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Al-Qaeda: the misunderstoodWahhabi connection and theideology of violence

M aha Azzam

Bew ildering descript ions of a shadow y netw ork, undercover terrorist cells,

imm inent dangers, new ar rests, create alarm but not m uch clarit y.

Speculation about the extent and strength of Al-Qaeda reach no

satisfactory conclusions. A more pertinent line of inquiry would be to

focus instead on questions about the nature and appeal of Al-Qaeda:

those related to ideology. Can we speak of an ideology behind Bin Ladens

and Al -Qaedas polit ics of vio lence? Is thei rs a coherent dogma or a

fragmented and ill-thought-out understanding of Islam? Do its leaders and

members share a common tradition? What lies behind the espousal of

Islam, anti-Americanism and the resort to terror?

B

RIEFING

PAPE

R Briefing Paper No. 1FEBRUARY 2003

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Middle East

Programme

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2 Al-Qaeda: the misunderstood Wahhabi connection and the ideology of violence

The a nswe rs to t hese que stions ma y help shed light on

the connection between the dif ferent elements that

make up t he net w ork and their use of Islamic tradit ion

a nd d og ma for th e justification o f violence. They w ill

a lso he lp clarify th e po litical and religious para met ers,so o f ten b lurred by the rheto ric of bot h Bin Lad en a nd

his opponen ts, w hich in t urn is critical in def ining

policy vi s--visregional states such as Saudi Arabia and

Ira n a nd increa sing ly tow a rds Isla mism in Turkey, a s

well as distinguishing between those Islamist groups

w hich espouse violence a nd t hose w hich do not.

Influences and sources of ideology:w hat are the def ining elements?

Much is mad e of the inf luence of Wahha bism on the

make-up of Bin Laden and the extremism of his

fo llow ers a nd supporters. The tea ching s of Muha mmed

Abdel Wahha b (the fo under of w hat lat er came t o be

referred to as Wahhabism) are a very particular

response to Arabian society d uring the eighteent h

century tha t empha sized the singularity of God in the

face o f a g rowing appeal o f sa in t adulat ion and

excessive visita tions t o shrines and a n un emb ellished

a nd strict a dhe rence to th e Quran. The a lliance of t his

man of religion a nd h is teachings with t he a l-Saud

fa mily helped fo rge the Saud i sta te a nd remains the

source of its relig ious legit imacy. The strict a nd

puritanical nature of this interpretation of Islam not

only characterized the stat e but fo und ad herents

w orld-w ide even thoug h they did not share the

political agenda of the ruling family. However, there is

no evidence tha t Bin Lad en or his follow ers w ould

describe themselves as Wahha bi , al thoug h t hey ma y be

inspired by the spirit and tradition espoused by

Muhammed Abdel Wahhab. A number of Islamists

claim tha t Bin Lad en ha s no connection w ith

Wahhabism and also point to his Yemeni background,

w hich is typ ica lly non-Wa hha bi.

A conf usion ma y a rise beca use ma ny Islamists see

the mselves as Salafi (a g enera lly more puritan ica l

interpretat ion of Islam fo unded o n ad hering t o the

interpretation of the early followers of Islam).1

Wahhabism is a form of Salafi interpretation. On the

othe r hand, the centre for orthodo x tolerant Sunni

Isla m, the a l-Azha r university, w ould a rgue t ha t a ll

go od Muslims a re Salafi b y def inition. Therefo re, in

trying to understa nd t he ideology o f Bin Lad en, i t is

not particular ly rew arding t o pursue the Wahha bi

connection. It is true that the teachings of the sheikhs

in Sau di-fund ed schools in Pa kistan g ave rise t o t he

rad ica lism of t he Taliba n, but it is eq ua lly true t ha t

Wa hha bi sheikhs in Sa udi Arab ia ha ve uneq uivocally

stat ed t ha t suicide b omb ings are un-Islam ic.

