The Fragility of Arctic StrategiesSensitivity of Arctic States for Harm from Volatility

Halldor Berg Hardarson1101214537 MIR

2013 05

Abstract

Climate change is melting the sea-ice that covers the northernmost regions of the planet opening up for various economic and political changes. Scientific models project a complete opening up of the area in coming decades. This trend will disturb the environment and lead to increased human activity which threatens the balance in the region. It will also lead to opportunities in regards to resource exploitation and shipping. Arctic and non-Arctic actors, including some of the most powerful states on the planet such as Russia and the US, have been developing strategies to react to these projections. These projections are based on scientific predictions that are inherently fragile and affects the strategies. The focus of this paper is on the fragility of the strategies using a definition put forward by Nassim N. Taleb. All of these actors are preparing themselves for something that hasnt happened yet but they assume will happen. If the assumption break, the strategies can either gain or lose from different outcome. By taking the fickle nature of the Arctic development into account its possible for states to guard themselves against the volatility to create more resilient strategies or even gain from the volatility and become antifragile. The key findings of the paper is that the US and Icelands strategies can be considered fragile as they dont take into account the possibility of huge downsides; Russia, Finland, Sweden and Norways strategies are robust; Denmark/Greenland, Canada and Chinas strategies are considered antifragile as they all gain from volatility.

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Foreword

This paper is written as a final thesis in my Masters of International Relations Program at Peking University. These two years studying in China has opened up a world for me. Ive gotten to witness and experience the extent and meaning of International Relations in a way that is sometimes lost when you focus on theory and rarely leave home. Its through international relations where the smallest of countries, like Iceland where Im from, and the largest, like China, can communicate and learn from each other.When choosing a topic for the paper I wanted something that would show how these two very different countries, far away from each other, affect each other and share common interests. The issue of the Arctic is interesting as it in one way or another affects the whole world. The reality of climate change is generally accepted and the biggest stakeholders have already started devising strategies. The sad truth is that none of these strategies has an answer to how to undo the mess that is climate change, maybe its too late. Instead they focus on how to adapt and benefit from something that is considered already a fact.Writing this thesis Ive gotten help from a lot of good people. I want to give a special thanks to my advisor, Fan Shiming, for good recommendations that helped me to find the limits of the research. I also want to thank Ragnar Baldursson, minister counsellor for Iceland in China, for sharing with me his extensive knowledge on Arctic affairs. I want to thank H.E. Kristn A. rnadttir Ambassador and the Embassy of Iceland in Beijing for good help and facilitating me while writing the thesis. Many were very helpful in answering my questions when I contacted them: Alyson Bailes, professor at the University of Iceland, Michael Corgan, professor at Boston University, Julien Bo, climate researcher, and Kristinn Schram, the director of Center for Arctic Policy Studies in Iceland. Finally I want to thank Jessie Jing for her translations from English to Chinese.

Beijing, April 23 2013Halldr Berg Hararson

Contents1. Introduction12. Background22.1 Climate Change and the Arctic22.2 Political and Economic Impact32.3 Literature Review52.4 Theories of International Relations62.5 Predictions and the Social Sciences92.6 Fragility as a Method113. Methodology153.1 Defining Fragility153.2 Fragility in Arctic Climate Models173.3 Using Fragility in the Context of Strategy204. Strategy Assessments234.1 The United States234.1.1 Strategy Overview234.1.2 Fragility of the Strategy254.2 Canada254.2.1 Strategy Overview254.2.2 Fragility of the Strategy284.3 Russia294.3.1 Strategy Overview294.3.2 Fragility of the Strategy324.4 Nordic Countries334.4.1 Denmark (Greenland)334.4.2 Norway344.4.3 Iceland364.4.4 Finland and Sweden374.4.5 Fragility of the Strategies384.5 Non-Arctic Actors394.5.1 European Union394.5.2 China404.6.2 Fragility of the Strategies425. Conclusions446. Bibliography46

Table of FiguresFigure 1 Number of Google Scholar Results for the key words "Arctic" and politics5Figure 2 Example of probability distribution 14Figure 3 Example of the probability distribution of different types of fragility15Figure 4 Definition of Fragility - the shaded area represents the fragility of the function16Figure 5 Bo, Hall, & Qu, 200917Figure 6 Probability Density for Surface Warming19Figure 7 Overview over the fragility of different strategies42

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1. IntroductionClimate change is melting the sea-ice that covers the northernmost regions of the planet, opening up room for various economic and political changes. This trend is interesting as the area involves some of the greatest powers in the international community; in Northern America we have Canada and the United States and in Eurasia we have Russia and Northern European countries. The implications of this change also means that many other non-Arctic actors, such as China and the European Union, have started to consider themselves as having strategic interest in the high north. Besides the many different natural resources that can be found in the region, there is a great potential for new shipping routes across the north to connect the Eastern and Western hemisphere in a new and more efficient way, powerfully altering global political and economic realities. This has made policy makers in these countries both excited and worried and in recent years, all of them have gone into the work of building or renewing their Arctic strategies. Many facades of this work can be observed in the focus of these states and in their published strategy reports, which will be examined in this paper. Specifically, the countries that the paper will examine are Russia, Canada, USA and the Nordic countries and their territories. Moreover two non-Arctic actors will also be studied, the Arctic policy of the European Union and China. For the most part, these new policies assume that climate change will lead to warmer climates in the Arctic and tries to use that prediction to rearrange their priorities to take advantage of the many opportunities that the great melt might lead to or at least protect the established power balance that such a change might threaten.What is interesting about the situation in the greater context of the field of International Relations, is that this is all based on a certain prediction. All of these great powers are preparing themselves for something that hasnt happened but that they assume will happen. Predictions are perfectly all right in the context of science where one can use the tools of statistics to make reasonable theories about the future within the limits of the assumption put forth. The Social Sciences and within the realm of politics on the other hand have a much worse track record of making prediction. The innumerable variables that human society consists of means that any prediction beyond the very short term usually becomes prey of the effect of many unlikely scenarios that are impossible to expect but will necessarily accumulate over time. This makes social and political policies based on predictions inherently fragile. Not all policy is fragile in the same way. By taking the fickle nature of the Arctic development into account, it is possible for states to guard themselves against the volatility to create strategies that are more resilient or to gain from the volatility. The focus of this paper will be on the fragility of the Arctic policies of the states and actors mentioned above.

2. Background2.1 Climate Change and the ArcticFossil evidences from the northwestern part of Iceland show that several million years ago, the environment on this now barren cold island used to be completely different. Its hard to wrap your mind around the fact that tropical plants and jungles were thriving at such northerly latitude but that was nonetheless the case[footnoteRef:2]. The scientific community has known for a long time that the climate on this planet is not always the same and that it changes regularly on the grand timescale of the geology. The planet has had phases of cold and hot eras; from long ice ages, where a big part of the global land surface was covered with ice, to warmer ages between when almost all ice had disappeared, even from the Polar Regions. Its known that the environment is relatively sensitive to any non-temporary change in its conditions. Even small changes in the planetary position seem to be able to trigger a lasting change in the climate through feedback processes that reinforces the change. This can even happen on a much smaller timescale; scientists have been able to study considerable fluctuation within the smaller timespan of written weather remarks in human history. This can also happen very regionally; but scientists have seen that a drastic regional climate change can happen as quickly as in ten years[footnoteRef:3]. [2: Gsli rn Bragason 2007] [3: Weart 2003]

As early as the 19th century physicists, started to realize that the atmosphere and what it consists of must have a great effect on the climate. The atmosphere moderates and distributes the energy received from the sun in correlation with the amount and ratios of atmospheric gases. This can be seen by observing the inhospitable, blazing hot and thick atmosphere on the planet Venus. Early on, many scientists theorized that human activity could cause climate change. Industrialization was measurably affecting the atmosphere with an increasing rate and it made sense that this might affect the climate. In the last decades, this effect has been confirmed in general weather trends. In the 1980s, results from studies on ice-cores from Greenland show that global warming seemed to be correlated with the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere like methane and carbon dioxide (CO2). The impact of the CO2 was especially important as the ever-increasing usage of fossil fuels had significantly raised the CO2 levels in the atmosphere and there were no signs that this trend was going to stop[footnoteRef:4]. [4: Weart 2003]

