Wade Benzoni 1996

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES

Vol. 67, No. 2, August, pp. 111–126, 1996ARTICLE NO. 0068

Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness in Asymmetric,Environmental Social Dilemmas: Explaining Harvesting

Behavior and the Role of Communication

KIMBERLY A. WADE-BENZONI

Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University

ANN E. TENBRUNSEL

College of Business Administration, University of Notre Dame

AND

MAX H. BAZERMAN

Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University

Stocks of fish in many fisheries around the world areThis research explores the effects of egocentric in- at the brink of collapse with considerable uncertainty

terpretations of fairness, expectations about other as to when and how they will be brought back to aactors’ harvesting decisions, and communication on sustainable level (National Marine Fisheries Service,the focal actor’s harvesting decisions in asymmetric 1992). Should fishers reduce their individual harvestsocial dilemmas. We found support for the predictions

levels? The individual fishers may correctly concludethat egocentrism exists in perceptions of fairness inthat each consumes such a small amount of the totalasymmetric dilemmas, overharvesting is positively re-resource that what is done individually without thelated to the amount of egocentrism, and egocentrismcooperation of other fishers makes essentially no differ-is stronger before discussion than after discussion.ence to collective outcome. Yet, in the aggregate, thisFurthermore, in a comparison between asymmetric

and symmetric dilemmas, we found that egocentrism line of thinking eventually results in a collective har-and overharvesting were greater in asymmetric dilem- vest that is too high to enable the various species tomas than in symmetric dilemmas. Finally, the results maintain their existence over time.indicate that among certain actors, overharvesting in A variety of critical issues associated with environ-asymmetric dilemmas is positively related to the mental degradation—human overpopulation, resourceamount of harvesting expected from the other parties. depletion, and pollution—can be characterized as situ-This study contributes to the social dilemma literature

ations in which individual interests are at odds withby (1) introducing the idea of egocentric interpreta-collective interests. In these ‘‘social dilemmas’’ each de-tions of fairness as an explanation for overharvestingcision maker is best off acting in his/her own self-behavior, (2) demonstrating that egocentrism is moreinterest, regardless of what others do; yet, each self-pronounced in asymmetric versus symmetric dilem-interested decision creates a negative outcome for allmas, (3) suggesting that the reduction of egocentric

interpretations of fairness is another reason why com- involved. When a large number of people make the self-munication enhances cooperative behavior, and (4) interested choice, the costs accumulate. As a result,demonstrating that beliefs about what others will do everyone is worse off than if they had decided not tois related to harvesting decisions in asymmetric as act in their own self-interest.well as symmetric dilemmas. q 1996 Academic Press, Inc. An important aspect of the fish consumption situa-

tion described above, as well as many other real-lifesocial dilemmas, is the asymmetry in the distribution

This research was supported by the Dispute Resolution Research of the associated benefits and burdens. For example,Center and the Kellogg Environmental Research Center of North- large commercial fishers with sizable harvesting capac-western University. We thank George Loewenstein, Dave Messick, ities, relative to smaller fishers, reap the majority ofand Leigh Thompson for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of

the benefit from harvesting beyond a sustainable levelthis paper, and Dawn Iacobucci for her statistical advice. Addresswhile experiencing a minimal economic burden of areprint requests to Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni, Kellogg Graduate

School of Management, Evanston, IL 60208-2001. collapsed stock because of their greater ability to switch

111 0749-5978/96 $18.00Copyright q 1996 by Academic Press, Inc.

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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112 WADE-BENZONI, TENBRUNSEL, AND BAZERMAN

their harvest to a different species of fish. Such asym- participant has the same personal resources, and theconsequences of their choices are identical to themetries in problem cause and outcome dependency

have an impact on the dynamics of potential dilemma choices of the other participants. However, in manyreal life situations, participants differ with respect toresolution processes.personal resources or consequences of choices, and re-This paper investigates the role of egocentric inter-ceive different levels of benefit from mutual coopera-pretations of fairness, expectations about the decisionstion. In asymmetric resource dilemmas, some partiesof others, and communication with respect to harvest-have more interest in maintaining the resource thaning behavior in asymmetric social dilemmas. In addi-others and some parties are in a position where theytion, the study compares egocentrism and overhar-are able to harvest more than others. We agree withvesting in asymmetric dilemmas to such behavior inMurnighan et al. (1990) and Van Dijk (1993) in thesymmetric dilemmas. ‘‘Egocentric’’ interpretations ofassertion that situations of asymmetry are more preva-fairness refer to judgments that are biased in a mannerlent than situations of symmetry and, therefore, a focusfavoring the individuals making the judgments. Thison asymmetric dilemmas enhances the ecological valid-study contributes to the existing literature on sociality of social dilemma research. We also argue thatdilemmas by introducing the idea of egocentric inter-asymmetry highlights a set of new research questionspretations of fairness as an explanation for overharv-not addressed by the symmetric social dilemma litera-esting behavior, demonstrating that egocentrism isture.more pronounced in asymmetric versus symmetric di-

lemmas, suggesting that reduction of egocentric in- In asymmetric social dilemmas, the incentive struc-ture of the problem varies from one party to another,terpretations of fairness is another reason why

communication enhances cooperative behavior, and introducing additional complications in the dilemmaresolution process. We argue that a central complica-demonstrating that expectations about what others

will do is related to harvesting decisions in asymmetric tion is that this asymmetry promotes egocentric assess-ments of fairness in the allocation of resources. In sym-dilemmas.metric dilemmas, where all parties occupy identical po-Social dilemmas are formally defined by three prop-sitions, an easily evoked normative rule is the equalerties (Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Yamagi-division rule which prescribes that whatever is beingshi, 1986): (1) a noncooperative choice is always moreallocated or contributed should be divided equallyprofitable to the actor than a cooperative choice, re-among participants (Allison & Messick, 1990). In con-gardless of the choices made by others; (2) a noncooper-trast, when there is asymmetry in interests and out-ative choice is always harmful to others compared to acomes it is not clear what should be considered a ‘‘fair’’cooperative choice; and (3) the aggregate amount ofsolution, since all parties do not benefit equally fromharm done to others by a noncooperative choice isthe equality rule as they do in symmetric situations.greater than the profit to the actor himself. Such dilem-For example, in an asymmetric resource dilemma, par-mas are social in nature because people have an influ-ties who currently harvest less of the resource benefitence on each other’s welfare, and the underlying di-more from a solution based on an equal percentagelemma is attributable to the conflict between individualreduction of current harvest, while those who currentlyand collective rationality (Kahan, 1974).harvest more of the resource benefit more from a solu-A resource dilemma is a specific type of social di-tion based on an equal unit reduction of current har-lemma. In a resource dilemma, collective noncoopera-vest. Both solutions can be considered fair, but neithertion leads to a serious threat of depletion of future re-is the obvious ‘‘fairest’’ solution. In the symmetric case,sources (Hardin, 1968; Van Lange, Liebrand, Mes-equal-percentage reduction and equal-unit reductionsick, & Wilke, 1992). The resource dilemma refers to aare the same solution, whereas in the asymmetric casesituation in which a group shares a common resourcethey are not. Thus, in the asymmetric case there is(for example, fish, water, forests, or energy) from whichambiguity concerning appropriate contributions andthe individual members can harvest. If members takeentitlements of parties. We therefore predict that theretoo much from the common source, the resource is ex-will be more ambiguity (variation) about what shouldhausted. The group interest requires moderate harvest,be considered a fair allocation of resources in asymmet-but personal interests may induce the individual mem-ric than in symmetric social dilemmas (Hypothesis 1).bers to harvest excessively.

