The Gettysburg Campaign June–July 1863 (2013)

7/28/2019 The Gettysburg Campaign JuneJuly 1863 (2013)

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CIVIL WAR

The Gettysburg Campaign: JuneJuly 1863

(2013)

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The Gettysburg Campaign: JuneJuly 1863 (2013)

The United States Army's Center of Military History in June 2013 published a new concisemonograph on the Gettysburg Campaign.

Authors Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler examine the operations that culminated in the pivotal

and devastating three-day Battle of Gettysburg, pitting the Union Army of the Potomac underMajor General George G. Meade against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia underGeneral Robert E. Lee.

Carol Reardon holds a Ph.D. from the University of Kentucky and is the George Winfree Professorof American History at Pennsylvania State University. Her publications include Picketts Charge inHistory and Memory (1997) and With a Sword in One Hand and Jomini in the Other: The Problemof Military Thought in the Civil War North (2012). Tom Vossler is a retired U.S. Army colonel andformer director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute. Since 1998, he has worked as alicensed battlefield guide at Gettysburg National Military Park where he conducts military staffrides, civilian corporate leadership seminars, and general interest tours of the battlefield.


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The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

The

June July


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CMH Pub 7510

Cover: Scene from the Gettysburg Cyclorama painting, The Battle of Gettysburg, byPaul Phillippoteaux, depicting Picketts Charge and ghting at the Angle.

Photograph Bill Dowling, Dowling Photography.


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byCarol Reardon

andom Vossler

Center o Military HistoryUnited States ArmyWashington, D.C., 2013

The

June July


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Introduction

Although over one hundred fify years have passed since thestart o the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues tomatter. Te orces unleashed by that war were immensely destruc-

tive because o the significant issues involved: the existence othe Union, the end o slavery, and the very uture o the nation.Te war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, withover six hundred thousand killed in the course o the our-yearstruggle.

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the AmericanCivil War was no exception. Te seeds o the conflict were sownin the earliest days o the republics ounding, primarily over the

existence o slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict canbegin without the conscious decisions o those engaged in thedebates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way topaper over the division o the country into two camps: one thatwas dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limitits spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed hal slaveand hal ree, and that could not stand.

Regardless o the actors tearing the nation asunder, the

soldiers on each side o the struggle went to war or personalreasons: looking or adventure, being caught up in the passionsand emotions o their peers, believing in the Union, avoringstates rights, or even justiying the simple schoolyard dynamico being convinced that they were worth three o the soldierson the other side. Nor can we overlook the actor that some wentto war to prove their manhood. Tis has been, and continuesto be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the proes-

sion o arms. Soldiers join or many reasons but ofen stay in thefight because o their comrades and because they do not want toseem like cowards. Sometimes issues o national impact shrinkto nothing in the intensely personal world o cannon shell andmini ball.


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Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly andonly culminated with the conquest o the rebellious Conederacy,the preservation o the Union, and the end o slavery. Tesecampaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared incommemoration o our national sacrifices, seek to rememberthat war and honor those in the United States Army who died topreserve the Union and ree the slaves as well as to tell the story othose American soldiers who ought or the Conederacy despitethe inherently flawed nature o their cause. Te Civil War was ourgreatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study andcontemplation.

RICHARD W. SEWARChie Historian


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The Gettysburg CampaignJuneJuly 1863

Strategic Setting

Ater the Conederates victory at Chancellorsville in May1863, General Robert E. Lees Army o Northern Virginia and theArmy o the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker,

once again conronted each other across the RappahannockRiver near Fredericksburg, Virginia. he battle, which costHooker nearly 16,000 casualties and Lee some 12,300 losses,had proved indecisive. he two armies maintained an uneasystalemate, occupying virtually the same ground they had heldsince December 1862. Washington, D.C., the U.S. capital, stoodity-three miles to the north, while Richmond, Virginia, theConederate capital, lay ity-seven miles to the south. he rival

presidents, Abraham Lincoln and Jeerson Davis, ponderedtheir next moves.Despite the deeat at Chancellorsville and mounting

discontent on the Northern home ront, Lincoln could takeheart rom recent developments in the west. In April 1863, Maj.Gen. Ulysses S. Grant shited 20,000 Union troops rom the westbank o the Mississippi River to the east bank, about thirty-ivemiles below the Conederate garrison at Vicksburg, Mississippi.

From 1 to 17 May, Grants command deeated Conederate orcesat Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hill, and the BigBlack River Bridge. By the end o the month, Grant had trappedLt. Gen. John C. Pembertons 30,000 Conederates inside theirortiications around Vicksburg. Ater two unsuccessul rontal


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assaults, Grants army settledinto a siege; meanwhile, aConederate relie orce underGeneral Joseph E. Johnsonailed to rescue Pemberton.

Davis conronted a moredaunting set o problemsthan his Northern counter-part. Amid bad news romVicksburg and other parts othe Conederacy, he summonedLee to Richmond twice in

mid-May to discuss their stra-tegic options. Despite Leesvictory at Chancellorsville, themilitary situation in Virginiaappeared to be deteriorating. Inthe idewater region, a Federalgarrison o some 20,000 menheld Suffolk, and their presence

threatened both Norolk andHampton Roads. Given thesize and location o the Federalorce, Davis and Lee also earedor the saety o Richmond.

On 16 February 1863, Leehad ordered the inantry divi-sions o Maj. Gens. John Bell

Hood and Laayette McLawsto march rom the armyswinter camp at Fredericksburgto Richmond and HanoverJunction. wo days later,Lee ordered Lt. Gen. JamesLongstreet to take commando the Suffolk Expedition, as

he called it. On 21 March, Leeadvised Longstreet to remainalert or an opportunity odealing a damaging blow, or odriving [the enemy] rom any

General Lee (Library of Congress)

General Longstreetby Alfred R.Waud (Library of Congress)


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important positions. Should Longstreet find such an opening, Leeurged him not to be idle, but act promptly.

Bad news on nearly all military rontsabove all, the reportthat Grant had trapped Pembertons army inside Vicksburgsdeensesorced the Davis administration to consider a widerange o options. No single course o action could resolve all thechallenges acing the president. In addition to Vicksburg andSuffolk, Davis also had to consider impending Union offensives inmiddle ennessee and at Charleston, South Carolina.

Lee had, in act, already crafed a plan or his own army. Inearly April, he advised Conederate Secretary o War James A.Seddon: Should General Hookers army assume the deensive,

the readiest method o relieving pressure on [Vicksburg andCharleston] would be or this army to cross into Maryland. Oneweek later, Lee suggested to Davis:

I think it all important that we should assume the aggressive bythe first o May when we may expect General Hookers army to beweakened by the expiration o the term o service o many o hisregiments. . . . I believe greater relie would in this way be afforded

to the armies in middle ennessee and on the [South] Carolinacoast than by any other method.

During his mid-May deliberations with Davis and Seddon,Lee continued to advocate an offensive operation against Hookersarmy. He hoped to take the Army o Northern Virginia north o thePotomac once again. Lees reverse at Antietam in September 1862did not deter him rom making a second northern expedition.

While in winter camp in February 1863, Lee had directed JedediahHotchkiss (then Lt. Gen. Tomas J. Stonewall Jacksons chieengineer) to draw up a map o the valley o Virginia extending toHarrisburg, PA and then on to Philadelphiawishing the prepara-tion to be kept a proound secret.

Not everyone who participated in the strategic conerence inRichmond agreed with Lees plan. A number o senior Conederateofficialsincluding Postmaster General John H. Reagan and,

or a time, even Davis himseladvocated sending all or part oLees army to Mississippi. In the end, however, Lees views wonout. Davis gave his approval or the Army o Northern Virginiasinvasion o the North. Only one question remained: When shouldthe campaign begin?


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Operations

THEADVANCEINTOPENNSYLVANIALee issued his initial orders or the northern offensive on

3 June, stealthily breaking contact with Hookers Army o thePotomac near Fredericksburg to concentrate around Culpeper.Despite Lees best efforts, Hooker discovered that the Conederateswere marching northward on 5 June. Hooker sent a orce o 7,000cavalry and 4,000 inantry and artillery under his new cavalrycommander, Maj. Gen. Alred Pleasonton, in pursuit o theConederates. Early on the morning o 9 June, Pleasonton surprisedMaj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuarts Conederate horsemen at Brandy Station.

In a chaotic fight that proved to be one o the largest mountedclashes o the war, the Union troopers initially scattered Stuartsmen and nearly captured the vaunted cavalry commander himsel.In the end, Stuart held his ground, but it had been a near thing.Richmond newspapers sharply criticized him and demanded that

he redeem himsel throughheroic action.

Te scare at Brandy

Station did not deter Lee inthe least. He orged ahead withambitious plans that wouldtest his armys new organiza-tional structure in active fieldoperations. Afer the death oGeneral Jackson on 10 May,Lee had reconfigured his army

o two corps under Jacksonand Longstreet into threecorps. Longstreet retainedcommand o the First Corps,while two newly promotedlieutenant generals, RichardS. Ewell and Ambrose PowellHill, led the Second and Tird

Corps respectively. Te inclu-sion o Stuarts cavalry raisedLees total strength to roughly75,000 officers and enlistedmen. An unbroken string o

General Stuart (Library of Congress)


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victories during Lees thirteen months in commandassumingthat Antietam was a tactical drawinspired high morale amongthe rank and file and great confidence in the commander. As oneGeorgian said while passing the general during the march north,Boys, there are ten thousand men sitting on that one horse.

Lee planned his northward route with care. (SeeMap 1.) Aferconcentrating at Culpeper, he intended to clear the ShenandoahValley o Union troops and then continue north into Pennsylvaniasrich Cumberland Valley. I he stayed west o the Blue RidgeMountains, the range would shield both his armys supply trainsand, in time, southbound wagons filled with goods taken north othe Potomac. On 10 June, Lee ordered Ewell to proceed into the

Shenandoah Valley. Lee chose Ewells Second Corps to lead the

General Ewell (Library of Congress) General Hill (Library of Congress)


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out in great haste and conusion, described a Louisiana captain.Ewell captured 23 cannon, 300 wagons, and 4,000 prisoners. He thensent Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins cavalry brigade scouting aheado the main column. Jenkins horsemen rode into Chambersburg,Pennsylvania, on 20 June, and two days later, Ewells inantry enteredthe Keystone State near Greencastle.

For the next week, Ewells troops scoured south-centralPennsylvania or supplies, advancing as ar north as the outskirtso Harrisburg, the state capital. On 21 June, Lee issued GeneralOrders 72, setting orth proper oraging procedures: quartermaster,commissary, ordnance, and medical officers were to obtain neededgoods at air market value, and all soldiers must respect private

property. Jenkins cavalry apparently interpreted the order quiteloosely. Some people, with . . . antiquated ideas o business, mightcall it stealing to take goods and pay or them in bogus money,wrote a Chambersburg journalist, but Jenkins calls it business,and or the time being what Jenkins called business, was business.When Ewells inantry arrived, they also enjoyed the bounty othe region. Pvt. Gordon Bradwell o the 31st Georgia recalled anissue o two hindquarters o very fine bee, a barrel or two o flour,

some buckets o wine, sugar, clothing, shoes, etc. All this or abouttwenty men.

Reports o such excesses troubled Lee. On 27 June, he issuedGeneral Orders 73 chastising his soldiers or their instances oorgetulness and reminding them o the duties expected o usby civility and Christianity. Still, even beore Lees entire armyhad crossed into Pennsylvania, wagon trains loaded with ood-stuffs and other goods began heading south. In addition, reported

the Chambersburg editor, Quite a number o negroes, ree andslavemen, women and childrenwere captured by Jenkins andstarted south to be sold into bondage.

Pennsylvanians responded to the arrival o Lees army invarious ways. Many civilians in Lees path simply fled with all theycould carry. Some Pennsylvania Democrats believedwrongly,as it turned outthat their political affiliation would protectthem rom depredation. A Harrisburg editor opined that Lees

men enjoyed great success as oragers because the people o theState were not prepared to meet any oe, and least o all, such aoe as marches beneath the black flag o treason. He cited thelegislatures recent ailure to improve the states militia systemor leaving south-central Pennsylvania open to invasion. On 9


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June, the Lincoln administration had established the Departmento the Susquehanna to organize local deense, and GovernorAndrew G. Curtin had called out the states emergency orces, butall such efforts proved utile. On 26 June, the 26th PennsylvaniaEmergency Regiment deployed against some o Ewells men justwest o Gettysburg; those who did not become prisoners scatteredin panic afer exchanging a ew shots with the Conederates.

Even as Ewell neared Harrisburg, he aced only minimal resis-tance; however, the rest o Lees army aced ar stiffer oppositionduring its northward advance. Now alerted to Lees movements,Hooker sent his cavalry and some inantry to probe the Blue Ridgegaps, seeking opportunities to intercept the Conederate columns.

Lee had kept Longstreets First Corps and Stuarts cavalry easto the Blue Ridge to block Hookers advance, resulting in sharpclashes between rival horsemen at Aldie on 17 June, at Middleburgon 19 June, and at Upperville on 21 June. On 23 June, Lee orderedStuart to harass and impede as much as possible the progresso Hookers army i it attempted to cross the Potomac, and,should that occur, to take position on the right o our columnas it advanced. Stuart certainly bothered the Union army and

caused great consternation in Washington, but he chose a north-bound course that placed Hookers hard-marching army squarelybetween him and Lee or one crucial week in late June. Lee thushad to conduct operations without benefit o the excellent intel-ligence that Stuart usually provided him.

Even so, Lee continued to display an aggressiveness thatconounded Hooker. Still convinced that he aced an enemy in myront o more than my number, Hooker delivered an ultimatum to

Halleck on 27 Juneeither send reinorcements or relieve him ocommand. Hookers superiors decided to replace him. In a letter tohis wie, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade noted that he was awakenedbeore dawn on 28 June by an officer rom Washington. Teofficer, Meade wrote, said that he had come to give me trouble.At first I thought that it was either to relieve or arrest me, andpromptly replied to him, that my conscience was clear. . . . He thenhanded me a communication to read; which I ound was an order

relieving Hooker rom the command and assigning me to it.Hooker was in such a hurry to leave that he ailed to provideMeade with a detailed assessment o the military situation. Tenew commander thereore knew little about his own armys statusand even less about Lees. With a hostile army on the march ahead


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o him, his own army in hot pursuit, and a myriad o adminis-trative and operational challenges conronting him, Meade hadto assume the responsibilities o high command in short order.He began by making a ew essential administrative and organi-zational changes and then communicated with General Halleckand President Lincoln in Washington. Meade also fieldednumerous requests or inormation or supplies rom politicaland military officials, and began to develop a plan o action orhis new command based on Hallecks instructions: You will . . .maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital andalso Baltimore. . . . Should General Lee move upon either o theseplaces, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive

with him so as to give him battle.Despite the deensive

tone o Hallecks instructions,Meade understood that he hadto find and fight the enemy,and he ordered the Army o thePotomac to resume its north-ward advance the next day,

29 June. On 30 June, Meadewas still uncertain as to Leeslocation and intentions, so hedrafed a contingency plan toconcentrate his army alongPipe Creek in Maryland, justsouth o the Pennsylvaniastate line. Meades critics later

cited the Pipe Creek circularas proo o his unwillingnessto fight, but his concludingsentence suggested otherwise:Developments may causethe Commanding General toassume the offensive rom hispresent positions.

While encamped nearChambersburg, Lee learned oMeades accession to commandthe day afer his appointment.Although he assumed that a

General Meade (Library ofCongress)


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new commander would enter his duties cautiously, Lee issuedorders on 29 June or the Army o Northern Virginia to concentrateat Cashtown, east o the Blue Ridge and seven miles northwest oGettysburg. He warned his corps commanders not to give battlewith Meades approaching orces until the whole o the army wasconcentrated to provide ready support. By 30 June, most o HillsTird Corps had already reached Cashtown. Longstreet remainedwest o the Blue Ridge, but was less than a days march away. Ewellmade plans to leave his camps around Carlisle early on 1 July andhead or Cashtown.

On 30 June, Hill sent orward a brigade rom Maj. Gen.Henry Heths division to reconnoiter toward Gettysburg. Te

brigade commander, Brig. Gen.James J. Pettigrew, reportedthat Union cavalry had enteredthe town rom the south.Pettigrew had encounteredthe lead element o the Armyo the PotomacBrig. Gen.John Buords cavalry division,

which then consisted o twosmall brigades and one six-gunbattery. An outstanding cavalryofficer, Buord had deployed hiscommand to cover Gettysburgsroad network rom the HanoverRoad to the east through theYork Pike and the Harrisburg

Road to the northeast, theCarlisle Road to the north,the Mummasburg Road andChambersburg Pike to thenorthwest, and the FairfieldRoad to the southwest (Map 2).Buord remained uncertain oLees location and intentions, yet

he sensed that the Conederateswho had appeared west o townearlier that day would returnthe next morning in ar greaternumbers. He was right.

