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53 ɉɪɢ ɚɧɚɥɢɡɟ ɝɨɥɨɫɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɜɨɡɧɢɤɚɟɬ ɜɚɠɧɵɣ ɜɨɩɪɨɫ : ɤɬɨ ɢɝɪɚɟɬ ɪɟɲɚɸɳɭɸ ɪɨɥɶ ɜ ɝɨɥɨɫɨɜɚɧɢɢ ɢ ɤɚɤ ɢɡɦɟɪɢɬɶ ɷɬɭ ɦɟɪɭ ɜɥɢɹɧɢɹ. ȼ ɬɟɱɟɧɢɟ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɧɢɯ 50 ɥɟɬ ɛɵɥɨ ɩɪɟɞɥɨɠɟɧɨ ɦɧɨɝɨ ɬɚɤ ɧɚɡɵɜɚɟɦɵɯ ɢɧɞɟɤɫɨɜ ɜɥɚɫɬɢ. ɇɚɢɛɨɥɟɟ ɜɚɠɧɵɟ ɢɡ ɬɟɯ, ɤɨɬɨɪɵɟ ɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɥɟɧɵ ɜ ɥɢɬɟɪɚɬɭɪɟ, – ɢɧ- ɞɟɤɫ ɒɟɩɥɢ ɒɭɛɢɤɚ, ɧɨɪɦɚɥɢɡɨɜɚɧɧɵɣ ɢɧɞɟɤɫ Ȼɚɧɡɚɮɚ , ɢɧɞɟɤɫ ɉɟɧɪɨɭɡɚ Ȼɚɧ - ɡɚɮɚ, ɢɧɞɟɤɫ Ⱦɢɝɚɧɚ ɉɚɤɤɟɥɚ ɢ ɢɧɞɟɤɫ ɏɨɥɟɪɚ 1 . ɂɧɞɟɤɫɵ ɜɥɚɫɬɢ ɧɚɯɨɞɹɬ ɲɢɪɨɤɨɟ ɩɪɢ- ɦɟɧɟɧɢɟ ɜ ɚɧɚɥɢɡɟ ɩɪɢɧɹɬɢɹ ɪɟɲɟɧɢɣ ɩɪɚ- ɜɹɳɢɯ ɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪ, ɫɨɫɬɨɹɳɢɯ ɢɡ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫ- ɤɢɯ ɩɚɪɬɢɣ . Ɍɚɤɭɸ ɩɪɚɜɹɳɭɸ ɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɭ ɦɨɠɧɨ ɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɢɬɶ ɜ ɜɢɞɟ ɢɝɪɵ, ɜ ɤɨɬɨɪɨɣ ɢɝɪɨɤɚɦɢ ɹɜɥɹɸɬɫɹ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɩɚɪɬɢɢ, ɩɪɢɧɢɦɚɸɳɢɟ ɪɟɲɟɧɢɹ ɩɭɬɟɦ ɝɨɥɨɫɨɜɚɧɢɹ. ɑɢɫɥɨ ɱɥɟɧɨɜ ɞɚɧɧɨɣ ɩɚɪɬɢɢ ɨɩɪɟɞɟɥɹɟɬ ɜɟɫ ɞɚɧɧɨɝɨ ɢɝɪɨɤɚ. ɂɧɞɟɤɫɵ ɜɥɚɫɬɢ ɜ ɬɚ- ɤɨɦ ɝɨɥɨɫɨɜɚɧɢɢ ɨɰɟɧɢɜɚɸɬ ɪɚɫɩɪɟɞɟɥɟɧɢɟ ɜɥɚɫɬɢ ɦɟɠɞɭ ɩɚɪɬɢɹɦɢ. Ɇɵ ɩɪɨɚɧɚɥɢɡɢ- ɪɭɟɦ ɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɭ ɑɢɬɢɧɫɤɨɣ Ɉɛɥɚɫɬɧɨɣ Ⱦɭɦɵ. Ɉɩɪɟɞɟɥɢɦ ɢɝɪɭ ɝɨɥɨɫɨɜɚɧɢɹ. Ɉɛɨɡɧɚ- ɱɢɦ ɱɟɪɟɡ N={1, 2, ..., n`ɧɟɩɭɫɬɨɣ ɤɨɧɟɱ- ɧɵɣ ɧɚɛɨɪ ɢɝɪɨɤɨɜ. Ʌɸɛɨɣ ɩɨɞɧɚɛɨɪ ɧɚ - Ⱥ. Ɇ. Ʉɚɥɭɝɢɧɚ ɂɇȾȿɄɋɕ ȼɅȺɋɌɂ ɂ ɉȺɊȺȾɈɄɋɕ ȼɅȺɋɌɂ ȼ ɑɂɌɂɇɋɄɈɃ ɈȻɅȺɋɌɇɈɃ ȾɍɆȿ Ɋɚɛɨɬɚ ɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɥɟɧɚ ɥɚɛɨɪɚɬɨɪɢɟɣ ɦɚɬɟɦɚɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɣ ɤɢɛɟɪɧɟɬɢɤɢ ɂɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɚ ɩɪɢɤɥɚɞɧɵɯ ɦɚɬɟɦɚɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɣ Ʉɚɪɇɐ ɊȺɇ. ɇɚɭɱɧɵɣ ɪɭɤɨɜɨɞɢɬɟɥɶ ɞɨɤɬɨɪ ɮɢɡɢɤɨɦɚɬɟɦɚɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɧɚɭɤ, ɩɪɨɮɟɫɫɨɪ ȼ. ȼ. Ɇɚɡɚɥɨɜ ȼ ɫɬɚɬɶɟ ɪɚɫɫɦɚɬɪɢɜɚɟɬɫɹ ɩɪɢɦɟɧɟɧɢɟ ɢɧɞɟɤɫɨɜ ɜɥɚɫɬɢ ɜ ɚɧɚɥɢɡɟ ɩɪɚɜɹɳɢɯ ɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪ ɪɚɡɧɨ- ɝɨ ɭɪɨɜɧɹ (ɢɧɞɟɤɫ Ȼɚɧɡɚɮɚ, ɢɧɞɟɤɫ ɉɟɧɪɨɭɡɚ Ȼɚɧɡɚɮɚ, Ⱦɢɝɚɧɚ ɉɚɤɟɥɚ, ɢɧɞɟɤɫ ɏɨɥɟɪɚ), ɩɨ- ɧɹɬɢɟ ɩɚɪɚɞɨɤɫɨɜ ɜɥɚɫɬɢ. ɂɫɩɨɥɶɡɭɟɬɫɹ ɞɜɚ ɩɨɞɯɨɞɚ ɤ ɩɨɫɬɪɨɟɧɢɸ ɢɧɞɟɤɫɚ ɜɥɚɫɬɢ. ɇɚɣɞɟɧɵ ɡɧɚɱɟɧɢɹ ɢɧɞɟɤɫɨɜ ɜɥɚɫɬɢ, ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɨ ɩɨɹɜɥɟɧɢɟ ɩɚɪɚɞɨɤɫɨɜ ɜɥɚɫɬɢ ɞɥɹ ɑɢɬɢɧɫɤɨɣ Ɉɛɥɚɫɬ- ɧɨɣ Ⱦɭɦɵ 3-ɝɨ ɢ 4-ɝɨ ɫɨɡɵɜɨɜ. The article considers the indexes of power application to the analysis of the ruling structures of different levels (Banzhaf index, Penrose–Banzhaf index, Deegan–Packel index, Holer index) and the concept of paradoxes of power. The two approaches to constructing an index of power are used. The values of indexes of power are found; the occurrence of paradoxes of power in the Chita Regional Duma of 3 rd and 4 th convocations is investigated. ɡɨɜɟɦ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɟɣ. ɂɝɪɚ ɝɨɥɨɫɨɜɚɧɢɹ G ɨɩ- ɪɟɞɟɥɹɟɬɫɹ ɩɚɪɨɣ G=(N, W), ɝɞɟ W ɧɚɛɨɪ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɣ, ɤɨɬɨɪɵɣ ɭɞɨɜɥɟɬɜɨɪɹɟɬ ɫɥɟɞɭɸ- ɳɢɦ ɩɪɟɞɩɨɥɨɠɟɧɢɹɦ: 1) Wz, 2) W , 3) ɟɫɥɢ ST ɢ SW, ɬɨɝɞɚ TW. ɗɥɟɦɟɧɬ W ɧɚɡɵɜɚɟɬɫɹ ɜɵɢɝɪɵɜɚɸɳɟɣ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɟɣ. ɇɚɛɨɪ ɜɫɟɯ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɣ, ɧɟ ɩɪɢ- ɧɚɞɥɟɠɚɳɢɯ W, ɨɛɨɡɧɚɱɢɦ L. ɗɥɟɦɟɧɬ L