Transcript
Page 1: 2014 China-EU High Level Forum “China and EU Dialogue: Rule of Law” Subtopic reforming the System of law enforcement: development of administrative oversight

2014 China-EU High Level Forum 

“China and EU Dialogue: Rule of Law”

Subtopic reforming the System of law enforcement: development of administrative

oversight bodies as anticorruption tool

Ms. Johanna Beate Wysluch

[email protected]

Bejing, China

12th of June 2014China-Europe Public Administration Project II (CEPA II)

中欧公共管理二期项目

Page 2: 2014 China-EU High Level Forum “China and EU Dialogue: Rule of Law” Subtopic reforming the System of law enforcement: development of administrative oversight

Control of the administration and anticorruption (example:Germany)

• Rule of law in general• Administrative self control (supervision, legality and internal

revision and control)• Citizen initiatives ( right to objection and administrative

appeal)• Legal control by courts

Sanctions and IntegrityIn accordance with the rule

of law bases on

• Parliament• Civil society• Media

ParticipationEconomical and political

control is done by

• Federal supreme audit• State courts of auditors ( 16 in Germany)

AccountabilityExternal Fiscal control done

by

China-Europe Public Administration Project II (CEPA II)中欧公共管理二期项目

Page 3: 2014 China-EU High Level Forum “China and EU Dialogue: Rule of Law” Subtopic reforming the System of law enforcement: development of administrative oversight

Administrative and anticorruption control in the EU by institutions (excerpt)

• examine the accounts of all receipts and expenditures of the European Communities• informs the Commission• provides advice to the Council before new financial management regulations are

adopted• submits opinions on the financial regulation of the EC and on steps taken to combat

fraud in the EC

European Court of Auditors

Strict approach through

accountability

• investigates complaints about maladministration in EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies

• Maladministration: if an institution fails to respect fundamental rights, legal rules or principles, or the principles of good administration

• Identified fraud and corruption cases are submitted to Olaf for further investigation

European OmbudspersonSoft approach

through participation and

keeping up integrity

• investigates fraud against the EU budget, corruption and serious misconduct within the European institutions

• develops anti-fraud policy for the European Commission• Since establishment 1999 over €1.1 billion of EU money has been

recovered

European Anti Fraud Office, Olaf

Strict approach through sanctioning,

however, limitedChina-Europe Public Administration Project II (CEPA II)

中欧公共管理二期项目

Page 4: 2014 China-EU High Level Forum “China and EU Dialogue: Rule of Law” Subtopic reforming the System of law enforcement: development of administrative oversight

Olafs role and some considerations

• Till 1998 Unit for coordination for Corruption and Fraud in the EU – UCLAF depended on the European Commission (integrity scandal triggered change)

• Since 1999 part of European Commission, but totally (reconfirmed in 2005) independent in its work (independence improved quality and trust)

• Improved its information and transparency policy after criticism from European Court of Auditors in 2005

• Conducted since 1999, 3500 investigations on which as a result Euro 1.1. billion has been recovered, 335 people received sentences in member states with a total up to 900 years

• Mandate only cover administrative investigation and as follow up recommendations and monitoring of it,but no disciplinary neither criminal procedures (effective work stops at border of member states and limited by EU body responsible for disciplinary sanctions)

Establishment of European Attorney General shall close that gapChina-Europe Public Administration Project II (CEPA II)中欧公共管理二期项目

Page 5: 2014 China-EU High Level Forum “China and EU Dialogue: Rule of Law” Subtopic reforming the System of law enforcement: development of administrative oversight

• BRH is a supreme federal audit authority• as independent body of auditing only subject to the law

(independent)• Does not evaluate policy decisions made in compliance with

applicable legislation (no political interference)• Examines federal financial management (external control

mechanism)• Reports to the Houses of Parliament and federal government,

but also addresses audited bodies in management letters • Provides advice to government bodies ( prevention function)• No supervision function over state courts of audit in Laendern

China-Europe Public Administration Project II (CEPA II)中欧公共管理二期项目

External financial control at centralized level: German Bundesrechnungshof ( BRH)

Page 6: 2014 China-EU High Level Forum “China and EU Dialogue: Rule of Law” Subtopic reforming the System of law enforcement: development of administrative oversight

• From the certification of a voucher and economy audit towards a voucher unindependent and operational audit of adminstrative processes, organisations and structures;

• from the implementation audit towards the programme audit:• from the critisicm of the implementation towards criticism of

the state tasks;• from the audit based criticism towards target oriented policy

advise – through audit and at request;• from the audit of the past towards a future oriented auditing

task;

China-Europe Public Administration Project II (CEPA II)中欧公共管理二期项目

How did the state audit function change in Germany?

Page 7: 2014 China-EU High Level Forum “China and EU Dialogue: Rule of Law” Subtopic reforming the System of law enforcement: development of administrative oversight

Internal control• management tool and process along the lines of

reporting, compliance, effectiveness and risk management

• systematic approach of management

Internal audit• usually an organizational unit or function with

specific tasks• specific Function that (ideally) reports to

management

China-Europe Public Administration Project II (CEPA II)中欧公共管理二期项目

Page 8: 2014 China-EU High Level Forum “China and EU Dialogue: Rule of Law” Subtopic reforming the System of law enforcement: development of administrative oversight

Internal revision at all levels of administration and lessons learned

• not used my the whole administration neither at central nor at decentralized level – as Implementation not mandatory by law, but

recommend by BGH and 16 state courts of audit• Establismneht of IR often done without prior risk analysis

– but only a risk analysis can decide whether “small solution” like a whistleblower system is enough or whether an IR needs to be established

• IR often not directly linked to the Management– but IR is an instrument for steering and management

and not only an approach to control

China-Europe Public Administration Project II (CEPA II)中欧公共管理二期项目

Page 9: 2014 China-EU High Level Forum “China and EU Dialogue: Rule of Law” Subtopic reforming the System of law enforcement: development of administrative oversight

Hypothesis

An effective administrative oversight body – whether externally or internally – needs to be totally independent by its institution and staff, but being constantly monitored by a watchdog like an ombudsperson to be able not only to audit

but also to give political advice without any conflict of interest.

China-Europe Public Administration Project II (CEPA II)中欧公共管理二期项目


Recommended