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ONDOKUZ MAYIS NiVERSiTESi
iLAHiYAT fAIL
lESi
lll -
DERGISI
SAYI 1
.
Samsun - 88
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INilllKIZ
MAYIS
ONiVEIIiTEii
iLAHiYAT f l iLIEli
I E I ~ i l i
S a y
:
10
Samsun 1998
..
Sahibi
ilahiyat Fakltesi
A d n a :
Prof Dr Hseyin PEKER
Mesul Mdr
Y a y n K o m i s y o n u A d n a
Prof Dr. Mustafa Zeki T E R Z
Y a z i l r i Mdr
Yrd Do Dr Yavuz NAL
Dizgi veMizanpaj
A r
Gr
Vejdi
B L G N
B a s k
Ondokuz
M a y s
niversitesi M a t b a a s
Dergide a y n l a n a n y a z l a r n
bilim ve dil
ynnden
s o r u m l u l u u
y a z a r i a r n a aittir
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l l
DEGGfii S
NOIIO.N Of
Ril i
N NI TIME
Ir.
lurhanoUih
I B H I U *
TURK Z T
Heidegger bilginin nesnesi ile
u y u m a s ' e k l i n d e t a n m l a n a n
geleneksel hakikat
k a v r a m n
bu t a n m n a r k a p l a n n d a bulunan varsa-
y m Z a r a geri gtrr. Herhangi bir hakikat
i d d i a s n d a
ortaya
k a n
e y ,
temelde, nesnenin tezahr o l d u u iin, hakikat tezahr ( i f a ) olarak
a n l a l m a l d r .
Tezahr
( i f a )
ncelikli olarak nesnelerin tezahr
( i f a )
nn a r k a p l a n olarak d n y a n n tezahrne i a r e t eder.
Heidegger
e
gre, yeni bir nesnenin k e f e d i l m e s i tmyle gizli olan bir
nesnenin
k e f e d i l m e s i e k l i n d e
g e r e k l e e m e z ;
fakat hareket
o k t a s n
d
g r n t e b e n z e e n bir tezahrden a l r . Bu demektir ki, nesneler
,
belli
bir tarzda zaten
k e f e d i l m i
ve
a y n
zamanda rtk bir
d u r u m d a d r / a r .
Onlar rtk bir durumda
o l d u k l a r
iin,
i f a y
da bir
e y i
ama ola-
rak hakikat daima nesnelerin kendilerinden elde edilmelidir. Buna gre,
Dasein ( O r a d a - v a r l k l hem hakikat ( i f a ) iinde hem de h a k i k a t - d
(yani henz kendisini i f a e t m e m i v a r l k ) nda bulunur.
Bununla birlikte, i f a yolu ancak u n l a r n [hakikat ve hakikat-
d ]
a r a s n
a y r t e t t i i
zaman
b a a r / r
d e d i i
zaman, Heidegger neyi
kastetmektedir? Bizler hakikat ve h a k i k a t - d
m a y r t e t t i i m i z
zaman
i f a
n a s l
g e r e k l e t i r e b i l i r i z ? Bu i d d i a y ileri srerken, Heidegger
hakikat ve h a k i k a t - d ' n kendisiyle a y r t e t t i i m i z ve bylece i } a ger-
e k l e t i r d i i m i z
bir (hakikat) n k a v r a m n a sahip o l d u u m u z u kabul
e t m i
olmuyor mu?
a y e t
durum
bu
ise, her yeni
i f a
(ama) kendisini
O.M.. l i i h i y a t Fakltesi.
Heidegger Dnya
k a v r a m
ile zellikle
v a r l n
tarihsel tezahrleri Zerinde olu-
a n
b e e r i
tecrbeler yani kltr
n y a s m
k a s t e t n e k t e d i r .
2
Dasein k a v r a m y l a Heidegger
i n s a n n
Dnya da kendine zg
v a r o l u t a r z n a
i a r e t eder. Buna gre i n s a n n v a r l (Dasein) Dnya dan ve Dnya da i n s a n n
v a r l n d a n : b a m s z
olarak
k a v r a n a n a z . H e n l e n t i k
daire
( h e r n e n e u t i c
circle)
metaforoyla
i a r e t
edileri bu k a r l k l b a m l l k
v a r l n t e z a l r n n
ve insan
k a v r a y n n
t a r i h s e l l i i n i gsterir.