General Buford (Library ofCongress)


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THEFIRSTDAYOFBATTLE, 1 JULY

As Buord had expected, Hill ordered Heths entire division toadvance on Gettysburg at first light. About 0700, troopers rom the8th Illinois Cavalry, posted three miles west o Gettysburg on theChambersburg Pike, spotted shadowy figures nearing the MarshCreek Bridge to their ront. According to tradition, Lt. MarcellusJones borrowed a sergeants carbine and fired the first shot o theBattle o Gettysburg. He then fired several more rounds at skir-mishers rom Brig. Gen. James J. Archers brigade, the lead elemento Heths division. Jones immediately reported the contact; inshort order, Buord learned not only o the mounting threat alongthe Chambersburg Pike but also o enemy activity along roads

to the west and north o Gettysburg. He immediately sent briebut inormative assessments o the rapidly changing situation toMeade at Army headquarters and to Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds,whose I Corps had encamped the previous night just a ew milessouth o Gettysburg. In order to keep the Gettysburg crossroadsunder Union control, Buord would need Reynolds help. WithHeths division in the lead and Maj. Gen. William Dorsey Pendersdivision close behind, a orce o nearly 14,000 Conederates rom

General Hills Tird Corps advanced down the ChambersburgPike toward Buords 2,800 cavalrymen.

Fortune avored Buord that muggy July morning. Withoutcavalry to scout ahead, Heth admitted, I was ignorant what orcewas at or near Gettysburg. Tis meant that even the slightest resis-tance rom Buords pickets compelled Archers brigade to halt,deploy skirmishers, and proceed cautiously as i the commandaced a comparable orce o inantry. As Capt. Amasa Dana o

the 8th Illinois Cavalry recalled, the firing was rapid rom ourcarbines, and . . . induced the belie o our times our number omen actually present. For nearly a mile-and-a-hal, each timeArchers skirmishers came too close we retired and continuedto take new position, and usually held out as long as we couldwithout imminent risk o capture. Buords cavalrymen thustraded space or the time required or Reynolds to arrive with hisI Corps. About 1000, Archers brigade halted on Herrs Ridge, two

miles west o Gettysburg, to await the rest o Heths division whileBuords troopers took up their final deensive line on the next riseto the eastMcPhersons Ridgeone mile closer to town.

Reynolds had not yet arrived when Heth launched his stron-gest attack yet. Deploying Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis brigade


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north o the Chambersburg Pike and Archers brigade south oit, Heth sent his troops across Willoughby Run and up the slopeso McPhersons Ridge against Buords line. Tanks to the ease oreloading their single-shot, breech-loading carbines, the caval-rymen produced a volume o fire entirely disproportionate to theirnumbers, but both sides knew the outnumbered troopers couldnot withstand the Conederate inantry much longer. At roughly1015, however, the rattle o drums signaled the arrival o GeneralReynolds and the lead division o the I Corps.

Te fighting on 1 July west o Gettysburg breaks down intoour phases. Te advance o Archers Conederate inantry againstBuords Union cavalry that began at 0700 and culminated with

the assault on McPhersons Ridge around 1015 constituted thefirst phase. No officer in either army more senior than a divisioncommander played a major role in this action and casualtiesremained comparatively light. Te three remaining phases o the1 July fight eatured ar more lethal action between large inantryunits, well supported by artillery, with corps commanders and, intime, Lee himsel present on the battlefield to make key decisions.

Phase two o the 1 July fight, lasting rom about 1030

until 1200, included two largely independent brigade-levelinantry actions on McPhersons Ridge, one on each side o theChambersburg Pike (Map 3). North o the road, Heth sent Davisback into the fight, this time against Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutlersinantry brigade rather than Buords cavalry. Davis turned Cutlersright flank, but the 380-man 147th New York ailed to receive theorder to withdraw and remained in position to protect an artillerybattery. Te New Yorkers were hard-pressed by enemy troops in

their ront, and their right flank was exposed or in the air. oconront both threats, the 147th New York reusedor bent backits rightmost companies, giving the battery time to withdraw. Asthe New Yorkers ranks melted away in the crossfire that enguledthem, Maj. George Harney issued a unique command: In retreat,double time, run. During the short but sharp fight, the 147th NewYork lost almost 80 percent o its troop strength.

At roughly the same time south o the Chambersburg Pike,

Brig. Gen. Solomon Merediths amed Iron Brigadeconsisting othe 2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, the 19th Indiana, and the 24thMichiganarrived on the field. Reynolds himsel pointed out theMidwesterners first objective: the repulse o Archers brigade, thencresting McPhersons Ridge through the Herbst amily woodlot.


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Surrender, or I will fire! According to Dawes, the man repliednot a word but promptly handed me his sword. Ten, six otherofficers came up and handed me their swords, Dawes recalled. Tesuccessul charge consequently averted a Union disaster, inspiringDoubleday to hold McPhersons Ridge in the belie that it had beenReynolds intention to deend the place.

Te fight at the railroad cut ended about 1200, and an eeriecalm settled over the battlefield. When the third phase beganaround 1400, the battle changed in three important ways. First,both sides received substantial reinorcements. Second, the morn-ings fight west o Gettysburg now extended to the north o town.Tird, General Lee arrived on the battlefield and took a significant

measure o tactical control over his armys actions.Phase three began when General Heth renewed the contest

south o the Chambersburg Pike by advancing his two remainingresh brigades against the Iron Brigade. Te Midwesterners linehad been bolstered by two newly arrived I Corps brigades. Fightinggrew in intensity all along McPhersons Ridge, but nowhere didthe carnage exceed that in the Herbst woodlot, where the lefflank o General Pettigrews North Carolina brigade assaulted the

Iron Brigades line. Fate had thrown two o the largest regimentson the fieldthe 496-man 24th Michigan and the 800-man 26thNorth Carolinaagainst each other. Col. Henry Morrow o the24th Michigan considered his position to be untenable, but hereceived orders that the line must be held at all hazards. Te 26thNorth Carolina advanced with rapid strides, yelling like demons,Morrow reported. Beore the fighting ended, at least eleven NorthCarolina color bearersand their 21-year-old colonel, Henry

K. Burgwyn Jr.ell to Iron Brigade bullets. Company F, 26thNorth Carolina, contained three sets o twins in its ranks, andfive o those six men were either killed or mortally wounded. Te24th Michigan paid dearly as well, reporting 316 men killed andwounded, along with another 80 listed as missing in action.

In the meantime, a new threat emerged against the righto the I Corps line, this time rom the north and northwest.Earlier that day, General Ewell was heading southwest toward

Cashtown with the Second Corps divisions commanded by Maj.Gens. Robert E. Rodes and Jubal A. Early. Ten word arrived othe fighting at Gettysburg. Ewell immediately changed directionand began marching south toward Gettysburg, bearing in mindthat Lee did not want a general engagement brought on till the


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soldiers. It had been plagued by misortune, having borne the brunto Stonewall Jacksons flank attack at Chancellorsville, afer whichthe XI Corps became known throughout the Army as HowardsCowards or the Flying Dutchmen. By virtue o seniority, Howardsuperseded Doubleday as the Union commander at Gettysburg.He ordered Doubleday to continue to hold McPhersons Ridgewith the I Corps. Recognizing the importance o Cemetery Hill,a key terrain eature just south o town, Howard sent Brig. Gen.Adolph von Steinwehrs division there as a reserve in case the situ-ation north o Gettysburg deteriorated. He sent his other two XICorps divisionsthose o Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz and Brig. Gen.Francis C. Barlownorth through the town. As Howards senior

division commander, Schurz became commander o the XI Corpswhen Howard assumed overall command.

Schurz intended to deploy on the right flank o the I Corpsline, but Rodes presence on Oak Hill made that impossible.Worse yet, the acting XI Corpscommander began to receivereports o the advance o Earlysdivision down the Harrisburg

Road rom the northeast.Schurz conerred with Barlowand quickly decided to estab-lish a deensive line perpen-dicular to the I Corps line tocounter the threat posed byboth Rodes and Early. Sincethe Carlisle Road bisected his

new ront, Schurz deployedwest o it, and he sent Barloweast o it. Barlow dislikedthe position that Schurz hadassigned him. Concerned thatEarly might transorm a knobo high ground in his imme-diate ront into a commanding

artillery position, Barlowadvanced his entire division,posting one o his two brigadesas a heavy skirmish line astridethe Harrisburg Road at Rock

General Howard (Library ofCongress)


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guns finally gave way and ell back to the Union rallying pointon Cemetery Hill. About 1700, soldiers rom Perrins 1st SouthCarolina Inantry raised their regimental flag over the Gettysburgtown square.