Bin Lad en himself sta r ted o f f a s a membe r of t he

Muslim Brotherhood, which is not a Wahhabi-oriented

organizat ion .2 He joined f orces w ith Abd ulla h Azzam

(a legenda ry Arab f ighter a ga inst t he Soviet Union in

Afgha nistan w ho w as a lso a member o f theBrothe rhood ). The Muslim Brot herhoo d b roke off its

links with Bin La den in the mid-1980s w hen he set up

Al-Qaeda, not because of religious disagreement, but

because poli t ical ly he had g one his ow n w ay. Abdullah

Azzam, on the o ther hand , remained pa rt of the

Brothe rhood. Although he ha d opte d to empha size

ji had, he remained within the fold.

An essential component in the recruitment and

training of members of Al-Qaeda and new arrivals in

Afghanistan has been Ilm al-Sharia (Knowledge of

Isla mic La w ). Recruits ha d t o a tt end lectures given by

Osa ma Bin La den a nd Ayyman al-Za w a hri. These

lectures may g ive a bet ter indication of the ideolog ical

influences on the Al-Qaeda movement. One of the

main textual sources used w as the w ork of a tw elf th-

century Muslim schola r, Ibn Taymiyya, w ho w rote at

the t ime of the Mog ul occupat ion and w ho professed

the necessity for Muslims to oppo se tyrann ica l rule b y

force.3 Ibn Taymiyya ha s long b een a fa vourite w ith

ma ny in the Islam ist m ovemen t, especia lly in Egypt ,

pa rtly because they f ind in his writings a response to

w hat they see as closer paral lels to the mo dern

political situa tion in the Muslim countries, a nd pa rtly

because, unlike ma ny of the theo logical w orks

fa voured by t he ma instrea m, tho se of Ibn Ta ymiyya

seem to encourage direct action. What is not clear is

w het her Ibn Taymiyya w as the ideo logical sta rting

point for Bin Lad en, or w hether Bin Lad en a dopt ed his

w riting s because of a n influx of Eg yptian Islamist

recruits.

The na ture o f t he recruits also off ers few clues as to

ideolog y. Those w ho joined Bin La den w ere from a n

array of nat ionalit ies: some came a s committed

Muslims while ot hers need ed ba sic instruction in

Islamic dogma and practice.

It seems, therefore, that the connection betw een Bin

Lad en, the Taliba n a nd Mullah Omar w as one of a

collusion of interests and def iance in the fa ce of a

common enemy, rat her than a confed eration of

Wahhabi-influenced Islamists.

Is Al-Qaeda just a terroristorganization or does it possess thecharacterist ics of a movement?

The idea b ehind Al-Qae da w a s the e stab lishment of a

base which w ould bring to get her the dif ferent

Isla mist g roups and coordina te t heir activities. Man y of

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those w ho w ere attra cted to Al-Qaeda w ere non-Arab.

The a im wa s for the d ifferent Islamist g roups to rema in

independent w hile receiving funding from Bin Lad en.

However, at i ts inception, the new orga nization fa i led

to at tract the mainstream of t he rad ical Islamistmoveme nt in Arab countries. In a m eet ing in 1988 in

Afgh anista n, tw o o f the main Arab Islamist g roups, the

Egyptian Jihad and the Jama a a l-Islamiyya, refused to

join Al-Qae da . This refusal seeme d t o b e ba sed on t w o

ob jections. First, they ha d no w ish to relinq uish

leadership to Bin Lad en, w ho a t the t ime had no

pa rticular claim to fa me a mon g Islamists. Second ly,

and probab ly of g reater signif icance, there w as a key

disagreement about the scope of Islamist action. With

few except ions (not ab ly the Hizb a l-Ta hrir w ith its pan-

Islamist emphasis), most Islamist groups took the view

that revolutionary Islamist action should be confinedw ithin ea ch groups nation-sta te a nd th at they should