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hakikat
n k a v r a m n d a n
a y r a n
bir
z e l l i e
sahip olmuyor mu? Bu a
l m a m z d a u n u
iddia
e d e c e i z :
Ama y da
i f a
olarak hakikat
v a r l k
l a r
(nesneleri) kendi oriJinallikleri
ve
tarihsellikleri iinde ortaya
karmak o l d u u iin
i f a
olarak her hakikat tezahr eden nesnenin orifi
n a l l i i a ; n d a n kendisine zg nitidik/ere sahiptir.
H a k i k a t n
z d m a n s a l l (temporality)
a y n
zamanda bilgimizin
z a m a n s a l l n . o r t a y q .
koyar. A k a s n-kavram yeni hakikate
a r a c l k
edemez,
zi ra
yeni hakikat n-hakikatz s n r n gstermek suretiyle olum
suz/ar. Bylece
s n r l / k ,
janilik (finiteness) sadece bizim tarihsel ujku
muzun
s n r l
o l u u n d a n
d e i l , a y n
zamanda hakikat
n k a v r a m m z n
s n r _ l a r n
gsteren yeni hakikatin
o r i j i n a l l i i n d e n .
k a y n a k l a n r . Her
ne
kadar paradoxal grnse de, bu gerek yzndendir ki, hakikat kendi
zeminini kuran bir hareket olarak ortaya
k a r .
Bununla birlikte, eski
hakikat (hakikat
n - k a v r a m )
ile yeni hakikat a r a s n d a k i b o l u k y da
sreksizlik problemi hala
o r t a d a d r .
Heidegger de hakikat
n k a v r a m
ile yeni hakikat
a r a s n . d a
da
hili bir gerilim
v a r d r
Ne var
ki,
Hegel in
K a n t n
numen ve fenomen
a y r r n m a g e t i r d i i t t i r a z
kullanacak olursak,
s n r n f a r k n d a
olmak
zaten bu
s n r n
tesine gitmektir. Bu demektir ki, her yeni
f a
(hakikat)
eski
i f a
(hakikat) ' n s n r n gsterir ve bizim bu
s n r n
tesine gitmemi
zi ve kendisini
t a n m a m z a
imkan verir. Bu nedenle, Heidegger
e
gre
hakikat, Gadamer
in
diliyle, nesneninbizzat kendisini g s t e m e s i d i r ..
H e i d e g g e : .
leads the traditional canception of truth as the
agreement
of
knowledge with its object back to its unthought
p r e s i p p o s i t i o n s . Since what is demonstrated in the assertian is solely
the Being-uncovered of the entity itself, truth mu st be understood in
t e r n s
of
disclosedness. Disclosedness refers primarily to the world's
disciosedness as the ground of the uncoveredness of entities. According to
. Heidegger, the discovering of anything new is never done on the basis of
having something completely hidderi, but takes its departure rather from
uncoveredness in the mode of e m b l a n c e . ' , This is t say that entities have, in
a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are
sti1l
disgt l ised Since
they are disguised, truth as uncoveredness must always be captured from
entities. Therefore, Dasein is both in the truth and in untruth.
3
Otto Pggeler,
Martin Heidegger :S Path of Thinking,
trans. p. agurshakand S
Barher (NJ: Humanities Press International, Ine., I 987),
p
7
4
M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward J,{obinson
(New York: H a p e r and Row, 1962), p 265
298
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However; what does Heidegger mean when
he
asserts that the
way
o
uncovering
is
achieved
only n
distinguishing between these [truth
and untruth] ?
5
How can
we
achieve discovering by distinguishing truth
from untruth? n this argurnent does not Heidegger accept that we have a
fore-conception
o
truth by which we distinguish between truth and
untruth, and thus.achieve discovering? And i this
is
the.case, does not new
uncoveredness have a feature by which it differs from the f o r e ~ o n e p t i o n
.
o
truth? This paper will argue that s nce truth as uncoveredness is to
discover entities in
t h ~ i r
originality (and historicity), every truth . as
uncoveredness has al
so
a speciflc feature in terms
o
the originality
o
he
entities uncovered.
nHeidegger's hermeneutics, 'fore-conception' oftruth refers both
to the fact that uncoveredness
o
beings
is groun:ded
in the 'world' s
disclosedness' and to the basic characteristic
o
Dasein as 'uncovering.'
Precisely because
o
this fact, as Versenyi puts it, . in Heidegger's
philosophy man and world can never be separated or even discussed in
separation.
6
Accordingly, since Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, it
is
always already dwelling with s
ome
.
be
ing, that is the uncoveredness
o
such. beings
is
equiprimordial with the being
o
Dasein. and its
disclosedness.
