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CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL

CM 217 – Mass Media Law

CASE DIGEST

CHRISTINA FERMIN, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, respondents

28 March 2008

Issue:

Whether or not Cristy Fermin had actual knowledge and participation is guilty of libel?

Facts of the Case:

Cristy Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-chief of Gossip Tabloid

The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it is improbable for Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be true that she is evading her conviction in an estafa case here in the Philippines for she and husband Eddie have more problems/cases to confront there. This was said to be due to their, especially Annabelle's, using fellow Filipinos’ money, failure to remit proceeds to the manufacturing company of the cookware they were selling and not being on good terms with the latter.

Annabelle Rama and Eddie Gutierrez filed libel cases against Fermin and Tugas before RTC of QC, Br. 218.

RTC: Fermin and Tugas found guilty of libel. CA: Tugas was acquitted on account of non-participation but

Fermin's conviction was affirmed. Fermin's motion for reconsideration was denied. She argues that

she had no knowledge and participation in the publication of the article, that the article is not libelous and is covered by the freedom of the press.

Ruling of the Case:

HELD: YES.

Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication is not required, since Fermin has been specifically identified as “author, editor, or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication but also the “president” and “chairperson.” Thus, petitioner’s criminal guilt should be affirmed,

The elements of libel were present.

o Evident imputation of the crime of malversation (converting money for personal use), of vices or

defects for being fugitives from the law (evading prosecution in America) and of being a wastrel

o Attribution made publicly. Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation.

o The victims were identified and identifiable.

o The article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants.

Malice in law - the article was malicious in itself; the imputations were false.

Malice in fact - there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign as Fermin is a close friend of Eddie's opponent in the Congressional race

While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, journalists do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.

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G.R. No. L-6465

January 31, 1955

NORBERTO QUISUMBING, petitioner-appellant, vs.

EUGENIO LOPEZ, ET AL., respondents-appellees

ISSUE:

Whether or not The Manila Chronicle’s published article with a malicious headline is liable of libel?

FACTS:

1. The respondents Eugenio Lopez, Ernesto del Rosario and Roberto Villanueva are the publisher, editor-in-chief, and general manager respectively of The Manila Chronicle, a daily newspaper published and circulated in English in the City of Manila. On July 15, 1949, the petitioner, Norberto Quisumbing, filed a complaint against said re-spondents in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages in the sum of P50,000 as a result of the following al-leged libelous publication in The Manila Chronicle of November 7, 1947.

“NBI MEN RAID OFFICES OF 3 CITY USURERS"

2. After answer and trial the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment dismissing the complaint from which the petitioner ap-pealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter Court, in its decision pro-mulgated on January 19, 1953, affirmed the judgment of the court of origin; and the case is now before us on petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner.

3. The Court of Appeals found "that the context of the article in ques-tion, is a fair, impartial and true report of official or public pro-ceeding authorized by law. The news item was the result of a press release in connection with an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division, N.B.I., and was a substantial, if not a faithful repro-duction of the said press release which was, in turn, an accurate re-port of the official proceedings taken by the Anti-Usury Division. The article merely reported a raid on the 'business offices of three alleged money lenders'; and related the steps actually taken or to be taken by the proper officials relative to the investigation. It did not go beyond the actual report of official actuations.

RULING OF THE CASE:

HELD

1) NO. The elements of libel are NOT present.

i) Headlines which are voluntarily defamatory statements of the publisher are not privileged even though they head a privileged report of a judicial or other public proceedings. It is not neces-sary to reiterate the rule that the headline of an article might be libelous while the body of the article is privileged. The whole li-bel might be included in the headlines.

A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. So, the whole item, including display lines, should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined.

ii) The headline of an article or paragraph, being so conspicuous as to attract the attention of persons who look casually over a paper without carefully reading all its contents, may in itself in-flict very serious injury upon a person, both because it may be the only part of the article which is read, and because it may

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cast a graver imputation than all the other words following it. There is no doubt that in publications concerning private per-sons, as well as in all other publications which are claimed to be libelous, the headlines directing the attention to the pub-lication may be considered as a part of it and may even justify a court in regarding the publication as libelous when the body of the article is not necessarily so.

iii) If so, the petitioner's positions would be untenable, since by reading merely the headline in question nobody would even suspect that the petitioner was referred to; and "libel cannot be committed except against somebody and that some-body must be properly identified". It may be insisted that the identity of the petitioner is revealed in the body of the news item, but we should remember that nowhere in the context is the petitioner portrayed as one charged with or convicted of the crime of usury.