We suggest that the ambiguity described above en-The majority of social dilemma research has focusedables individuals to make ‘‘egocentric’’ or self-servingon symmetric dilemmas where all group members oc-

cupy symmetric or interchangeable positions (see Mur- interpretations of the situation and to judge as fairdistributions of resources that favor themselves. Sub-nighan, King, & Schoumaker, 1990, and Van Dijk,

1993, for exceptions). In symmetric dilemmas, each stantial research evidence suggests that people make

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113EGOCENTRIC INTERPRETATIONS OF FAIRNESS

egocentric judgments in a variety of situations (Bazer- was observed in the preference for the contributionrules. Van Dijk points out that in his experimentalman & Neale, 1982; Messick & Sentis, 1983; Neale &

Bazerman, 1983) including judgments of fairness (Bab- design, preference for the contribution rule did not in-fluence the actual outcomes. Thus, a bias in the prefer-cock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995). Peo-

ple tend to justify their assessment of fairness by ence for contribution rules was not instrumental forfurthering one’s own interests. In addition, Van Dijkchanging the importance of attributes affecting what is

fair (Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, and Bazerman, 1996). only examined the egocentric bias indirectly by lookingat preference for contribution rules. In our study, weWalster, Walster, and Berscheid (1978) introducedmeasure the egocentric bias directly, and we relate thethe notion of egocentric interpretations of fairness bybias to harvesting decisions which represent individu-noting that when people are personally involved in aals’ actual outcomes.situation, judgments of fairness are likely to be biased

in a manner that benefits themselves. Early research We thus propose that egocentrism may be one causalmechanism contributing to the exploitation of a re-on egocentric biases included a study by Ross and Si-

coly (1979) who found that people tend to overestimate source in asymmetric social dilemmas. We believe thatasymmetry in interests and outcomes in social dilem-their own input, such as family members overestimat-

ing their contribution to household tasks and seminar mas creates a situation whereby individuals may differin their interpretations of fairness. When there areparticipants overestimating their own participation

relative to others’ estimates of their participation. The multiple ways to decide what is fair, people differen-tially focus on solutions favorable to themselves. Inegocentric bias in judgments of fairness was also stud-

ied by Messick and Sentis (1979; 1983), who suggested resource dilemmas where all interested parties mustdecrease their use of a resource in order to preserve it,that people initially determine their preference for a

certain outcome on the basis of self-interest and then the egocentric bias results in individuals believing thatit is fair for them to have more of the resource than anjustify this preference on the basis of fairness.independent advisor would judge. The collective resultThompson and Loewenstein (1992) argue that ego-is excessive resource depletion which does not neces-centric interpretations of fairness are an importantsarily result from greed alone, but from biased percep-cause of unnecessary and costly settlement delays intions of fairness as well. Thus, the problem is not neces-bargaining. They found that negotiators’ judgments ofsarily in individuals’ desire to be unfair, but perhaps infair outcomes were biased in an egocentric directiontheir inability to interpret information in an unbiasedand that asymmetries in negotiators’ costs increasedmanner (Messick & Sentis, 1983, Diekmann et al.,egocentric interpretations of fairness. In addition, they1996). Consequently, we predict that in asymmetric so-found that even when people were presented with iden-cial dilemmas, egocentrism will exist in perceptions oftical information, their perceptions of the situation dif-fairness (Hypothesis 2). Since we argue that asymmetryfered dramatically depending on their role in the situa-exacerbates the tendency for individuals to hold ego-tion. They concluded that egocentric interpretations ofcentric interpretations of fairness, we predict that therefairness hinder conflict resolution because people arewill be greater evidence of egocentrism in asymmetricreluctant to agree to what they perceive to be an inequi-than in symmetric social dilemmas (Hypothesis 3). Thetable settlement. Consistent with the finding that ego-prevalence of egocentrism in asymmetric social dilem-centric assessments of fairness may be an importantmas results in individuals believing that they deservecause of ineffective conflict resolution, we argue thatmore of a resource than others think they deserve. This,egocentric interpretations of fairness in asymmetric re-in turn, leads the interested parties to take too much—source dilemmas are an important cause of overharv-resulting in overharvesting. We therefore predict thatesting.harvesting will be positively related to the amount ofVan Dijk’s (1993) research, which examined the rela-egocentrism in asymmetric dilemmas (Hypothesis 4).tionship between fairness considerations and choice be-Since we have argued that there is more evidence ofhavior, is indirectly related to our interest in the rela-egocentrism in asymmetric than symmetric dilemmas,tionship between egocentrism and overharvesting inand that egocentrism is related to harvesting, we wouldasymmetric social dilemmas. Using an asymmetric so-expect to find greater overharvesting in asymmetriccial dilemma, Van Dijk (1993) examined the relation-than in symmetric dilemmas (Hypothesis 5).ship between fairness considerations and choice behav-

ior. In one study involving a public good dilemma, he We have argued that the additional complexity inasymmetric relative to symmetric social dilemmas en-predicted that subjects would exhibit an egocentric bias

in their preference for contribution rules (equal versus ables more opportunity for egocentric interpretationsof fairness. As a result, the dilemma is harder to resolveproportional) such that rule preference would be

shaped by self-interest. However, no egocentric bias because it is more difficult to reach agreement about

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what is fair. We also argue that it is difficult for individ- fairness and gain information about the behavior ofothers is by communicating with the other parties. Pastuals to accurately predict how other parties will behaveresearch provides evidence that communication en-in asymmetric dilemmas since everyone does not oc-hances cooperation in social dilemmas (Deutsch, 1960;cupy identical positions. The result is, once again, thatJerdee & Rosen, 1974; Jorgenson & Papciak, 1981; Lie-the asymmetric dilemma is difficult to resolve.brand, 1984; Radlow & Weidner, 1966). However,It has been well established across a variety of socialDawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) showed thatdilemmas that expectations of others’ cooperationcommunication promotes cooperation only when theand one’s own cooperation are strongly interrelateddiscussion itself is relevant for the decisions that have(Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Messick, Wilke,to be made. This finding raises the question of howBrewer, Kramer, Zemke, & Lui, 1983; Schroeder, Jen-discussion increases cooperativeness. Two of the mostsen, Reed, Sullivan, & Schwab, 1983; Van Lange &plausible explanations for the effect of communicationLiebrand, 1989). The literature on this topic suggestsare (1) the development of a commitment norm and (2)that the relationship between expectations and choiceenhanced feelings of ‘‘we-ness’’ or group identity (Vanbehavior is bidirectional (Abric & Kahan, 1972; VanLange et al., 1992). Another source of communicationLange & Liebrand, 1991; Van Lange et al., 1992). Oneeffects could be that group members’ statements ofexplanation for the relationship is conditional coopera-their own intended decisions could assure other mem-tion—people are more likely to cooperate if they expectbers of their good intentions, leading to higher rates ofothers to cooperate than if they expect others not tocooperation (Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee, 1977).cooperate. Alternatively, an individual who decides to