In the late 80s, the United Nations in co-operation with governments all over the world and the scientific community established the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that has since then released four assessment reports, the latest in 2007. These reports are not independent researches but an overview and analysis of new knowledge in the field of climate science taken together as an attempt to assess the current and future state of the climate[footnoteRef:5]. The main findings of the IPCC included that since the industrial revolution, the global climate had indeed warmed up considerably, with more than 2/3 of the warming happening in the last three decades. The world was getting hotter and global warming was happening faster. An overwhelming majority of climate models, using what we know about which factors affect climate change, past trends and a wide measurement network, also showed that global warming would further increase in the coming decades[footnoteRef:6]. [5: IPCC n.d.] [6: IPCC 2007]

The real world implication of this fact is probably nowhere as apparent as in the Arctic region. Unlike the Antarctic, the North Pole is not located in the middle of a landmass but rather in the middle of the ocean. This fact means that the ice formation is very different from the South Pole. The nearest landmass is Greenland, which is covered with an enormous glacier that rises high into the air and is not as easily melted when the temperature rises. The Arctic itself is covered in sea-ice. The ice is broken into many different plates that float and drift around. They clash and make chunks ice ridges and break up again. The seasonal weather patterns have a huge impact on the ice. Half the year, the sun cant be seen and half the year there is nothing but sun. In the frosts of the long winter nights, the sea freezes at the surface and creates new ice that can be everything from a few centimeters up to a meter. In the summertime, the sun easily melts the thinner layers but if the conditions are right, some of the ice survives and gets another chance to become thicker. Multi-year ice can get extremely thick[footnoteRef:7]. [7: National Snow and Ice Data Center 2013]

In recent years, with increased temperatures, the summer ice coverage has been shrinking rapidly. The ice still covers most of the Arctic vastness in the wintertime but its getting thinner and thinner. An increased percentage of the winter ice is less than one year old and melts away in the summer. The thinner ice has made it easier to cross the Arctic on ice breakers but in recent years, there has also been the opening up of regions on the edge of the Arctic that have turn completely ice-free in the summertime[footnoteRef:8]. Ice free routes, both east and west of the North Pole has, in recent years, been sustainable enough to allow for sail boats to circumvent the North Pole but until very recently that thought would have been impossible[footnoteRef:9]. Scientists predict that this development will keep going and that the North Pole itself will be ice-free over the summertime sometime in this century[footnoteRef:10]. [8: National Snow and Ice Data Center 2013] [9: First Circumnavigation of Arctic Completed 2010] [10: Bo, Hall and Qu 2009]

2.2 Political and Economic ImpactThis change will completely alter every possible political and economic condition in the region. The countries that have territorial claims in the Arctic are some of the most powerful states in the world, which means that the melt might affect the global power balance. From a geopolitical point of view, the ice-locked north has always been a very firm limitation in the topology of the whole world. Living in the shadow of that fact, a sleuth of smaller states and groups of native people also exist in the region protected by the inflexibility of the ice filled Arctic-ocean that kept them insignificant. Now changing climate threatens to change everything.It is known that the area has many resources, everything from precious metals to fossil fuels reserves that until this day have been inaccessible. The changes now might cause a boom in economic activity in the high north that could lead to migration pressure in areas that havent been considered very habitable before climate change. Potentially more important than the resources for economic activities is the opening up of new shipping routes across the Arctic. The effect of this on the global economy is unimaginable. If ships could cross the Arctic directly and unhindered it would shorten the distance between the markets in East Asia and the markets in Europe and the East Coast of the United States about 40%[footnoteRef:11]. This would be a complete game changer. [11: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland 2009]

The main drive for the economic globalization in the last few decades has been inexpensive and secure shipping on a global scale. The connection between the eastern and western hemisphere has a allowed for international division of labor and resources that has been incredibly beneficial for all parties involved and brought on a surge of growth in developing parts of the world. There are nonetheless serious limitations to the global value chain as it stands today. Shipping routes that connect the west and east are limited by severe geographical bottlenecks[footnoteRef:12]. In the old days, ships had to go around the southernmost points of South America and Africa, which made these ways of moving products incredibly costly. Transportation on land is an order of magnitude less efficient, even when trains are filled with goods to be hauled; the payload is only a fraction of that which could be transported with a cargo ship. [12: Castonguay n.d.]

The opening of the Suez and Panama channel changed a lot and made the global economic environment of last few decades possible. They are nonetheless limited in many ways. They are already being used at full capacity and even with recent and planned renovations, they put a serious limit on the number and size of the cargo ships that go through. They are also politically dangerous as they create choking points that could prove the Achilles heals of everybody that are too dependent on them[footnoteRef:13]. In the monopolar moment of todays global politics, one country, the United States, is responsible to protect most of these precious shipping lanes and to keep the bottle necks open; not only the channels but also other natural bottlenecks on the way such as the Strait of Malaga. This situation makes the US vulnerable but could also create a very uncomfortable situation for any potential rising power that has to rely on these same lanes and the established rule that keeps them in order[footnoteRef:14]. [13: Zumerchik and Danver 2010] [14: Blair and Lieberthale 2007]

Opening up of shipping over the Arctic is therefore very likely to strongly influence the global order. Shortening of the shipping routes and the lack of channels that limits the size of cargo ships could lead to shipping capacities reaching unknown levels. Even only partial opening in the summer time would be extremely meaningful. The winter-ice is projected to persist but in most areas, it will be ice that is less than a year old and therefore thin. New icebreaker technologies, such as the double-acting hull ships, are likely to make shipping economically viable all year round[footnoteRef:15]. In a bigger context, this could give the slowing down economies in the West a much-needed economic spur and prevent the foreseeable economic slowdown in East Asia. This could also open up new political dimensions in how the global distribution network is kept secure. [15: National Research Council 2007]

2.3 Literature ReviewYearResults

20002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120121700190021202390277029703230380045005400541055805730

With the potential economic and political impact of this magnitude, the issues of the Arctic have gotten surprisingly little attention in the mainstream IR circles. None of the most influential IR scholars has discussed the issue specifically beyond anything but vaguely mentioning the interest that the matter seems to raise in China. Even though there is not a lot of debate in the several most important journals, there are nonetheless hundreds of articles published in more specialized publications every year.

Figure 1Number of Google Scholar Results for the key words "Arctic" and politicsBy using Googles search machine for academic articles[footnoteRef:16] the general trend can be observed. In the last decade or so, the number of articles that discuss the Arctic in a political context has tripled. Moreover the number of policy papers, think tank reports and other publications that are evidence of governmental interest has increased rapidly and many of the academic articles are a reaction to that. [16: http://scholar.google.com]

There have quite a few general analyzes on the political situation in the Arctic and Arctic strategies, for an instance New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration written by The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis [footnoteRef:17] and A New Security Architecture for the Arctic published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies[footnoteRef:18]. Two of the central sources used in this paper are an example of how the Academic analyses are reactive to the governments initiative. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been known as expert analysts when it comes to Chinas Arctic policy and aspirations. They have published such reports as China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic [footnoteRef:19] and the more recent Chinas Arctic Aspirations[footnoteRef:20]. These papers and others like it are not based on scholars speculations about the geopolitical meaning of the area but rather reactive to something that is happening in the realm of policymaking and diplomacy. In the case of SIPRIs analysis on Chinas policy, it doesnt give any deep insights in to the academic discussion in China (which doesnt seem to be that significant in the case of Arctic policy anyway) but focuses on the activities of the governmental institutions, the activities of the Chinese foreign service with Arctic countries and within Arctic cooperation and analyzing governmental policy papers and so on. The state of Arctic research within the field of International Relations is maybe an example of how sometimes, the academia follows the real world policy rather than the other way around. [17: 2012] [18: Conley 2012] [19: Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic 2010/2] [20: Jakobson and Peng 2012]

In this paper, that fact is actually beneficial. By looking into the analysis on the state Arctic Policy, there are many sources to base a study on the fragility of Arctic strategies. The analytical state of research and lack of theoretical discussion gives a lot of space for new approaches. One of most important report for the research in this paper is similar in this regard; Bailes and Heininens Strategy Papers on the Arctic or High North: A comparative study and analysis [footnoteRef:21] compares the different strategies papers published by governments of each of the actors and states in the Arctic. [21: 2012]

