Use Theory USE THEORY: HISTORY & MOTIVATION The Causal-Historical Theory Last time we learned about the causal-historical theory of reference. The Causal-Historical Theory Lets call that baby Feynman Feynman The Causal-Historical Theory Lets call that baby Feynman Feynman Historical Chain of Transmission The Causal-Historical Theory Denotation Feynman Causal Theories We didnt have time to look at other causal theories of reference/ meaning. The general motivation, though, was that causal interaction with the referent was far more determinate than mere description. The Mirror Universe Ignorance: Feynman What people know: Hes a physicist Hes famous Hes dead He worked on quantum mechanics Ignorance: Feynman But Bohr: Hes a physicist Hes famous Hes dead He worked on quantum mechanics EarthTwin Earth Causal Isolation However, its widely recognized that causation cant be essential to all meaning, because some things that are meant cant be causes or effects. Causal Isolation Consider words like and, or, and not. Conjunction cant cause or be caused by anything. Theres nothing to point to and say let that be the meaning of and. Use to the Rescue However, people who have mastered the meaning of and are inclined to use the word and in the following ways: If they believe A and B: Then they would be willing to believe A And they would be willing to believe B Use to the Rescue However, people who have mastered the meaning of and are inclined to use the word and in the following ways: If they believe A And they believe B: Then they would be willing to believe A and B Suggestion So maybe and means what it does because of how people use it in inference. If you didnt use and in those ways, you wouldnt mean what everyone else means by and, and if you use or in those ways, then by or you mean what everyone else means by and. Their meaning is their use. Further Suggestion And maybe, just maybe, we were wrong to become causal theorists in the first place. Maybe the meaning of Richard Feynman and the meaning of water is also how we use those words. Careful! But be careful. Its not enough to say that the meaning of the words is determined by how theyre used. Thats in a way accepted by everyone. According to a causal theorist, the meaning of water is determined by the fact that your uses of the word water are caused by a certain substance (namely, water). Careful! A real use theory doesnt say use merely plays a role in meaning it says that use is meaning! The Denial of Denotation One of the big reasons people have had for adopting use theories is that they have come to deny that words (or all words, or many words) have denotations. They dont think names refer to things, or that common nouns and verbs apply to things, or that sentences can be true or false. Denotation Relations Why do I connect these ideas: refer to, apply to, and truth/ falsity? Because truth/ falsity can be defined in terms of the former: A sentence Michael is hungry is true := hungry applies to the referent of Michael. Denotation Difficulties Why would anyone want to give up on these relations? Usually, its out of an endless parade of historical failures in accounting for denotation. Denotation Difficulties The idea theory cant explain why dog applies to dogs, because resemblance is indeterminate. Many non-dogs resemble the idea associated with dog. Denotation Difficulties The verification theory wont work, for similar reasons. Many non-dogs (e.g. fake dogs) confirm dog more than some dogs do (e.g. abnormal dogs). Denotation Difficulties And the causal theory wont work, for similar reasons. Dogs often cause me to say dog or think DOG. But so do fake dogs, and marsupial dogs and pictures of dogs, and so on. The Denial of Connotation The use theory thus denies that denotations even exist. But it does not thus identify meanings with any of the classical connotations. The Denial of Connotation Remember that ideas (mental images) and verification conditions (possible experiences) were posited as meanings (connotations) solely to explain why words had the denotations that they did. If you deny the existence of denotations, why do you think mental images are meanings? Whats special about them? The Middle Way Instead, the use theorist maintains that meaning is non-mental (not connotation). Its out there in the world. But its not the stuff out there in the world we think of as denotation either. The Middle Way Michael doesnt, for instance, mean me. The meaning of an expression = how it is used. Sure, use is out there in the world. But the (relevant) use of Michael need not involve me at all. HORWICH AND THE USE THEORY Paul Horwich Professor of Philosophy at New York University. Meanings are Concepts Horwichs first thesis is that meanings are concepts. Meanings are Concepts Concepts are what psychologists and philosophers turned to after the whole idea theory didnt work out. Concepts are mental entities, but they are not little pictures in the mind. Meanings are Concepts Horwich, influenced by the Computational Theory of Mind, takes them to be expressions in the language of thought a.k.a. Mentalese. Metasemantics Remember that a theory of meaning is not a theory that tells you what meanings are (though often it does that as well) Its one that tells you why words have the meanings they do, rather than different meanings, or no meanings at all. Metasemantics So whats Horwichs story of how words get their meanings (why do they mean the concepts they do, rather than other concepts or none at all?)