not interfere in one ano ther s terri tory beyond

providing moral support. It seems, however, that some

of the key Islamist f igures sta r ted t o chang e t heir

outlook to tha t of a more internat ionalist

revolutiona ry movemen t. Crucially fo r Al-Qae da ,

Ayyman a l-Zaw ahri , the leader of the Jihad movement,

seems to ha ve underg one such a conversion. In fa ct, his

conviction w as such tha t w hen he fa i led t o carry his

group w ith him, he w as w il ling to give up his

lead ership of th e Jiha d w hile remaining its real ment or,

in order to join Al-Qae da . The shift ma de by a l-Za w a hri

lay in the premise that the Islamist groups within each

sta t e w ere hemmed in and t hat a lthough the enemy

lay w ithin, there w as nevertheless also a common

external enemy tha t represented a n obsta cle to a ny

radical change on t he do mestic front.

Thus the ne w movement brought tog ether Islamists

who had proved their revolutionary credentials in

several w ays; by having joined the Afg han Jihad , by

having employed the t actics of terror ag ainst t heir ow n

regimes and by espousing strong religious sentiment

(even thoug h this w as recog nized by many a s

misdirected ). This ban d succeeded in capt uring the

imaginat ion of man y who saw in their actions a much-

needed act of de f iance aga inst the enemy tha t

enemy being t he a morphous mass accused o f being t he

source o f a ll the ills a ffecting the Muslim w orld,

especially the US because o f its support of Israe l and

the corrupt d icta to rships of the Middle Ea st. Such

sympathizers may no t ha ve joined t he minority w ho

make up Al-Qaed a but they w ould f ind justi f ication for

its actions.

The politics behind the ideology

As indicat ed a bove, the key to the ideology of Bin

Lad en lies not in Wah ha bism or th e Salaf i practice of

Isla m, but rat her in a politica l view of t he Middle East

situa tion. It is a lso be coming clea rer tha t Bin La den

provided the f ront and t he f inance but that the

political theory of Al-Qaeda was developed by al-

Zawahri .4

The o rigina l stra nds for t ha t po litical theo rycan be found in a treatise which al-Zawahri published

w hile st il l the lead er of the Jihad movement a f ter the

bomb ing of the Egyptian Emba ssy in Islamab ad in

1996, entitled Shif a Sudu r al-Mu min in[The Cure f or

Believers Hea rts].5

In essence it is a justifica tion f or the a tt a ck fo llow ing

w ha t clearly rankled as severe media criticism fro m

Egypt, a nd i t conta ins al l the component s that w ould

later develop into th e polit ics and metho dolog y of Al-

Q aeda .

First, and clea rly most importa nt, a l-Zaw ah ri ranks

the ma in issues facing t he Islamist mo vement in orderof priority. At the very top of this list is the issue of

Palestine. The view expressed is tha t a ll Arab an d

Isla mic reg imes, including t he PLO, ha d sold o ut b y th e

mere f a ct tha t they a ccepted the author ity o f t he

United Nations and the very idea tha t a ny Jew might

remain in any pa rt of Palestine. One should remember

tha t a l-Za w a hri is very much part o f t he Nasser

generation, and this rejectionism echoes the

rejectionist front of the 1960s.

This ma in issue o f Pa lestine, t hen, d efines the w a y in

w hich al-Zaw ah ri view s the va rious governmen ts and

regimes with w hich he comes into contact . For

example, he sees the Saudi regime as traitorous

because of i ts t ies with the US go vernment w hich

supports Israel. Hitherto, the assumption has been that

the Isla mists rank t he a pplication of Islam ic law (Sharia)

to p of t heir list o f priorities, but by invoking the

Palestine issue, al-Zaw ah ri ca n justify d ecla ring the

Saud is, wh o a pply Sharia law, t o be outside t he fold of

Isla m. Furthermo re, he sees Saudi a nd US support fo r

the Mujahideen movement in Afgh anista n as a ploy to

distract the Arab Mujahideen from t heir real goa l of

chang e in the Muslim wo rld. He then b oldly decla res

tha t the Mujahideen saw clearly throug h this ploy and

esta blished Al-Qae da a s the ba se of th eir opera tions in

Afg hanista n, f rom w here they could unde rtake their

w orldw ide strugg le. This is one of the ea rliest

references to the term Al-Qaeda, and it comes from al-

Za w a hris bo ok in 1996, w hen he w as still lead er of

the J ihad mo vement .