That is not to say that there doesnt exist papers that try to approach the politics of the Arctic in more of a theoretical way but these papers or more peripheral in the field; student papers, not published or in either very small or specialized publications. The main question that people seem to be interested in is the question of if the change in the balance around the Arctic might lead to some kind of conflict or if it will lead to new types of international cooperation. The different theories of International Relations have a different answer to that question. 2.4 Theories of International RelationsOne of the most fundamental questions of international relations is how states can cooperate with each other and what prompts them to be confrontational and most of the theoretical frameworks that underpin the field revolve around answering that question. A long history of aggressiveness, mutual hostility, attacks without much provocation, colonialism, world wars and the creation of weapons of mass destruction seem to indicate that the international community isnt so much a community at all but rather a jungle were actors are driven by pure self-interest and nothing else. Nevertheless, many others have pointed out that this picture is perhaps quite a bit of a simplification and does not portray the intricacies of the real situation. There are many examples of cooperation in history that can be easily pointed out and one could argue that the force of cooperation was actually much more powerful in shaping the world and course of events compared to the force of aggressiveness and self-interest. How else would you explain the incredible economic ties between countries and the wide span sharing of culture and distribution of new technologies and ideas? On a state-to-state level, we also see many examples of direct cooperation that seem to debunk the bleak portrayal first depicted. These two opposite points of view are at the heart of main debates in International Relations and many of the most influential theories today can be broadly found in either of these two categories.These points of view are best crystalized in their respective theories: Realism and Liberalism. Realism is the theory that assumes that the international system is anarchic, the states are the only significant actors, andand all states behave in a unitary rational way with their self-interest and survival as their main goal[footnoteRef:22]. The central idea of Liberalism in international relations is that the state only exists in the context of a domestic and international civil society[footnoteRef:23]. The state is therefore not a unitary single actor with one main goal but reacts to a multitude of different interests and cultural values in its environment. Economic ties, political co-operation and many other behaviors can easily exist in the international space that does not necessarily reflect the best interest of the state but influences it nonetheless[footnoteRef:24]. These very broad looks on state behavior have, in recent years, been mostly replaced by more specific models based on either Realism or Liberalism and some independent theories that try to approach the subject from a completely different angle[footnoteRef:25]. [22: Donnelly 2000] [23: Moravcsik 1992] [24: Moravcsik 1992] [25: Mingst 2003]

The main paradigm of realism in the last 20 to 30 years is the so-called neo-realism. It bases its theoretical framework on the anarchic nature of the international structure. Because international relations happen in a space that by definition, is without governing of any sort it defines any other behavior of states. Without international government to make sure contracts are honored, the opportunity for international cooperation is very limited[footnoteRef:26]. Only cooperation that allows the state to gain in a relative sense (in terms of security or power) is worth it to go into and only has any meaning as long as the benefits are being reaped. No state neither would nor has to honor contracts they lose from[footnoteRef:27]. This means that all cooperation is extremely hard to establish and even harder to maintain and is mainly shaped by the power of the participating states. [26: Powell 1994] [27: Mingst 2003]

Neoliberalism is the other popular paradigm that, as opposed to neorealism, emphasis that international cooperation is very possible and quite common. Even if liberal scholars would accept all of the other assumptions of the neorealist, such as the influence of the anarchic nature of the international arena and so on, there is always at least one assumption that they assess differently. This is the way states value their self-interest. While the neo realists claim that states are only concerned with relative gains in power and security, the neo liberalists argue that in reality, states are more interested in absolute gains[footnoteRef:28]. That leaves a lot of space for mutually beneficial cooperation because even though an arrangement of cooperation might benefit some states more than it does others, some benefits are always preferable to no benefits[footnoteRef:29]. This theory is related to more specific theories of how international cooperation happens, such as institutionalism, that conceives international cooperation mainly as building of multilateral institution, and neo-functionalism, that stresses the importance of the process, which catches the state in an escalation of ever-increasing commitment that is not easy to abandon[footnoteRef:30]. [28: Powell 1994] [29: Mingst 2003] [30: Mingst 2003]

Besides these two general points of view within the field of International Relations, there are at least several other very influential theories that mostly fall outside of this dichotomy. Most noteworthy of them is the set of idealistic and revolutionary theories that approaches quite differently, for them international relations are characterized by ideas, joint values, culture and social identities. The main actors are not necessarily the state but all kinds of groups and individuals that help shape our culture, values and paradigms[footnoteRef:31]. An example of this kind of theory is constructivism[footnoteRef:32]. These three main categories of paradigms, the realist, the liberal and the idealistic, all have different views on how international cooperation happens and what it is that prompts security dilemmas. It is therefore to be expected that they have something interesting to say about how the political circumstances in the Arctic will play out. [31: Mingst 2003] [32: Mingst 2003]

Throughout the Cold War, the relations in the Arctic were shaped by the balance of power between the USSR, the US and their allies (NATO). Their relations were very much in accordance with neo-realist theories. Both powers had a big military presence in the region and all interaction happened based on mutual mistrust as countries in the middle ensured their security by allying themselves with either of the superpowers, occasionally using opportunities to gain by playing them against each other. Every development in the Arctic and how it influenced international relations was analyzed under this paradigm until the 1980s[footnoteRef:33]. [33: Arup 2012]

The meetings between the leaders of the States and the Soviet Union, such as the meeting by Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik 1986, showed some new approaches in the question of cooperation but everything changed when the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of the decade[footnoteRef:34]. With the old model out the window, what were we supposed to expect in the relations between the Arctic states? Right after the big change, there was immediately some efforts to establish cooperation between states and ever since then those efforts have been escalated and institutionalized. In 1991, eight Arctic countries signed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and in 1996, the Arctic Council was established in the Ottawa Declaration, including all states that have territories in the regions and even including some non-state actors such as representatives for ethnic groups that are native to the area[footnoteRef:35]. The cooperation has grown ever since and is today central to any issues regarding the Arctic[footnoteRef:36]. [34: Axworthy 2013] [35: Axworthy 2013] [36: Gordon Foundation 2013]

This development is of course exactly in the spirit of neo-liberalist theories and therefore tempting to conclude that any possible future friction in the region will be resolved through these channels of cooperation. Thats far from reality though; as it is the Arctic Council is a completely powerless institution. The Arctic states have been eager to keep the Arctic council as a platform free from politics that is instead effective as a channel of communication and research, with the environment as a special focus[footnoteRef:37]. There have been some signs of the Council moving more into the direction of a political regime, such as a by establishing a standing secretariat in Troms, Norway, and the recent Search and Rescue Agreement which is the Councils first law-bound international agreement[footnoteRef:38]. [37: Arctic Portal 2010] [38: Molenaar 2012]

Even so there also seems to be determination amongst the five littoral state to keep such issues as territorial claims and security separate and leave them to the more traditional approach of sovereignty and self-determination as well as to different degrees international law of the sea or bilateral or multilateral communications[footnoteRef:39]. In recent years as it has become more apparent that the Arctic environment is changing, some have said that the each country is now raising to unilaterally secure as well they can own interested and power as Arctic neighbors draw up battle lines[footnoteRef:40]. An example of that is the Russian submarine mission in 2007 that put a Russian flag on the sea bottom right at the North Pole[footnoteRef:41]. [39: Arctic Portal 2010] [40: Carter 2007] [41: Carter 2007]