7
Out
o
this inseparability between man and world, it
follows that entities can never be true in themselves; what makes them r u e
is
the fact that they enter into a relationship with Dasein
in
terms.ofBeing
discovering and
B e i n g ~ d i s c o v e r e d
From t l s perspective, Heidegger's
cntention that ' :asein is in the truth' states equiprimordially iliat
'Dasein
is
in untruth' can be taken to mean that Dasein is always aware
o
he boundary where truth differs from untruth. f his
is
the case,
we
can
argue that just as
we
know that
we
are
in
truth since
we
have a fore
conception
o
truth, so we know that we are in untruth since we have a
fore-conception
o
untruth.
However, this
does
not mean certainly that the fore-conception
o
truth is discrete from that
o
untruth. But. rather this distinction reflects
only the inner tension between 'disclosedness' and 'closedness' in the
concept
o
truth itself.
8
For that reason, there
is no
total concealment and
total revealment bt as Pggeler argues, truth
is
a co-presence
o
5
lbid.
6
Lazslo Versenyi, Heidegger Be ng and Truth (New Haven: YaleUniversity
Press: 1966), p. 14.
7
Heidegger, e ng and Time p. 264.
8
In this context, Heidegger argues that to be closed off and covered up belongs to
Dasein's facticity. lbid. p. 265.
299
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.unconcealment and concealment, a process
of
instituting and :withholding
of ground.
9
Since truth. enters always into. a 'limited opening,' to bring
something into the light
is
to cast anaspect
f i t i ; t o
shadow.
1
.
At this point to maintain both that 'trutli is co-presence of
u i c o n c e a J m e i t and concealment' and that 'untruth is coveredness'seems
to be u z z l i n g ~ How can we explain that 'untruth' is both 'closedness' and
'present' at one and the same time? If untrutp as coveredness is the
absence of truth as uncoveredness; how can absence be deseribed as
present?
It
seems that the
a r g t m e n t
fOr- the co-presence of tnith and
~ t r u t h
cannot be restricted only to temporal co-existence, since it
presupposes that the presence
of
truth is not at the same Ievel
a8
that of
untruth. If this is the case, the co-presence of truth and untruth must be
both temporal and spatial
c o p r e s e n c ~ .
In our view, this spatio-temporal
'co-presence' of truth and. untruth. cannot be un derstood i we do not look
at
it as manifesting the internal continuity between them.
From this perspective, we can argue that Dasein can uncover
entities only by following this inner continuity which takes its departure
from the limited
d i s c l o s e d e s s
of
entities. Accordingly,
tb
follow the
n i e r
continuity is to suppose that untruth is also truth to be uncovered.
To
put
it another way, to beaware ofuntruth is to propose a future (or possible)
truth. If, as Tugendhat remarks, disclosure is to be understood as an
occurrence that is actively related to its opposite closedness or
concealment
11
th.ere
: s t be a circular relation between truth and u i t r u t h .
Since we take our departure .. from uncoveredness we r e ~ i l i z e that
entities ... are disgised, but insofar as we are aware of : n t r u t h we can
snatch entities out
oftheir
hiddenness.
12
Since we have a fore-conception
o
ruth we approach entities
in
their hiddenness, and insofar as we
approach suchentities in theirliiddenness we can release their truth, i.e.,
uncover them.
However, if, since we have a fore-conception.of truth, we snatch
entities in their hiddenness, how do we reaiize the difference between
the
fore-conception
oftruth
and new discoveredness?_In other words, ifDasein
B e i n g - i n c o v e r i n g , i.e., discovering
is
a process, how does Dasein
9
Pggeler, Metaphysics and Topology
of
Being in Heidegger, trans. P. Amad,
Man and World
8, no.
I
975),
p.
lO.
10
Robert J. Dostal, 'The Experience
of
Truth
for
Gadamer and Heidegger: Taking
Time and Sudden Lightening, in Henneneutics and Truth edit. B.
Wachterhauser (Evanston: Northwestem University Press, 1994), pp. 49-50.
.EmsTugendhat, Heidegger's Idea f T r u t h , ~
inHenneneutics and Truth;
p 88.
12
Heidegger, Being and Time p. 265.
300
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appreciate the new occurrence
of
truth? The significance
of
this question
shows itself
if
w e look
at
it from the po nt
of
view
of
the internal tension or
circular relation between truth and untruth. Accordingly, is the new
occurrence oftruth only a different aspect
of
a vicious circle or, reversely,
is it a new manifestation which occurs
ina
circular process?