In the meantime, chaos reigned on Cemetery Hill. WhileDoubleday and Howard squabbled over possible courses o action,thousands o lost soldiers searched or their units as small groupso exhausted men gathered around tattered remnants o regi-mental colors. o restore order, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock,the commander o the Army o the Potomacs II Corps, arrivedon the scene as General Meades personal representative, carryingwritten authorization to make decisions in Meades name and

an order to evaluate Gettysburg as a potential battlefield. I youthink the ground and position there a better one to fight a battlethan the Pipe Creek line, Meade instructed, then the commandinggeneral would order all the troops up. Upon his arrival, Hancock

quickly ended all dissen-sion by assuming commandin Meades name. Ten heordered Howard to keep his XI

Corps on Cemetery Hill, andoverruled Doubledays objec-tion to sending the I Corpsto deend neighboring CulpsHill. In a dispatch to Meade,Hancock assessed the situationat Gettysburg: I think we canretire; i not, we can fight here,

as the ground appears not una-vorable with good troops.It was well that Hancock

carried out his orders so effi-ciently. Buoyed by his tacticalsuccess, at 1645, Lee sent Ewellone more order: attack thehigh ground south o town

Cemetery Hilli practicable.Ewell was unaccustomed tosuch discretionary orders. Heperormed a perunctory recon-naissance o the ground, saw the

General Hancock (Library ofCongress)


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southern end o Cemetery Ridge. When placed on a map, Meadesline resembled a giant fishhook.

As Meade deployed his army, Lee considered how best toattack it. As his conversation with Longstreet indicated, Leeevinced little interest in the other options still open to him. Atirst light, he sent out Capt. Samuel R. Johnston, an engineeron his sta, to reconnoiter the Union let lank. Johnstondescribed the Union line as extending south rom CemeteryHill along the Emmitsburg Road until it ended just south o thedistinctive red Codori arm buildings. When asked i he hadound Union troops on Little Round opthe less orested othe two hillsJohnston reported that he had ridden to its peak

and ound it unoccupied.Present-day students o the battle find Captain Johnstons

report beuddling because the Union lef flank bore no resem-blance to Johnstons description. In act, when the captain madehis reconnaissance, the II Corps linethen the armys lef flankextended along Cemetery Ridge well south o the Codori arm.Te line also rested at least 250 yards east o the EmmitsburgRoadin reality, Meade had posted no Union troops on the road

itsel. Moreover, troops rom Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocums XIICorps and later Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles III Corps encamped inthe area o Little Round op in such numbers that Johnston shouldhave detected their presence. Flawed as Captain Johnstons reportwas, it determined Lees plan o attack or 2 July.

About 0900, Lee explained his plan to Longstreet. As Leelater reported, It was determined to make the principal attackupon the enemys lef, and endeavor to gain a position rom

which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bearwith effect. He gave Longstreet command o the assault on theUnion lef, which he was to drive in. Lee also ordered Ewellto make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemys right,to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer. Hedirected Hills Tird Corps to threaten the enemys center, inorder to prevent the shifing o reinorcements against Longstreetor Ewell. Longstreet once more raised objections to Lees plan.

When it became clear that Lee would not reverse his decision,Longstreet sought to delay its execution. Only two o his divi-sionsthose commanded by Generals McLaws and Hoodhadarrived. He wanted to wait or Maj. Gen. George E. Pickettsdivision, still hal a days march away. Lee determined to press on


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without it, but he did permit Longstreet to await the impendingarrival o Hoods final brigade and even arranged or Maj. Gen.Richard H. Andersons division o Hills Tird Corps to coop-erate with Longstreet. Assuming that Longstreet would obey hisorders to advance rapidly against the Union lef flank, Lee rodeoff to Ewells headquarters.

When Lee returned around 1100, he was upset to discoverthat Longstreet had not yet moved. Yet again he rejected his subor-dinates objections and ordered him to attack at once. Longstreetscolumns soon began their march to the southeast, but they haltedjust south o the Fairfield Road. Te advance had spotted a Unionsignal station on Little Round op, which no doubt would have

seen them had they continued on their current route. Longstreetthereore ordered his columns to ace about and countermarch.Teir detour took them between intervening ridges that screenedtheir movement but cost the attackers valuable time.

At 1515, McLaws leadbrigade reached the base oSeminary Ridge several milessouthwest o Gettysburg where

the Millersville Road crestedthe ridge and then proceededeastward to intersect withthe Emmitsburg Road. heConederates revised plano attack was to ollow theMillersville Road over thecrest, halt at the Emmitsburg

Road, ace let, and advancenorth toward the Union letlank. At the top o the ridge,however, where McLaws andLongstreet had expected tosee empty ields and quietorchards, they ound SicklesIII Corps deployed or battle.

Sickles actions on 2 Julyremain a contentious issue tothis day. Meade had intendedor the III Corps to occupy thedeensive fishhook along the

General Sickles (Library ofCongress)


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bend in Sickles line at the Peach Orchard created a vulnerablesalient that the Conederates could attack rom both the southand the west. In addition, Sickles decision to abandon hisposition on the southern stretch o Cemetery Ridge uncoveredthe aneytown Road, an essential line o communication orMeades army.

Sickles movement did succeed in complicating Longstreetsassault, however. Since the Conederates could not execute theirplan to attack up the Emmitsburg Road, Longstreet orderedMcLaws to deploy his men along the crest o Seminary Ridgeparallel torather than perpendicular tothe roadway. Hethen told Hood to extend McLaws line to the south and prepare

to assault Sickles new position. Te Round ops had played norole in the original attack plan, but now they had to be taken intoaccount. Hood sent out scouts, and he reported to Longstreet thatthe way to the Army o the Potomacs lef flank and rear east othose hills remained clear o enemy troops. He asked permissionto bypass the Round ops by sweeping around them rather thanattack the hills straight on.

But the clock had advanced to 1600, and Lee had grown impa-

tient. When Longstreet reported that the situation had changeddramatically since the crafing o the original attack plan, Leeproved unwilling to reconsider his options. Longstreet betrayedhis rustration with Lee in his comments to Hood. He rejectedHoods repeated appeals to bypass the Round ops and ordered theattack to start at once. Hoods division would strike first, ollowedby McLaws and then Anderson, the attack proceeding rom southto north. A rustrated Hood lodged a ormal protest, the first time

that the hard-fighting general had ever done so. But he continuedhis preparations notwithstanding.As Hood prepared to attack, Sickles inspected his new

line. General Meade and his staff caught up with him nearthe Peach Orchard, and afer a colorul and mostly one-sidedverbal exchangeMeade was notorious or his hot temperSickles offered to pull back to Cemetery Ridge. At that moment,Longstreets artillery opened fire. o prevent the III Corps with-

drawal rom becoming a rout should the Conederates attack,Meade ordered Sickles to stay put and await reinorcements.Sickles advocates later tried to turn Meades order into a belatedendorsement o his subordinates initiative, but the commanderclearly meant no such thing.


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Hoods attack plan or his our brigades seemed straightor-ward enough (Map 5). Brig. Gen. Evander M. Laws Alabamianswould step off first, seize the crest o Round op and move onLittle Round op, bypassing the III Corps lef flank at Devils Denentirely. Te next unit to step off, Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertsonsbrigade, would assault Devils Den. Brig. Gen. Henry L. BenningsGeorgians would ollow the Alabama flags, presumably to theRound ops. Brig. Gen. George . ige Andersons Georgianswould support Robertson. Early in the action, Hood ell badlywounded; rom that point on, his division lacked effective direc-tion, and the attack soon began to ragment.

