1 · 2019. 6. 4. · Zilong, Zheng Zhiqing and Zhang Xuhelped in preparing th isbrochure. Many thanks to them for their excellent works! - 6 -

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会议时间： 2019 年 6 月 7 日—6 月 10 日

会议地点：中国，北京，北京大学

官方语言：中文、英文、德文

主办单位：北京大学哲学系

北京大学外国哲学研究所

康德哲学专业委员会

协办单位：中华全国外国哲学史学会

康德学会（德国）

德意志联邦共和国驻华大使馆

商务印书馆

Date: June 7 (Friday) - June 10 (Monday), 2019

Venue: Peking University, Beijing, P.R. China

Official Language: Chinese, English, German

Hosts: Department of Philosophy, Peking University

Institute of Foreign Philosophy, Peking University

Chinese Kant-Society

Sponsors: Chinese Society for History of Foreign Philosophy

Kant-Gesellschaft

Deutsche Botschaft Peking

The Commercial Press

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目录/Contents

前言/Foreword 1

会议日程/Program 9

论文摘要/Abstracts 29

会议信息/Conference Information 203

通讯录/Address Book 209

北京大学校园地图/Peking University Campus Map 210

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前言

Foreword

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在来自北京大学哲学系和其他兄弟院校若干知名学者率先倡议下，在国内外

诸多学界同仁鼎力支持下，中华全国外国哲学史学会于 2018 年批准了成立“康

德哲学专业委员会”的申请。为了庆祝本专业委员会的正式成立，也为了借此机

会增进中国康德研究的内部交流与国际对话，北京大学哲学系、北京大学外国哲

学研究所于 2019 年 6 月 7 日-10 日在北京大学举办“康德哲学与人类未来”国

际学术研讨会。

本次会议主题之所以定为“康德哲学与人类未来”，乃是因为康德将自己的哲

学理解为不属于任何一个学派，而始终以世界公民为依归，以人类为根本目的。

他的哲学超越了时代、语言和文化的限制，对后来的哲学、科学乃至整个人类文

化的发展产生了多方面的重要影响。在他身后的两百多年时间里，人类的科学知

识、技术水平、社会制度、生活方式乃至文学艺术形式等都发生了翻天覆地的变

化，但人们却依然可以通过回到康德的核心洞见上来找到理解世界的有益启示。

随着人工智能、基因工程等新兴科技的崛起，今天整个人类社会面临的不确

定性与挑战或许超过了以往任何一个时刻。康德关于人类认识能力的原理是否会

被人类未来的发展所颠覆？康德设想的那些用来约束和引导人类社会及其行为

的根本原则是否在未来社会仍然适用？康德关于人类历史发展大势的那些构想

能否得到某种程度的印证？总而言之，康德提出的四个哲学基本问题是否依然有

效？我们期待，各位学者在本次会议上就这些问题展开深入的讨论和富有成效的

交流。

人文学科的国际交流面临着一种特殊的两难困境：一方面，英语乃是当今世

界唯一通用的国际语言，因此为了让沟通更加顺畅、交流更加有效，人们理当尽

量使用英语来进行国际对话。另一方面，许多人不无道理地指出，母语表达中细

致入微的概念辨析和引人遐思的丰富意蕴等对于人文学科来说是至关重要的，而

在外语表达中，这些要素很难得到充分体现。为了走出这一两难困境，我们决定

以下面的方式来尝试在这两方面间达到一种平衡：我们鼓励会议发言人提交一份

比通常的文章摘要详细得多的内容概述，并且以中英或中德双语的形式将它们提

供给各位参会者，以便让来自中国的与会者们既能用母语写作和阅读，又能将自

己的想法以国际通用的语言展现在全体参会者面前。绝大多数发言人都对我们这

项倡议作出了十分积极的响应，并专门为我们的会议撰写了详细的摘要。会议组

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On the initiative of several well-known Kant-scholars from Peking University and other academic institutes, and with the support of many colleagues in China and abroad, our application for establishing the Chinese Kant Society has been approved by the Chinese Society for History of Foreign Philosophy in 2018. On the establishment of the Chinese Kant Society, the Department of Philosophy and the Institute of Foreign Philosophy of Peking University organize the international conference “Kant and the Future of Humanity”, which will be held at Peking University from June 7th to 10th, 2019. Kant famously declares that philosophy should serve not the “monopoly of the schools,” but rather the “interest of human beings,” and that the ultimate concern of philosophy in a cosmopolitan sense is “that which necessarily interests everyone.” The reception of the Critical Philosophy in the past two hundred years proves that the latter has indeed transcended the limitations of any particular time, language, and culture, and exerted significant influences on the development of philosophy, natural and social sciences, and even the entire human culture in diverse manners. In spite of the enormous changes that take place in science, technology, social institutions, lifestyles, and arts during the two hundred years after Kant’s death, it remains always possible to find out valuable perspectives for a better understanding of the world by revisiting Kant’s fundamental insights.