We argue that communication may also enhance co-cooperate or to defect may have a rational basis foroperation by reducing the amount of egocentrism inbelieving others will do likewise. In other words, peoplethe interpretation of fairness. Discussion allows partiesuse their own behavior as information about whatto share their interests and beliefs, including percep-other people will do (Orbell & Dawes, 1991). This maytions of fairness. Once individuals learn what othersbe particularly difficult in the asymmetric situation, asbelieve to be fair, they may adjust their perceptions ofit is harder to use oneself as a source of informationfairness to a less biased position. Thus, we predict thatabout others’ behavior. The correlation between choiceegocentrism will be stronger before discussion than afterand expectations may also be explained by post-hocdiscussion (Hypothesis 7).justification—rationalizing one’s own cooperative or

noncooperative choice by expressing cooperative orMETHODnoncooperative expectations of others (Messe’ & Siva-

cek, 1979). Such justification enables defectors to as-Subjects

suage guilt and cooperators to avoid feeling unwise,One-hundred eighty students from the J. L. Kelloggthereby permitting individuals to maintain an image

Graduate School of Management at Northwestern Uni-of being rational and moral people.versity participated in a simulated resource dilemmaAlthough the relationship between expectations ofas part of a negotiations class exercise. One-hundredothers and cooperative decision making has been welltwenty-four subjects participated in an asymmetric di-documented in symmetric dilemma situations, we be-lemma simulation, which was the central piece in ourlieve that it is important to study in asymmetric situa-experiment. Fifty-six subjects participated in a sym-tions. Asymmetric temptation (differing temptation formetric dilemma simulation, which served as a compari-self and opponent), as compared to symmetric tempta-son case for the asymmetric dilemma.1tion, was found to increase the amount of misrepresen-

tation that occurs in a negotiation situation and to in-Procedurescrease the expectation that one’s opponent will engage

in misrepresentation (Tenbrunsel, 1995). These results The procedures and materials used for the symmetricindicate a relationship between one’s own behavior and and the asymmetric simulation were the same exceptthe expected behavior of others in asymmetric situa- where specifically noted.tions similar to the relationship observed in symmetric Students participated in an exercise based on thesituations. Based on this observation, we expect the real-life crisis in the northeastern fishery where cur-choice-expectations relationship found previously in rently stocks of principal groundfish species have col-symmetric social dilemmas to also be present in asym-metric social dilemmas. Thus, we predict that harvest-

1 All subjects came from the same general population. However,ing will be positively related to the amount of harvestingthe data on the subjects for the symmetric condition were collected at

expected from the other parties (Hypothesis 6). a later point in time in response to the suggestions of two anonymousreviewers.One way that individuals may share their notions of

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lapsed and there is considerable uncertainty as to when value was a function of their harvest level, the valuethe association placed on shark harvesting in the fu-and how they will be brought back to a sustainableture, and the total harvest level of all four associations.level. The two most critical issues for fisheries manage-

The payoff structure (profitability for each associa-ment in the future are (1) who will pay the cost oftion) was described by the following ‘‘profit functions’’correcting problems and (2) who will receive the bene-in the asymmetric simulation:fits. Thus, the northeastern fishery exemplifies the is-

sues inherent in managing any commonly held re-source. Since the substantive features as well as the Large commercial (LC)payoff structure of the exercise (in the asymmetric sim-

$10,000∗(Harvest Level / .10(Future))ulation) were grounded in, and consistent with, thisreal world situation, the ecological validity of the exper- Small commercial (SC)imental situation was enhanced.

$10,000∗(Harvest Level / .25(Future))In this multi-party exercise, each person representedan organization which relied on shark fishing for in- Recreational competition (RC)come. The representatives participated in a conference

$10,000∗(Harvest Level / .70(Future))to discuss the common concern of the exploitation oflarge coastal shark. The resource on which they all Recreational tours (RT)depended (shark) was in danger because they were col-

$10,000∗(Harvest Level / .85(Future))lectively overfishing the resource. In addition to thecommon goal of solving the exploitation problem, theyall had the individual goal of protecting the economic ‘‘Harvest Level’’ was the harvest level of that particu-health of their organizations. lar association in metric tons. The total harvest level

The conference consisted of four representatives from of all four associations was currently at 5000 metricvarious commercial and recreational fishing groups: tons. The 5000 metric ton total was the sum of theLarge Commercial Fishers Association, Small Com- following current harvesting levels for each individualmercial Fishers Association, Recreational Fishers As- association: large commercial, 2000 metric tons; smallsociation, and Recreational Tours Association. In the commercial, 1500 metric tons; recreational competi-asymmetric simulation, the commercial fishers used tion, 1000 metric tons; recreational tours, 500 metricrelatively larger numbers of sharks and had less of an tons. The associations had harvesting options indicated

by the following ranges: Large commercial: 400–2000interest in the future health of the resource. In con-metric tons, Small commercial: 300–1500 metric tons,trast, the recreational fishers used smaller numbers ofRecreational competition: 200–1000 metric tons, Rec-shark, but had a greater interest in the future of thereational tours: 100–500 metric tons.resource. In the symmetric simulation, the fishers in

In contrast to the asymmetric simulation, the payoffall four roles were currently harvesting the samestructure for the symmetric simulation was describedamount of shark and had the same level of interest inby the following ‘‘profit function’’:the future health of the resource.

All subjects were given two sets of materials duringthe exercise, one before the discussion period (confer- $10,000∗(Harvest Level / .475(Future))ence) and one after the discussion period. The first setof materials included the subject’s role assignment, the The profit function for the symmetric dilemma wasgeneral case information (explaining the general situa- the same for all four associations. ‘‘Harvest Level’’ wastion and the structure of the simulation), and role in- the harvest level of that particular association in metricstructions. The general information provided all sub- tons. The total harvest level of all four associationsjects with the payoff structure for all four parties in was currently at 5000 metric tons, with each individualthe simulation. association harvesting 1250 metric tons regardless of

All participants were told that (1) they would like to role. All four associations in the symmetric version hadmaximize current profit without depleting the harvest harvesting options indicated by the following range:pool to a level that is too low to provide future harvests, 250–1250 metric tons.and (2) their goal was to maximize the net present The harvesting ranges in both the symmetric andvalue of the profit that their associations would receive. asymmetric versions reflected real world restrictionsThis profit was broken up into two components: the by (1) requiring that harvest levels fall between 20 andprofit that was received from the current harvest and 100% of the current harvest level so as not to allow thethe expected profit that would be received from future associations to go out of business and (2) requiring that

associations not harvest more than that which was in-harvests. Consequently, each association’s net present

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dicated by their current harvesting level since current metric ton sacrificed, they receive less than a metric tonin return. However, in the symmetric and asymmetricharvests reflected maximum capacity.versions the sum of the coefficients is greater than 1,Subjects were told that the sustainable level was aindicating that the dominant collective strategy is toharvest of 2500; if the total harvest level was 2500 orcurtail harvesting (cooperate). The dominant collectiveless, the species would be able to reproduce itself atstrategy to cooperate is illustrated in the negative, lin-their current population level; if the total harvest levelear relationship between total harvesting level and to-was above 2500, the species would not be maintained attal profit. In the asymmetric simulation, if the fourtheir current levels. Harvesting above the sustainableparties all harvested at their maximums, the totallevel decreased the opportunity for future harvesting,profit would be $50,000,000, with the large commercialresulting in a net decrease in the total profit. ‘‘Future’’group receiving $20,000,000, the small commercialrepresented the future shark level that was availablegroup receiving $15,000,000, the recreational competi-for reproduction; when the harvesting level was greatertion group receiving $10,000,000, and recreationalthan 2500, the value of Future decreased, which in turntours group receiving $5,000,000. In contrast to maxi-decreased overall profit. Future was calculated as themum harvesting behavior, a total harvest of only 2500smaller of {(2500) or (5000—the total harvest level ofmetric tons would create a total profit of $72,500,000,all four associations)}. This formula captured the futurewith the distribution of that profit depending on thenegative implications of utilizing the resource aboveallocation of the 2500 metric tons. In the symmetricthe sustainable level.simulation, if the four parties all harvested at theirIn the asymmetric simulation, associations placedmaximums, the total profit would be $50,000,000, withdifferent weights on the importance that they attachedeach association receiving $12,500,000. Similar to theto future shark harvests as indicated by the coefficientasymmetric version, a total harvest of 2500 metric tonspreceding Future. As is evident, recreational fishingin the symmetric version would create a total profit ofgroups were more concerned with future harvests than$72,500,000, with the distribution of that profit de-the commercial groups. Consistent with the real worldpending on the allocation of the 2500 metric tons. Anysituation, subjects were told that the commercialsubstantive information indicating asymmetries in de-groups had better capabilities than recreational groupspendency on the future state of the resource was editedto switch to a different kind of fish should the sharkout of the symmetric case. All other substantive infor-resource be depleted, explaining their lower depen-mation was common between the symmetric and asym-dency on the future condition of the resource. Largemetric cases.2commercial fishing groups depended the least on future