Harassed all the way to the Round ops by Berdans

Sharpshooters in their distinctive green uniorms, Laws brigadesplit in two, with three regiments heading toward the Round opsas planned, while the remaining two regiments veered off to dealwith a troublesome Union artillery battery at Devils Den. Laws44th and 48th Alabama thus fired the first Conederate volleysthat bloody afernoon amid Devil Dens giant boulders. Teenemy were as invisible to us as we were to them, recalled Col.W. F. Perry o the 44th Alabama. As his men emerged onto open

ground, a sheet o flame burst rom the rocks less than a hundredyards away. Te fire came rom the rifle muskets o the 4th Maine,which constituted Birneysand by extension, the Army o thePotomacslef flank just then. Te 4th Maine deended the rockygorge at the southern end o Devils Den.

Robertsons brigade also split as it advanced. Te 4th and 5thexas ormed on Laws lef flank, a move that carried them towardthe Round ops. Te 1st exas and the 3d Arkansas, meanwhile,

attempted to ollow orders directing them to keep their lef flank onthe Emmitsburg Road, and were swept into the fight at Devils Den.Tey advanced into a triangular field enclosed by stone walls on theDevils Dens steep western slope. Col. A. Van Horn Ellis 124th NewYorknicknamed the Orange Blossoms in honor o their homecountymanned the wall at the ar end o the field. Pvt. James O.Bradfield o the 1st exas described the fight: Te enemy stoodtheir ground bravely, until we were close on them, but [they] did not

await the bayonet. Tey broke away rom the rock ence as we closedin with a rush and a wild rebel yell. Te New Yorkers lost heavily ina counterattack down the slope, and the exans drove them back toa stone wall at the top o the hill. Here occurred one o our wildestfiercest struggles o the war, Bradfield recalled, a struggle such as


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it is given to ew men to pass through and live. It was a chaoticfightone in which every man became his own commander.

Te conusion quickly worsened. Under Hoods original plan,Bennings Georgians should have ollowed the Alabamians towardthe Round ops, but as General Benning later explained, a woodon the right had concealed most o Laws brigade rom him.Benning thereore led his men into the fight at Devils Den. Pvt.Tomas Fluker o the 15th Georgia recalled: We raised a dea-ening yell and went over the rock ence and up the hill shoutingand yelling like demons. Birney shifed troops rom other partso his thin line to reinorce Devils Den, but the combined orce oAlabamians, Arkansans, Georgians, and exans overwhelmed the

deenders, who grudgingly yielded both the position and severalartillery pieces to the victorious Conederates. In truth, serendipityplayed a greater role in the Conederates success than deliberateexecution. With Hood down, the assault lacked a guiding hand to

separate the entangled brigadesand put them back on track.Te absence o capable seniorleadership on the Conederate

right flank stymied Longstreetsefforts on 2 July.

In contrast, the Unioncommanders who directed thedeense o Little Round opdisplayed remarkable skill andinitiative. On top o the hillwith only a small signal detach-

ment, Brig. Gen. GouverneurK. Warren, Meades chieengineer, spotted Longstreetsline o battle extending beyondSickles lef flank at Devils Denand recognized Little Roundops vulnerability. Knowingthat Meade intended to anchor

the lef o his fishhook on thathill, Warren realized that hehad to act. He saw reinorce-ments rom the V Corpsmarching toward Sickles line

General Warren (Library ofCongress)


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backor reusedhis lefmost companies to conront themdirectly. Cpl. Teodore Gerrish never orgot how rapidly thecartridges were torn rom the boxes and stuffed in the smokingmuzzles o the guns; how the steel rammers clashed and clanged inthe heated barrels; how the mens hands and aces grew grim andblack with burning powder; how our little line, baptized with fire,reeled to and ro as it advanced or was pressed back. He recalledas well a terrible medly o cries, shouts, cheers, groans, prayers,curses, bursting shells, whizzing rifle-bullets, and clanging steel.

When the men o the 20th Maine had exhausted their ammu-nition, Chamberlain ordered them to fix bayonets. Accounts varyabout the impetus or what happened next, but suffice to say that

the 20th Maines reused flank led the charge down Little Roundops eastern slope, the line o onrushing men swinging out likea giant gate. Te effect was surprising, Chamberlain reported,many o the enemys first line threw down their arms and surren-dered. A Conederate officer fired his pistol at Chamberlain whileoffering his sword in token o surrender. Te 20th Maine routedthe exhausted Alabamians, but Chamberlain lost 124 o his 386men during the fight, 42 o them killed or mortally wounded.

History has immortalized the 20th Maine or its stand onLittle Round op, but a similar crisis threatened Vincents rightflank, where the line o the 16th Michigan nearly gave way. Tetimely arrival o Brig. Gen. Stephen H. Weeds V Corps brigade,with Col. Patrick H. ORorkes 140th New York in the lead, madethe difference. Bloody work was ready or us at our very eet,Adjutant Porter Farley recalled. Many New Yorkers had no time toload their rifles or fix bayonets. Down this way, ORorke shouted,

and according to Farley, the 140th rushed down the rocky slopewith all the same moral effect upon the rebels, who saw us coming,as i our bayonets had been fixed and we ready to charge uponthem. Little Round op remained securely in Union handsbut at a terrible cost. Warren was wounded, and Vincent, Weed,ORorke, and Lt. Charles E. Hazlett, the commander o Battery D,5th U.S. Artillery, all lost their lives deending it.

While the Conederates succeeded in overrunning Devils

Den and the Federals managed to hold on to Little Round op, theoutcome o the clash in the Rose Wheatfield was not so clear-cut. Atfirst only a handul o III Corps regiments deended the position,but they were soon reinorced by two small V Corps brigades.Afer being crowded out o the fight at Devils Den, General ige


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Andersons Georgians attacked the Union line in the Wheatfield.Te 17th Maine, posted behind a stone wall at the southern edgeo the field, bore the brunt o the Georgians first attack. Accordingto the 17th Maines commander, Lt. Col. Charles B. Merrill, Tecontest became very severe, the enemy at times being driven backby our line, and then by superior numbers compelling us in turnto give way. Te heavily outnumbered Union deenders began tobuckle under the pressure o the Conederate attacks.

At that moment, Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwells divisionrom Hancocks II Corps arrived to stabilize the position. Eacho Caldwells our brigades launched a separate attack. Brig. Gen.Samuel K. Zooks brigade swept the woods and the western part

o the Wheatfield, while Col. Edward E. Cross brigade attemptedto clear the eastern hal. Col. Patrick Kellys Irish Brigade engagedBrig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaws South Caroliniansthe first oMcLaws brigades to enter the fighton a little knob o groundin the Wheatfields southwestern corner. Relieving Cross men,Col. John R. Brookes brigade surged into the woods south o theWheatfield and reached a high rocky shel, where they collidedwith the Georgians o Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes brigade. Te

Conederates counterattacked and drove back the Union brigadeswith heavy losses; in the process, Brooke was severely wounded,and Cross, Zook, and Semmes all ell with mortal wounds.

Te intense combat in the Wheatfield seared itsel into thesurvivors memories. Pvt. James Houghton o the 4th Michigandescribed one horrific moment: My tent mate James Johnston wasshot. He was but a ew eet in ront o me when he ell. I heard himsay I am killed. Tis was the last words that I heard him speak. Te

rest was groans. Tere was no help or him. He was shot seven times.A terrified Capt. Charles Fuller o the 61st New York, wounded inthe leg and unable to move to saety, had to lie entirely helpless . . .hearing those vicious bullets singing over my head.

Among the steady succession o reinorcements thatMeade ed into the Wheatield were two small brigades o U.S.Regular inantry rom the V Corps; they briely restored thenumerical balance and prolonged the seesaw ight across the

trampled grain. As sunset neared, however, the Conederatesgained the upper hand. By 1830, Brig. Gen. William . WoordsGeorgians had pushed the Regulars out o the Wheatield andpursued them to the oot o Little Round op. Lt. John Page othe 3d U.S. Inantry remembered seeing artillerymen on the hill


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Worse yet or Meades army, the loss o the Peach Orcharduncovered the lef flank o Humphreys division posted alongthe Emmitsburg Road. Tis threat, combined with the advanceo three o General Richard Andersons Tird Corps brigades

Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcoxs Alabamians, Col. David LangsFloridians, and Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wrights Georgiansagainst Humphreys ront, succeeded in breaking the stubbornresistance o the III Corps and finally orcing it back. Te collapseo the Emmitsburg Road line created yet another crisis or theUnion high command. A huge gap remained in the Union linealong lower Cemetery Ridge in the area ormerly held by Sicklesmen and Caldwells II Corps division. A determined push by

Barksdale, Wilcox, Lang, or Wright could have severed the Unionsupply line on the aneytown Road just behind the ridge.General Hancock displayed great initiative in shifing units

rom quiet sectors o his II Corps line to stop the attackingConederates. Col. George L. Willards New York brigade slowed

Confederate Dead at the Edge of the Rose Woods (Library of Congress)


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Barksdales advance, with both commanders losing their lives inthe desperate fighting. Te amous charge o the 1st Minnesotahelped to stop Wilcoxs Alabamians and some o Langs Floridians.Te regiment lost 82 percent o the Minnesotans who went intothe charge, but the rightul losses did not deter the survivors romaccomplishing their mission. According to Sgt. Alred Carpenter,Bullets whistled past us; shells screeched over us; canister andgrape ell about us; comrade afer comrade dropped rom theranks; but on the line went. No one took a second look at his allencompanion. We had not time to weep.

