The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 10 | Number 3 | Article ID 3317 | Mar 08, 2010

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The Travails of a Client State: An Okinawan Angle on the 50thAnniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty　属国の苦悩−−日米安全保障条約五〇周年の沖繩の一視点

Gavan McCormack

The Travails of a Client State: AnOkinawan Angle on the 50thAnniversary of the US-Japan SecurityTreaty (Japanese text available)

Gavan McCormack

“It is incredible how as soon as apeople become subject, it promptlyf a l l s i n t o s u c h c o m p l e t eforgetfulness of its freedom that itcan hardly be roused to the pointof regaining it, obeying so easilyand so willingly that one is led tosay that this people has not somuch lost its liberty as won itsenslavement.”

Etienne de la Boétie (1530-1563).Discours de la servitude volontaireou le Contr'un (Discourse onVoluntary Servitude, or the Anti-Dictator).[1]

For a country in which ultra-nationalism wasfor so long a problem, the weakness ofnationalism in contemporary Japan is puzzling.Six and a half decades after the war ended,Japan still clings to the apron of its formerconqueror. Government and opinion leaderswant Japan to remain occupied, and aredetermined at all costs to avoid offence to theoccupiers. US forces still occupy lands theythen took by force, especially in Okinawa, while

the Government of Japan insists they stay andpays them generously to do so. Furthermore,despite successive revelations of the deceptionand lies (the secret agreements) that havecharacterized the Ampo relationship, one doesnot hear any public voice calling for a publicinquiry into it. [2] Instead, on all sides onehears only talk of “deepening” it. In particular,the US insists the Futenma Marine Air Stationon Okinawa must be replaced by a new militarycomplex at Henoko, and with few exceptionspoliticians and pundits throughout the countrynod their heads.

Okinawa in the East China Sea. Why theRyukyus are the “Keystone of the Pacific”

for US strategic planners

Chosen dependence is what I describe as ClientState-ism (Zokkoku-shugi). [3] It is not aphenomenon unique to Japan, nor is it

http://admin.japanfocus.org/data/mccormack_okinawa.pdf

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necessarily irrational. To gain and keep thefavor of the powerful, dependence can oftenseem to offer the best assurance of security forthe less power fu l . Dependence andsubordination during the Cold War broughtconsiderable benefits, especially economic, andthe relationship was at that time subject tocertain limits, mainly stemming from thepeculiarities of the American-imposedconstitution (notably the Article 9 expression ofcommitment to state pacifism).

But that era ended, and instead of graduallyreducing the US military footprint in Japan andOkinawa as the “enemy” vanished, the USdecided to ramp it up. It pressed Japan’s SelfDefence Forces to cease being “boy scouts” (asDonald Rumsfeld once contemptuously calledthem) and to become a “normal” army, able tofight alongside and if necessary instead of, USforces and at US direction, in the “war onterror,” specifically in support of US wars inIraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It wantedJapanese forces to be integrated under UScommand, and it wanted greater access toJapan’s capital, markets and technology.“Client State” status required heavier burdensand much increased costs than during the ColdWar, but it offered greatly reduced benefits.

Ever since the Hatoyama team first showedsigns of being likely to assume government,and talked of “equality” and of renegotiatingthe relationship, Washington has maintained aceaseless f low of advice, demand andintimidation to push it into the kind ofsubservience that had become the norm. Thesame “Japan experts” and “Japan-handlers”that in LDP times offered a steady stream ofadvice to “show the flag,” “put boots on theground” in Iraq, and send the MSDF to theIndian Ocean, now send a steady drumbeat of:Obey! Obey! Obey! Implement the GuamTreaty! Build the new base at Henoko!

Yet, with the important exception of Okinawa,there is little sign of outrage in Japan. Instead,

US demands are echoed by a chorus ofJapanese voices agreeing that Hatoyama andhis government be “realistic.” One well-placedJapanese observer recently wrote of the “foulodor” he felt in the air around Washington andTokyo given off by the activities of the “Japan-expert” and the “pro-Japan” Americans on oneside and “slavish” “US-expert” and “pro-American” Japanese on the other, both “livingoff” the unequal relationship which they hadhelped construct and support.[4]

Another recent Japanese critic, quoting thepassage from de la Boétie that prefaces thisarticle, writes:

“Struggling to be ‘best’ under theAmerican umbrella, and taking itas matter for pride when cared forby the US, has become a structurein which ‘servitude’ is no longerjust a necessary means but ishappily embraced and borne.‘Spontaneous freedom’ becomesi n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m‘spontaneous servitude’.” [5]

As the security treaty in its current form marksits 50 th anniversary in 2010, it should bepossible to reflect on the relationship, tocontinue it unchanged, straighten it out andrevise it if necessary, or even to end it, butsuch reflection is blocked by a combination ofcover-up of the past record, one-sided pressureto revise in a certain way, and political hypeand rhetoric. As a result, in the year of the“golden Jubilee” anniversary, a more unequal,misrepresented and misunderstood bilateralrelationship between two modern states wouldbe difficult to imagine.

Although Hatoyama called for an “equal”relationship, the truth is that the US state doesnot admit the possibility of equality in its

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relations with any other state. The “closeness”and “reliability” of an ally is simply a measureof its servility. According to one senior memberof the cabinet of Britain’s Tony Blair, lookingback on her Government’s role in the war onIraq, despite being the US’s supposedly closestof allies, “We ended up humiliating ourselves[with] unconditional, poodle-like adoration”because the “special relationship” meant “wejust abjectly go wherever America goes.”[6]Her words deserve to be taken seriously by allAmerica’s allies.

Only twice have Japanese governments madean effort to think of an alternative to thedependence rooted in the treaties of 1951 (SanFrancisco) and 1960 (Ampo) that have formedthe legal frame for the post-Occupationrelationship. In 1994 the Higuchi Commissionrecommended to Prime Minister MurayamaTomiichi that Japan revise its exclusively US-oriented, dependent diplomacy to become moremultilateral, autonomous, and UN-oriented. [7]However, a US government commission headedby Joseph Nye then advised President Clintonalmost precisely the opposite: since the peaceand security of East Asia was in large part dueto the “oxygen” of security provided by USforces based in the region, the existing defenceand security arrangements should bemaintained, the US military presence in EastAsia (Japan and Korea) held at the level of100,000 troops rather than wound down, andal l ies pressed to contr ibute more tomaintaining them. Higuchi was forgotten andthe Nye prescription applied. Not until 2009was there any serious questioning of thewisdom of the Nye formula.

It was Nye and his associates (notably RichardArmitage) who from 1995 drew up the detailedsets of post-Cold War policy prescriptions forJapan. Paradoxically, but also reflecting the“Client State” phenomenon, they came to berespected, even revered, as “pro-Japanese” or“friends of Japan.” They and their colleaguesdrew the 2000 goal (in the “Armitage-Nye

Report”) of turning the relationship into a“mature” alliance by reinforcing Japanesemilitary subordination and integration underUS command, removing barriers to the activeservice of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces on“collective security” missions, and taking thenecessary steps towards revising theconstitution, and in 2007 the further agenda ofstrengthening the Japanese state, revising the(still unrevised) constitution, passing apermanent law to authorize regular overseasdispatch of Japanese forces, and stepping upmilitary spending.[8] The agreements onrelocating US Forces in Japan (Beigun saihen,2005-6) and Guam Treaty (2009) were thedetailed policy instruments towards thosegoals. The “Futenma Replacement” (Henoko)project formed a central plank.

As Hatoyama’s team began to talk of equalityand of an Asia-Pacific Community, it was JosephNye who issued a series of warnings, firstspelling out (in December 2008) the acts thatCongress would be inclined to see as “anti-American,” prominent among them being anyattempt to revise the Beigun Saihenagreements (including the Futenma transfer).

The Treaty system whose anniversary iscelebrated in 2010 has been unequalthroughout its 50 years and is encrusted withdeception and lies. The 1960 Treaty, rammedthrough the Diet in the pre-dawn hours and inthe absence of the opposition, reconfirmed the(1951) div is ion of the country into ademilitarized mainland “peace state” Japan anda directly American-controlled Okinawan “warstate.” That division was maintained evenwhen, in 1972, Okinawa was restored tonominal Japanese administration, in a deal thatwas also a model of deception. Firstly, theOkinawa “return” was in fact not a “givingback” but a “purchase,” Japan paying the USeven more (for “return” of assets that in factthe US military retained) than it had paid seven

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years earlier to South Korea in compensationfor forty years of colonial rule. And secondly,although the deal was declared to be one ofreduction of Okinawan bases to mainland levelsand without nuclear weapons, “kaku-nukihondo-nami,” it was neither. The “war state”function remained central, bases remainedintact and the US was assured (in the secretagreement, or mitsuyaku) that its nuclearprivilege would remain intact. Despite thenominal inclusion of Okinawa under theJapanese constitution, then and since it hascontinued in fact to be subject to the over-riding principle of priority to the military, thatis, the US military, and in that sense, ironically,matching North Korea as a “Songun” state.