Third Element: The Person libeled must be identified. (Identity of victim)

This means the complainant or plaintiff must prove he is the person subject of the libelous matter, that it his reputation which was targeted.

This element is established by the testimony of witnesses if the complainant was not directly mentioned by name. They must be the public or third persons who can identify the complainant as the person subject of the libel. If third persons cannot say it is the plaintiff or complainant who is the subject, then it cannot be said that plaintiff’s name has been tarnished.

2) The Court of Appeals found as a fact that "there is no evidence in the record to prove that the publication of the news item under consid-eration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was

intention to do harm," and that on the other hand there was "an hon-est and high sense of duty to serve the best interests of the public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none."

Matters Considered Privileged By Jurisprudence

Fair Comments on Matters of Public Interest

(a) In Borjal vs. Ct. of Appeals, (301 SCRA 1, Jan. 14, 1999) it was held that the enumeration in Article 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications because “fair comments on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander”

(b). They refer to events, developments, or matters in which the public as a whole has a legitimate interest.

Truth And Good Motives or Justifiable Ends.

A. It is not enough that what was publicized about another is true. The accused must also prove good motives or intentions and justifiable ends, in order to disprove malice.

B. This defense is available only if: (a) What is imputed to another is a crime regardless if the victim is a private or public person or (ii) if the victim is a public officer regardless of whether a crime is imputed, so long as it relates to the discharge of their official duties

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G.R. No. L-16027

May 30, 1962

LUMEN POLICARPIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE MANILA TIMES PUB. CO., INC., CONSTANTE C. ROLDAN, MANUEL V. VILLA-REAL, E.

AGUILAR CRUZ and CONSORCIO BORJE, defendant-appellees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of having published libelous/defamatory articles?

FACTS:

Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO Nat’l Commission. As such, she had filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her subordinates in the Commission, & caused the latter to be sepa-rated from the service. Reyes, in turn, filed counter-charges which were referred for investigation. Pending completion, Reyes filed a complaint against Policarpio for alleged malversation of public funds & another complaint for estafa thru falsification of public doc-uments.

Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing Co. for pub-lishing two defamatory, libelous and false articles/news items in Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956 and in the Daily Mirror of Au-gust 13, 1956.

Saturday Mirror (Aug 11, 1956):

“WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED

PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDS

Unesco Official Head Accused on Supplies, Funds Use by Colleague”

Daily Mirror (Aug 13, 1956):

“PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS AGAINST POLICARPIO

Alba Probes Administrative Phase of Fraud Charges Against Unesco Woman Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz of Criminal Suit on Aug 22”

The articles contain news on Reyes’ charges against Policarpio for having malversed public property and of having fraudulently sought reimbursement of supposed official expenses. It was said that Poli-carpio used several sheets of government stencils for her private and personal use. The other charge refers to the supposed reim-bursements she had made for a trip to Quezon and

Pangasinan. Reyes’ complaint alleged that Policarpio had asked for refund of expenses for use of her car when she had actually made the trip aboard an army plane. Policarpio was said to be absent from the Bayambang conference for which she also sought a refund of expenses.

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CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not proven that defendants had acted maliciously in publishing the arti-cles, although portions thereof were inaccurate or false.

RULING OF THE CASE:

The headline of the Aug 11 article was given prominence with a 6-column (about 11 inches) banner headline of 1-inch types. Its sub-title – ‘PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud” – printed in bold 1 cm type is not true. Also, the statement in the 1st paragraph of the article, to the effect that plaintiff “was charged with malversation & estafa by the Pres’l Complaint & Action Commission” (PCAC) is not true, the complaints for said offenses having been filed by Reyes. Neither is it true that said “criminal action was initiated as a result of current administrative investigation.”

PLAINTIFF maintains that the effect of these false statements was to give the general impression that said investigation by Col. Alba had shown that plaintiff was guilty and that, as a consequence, PCAC had filed the corresponding complaints w/ the fiscal’s office. She also said that the article did not mention that fact that the num-ber of stencils involved in the charge was only 18 or 20; that the sum allegedly misappropriated by her was only P54, and that the falsification imputed to her was said to have been committed by claiming that certain expenses for which she had sought reimburse-ment were incurred in trips during the period from July 1 – Sept 30 1955, although the trips actually were made from Jul 8-Aug 31, 1955. By omitting these details, plaintiff avers that the Aug 11 arti-cle had the effect of conveying the idea that the offenses imputed to her were more serious than they really were.