From a theoretical point of view, three scenarios that can happen now regarding the question of whether the changing environment in the Arctic will bring out confrontation in the Arctic. From the point of view of Neo-Liberalism, we might expect the cooperation that has been growing in the last two decades to keep on growing and eventually be the channel through which any friction will be settled. From the point of view of Neo-realism, we can expect every country to rise to protect their claims and ambitions and in the case of uncertainty, resort to confrontation. From the point of view of Idealism, some other entirely different scenario might develop where new ideas and solutions will prevail. Thats the problem with theories in Social Studies, they always seem to leave out the possibility that unexpected things can happen. 2.5 Predictions and the Social SciencesThere is nothing wrong with the theories of International Relations if we remember to accept them in the context of their assumptions. As a basis of policy, on the other hand they have been proven terrible. What is the purpose of a theory? In general, a theory, be it a scientific theory, mathematical theory, psychological theory or a social science theory, are all meant to do at least one or more of the following four things: describe, explain, predict and change. A theory creates a mental model that allows us to understand natural or philosophical concepts better. However, not all theories are as good as others are in fulfilling all four goals.The scientific theory applied in the natural science is the ultimate role model for any budding theorist. Ever since our forefathers realized the reliability of the seasonal change and the first astronomers predicted solar eclipses with awe-inspiring accuracy, mankind has been obsessed with the idea that we can foresee the future through our insights and calculations. In many aspects, we have been tremendously successful, such as in the field of physics, chemistry and possibly fields such as biology and medicine. We have also realized that sometimes when theories and science fall short in their predictability it is. Its often because we simply havent enough data, time or the right tools and approaches to correctly deduct results. This has led to believe that perhaps all fields of reality are possible to predict about assuming enough data; that its only the complexity that prevents from seeing the future, not the nature of phenomena.In many ways, the Social Sciences were based on this belief. The origin of the Social Sciences in the 19th century can be traced to Positivism that attempted to use the methods and models of the natural sciences to create theories about societies and human behavior in the hope that it could be used to get to the same kind of predictability as we have gotten used to in the natural sciences[footnoteRef:42]. In his lecture, Predictions and Prophecies in the Social Sciences[footnoteRef:43], the political philosopher Karl Popper named this tendency historicism. Historicism is in his view not a scientific but a pseudoscientific symptom in many ideologies and theories, made to look progressive and scientific while in reality it stems from the superstition and ancient dream that human progress could be understood as some kind of narrative. [42: Keat and Urry 2010] [43: 1948]

This obsession with seeing the future is the Achilles heel of many theorists but the reasons why it rarely is fruitful are simple. In the words of Popper: [L]ong term prophecies can be derived from scientific conditional predictions only if they apply to systems which can be described as well isolated, stationary, and recurrent[footnoteRef:44]. While many natural systems (like the solar system) are indeed isolated, stationary, and recurrent, modern society most certainly is not such a system. Nassim Taleb has a more detailed description on why this is indeed the characteristics of human societies (and especially modern societies) in his Black Swan Theory[footnoteRef:45]. [44: 1948] [45: 2010]

Black swans are an event that are extremely rare, so rare that nothing in history and our current understanding could have convincingly made us expect them, and they have great impact that changes all other assumptions and situations. These kinds of events are statistical outliers but have an out of proportion effect on society and development of affairs. After the fact, they also have a tendency to be very obviously explained, giving the illusion that they could have been predicted. The name comes from a Latin expression that something is so rare that its like finding a black swan but at the time the phrase was coined, it was assumed that black swans didnt actually exist but when the continent of Australia was discovered by Europeans the original meaning of the saying became obsolete when actual black swans were found to exist there[footnoteRef:46]. [46: Taleb, The Black Swan 2010]

These kinds of events make it next to impossible to make theories that can predict the future with any long-term accuracy. People have a psychological tendency to be blind to the massive influence of black swan events on history and especially in taking into account the statistical improbability of many of the turning points in history. Nevertheless, how can something that is unlikely be so likely to have extreme effects? It stems from the fact that many of the systems that rule human society are characterized by unstructured randomness. Given enough time, there is almost infinite ways for something unexpected to happen so such occurrences will therefore happen very frequently but its impossible to say in which way they are going to manifest or how much impact they will have[footnoteRef:47]. We cant even predict them in the same way that we can statistically predict rare events in systems characterized with structured randomness (like in games or gambling) because they arent structured and we cant map the possibilities. [47: Taleb, The Black Swan 2010]

Does this mean that the traditional theoretical approaches of International Relations described in the last chapter are useless? Of course not. These theories are possibly powerful enough to predict the outcomes of many very isolated and short-term circumstances but beyond that, theories also have other uses besides predictability. They can help people understand by explaining and describing past and sometimes current events. For instance, the theories of neoliberalism and neorealism can be useful in explaining the changing spirit of international cooperation in the Arctic from the Cold War and from the 90s onward. This understanding can also help us change the future. Its perfectly reasonable to use the lessons of the past to base a policy of hopeful goals as long as we dont confuse it with predictability. The goal of this paper is to describe and change, less so explain and not at all predict. The nature of the subject at hand makes it very easy to fall into prophetic mode. The paper analyses policies that are directly linked to scientific predictions. If we try to use the theories of neoliberalism, neorealism or any other such theory to try to answer the question of if the future of the Arctic beholds conflict or cooperation, the Author has failed the task and has become a victim of historicism. The complexity and black swan nature of international relations could mean incredibly unpredictable outcomes from any variation in the prediction of the climate models with the accumulated effects so strong that it would render any conclusions made meaningless. Instead, the paper utilizes a different tactic: ignoring any predictions, the paper wants to describe the fragility of the strategies, a characteristic that can be observed right now and tell us how sensitive different countries are to volatility in their general environment (but here more specifically; the volatility in the outcomes linked to the assumptions in their strategies). 2.6 Fragility as a MethodThe viewpoint Taleb brings with his Black Swan Theory opens up the possibility for a completely new approach in many fields of Social Science. Instead of using the IRs framework of analysis to predict the future (which is futile anyway because of the black swan nature of modern societies), we can use it to analyze the ability to be less sensitive to unpredictable outcomes and volatility. The goal is not to predict black swan events but rather to measure the robustness against negative ones and ability to gain from positive ones. These two qualities are called by Taleb Fragility and Anti-fragility respectively. The usefulness of these concepts is that [f]ragility can be measured; risk is not measurable[footnoteRef:48]. [48: Taleb, Antifragile - Things that gain from disorder 2012, 31]

But what is fragility? When a thing, a system or any phenomena is fragile we know that we should handle it with care. A fragile thing is only tolerant of normal and expected situations but sensitive to volatility and randomness. If I decide to drop a porcelain teacup from a 1 cm height, its unlikely that it would harm it a lot. Even if I did once a day for 100 days, its unlikely to suffer any harm. This is the kind of wear and tear that the cup is built and expected to bear. If I on the other hand decide to drop the cup from 100 cm height (1 meter) we would all expect it to break into hundreds of pieces. The harm that the cup suffers is non-linear; the harm of dropping it from 100 cm is obviously a lot more than 100 times the harm of dropping it from 1 cm. When the damage is done, there is no going back. Increasing randomness in the environment of a fragile thing increases the probabilities of ruining the thing permanently[footnoteRef:49]. [49: Taleb, Antifragile - Things that gain from disorder 2012]

Not only are things fragile but also any kind of systems; in the economic collapse of 2008 many big companies, banks and even countries got completely ruined because they couldnt stand an unexpected shock. The usual response to fragility is to try to think of any possible scenarios that could come up and try to prepare for them somehow in advance. This often has the exact opposite effect. Because of the black swan occurrences, its never possible to completely foresee any possible scenarios. This makes the system or thing even more fragile when something truly unexpected happens because the system has been allowed to grow beyond its capability to correct its fundamental errors before the error can be discovered. The system becomes too big to fail and then it fails. N.N. Taleb believes that modern society and technological processes are often more effective in fragilizing than the making things more resilient[footnoteRef:50]. [50: 2012]

An interesting question in regards to fragility is: what is the prober antonym for the word fragile, the perfect opposite of being fragile? Most English speakers would probably come up with words resilience, robustness or possibly just simply strength. In Talebs opinion, this is not a very precise description of the opposite of fragility in accordance with how we usually talk about the concept. He proposes that we imagine a box marked Fragile and Handle with care. Everybody understands the meaning of the word fragile in the context of such a box; we dont need to know whats in the box, we just know that the more we mishandle the box, shake it, throw it around or stomp on it, the more likely it is that whatever is in the box will be broken. If somebody told us that whatever is in the box is resilient or robust, it would seem to imply that we dont have to worry too much about how we handle it. Throw it around or shake it; it shouldnt matter, the package is robust and therefore okay[footnoteRef:51]. [51: Taleb, Antifragile - Things that gain from disorder 2012]