Both governments prefer secret diplomacy topublic scrutiny. By simple bureaucraticdecision, Japan instituted a system of subsidyfor US wars known as the “omoiyari”(sympathy) payments and expanded the scopeof the security treaty from Japan and the “FarEast” (according to Article 6) into a globalagreement for the combat against terror.“Client State” Japan pays the US generously tocontinue, and not to reduce, its occupation.[9]

In mainland Japan, political and intellectualresistance to the Nye Client State agenda forJapan quickly crumbled nationally from 1995with the return to power in Tokyo of the LDP,and the qualities of nationalism, democracy andconstitutionalism were gradually relegated tosecond place to the “higher” cause of thealliance. In Okinawa, however, forced to bearthe brunt of US military rule, civil democracy inthe form of anti-base resistance grew steadilyand the Client State agenda was never able toattain legitimacy. Consequently, for 14 years,through the terms of 8 Prime Ministers and 16Defense Ministers, the 1996 bilateralagreement to substitute a Henoko base for theFutenma one made no progress. It was blockedby the fierce, uncompromising, popularly-supported Okinawan resistance.

In 2005 Okinawan civil society won anastonishing, against all odds, victory over theKoizumi government and its US backers,forcing the Government of Japan to abandonthe “offshore” (on-reef, floating, pontoonstructure) Henoko base project. It was ahistoric event in the history of democratic andnon-violent civic activism. The governmentreturned to the offensive in 2006, however,with its design for an enlarged, “on-shore”Henoko base to be built on reclaimed land thatwould jut out into Oura bay from within theexisting Camp Schwab marine base. This dualrunway, hi-tech, air, land and sea base able toproject force throughout Asia and the Pacificwas far grander and more multifunctional thaneither the obsolescent, inconvenient anddangerous Futenma or the earlier offshore,pontoon-based “heliport.”

Oura Bay

Though widely reported (with the subterfugethat is characteristic of the “Alliance”) as a US“withdrawal” designed to reduce the burden ofpost-World War II American military presencein Okinawa, the 2006 agreement would actuallyfurther the agenda of integration of Japanesewith US forces and subjection to Pentagonpriorities and increase the Japanese financialcontribution to the alliance (with Japan paying$6.1 billion for US marine facilities on Guamand up to $10 billion for a new Marine Base at

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Henoko). “Consolidation” and “reinforcement”were the appropriate terms.

When Obama took office in early 2009, hisJapan expert advisers seem to have advised himto move quickly to pre-empt any possible policyshift under a future DPJ government. Theytherefore exploited the interval when the LDPstill enjoyed the two-thirds Lower Housemajority delivered by Koizumi’s “postalprivatization” triumph of 2005 to press the2006 agreement into a formal treaty and hadPrime Minister Aso ram it through the Diet (inMay 2009), so as to tie the hands of theDemocratic Party forces about to be elected togovernment.

The Guam Treaty of 2009 was a definingmoment in the US-Japan relationship, whenboth parties went too far, the US in demanding(hastily, well aware that time was running outto cut a deal with the LDP) and Japan insubmitting to something not only unequal(imposing obligations on Japan but not on theUS), but also unconstitutional, illegal, colonialand deceitful. [10] Yet few Japanese seemedable to detect the “foul odor” that arose fromthe deal.

In Okinawa, however, the Hatoyama DPJelection victory of August 2009, marked notonly by the national party’s electoral pledge torelocate the Futenma base outside theprefecture but by the clean sweep within theprefecture of committed anti-base figures, wastaken as signalling that a new and favourabletide to Okinawa was rising. Opposition to any“within Okinawa” Futenma relocation becamealmost total across the political spectrum.When a committed anti-base candidate waselected mayor of Nago City on 24 January2010, the threat to Oura Bay (and its dugong,coral and turtles) seemed drasticallydiminished. Having witnessed the lies anddeceptions by which over 13 years thetemporary, pontoon-supported “heliport”gradually evolved into the giant, reclamation,

dual-runway and military port project of 2006,and having experienced the emptiness of thepromise of economic growth in return for basesubmission, Okinawans were in no mood to betricked again.