At this level we can say that if the act
of
uncovering is a process,
then the uncoveredness of anything new should introduce itself as a
manifestation
of
this process.
In
other words, even
i
uncoveredness
is
the
truth itself, every new uncovering should transcend or widen the horizon
of
the truth which has occurred before.
If
this is the case; the internal tension
and the continuity (circular relation) between truth and untruth should not
be a vicious circle. This
is e d u s e
we have a fore-conception
of
truth that
we are faced with untruth and every new uncoveredness becomes a fore
conception for further uncovering.
When Heidegger remarks that, through uncovering, entities
becme
accessible in themselves
to
Dasein,
3
he
refers
to
the fact that truth is
g n s p i n g
the originality of anything behind the semblance or cover.
In
this
context, he also argues that Dasein should defend it [that which
has
already
been uncovered]
against
semblance.
4
By this he means
that
Dasein should
preserve the originality ofuncovering in discourse and language.
From this perspective,
it
can be argued that
if
every truth
is
finite,
i.e., limited, and uncovering is a process, then originality of'uncoveredness
refers
to
nothing else than the distinctive aspect and uniqueness.
of
a being
unco:vered. This is to say that since no discovering can be reduced to
another discovering and replaced
by
another truth, so every truth as
discoveredness has its own feature, scope and limit.
5
Heidegger's
argument that disclosedness is essentially.factical calls our attention also
to the limit and uniqueness
of
every occurrence
of
truth. Precisely because
of
this fact, we refer to the original feature
of
disclosedness by means
of
different words. For instance, when we associate the name 'Newton' with
the laws we not only mention that 'Newton first discovered them,' but
also, and m9re importantly, refer to the fact that the truth
ofthese
laws has
3
lbid. 269.
14
Jbid.
265.
5
As can be seen, by 'irreducibility of original discoveredness'
we
mean both that
discoveredness cannot be reduced to another discoveredness behind it (for
instance, since a syroptom considered as discoveredness can be reduced to another
discoveredness e l i n d it, it is not original discoveredness) and that
it
cannot be
reduced to another discoveredness before it, i.e., t is not a repetition of what is
already known.
301
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been preserved.
or
handed down
to
us) in the originality
of
.i
s
discoveredness. For that reason, through language entities become
accessible in their originality to Dasein.
However, the originality here should not be con:fused with the
originating moment of uncovering or with the way the author understood
what he uncovered. The 'originality' refers to the fact that the identity of
the entity uncovered cannot be based on something. el s nce the
distinctive aspects and features .of the. unc.overedness cannot be r e d u c e j to
anything else.
6
Since e v e r y u n c o v ~ r e d n e s s is f i n i ~ ~ and thus a p h e in the
endless process
of
uncovering, discontinuity or difference is. intrinsic to the
identity itself. To
put
it another way,
i d e ~ t i t y
is not something to which
different aspects .can be reduced and thus with respect to which difference
between the aspects disappears. Rather since the continuity ofuncovering
is grasped in terms
of
the occurrence of the discontinuities, identity and
difference reflects the internal conflict between force and resistance withln
the entity itself. While the intrinsic force is the basis of the revealment of
an entity, the intrinsic resistance to this force is the basis
of
the
limited
revealmenf As indicated above, we refer to this conflict wheri we argile
that
revealment
is
the revealment
of
the
irreducible
unique nature
of
each
aspect of the entity. From this perspective, since there isa counterbalance
between intriosic force and.intrinsic resistance
within
the uncovered entity
we perceive a unity (or identity) as the continuity between its distinctive
aspects or features.
n
other words, identity reveals itself in the opposite but
complementary functions of the aspects of the entity. By opposite but
complementary functions, we refer to the fact that though every aspect
(uncoveredness) has its own distinctive i d irreducible nature, it becomes
a step upon which further uncoveredness can be based. Heidegger refers to
this function by 'fore-conception.' From this perspective,
the
o J j r e s e i c e
of coveredness and uncciveredness does not mean that what is k i r i w n
previously becomes unknown when an entity reveals its new aspect.
Rather, it means that since every uncoveredness is original and irreducible
to another uncoveredness, it cannot be s u b s u n e d under one general
concept which reflects the timeless identity of the entity.