Subordinate to the f irst po int is the strugg le ag ainst

the oppressive reg imes tha t f ight the Muslims (i.e.

Isla mists) throug h ph ysical a nd intellectua l mea ns. It is

second a ry because al-Za w a hri sees the se reg imes a s

clients of the infidels, Christians an d Je w s someth ing

w hich is clearly prohibited in Islam ic law (a view he

recently reiterated in another treatise serialized in the

al-Qudsnew spaper in Londo n), an d w hich t herefore

places them outside the fold of Islam.

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Second ly, a l-Za w a hri expoun ds his view s of pe rsona l

responsibility in Islamic law. In essence, he argues that

the rank and f i le of t hese regimes canno t ta ke refug e

in their claim th at they w ere merely fol low ing orders

but must a ccept personal responsibility. Up to thispoint , he is not be ing controversial, but he t hen

expand s the idea furthe r. He includes not o nly

members of the security apparatus but all supporters

of t he g overnment, including th e media. How ever, the

crucial po int is tha t in discussing the victims of the

bo mbing in Isla ma ba d, he dismisses their description in

the Egyptian media as innocent civilians by saying that

the fact that they worked for the Egyptian government

makes them party to the crimes of th at go vernment

and therefore a legi t imate t arget . He then goes

further, expounding the view tha t t here is a

contradiction be tw een b eing a Muslim a nd serving in

such a reg ime in a ny capa city (a view reitera ted in the

trea tise pub lished in al-Quds). In essence, he is reviving

the extreme ideo logy o f t he a l-Ta kfir w a l Hijra g roup

of the 1970s in Eg ypt, th oug h in a less crude f a shion.

This point is crucial be cause a s al-Za w a hri beca me

the t heorist fo r the new Al-Qaeda movement he

translat ed t hat concept o f persona l liabili ty to t he

gro ups view of Western g overnment s. Log ica lly, th is

the ory could be present ed a s follow s. Civilians in the

West elect an d pa y for t heir go vernments. They a re

therefore responsible for the actions of these

go vernments in essence, th ey a re the decision-ma kers

and t hus they nega te t heir sta tus under Islamic law as

innocent no n-combat ant s and become legit imat e

targets .

Thirdly, al-Za w a hri propo und s the t w in idea s of t he

greater good and t he need to reac t to except ional

circumsta nces. Ideolog ica lly, he is gra ppling w ith t w o

ma jor prob lems. The f irst is the clea r an d a bsolute

prohibition of suicide under Islamic law. As this is one

of t he strong est tab oos in Islam, he cannot f ind any

theo log ical ba cking except fo r the idea o f ma rtyrdom

in the Christian sen se. The ca ses he uses a re insta nces

in early Islam w hen some Muslims we re captured by

the idolat ers . They w ere asked to recant on pa in of

death. Despite this threat, they refused. He views their

refusal as an act of suicide for the glory of God. Since

these early martyrs w ere not condemne d fo r their

actions by the e arly Muslims and grea t t heologians, he

argues that an Islamist can commit suicide for the

grea ter go od. That provides the mo vement w ith t he

legitimacy fo r suicide at ta cks, w hich 1,500 yea rs of

Islamic theo logy w ould view as heretical (note th at the

Mufti of Saudi Arabia condemned the suicide attacks in

Isra el fo r this sam e rea son). The second problem is tha t

he needs to justify collateral damage. Having dismissed

the innocence of civilian s, he is left w ith Muslims an dchildren w ho migh t be unint ent iona l victims of t hese

at ta cks. Aga in, he is strugg ling ag ainst t he ma in corpus

of Islam ic theolog y w hich is clear in its rejection o f such

colla tera l dama ge . To count er this he cla ims tha t

Muslims are fa cing exceptiona l circumsta nces, w ith a n

overpowering enemy and w ea k resources, and tha t

the se exceptiona l circumsta nces allow fo r a more laxinterpretation of the law.