Author being briefed at the site of theHelipad Sit-In, Higashi village, Yambaru,

Okinawa, 6 December 2009.

If the two elections gave great heart toOkinawans, however, they also shook the“alliance” relationship. Washington insisted onfulfilment of the Guam Treaty but the Henokobase could only now be built if Hatoyama wasprepared to adopt anti-democratic measures ofsomething akin to martial law to defy the will ofOkinawan voters and protesters. That would bea peculiar way to celebrate the 50th anniversaryof the “Alliance.”

At Honolulu in January 2010, Hillary Clintoninsisted that the Ampo base system wasindispensable for East Asian, especially Japan’s,security and prosperity. It was essentiallyJoseph Nye’s 1995 point. But is it true? Theidea that the peace and security of East Asiadepends on the presence of the Marines inOkinawa (the “deterrence” function) istendentious. There is today almost zeropossibility of an attack on Japan by some armed

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force such as was imagined during the ColdWar, and in any case the Marines are anexpeditionary “attack” force, held in readinessto be launched as a ground force into enemyterritory, not a force for the defense ofOkinawa or Japan as stipulated under Article 4of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation andSecurity. Since 1990, they have flownrepeatedly from bases in Japan for participationin the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars.

Furthermore, the hullabaloo in Japansurrounding the Henoko project rests on aserious misunderstanding. As Ginowan Citymayor, Iha Yoichi, has repeatedly shown fromhis analysis of US military planning documents,the Pentagon from 2006 has been committed totransfer main force Futenma marine units toGuam, upgrading it into the military fortressand strategic staging post covering the wholeof East Asia and the Western Pacific (and thusundercutting the strategic importance of anynew Okinawan base). [11] Iha’s analysis was atleast partially confirmed by a senior official ofJapan’s defense bureaucracy who described the3rd Marine Division as a “force for deploymentat any time to particular regions beyond Japan…. not for the defense of particular regions.”[12] In short, the Guam Treaty is concerned notwith a Futenma substitute, or even with thedefense of Japan, but with construction of anew, upgraded, multi-service facility that U.S.Marines will receive for free and will use as aforward base capable of attacking foreignterritories.

US military footprint on Guam

Virtually without exception, American officials,pundits and commentators support the Guamtreaty formula and show neither sympathy norunderstanding for Japanese democracy orOkinawan civil society, and by and large theJapanese pundits and commentators respond tothis in “slave-faced” manner (do-gan inTerashima’s term). The Okinawa Times (19January 2010) notes that the 50th anniversaryoffered a “chance to reconsider the Japan-USSecurity treaty that from Okinawa can only beseen as a relationship of dependence.” Toseriously “re-consider” would require wipingthe “slave faces” off Japan’s politicians andbureaucrats.

Hatoyama’s government has enunciatedidealistic sentiments – including statementssuch as from Party Secretary-General OzawaIchiro saying that “Okinawa beautiful blue seasmust not be despoi led” [13] , and thepostponing of a decision on the Futenma issueto May opened the issue to a measure of publicscrutiny and discussion. However, neither thePrime Minister nor any of his senior ministersoffered leadership or did anything to encouragediscussion on the nature of the alliance orOkinawa’s burdens. Instead, the Hatoyama

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government backed itself into a corner byassuming the legitimacy of the Guam Treaty,from which it followed that Futenma could notbe returned unless or until it was replaced.Furthermore, prominent ministers, in “ClientState” spirit, publicly identified with theposition of the US government. Thus ForeignMinister Okada in Nago on 5 December 2009pleaded with Okinawans to understand the“crisis of the alliance” and the “difficulty” ofthe negotiations. He suggested that Okinawansshould have sympathy for President Obama“who might not be able to escape criticism forweakness in his dealings with Japan at a time offalling popularity” if the Guam Treaty deal wasnot implemented. [14]

