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FO RMS OF COLLABO RATION WITH THE ENE
DURING THE FIRST GREEK WAR OF LIBERAT
Ja h n A. Pet TOp U los
The basic facts contained in this essay, drawn from published
na l and secondary sources, have long been known to specia list s
field of modern Greekhistory. However, almost noone has addresse
self specifically to the phenomenon ofcollaborat ion with the enem
ing the first Greek war of l iberat ion.! Itwill be the thesi s of th i
that, though limited in its numerical incidence and confined to only
types of dealings with the enemy, actual col laboration and the p
for further col laboration was a natural outgrowth of inherited at
and systems, a recurrent problem which the Greek insurgent leade
to confront, and a factor reflecting and affecting the nature of t
itself.
"Col laborat ion" i s perhaps an unfor tuna te te rm for use in a
nineteenth century context because of its close association w
events ofthe Second World War, when conditions were markedly dif
In the context of the Greek l iberat ion struggle of the 1820's, freq
used te rms for such a phenomenon were hypotage (submission) or
nesis (submission or homage), with kapok or kapaki referring to th
of submission negot ia ted by a member of the Greek rul ing e li te w
toman officialdom and buyurdi or proskyrwchartion designating
certificates ofamnesty issued to the common Greeks or their local l
Regardless o f the word used , the phenomenon is one involving
or indirect contact with the enemy and explici t or implici t ackno
ment of the enemy's authori ty.
Yet there are dis tinguishable types ofsuch behavior. Two I m
1. The notable exception is Takes Arg. Stamatopoulos in the following
limited to the Peloponnese: To Il (}o(Juvv"f j fJ .r.l ( l " 1 : o MW! /I IL. [Submission in the
the Grea t Danger of 1821J (Athens, 1953), reprinted under the title Of ToV (pwn
VrJP . i vO luill 6 KOJ.o~OTeWVrJ~ [The Submitters to the Turks a n d K o lo k o tr o ne s ] (
197ft), and "NEVbtQ< ; , 6 1 t "p o O " X\ l \I " lJ td VO t ; " T OU E b w at &VC l" ["Nenekos, the Submi
'21"J, I leMm ov v rw l U. u ~ I le w T ox e ov u l [Peloponnesian New YearJ III (1959), 18
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132 J 0 h n A. Pet r 0p u losFORMS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY
only to di spense with them. The f ir st was not unimpor tant or inf requent
and i t was completely patriot ic in intent. Itwas the act of submiss ion as
a temporary stratagem, undertaken under mil itary duress in order to gain
t ime for strengthening the resis tance. Itwas sanct ioned by representa-
tives ofthe Greek insurgent government and entered into with nointention
of carrying out its t erms. For inst ance, in September 1822, Alexander
Mavrokorda tos, pol it ical head of west Rumely, commissioned GeorgeVarnakiotes, an inf luent ia l chie fta in, t o negoti at e with Orner Vr ion i,
pasha of Yannina , in order to foresta ll an Ottoman mil ita ry campaign for
that season.t
The second type ofbehavior concerns Greek women captured by the
enemy in warfare and parceled ou t to enemy sold ie rs as concubines and
wives. Jules Mangeart, who partic ipat ed in the French mil ita ry expedi-
tion sent by the protecting powers in 1828 to evacuate Ibrahim Pasha 's
fo rces f rom the Peloponnese , expressed shock in his memoi rs tha t these
women freely chose to expatriate themselves and continue l iving under
non-Greek rule. The phenomenon repeated i tself in all the fortresses evac-
uated - Modon, Karon, Navarino, Patras, and Rion.8 Had he been fa-
mi lia r with Greek t radi ti ons and soc ia l va lues, he wou ld have real ized
that their lossof virgini ty condemned them to pariah status sofar asother
avai lable husbands were concerned and that loya lty to husband, even ifonly of the common- law varie ty, took precedence over loya lty to par-
ents or attachment to country.