Wrights Georgians crested Cemetery Ridge and capturedseveral artillery pieces, only to collide with counterattacking II

Corps soldiers. Meade also sent in XII Corps troops rom CulpsHill, the battered remnants o several I Corps regiments, andeven rallied some III Corps units to fill gaps in the Union line. Asdaylight aded and Andersons last two brigades ailed to supportthe Conederate attacks up Cemetery Ridge, Longstreets assaultfinally oundered. Te Union lef flank and center had held.

While Longstreets attack unolded, General Ewell prepared tolaunch his assault on the Conederate lef (Map 6). By 1600, Ewell

had deployed most o his artillery on Benners Hill east o townand opened a heavy bombardment on Cemetery Hill and CulpsHill. Although Ewells cannonade did considerable damage, theUnion artillerymen responded with an even heavier counterbat-tery fire that soon silenced the Conederate guns. Ten, ollowingLees orders to mount a ull-fledged assaultand perhaps regret-ting his inaction o the previous eveningEwell sent his inantryagainst the two heights.

On the evening o 2 July, three brigades o Maj. Gen.Edward Allegheny Johnsons division attacked Culps Hill. Onlythe 1,400 officers and men o Brig. Gen. George S. Greenes NewYork brigade remained to deend the section o the line vacatedby the rest o the XII Corps, which had gone to Sickles aid. Anengineer, Greene had put his men to work building breastworksthat afernoon. Te entrenchments proved invaluable to theheavily outnumbered deenders. Near the crest o the hill, the

60th New York repelled Brig. Gen. John M. Jones Virginians,capturing both prisoners and battle flags. According to the 60thNew Yorks historian, Te effects o our fire were so terriblethat the [enemys] flags were abandoned, and the prisoners werearaid to either advance or retreat.


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Greenes men, however, could not repulse Johnsons attacksagainst the lower part o the hill. Brig. Gen. George H. Steuartsswarming North Carolinians, Virginians, and Marylandersthreatened the overextended 137th New York and orced them towithdraw up the hill to an earthen traverse that lay perpendicularto Greenes original line. ogether with reinorcements amountingto 750 men rom at least three other corps, the 137th New Yorkcontinued to deend Culps Hill rom its new position. But it hadbeen a near thing. In the darkness, Johnsons Conederates hadadvanced to within a ew hundred yards o the Union supply lineon the Baltimore Pike but ailed to press their advantage.

Ewell, meanwhile, ordered Hays Louisiana brigade and

Averys North Carolina brigade rom Earlys division to assaultthe eastern slope o Cemetery Hill. Ewell also had intended orPenders and Rodes divisions to participate by attacking on Earlysright. Pender had been severely wounded earlier that day, andcommand o the division devolved on Brig. Gen. James H. Lane.Both Lane and Rodes were slow to deploy their orces, and by thetime they were ready to step off, the fight on Cemetery Hill wasover.

In any event, Hays Louisianans scattered the XI Corpsdeenders at the eastern base o the hill and headed or the NewYork and Pennsylvania batteries on the crest. As one Union batterycommander reported, the Louisianans charged his guns andsucceeded in capturing and spiking my lef piece. Te cannoneersought them hand-to-hand with handspikes, ramrods and pistols.Although Colonel Avery, commanding on the Conederate lef,ell mortally wounded early in the attack, his ar Heels managed

to advance across open fields swept by Union artillery and brokethe XI Corps line in their ront. As darkness ell, Col. Samuel S.Carrolls brigade rom Hancocks II Corps double-quicked throughEvergreen Cemetery, plugging the gap in the XI Corps line andpushing the Conederates off the hill. By then it was so darkthat Carrolls men could distinguish riend rom oe only by thelocation o their muzzle flashes. While Ewells assaults on CulpsHill and Cemetery Hill had met with initial success, the attackers

lacked sufficient striking power to exploit it.THETHIRDDAYOFBATTLE, 3 JULY

Around 2400, Meade summoned his senior subordinates tohis headquarters at the Leister house. Although the meeting was


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not a ormal council o warMeade did not regard its decisionsas bindingthe commanding generals chie o staff, Maj. Gen.Daniel A. Butterfield, nonetheless kept a record o the votes onthree main questions. First, should the army stay or withdraw? Tegenerals wanted to stay. Second, should the army attack or awaitLees next move? Tis question inspired greater discussion, but themajority preerred to remain on the deensive. Tird, how longshould the army wait or Lee to move? Te generals agreed thati Lee did nothing over the next twenty-our hours, they shouldreconsider their own options.

As the meeting broke up, Meade spoke to Brig. Gen. JohnGibbon, whose II Corps division held a portion o Cemetery Ridge

close to Army headquarters. I Lee attacks tomorrow, Meadereportedly told Gibbon, it will be in your front. Gibbon assuredMeade that his men would be ready. Afer the generals departed,Meade worked through the night to strengthen weak spots in hisfishhook line. He paid special attention to his lef flank on theaneytown Road behind the Round ops, the area that Hood hadwanted to attack on 2 July. Had the Conederates tried to turn thatflank on 3 July, they would have ound two well-posted inantry

brigades, supported by artillery, waiting or them.General Lee, or his part, did not hold a meeting o his senior

leaders but instead ormulated his own plans or 3 July. Becausehe considered the results o both Longstreets and Ewells effortsagainst the Union flanks on 2 July to be partial successes, he deter-mined to renew the attacks on those points. As he later wrote, thegeneral plan was unchanged. He issued orders or early morningassaults against both Union flanks.

Around 0430, cannon fire shattered the predawn stillness.In an effort to reclaim possession o his trenches on lower CulpsHill, the acting XII Corps commander, Brig. Gen. Alpheus S.Williams, ordered his batteries to fire on the Conederate troopsoccupying them. In response, Ewell launched the early morningattack that Lee had ordered. Flashes o musketry soon lit up theslopes o the hill. During the night, Ewell had doubled the size ohis attacking orce. But the entire XII Corps had since returned

to join Greenes brigade in the trenches, and Meade had sent abrigade rom the VI Corps as additional reinorcement. Hundredso Conederate attackers ell beore sheets o unrelenting Unionmusketry, as resh regiments swapped places with rontline unitsthat had emptied their cartridge boxes. A soldier in the 149th


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New York recalled: It was surprising to behold the number othe enemys dead, which were scattered on the ground, behindrocks, and even hanging on the limbs o trees. Te Union rightflank on Culps Hill remained secure.

Once the firing on the hill had died down, orders came romXII Corps headquarters or skirmishers to probe the Conederateline at Spanglers Spring. Te message became garbled in trans-mission and reached the commander o the 2d Massachusetts, Lt.Col. Charles R. Mudge, as an order or a ull-blown attack. It ismurder, but its the order, observed Mudge, who then shouted:Up, men, over the works! Te 2d Massachusetts and the 27thIndiana advanced into an open field, only to be mowed down by

Conederates posted behind strong stone walls. Mudge himsel ellmortally wounded while leading the utile charge. Te two Unionregiments ell back with heavy losses.

On Seminary Ridge, meanwhile, Lee listened to the firefighton Culps Hill with growing concern. Mistaking the artillery fireas Ewells early morning assault, he soon learned that the Unionarmy had taken the initiative. He also listened or the sound oLongstreets attack on the Union lef, but discovered that his senior

subordinate had not yet launched his own assault and showed noinclination to do so. In any case, the duration and intensity o thefighting on Culps Hill convinced Lee that Meade had reinorcedhis right flank overnight and that he had done the same or hislef. Lee thus surmised that the Union line must be weakest in thecenter, and he considered the possibility o attacking CemeteryRidge itsel. Longstreet once again offered his rank assessmentand restated his preerence or alternative courses o action; he

took seriously his responsibility as Lees senior subordinate toprovide such advice. General, he said, I have been a soldier allmy lie. . . . It is my opinion that no fifeen thousand men arrangedor battle can take that position.