DEFENDANTS contend that though the complaints were filed, not by the PCAC but by Reyes, this inaccuracy is insignificant & imma-

terial to the case for the fact is that said complaints were filed. As regards the number of sheets & the nature of the falsification charged, they argue that these “details” do not affect the truthful-ness of the article as a whole. Besides, defendants had no means of knowing such “details.”SC: Prior to Aug 11, Col. Alba had already taken the testimony of witnesses; hence, defendants could have ascertained the “details” had they wanted to. The number of stencil sheets used was actually mentioned in the Aug 13 article.

Moreover, the penalty for estafa/embezzlement depends partly upon the amount of the damage caused to the offended party. Hence, the amount or value of the property embezzled is material to said offense.

It is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints by another agency of the Govt, like the PCAC, particularly after an investigation con-ducted by the same, imparts the ideal that the probability of guilt is greater than when the complaints are filed by a private individual, wspecially when the latter is a former subordinate of the alleged of-fender, who was responsible for the dismissal of the complainant from her employment.

Newspapers must enjoy a certain degrees of discretion in deter-mining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspapers may publish news items relative to judicial, leg-islative or other official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication con-taining derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any com-ments or remarks.

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Art. 354, RPC provides:“Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even if it be true, if no good intention & justifiable motive for making it is shown, except, “A fair and true report, made in good faith, w/o any comments or remarks….”

In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the Aug 11 article presented her in a worse predica-ment than that in which she, in fact was. Said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings therein alluded to. What is more, its sub-title “PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud” is a comment or re-mark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said article are “presumed to be malicious”

In falsely stating that the complaints were filed by PCAC, either de-fendants knew the truth or they did not. If they did, then the publica-tion would actually be malicious. I f they did not, or if they acted un-der a misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of negligence in making said statement.

We note that the Aug 13 article rectified a major inaccuracy in the 1st article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed the complaints. It likewise indicated the number of stencil sheets involved. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the Aug 11 article, although it should mitigate it.

HELD: Decision reversed. Defendants ordered to pay plaintiff moral damages, atty’s fees plus cost.

G.R. No. 133575.

December 15, 2000

JUDGE MARTIN A. OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. SUN-STAR PUBLISHING, INC., Respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not on the basis of the facts admitted in the pleadings and Respondents affidavits submitted to the Court a quo Petitioner is entitled to a judgment for civil libel as a matter of law considering that only a preponderance of evidence is required to prove Respondents liability?

FACTS:

1. Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the April 20, 1998 Decision[1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 57, which dismissed petitioners Complaint for Libel.

2. Petitioner is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. He filed a Complaint[2 for Libel on account of two articles which appeared in the August 28, 1997 and August 30, 1997 issues of Sun-Star Daily, a provincial newspaper published and circulated by respondent in Cebu.

The August 28, 1997 article, which appeared on pages two (2) and twenty two (22) of the aforesaid newspaper, reads in full as follows

Judge Ocampo facing graft raps at Ombud chanrobles virtual law library

3. BRANCH 7 Judge Martin Ocampo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) faces graft charges before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas.Ocampo, in an interview yesterday, down-played the

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http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2000/dec2000/133575.php#_edn2



filing of the case saying it is natural for the losing party to hate the judge. He considers the case as pure harassment.

4. Instead, Tan said, Judge Ocampo adjudged counsel Tagra guilty of direct contempt on May 9, 1997 for filing a motion for reconsidera-tion to the order granting the relief.

5. The August 30, 1997 article, appearing on pages two (2) and twenty six (26) of the paper, reads

No jurisdiction, says Judge on Ombudsman

6. Judge Ocampo, in a letter to Sun-Star Daily, complained that the news report was libelous and damaging to his reputation. He said the paper should have known better that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate the case, only the Supreme Court.

7. Sun-Star Daily delayed publication for one day to get the judges comment. He was quoted in the report as describing the case as pure harassment and part of the professional hazards of a judge.