The types of submission which are o fmajor concern in this essay are
those which are in some sense reprehensible from the nat ionalist point of
view. There are th ree bas ic crite ria in t erms of which to judge deg rees o f
reprehensibil ity. First , did col laboration involve mere contact with. the
enemy whi le remaining active in the Greek cause , or con tact combined
with withdrawal f rom the liberation struggle , or active partic ipat ion in
the enemy's attempt to suppress the revolt? Second, did withdrawal
f rom the Greek side take p lace when organ ized mil it ary res ist ance was
running in favor of the Greeks, in favor of the Ottomans, or not yet in
e ither di rection? Fina lly , did submission to the enemy take plac
considerations of mere survival for oneself and one's family, from
minat ion to retain the social and economic gains achieved in pr
tion times, or for reasons of self-advancement and self-agg
ment? Since persona l and family su rv iva l requi red mere withdra
hind the Greek l ines or, inthe event ofult imate fai lure ofthe Gree
migration abroad, collaboration generally stemmed from consid
of more than mere su rv iva l.On the basi s o f these cr it er ia, we can proceed to examine f
types of coll aborat ion in the insu rgent provinces . One is wi thdr
support from the Greek cause or active help to the Ottoman cau
Greek fortunes were in the ascendant. There are no notable cases
type on record. Individual spies .there were, but the evidence wo
gest that such spies were Greeks not nat ive to the l iberated provi
rather indigenous to regions where Ottoman rule prevailed.! The
ing fou r types did occu r: (1) mere withdrawal f rom the Greek cam
the mi lit ary outcome in the region was in doubt (Stournares and
kakes); (2) active help to the enemy when the military outcome
region was in doubt (Bakolas, Koutalidas, Vamakiotes, and Nene
mere acquiescence when the Ottomans reestablished control and o
f ight ing ceased (vi rtua lly a ll the chieft ains o f West Rumely in
and (4) keeping open lines of communications with the enem
whil e par tic ipa ting actively in the Greek cause , as a type of in
against the consequences of possible Greek defeat.
In some cases, col laboration involved the desire to make gain
expense of one's rivals or the attempt to ward off the inroads
rivals, but, as the four basic types suggest, all cases were at t
leas t motiva ted by a reluc tance to wi thd raw from one 's local ha
seriously risk the necessity of such withdrawal. Such reluctance w
upon a reali sti c apprai sa l of what wi thd rawal would probably
As Souliotes in west Rumely and west rumeliot re fugees in the
isl and of Kalamos d iscovered, the insurgent Greek s ta te had ne i
material resources nor the administrative capability to prov
such displaced persons. The hard-pressed and impoverished inh2. Dionvsios A. Kokkinos, ' H ' E. U 1p I 1H t) 'E n av d lJ T ao " ~ [ T he G r ee k Revolution]
(At hens, 1956-1960 ), V , 210- 213, and Thomas Gordon, H isto ry o f t he Gree k Revo -lution (London , 1832 ), I , t,55-t,,56.
3. Jules Mangeart, Souvenirs de la Moree reeue il li s pendant lesejour des Francais
dans le Peloponnese (Paris, 1830), also in Greek translation by G. Tsoukalas under the
same t it le in volume XX, 43, t ,,9-50 ,59, 68·71,77, in the ser ies ent it led' Ano!lV1JflO11BV-
flam T W V ' A Y W VI O'T W V T oV '21 [Memoirs of the Fighters of '21J, ed. Emmanuel Proto '
psa ltes , 20 vols. (Athens , 1956-1959).
4 . Re fe ren ce s t o i ndi vi dual s pi es o ccu r h aphaz ar dl y and o ft en wi thout
i dent if ic at ion i n s cat te re d o ri gi na l s ou rce s and have yet t o be col lec te d and
sys tema ti cal ly f or aut henti ca te d j udgment on t hi s poi nt . S ee , f or i ns ta nc e,
' A ex e 1o v L ll O vv O '[ ov PW fla [Histo rical A rchiv e o f D io nqsio s Ro masJ (Athens ,
199 ,231; and Geo rge C .Arnaki s and Eurydi ce Deme tra copoul ou, e ds ., Geo
(Thessaloniki, 1965), 127, 206.
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13 4 J 0 h n A. Pet r 0 p U los FORMS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY
of regions into which refugees came often resented their presence if they
were penniless or fleeced them if they were not .s Even when th is was not
the case, the cond iti on o fmost refugees meant dependence on others and
a st ruggle for su rvival . As for the e li te groups, withdrawal th reatened to
deprive them oftheir privi leged status, which depended on the possession
o f a te rr it or ia l base providing both dependent s and resources for sup-
por ti ng these dependen ts , or i t p laced them in a posit ion o f tot al depen-
dence on the nat ional Greek government for pay, posit ion, and power.