The profit numbers obtained from these formulasharvests due to the small percentage of livelihood thatprovided subjects with a way of thinking about the netwas earned from shark fishing (coefficient Å .10). Smallbenefit of harvesting relatively more or less shark whilecommercial fishing groups depended slightly more onholding all other factors constant. The subjects wereshark harvesting for their livelihood and, therefore,told that all other factors, such as the harvesting ofhad a stronger desire to see that shark levels wereother types of fish, were accounted for in the equation.maintained for future use (coefficient Å .25). The recre-In addition, all future interests were embedded in theational competition fishing groups depended on sharkscoefficients. Thus, no factors other than those repre-for a significant portion of the tournaments that weresented by the formulas were considered valid. Finally,conducted (coefficient Å .70). Recreational tours weregroups were informed that they could not exchangeexclusively designed around sharks and thus the recre-profits or actual fish. (For example, one group could notational tour fishing groups placed the highest valuecapture the shark and redistribute it or the profit toon future shark harvests (coefficient Å .85). Thus, theanother group.)asymmetry was reflected in the current harvesting lev-

In the asymmetric simulation, there were 31 four-els and the future interest coefficients. In the symmet-party groups. Asymmetric groups were divided into tworic version, profit coefficients were the same for all fourconditions with 15 groups in one condition and 16fishing groups (coefficient Å .475). Note that the totalgroups in the other. The two conditions were createdfuture concern of the four parties was the same for theto allow for the investigation of communication on ego-

symmetric and asymmetric cases (4 1 .475 Å .1 / .25centrism. The only difference between the two condi-/ .7 / .85).tions concerned whether or not subjects made a variety

The profit formulas set up a classic social dilemma of assessments (as explained below) before the discus-in both the symmetric and asymmetric versions. The sion with the other parties at the simulated conference.dominant individual strategy to overharvest (defect)is reflected in the fact that all parties have a future

2 Actual materials are available from the authors.coefficient which is less than 1, indicating that for every

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Subjects received the first set of materials which in- To test for a significant difference in the standarddeviation of fairness judgments between the symmetriccluded all of the information described above before

the simulated conference. After reading the first set of and asymmetric groups, we used a method recom-mended by Hogg and Tanis (1977). Using this method,materials but before the conference, subjects in the first

asymmetric condition, but not in the second asymmet- we calculated,ric condition, received forms on which they recordedwhat they believed to be a fair solution to the problem,

F Å [(n1)(s21)/(n1 0 1)]/[(n2)(s

22)/(n2 0 1)],their projected harvest levels, and their predictions

about the behavior of others. Collecting these measures on (n1 0 1) and (n2 0 1) degrees of freedom,was the only difference between the two conditions.Next, all subjects participated in a 30-min discussion,representing the simulated conference, with the other where n1 Å sample size of population 1 (asymmetricthree members of their group.3 During this time, they groups), n2 Å sample size of population 2 (symmetricdiscussed the issues and potential solutions. However, groups), s2

1 Å sample variance for population 1 (asym-they were not allowed to make any binding commit- metric groups), and s2

2 Å sample variance for populationments. 2 (symmetric groups).

The second set of materials, received after the simu-Egocentrism. Two measures of egocentrism werelated conference, consisted of final role instructions

designed: an individual measure for each actor and afrom their respective associations, forms for harvestinggroup measure. Group and individual egocentrismlevel decisions, forms for estimated fair solutions, andwere determined both before and after the discussionforms for expectations of others’ behavior. All subjectsfor the symmetric case and condition one of the asym-individually read and completed the materials in themetric case and only after discussion for condition twoorder in which they are listed above.of the asymmetric case.In the symmetric simulation, there were fourteen

four-party groups. All subjects in the symmetric simu-Group egocentrism. For each actor, a ratio waslation followed the same procedures as the subjects in

computed which represented what the actor thoughtthe first condition in the asymmetric simulation (re-was fair for her in relation to what she thought wascording decisions prior to discussion as well as afterfair for the total of the four parties. The four ratiosdiscussion) as described above.were then added together. A total of one indicatedthat no egocentrism existed at the group level. AMeasurestotal in excess of one indicated that there was evi-

Ambiguity. Each of the four actors recorded what dence of egocentrism at the group level. For example,he or she considered to be a fair harvest for each of the if the large commercial representative believed thatfour parties involved (including him or herself), for a his association deserved 40% of the total harvest, thetotal of 16 measures per group. We then calculated 16 small commercial representative believed that heraverages—each of the four actors’ fairness judgments association deserved 30% of the total harvest, theof harvesting levels for each of the four parties. The 16 recreational competition representative believedaverages were calculated separately for subjects in the that his association deserved 20% of the total har-symmetric and asymmetric groups. The two sets of vest, and the recreational tours representative be-means were computed both before and after discussion. lieved that her association deserved 10% of the totalThe standard deviations of these means served as mea- harvest, group egocentrism would be equal to 1.0 (orsures of ambiguity with respect to fairness judgments. 100% if represented in terms of percentages). How-Larger standard deviations of the mean fairness judg- ever, if the large commercial representative believedments indicated more variance in interpretations of that his association deserved 50% of the total har-fairness. vest, the small commercial representative believed

that her association deserved 40% of the total har-vest, the recreational competition representative be-3 The four-party groups, although run simultaneously (with thelieved that his association deserved 30% of the totalexception of the symmetric dilemma groups which were run at a

later point in time) were not in the presence of one another. Each harvest, and the recreational tours representativegroup was either in its own small breakout room with the door closed, believed that her association deserved 20% of theor in its own part of a large auditorium where the discussions of total harvest, group egocentrism would be equal toother groups could not be heard. Subjects only found out about the

1.4 (or 140% if represented in terms of percentages).discussion of other groups during the debriefing session which oc-This measure can be summarized in equation formcurred after all data was collected. Thus, the assumption of indepen-

dence of observations was preserved. as follows:

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Group Egocentrism

Å [LClc /(LClc / LCsc / LCrc / LCrt)]

/ [SCsc /(SClc / SCsc / SCrc / SCrt)]

/ [RCrc/(RClc / RCsc / RCrc / RCrt)]

/ [RTrt/(RTlc / RTsc / RTrc / RTrt)],

where Ij Å what actor I thinks is fair for actor j; LCÅ Large Commercial; SC Å Small Commercial; RC ÅRecreational Competition; RT Å Recreational Tours.