But thats not the perfect opposite of the fragile box. A box that would be perfectly opposite to fragile could be handled in way that we desired, thrown around and shaken and whats inside wouldnt be broken nor would it be merely okay. It would be better than okay. It would be better the more the box is shaken, the more randomness is applied to the box. Because of a lack of a better word, Taleb named this characteristic simply anti-fragile. Such a box would be marked anti-fragile and please handle carelessly. Even though thinking about anti-fragility is something that doesnt come very natural to people (hence the lack of a proper term) its quite obvious that nature is full of anti-fragile systems, there are a lot of systems that evidently gain from more randomness and volatility. Evolution is one example and the process of innovation through trial and error is another[footnoteRef:52]. [52: Taleb, Antifragile - Things that gain from disorder 2012]

How does the concept of fragility, robustness and anti-fragility link to strategies and International Relations? Strategies in this context are systems and plans that prescribe how a state should react to different circumstances and use a certain set of assumptions to try to do this as intelligently as possible. As these assumptions are fragile, the strategy as a whole can also be fragile. Lets imagine three different stakeholders in the Arctic with three different Arctic strategies. All of them look at climate models and assume a certain environmental situation in some certain date. In light of their own situation and circumstances, they then make strategies that try to maximize the potential benefits (for instance in terms of security, power or economic gains) they can get if that forecast will indeed come true or at the very least minimizing the potential harm the predicted environmental situation could bring them.One of them is a state that assumes that a certain climate change might open their waters for new shipping traffic, which could bring considerable economic gains. The strategy therefore recommends building an infrastructure that prepares for such an eventuality. The plan on the other hand doesnt prepare for any variation in the original assumption. If the climate change turns out to be much stronger and faster than the average in the climate model seems to indicate (although is still possibility) it might completely destroy the environment in the seas next of the country, devastate the sea life and at the same time catastrophically damage the economy that is very dependent on fish resources. This would therefore be a very fragile strategy as it only prepares for one eventuality and doesnt react positively to any variation in assumptions or volatility.Another of them is a state that also assumes that a certain climate change might bring certain opportunities to the state, such as through the benefits of new shipping lanes, and starts to prepare for it by building connections and infrastructure much in the same way as the country with the fragile strategy. This country on the other hand is not very depended on the climate assumptions of its strategy. If the outcomes turn out to be something less probable the results arent devastating for the country. Its location or type economy doesnt make it sensitive to changes in Arctic environment. They also make sure that all of their build up will also have secondary uses in the case of improbable outcome. This could for instance be in the form of research facilities, new economic ties and so on. Even if the most unlikely situation would arise the strategy would always bring some benefits to the country. The only thing that doesnt profit the country is a status quo; all volatility and any type of variations bring the country some gains. This countrys strategy is anti-fragile.The third countrys strategy is somewhere between the first and the second country. Its not greatly depended on its assumptions like the first country and volatility wouldnt greatly harm it. At the same time, it would not gain in any considerable way either if there is a lot of volatility as is the case with the second country and therefore cant be called anti-fragile. This countrys strategy is relatively robust.By using this method, it is possible to do something interesting. We can compare the countries strategies without making predictions about which eventualities are most likely. We get around answering the question of conflict, cooperation, or anything else that requires us to be able to calculate the future. Instead, we can assess which countrys strategy is the least fragile. It doesnt necessarily mean that this country will be the most successful or most powerful, it simply tells how particular countries are relatively fragile which can be taken as an indication of whose strategy is least likely to break apart if something unexpected happens. This paper limits itself to the strategies of Arctic stakeholders as they are today in regards to the situation in the Arctic. A country with very fragile or anti-fragile Arctic strategy doesnt inevitably translate to a very fragile or anti-fragile state overall. Without further examination, it is acknowledged that fragilities in other strategies or systems of these countries could affect their status in the Arctic greatly. Even so, looking at the fragility of Arctic strategies specifically is still an interesting inquiry as no matter of anti-fragility elsewhere in a countrys systems and strategies can de-fragilize something that is already fragile. No chain is stronger than its weakest link.

3. Methodology3.1 Defining FragilityThe basic approach of estimating the fragility of different Arctic policies will be based on the heuristics outlined in Taleb and Douadys Mathematical Definition, Mapping and Detection of (Anti) Fragility[footnoteRef:53]. In the paper, fragility is defined mathematically as the sensitivity of a given risk measure to an error in the estimation of (the possibly one-sided) deviation parameter of a distribution[footnoteRef:54]. Essentially, what this means is that a fragile phenomenon is one in which a change in condition can drastically alter the outcome to the worse, exponentially so the bigger the change. A robust phenomenon is one that is insensitive to changes; any change to the condition will not alter the outcome a lot. Anti-fragile phenomenon are those that the bigger the change to the condition, the more beneficial it is to the outcome. [53: 2012] [54: Taleb and Douady, Mathematical Definition, Mapping and Detection of (Anti) Fragility 2012]

All this is explained in detail mathematically in Taleb and Douadys paper but the nature of the subject at hand and the nature of social sciences in general does not allow for too much accuracy or reliance on mathematical models. Nonetheless, some simple heuristics hold true even in the case of wrong probability distribution. Without changing the probability distribution and simply by looking at the general shape of it, we can assess the fragility of a system or a phenomenon. This is done by examining the curve of the probability distribution[footnoteRef:55]. We are therefore going to look into the particularities of the model and see how it can theoretically apply to the Arctic policies of different states. Then we are going to reveal the real world limitation of such an approach and use that as the basis of our analysis. [55: ]

Probability distribution is a mathematical concept that plots the different outcomes against the probability of that said outcome. An example is the figure below that plots the probability of every possible outcome of throwing two dices. This allows us to get a feeling for the probability density of this event; it is obvious from the graph that in case of two dices, the majority of the results are going to be between 5-9 by simply looking at the area it spans[footnoteRef:56]. [56: Johnson and Kuby 2012]

Figure 2 Example of probability distributionIn real life, probability distributions are not going to be symmetrical in the way the dice example is and the most likely the results are not always going to be in the middle. More often than not, the most probable outcome is asymmetrically closer to either extreme of good and bad outcomes. This can be observed but can give a wrong picture of the risk involved. In probability space, no outcome is certain and the tails, the accumulation of less likely outcomes, have to be taken into consideration[footnoteRef:57]. Lets for instance imagine the probabilities of increased average temperature in the Arctic. If for instance the most likely average temperature rise is 5, with 25% likelihood its very tempting to just consider that number. If however the accumulated of probabilities of the temperature rise to be 1-5 is 50% and from 5-10 is 25%, its obvious that the average rise of temperature is more likely to be somewhat less than 5 rather than 5 exactly or higher. [57: Taleb, Antifragile - Things that gain from disorder 2012]

How much does that matter? That depends on the convexity (or how deeply or steeply the curve bends). If the convexity is extreme (creating fat tails), it means that the bigger the change the more out of proportion the effect is on the outcome[footnoteRef:58]. The main question then is on which tail the fat tail is on. If the fat tail is on the left side it means that the main probability density is on outcomes worse than the mean and the change is not linear, i.e. a little change for the worse is a little less probable but twice as big of a change will be more than half as likely. This means that a twice as bad outcome is not twice as unlikely as intuition might imply but rather less, so any events lying to the left side of the mean might actually result in a much worse result than people would generally expect. Any event to the right of the mean (more beneficial outcomes) are much rarer and do not have the same impact. An example of an anti-fragile situation is where the fat tail is to the right. As opposed to the fragile situation, the downside (to the left) are rare and the convexity of the tail to the direction of good outcomes is so that the bigger the change is from the mean, the better the outcomes will be. All this can be demonstrated in the figure below and can be explained in detail in N.N. Talebs book Anti-fragile[footnoteRef:59]. [58: Taleb, Antifragile - Things that gain from disorder 2012] [59: 2012]

Figure 3 Example of the probability distribution of different types of fragility. The Type 1 Fragile is very rare in its symmetry [footnoteRef:60] [60: Taleb, Antifragile - Things that gain from disorder 2012]

The probability density function is the derivative of the probability distribution; we get the density function by integrating the probability distribution over some range. It shows the relative likelihood for some random variable to occur[footnoteRef:61]. By simply looking at the probability density function, we can detect fragility or anti-fragility. Because fragility is characterized by the thickness and location of the tails of the probability distribution curve (the shape of the area beneath the curve), the probability density function can be used to define fragility. The increase in tail thickness on the left side is the same as the shift the of probability density function to the right, as is shown on the figure below. [61: Johnson and Kuby 2012]