It w as this polit ical theo ry that formed t he ba sis and

justification fo r the a tt a cks on t he World Trad e Cente r.

The US suppo rts Israel a nd is th eref ore t he e nem y. No

US civilian can b e de emed innocent b ecause the y elect

and pay f or their government, a nd w hile kill ing

children an d Muslims is normally not a ccept ab le, the

exception al circumsta nce of t he current situa tion

w here t he Muslims (i.e. Isla mists) a re figh ting superior

fo rces allow for a n exception t o t hese rules. Finally,

because these a t ta cks are for the greater go od o f

Isla m, there can be preme dita ted suicides, w hich w ould

othe rwise be deemed to b e heretical .

The implica tion of t his po litical th eo ry is a co mplet e

separation bet w een the Islamists and t he enemy,

w hich now includes a ll Muslims w ho a re in an y wa y

connected to non -Isla mist reg imes in th e Muslim w orld,

a s we ll a s all citizens of Western count ries tha t

recog nize the sta te o f Israel , even i f a t t imes they

support M uslim causes in Afgh a nista n or Bosnia . The

other then be comes a perfectly legit imat e ta rget in

the w ar for the glory of Islam.6

It is important to note tha t t his is a completely new

dep art ure fo r the Islam ist m ovemen t. This the ory is

ba sed neither on the main schools of Islamic theo logy

(including Wahhabism) nor on the often

misunde rsto od Ibn Taymiyya. Althoug h intellectua lly

w ea k, al-Zaw ah ri ha s nevertheless provided Al-Qae da

specifically an d t hose Islamists w ho w ish to fo llow

them w ith a theo retical legit imizat ion for ruthless

political a ction.

Popularity and t he rejection of the

mainstream

The rea ction on the Muslim street clea rly show s tha t

this new ruthless form of confrontat ion ha s found

ferti le g round fo r genera l support . In ma ny w ays, this

is not surprising. Al-Qaeda is merely echoing the

rejectionist view s of Nasser which w ere very popular in

the 1960s and the 1970s. Palestine rema ins the cause

clbrein the Muslim w orld, w ith support fo r the

Palestinians heightene d b y blanket coverage in the

Muslim media of the Int i fadaand the subsequent

suicide b omb ings in Israel. At t he sam e t ime, the

undemo crat ic and oppressive na ture of the Arab

regimes in particular feed s a g eneral ant ipat hy amo ng

their populations.

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Ideolog ical ly, the g round ha d b een prepared o ver

the la st three de cade s w ith the rejection b y the Islamist

opposit ion o f mainstrea m Islamic theolog ical t houg ht

on political issues a s expounde d by t he ma in clerics.

The p ronoun cements o f t hese clerics are con sidered tobe suspect b ecause the y are viewe d b y Islam ists as to ols

of t he reg imes. Thus, by definition, the olog ical

oppo sition t o, fo r exa mple, suicide a tt acks a s a

legitimat e po litical w ea pon is dismissed by t he Islamists

(a nd b y man y on t he Muslim street ) a s acquiescing in

government pressure.

That is not to say tha t th e ma instream o n the

Muslim street a ccepts a ll a spects of this new ideolog y.

What w e ha ve is a small movement o f ded icat ed

revolutiona ries w ith a clea r exclusive po litical theo ry

tha t exploits a grea ter feeling o f disaf f ection.