When Hatoyama announced the postponementof decision till May 2010, a Pentagon PressSecretary declared that the US “did not accept”the Japanese decision, [15] and Joseph Nyereferred to the DPJ as “inexperienced, dividedand still in the thrall of campaign promises,”plainly meaning that attempts to renegotiatethe Guam Agreement would not be tolerated.[16]

Yet, the mood in Okinawa unquestionablystrengthened following the Hatoyama victoryand the sweeping aside of the representativesof the “old regime” in Okinawa in August 2009.Opinion polls had long shown levels of around70 per cent against the Guam formula (forHenoko construction), [17] but that figure rosesteadily, so that one May 2009 survey found apaltry 18 per cent in favour of the Henokooption on which Washington was adamant, andby November that figure had fallen to 5 percent; hardly anyone. [18] Both Okinawannewspapers, and the most prominent figures inOkinawan civil society, were strongly opposed.[19] The signals of anger and discontent rose totheir peak in February 2010 with the adoptionby the Okinawan parliament (the PrefecturalAssembly) of an extraordinary resolution,unanimously demanding that Futenma beclosed (moved “overseas or elsewhere in

Japan”), [20] and Okinawa’s 41 local districtmayors also unanimously declared themselvesof the same view. [21]

It meant that, while Tokyo struggleddesperately to find a way to implement theGuam Treaty, Okinawa unanimously rejected it.There is no longer a “progressive-conservative”divide in Okinawan politics on this question.The Mayor of Okinawa’s capital, Naha, who inthe past served as President of the LiberalDemocratic Party of Okinawa, recently madeclear that , as a prominent Okinawanconservative, he was disappointed by theHatoyama government’s reluctance to redeemits electoral pledge on Futenma and hoped theOkinawan people would remain united “like arugby scrum” to accomplish its closure andreturn (i.e., not replacement). [22] No localgovernment or Japanese prefecture in modernhistory had ever been at such odds with thenational government.

Early in March, Defense Vice-MinisterNagishima Akihisa bluntly declared that the USdemands would be met, even if it meantalienating Okinawans (who would be offered“compensation.”) [23] With Hatoyama likewiseinsisting that he would honour allianceobligations, and the likelihood high that otherformulas would prove unworkable orimpossible to clear in such a tight timetable,Okinawans braced themselves. By May, 2010Hatoyama would have to either reject the USdemands, risking a major diplomatic crisis, orsubmit to them, announcing with regret thatthere is no “realistic alternative” to the “V-shaped” base at Henoko, thus provoking adomestic political crisis.

While official 50th anniversary commemorationscelebrate the US military as the source of the“oxygen” that guaranteed peace and security toJapan, it is surely time for Japanese civil societyto point out that the same oxygen is elsewherea poison, responsible for visiting catastrophe in

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country after country in East Asia and beyond,notably Korea (1950s and since), Iran (1953),Guatemala (1954), Vietnam (1960s to 70s),Chile (1973), the Persian Gulf (1991),Afghanistan (2001-), and Iraq (2003-), and thatnow threatens Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and(again) Iran. Millions die or are driven intoexile, and countries are devastated as the USmilitary spreads its “oxygen” by unjust, illegaland ruthless interventions and permanentoccupations. The degree to which alliedcountries share criminal responsibility hasbeen the subject of major public review inHolland (which found that the Iraq War wasindeed illegal and aggressive) and in the UK(where the Chilcot Inquiry continues). It is timefor similar questions to be asked in Japan of theIraq and Afghan wars, and Japan’s direct andindirect involvement in them.

The 50th anniversary should be a time for theJapan whose constitution outlaws “the threat oruse of force in international affairs” to reflecton how it has come to rest its destiny onalliance with the country above all others forwhom war and the threat of war are keyinstruments of policy, and whether it shouldcontinue to offer unqualified support andgenerous subsidy, and whether it shouldcontinue to “honour” the Guam treaty, at allcosts maintaining the marine presence inOkinawa. As a first step, it is time to debateopenly the unequal treaties, secret diplomacy,lies, deception and manipulation of the last 50years and time to reflect upon, apologize, andoffer redress for the wrongs that have for solong been visited upon the people of Okinawaas a result.

Gavan McCormack is a coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, and author ofmany previous texts on Okinawa-relatedmatters. His Client State: Japan in theAmerican Embrace was published in English(New York: Verso) in 2007 and in expanded and

revised Japanese, Korean, and Chinese versionsin 2008. He is an emeritus professor ofAustralian National University. The presentpaper is an expanded version of his articlepublished in Japanese in Shukan kinyobi on 5March 2010.

