o f State spo kesman wo uld anno unce o n June 17 that a return o f “adminis trative rights ” to Japan o f the SenkakuIs lands “can in no way prejudice the underlying claims o f the Republic o f China.” (Ibid., Nixo n Pres idential Materials , White Ho use Special Files , Staff Memberand Office Files , Peter Peterso n, Bo x 1, 1971, Textile Nego tiatio ns (cables )) On June 15 Peterso n cabled Kennedy, in Seo ul, s tating that Aichi had met withthe ROC Ambassado r in To kyo to dis cuss the Senkaku is sue. (Ibid.) On July 12 Chiang Ching-kuo co mplained to McCo naughy that “the Japanese so far haverefused to talk in any meaningful way o n the subject.” (Telegram 3388 fro m Taipei, July 12; ibid., RG 59 ,Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT)

23 An exchange o f no tes between Ro gers and Ambassado r Shen o n June 29 extended and amended the Octo ber 12, 1967, agreement o n trade in co tto ntextiles . See TIAS 6361 (the 1967 agreement), TIAS 7011 (an exchange o f no tes fo r an interim agreement s igned in late December 1970), and TIAS 7135(the June 1971 no tes ). The agreement was further extended and amended in Augus t 1971 (TIAS 7177). A new agreement was reached in December 1971(TIAS 7249, co rrected in TIAS 7469). The United States and the Republic o f China were also parties to a multilateral acco rd o n trade in wo o l and man-madefiber textile pro ducts in December 1971 (TIAS 7493 and 7498).

24 So urce: Natio nal Archives , Nixo n Pres idential Materials , NSC Files , Bo x 523, Co untry Files , Far Eas t, China, Vo l. X. Secret; Sens itive; Eyes Only. Themeeting was held at Kis s inger’s villa at the Key Bis cayne Ho tel. A sho rt attached no te reads: “Co leman: This is ready to go to file. JHH do esn’t think it’snecessary to have HAK read it thro ugh. Eileen.”

25 Kis s inger held a sho rt press co nference o n No vember 29 to anno unce the date fo r the Pres ident’s trip to the PRC, where he was asked abo ut the U.S.defense co mmitment to the ROC. (Department o f State Bulletin, December 20 , 1971, p. 709)

26 In a January 14 memo randum, Ho ldridge info rmed Kis s inger that “Cho u’s co mment pro bably represents a fo rm o f mild pressure o n us to avo id delays o rdisappro vals rather than dis co ntent o ver an actuality; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] repo rting has indicated co ns iderable anxiety in the ROCDefense Minis try that we might tighten o r reduce the flo w o f military ass is tance.” (Natio nal Archives , Nixo n Pres idential Materials , NSC Files , Bo x 523,Co untry Files , Far Eas t, China, Vo l. X)

27 All ellipses are in the so urce text.

28 Ho ldridge info rmed Kis s inger that the Department o f Defense had passed to the ROC the White Ho use’s reques t that no crew members arrive in theUnited States prio r to March 11, 1972. (Natio nal Archives , Nixo n Pres idential Materials , NSC Files , Bo x 523, Co untry Files , Far Eas t, China, Vo l. X)

29 Apparent reference to Majo r General Jo hn Winthro p Barnes , who became Chief, MAAG, in the ROC in 1972.

30 Brackets in the so urce text.

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