2. 3. 4. 4 : 5. lines via fire extinguishing systems and
condensate watermakeup systems from the filtrate tanks as the water
sources lines via condensate water makeup systems from the
condensatestorage tanks as the water sources TEPCO has built a
switching facility in Unit 3 for injectingseawater into the reactor
via the residual heat removal sea watersystem. Units 1 and 2 are
not provided with such the facility because noseawater lines lead
into the reactor buildings of Units 1 and 2. 3 motor driven pump 1
diesel drivenpump procedures for coolant injection using these
lines during accidents(severe accidents)5 6. 6 Due to the total
loss of AC power supply, however, difficulties arose inassuring the
air pressure for driving the SRV necessary fordepressurization and
maintaining the excitation of the electromagneticvalves in the air
supply line, resulting in time-consumingdepressurization
operations. in this accident, as an ad hoc applicable operation,
water injection intothe reactor using a chemical fire engine that
was present at the site wasattempted. Nevertheless, since the
reactor pressure was higher than the pumpdischarge pressure of the
chemical fire engine, injection of freshwaterinto the reactor was
not available in a few cases. SRV 7. 7 8. 9. RCIC RCIC : ( ) ( , )
( ) 10. 10 10kg cm 2 12kg cm 2 3000 / 2000 (2 ) 10kg cm 2 1500 /
10kg cm 22050 / (6kg cm 2) 1200 / 70 (7kg cm 2) 9 3000 (3 ) 10kg cm
2 1500 (1.5 ) 10kg cm 2 12 10kg cm 2 10001000 (1 ) 10kg cm 2100m =
10kg cm 2= 0.98 MPa ( ) 62m,90m,51m,116m 11. ( ) SRV LOCA (1) (2)
RCIC RCIC SRV SRV RPV SRV RPV RPV11 12. RCIC RCIC RPV SRV RCIC :
RCIC RCIC ( )12 13. 14. 15 / 2TAF 0 6 / 2 ( ) Question: (SRV) 15 /
2 Answer: (SRV) 15 / 2 EOP contingence 2 RPV ADS SRVs 7 SRVs 4 SRVs
(SRV) EOP 15. 15 16. RELAP5-3D RCIC RCIC RPV (15kg/cm2) 17.
(2160gpm) PCT 1500 800gpm 18. 19. 19 RCIC For unit 2, on March
14around 18:00 due to theproblems including the airpressure for
driving SRV andthe maintaining excitation ofthe solenoid valve of
the airsupply line,the SRV wasseemed to be closed and thereactor
pressure increased.SRV condition was unclearafter March 14 around
18:00 20. -- SRV air SRV RCIC 4 SRV SRV air SRV HPCI 4 SRV 6MPa,
0.5MPa RCIC/ HPCI SRV 21. -- SRV RCIC/HPCI Hamaoka 22. 23. Because
of the total loss of the AC power supply, motor drivenvalves had to
be opened manually for the PCV ventingoperations.For operation of
pneumatically-actuated valves, thepressurized air required for
operating such valves could notbe assured, and thus a temporary air
compressor had to bemounted to assure the pressurized air.For such
reasons, the facilities could not be operated inaccordance with the
documented operation procedures forsevere accidents, which caused
the PCV venting operation tobe delayed. 24. RCIC+ 43.2 40 1 2
(exhaust stack)? 25. ( ) ( ) - 26. 2 Containment Overpressure
Protection System (COPS)which protects the containment by use of
rupture disksmounted in a line connecting the wetwell airspace to
theCOPS vent which is located on top of the Reactor Building.
Release from the wetwell airspace takes advantage of thesuppression
pool scrubbing of radioactive aerosol andparticulates. Two
isolation valves are also used to re-establish containment
integrity. 27. 28. ; ( ) 29. 30. 31. RCIC RCIC RCIC 32. SRV
(exhaust stack) 33.