Individual egocentrism. For each actor, a ratio wascomputed which represented what each actor thoughtwas fair for her in relation to what she thought wasfair for others compared to what each other actorthought was fair for the focal actor, correcting for theegocentrism for each other actor. This correction wascreated by comparing the focal actor’s assessment ofher fair share with that of one of the other parties,while eliminating the other party from the comparisonset. This procedure was then repeated using each ofthe three other parties for comparison. A ratio of zeroindicated that no egocentrism existed at the individuallevel. A total in excess of zero indicated that there wasevidence of egocentrism at the individual level. Thismeasure is computed as follows:

Egocentrism for LC

Å [{[LClc /(LClc / LCsc / LCrc)]FIGURE 10 [RTlc /(RTlc / RTsc / RTrc)]}

/ {[LClc /(LClc / LCsc / LCrt)]

0 [RClc/(RClc / RCsc / RCrt)]} reference, and leaving out D eliminates the possibleinfluence of D’s egocentrism. If A and D agree on the/ {[LClc /(LClc / LCrc / LCrt)] relative allocation of resources that A should receive

0 [SClc/(SClc / SCrc / SCrt)]}]/3, among A, B, and C, then the result of step (1) will bezero, suggesting no egocentrism by A. Steps (2) and (3)follow the same logic, comparing A’s judgment of thewhere Ij Åwhat actor I thinks is fair for actor j. Individ-allocation of resources between herself and two otherual egocentrism for the other three actors was calcu-actors with another actor’s judgment of a fair allocationlated in a parallel manner.between the three actors. In each step, the actor beingFigure 1 further clarifies the logic for this measureused as a point of comparison is left out of the trio. Ifby pictorially describing the measure conceptually. Asthe other three actors agree with A’s judgments, thenindicated by Fig. 1, we compare the focal actor’s assess-the sum of (1), (2), and (3) will be zero indicating noment of the percentage of the total harvest that theyevidence of egocentrism in actor A.think they deserve among a set of trios in which the

fourth member is excluded. We then use the assess-Expectations of others’ behavior. There were twoment of the fourth member as a control to assess the

measures of expectations of others’ behavior, an indi-egocentrism of the focal actor. We repeat this processvidual measure for each actor and a group measure.three times for each actor. Thus, in step (1), we firstBoth measures were determined separately both beforecalculate what A considers to be fair for herself in rela-and after the discussion for the symmetric case andtion to B and C. Next, we calculate what D considerscondition one of the asymmetric case and only afterfair for A in relation to B and C. D is left out of the

trio because D’s judgment is being used as a point of discussion for condition two of the asymmetric case.

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TABLE 1a

Ambiguity in Fairness Judgments—Symmetric versus Asymmetric (after Discussion)

Target

Respondent LC SC RC RT

LC SD (asy) Å 323 SD (asy) Å 291 SD (asy) Å 193 SD (asy) Å 99SD (sym) Å 127 SD (sym) Å 113 SD (sym) Å 113 SD (sym) Å 113p õ .001 p õ .001 p õ .001 ns

SC SD (asy) Å 346 SD (asy) Å 233 SD (asy) Å 200 SD (asy) Å 96SD (sym) Å 79 SD (sym) Å 71 SD (sym) Å 80 SD (sym) Å 73p õ .001 p õ .001 p õ .001 p õ .01

RC SD (asy) Å 425 SD (asy) Å 208 SD (asy) Å 241 SD (asy) Å 135SD (sym) Å 75 SD (sym) Å 64 SD (sym) Å 68 SD (sym) Å 63p õ .001 p õ .001 p õ .001 p õ .001

RT SD (asy) Å 397 SD (asy) Å 248 SD (asy) Å 182 SD (asy) Å 110SD (sym) Å 64 SD (sym) Å 64 SD (sym) Å 63 SD (sym) Å 66p õ .001 p õ .001 p õ .001 p õ .001

Note. ‘‘SD (asy)’’ indicates the standard deviation in asymmetric groups and ‘‘SD (sym)’’ indicates the standard deviation in symmetricgroups.

Group expectations. The group measure consisted Harvesting. There were two measures of harvestingbehavior, an individual measure for each actor and aof the sum of the twelve assessments that the four

parties provided of their expectations of the behavior group measure. The individual measure was simplywhat each actor recorded as her harvesting level (inof the other three parties, and then the total sum was

divided by three. This calculation provides a measure metric tons of shark). The group measure consisted ofthe sum of the four individual harvesting levels.of the expectations of group behavior for each party

while ignoring the focal party’s own behavior. Thismeasure can be summarized in equation form as fol- RESULTSlows:

Hypothesis 1, which stated that there will be moreGroup measure of expectations of others’ behavior ambiguity about what should be considered a fair allo-

cation of resources in asymmetric than in symmetricÅ (LC:SC / LC:RC / LC:RT / SC:LCsocial dilemmas, was supported by the measure of am-

/ SC:RC / SC:RT / RC:LC / RC:SC biguity both before and after discussion. To assess am-biguity, we assessed the variation in each of the four/ RC:RT / RT:LC / RT:SC / RT:RC)/3,actors’ interpretations of fair harvesting distributionsamong the four parties (including themselves).where K:L Å what actor K thinks actor L will do.

After discussion, we found that 15 out of 16 standardIndividual expectations. The individual measure deviations were significantly higher in the asymmetric

consisted of the sum of the three assessments that each than in the symmetric groups (p õ .001 for 14, and pactor provided of their expectations of the behavior of õ .01 for 1). Before discussion, we found that 9 out ofthe other three parties. There was a separate measure the 16 standard deviations were significantly higher infor each actor. This measure is summarized in equation the asymmetric than in the symmetric groups (p õform below: .001 for 6, p õ .01 for 1, and p õ .05 for 2).4 Tables 1a

and 1b summarize these results.LC’s expectations of other actors’ behavior Hypothesis 2, which stated that egocentrism will ex-

ist in perceptions of fairness in asymmetric social di-Å (LC:SC / LC:RC / LC:RT),lemmas, was supported by both the group and individ-ual measures of egocentrism, both before and after dis-

where K:L Å what actor K thinks actor L will do.Individual expectations of others’ behavior for the

4 Three of the nonsignificant items were in the predicted direction.other three actors was calculated in a parallel manner.