Figure 4 Definition of Fragility - the shaded area represents the fragility of the function[footnoteRef:62] [62: Taleb, Antifragile - Things that gain from disorder 2012]

3.2 Fragility in Arctic Climate ModelsAs was described in the climate background chapter, climate change is quickly changing the climate of the Arctic, melting the ice and creating new ice-free environment that changes the strategic meaning of the region. The warmer climate could open up sea routes at least part of the year with serious economic and political consequences. Scientists have data that reaches back decades to reveal this development but use simulations and models to make projections for future trends in the regions climate.These models get increasingly sophisticated. They take into account more and more variables: components of the atmosphere, ocean, land and the cryosphere[footnoteRef:63]. At the same time, they also get more and more complicated and sensitive. The overwhelming majority of these models shows us is that the sea ice in Arctic waters are going to decrease in the future. [63: Kattsov and Klln 2004]

Many different things matter to policy makers. They might be interested in knowing when either the east or west route opens up (however narrow it is), when any route that would be totally in international waters would open up or even when the North Pole itself might open up in a completely unfrozen Arctic. The extent of the ice is usually the biggest in Mars and April (after winter) and smallest in the end of September (after summer) so they might want to know when the Arctic is ice-free all year round or simply if there is a window of opening in September[footnoteRef:64]. The regularity of such an event would also be very important. It seems to be a very long wait until we can see an all year round ice-free Arctic but we are already starting to see the opening up of the eastern sea route at the end of summer almost annually. Now, a lot of focus is on when we can expect the North Pole itself to open up in September. This is important because this would mean that the shortest possible route between the eastern and western hemisphere would be viable for shipping at least part of the year. [64: National Snow & Ice Data Center 2013]

The projections of an ice-free North Pole regularly make the news. Different scientists make different estimations based on different simulations. Some news make it look like the ice might be disappearing in the next three or four years[footnoteRef:65], others talk about the Arctic becoming ice-free in the next decade or two [footnoteRef:66] while others say that climate change will leave the Arctic ice-free by 2050[footnoteRef:67]. The reason for the discrepancy is that scientists can of course not say when it will happen with 100% certainty; instead, they can only estimate the probability distribution of an ice-free Arctic by using a model built on certain assumptions. Other models, using other assumptions, will give different probability distributions. Each of them will only be able to estimate with some likelihood but there is also the probability that the event could happen some other time. [65: Vidal 2012] [66: Planetsave 2013] [67: Drajem 2013]

The method of making a best-guess projection is called the deterministic approach. Every different model gives one result and assuming they are all as likely it is possible to take an arithmetic mean to get one result that is deemed the most likely impact [footnoteRef:68]. This does not give the best picture of what these models are saying. Instead, it is better to use the probabilistic approach, where every different model is used separately for impact analysis, the probability distributions estimated and then evaluated together. If there is a need for a one result, it happens in the last phase, where the calculated impacts are averaged instead of the average climate change projection[footnoteRef:69]. [68: Kattsov and Klln 2004, 122] [69: Kattsov and Klln 2004, 122]

Figure 5 [footnoteRef:70] [70: Bo, Hall and Qu 2009]

By using the probabilistic approach on several of the most imported models, we get a graph like the one above. By examining it, we can predict with considerable certainty that by the year 2100 the September sea-ice cover will be completely gone[footnoteRef:71]. In the paper that the graph was published in, the authors uses the approach to say that there is a 16% probability that 20% of the base line ice cover in September will left by the end of the 21st century. But at the same time, there is the same probability that the ice will have disappeared completely by the year 2046-2065[footnoteRef:72]. [71: Bo, Hall and Qu 2009] [72: Bo, Hall and Qu 2009, 2]

This kind of projection is what policymakers try to base their strategies on. They tend to use the results of the scientists to get to some number they can strategize around but do not take into account the probabilistic nature of these projections. As explained in the earlier chapter, projections in probability space can be considered either fragile or not by looking at some of their characteristics.In the year 2007 a survey of the summer sea ice coverage revealed a record low. What was most shocking about the situation was that the most recent UN climate models at the time hadnt predicted this extremely low coverage until 40 years later, in 2040 or even 2050[footnoteRef:73]. What had happened was a freak weather incident that only happens every twenty years or so and the model had not taken into account. A combination of certain weather conditions had brought much warmer winds into the Arctic compared to normal years, increasing the rate of the melting[footnoteRef:74]. Because the incident happened in an era of general melting, the effects were irreversible and moved the projected probabilities ahead by many years. The model had not been designed to consider this kind of event, which made the model more fragile. [73: Silverman 2011] [74: Silverman 2011]

As a reaction to that event, all new models try to take into account historical frequency of outlying weather incidents. What is extremely hard for model builders to know is if the general trend of climate change might be exacerbating the volatility of the weather pattern in the Arctic. If that is the case, it means that the frequency of freak weather events becomes unpredictable and that all models are inherently fragile. Every strategy that does not consider those must therefore become as fragile or more.It is possible to show this mathematically. We know how we can define fragility if we know the probability density function of a certain phenomenon. Moreover, we do not need accuracy or perfect description of the probability distribution thanks to Talebs heuristic. All we need to know is the general shape of the density function. Because of the probabilistic approach that most of the models use and the fact that they are strongly linked to the variables of global climate change, we can examine the probability density of projected warming, which the sea ice cover projections are built on.

Figure 6 Probability Density for Surface Warming between the year 1990 and (A) year 2100 / (B) Year 2200 [footnoteRef:75] [75: Titus and Narayanan 1998, 38]

The graph above shows the probability distribution for projected global warming from the year 1990 to the year 2100 (right side) and 2200 (left side). We can assume that the lag for Arctic temperatures will not be considerably different from the lag for global temperatures[footnoteRef:76]. The authors used similar methodologies as IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change) and others[footnoteRef:77]. The shape of the probability distributions is therefore fairly representative for models like this. We also see very similar shapes of probability distributions when we examine projected temperature sensitivity[footnoteRef:78]. Temperature sensitivity is the projected temperature rise that results from doubling the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. The shape tells us that the reaction is nonlinear. [76: Titus and Narayanan 1998, 36] [77: Titus and Narayanan 1998, 21] [78: Rogelj, Meinshausen and Knutti 2012, 3]

The shape of the probability distribution looks familiar. While the mean temperature increase is around 3C, we can see that the right tail is a lot thicker than the left tail, which means that freak incidents are much more likely to trend toward a temperature rise higher than the mean rather than the opposite. This is exactly the same kind of situation as we saw on the examples of fragile and anti-fragile phenomena earlier. 3.3 Using Fragility in the Context of StrategyThe phenomena in Figure 5 is neither fragile nor anti-fragile, its simply a natural development that has no subjective meaning, good or bad, except for in the context of human made strategies. We can assume (and we will see later) that the different outcomes of Arctic strategies are strongly correlated with how much global warming will lead to decreased sea-ice in the Arctic-ocean. The outcomes of the strategies can be good or bad, depending on the probabilities, and are therefore either fragile or anti-fragile. Their fragility is determined by if they are positively or negatively correlated with the x-axis on Figure 5. Generally, you can expect a strategy that benefits from more and quicker melting of sea-ice and therefore from more warming to be anti-fragile. If a strategy benefits more from more status quo, less opening up of the northern routes and therefore less warming up will have a distribution that is mirrored to the one above and therefore fragile.We cannot expect to be able to create a model that explains that correlation mathematically. The different values of how good and bad the outcomes will be are necessarily very subjective; such is the nature of social studies. Thats not a problem though, as we dont need to be able to specify the probability distribution with any precision[footnoteRef:79]. Instead, we use the transfer theorem that outlines certain detection heuristics that have been proven to reveal fragility without precise probability distribution. The heuristic allows us to simply analyze the shape of the distribution but according it to there are four types of distributions that creates an exhaustive map of possible outcomes with mutually exclusive categories of payoffs[footnoteRef:80]. These types are the robust type, fragile (type 1), fragile (type 2) and anti-fragile and how they look and how their tails are shaped can be seen in Figure 2. [79: Taleb, Antifragile - Things that gain from disorder 2012, 684 in epub version] [80: Taleb and Douady, Mathematical Definition, Mapping and Detection of (Anti) Fragility 2012, 4]