In to these calcula tions en te red what I be lieve to have been the tra-
dit ional not ions of freedom, conceived either as the possession of privi-
lege and immunity from the impositions of a central government or as
the appropriation ofthe central government i tself. Tokeep central author-
ity at a distance or appropriate it for one's group often depended on an
independent power base in one's region. All the col laborators referred to
in thi s essay ini tia lly served in the Greek cause , bu t most fought mainly
in their home districts or served elsewhere only when their home districts
were unthreatened. They, aswell as many non-col laborators , were much
readie r to r isk thei r own lives than they were to mor tgage the ir pat rimo-
nies and compromise the future of their famil ies.
Suppor t or lack o f support for the l ibera tion s truggle depended , for
them, on how one answered two basic quest ions: (1) Did the revol t, givenobjective fac to rs , s tand a reasonab le chance of success, and (2 ) would it
advance the major goal of less rather than more control by an outside
pol it ical center, whether that center was Greek, Ottoman, or indigenous
to the particul ar di str ict ? Another facto r making the poss ibi li ty o f col -
laborat ion a real one was a rather consistent Ottoman policy ofpromising
to let bygones be bygones, offering in return for submission a rein-
s ta temen t of the status quo ante.6 With such attitudes and under such
condit ions, what i s surpri sing is no t that coll aborato rs exi st ed but tha t
there were not more of them.
The behavior ofmany Greek leaders reflects a keen awareness ofthe
danger. The primate Kanel los Delegiannes openly admits in his memoirs
that he del iberately had the Turkish populat ion of Langadia massacred so
as to convince the peasan try that the return of Ottoman ru le wou ld br ing
merciless retaliation. 7 False news about non-exis tent vic tor ies
imminence of foreign aid were officially sponsored to convince t
popu la tion that the odds were in favo r o f success . Fellow-Gre
pressed into the l iberat ion struggle by threats to deprive them o
things tha t collabo rat ion with the enemy might be intended to
The amount of military aid dispatched by the centre to hard
areas was of ten de te rmined, not by what mil it ary victory requ
by the calcul ated minimum for e lic it ing the resolve of the indig
habitants to resis t through their own resources.
Having said all this, one still has to contend with a basic
fact that the highest incidence of col laboration took place among
itary chieftains ofwest Rumely, whereas the Peloponnese produ
one notable instance of collaboration, and even then for onl
period," West Rumely joined the Greek war of liberation
months after its initial outbreak in the Peloponnese. From th
July 1822, when the di sast rous battl e o f Peta tu rned the milit ar
decis ively against the Greeks, the major chieftains contributed
to Greek success in the region.
The first wave ofdefect ions took place between July and S
of that year , in ant ic ipat ion of an expec ted enemy campaign s
toward Messo longi. As a p rel iminary to milit ary activity, Omea native Albanian now serving as pasha of Yannina and p
famil ia r with the Greek insurgen t chief tains s ince the days of
service to Ali Pasha, pursued a policy of conciliation toward
return for their submission, he offered them not only amnesty but
mation in the Ot toman servi ce as armatoloi of the ir dis tr ic ts. U
themselves to p reven t the ir d ist ric ts f rom being overrun and n
5. For instance, Kokkinos, op . cit., VI, t.16.
6.For the policy ofKiutahi Pasha in Rumely after the fall ofMessolongi in 1826 ,
for instance, see Kokkinos, op, cit., X, 213-232. For other instances, see Spyromelios,
• A n0 fl -V "r J{ .w ve vf .l ar :a . .. [ Me mo ir s o f t he S ec on d S ie ge o f Messolongi ...] (Athens 1926) and
reprinted in volume XIX of [M em oirs o f the F ig hte rs o f'2 1], o p. cit., 119 , HO.
7. Kanellos Delegiannes , ' Ano f l- VY jf .WVev f. la T a [Memo i rs ] , in [Memo irs
F ig hte rs o f '21], op . cit., XVI, 169-170.
8. Because of the time limits imposed on the length of the original s
presentation, this essay does not treat the celebrated case of collaborati
chieftain Odysseus Androutsos, which would be necessary for a full study o
ation during the first war ofliberation. Suffice ittos ay here tha t, in the v ie
writer, Androutsos' behavior was the outcome of internal rivalries within
camp for power in east Rumely, more especially between him and suchhismilitary proteg~ John Gouras and hiscivilian rival John Kolettes, a cas
to the Ottomans in the desperation ofa losing struggle against his r ivals a
stance ofhisrivals' cleverexploitation ofhiscollaboration todestroy him. O
tsos, see, for instance, Karpos Papadopoulos, 'Or5vO"O'sv,;'Avr5eoiil"O"ol;' in [M em
F ig hte rs o f '21], op . cit., XII; Takes Lappas, ' O r5V( I " o " sV, "Avoeoiir:(I"oi;' (Athe
and Kokkinos, o p . c it ., VIII, 351-372.