RULING OF THE CASE:

1. While the law presumes every defamatory imputation to be mali-cious, there are exceptions to this general rule, set forth in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code,

ART. 354. Requirement of publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

2. First , the articles complained of are fair and true reports of a judi-cial/administrative proceeding, which is not confidential in nature. They quote directly from the affidavit-complaint filed before the Om-budsman. Indeed, a perusal of the first article would readily show that it merely reported the filing of graft charges against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas. In so report-ing, the article quoted from the affidavit-complaint filed by the com-plainant lawyer, Elias Tan, and narrated the antecedent facts lead-ing to the filing of the graft charges. On the other hand, the second article presented petitioners own reactions against the graft charges filed against him; with explanatory statements from Office of the Ombudsman Director Virginia Santiago refuting petitioners claims that the said office had no jurisdiction over graft charges against judges for alleged violations of judicial canons.

Second, there were no comments or remarks made by the reporter of private respondent in both instances. The articles were pure reports of the graft charges filed against petitioner.

Third, they were both fair reports. The fairness and balance exercised by private respondent is evident in the fact that petitioner was given a chance to air his side on the graft charges filed against him. In fact, before the first article was published, private respondents reporter took pains to interview petitioner on the matter; and his reactions were equally published in both articles.

Finally, the reports were also true accounts of a newsworthy event, the filing of graft charges against a local judge. It cannot be denied that petitioner did face graft raps at the Ombudsman as the complaint filed against him was for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Neither can the narration in

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the articles be denied as these were merely culled from the subject affidavit-complaint.

3. Petitioner cannot insist that the case against him is confidential in nature because it has already been ruled that complaints are public records which may be published as such unless the Court directs otherwise in the interest of morality or decency. Neither should the case of In Re: Abistado, relied upon by petitioner, be applied to the instant case since, unlike In Re: Abistado where the proceed-ings were on charges of malpractice against a lawyer which are confidential in nature, the charge filed before the Ombudsman against petitioner is not administrative in nature, such as to fall un-der the confidentiality rule of the Rules of Court, but criminal in na-ture, being a graft charge under Republic Act No. 3019. Unlike the proceedings in this Court, which expressly mandates that its disci-plinary proceedings for lawyers and judges are confidential in na-ture, the Office of the Ombudsman has no such confidentiality rule.

4. While the administrative nature of proceedings before us allows the protection of the personal and professional reputation of our col-leagues in the profession of law and justice against baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible clients and liti-gants, the criminal nature of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not allow the same protection to our brethren in the judi-ciary, who are placed on the same level, without distinction, as other government employees. Violations of this law partake of an infinitely more serious nature, touching as it does on what has been perceived to be an endemic social cancer eroding our system of government. It cannot be denied that this is a matter in which the public has a legitimate interest and as such, media must be free to report thereon.

G.R. No. 164437

May 15, 2009

HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA,

petitioner, vs.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., LETTY JIMENEZ MAGSANOC, ROSAURO G. ACOSTA, JOSE MARIA NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR., RAFAEL CHEEKEE, and MANILA DAILY BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION,

NAPOLEON G. RAMA, BEN F. RODRIGUEZ, ARTHUR S. SALES, CRIS J. ICBAN, JR.,

respondents.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner is required to prove malice to be entitled to damages?

2. Whether or not the respondents are liable for malicious and imputing statements to the petitioner?

FACTS:

1. Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Ori-

ental during the May 11, 1992 elections.

2. Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent

Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin) pub-

lished the following story:

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The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayor’s office of Bais City.

A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992,

respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came

out with a similar story, to wit:

The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the mayors office in the city.

3. On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as

scheduled. When results came out, it turned out that petitioner

failed in his mayoralty bid.

4. Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the

above-quoted stories, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila

Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for damages before

the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the articles were maliciously

timed to defeat him. He claimed he should have won by landslide,

but his supporters reportedly believed the news items distributed by

his rivals and voted for other candidates. He asked for actual dam-

ages of P270,000 for the amount he spent for the campaign, moral

damages of P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of exemplary

damages, attorney’s fees of P300,000 and costs of suit.

5. Respondents disclaimed liability. They asserted that no malice can

be attributed to them as they did not know petitioner and had no in-

terest in the outcome of the election, stressing that the stories were

privileged in nature.

6. On April 18, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of pe-

titioner that the defendants Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and

Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation with their respective

officers are liable [for] damages to plaintiff:

1. As moral damages, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and the Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation are ordered to pay P1,000,000.00 each to plaintiff; 2. Both defendants are likewise ordered to pay an exemplary damage in the amount of P500,000.00 each; 3. To pay plaintiff’s attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00 4. And to pay the costs.