ɧɚ- ɡɵɜɚɟɬɫɹ ɩɪɨɢɝɪɵɜɚɸɳɟɣ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɟɣ. Ʉɨɚ- ɥɢɰɢɹ ɛɥɨɤɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɷɬɨ ɬɚɤɚɹ ɩɪɨɢɝɪɵ- ɜɚɸɳɚɹ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɹ, ɱɬɨ ɟɟ ɞɨɩɨɥɧɟɧɢɟ ɬɚɤɠɟ ɹɜɥɹɟɬɫɹ ɩɪɨɢɝɪɵɜɚɸɳɟɣ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɟɣ. ɂɝɪɚ ɝɨɥɨɫɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɧɚɡɵɜɚɟɬɫɹ ɧɚɞɥɟɠɚ- ɳɟɣ, ɟɫɥɢ ɞɨɩɨɥɧɟɧɢɟ ɥɸɛɨɣ ɜɵɢɝɪɵɜɚɸ- ɳɟɣ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɢ ɩɪɨɢɝɪɵɜɚɸɳɚɹ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɹ, ɢ ɫɢɥɶɧɨɣ, ɟɫɥɢ ɞɨɩɨɥɧɟɧɢɟ ɥɸɛɨɣ ɩɪɨɢɝ- ɪɵɜɚɸɳɟɣ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɢ ɜɵɢɝɪɵɜɚɸɳɚɹ ɤɨ- ɚɥɢɰɢɹ . ɂɝɪɚ ɝɨɥɨɫɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɧɚɡɵɜɚɟɬɫɹ ɪɟ- ɲɚɸɳɟɣ, ɟɫɥɢ ɨɧɚ ɨɞɧɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨ ɹɜɥɹɟɬɫɹ ɧɚɞɥɟɠɚɳɟɣ ɢ ɫɢɥɶɧɨɣ. ɉɭɫɬɶ S ɜɵɢɝɪɵɜɚɸɳɚɹ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɹ. ɂɝ- ɪɨɤ kS ɧɚɡɵɜɚɟɬɫɹ ɨɫɧɨɜɧɵɦ, ɟɫɥɢ ɟɝɨ ɭɞɚɥɟɧɢɟ ɩɪɟɜɪɚɳɚɟɬ S ɜ ɩɪɨɢɝɪɵɜɚɸɳɭɸ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɸ. ȼɵɢɝɪɵɜɚɸɳɚɹ ɤɨɚɥɢɰɢɹ, ɜ ɤɨ- ɬɨɪɨɣ ɜɫɟ ɢɝɪɨɤɢ ɹɜɥɹɸɬɫɹ ɨɫɧɨɜɧɵɦɢ, ɧɚ-

Индексы власти и парадоксы власти в Читинской Областной Думе

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Page 1: Индексы власти и парадоксы власти в Читинской Областной Думе

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Page 2: Индексы власти и парадоксы власти в Читинской Областной Думе

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Page 4: Индексы власти и парадоксы власти в Читинской Областной Думе

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