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136 J 0 h n A . P et r 0 p u .l 0 srORMS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY
ab le to count on a un it ed Greek effor t t o defend the ir di str ict s, t hey knew
tha t cont inued par tic ipat ion in the Greek camp wou ld mean abandon-
ment of thei r d is tr ic ts and leave them totally dependen t on the good will
of Mavrokorda tos and the Greek cente r, whereas the ret ention of the ir
dis tricts would guarantee them some degree of autonomy even vis-a-vis
Orner Vrioni himself.
Shortly after the battle of Peta, Gogos Bakolas and John Kouta-
lidas, chie fta ins of the dis tr ic t o f Radov ist i, were the f ir st to defect, fol-lowed in September by George Varnakiotes , who control led the dis trict
of Xeromeron. Into the enemy camp of Orner Vrioni, Varnakiotes
brought others, including the chieftains John Rangos and Andreas Iskos
aswell as the primate George Valtinos. Others, from districts lying within
the administrative sphere of Trikala, made their kapak with Soultsa
Gordza, an Albanian holding the office of deroen-aga there. Of these , the
most notable were Nicholas Stournares, armato l o s ofthe district ofAspro-
potamos, and George Karaiskakes, who had recently entrenched himself
as head of the dis tr ic t o fAgrapha.
From th is group, Kou ta lidas, Bakolas , and h is son Metros afte r h im
remained permanent ly within the enemy camp, wh il e Varnakiot es re-
turned to the Greek side only in 1828when the success o f the Greek cause
in some form was virtually assured. All had decided, as early as July
1822, that the Greek liberation struggle could not succeed, at least in
west Rumely. All had stayed incontact with the enemy and were suspected
of bet rayal to the Turks, even before they made their formal kapaks. All
a tt empted to protect themselves aga ins t the faint cont ingency of an ul-
t imate Greek victory by communicating with the Greek camp, suggest ing
tha t they would eventually return and meanwhile o ffe ring valuable in-
telligence concerning Turko-Albanian activities. All actively accompanied
the enemy in his military campaigns against their fellow-Greeks, at
least when cal led upon to do so. Yet, whi le Kouta lidas and Bako las kep t
the ir servi ce to the Ottoman war effor t t o a minimum, Varnakio tes was
much more act ive in i ts beha lf both in fight ing and in a tt empt ing to fos-
ter further defections. In part, his behavior isexplained byhis ant ipathy
toward the cent ral iz ing tendencies and poli tical ambit ions of Mavro-
kordatos, which he held accountable for the failure of the liberationst ruggle to catapu lt him into the pos it ion of semi -au tonomous rul er of
all west Rumely under the umbrella of a wider Greek state. In part, his
behavior refl ec ted the fac t tha t, for some t ime afte r the failure o f the f ir st
s iege ofMessolongi (January 1823) and the withdrawal of Ottoman forces
to the ir bases in Ar ta and Yann ina , Varnakio tes was fo rced to wi thdraw
from his territorial base in Xeromeron and was, therefore, mu
dependent on the Ottoman administrat ion than Koutalidas and
who remained firmly entrenched in their dis tricts ."