Ater listening to Longstreet state his case, Lee decided onthe attack that came to be known as Picketts Charge. Col.Armistead L. Long o Lees sta later reuted what he consid-ered to be a glaring misconception about the commanding

generals decision: he attack o Picketts division on [3 July]has been more criticized, and is still less understood, than anyother act o the Gettysburg drama. Long noted that it hasbeen characterized as rash and objectless, on the order o heCharge o the Light Brigade; nevertheless it was not ordered


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without mature consideration, and on grounds that presentedair prospects o success.

Lee made several important decisions regarding the attackon the Union center. First, he selected the troops. He chose hisonly remaining resh units, Picketts three Virginia brigades romLongstreets First Corps. Tey seemed primed or action. Accordingto Lt. Col. Rawley Martin o the 53d Virginia, Te esprit de corpscould not have been better. But the division numbered only about5,500 officers and men. o add more weight to the attack, Leeturned to Heths division, the unit rom Hills Tird Corps that hadopened the battle on 1 July. Knowing that the division had sufferedheavy casualtiesincluding the wounded Heth, who was replaced

by PettigrewLee added two brigades rom Penders divisionunder the command o Maj. Gen. Isaac R. rimble and directedhim to support Pettigrew. Lee thus planned to send about 13,000soldiers against the Union center, but the commands o Pickett,Pettigrew, and rimble came rom two different corps, and two othe three senior leaders were new to their duties.

Lees second decision called or an artillery bombardment othe Union center to precede the inantry assault. Te attackers had

to cross undulating, open ground or nearly a mile, and Lee worriedabout the impact o massed artillery on his ranks. He thereoreexploited one o the ew advantages his sprawling exterior linesoffered: the ability to concentrate artillery fire on a specific point.His target was a prominent copse o trees near the center o theenemy line on Cemetery Ridge.

Tird, Lee decided to place Longstreet in command o theattack. Lees senior subordinate tried to sidestep the assignment by

suggesting that General Hill should be the commander, becauseslightly more than hal o the assaulting orce came rom his TirdCorps. A withering look rom Lee quickly put that notion torest. Like it or not, Longstreet now had to execute Lees plan. AsLongstreet later noted, Nothing was lef but to proceed.

About 1300, the Conederate artillery opened fire on the gunspositioned along the center o the Union line. Many projectilesovershot their target and landed among the supply wagons and

ambulances behind Cemetery Ridge or crashed into Meadesheadquarters at the Leister house. Te errant rounds woundedseveral o Meades staff and orced the temporary evacuation othe Union Army headquarters. Yet a large number o Conederateshells ound their targets, dismounting guns, exploding caissons,


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and killing or disabling artillerymen and draf horses. Unionbatteries answered the Conederate cannonade, o course, butGenerals Hancock and Hunt engaged in a contest o wills over firecontrol. As the armys chie o artillery, Hunt ordered all Unionguns to fire deliberately, and to husband their ammunition,while Hancock instructed his II Corps batteries to maintain asteady fire to bolster the morale o his inantrymen, coveringthemselves as best they might by the temporary but triflingdeenses they had erected and the accidents o the ground.

Union counterbattery fire took a heavy toll on Lees guns.Hunts inspection o the Conederate line on 5 July convinced himthat the enemys losses in materiel in the artillery combat were

equal to ours. Any shots that sailed long plunged into the rankso the Southern inantrymen deploying or the attack. Sgt. Maj.David Johnston o the 7th Virginia never orgot the fiery usesand messengers o death, sweeping, plunging, cutting, plowingthrough our ranks, carrying mutilation, destruction, pain, sufferingand death in every direction. Gettysburg eyewitness accounts thatmention the bombardment vary widely as to estimates o duration,demonstrating the fluidity o time in such stressul circumstances.

Tose who listened ar rom the scene recall a shelling o only a ewminutes duration, while others within range o the projectiles claimthat the bombardment lasted rom two to our hours.

At the height o the cannonade, Longstreet received a noterom his acting First Corps artillery chie, Lt. Col. E. PorterAlexander, warning that he was running low on ammunition.He added this plea: I you are coming at all you must come atonce, or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemys fire

has not slackened at all; at least eighteen guns are still firing romthe cemetery itsel. A second message soon ollowed: For Godssake, come quick. Te eighteen guns are gone; come quick ormy ammunition wont let me support you properly. In truth,Alexander had observed the removal o several damaged Unionbatteries on Cemetery Hill, unaware that reserve guns werestanding by to replace them.

Te firing at last stopped, and everyone knew that the

Conederate inantry would soon advance, but Longstreet hesi-tated to give the order. As he told Alexander, I would stop it nowbut that General Lee ordered it and expects it to go on. I dont seehow it can succeed. When Pickett arrived or the order to advance,Longstreet could only nod in assent.


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Hundreds o wartime and postwar illustrations o PickettsCharge depict straight, unbroken battle lines emerging rom the treeline on Seminary Ridge; extending over a mile in length, they advancewith parade-ground precisionacross terrain as flat as a tabletop (Map 7). All such depictionsare mistaken. By midmorning,Picketts Virginians had takenposition in the swales aroundthe Spangler arm buildings onthe right-center o Lees line, wellbeyond the Seminary Ridge tree

line. Te brigades commandedby Brig. Gens. Richard B. Garnettand James L. Kemper ormedranks in ront o the arm build-ings, while Brig. Gen. Lewis A.Armisteads brigade deployedbehind a low ridge in Garnettsrear. From their position, they

could not see the clump o treeson Cemetery Ridge, but neithercould the Union inantry andartillery see Picketts men.

Pettigrews and rimbles Alabamians, Mississippians,North Carolinians, ennesseans, and Virginians enjoyed similarprotection in their preattack position on the reverse slope oSeminary Ridge, behind the tree line and about 600 yards north

o Picketts lines. As these deployments suggestbut mostpopular illustrations ail to depictthe Conederate jugger-naut that swept eastward toward the Union center on CemeteryRidge actually consisted o two distinct orces: Picketts divisionadvancing rom the low ground on the Spangler arm, whilePettigrew and rimble marched out o the tree line on SeminaryRidge.

he assault orce suered comparatively light losses until

it passed the halway point to Cemetery Ridge. Picketts menmarched by let oblique, angling orward and to the let inorder to close on Pettigrews line prior to the inal push on theUnion center near the clump o trees. As Picketts three brigadesapproached the Emmitsburg Road, they came into ull view o

General Pickett (Library ofCongress)


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Hancocks II Corps artillery and several batteries that Hunt hadmassed along the portion o the II and III Corps line recon-structed the previous evening. he Union artillery maintaineda deliberate ire as it switched rom shell to canister, a short-range round illed with lead balls that transormed cannon intogiant shotguns. o increase the lethal eect, Union gun crewson Cemetery Ridge also ired double canistertwo roundsloaded simultaneously into the gun tube and ired using a singlecharge. Until Pettigrews and rimbles men cleared the smokyBliss armyard, they enjoyed some protection rom the Unionguns. But the batteries soon ound their range. On Pettigrewslet, Col. John M. Brockenbroughs brigade o Virginians

advanced a short distance beore heavy musketry rom the 8thOhio Inantry and cannon ire rom Cemetery Hill caused themen to break to the rear.

As they approached the Emmitsburg Road, Picketts andPettigrews men could finally see each other, but whatever successthey enjoyed in coordinating their actions was more accidentalthan deliberate. Te two orces brushed aside a line o Unionskirmishers, only to conront a pair o post and rail ences that

lined each side o the roada daunting obstacle that broke theorward momentum o the Conederate advance. Once over theences, Picketts troops dressed their lines and pressed on towardHancocks deenders at the copse o trees. Garnetts men broke tothe lef o the Codori arm while Kempers brigade swung to theright, angling toward the copse o trees where Brig. Gen. AlexanderS. Webbs Philadelphia Brigade waited. In doing so, the Virginiansswept past the ront o the other two brigades o Gibbons division,

each brigade later claiming that the intensity o its fire had driventhe Conederates rom its sector. According to Capt. Henry L.Abbott, the commander o the 20th Massachusetts, his men beganshouting out Fredericksburg, imagining the victory as completeeverywhere as it was in ront o the Tird Brigade. Indeed, manyII Corps veterans at Gettysburg saw this battle as an oppor-tunity to exact revenge or their bloody repulse in the Battle oFredericksburg seven months earlier.