? To understand this, well have to look at Grices distinction between natural and non-natural meaning. Natural Meaning One meaning of the word meaning is indication. Indication Smoke means (indicates the presence of) fire. Indication These Kopliks spots mean your child has measles. Indication The fact that theres 16 rings on this tree stump means that the tree was 26 years old when it was cut down. Features of Natural Meaning We cant say these spots mean the child has measles, but the child doesnt have measles. We cant say these spots mean the child has measles. It cant be true that someone means the child has measles by these spots. Non-Natural Meaning We can say Johns utterance lenfant a la rougeole means the child has measles, but the child doesnt have measles. We can say This sentence (lenfant a la rougeole) means the child has measles. It can be true that someone means the child has measles by lenfant a la rougeole. Meaning is Ambiguous Grice thus concludes that there are two English verbs to mean. One just expresses natural meaning, roughly: A means B = Whenever A is true, its a fact of nature that B is true as well. Meaning is Ambiguous The other is non-natural meaning, and its what were trying to analyze when we do metasemantic theorizing. The Univocality of Meaning Horwich, however, claims that theres only one sense of meaning, the natural one. The Univocality of Meaning The way he understands natural meaning is: smoke means fire = smoke gives us a good reason to believe theres fire. So he says cat means the concept CAT = (utterances of) cat give us a good reason to believe theres (in the speakers mind) CAT. Univocality as Virtuous It is a virtue of this account that it respects the relational appearance of meaning attributions and that it calls for no special, ad hoc assumption about the meaning of means in semantic contexts. Virtue? Horwich, in his ad hoc remark, seems to forget that there were principled reasons for denying the univocality of meaning. Natural Meaning is Transitive Furthermore, natural meaning is transitive: 1.Thunder means theres lightning. 2.Lightning means theres unbalanced electric charges in the clouds. 3.Therefore, thunder means theres unbalanced electric charges in the clouds. Non-Natural Meaning is Not Transitive If all meaning were natural meaning wed expect: salt means theres SALT SALT means theres PEPPER Therefore salt means PEPPER Principle 2 Principle 2: The overall use of each word stems from its possession of a basic acceptance property. The Robustness of Use Often, we use words in ways that are not consistent with their meaning. We flub our speech; we make a genuine mistake (and call a cow a horse); we use words metaphorically; we overstate or understate The Problem of Error If meaning is to be identified with use, then it would seem that these uses, since they are uses, must be part of the meaning. So flubs, mistakes, metaphors, hyperboles, etc. are all literally true. But thats silly. Horwichs Response So Principle 2 is Horwichs response: there is some sort of basic regularity that explains all of the use, including correct use, incorrect use, and poetic use. Horwichs Response The regularity that explains all the use is the meaning. So erroneous uses, while explained by the basic regularity, are not constitutive of meaning. Only the basic regularity is. Basic Acceptance Properties (a) The acceptance property that governs a speakers use of and is (roughly) his tendency to accept p and q if and only if he accepts both p and q. Basic Acceptance Properties (b) The explanatorily fundamental acceptance property underlying our use of red is (roughly) the disposition to apply red to an observed surface when and only when it is clearly red. Basic Acceptance Properties (c) The acceptance property governing our total use of the word true is the inclination to accept instances of the schema the proposition that p is true if and only if p. Principle 3 Two words express the same concept in virtue of having the same basic acceptance property. In Principle 1, Horwich said that meanings are concepts. In Principle 3, he says that concepts are individuated by basic acceptance properties of the words that mean them. Individuation Consider the word gift in English: it means something like a present, something of value given without charge. Now consider the word gift in German: it means something like a poison, venom, or toxin. Individuation Are these one word with two meanings, or two words? The answer to this question is not important for us. What is, is this: if words are individuated by their spelling/ pronunciation, we have one word; if theyre individuated by their meaning, two. Horwich on Individuation For Horwich, concepts are individuated by basic acceptance properties of the words that express them. Lets call these their meanings. Then two concepts have the same meaning = the words expressing them have the same acceptance properties. Horwich on Individuation This is how meaning for Horwich is both concept and use. The way you tell one concept from another is the use of the words that express it. Summary of Principles 1.Words mean concepts, and meaning is univocal it always means just indication. 2.For any word, all of its uses may be explained by a basic acceptance property: a regularity in the use of the word, that explains irregular uses as well. 3.Concepts are individuated by the basic acceptance properties of the words that express them. PRO Argument 2: Explanation Premise: What people say is due, in part, to what they mean. Premise: It is relatively unclear how any other sort of property of a word [besides use properties] would constrain its overall use. Conclusion: Only the use theory can explain how what people say is due to what they mean. Premise 2? Im skeptical of premise 2 in this argument. Horwich says that what a word refers to cant explain its use. Imagine I have a map of Central and on one part of it is written Wing Lok Street. Premise 2? Why did the mapmaker use that name there? Quite sensibly, because the street drawn on the map corresponds to Wing Lok Street, and Wing Lok Street refers to Wing Lok Street. Premise 2? How does a basic acceptance property provide a better explanation than that? PRO Argument 3: Attribution When we judge that two words (in different languages or idiolects) mean the same thing, we check to see if their uses are appropriately similar. Appropriate Similarity And what does appropriate mean here? Horwich argues that it means differences in use are circumstantial both words are still governed by the same basic acceptance property. He says we judge they mean differently when differences in use are more than merely circumstantial. Theoretical Entities Redux This is certainly an empirical question. It does run Horwich into some potential trouble though (CON Argument 2: Holism). People with radically different theories (about electrons or whatever) will use words in radically different ways. Radical Theory Difference Theoretical Entities Redux Horwich can say that they are still talking about the same thing but only up until