Qu it e d if fe ren t were the te rms of col laborat ion in the case
skakesand Stou rnares . With thei r d ist ric ts lying a t the border
liberated west Rumely and Ottoman-held Thessaly, they n
kapaks which ensu red both the ir autonomy and neut ra lit y. In r
withholding military assistance to the Greek cause and preventing
of any outside Greek forces into their dis tricts , the Ottoman ad
tion of Trika la guaran teed to keep i ts forces outs ide these di st
gave Kara iskakes and Stournares the exc lus ive r igh t to col lect
levied by the Ottoman administrat ion there. Through this arran
these two chieftains managed to achieve what was probably the
goal of all west Rumeliot chieftains, whether they were deali
Greek, Albanian , or Turki sh over lords. From roughly the begi
1822 to August 1823 Karai skakes and Stournares en joyed the
posi tion of keeping a foot in bo th camps , hold ing simu ltaneously
fice of armatolos f rom the Ot toman admini strati on and office of
arms (archegos armaton) from the Greek administrat ion, fight ing
Greek and Turko-Albanian troops a ttempting to en te r the ir
This rather unique posit ion came to an end the summer of 18Mustai Pasha, bey of Skodra, undertook from Trika la tha t year
man campaign against west Rumely. To do so, he had to pass
the dis tricts ofAgrapha and Aspropotamos and violate the kapa
wi th Kara iskakes and Stou rnares . As a resu lt, both chie ft ains w
and joined the Greek camp in Messolongi, but both retained thei
ing in thei r former d ist ric ts and , th rough local agen ts, cont inued
laborat eind irec tly with the Ot toman admin is tration a t Tr ikal a,
advan tage of Kara iskakes' absence af te r the wi thd rawal of Mu
at the end of 1823, John Ranges, who had long contested Kara
leadersh ip in Agrapha , took over there through the suppor t o
9. Concerning the general course of events and the individuals descr i
above paragraphs, see Kokkinos, op. cit., V, 162-165, 183-230, 20,*-228
Kasomoules,'EvBv ,u~,ua t ' a !1l'(!anron~(hij,•E n av a !1 l 'a O 'e r op w v • E .u 1 jv w JI
1821-itary R em in is ce nc es o f t he R eo o lu ti on o f the Greeks 1821-1832], ed. Gianne
giannes, (Athens, 1939), I, 38-40, 1?7-186, 220-221; and Spyromelios, op.
pass im. More particularly on Varnakiotes, see Karpos Papadopoulos, T
B!lQJIa~lcbT1JV ~al ~ d l la~1JO ' I~ Tev M 6l ]o t. oy yl ov [ Co n ce rn in g V ar na ki ot ee a
c o n qu e st o f M e ss o lo n g i] (Messolongi,1861) reprinted in [M em oi rs o f the F
'21], op. cit., XII, 161-269.
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Job n A. Pet r o p u. lo s38 F OR MS OF C OL LAB OR AT IO N W ITH THE EN EM Y
Gordza, the same man who had or igina lly made the kapak with Karai-
skakes. At the very moment when Mavrokordatos was staging, in Anato-
liko, a tr ia l o f Kara iskakes fo r col laboration with the enemy, hi s c lient
Rangos was doing the same and Mavrokordatos knew it.lo
Most of the remain ing cap ta ins returned to the Greek camp either
during or after the first (unsuccessful) Ottoman siege ofMessolongi . Once
the Ottoman forces withdrew to their original bases in Arta and Yannina,
re tent ion o f thei r dis tr ic ts no longer depended On Ot toman goodwi ll,
especi al ly now tha t Orner Vrioni was too invo lved with di ssident Alba-
nian chieftains inhis home district to engage in further campaigns against
the Greeks. Once again patriot ic impulse and polit ical interest were com-
patible.P
The failure of the first siege of Messolongi demonstrated that, so
long as the Greek administrat ion possessed one mil itary base accessible to
suppor t f rom other part s of insurgent Greece , the reg ion be tween it and
and such Turko-Albanian bases as Ar ta , Yannina, and Tr ika la would be
polarized be tween the two sides . This was confi rmed by the fall o fMes-
solongi in April 1826, which led to the col lapse oforganized Greek resis-
t ance in west Rumely . With the excep tion o f west Rumel iot ch ie ft ains
who withdrew to the Peloponnese and Demetrios Makres and Demo-
t se lio s, who took refuge within west Rumely, the west Rumeliot chi ef-
tains made their kapoks with the Ot toman adminis tration by the begin-
ning of 1827.12
Only the mi lit ary campaign of Richard Church in 1828 gradual ly
won them over once again, one by one. The establishment of a new toe-
ho ld in west Rumely , this time at Dragomeste, se rved asa ra llying poin t
and demonstrated the renewal of outside support . Aided by the interven-
t ion o f the European powers in beha lf of the Greeks and by the e lect ion
of John Kapodistrias as president , both rendering the success ofthe G
cause more than l ike ly , Church pursued a pol icy of pa ti ent nego tia t
with chieftain after chieftain , offering amnesty and reinstatement to
s iti ons within the Greek servi ce , guaran teeing money and suppli es
once mil itary power grew, threatening the use of force against remain
defectors. Tha t west Rumely would be included in the new Greek s
remained problematic, however, a fact that left some chieftains disincli
to risk returning to the Greek carnp but persuaded the majoritytheir renewed participation might make the difference.P
Why, then the high inc idence of co llaboration in west Rumely
i ts relat ive absence in the Peloponnese? I bel ieve the answer l ies ma
in the struc tua l dif fe rences of each reg ion. To begin with, west Rum
lay much closer to enemy cen ters of power than the Peloponnese . A
Yannina , and Tr ika la const itu ted not only the advanced bases of im
rial expedit ions southward but alsothose centers that mobil ized the m
ey, arms, and men of Epirus, Albania, and Thessaly against the Gr
insurgents. West Rumely was, therefore, bound to feel the ini tial imp
of each Ottoman expedition. To be sure, the Ottomans retained a
strategic footholds in the Peloponnese throughout the war (Modon,
ron, Pa tras, and i lion) , but these were most of the time essent ia lly de
sive enclaves, unable to generate their own sources ofsupply and depe
ing on the Ottoman fleet for survival. Even between 1825 and 1828, w
Ibrahim Pasha used Modon and Koran as offensive bases and secu
control over Tripolis in the interior, he too was dependent on regions o
side the Peloponnese for reinforcements.