From this perspective, coveredness or hiding itself does not
16
Thus since, in the originality ofdiscoveredness, w hat is c q m ~ s into the
T h ~ r e
(Da), Newton's laws, for instance, cannot be reduced to anything else. Here
Newton's laws do not stand as secondary representation ofy.-hat' 'is:
~ t h ~ r
through it reality comes
to
its own
truth. '
302
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necessarily mean that when one aspect
of
the entity comes to the fore its
other aspect is obscured. But
it
refers primarily to the fact that the identity
of
the entity reveals itself always
iria
finite, limited way Therefore,
just
as
f o r e ~ c o n c e p t i o n
p v ~ s the
way
for f i r t h e r (new) uncoverings,
so
the new
rmcovering makes us anticipate future uncoverings. Thus 'hiding' isnt a
total darkness behirid the light(revealedness)
but
reflects the irifinite
possibilities or the depth
of
the future which irivites Dasein to itself. .
For
that reason, the temporality (finitude)
oftruth
as uncoveredness refers also
to the temporality (historicity) ofidentity. n this sense, the identity carries
with
itself
the determinacy of the present (the said) and the
i n d e t e r r i i n c y
of
the future
{the
unsaid).
n
other words, the identity
of
text
cannot
be
realized without anticipating the future.
If out
analysis of Heidegger's concept of truth and identity is
correct, we can also say that the metaphor
of
sudden lightening which
Heidegger
e r i p l o y s
n order to characterize the unexpected, s u p r i s i n g
nature
of
truth must refer not only to the temporality (the suddenness
of
the moment)
of
truth but also t the original and distinctive features
of
uncciveredness itself. This is so because, if the every occurrence
of
truth as
an intetplay
of
the way in which Being sends
itselfandits
withdrawal were
not the occurrence
of
the new uncoveredness
in
its originality
(irreducibility) and thus in its s u p r i s e character, it would be only a mere
repetition
of
what occurred before. n this case, since we would have been
already in the same light, i.e., familiar with it, we could not even
recognizethe o urren e
of
the truth and the argument for sudden
lightening wotild
be
an empty one.
17
However, how can one solve the puzzle of the relation between fore
conception and the s u p r i s e character oftruth? Since we have fote-conceptions,
we can anticipate or project
into
the future and thus unoover entities. However,
on the other
hand we
argue
that
every truth
is
distinctive and thus
s u p r i s e s
us.
18
n this case, we lccept that
t r u t l
does not occur exactly
in
the way we
anticipated.
t is
beyond our control and always ttanscends our expectations. It
reveals itself as the negation of
our previous conceptions
in
the
sense
that it
always reflects the narrowness
of i r
fore-conceptions.
17
Dostal understands by Heidegger's metaphor of sudden lightening only the
temporality (the suddenness of the moment) of truth. See, Dosta , "The Experience
ofTruth," pp 47-58.
18
The relation between the fore-conception and the occurrence of the new truth is
called 'hermeneutic circle.' When Heidegger talks about the productive nature of
the hermeneutic circle he seems
to
refer to this dialectic between fore-conception
and new truth. Hence he convinces us that it is not a vicious circle as noted above.
303
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'
In
conclusion, the
temporalityof
~ t h
is
alsothe
r e c o g l l t i o n
of
the tem,poralityof
our
k n o w l e d g ~ , Obviously this is .to say
that
a fore
conception cannot mediate. the new .truth since the new t r . t h negates 1;he
mediation p: o r ~ - c o n c e p t i o n by reflectwg its. limit. Thus finiteness comes
not only f r o n ~ t h e limit of our.
bistorical
horizon
but
also out of the
originality of the ;new
t u t h
.which limits
our
fore:-eonception
of t n t l
Howeyer paradoxical it may seem, it. is precisely because
of
this fact that
truth occurs also
as
a self-grounding movement. Nevertheless,
the
pro)Jlem
of the
gap
(the disc()ntinuity) between the old
t u t h .
(the f o r e - c o n c ~ p t i o n )
andthe
new truth remains open.
As we noteel above that there is an internal tension between the
fore-conc:eption .and the new truth. What .was indicated .there is the fact
that, to use Hegel' s objection to the Kantian distinction betWeen noumenon
and phenomenon, to recognize the
l.imit
is a l e a d y
to.
have gone beyond it
This is
to
say
that
every new uncoveredness reflects the limit of the
old
unoveredness (fore-conception) and
us
makes it possible for us to go
beyond this limit and to recognize itself. Therefore, Heideggerian truth, to
use
G a d a n e r s l a g u a g e
is the self-presentation
of
the thing itself..
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