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TABLE 1b

Ambiguity in Fairness Judgments—Symmetric versus Asymmetric (before Discussion)

Target

Respondent LC SC RC RT

LC SD (asy) Å 412 SD (asy) Å 251 SD (asy) Å 183 SD (asy) Å 130SD (sym) Å 149 SD (sym) Å 153 SD (sym) Å 142 SD (sym) Å 196p õ .001 p õ .05 ns ns

SC SD (asy) Å 493 SD (asy) Å 213 SD (asy) Å 188 SD (asy) Å 139SD (sym) Å 197 SD (sym) Å 236 SD (sym) Å 243 SD (sym) Å 296p õ .001 ns ns p õ .01a

RC SD (asy) Å 392 SD (asy) Å 159 SD (asy) Å 220 SD (asy) Å 141SD (sym) Å 119 SD (sym) Å 94 SD (sym) Å 137 SD (sym) Å 106p õ .001 p õ .01 p õ .05 ns

RT SD (asy) Å 497 SD (asy) Å 273 SD (asy) Å 260 SD (asy) Å 149SD (sym) Å 68 SD (sym) Å 101 SD (sym) Å 77 SD (sym) Å 105p õ .001 p õ .001 p õ .001 ns

Note. ‘‘SD (asy)’’ indicates the standard deviation in asymmetric groups and ‘‘SD (sym)’’ indicates the standard deviation in symmetricgroups.

a This test was significant in the opposite direction than was predicted. We have no explanation for this result.

cussion. The group measure of egocentrism before was .041 which was significantly greater than zero(tÅ 2.31, df Å 30, põ .05); the small commercial repre-discussion (includes condition one only) was 1.23 which

was significantly higher than one (t Å 5.68, df Å 13, p sentative’s individual egocentrism score was .031which was significantly greater than zero (t Å 2.82, dfõ .001). The group measure of egocentrism after dis-

cussion (includes both conditions one and two) was 1.11 Å 30, põÅ .01); the recreational competition represen-tative’s individual egocentrism score was .054 whichwhich was significantly higher than one (t Å 4.43, df

Å 30, p õ .001). was significantly greater than zero (t Å 2.86, df Å 30,p õ .01); the recreational tours representative’s indi-Individual measures of egocentrism indicated that

egocentrism existed in all actors in the asymmetric di- vidual egocentrism score was .002 which was not sig-nificantly different from zero (t Å .19, df Å 30, ns).lemma both before and after discussion, with the excep-

tion of the recreational tours representative. Before Table 2 summarizes the results from the test for Hy-pothesis 2. It includes all egocentrism scores and sig-discussion (includes condition one only), the large com-

mercial representative’s individual egocentrism score nificance levels.Hypothesis 3, which predicted that there will bewas .095 which was significantly greater than zero (t

Å 3.10, df Å 14, p õ .01); the small commercial repre- greater evidence of egocentrism in asymmetric than insymmetric social dilemmas, was supported by thesentative’s individual egocentrism score was .076

which was significantly greater than zero (t Å 2.47, df group measures of egocentrism after discussion. In thesymmetric dilemma, the group measure of egocentrismÅ 13, p õ .05)5; the recreational competition represen-

tative’s individual egocentrism score was .077 whichwas significantly greater than zero (t Å 2.24, df Å 14,

TABLE 2p õ .05); the recreational tours representative’s indi-Existence of Egocentrism in Asymmetric Social Dilemmasvidual egocentrism score was 0.005 which was not sig-

nificantly different from zero (t Å 0.20, df Å 14, ns).After

Similarly, after discussion (includes both conditions Before discussionone and two of the asymmetric groups), the large com- discussion p (cond. 1 & 2) pmercial representative’s individual egocentrism score

Group 1.23 õ.001 1.11 õ.001LC .095 õ.01 .041 õ.05

5 The degree of freedom is one less than would be expected in SC .076 õ.05 .031 õ.01calculations involving fairness judgments of the small commercial RC .077 õ.05 .054 õ.01actor before discussion in asymmetric groups. This is because one RT 0.005 ns .002 nssubject felt he could not judge what was fair for him before discussion.This was the only judgment he did not make. Note. Group: no egocentrism Å 1, Individual: no egocentrism Å 0.

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TABLE 3 (2) LC harvestÅ B0 / B1(LC egocentrism)Symmetric versus Asymmetric Egocentrism

/ B2(LC expectations of others) / eSymmetric Asymmetric

(3) SC harvestBefore discussion 1.14 1.23After discussion 1.03 1.11 Å B0 / B1(SC egocentrism)

Note. No egocentrism Å 1. / B2(SC expectations of others) / e

(4) RC harvest

Å B0 / B1(RC egocentrism)after discussion was 1.03 which was not significantlydifferent from one (t Å 1.75, df Å 13, ns), indicating no / B2(RC expectations of others) / eevidence for egocentrism according to our measure. In

(5) RT harvest Å B0 / B1(RT egocentrism)addition, a one-way analysis of variance indicated asignificant difference in group egocentrism after discus- / B2(RT expectations of others) / esion between symmetric and asymmetric groups (F Å

(6) Harvest4.76, df Å 44, p õ .05). The group measure of egocen-Å B0 / B1(roledummy1) / B2(roledummy2)trism before discussion in the symmetric dilemma was

1.14, in contrast to group egocentrism of 1.23 (reported / B3(roledummy3) / B4(egocentrism)earlier) found in the asymmetric dilemma. Although

/ B5(expectations of others) / e,this result was in the predicted direction (egocentrismwas lower in the symmetric dilemma than in the asym-

where LC Å Large commercial; SC Å Small commer-metric dilemma), it was non-significant (F Å 2.51, dfcial; RCÅRecreational competition; RTÅRecreationalÅ 27, ns). Table 3 summarizes the comparison betweentours.symmetric and asymmetric groups, clearly illustrating

These regressions provided moderate support for ourlower egocentrism for the symmetric case.6

predictions. Three of the individual regressions as wellModerate support was found for Hypotheses 4 and 6as the overall regression showed a significant relation-which predicted that harvesting would be positivelyship between egocentrism and harvesting behavior.related to the amount of egocentrism (Hypothesis 4)The group regression, the overall regression, and twoand to the amount of harvesting expected from theof the individual regressions showed significant rela-other parties (Hypothesis 6). To test Hypotheses 4 andtionships between expectations of others’ behavior and6, regressions were run treating harvesting levels asharvesting behavior.the dependent variable and measures of egocentrism

In the group regression (R2 Å .61, df Å 2,23),8 expec-and expectations of others’ behavior as the two inde-tations of others’ behavior was significantly related topendent variables. Six regressions were run, one forharvesting behavior (T Å 5.531, p õ .001) and egocen-the group measure, one for each of the four individualtrism was in the predicted direction, but nonsignificantmeasures, and one overall regression which combines(T Å .473, ns). For large commercial (R2 Å .23, df Åthe data from the four individuals regressions by in-2,25), expectations of others’ behavior was signifi-cluding role as an independent (categorical) variable.7cantly, positively related to harvesting behavior (T ÅRegression equations were as follows:2.22, p õ .05) as predicted, and egocentrism was in thepredicted direction, but nonsignificant (T Å 1.11, ns).For small commercial (R2 Å .22, dfÅ 2,27), egocentrism(1) Group harvestwas significantly, positively related to harvesting be-

Å B0 / B1(Group egocentrism) havior (T Å 2.56, p õ .05) and expectations of others’behavior was in the predicted direction, but nonsig-/ B2(Group expectations of others) / enificant (T Å 1.67, ns). For recreational competition

6 Comparisons of egocentrism between the symmetric and asym- 8 One large commercial subject felt that he could not judge theharvesting levels of the other three actors after discussion. Anothermetric groups are not made at the level of individual egocentrism.

The individual roles are not comparable since in one case they are large commercial actor made no final harvesting decision for himself.One small commercial actor felt that she could not judge the harvest-symmetric, and in the other case they are asymmetric. Thus, such

a comparison at the individual level would be inappropriate. ing level of the large commercial actor. These omissions account forthe slight variation in the degrees of freedom of the regressions. All7 The overall regression was based on the suggestion of an anony-

mous reviewer. three of these actors made all other decisions as instructed.