7. This petition for review on certiorari assails the Amended Decision

dated May 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.

54134, reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. 206-

B, which had awarded damages to petitioner for respondents false

reporting.

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RULING OF THE CASE:1. YES. The news items derogatory and injurious to petitioner’s repu-

tation and candidacy. It faulted respondents for failing to verify the

truth of the news tips they published and held respondents liable for

negligence, citing Policarpio v. Manila Times Pub. Co., Inc. the

news items lacked truth and fairness, they were not privileged com-

munications.

2. Although the stories were false and not privileged, as there is no

proof they were obtained from a press conference or release, re-

spondents were not impelled by malice or improper motive. There

was also no proof that petitioner’s supporters junked him due to the

reports. Neither was there any proof he would win, making his ac-

tion unfounded.

3. YES. Petitioner argues that his cause of action is based on quasi-

delict which only requires proof of fault or negligence, not proof of

malice beyond reasonable doubt as required in a criminal prosecu-

tion for libel. He argues that the case is entirely different and sepa-

rate from an independent civil action arising from libel under Article

100 of the Revised Penal Code. He claims he proffered proofs sus-

taining his claim for damages under quasi-delict, not under the law

on libel, as malice is hard to prove. He stresses that nowhere in the

complaint did he mention libel, and nothing in his complaint shows

that his cause of action had some shade of libel as defined in the

Revised Penal Code. He also did not hint a resort to a criminal pro-

ceeding for libel.

4. PDI and its officers argue that petitioner’s complaint clearly lays a

cause of action arising from libel as it highlights malice underlying

the publications. And as malice is an element of libel, the appellate

court committed no error in characterizing the case as one arising

from libel.

G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999

ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petition-ers, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, respondents.

Facts:

1. A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing and pub-lishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be

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launch concerning resolving matters on transportation cri-sis that is tainted with anomalous activities.

2. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the arti-cles nor was the conference he was organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respon-dent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of Ap-peals. A petition for review was filed before the SC con-tending that private respondent was not sufficiently identi-fied to be the subject of the published articles.

Issue:

Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel?

Ruling of the Case:

1. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be iden-tifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third per-son could identify him as the object of the libelous publica-tion. These requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability was not met since it was Wences-laso who revealed he was the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.

2. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.

The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.

3. The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the conference, the composition of its mem-bers and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public fig-ure and even otherwise is involved in a public issue. The court held that freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and pro-tected with the reminder among media members to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise thereof.

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A privileged communication may be either:

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1. Absolutely privileged communication à those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.

2. Qualifiedly privileged communications à those containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks."

G.R. No. 135306

January 28, 2003

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., petitioners,

vs.ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,

ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO,

respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an existence of the elements of libel in the

Bulgar article.

FACTS:

1. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organiza-tions, and some individual Muslims field in the RTC of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in be-half of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICA-TIONS, INC and some its staff arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.

2. The complaint:

a) The statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims;

b) that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations;

c) that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.

3. MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. and BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, contended that the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.

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4. The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that Islamic Da’wah et al. failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. The alleged libelous article refers to the larger collectivity of Muslims for which the readers of the libel could not readily identify the personalities of the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an individual Muslim member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him.

5. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. It opined that it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. This libelous imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the same religious beliefs." It added that the suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all Muslims.

6. MVRS brought the issue to the SC.

RULING OF THE CASE:

HELD

The article was not libelous. Petition GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the RTC was reinstated.

1. There was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community. Each has a varying interest and a divergent political and religious view. There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

2. Defamation, which includes libel (in general, written) and slander (in general, oral), means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.

3. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages.

4. Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.

5. The SC used the reasoning in Newsweek v IAC: where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately.

6. The SC cited some US cases wherein the rule on libel has been restrictive. It was held that there could be no libel against an extensive community in common law. With regard to the largest sectors in society, including religious groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action at the behest of the state, or civil action on behalf of

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the individual, will lie.

7. "Emotional distress" tort action has no application in this case because no particular individual was identified in the Bulgar article. "Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. This kind of tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. Under the Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that:

(a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;

(b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous;

(c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress;

(d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.

8. "Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. The actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

9. Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. Intentional tort causing emotional distress must necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free speech.

10. Respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by

the filing of a class suit. An element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider:

(a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class;

(b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and,

(c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity.