the point that their uses are governed by the same basic acceptance property. Again, whether this comports with intuition is an empirical matter. PRO Argument 4 Premise 1: We are generally inclined to accept inferences from a sentence S containing word w, S(w), to the sentence S(v), when w and v are synonyms (have the same meaning). PRO Argument 4 Premise 2: If the use theory is true, then w and v are synonyms = w and vs uses are governed by the same basic acceptance property. Thus if ws basic acceptance property leads me to accept S(w), vs basic acceptance property, which is the same as ws, will likewise lead me to accept S(v) PRO Argument 4 Inference to the best explanation: Since no other theory of meaning explains these facts better than the use theory, the use theory is true. Against Application as a ToM For example, Horwich argues that if the meaning of groundhog is what it applies to, then to know the meaning is to know what it applies to. Against Application as a ToM And to know the meaning of woodchuck is to know what it applies to. But, he claims, you can know all this without knowing that groundhog and woodchuck apply to all the same things. In Defense of Denotation Is that really true though? Many philosophers have held that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-conditions (and remember: truth is a notion belonging to the denotation relations). To know what a sentence means is to know the circumstances under which it is true. In Defense of Denotation If S(w) and S(v) are true under the same circumstances, then shouldnt we know that S(w) if and only if S(v), when we know their meanings? In Defense of Horwich Well not exactly. There are classic examples where sentences are true under the same circumstances, but not known to be so by people who understand them: = 4 if and only if Obama is president. e i + 1 = 0 if and only if Obama is president. PRO Argument 5: Implicit Definition An implicit definition is where we define a word or symbol by using the defined symbol in a context. Heres an example: Euclids Postulates 1. A straight line segment can be drawn joining any two points. 2. Any straight line segment can be extended indefinitely in a straight line. 3. Given any straight line segment, a circle can be drawn having the segment as radius and one endpoint as center. Euclids Postulates 4. All right angles are congruent. 5. Given any straight line and a point not on it, there exists one and only one straight line which passes through that point and never intersects the first line, no matter how far they are extended. PRO Argument 5: Implicit Definition Horwich argues that the use theory is needed to make sense of implicit definition. When people are given a set of axioms or postulates involving new terms, they accept them and use those postulates to decide what other sentences involving those terms to accept. PRO Argument 5: Implicit Definition Thus the implicitly defining postulates wind up being the basic acceptance properties governing future use. Implicit Definition? This argument rests quite a bit on the possibility of implicit definition. Theres some reason to think things dont work this way. Non-Euclidean Geometry In non-Euclidean geometry, lines dont satisfy Euclids postulates. But that doesnt make sense if Horwich is right: the things in non- Euclidean geometry arent lines. PRO Argument 6: Translation Why is it that when I say, Id like some cheese in America and Je voudrais du fromage in France, similar things happen in both countries? Heres Horwichs idea. I have this theory: If I say Id like some _____ in America, peons bring me some _____. Further Theory In addition, I have this theory: If I say, Id like _____ in America then peons bring me _____. For example, If I say Id like ALL cheese, then peons bring me ALL cheese. Further Further Theory In addition I have this theory: If I say xxxxx would like _____, in America then peons bring xxxxx _____. For example, if I say Tony Parker would like no beans, then peons bring Tony Parker no beans. Similar Role for French But then notice that voudrais plays a similar role: If I say xxxxx voudrais/ voudrait/ etc _____ in France, then peons bring xxxxx _____. Basic Acceptance Property Its a simple step here. Horwich claims that the basic acceptance property underlying our uses of would like and voudrais/t/etc. And this is it: All uses of w (would like, or voudrais) arise from the fact that we accept that if we say xxxx w _____ then peons bring xxxxx _____. Why Translation Works Therefore, identical basic acceptance properties between words in different languages give rise to identical behaviors (or at least, expectations of behaviors) across those languages. Translation works, Horwich says, because meaning is constituted by basic acceptance properties. Other Possibilities? Horwich doesnt claim, however, that a denotation-involving theory couldnt arrive at an explanation of why translation works. For example, for commands, we might think that instead of truth conditions (circumstances under which they are true), they had satisfaction conditions (circumstances under which they are obeyed) as their meanings. Alternative Explanation Then we might say that 1.In any country, peons satisfy the conditions of your commands (when they speak the language you utter them in). 2.Id like some cheese and Je voudrais du fromage have the same satisfaction conditions. 3.Peons will bring me cheese in France when I say Je voudrais du fromage. PRO Argument 7: Pragmatic Argument Horwichs final argument is that since his theory explains why translation works, it explains why we bother translating things. Im not sure this gets to count as an extra reason for accepting the theory. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS Horwich is not the only use theorist, but hes one of the few that I understand. His views are put forth in admirable clarity. Heres a summary of the arguments, color- coded for whether I think they work, dont work, or are still up for grabs. Rainbows 1.Theres only one sense of meaning. 2.UT required for meaning to explain use. 3.Appropriate similarity in use = same meaning 4.UT required for synonym equivalence. 5.UT required for implicit definitions to work. 6.UT required for efficacy of translation. 7.UT explains purpose of translation.