Second, in the western part of mainland Greece, constituting
core of Al i Pasha 's semi- independent st at e unti l the beginn ing of 1
the admini strati ve and demographic st ructure had remained basica
int ac t. Poli tically , the Greeks of west Rumely opera ted not mere ly a
separat e en tit y, compr is ing one component of an insurgent Greece
conflict with the Ottoman empire. They also operated as a part of
Pasha 's former s ta te , caught in the o rb it o fc lashing Greek and Ot tom
centers lying outs ide the reg ion. They had to take into accoun t a stro
Albanian element with which they shared certain local interests runni
counter to those outside centers, whether Greek orTurkish. The ease ofc
10. For the case of Karaiskakes and Stournaras and the military campaign of
Mustai Pasha, see Kokkinos, op . eit., V, 229-230, IV, 411-457, VIl , 210·240; and Kaso-
moules, op . oii., I , 253-259, 274-283. More par ticularly on Karaiskakes , see Constantine
Paparregopoulos, Tew ( ! Y lo q K a ( ! at r J~ d~ 7J< ;. . (Athens , 1867) ; D. Ainian, 'H Bloy ( !arp ta
'r oi l r 'r (! o'r 7J yo il T eo so vl o» K ae ai (J ~d U1 ) . .. [ Th e B io gr ap hy o f G en er al G eo rg e K ar ai sk a-
kes" .] , 2d ed. (Athens , 1903 ), r ep rin te d i n [M em oirs o f the F ig ht er s o f '21], op . cit.,
VII; and Elias Papasteriopoulos, 'HL 1l U 1) ro il K C lQ a fc r~ d ~ [ T he T r ia l o f K a ra is ka ke s](Athens, 1961).
11. Kokkinos, op . cit., V, 250-254.
12. Kokkinos, o p. c it ., X, 71, 231-234, 316; Kasomoules, op . cit., 11,333·334,
586·587; Stephan os I.Papadopoulos, ' H •E :n a vd r J 'r aC1 'r /t n f J A vn X? ) B r: e(! ed • EM d 6a . ..
1826-1832 [The R evo lu tio n in W este rn M ain la nd Greec e . . . ] (ThessaJoniki, 19(2),
32-40; and Phi lip J. Green, S ke tc hes o f th e W ar in G re ec e (London, 1827), 251-252.
13. The revival of insurgency in west Rumely has received systematic study
two excellent monographs: Papadopoulos, op . cit., especially ch. IV, and Domna
Dontas, Th e Last P ha se o f t he W ar o f In dep en den ce in W est er n G re ec e (D ec em be r 1
to M ay 1829) [Thessa loniki , 1966) . See also Kokkinos, o p . c it ., XI, 316-318.