Richard Gutierrez, petitioner vs. Jo-Ann Maglipon, editor in chief of PEP, respondent

ISSUE:

Whether or not Maglipon is liable of malicious published articles on PEP website?

Whether or not PEP’s apology constitutes and or mitigate the libel suit from Guttierrez?

FACTS:

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1. Actor Richard Gutierrez filed on Monday a P25-million libel com-plaint at the Makati City Prosecutor's Office against the editor-in-chief of a showbiz website.

2. The lead actor of GMA-7's "Zorro," who arrived past 2 p.m. with his family, claimed that Jo-Ann Maglipon, editor in chief of Philippine Entertainment Portal, and two others, maliciously published an arti-cle on March 29 that accused him of being in a gun-toting incident with actor Michael Flores.

3. Gutierrez said that as an endorser of several brands, the article dis-credited him by portraying him as a "troublemaker" when "no such incident took place."

4. Also named as respondents in the five-page complaint were Karen Pagsolingan, PEP managing editor and Ferdinand Godinez, staff writer.

5. PEP earlier posted an apology on its website, acknowledging its mistake of posting the story on the alleged gun-toting incident with-out getting the statements of Gutierrez and Flores.

6. Maglipon said that Gutierrez’s mother and manager, Annabelle Rama, had agreed not to press charges against PEP if they would issue an apologize on the website.

7. Actor Richard Gutierrez has lost his legal battle with Philippine En-tertainment Portal (PEP) after the Department of Justice (DOJ) dis-missed the libel suit he filed against the entertainment Web site.

RULING OF THE CASE:

1. The Associate Prosecutor Mary Jane Sytat, cited "lack of probable cause" in dismissing Gutierrez’s libel complaint against editor-in-chief Jo-Ann Maglipon, managing editor Karen Pagsolingan and writer Ferdinand "Bong" Godinez.

2. The resolution acknowledged that PEP committed a lapse when it published a story on the gun-toting incident allegedly involving Gutierrez and fellow actor Michael Flores in March. The article, Gutierrez complained, gave an impression that he was a trouble-maker.

3. The resolution, however, opposed the actor's argument, maintain-ing that PEP's "lapse" did not constitute an “imputation of a discred-itable act or condition to another.”

“No evidence was presented which would prove that a reasonable mind, in this case that of the public or the readers, would believe that complainant was a trouble-maker based on the statements in the questioned article,” the resolution said.

4. The resolution also pointed out that the complainant failed to prove that the publication of the PEP article “was attended with malice.”

Malice in Fact or Malice as a Fact. -. It is the malice which must be proven by the plaintiff. He must prove the purpose of the accused is to malign or harm or injure his reputa-tion. This arises either because:

(i) the article is not defamatory on its face or if libelous it is ambiguous

(ii) the accused was able to overcome the presumption of malice.

5. YES. It cited Maglipon’s apology and order to immediately pullout the article and PEP’s attempt to get Flores’ side of the story as “suf-ficient evidence to show that the respondents have no desire to de-liberately injure the reputation of the complainant.”

CASE DIGEST

GR Nos. 161032 and 161176

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http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/entertainment/04/13/09/update-richard-gutierrez-files-p25-m-libel-case-vs-pep



Attorney Ding So of the Bureau of Customs, petitioner vs. Erwin Tulfo,respondent

16 September 2008

Facts :

1. In the column entitled “Direct Hit” published in the daily tabloid Remate, the said column was accusing Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of Customs of corruption. On the pub-lished article Atty. So was portrayed as an extortionist and a smuggler.

2. Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed a libel suit in four separate information against Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay of Remate.

3. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found Tulfo guilty of li-bel. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issues :

1. Whether or not Tulfo is guilty of false and malicious imputations in his column in Remate.

2. Whether or not the assailed articles are privileged.3. Whether or not the assailed articles are fair commentaries.

Ruling of the Case :

1. YES, For the ruling in Borjal case was not applied to this libel case:

a. The case was based on a criminal case.b. There was sufficient identification of the complainant.c. The subject was not a private citizen, in this case, the sub-

ject is a public official.d. In this case it is not in the scope of “fair commentaries

on matters of public interest.”