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TABLE 4 subjects tests. Group and individual measures of ego-centrism before discussion in condition one of the asym-

Expectations metric groups (where subjects recorded what theyEgocentrism of others Role thought was fair before discussion) were compared to

group and individual measures of egocentrism afterGroup ns p õ .001discussion in condition two of the asymmetric groupsLC ns p õ .05

SC p õ .05 ns (where subjects did not record what they thought wasRC p õ .01 ns fair before discussion). This procedure was used sinceRT p õ .01 p Å .06 subjects’ decisions in condition two of the asymmetricOverall p õ .001 p õ .01 p õ .001

groups were not biased by previous exposure to dataforms. A one-way analysis of variance was used to com-pare the group egocentrism before (mean Å 1.23) and

(R2 Å .30, df Å 2,28), egocentrism was significantly, after discussion (mean Å 1.09) and a significant differ-positively related to harvesting behavior (T Å 3.00, p ence was found (F Å 6.56, df Å 29, p õ .05). Similarly,õ .01) and expectations of others’ behavior was in the a one-way analysis of variance was used to comparepredicted direction, but nonsignificant (T Å 1.68, ns). individual egocentrism in the asymmetric groups be-For recreational tours (R2Å .30, dfÅ 2,27), egocentrism fore and after discussion for each of the four roles. Thewas significantly, positively related to harvesting be- results for each role were as follows: Large commercialhavior (T Å 2.89, p õ .01) and expectations of others’ egocentrism before discussion (mean Å .095) was mar-behavior was marginally significant (T Å 1.97, p Å .06) ginally greater than egocentrism after discussionand in the predicted direction. (mean Å .017); (F Å 3.92, df Å 30, p õ .06). Small

Finally, for the overall regression (R2 Å .85, df Å commercial egocentrism before discussion (mean Å5,112), role was significantly related to harvesting be- .076) was nonsignificantly greater than egocentrismhavior (T Å 06.75, 016.27, 018.62, p õ .001). Egocen- after discussion (mean Å .034) (F Å 1.56, df Å 29, ns).trism was significantly, positively related to harvesting Recreational competition egocentrism before discus-behavior (T Å 4.72, p õ .001) and expectations of oth- sion (mean Å .077) was nonsignificantly greater thaners’ behavior was also significantly, positively related egocentrism after discussion (mean Å .063) (F Å .128,to harvesting behavior (T Å 3.23, p õ .01). Table 4 df Å 30, ns). Recreational tours egocentrism before dis-summarizes the results from the six regressions. cussion (mean Å 0.005) was very similar to egocen-

Hypothesis 5 predicted greater harvesting in asym- trism after discussion (mean Å 0.008) (F Å .007, df Åmetric than in symmetric groups. The data strongly 30, ns). Although nonsignificant, differences in individ-support this prediction. On average, symmetric groups ual egocentrism before and after discussion were in theharvested 2614 metric tons, while asymmetric groupsfollowing the exact same procedure harvested an aver-age of 3228 metric tons (F Å 10.10, df Å 27, p õ .01).

TABLE 5Including both conditions one and two for the asymmet-

Harvesting Levels (Metric Tons)ric groups, subjects harvested an average of 3436 met-ric tons (F Å 18.46, df Å 41, p õ .001).9 Table 5 summa- Sym Asym (1) Asym (2) Asym (1 & 2)rizes the individual and group harvesting levels (after

Group 2614 3228 3645 3436discussion) for the two asymmetric conditions and theLC 746 1548 1691 1622symmetric condition. In addition, 64% of the symmetricSC 686 1145 1253 1200groups reached the sustainable 2500 metric ton level,RC 591 420 524 474

while only about 10% of the asymmetric groups were RT 591 180 195 188able to do so. A x2 test revealed a significant difference

Note. Although group harvesting levels are comparable betweenbetween symmetric and asymmetric cases in the num-symmetric and asymmetric groups, individual harvesting levels

ber of groups that reached the 2500 metric tons level are not. Recall the harvesting options:(p õ .001).

Hypothesis 7, egocentrism will be stronger before Harvesting options: (in metric tons)discussion than after discussion in asymmetric social

Symmetric Asymmetricdilemmas, was tested using both between- and within-

Group 2500–5000 2500–5000LC 250–1250 400–20009 Three individuals in the asymmetric case did not report a final SC 250–1250 300–1500

harvesting level for themselves. Thus, the group harvest could not RC 250–1250 200–1000be calculated for three groups resulting in less degrees of freedom RT 250–1250 100–500than would be expected.

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TABLE 6a DISCUSSION

Effect of Discussion on Egocentrism (Between–Subjects)

The results of this study advance our knowledge ofBefore discussion After discussion resource dilemmas in several ways. First, we find sup-

port for the notion that egocentrism, which is particu-Group 1.23 1.09LC .095 .017 larly pronounced in asymmetric dilemmas, may be aSC .076 .034 causal mechanism that increases exploitation of re-RC .077 .063 sources. Second, we propose that an additional benefitRT 0.005 0.008

of communication in social dilemmas may be the reduc-tion of egocentrism. Third, we extend the finding thatNote. Group: no egocentrism Å 1, Individual: no egocentrism Å 0.expectations of others’ behavior is related to harvestingin an asymmetric dilemma situation.

The results of this experiment provide evidence ofpredicted direction for all roles. Table 6a summarizes egocentric biases in the interpretation of fairness atthe egocentrism scores before and after discussion for both the group and individual levels in asymmetric so-this between-subjects test of Hypothesis 7 with the cial dilemma situations. Evidence of the bias was foundasymmetric groups. at the group level and at the individual level in actors

The above test for Hypothesis 7 has the advantage in three out of the four roles. Egocentric interpretationsof statistical independence between pre- and post-dis- of fairness was absent only in actors in the recreationalcussion measures. We also conducted three similar tours role. We attribute its absence to the fact that thiswithin-subjects tests. For the first within-subjects test, role represented the weakest actor (unable to harvestmeasures of egocentrism before discussion were com- much in the present and very dependent on the future)pared to measures of egocentrism after discussion us- which minimized ambiguity with respect to this actor.ing subjects from condition one of the asymmetric It was obvious to all actors that recreational tours wasgroups only (thereby examining the effect of discussion very dependent on the cooperation of others for theirwithin the same group of individuals). Although pre- survival. Thus, they felt fairly treated even with smalland post-discussion measures of egocentrism were not concessions from the other parties and their assess-significantly different, they were in the predicted direc- ments of what was fair for them tended to be congruoustion (egocentrism was lower after discussion) for the with the assessments of other parties.group measure and three of the individual measures.10

In addition, the results of this experiment suggestTable 6b summarizes the egocentrism scores before and that harvesting behavior is affected by egocentric inter-after discussion for this within-subjects test. A second pretations of fairness. The relationship was foundwithin-subjects test compared measures of egocentrism among actors for three out of the four roles at the indi-at the group level before and after discussion including vidual level and in the overall regression test. In aonly the symmetric groups. A t test revealed that ego-centrism after discussion (1.03) was significantly lowerthan egocentrism before discussion (1.14) (t Å 3.41, df

TABLE 6bÅ 13, p õ .01). A third within-subjects test combinedEffect of Discussion on Egocentrism (Within-Subjects)the symmetric groups and condition one of the asym-

metric groups (all groups that made decisions both be-Before discussion After discussionfore and after discussion) and compared group egocen-

trism before and after discussion. Before discussion, Asymmetric groupsgroup egocentrism was 1.19 and after discussion group

Group 1.23 1.15egocentrism was 1.09. A t test revealed that egocen- LC .095 .066trism after discussion was significantly lower than be- SC .076 .024fore discussion (t Å 3.70, dfÅ 27, põ .001). The results RC .077 .043

RT 0.005 .012for the second and third within-subjects tests are alsosummarized in Table 6b.