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14 0 J 0 h n A. Pet r 0p u l 0 8 FORM S OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY
tact between Greek and Albanian chieftains,. developed in common asso-
ciation with the court ofAli Pasha, persisted, even when the war oflibera-
t ion made them ostensible enemies. In terms oftheir pol it ical ambit ions,
t here was the lure p rovided by Ottoman as well as Greek insu rgen t poli -
tical structures. It was difficult for Greek polit ical rivalries in west Ru-
mely not to become enmeshed with Albanian polit ical rivalries in Epirus
and thus involved inwhat , inthe context ofconfl ict between Greek and Ot-
toman centers, amounted to collaboration.The Peloponnese, on the other hand, tended to think of itself as a
se lf -conta ined unit , though one of severa l componen ts making up in-
surgent Greece . There, i n the f ir st year of the war and by the de liberate
pol icy of the Peloponnesian Greek leadership, the Ottoman populat ion,
constituting no more than 10% of the who le , had been dec imated and the
Ottoman administrat ive structure had been completely smashed. By de-
sign, leaders l ike Kolokotrones and Delegiannes had made col laboration
structurally impossible. As a resul t, there were virtual ly no Turks on the
spot to col laborate with and no Ottoman administrat ion to lure dissident
Greeks. Leaders and people alike hardly expected or could hope to expect
mercy f rom the Turks aft er having decimated the Ot toman popu la tion
of the Peloponnese and violated so many capitulat ion agreements. Pol i-
tical ri va lr ies between Peloponnesi an Greeks assumed the form of c ivi l
war rather than that of col laboration.Third, t he soc ia l basis of power s trugg les dif fe red in each reg ion. In
west Rumely, the power struggle was mainly one between mil itary chief-
tains , virtual ly all ofwhom had obtained their influence in Ottoman times
through accommodat ion wi th non-Greek offic ialdom. Accommoda-
tion was no t an accusa tion they could use aga inst each o ther in vying for
the a llegi ance o f the peop le . In the Peloponnese, the power struggle , a t
the beginning at least , was between klephtic types who had been expel led
from the Peloponnese in 1806, and the primates, who had fol lowed a policy
of accommodat ion with the Ottomans . When the Peloponnesian chief-
ta ins sought to di splace the pr imates as a ruling e li te , they cou ld effec-
tively use the charge of accommodation aga ins t the pr imates and d id so .
This tended to place a restraint on any form of collaboration either by
one con tending group or the other.
Fina lly , in the Peloponnese, one chief tain - Theodoros Kolokot ro -nes - managed to prevail over all others, in terms of gaining popular
suppor t and commanding an army, whereas, in wes t Rumely, the ch ie f-
ta ins tended to more equa lly divide effective mi li ta ry power. There was
no one in wes t Rumely st rong and inf luenti al enough to curb
t ion, as there was in the Peloponnese when it ult imately occurre
The one notable examhle of coll aborat ion on the Pelopon
serve as an excellent test case for the kind of explanation I h
This case was largely confined to the year 1827, and, at its he
widespread in the north Peloponnesian provinces of Patras, K
and Vostitsa. It took place under the leadership of Demetrios
cap ta in of the vi llage o fZoumpata in the eparchy of Patras , whotic ipat ed in the war of l iberat ion f rom the beg inn ing under the
of Aohaia and had shown bravery in many mil itary engagemen
In the first place, the phenomenon took place in regions
Patras, which was an Ottoman forti fied base. Since the civil war
1824, the Greco-Turkish military conflict in the area had ab
had allowed for some fraternization between Greeks and th
especially inthe economic sphere. Nenekos, weknow, was in con
the enemy in Patras, even before his decis ion to defect, fol lowing
the common wes t Rumelio t pat te rn of keeping a foot in bo th c
Second , the Albanian e lement p layed a prominent role in
nomenon. The villages where submission originated, Zoumpata,
and others, were Arvanitoohoria whose inhabitants were Greco
pasto ral ist s. The in te rmediary who got Nenekos in touch wi th
Pasha was CafeI ' Fida, ch ie fta in of the Albanian Laliot s who hrefuge in Patras since the ir wi thdrawal from the ir home dis tr ic
in 1821.
Third, the prominence of pr iva te loca l inte res t, combined
sinking fortunes of the Greek insurrect ion, prompted submissio
out the protect ion oforganized Greek forces and prey to the dep
of enemy troops, these Greco-Albanians found their movements
ed, a fata l occur rence for the livel ihood of pas toralis ts. Wi th
of thei r fami lies held cap tive by Ibrahim Pasha, they pressed N
negot ia te the ir re lease . They a lso l earned tha t submission wo
economic ga in, such as a lucrative marke t for thei r p roduc ts i
grazing land in the pla ins wh ich in te rmi ttent warfa re had long
low, and, in the case of some, employment in enemy military
Once amnestied, other villagers, some purely Greek, followed th
ple , not simp ly fo r secur ity against enemy pressu re but a lso tthemselves aga inst the fi rst submit te rs, who were using the ir
immunit ies to take the land and goods of non-submitters.