2. NO. The columns were mere trivialized and editorialized, the col-umns don’t have evidences to substantiate the claims and attacks to Atty. So. The articles cannot be privileged simply because the target was a public official.

a. Tulfo made no effort to verify the information given by his source or even to ascertain the identity of the person he was accusing.

b. Tulfo abandoned the “consistent with good faith and reasonable care” when he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story and instead misinforming the public.

c. Tulfo had written and published the articles with reckless disregard of whether the same were false or not.

d. Evidence of malice: The fact that Tulfo continuously pub-lished articles lambasting Atty. So after the commence-ment of an action. This is a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and is proof of malice.

3. NO. Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before publication. Moreover he added facts based on his stan-dards of veracity.

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a. The absence of details of the acts committed by the sub-ject. These are plain and simple and mere “gossip” accu-sations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source.

Journalists do not rely on fictions instead on truth. There must be some foundation to their reports; these reports must be warranted by facts.

b. The columns of Tulfo are not fair and true. Tulfo failed to do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless.

Velasco, Jr., J:Elements of fair commentary (to be considered privileged):

a. That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential na-ture, or of a statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public offi-cer in the exercise of his functions;

b. That it is made in good faith;c. That it is without any comments or remarks.

Joseph Ejercito Estrada, petitioner vs. Philippine Daily Inquirer and Alfonso Yuchengco,

ISSUES:

Whether or not Yuchengco is liable of imputations and allegations detrimental to Estrada?

Whether or not the Philippine Daily Inquirer is liable of false and malicious statements against Estrada?

FACTS:

1. Former President Joseph Estrada filed yesterday a libel suit against business tycoon Alfonso Yuchengco and the Philippine Daily In-quirer over allegations that he coerced the businessman to sell his shares in the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT), the country’s largest telecommunications firm.

2. In his six-page complaint Estrada also named as respondents Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) publisher Isagani Yambot, editor-in-chief Letty Jimenez-Magsanoc and reporters Daxim Lucas, Chris-tine Avendano and Doris Dumlao.

PDI published the story entitled “Erap bullied me, says Yuchengco-Taipan confirms coercion in PLDT deal,” which was based on a privilege speech delivered by Sena-tor Panfilo Lacson last Monday.

3. In filing the complaint, Estrada denied Yuchengco’s allegation and said the news report was based on false and malicious statements.

4. The former president said in his complaint. “Respondent Yuchengco’s statements imputing to me the commission of serious crimes are mere fabrications. I vehemently deny having committed any unlawful or criminal act against respondent Yuchengco or the members of his family in relation to the sale made by the respon-dent of his Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corp. (PTIC)/PLDT shares in favor of First Pacific (First Pacific Co. Ltd),”

5. As to the liability of the Inquirer, Estrada said the respondents caused the printing, publication and circulation of false and mali-cious statements without first validating them.

6. Estrada asked P10 million to P20 million worth of damages.

7. February 22, 2010 the CA dismissed the libel suit to PDI.

RULING OF THE CASE:

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1. In dismissing the libel case, the Justice department pointed that Yuchengco never said that Estrada intimated and threat-ened him to sell his PLDT shares.

“The questioned statement can be interpreted in no other way than that Yuchengco’s shareholdings in PTIC were taken from him through intimidation and threats to himself, his family and his businesses.

2. Yuchengco did not cast any aspersion on complainant Estrada’s or any other person’s character, integrity and reputa-tion,” the ruling said.

The resolution further said that Yuchengco statement was priv-ileged in nature because it constitutes fair comment on matters of public interest.

Matters Considered Privileged By Jurisprudence

1. Fair Comments on Matters of Public Interest

(a) In Borjal vs. Ct. of Appeals, (301 SCRA 1, Jan. 14, 1999) it was held that the enumeration in Article 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications because “fair comments on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for li-bel or slander”

(b). They refer to events, developments, or matters in which the public as a whole has a legitimate interest.

3. “Since the privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice, the onus of proving actual malice lies on complainant Estrada [but] no malice can be presumed from the questioned statement because complainant is a public figure,” the Justice department said.

Doctrine of Privilege Communication

Qualifiedly/Conditionally Privileged Communication: this refers to communications in which the law presumes the absence of malice, thus they are initially not actionable. The burden therefore is on the plaintiff to prove the exis-tence of actual malice.

4. It added that Estrada failed to prove that Yuchengco was prompted by personal ill-will to inflict harm on the latter’s repu-tation in circulating the questioned statement.

5. In the same resolution, the Justice department also dismissed the charges against the PDI editors and reporters, saying that Estrada has not shown the falsity of the contents of the news report or that respondents were aware that they were false or that there was reckless disregard as to whether the statements were false or not.

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