Recommended citation: Gavan McCormack,"The Travails of a Client State: An OkinawanAngle on the 50th Anniversary of the US-JapanSecurity Treaty," The Asia-Pacific Journal,10-3-10, March 8, 2010.

See the following articles on related themes:

Kikuno Yumiko and Norimatsu Satoko, Henoko,Okinawa: Inside the Sit-In

Urashiima Etsuko and Gavan McCormack,Electing a Town Mayor in Okinawa: Reportfrom the Nago Trenches

Iha Yoichi, Why Build a New Base on OkinawaWhen the Marines are Relocating to Guam?:Okinawa Mayor Challenges Japan and the US

Tanaka Sakai, Japanese Bureaucrats HideDecision to Move All US Marines out ofOkinawa to Guam

Gavan McCormack, The Battle of Okinawa2009: Obama vs Hatoyama

Hayashi Kiminori, Oshima Ken’ichi andYokemoto Masafumi, Overcoming AmericanMilitary Base Pollution in Asia: Japan, Okinawa,Philippines

See also, the Peace Philosophy Center,particularly the two articles posted on March16, 2010 entry on recent plans for a newoffshore base and plans for a naval base andcasino. The blog is an important and regularlyupdated source of information in Japanese andEngl i sh on Ok inawan and US- Japan

http://www.amazon.com/dp/184467133X/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20http://www.amazon.com/dp/184467133X/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20Http://japanfocus.org/-Kikuno-Yumiko/3306Http://japanfocus.org/-Kikuno-Yumiko/3306http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3291http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3291http://japanfocus.org/-Iha-Yoichi/3287http://japanfocus.org/-Iha-Yoichi/3287http://japanfocus.org/-Iha-Yoichi/3287http://japanfocus.org/-Tanaka-Sakai/3274http://japanfocus.org/-Tanaka-Sakai/3274http://japanfocus.org/-Tanaka-Sakai/3274http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3250http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3250http://japanfocus.org/-Hayashi-Kiminori/3185http://japanfocus.org/-Hayashi-Kiminori/3185http://japanfocus.org/-Hayashi-Kiminori/3185http://japanfocus.org/-Hayashi-Kiminori/3185http://peacephilosophy.comhttp://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2010/03/no-longer-relocation-idea-of-massive.htmlhttp://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2010/03/airbases-military-port-and-casino.htmlhttp://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2010/03/airbases-military-port-and-casino.html

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developments and issues of war and peace inthe Asia-Pacif ic. It is available here:http://peacephilosophy.com

Notes

[1] In English as The Politics of Obedience: TheDiscourse of Voluntary Servitude, translated byHarry Kurz and with an introduction by MurrayRothbard, Montrèal/New York/London: BlackRose Books, 1997. Web version here. I amindebted to Nishitani Osamu (see note 5) fordrawing my attention to de la Boétie.

[2] Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya did set upan “Experts” committee to investigate the so-called “Secret Agreements” between US andJapanese governments on nuclear and othermatters and report back during 2010, but itwas of limited focus, precipitated by thecommon knowledge that such documentsexisted in the US archives and a series ofpublic statements by former senior officialstestifying to their existence. Early reports fromTokyo suggest that no such documents hadbeen found, which raised the possibility theyhad been deliberately destroyed.

[3] Client State: Japan in the AmericanEmbrace, New York, Verso, 2007. ExpandedJapanese edition as Zokkoku – Amerika no hoyoto Ajia de no koritsu, Tokyo, Gaifusha, 2008.

[4] Terashima Jitsuro, “Zuno no ressun,Tokubetsu hen, (94), Joshiki ni kaeru ishi tokoso – Nichibei domei no saikochiku nimukete,” Sekai, February 2010, 118-125.Terashima refers to Japanese intellectuals bythe term, “do-gan” (literally “slave face”, aterm he invents based on his reading of asavagely satirical early 20th century Chinesestory by Lu Hsun).

[5]. Nishitani Osamu, “’Jihatsuteki reiju’ okoeyo – jiritsuteki seiji e no ippo,” Sekai,February 2010: pp. 134-140, at p. 136.