Pettigrews and rimbles line o advance carried them towardthe section o the II Corps line on Gibbons right, which was heldby Brig. Gen. Alexander Hays division. Gibbons and Hays menenjoyed the cover o rock walls that ran north and south alongCemetery Ridge, but the wall in ront o Hays division stood closer


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to the crest than the wall protecting Gibbons men. A perpendicularrock wall that connected the walls ronting Gibbons and Haysdivisions ormed an area behind Gibbons right flank known asthe Angle. Should the Conederates reach the Union line, PickettsVirginians would first strike Gibbons position at the Angle.

Te Conederate advance took about twenty minutes. Garnettsand Kempers men halted beore the stone wall and traded theirfirst volleys with Gibbons troops. At first Webbs men behind therock wall at the Angle held ast, but they began to waver as theConederate attackers drew near. Nearby, Lt. Alonzo H. Cushing,the commander o Battery A, 4th U.S. Artillery, pushed orwardhis three undamaged cannon to the wall in preparation or the

Conederate onslaught. Te severely wounded Cushing was so weakthat he had to issue orders through one o his men. During the finalrush to the wall, Lt. John Dooley o the 1st Virginia called out: On,men, on! Tirty more yards and the guns are ours!

Picketts men breached the Union line in two places. Firingdouble canister at point-blank range, Capt. Andrew Cowans 1stNew York Independent Battery quickly sealed the smaller gapjust south o the clump o trees. A ew yards shy o the wall, both

Kemper and Garnett ellthe ormer severely wounded and thelatter killedleaving Armistead to lead a sizeable number oConederates through a second, and much larger, penetration othe wall at the Angle just north o the copse o trees. Moments aferfiring his last canister round, Cushing ell dead, the bullet enteringhis mouth and exiting out the back o his skull. As the Conederatesswarmed over the wall, many o Webbs Pennsylvanians panickedand fled. First Lt. Frank A. Haskell o Gibbons staff recalled: Great

heaven! Were my senses mad? Te larger portion o Webbs brigade. . . was alling back, a ear-stricken flock o conusion! Te ate oGettysburg hung upon a spiders single thread!

Webb managed to rally a part o his brigade, and his commandwas soon joined by other regiments rom Gibbons division. Tedeenders sealed the breach at the Angle and then drove Pickettsmen back to the stone wall. During the melee, Armistead ellmortally wounded, while Webb was shot in the groin and both

Gibbon and Hancock were severely wounded. Many o theremaining Virginians cast anxious glances over their shoulders inexpectation o reinorcements. wo o General Hills brigadesWilcoxs and Langsadvanced to support Picketts right flank,but rather than move toward the clump o trees as intended, they


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marched toward Hunts massed batteries, whose canister fire soonhalted the Conederates. In the meantime, three regiments o Brig.Gen. George J. Stannards Vermont brigade swung out and poured adeadly fire into the right flank o Picketts division. Hard-pressed byStannards Vermonters and with no reinorcements in sight, someo the surviving Virginians surrendered while the remainder slowlyell back. Te fight at the wall had lasted about twenty minutes.

On Picketts lef, some o Pettigrews and rimbles men advancedto a point arther up the slope o Cemetery Ridge than Picketts troopshad reached. ry as they might, however, the Conederates could notpenetrate the recessed wall that protected General Hays division.As Hays reported, Four lines rose rom behind our stone wall, and

beore the smoke o our first volley had cleared away, the enemy, indismay and consternation, were seeking saety in flight. . . . In lesstime than I can recount it, they were throwing away their arms andappealing most piteously or mercy.

Both North Carolina and Mississippi claimed the laurels orthe arthest Conederate advance on 3 July. Based in part on the spotwhere Capt. E. Fletcher Satterfield o the 55th North Carolina report-edly ell dead, North Carolina later adopted as its state motto: First

at Bethel, Farthest to the ront at Gettysburg and Chickamauga,and Last at Appomattox. Regardless o the truth o these claims,the combined firepower o Hays inantry and the Union artillery onCemetery Hill succeeded in stopping Pettigrew and rimble.

Although no oneleast o all Lee or Meadecould haveknown it at the time, the main inantry fight at Gettysburg hadended with Picketts Charge. Col. Norman J. Hall, who commandeda Union brigade near the copse o trees, assessed the decisiveness

o the final major action: Te decision o the rebel commanderwas upon that point; the concentration o artillery fire was uponthat point; the din o battle developed in a column o attack uponthat point; the greatest effort and greatest carnage was at that point;and the victory was at that point.

Lee met Picketts men as they returned to Seminary Ridge.Its all my ault, he told them, but he also urged them to do theirduty. When he met Pickett, Lee ordered him to rally his division

to repulse an expected Union counterattack. General Lee, Pickettreportedly told him, I have no division. Pickett had in actlost roughly 60 percent o his men in the assault. Pettigrews andrimbles commands also lost heavily, but it is impossible to be morespecific, given that their casualty figures or the three days o battle


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are combined. Horrific memories o the 3 July charge haunted manyo the survivors long afer it was over. In a Christmastime letter tohis amily, Capt. Henry . Owen o the 18th Virginia described arecurring nightmare in which he saw once more the lofy hills,broken rocks and rightul precipices which resembled Gettysburg. . . and went all through the Battle o Gettysburg again.

As Lee launched his assault on the Union center, GeneralStuartwho had finally rejoined the Army o Northern Virginia on 2Julybecame locked in a heated clash with Union cavalry our mileseast o Gettysburg. In his report, Lee had little to say about Stuartsmission on 3 July, but the cavalry chie offered his own account. AtLees behest, Stuart rode out beyond the armys lef flank toward

Hanover, where he ound a commanding ridge that completelycontrolled a wide plain o cultivated fields stretching toward Hanover.From this vantage point, he rendered Ewells lef entirely secure andcommanded a view o the routes leading to the enemys rear. Indeed,Stuarts position placed him near the key intersection o the HanoverRoad and the Low Dutch Road. A ew miles arther south, the LowDutch Road intersected with the Baltimore Pike. I Stuart could reachthat point, he would be in precisely the right position to disrupt the

Union retreat should the enemys main body [be] dislodged, as wasconfidently hoped and expected.

Stuart also ound elements o Brig. Gen. David M. Greggs Unioncavalry division blocking his route to the intersection. DismountedUnion troopers fired on the advancing Conederates rom behindtrees, stone walls, and the Rummel arm buildings. Te fighting soonintensified, culminating in one o the wars greatest mounted charges.Brig. Gen. Wade Hamptons Southern cavalrymen drew sabers and

charged south across open fields toward the Hanover Road, whilereinorcements rom a Michigan cavalry brigade led by the newlypromoted Brig. Gen. George Armstrong Custer raced to interceptthem. According to a Pennsylvania cavalryman,

Te gait increasedfirst the trot, then the gallop. . . . Te words othe Conederate officers could be heard by those in the woods ontheir lef: Keep to your sabres men, keep to your sabres! or the

lessons they had learned at Brandy Station and at Aldie had beensevere. Tere the cry had been: Put up your sabres! Draw yourpistols and fight like gentlemen! . . . As the charge was orderedthe speed increased, every horse on the jump, every man yellinglike a demon.


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At first, the Michigan men wavered, but then Custer waved hissabre and shouted, Come on, you Wolverines! Led by the Michiganbrigade, Greggs Union cavalry broke the Conederate charge. Custerlater boasted, I challenge the annals o warare to produce a morebrilliant or successul charge o cavalry than the one just recounted.

Several miles to the southwest, Union cavalry spent 3 Julylaunching their own assaults against the Conederate right flankand rear. Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatricks Union cavalry divisionlessCuster and his Wolverines, who were busy making their names easto townadvanced up the Emmitsburg Road late that afernoon andprobed Lees right flank just south o the Round ops. General Law,commanding Hoods battered division, quickly shifed General ige

Andersons Georgia brigade to a new line astride the road and acingsouth to repel the advance o Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritts brigade.

On Merritts right, Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth led his brigadeinto position. Kilpatrick ordered Farnsworth to advance into therough low ground in his ront, pass through the Slyder arm, cross thesouthwest slope o Round op, and attack the Conederate line heldby the exans and Alabamians o Hoods division. Farnsworth andKilpatrick allegedly exchanged heated words over the mission, during

which Kilpatrick accused his subordi

Documents

The Gettysburg Campaign June–July 1863 (2013)