Having these heuristics in mind, we can use it to analyze different strategies. This is an inaccurate task but thanks to the general characteristics of the fragility heuristics, we can make estimates under certain assumptions of how we measure strategies ability to react to volatility. The first thing that we have to research is the volatility in question, which is the probability distribution of climate change. This we have already done in the chapter above. Applying probabilities on models in natural science is easy enough but how do we apply it to strategies?The general idea in this paper is that in theory, you could use the newest sources on the Arctic policy of the involved powers to estimate the countries preparedness to deal with different scenarios of temperature rise. For the sake of comparison, certain variables will be evaluated using a numerical scale. The numbers are not extremely meaningful on their own; the evaluation is always going to be extremely subjective. Paired with the assumptions and arguments, these observations should nonetheless be somewhat useful in giving a picture of the scope of different countries strategies. With the strategy evaluation in hand and the probability distribution of different climate models, we can get a very general picture of the probability distribution of good and bad outcomes for different strategies. For example, if a certain country is well prepared for a certain rise in temperature we can see the probability of that outcome by comparing to the probability of that temperature rise. By looking at different temperature rises compared to different levels of preparedness, we can plot the probability distribution of good outcomes for the strategies. Different countries will benefit in different ways from different climate scenarios so the distribution is not going to be the same for every country. By looking at the distribution and having the fragility heuristic in mind, we can easily see if the strategy is fragile, robust or anti-fragile.A weaker version of this will be applied as the numbers wouldnt be meaningful anyway. Simply assessing certain parts of the strategy can be as affective in portraying the fragility of the strategy. Thanks to the fact that the heuristic doesnt need the distribution to be accurate, only generally shaped right, we can use this indicator to get some meaningful results about the fragility of the strategies. The results will be subjective because the original evaluation was subjective and has to be understood with the original assumptions in mind. After processing the strategy of every country in this way, we can backtrack and check if the whole framework leads us to a sensible result by discussing the real world implications of the strategies of the country.In the first part of the assessment of each country, we will get an overview of the strategy. Special attention is paid to the environmental assumption that underpins the strategy. Two dimensions will be considered particularly; economic and security and in the second part there will be an assessment on how the outcomes in this two fields are affected if the environmental assumptions break. All the strategies are designed to deliver good outcomes under certain assumptions about the climate trend. The paper attempts to analyze the consequences on the strategy outcomes if the environmental changes will happen slower or faster than assumed. Using this method, we get a different perspective on what makes strategies good, which doesnt necessarily negate other methods but possibly compliments them and results in an interesting study.

4. Strategy Assessments4.1 The United States4.1.1 Strategy OverviewAccording to Bailes & Heininen[footnoteRef:81], the main strategy document of the United States government at the moment is the National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive labeled NSPD-66 / HSPD-25 under the subject title Arctic Region Policy[footnoteRef:82]. The priorities are listed early in the document: [81: 2012] [82: The White House 2009]

It is the policy of the United States to[footnoteRef:83]: [83: The White House 2009]

1. Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;2. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;3. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable;4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden);5. Involve the Arctic's indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues.When this paper was being finalized in mid of May 2013, a new version of the strategy was published, National Strategy for the Arctic Region[footnoteRef:84]. The new strategy document puts further emphasis on innovative arrangements[footnoteRef:85] but in every main way it has the same priorities as the 2009 document. In the background of their policy, they take into account the effect of climate change and increased human activity in the Arctic region[footnoteRef:86]. They also take into account the growing awareness that the Arctic region is fragile. The focus in the strategy is on how to protect US national security interests in the Arctic. The strategy recommends that the US government increases their military presence in the high north and invest more in Arctic capable equipment. The document names possible hard threats like terrorists, criminal action, piracy and possible state activities[footnoteRef:87]. [84: The White House 2013] [85: The White House 2013] [86: The White House 2009] [87: Bailes and Heininen 2012, 54]

This goes against the de facto situation in the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean but the U.S. has, in the last decade, decreased their presence significantly, closing their base in Iceland in 2006 and leaving most of the region/s security to their NATO allies[footnoteRef:88]. This is understandable as the focus of the US military defense after the Cold War moved to the Middle East. With a possible pivot to Asia in coming years[footnoteRef:89], its hard to see how the US is going to realistically project power in the Arctic without spreading its forces too thin. [88: Bailes and Heininen 2012] [89: Blackwill 2013]

The focus is also on making sure that the territorial claims of the US are respected and to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf coming from Alaska towards the North Pole. These claims rely heavily on the idea that international treaties and traditions will be honored. Such an agreement is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Even though its in many ways flawed and open to individual states interpretation and without an international body that has a power to evaluate and rule when there is doubt there is a lot of use in it in a situation like this as a platform for rightful claims. The problem for the US is that even though almost every other state on the planet has ratified the UNCLOS, except for the U.S. itself. The last three presidents, Clinton, Bush and Obama, were all strongly for the ratification. such a commitment has always been stopped in Americas law making bodies as there is still a majority opinion that backing this kind of international convention would go against Americas sovereignty to act freely outside of own waters[footnoteRef:90]. [90: Bailes and Heininen 2012]

An interesting aspect of the States Arctic strategy is its emphasis on working through international cooperation. It wants to strengthen the Arctic council and therefore probably move it away from being a simple platform for discussion to a more of a ruling actor in the area. This is not very ordinary approach from a superpower. A superpower would only endorse international governance if they believe they have enough influence to keep it in direct control. Perhaps thats the United States idea, after all the majority of the Arctic council are very firm allies, like Canada and the NATO members within the Nordic states. Thats nonetheless hardly going to be the case when you have a state like Russia on board. Not even Canada seems to be going to allow the US to lead the way Arctic issues.There is a lot of economic interest in the Arctic that the States could benefit from, especially in the case of the state of Alaska. There is nonetheless not a very enthusiastic tone in their strategy towards the economic opportunities. Alaska is, after all, a very small and sparsely populated state and not very economically significant for the whole economy of the United States which is leading on a global scale. The strategy emphases that resource management in the region will happen in a sustainable way and with cooperation. Research and development is to be strengthened through cooperation but if we look at efforts to build something like Arctic research ships (there are currently none), they have been postponed until after the term of the sitting government and have a therefore uncertain future. When it comes to the prospects of shipping, the strategy commends that there additional measures will be developed to address issues like infrastructure and rescue and safety operations, but it will happen in cooperation with other countries. There is nothing about how the US government could facilitate such activities in a way that would directly help with American economic interests.4.1.2 Fragility of the StrategyThe overview of the current Arctic strategy of the United States shows us that the US government indeed assumes that climate change will lead to some increased human activities in the Arctic region and arranges measures with that in mind. However, what if that assumption fails? It seems obvious that if climate change would not affect the Arctic a lot or lead to increased human activity then there would not be a lot of harm done to the US strategic interest, it could even be better for them. If on the other hand the process of a changed Arctic environment would escalate and happen even faster and more intensely than is currently being forecasted then what would happen?If the process of opening up would happen really quickly it seems that the current Arctic strategy would not make certain that the U.S. would take the lead economically, neither in shipping nor resource exploitation. This has very drastic consequences for the status of the US as the world main and only superpower. Unlike the smaller states, such a power has to concern itself with more matters that score high in the worldview of the Theory of Realism, such as relative power balances and the matter of global hegemony. The shipping networks that connect a state to the rest of the world could be described as the breathing room of the state. To be able to protect these lanes should always been a top priority of the leading power as is the case with the US today. The current economic recession in western countries can be solved with growth fueled through globalization but with the world distribution networks working at full capacity this is not a likely option. A fast climate change in the Arctic would greatly update the worlds capacity for globalization. There is nothing in the strategy that prepares America for such a situation leaving that space upon for any other rising power to grow into, most likely Russia or the states of East Asia.This would also critically affect the security environment of the US. With an increasingly globalized world that relies deeply on human activity in the high north that is mostly ruled by other powers than America, this would undoubtedly lead to a lot of stress on the American military that would have to move under-equipped and unprepared forces from very different corners of the world to be able to show any sort of power projection as is dictated in the strategy. This would be a very uncomfortable and costly for the military, more so the faster it happens. Its therefore the conclusion of this paper that in any other case than a slow and stress-free climate change in the Arctic it seems that this strategy would not be very useful in keeping the US in the lead economically nor in terms of power. The strategy is therefore considered relatively fragile.4.2 Canada4.2.1 Strategy OverviewAccording to Bailes & Heininen[footnoteRef:91], the main Arctic strategy document of the government of Canada at the moment is Canadas Northern Strategy Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future [footnoteRef:92] which remains the core strategy. Since then, there also has been added another document, Statement on Canadas Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canadas Northern Strategy Abroad[footnoteRef:93], which goes in more detail into implementation and meaning of the strategy. [91: 2012] [92: Government of Canada 2009] [93: Government of Canada 2010]