Symmetric groups

1.14 1.0310 The egocentrism measures for the recreational tours role did not

support hypothesis 7 according to this within-subjects test. However, Asymmetric & symmetric groupsthe individual egocentrism measures both before and after discussionfor this role indicated no evidence for egocentrism. Thus, it is not 1.19 1.09surprising that discussion had no effect since our prediction assumedthe presence of egocentrism. Note. Group: no egocentrism Å 1, Individual: no egocentrism Å 0.

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resource dilemma, egocentrism results in parties be- argued earnestly and fervently with one anotherthroughout the debrief, and remained in disagreementlieving that it is honestly fair for them to have more of

a resource than independent advisors would judge as concerning issues of fairness at the conclusion of theexercise. In striking contrast, when debriefing subjectsfair, causing them to overharvest, which in turn results

in resource depletion. One explanation for why this who participated in the symmetric dilemma, the major-ity of subjects agreed on the equal division rule as therelationship might not exist for large commercial actors

is that it is probable that the large commercial actors’ singular truly defendable fair solution.12 The only dis-play of emotion was directed at defectors who had diffi-incentive to defect was so strong that fairness, whether

egocentrically-based or not, was overridden by self-in- culty defending their behavior, especially on the basisof fairness.terest. During the debriefing, several students in this

role indicated that although they thought it was fair Another important result of this experiment is thatcommunication in social dilemmas may serve as afor them to show self-restraint in their harvesting deci-

sions, the incentive to not cooperate was stronger. In means of reducing egocentric interpretations of fair-ness which contribute to non-cooperative behavior.addition, they felt that they would have trouble justi-

fying almost any cooperative behavior to their constitu- This result points to an additional benefit of communi-cation in social dilemmas: the reduction of egocentrismency in light of the payoff structure.

Our results suggested that egocentrism was more which was shown to be associated with harvesting.Hearing the other parties articulate the logic for distri-pronounced in asymmetric than in symmetric dilem-

mas. We argue that the reason for this lies in the addi- bution patterns that are different than one’s own ego-centrically determined patterns may lead parties to re-tional ambiguity in fairness judgments introduced in

the asymmetric social dilemmas. Suggestive of this rea- evaluate their own assessment of what would be fair,thereby decreasing harvesting levels. Future researchsoning are our results which demonstrate more ambi-

guity in fairness judgments in the asymmetric dilemma may be useful in explaining the contextual factors thatdetermine the importance of communication in asym-than in the symmetric one. In general, social dilemmas

are characterized by a significant amount of uncer- metric dilemmas.The results of this study also indicate that expecta-tainty, including uncertainty about the behavior of

other people, and, in resource dilemmas, about the na- tions of others’ behavior is related to choice behaviorin asymmetric social dilemmas. This result parallelsture of the environment (Biel & Garling, 1993). Much

real world ecological debate concerns the definition of early symmetric dilemmas research by Dawes et al.(1977) and others. However, since this relationship was‘‘safe’’ levels of resource use. It is rarely clear what

levels of resource exploitation will not endanger future not found among all individual actors, perhaps inasymmetric social dilemmas this relationship holds foraccess to it (Messick, 1991). The presence of so much

ambiguity enables judgments to be biased in a self- some, but not all, parties and this relationship dependson the payoff structure. This suggests another areaserving manner. In asymmetric dilemmas, which we

believe more closely parallel real world social dilemmas where future research might lend some insight.In interpreting these results, it is important to recog-than symmetric dilemmas, the problem is only com-

pounded by the added ambiguity of what constitutes a nize the potential lack of generalizability to real world‘‘fair’’ solution. The association between the asymmetry settings. While we made every effort to use a realisticin the dilemma and the ambiguity concerning fairness dilemma scenario, and drew on many facts related towas clear to us in comparison to the symmetric di- this scenario, we realize that our replication is not per-lemma not only through our measures of ambiguity, fect nor are our participants ‘‘real’’ fishers. If anything,but also through our discussion with the subjects after the self-interested motivation of our subjects may bethe data collection. When debriefing subjects who par- substantially less than that of real-world fishing groupsticipated in the asymmetric dilemma, there was consis- whose livelihood depends on shark harvests, and astently significant disagreement within the groups as such the magnitude of our results may be conservative.to what they believed to be a fair solution. Fairness Despite its limitations, this study points to a set ofarguments included splitting the profits equally, reduc-ing harvests by equal numbers of metric tons, reducing

12 Fifty-seven percent of the symmetric groups reported the ‘‘equalharvests by equal percentages of current harvests, re-division rule’’ (everyone harvests 625 metric tons) as the fairest solu-ducing harvests in accord with the extent to which eachtion, and those groups actually harvested according to that rule. Inassociation cared about the future of the resource, andcontrast, none of the asymmetric groups (0%) reported the equal

several permutations of these four solutions.11 Subjects division rule as the fairest solution, nor harvested according to thatrule. A x2 test comparing symmetric to asymmetric groups indicated

11 Note that each of these four solutions represented different lev- a significant difference in the number of groups who reported theequal division rule as the fairest solution (p õ .001).els of relative harvest reduction for the groups.

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factors which may be important to understanding be- believe that the other party would be biased, but thatthey were immune. However, the results of our studyhavior considered undesirable in light of the currentsuggest that communication among parties may be anenvironmental crisis. Consistent with research on am-effective method to reduce egocentric interpretationsbiguity and self-interested behavior (Hsee, 1993; Ten-of fairness which may, in turn, decrease the likelihoodbrunsel, 1995), the pervasive real-world resource di-of overharvesting and increase the probability that par-lemma represents a critical area where ambiguity en-ties come to a consensus on a solution.ables individuals to justify behavior characterizing

As a final note, we add that delayed consequenceswhat they want to do (take a larger share of a limitedis an important characteristic of the typical resourceresource) instead of what they should do (practicedilemma where group members share a common re-self-restraint in the use of the resource). Thus, the self-plenishable resource over time. Over-consumption ofserving bias allows individuals the illusion of consis-the common resource is rewarding to group memberstency between an attitude of concern for the environ-in the short run but can have deleterious consequences,ment and behavior that contradicts this concern (Baz-such as loss of future access to commons due to deple-erman, Wade-Benzoni, & Benzoni, 1996). Self-servingtion, for the group in the long run (Samuelson & Mes-biases may lead to behaviors which damage the healthsick, 1986). While fish consumers today enjoy most ofand hinder the sustainability of the natural environ-the benefit, experience minimal burden, and contributement in so far as ambiguity provides individuals withsignificantly to the problem, future generations of peo-the leeway to do what they want instead of what theyple experience minimal or no benefit, endure the major-should do. For example, since there is a lot of uncer-ity of the burden, and contribute little (or not at all) totainty about which behaviors are most important tothe creation of the problem. This temporal componentsolving environmental problems, egocentric biases maycontributes to the asymmetry in outcomes in many re-cause individuals to believe that their positive contri-source dilemmas as the present generation gains thebutions to environmental issues are more importantbenefits of consumption, leaving the burdens to futurethan the contributions of others. Similarly, equivocalgenerations. This suggests an area ripe for the futureconnections between environmental problems andstudy of egocentric interpretations of fairness, as theytheir causes can lead to self-serving assignment ofmight be expected to influence intergenerational allo-blame for environmental problems. Ambiguity enablescation decisions.individuals to perceive their own negative contribu-

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Received: February 1, 1995

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