[6] Clare Short, formerly International

Development Secretary, “Clare Short: Blairmisled us and took UK into an illegal war,” TheGuardian, 2 February 2010.

[7] Boei mondai kondankai, “Nihon no anzenhosho to boeiryoku no arikata – 21 seiki emukete no tenbo,” (commonly known as the“Higuchi Report” after its chair, HiguchiKotaro), presented to Prime MinisterMurayama in August 1994.

[8] Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye,“The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia rightthrough 2020,” Washington, CSIS, February2007.

[9] For details, see my Client State, passim.

[10] “The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vsHatoyama,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 16November 2009.

[11] “Why Build a New Base on Okinawa Whenthe Marines are Relocating to Guam?: OkinawaMayor Challenges Japan and the US.” See alsoIha Yoichi, interviewed in “Futenma isetsu toHenoko shin kichi wa kankei nai,” Shukankinyobi, 15 January 2010, pp. 28-9.

[12] Yanagisawa Kyoji (special researcher andformer Director of National Institute forDefense Studies), “Futenma no kakushin–kaiheitai no yokushiryoku o kensho seyo,”Asahi shimbun, 28 January 2010.

[13] “Santo raigetsu isetsusaki oteishi,”Okinawa Times, 29 December 2009.

[14] Quoted in “Kiki aoru dake de wanasakenai,” editorial, Ryukyu shimpo, 7December 2009. For a fascinating transcript ofthe meeting, see Medoruma Shun’s blog,“Uminari no hitobito,” “Okada gaisho to ‘shiminto no daiwa shukai’, zenmen kokai,” in 7 parts,beginning here.

[15] “Pentagon prods Japan on Futenmadeadline,” Japan Times, 8 January 2010.

http://mises.org/rothbard/boetie.pdfhttp://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3250http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3250http://japanfocus.org/-Iha-Yoichi/3287http://japanfocus.org/-Iha-Yoichi/3287http://japanfocus.org/-Iha-Yoichi/3287http://blog.goo.ne.jp/awamori777/e/1863c314ee19f70bd5c5c676e8409ad1

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[16] Joseph S. Nye Jr, “An Alliance larger thanOne Issue,” New York Times, 6 January 2010.

[17] “Futenma hikojo daitai, kennai isetsuhantai 68%,” Okinawa Times, 14 May 2009. Inthe Northern Districts (including Nago Ciy)opposition was even higher, at 76 per cent.

[18]“Futenma iten: Genko keikaku ni ‘hantai”67%, Okinawa yoron chosa,” Mainichi shimbun,2 November 2009; for a partial Englishaccount, “Poll: 70 percent of Okinawans wantFutenma moved out of prefecture, Japan,”Mainichi Daily News, 3 November 2009.

[19] Open Letter to Secretary of State Clinton,b y M i y a z a t o S e i g e n a n d 1 3 o t h e rrepresentative figures of Okinawa’s civilsociety, 14 February 2009, (Japanese) text at“Nagonago zakki,” Miyagi Yasuhiro blog, 22March 2009; English text courtesy SatoManabu. They demanded cancellation of theHenoko plan, immediate and unconditionalreturn of Futenma, and further reductions in

the US military presence.

[20] “Kengikai, Futenma ‘kokugai kengai isetsumotomeru’ ikensho kaketsu,” Okinawa Times,24 February 2010. A resolution to the sameeffect had been passed by a majority in July2008.

[21] “Zen shucho kennai kyohi, Futenma kengaitekkyo no shiodoki,” editorial, Ryukyu shimpo,1 March 2010. The rising tide of Okinawansentiment on this issue is plain from the factthat the figure had been 80 per cent, or 31 outof the 41 mayors, in October “Futenma ‘kengai’‘kokugai’ 34 nin,” Okinawa Times, 30 October2009).

[22] Onaga Takeshi, “Okinawa wa ‘yuai’ no sotona no ka,” Sekai, February 2010, pp. 149-154.

[23] John Brinsley and Sachiko Sakamaki, “USbase to stay on Okinawa, Japanese officialsays,” Bloomberg, 2 March 2010.

Click on the cover to order.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/opinion/07nye.htmlhttp://www.amazon.com/dp/184467133X/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20

APJ | JF 8 | 10 | 3

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APJ | JF 8 | 10 | 3

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