In this, Al-Qaeda has been greatly helped by the

reaction o f t he US. The US has mad e it clea r tha t it

v iew ed the t w in tow ers a t t ack as a ma jor blow ag ainst

its security. In ot her w ords, the a tt a ck w as seen as a

successful blo w. For the Muslim street w hich suff ers

from o ppressive reg imes a nd still fee ls bitte r ab out the

def ea t o f 1967, blaming t he success of Israe l sq ua rely

on t he support o f th e US, Al-Qae da is seen as the only

movement t hat scored a successful blow ag ainst t he

combined enemy. Nothing succeeds like success, and

the Western and Arab med ia have portrayed the t w in

towers attack as a success.

It is equa lly clea r tha t Al-Qae da is eng end ering

copycat sympathy, as seen, for example, in the attacks

in Kuw ait o n US civilia ns or the b omb ing of t he

nightclub in Bali. However, the question remains

w hether Al-Qaeda has the capab ili ty to exploit t his

popularity and translate it into political power, So far,

this loo ks fa r-fet ched, ma inly beca use Al-Qae da ha s no

real ba se in a ny ma jor Arab country, especia lly am ong

the a rmed forces.For th e t ime being , Al-Qae da remains a

revolutiona ry group w ith a n ideology tha t diverges

grea tly from the mainstream, but w hose actions f ind

gen eral populari ty by feed ing on long-standing

feelings of despair and impotence in the Muslim street.

Because Al-Qae da ha s presented itself a s the champion

of an ti-imperia lism (in th e Arab 1960s understa nding

of the term), it w ill inevitab ly benefit in terms of

popularity from any copycat attacks and more crucially

from all suicide attacks in Israel.

The ne xt move t ha t Al-Qae da is trying t o ma ke is to

expound i ts poli t ical theory in a w ider arena; hence t he

various videotapes sent to the al-Jazeera satellite

station and the serialization of al-Zawahris most

recent book in al-Quds. Al-Za w a hri is clea rly trying t o

w in over converts to his political theo ry from the

mainstream , hoping tha t t he Muslim Umma w il l be

ga lvanized into r ising a ga inst t he regimes as a prelude

to a renewe d a ttempt t o l iberat e Palestine. Once

ag ain, al-Zaw ahri is translating the ideo logy formed by

the Jihad in Egypt t o a w ider Muslim a rena. It is worth

noting tha t t w enty yea rs of Islamist a ctivity in Egypt,

thoug h result ing in a general move aw ay from a

secular to a relig ious wo rld-view , still fa iled t o lea d t o a

revolution. However, an increasingly angry mood in

Muslim societies may open t he do or to a grea ter

a ccepta nce of extremist po litics.

Al-Qaeda: the misunderstood Wahhabi connection and the ideology of violence 5

Endnotes1 For an authoritative reading of Wahhabism see J.L. Esposito, Unholy W ar; Terror in the Name of Islam, OU P, 2002, pp . 10517.2 For a n a lternative view tha t e mphasizes the Wahha bi connection of Al-Qaeda , see Stephen Schw artz, The Tw o Faces of Islam: The

House of Saud f rom Tradit io n t o Terror, Doubleday, 2002.3 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and M oder n Islam, Ma rkus Wiene r Pub lishers, 1996, pp. 4355.4 The f inancial netw ork is discussed in Roland Jacq uard , In the Name of Osama Bin Laden, Duke University Press, 2002, pp. 12635.

5 The f ull tit le is Shif a Sud ur al-M um inin : Risala an bad m aani al-jihad fi am aliyyat Islam A bad [The Cure for Believers Hearts: a

treat ise regarding some of th e meanings of j ih ad in th e operat ion of Islamabad]. Published a s No. 11 in the series of publicat ions of

al-Mujahideen in Egypt, March 1996.6 Al-Qu ds al-Arabi, London, 20 January 2002, p. 13.

Dr M aha Azzam has an Oxford PhD on t he Muslim Broth erhood, is a fo rmer Fellow at Roya l United

Services Institute, and a contemporary expert on Islamist movements.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs is an independent body which promotes the rigorous study of international questions and does not express opinions ofits own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any other means without the priorpermission of the copyright holder.

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