Final ly, the behavior of Nenekos and other chieftains is e
not mere ly by the ir ambit ion to ga in power and pos iti on throug
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14 2 J o h n A. Pet r ° p u losFORMS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY
oration, but by the pol it ical rivalries within the Greek camp itself. With-
in hi s vil lage , Nenekos , a c lient of Ven izelos Rouphos , was engaged in
riva lry with his cous in Athanasios Sagias , a cl ient of Kolokot rones who
eventually carried out Kolokotrones' decree for Nenekos ' execution. On
the regional level , with the influence of the Achaia primates undermined
by the second civil war, Nenekos and his fel low-chieftains lost their t ra-
diti ona l sou rce of suppor t a t t he very moment when the ir ri va ls, the Pet -
mezas ', were strengthened by the pa tronage o f John Kole tt es. In a sense,therefore, Nenekos and his fol lowers resor ted to the enemy as an al te r-
native source of support.
Because these vital factors were, to some extent, operative elsewhere
in the Peloponnese , there was a g rave danger tha t the movement of sub-
mission and collaboration would spread, especially in those regions where
Ibrahim had established his mil itary strongholds, l ike Messenia and Tri-
polis. That the movement aborted is due, in part, to the international
s ituation, which increasingly favored Greek statehood in one form or an-
other. But far more decisive, it seems to me, was the behavior of Ko loko-
trones and the resources he commanded. It is in this area that a major
d if ference between west Rumely and the Peloponnese is evident . Like
Church during his west Rumeliot campaign of 1828, Kolokotrones com-
bined a policy of conciliation and fire. He executed a few of the minor
col laborators as a warning to the rest, whi le at the same t ime he offe red
generous terms to the major defectors soasto lure them back into the fold.
But, most of all, he turned the tide by reorganizing a resistance that
would, On t he one hand, protect those faithful to the Greek cause from
retaliation by the enemy and, on the other, threaten the waverers with
Greek retal iation if they defected. His abi li ty to renew an organized resis-
tance with only minimal government support was due to the fact that
he, unl ike any Rumeliot chi ef tain, commanded a preponderance of mil-
i ta ry inf luence, a t l east in tha t par t of the Peloponnese which lay under
the inte rmi ttent control of Ibrahim Pasha . In 1827, when he was vigo r-
ously a ttempting to f ight down col laborationism, he commanded a mil-
i ta ry fo rce est imated to reach 8,000 men, a ll under mi lit ary chie fta ins
who recognized h is author ity and fol lowed his commands . He centered
hi s activi ty in those very regions where col laboration had its grea test
s trength. The activity of h is son Gennaios, with hi s base in the for tres s
of Karytaina, wiped out col laboration in Elis and Phanari and forestalled
i t i n Tr ipo lis . The Messenian refusa l to col laborate wi th Ibrahim even
though the presence there of his main bases made col laboration possible
and res ist ance easily puni shable , owed as much to the mil ita ry activ ity
of Niketas Stamatelopoulos, Kolokotrones' fai thful l ieutenant,
to the fact that relations between the surviving Turks and th
local populat ion had never been good.14
~ollaboration was not viewed by anyone with the same c
and intole rance tha t i s typical in twent ie th-cen tury Europe and
ca. It was accepted, at the very least, as an understandable fac
to be ~arded aga ins t. by c~ncerted, even ruthl es s, e ffor t, to be e
for national purposes If possible, and to be forgiven if one could oi t t hrough the same fac tors tha t p rompted it and the same inst
that made i t possible. To have declared total war Oncollaborators
by threat en ing thei r surviva l, have pressed them permanently
enemy camp and, once Greek independence was achieved, have
an already fragmented nat ion eyen more. To raise the quest ion o
oration may be regarded as reflecting badly on those Greeks w
cumbed to it . 'What i t should ref lec t, however , i s the vir tue of tho
prompted by the same considerations and circumstances, did no
orate, the r~m~rkable ability of men like Karaiskakes to outg
early parochialism and atone for it with his life, and the skill
leaders in handling the kind of si tua tion which emerged natu ra lly
the tradi tional Ottoman heritage.
14. On the case of Nenekos and collaboration in the Peloponnese, see
the studies of Takes Stamatopoulos (cited in n. 1 above), Kokkinos, op.
167-190; Photios Chrysanthopoulos or Photakos, Blot ll8Aonowt7'1lwv
[Lives o f Peloponnesian Men . .. ], ed. Stavros Andropoulos, (Athens, 1888
and the same Photakos, ' A n :0 f .t I! 1 J !- ' ov 8 v p a T a ; rr ;e ( ! i T i jt ; ' E AAT } V tK i j ,' E x o s a a ra a e o » ;
concerning the Greek Revolution], ed. Stavros Andropoulos, (Athens 1900),I 1
418-4M, or in a new edition (Athens, 1960), 585-589, 601-619.
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