Canada is in many ways in a special situation. They are a true Arctic country and a great power in the Arctic. In the Arctic, it controls vast lands, seas and resources and within their population, they have many of the indigenous people of the Arctic. They are the second biggest country in the world and their sheer size puts them up with Russia as the main Arctic players. At the same time, they are nonetheless a small country. The population of Canada is less than of the State of California in the U.S. and Canadas military and economic power cannot compare with that of the US and Russia. In the Arctic context, this could actually be considered as a kind of advantage. In the Arctic, they can be just as influential as Russia and the US but because they are not a significant global power, they can also really focus on being an Arctic power. The strategic documents really show effort from the Canadian government to establish the identity of Canada as a pure Arctic state.The main priorities of the Canadian Northern Strategy are according to the Arctic Foreign Policy Statement[footnoteRef:94]: [94: Government of Canada 2010]

1. Exercising sovereignty2. Promoting economic and social development3. Protecting the Arctic environment4. Improving and devolving governanceThe strategys assumption about the coming impact of climate change is pretty well demarcated. It assumes that the impact is going to be great as it will change the environment and the livelihood of the people living in the north and bring international interest, especially through resource development and opening of new transportation routes[footnoteRef:95]. On the other hand, even though the North Western Passage, the sea route that goes through the waters of Canada, has become fully navigable in the end of summer in some recent years, they dont expect it to become safe or reliable transportation route in the near future[footnoteRef:96]. The climate projection they are building their strategy on is therefore one that will bring a lot of change in coming years but not so fast that we would see the full effects in the near future. [95: Government of Canada 2009, 5] [96: Government of Canada 2009, 5]

The top priority of Canadas Arctic Strategy is to exercise its sovereignty, and in the same way as the US and Russia to get their territory claim recognized and to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf in accordance with their right according to the UNCLOS. This is of primary importance to Canada; everything else in their strategy depends on them being unchallenged caretakers and on these territories and waters being an inalienable part of Canada. The capability of Canada is very limited in terms of power projection but in the strategy, it is underlined that this is a process that the government of Canada will pursue through the channels of international cooperation and negotiation. Canada has shown that they can lead the way in cooperation but at the same time, they dont rely too heavily on it and are flexible for new beneficial channels of cooperation and generally do not like to involve stakeholders that are not directly linked to the Arctic. In the case of overlapping claims, they use the Arctic Council but also lead the way of establishing an even narrower platform for cooperation: the newly established informal cooperation of the five Arctic littoral states[footnoteRef:97]. [97: The Ilulilssat Declaration 2008]

This does not mean that there arent any problems of contested sovereignty. Canada has, for many years, been in disputes with the kingdom of Denmark because of unpopulated Hans Island, which is in between Canada and Greenland[footnoteRef:98]. Canada has stood firm in their claim and its military regularly goes to the island to put up the Canadian flag between the Danish military doing the same. The dispute is not allowed to strain the diplomatic relations between the countries. This is the main rule of how Canada approaches its sovereignty disputes, with firmness, but not allowing it to affect relations. [98: Government of Canada 2009, 13]

This is can be a hard line to stay on when a lot is at stake. Canada has, for several years, been in disputes with the US, its neighbor and closest ally, about the waters of the North Western Passage. The US contests Canadas claims to these waterways and states that they are in international waters. They are known to send their submarines through there without notifying the Canadian government. This angers the Canadians that have reason to say that these waters are not international[footnoteRef:99]. The North Western Passage goes through the Canadian Arctic archipelago. These consist of a myriad of islands that are all Canadian territory, which under the provisions of the UNCLOS could be interpreted to mean that the entirety of the waters between them should be considered Canadas territorial waters. To underline their position the Canadian navy has established an armed naval presence at strategic choking points in the Canadian Arctic[footnoteRef:100]. [99: Teeple 2010] [100: Webster 2007/3]

The status of these waters could become very important to Canada in case of the opening up of transportation routes in the future. Canadas sovereignty in the Arctic (including the maritime sovereignty[footnoteRef:101]) is defined as the number one Arctic foreign policy priority[footnoteRef:102]. The strategy dictates that Canada reacts by strengthening their presence in the Arctic considerably. This is done by sending more military staff to the north, more ships in the waters and more air surveillance. They are building army bases and training centers, naval facilities and producing a new and bigger polar research vessel for the Canadian coast guard[footnoteRef:103]. This also reflects Canadas commitment to Arctic research, but alongside these military installments, they also being build research facilities and research networks[footnoteRef:104]. Canada has become the world leader in Arctic science and is determined to establish its position as such[footnoteRef:105]. [101: Bailes and Heininen 2012, 60] [102: Government of Canada 2010] [103: Government of Canada 2009, 9-10] [104: Government of Canada 2009, 24] [105: Bailes and Heininen 2012, 61]

Neither the human dimension nor the indigenous people are a high on the list of priorities. Next on the list of priorities, after the sovereignty issue, is definitely economic development, but given the security of Canadas sovereignty in the North this is definitely the field that has most opportunities for Canadas future. According to the Governments 2009 strategy document they havent even started to scratch the surface of the Norths immense store of mineral, petroleum, hydro and ocean resources[footnoteRef:106]. This could really define the future of the Canadian economy and the government is determined to maximize its utility. Huge infrastructure and investment projects are underway to make sure this will happen. Everything that has to do with the human dimension in the north is being put into this economic context. [106: 2009, 16]

Although this could be considered as mainly positive development for Canada as a whole, its quite apparent that climate change and increased human activity could be incredibly disruptive of the situation and the way of life of the many groups of indigenous people of these northern territories. This is a problem Canada shares with Russia (and on a smaller scale some of the Nordic countries) and this disruption could lead to more widespread social problems and feelings of injustice. Canada has an interesting political way to tackle this, which consist of involving these groups of people as much as possible, in terms of political power and ownership. The political devolution in the northern territories in recent years and decades are interesting. Of the fourteen indigenous nations living in the regions of Yukon, North Western Territories, Nunavut and Northern Quebec, the central government has sign agreements of self-governing with eleven of them.More and more the decisions and policymaking regarding resource management has been moved to the local governments of the native people. This devolution is happening on more than one level. In the 2000s, the Canadians introduced the new province of Nunavut, with its own parliament and government. The disruption is deemed inevitable but the strategy reacts by bringing these people as close to the decision-making and the development as possible. This is also seen in terms of ownership. New models for aboriginal participation are being developed which includes aboriginal ownership positions in resource management projects[footnoteRef:107]. [107: Government of Canada 2009, 15]

4.2.2 Fragility of the StrategyThe overview of the current Arctic strategy of Canada shows us that the Canadian government assumes that climate change will lead to greatly increased human activities in the Arctic region and arranges measures with that in mind. The speed of the change is also indicated, as something that will have implications immediately but the full impact will not be felt in the near future. However, what if that assumption fails? Lets check the meaning of the strategy if the climate will not warm up as projected and if the climate change will actually happen much faster than they assume.In terms of security, the main actions of the strategy involves actively exercising their sovereignty by being very firm in their claim without allowing it to affect their relations with other states, by leading but being flexible in cooperation, and by greatly increasing their military, research and economic presence in the Arctic. In the case of the climate remaining unchanged, it is very hard to imagine how this strategy could backfire. The buildup of presence and claims wouldnt be as significant as if the Arctic were to open up but in any case it would help with securing Canadas security, giving it a clear voice in the international community and establishing new links and knowledge that could be beneficial fo