With the rise of new, disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence and genetic engineering, the uncertainty and challenges that the entire human society now encounters are probably more radical than ever. Would Kant’s principles of human cognition be overturned by the future development of the human species? Are Kant’s fundamental principles for restricting and guiding human actions still applicable in future societies? To which extent could Kant’s conception of the basic trend of human history be confirmed by its actual development? In one word, are the four basic questions of the Critical Philosophy still valid? We hope that the participants of our conference may contribute to answer these questions by deep analyses and substantive discussions.

The international exchange of humanities faces a special dilemma: on the one hand, English is the only lingua franca in the world today, so in order to make communication smoother and more efficient, people should try to use English as much as possible in international dialogues. On the other hand, it is often, and not without justification, argued that the nuanced conceptual distinctions and rich connotations of the expressions in native language are crucial to the humanities, but these elements can hardly be preserved in foreign languages. In order to get out of this dilemma, we decided to try to strike a balance between the two horns: we encourage our speakers to submit a long abstract that contains much more details than the usual ones, and present them to the participants in Chinese/English or Chinese/German bilingual version, so that participants from China can write and read in their native language, while at the same

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织者在此对他们的通力合作表示衷心的感谢。值得指出的是，绝大多数中国发

言人的英文或德文摘要都是由作者本人撰写的。他们的语言能力十分优秀，可

以用外文毫无障碍地讨论专业问题。因此，我们十分欢迎来自国外的与会嘉宾

以本册中收录的论文概述为基础，就自己感兴趣的问题与中国学者进行交流和

辩论。

本次会议的筹备得到北京大学哲学系、北京大学外国哲学研究所和北京大学

国际合作部的大力支持，在此谨向这些机构的领导和同事们表示诚挚的谢意。哲

学系外事秘书林杉女士做了大量与会议有关的联络工作，李卓擎女士为“康德哲

学专业委员会”设计了一款简洁而美观的标志，祁箫同学设计了精美的会议海报，

展翼文博士和倪逸偲、李牧今、张旭、夏语等同学为论文摘要提供了高质量的翻

译，冯子龙、郑志清和张旭等同学帮助制作了这份手册。在此对他们的工作一并

表示感谢！

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time present their ideas to all participants in an international language. Most of the speakers responded very positively to our request and wrote a special detailed abstract for our conference. The organizer is deeply grateful for their cooperation. It is worth pointing out that the English or German abstracts of most Chinese speakers are written by themselves. Their language skills are excellent, and they can discuss professional issues without any obstacles in foreign languages. Therefore, the foreign guests are strongly encouraged to communicate and debate with Chinese colleagues on issues they find interesting, with the help of the abstracts included in this brochure.

The organization of this conference is strongly supported by the Department of Philosophy, the Institute of Foreign Philosophy, and the Office of International Relations of Peking University. The organizer would like to express his sincere gratitude to the directors and colleagues of these institutions. Ms. Lin Shan, secretary of the Institute of Foreign Philosophy, has done a lot of works related to the conference. Ms. Li Zhuoqing has designed a simple but significant logo for the Chinese Kant Society. Ms. Qi Xiao has designed a beautiful conference poster, which is also used as the cover of this brochure. Dr. Zhan Yiwen and several graduate students, Ni Yicai, Li Mujin, Zhang Xu, and Xia Yu, provided high-quality translations of the abstracts. Feng Zilong, Zheng Zhiqing and Zhang Xu helped in preparing this brochure. Many thanks to them for their excellent works!

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关于北京大学

北京大学创办于 1898年，初名京师大学堂，是中国第一所国立综合性大学，

也是当时中国最高教育行政机关，长期引领着中国高等教育的快速发展。

辛亥革命后的 1912年，学校改为现名。百年校庆之际，在国家政策支持下，

学校适时启动了“创建世界一流大学计划”。2000 年与原北京医科大学合并后，

学校在学科结构上得到进一步拓宽。

北京大学是一座国家重点的综合性大学，燕园主校区临近圆明园和颐和园景

区，坐落在北京西郊的海淀区，占地面积 274公顷。学校当前有着引以为傲的研

究队伍，其中包括中国科学院院士 53 人，中国工程院院士 7 人，第三世界科学

院院士 14人。

学校不仅致力于改进教学和科研工作，也在大力促进各学科之间的互动与交

融，并将重要的科学问题的研究同社会主义现代化建设所需的高水平技术人才的

培养有机结合，为国家培养了大批人才。

北京大学为民族的振兴和解放、国家的建设和发展、社会的文明和进步做出

了不可替代的贡献，在中国走向现代化的进程中起到了重要的先锋作用。爱国、

进步、民主、科学的传统精神和勤奋、严谨、求实、创新的学风在这里生生不息、

代代相传。

新时代的北京大学已成为拥有基础、应用科学，人文社会科学，医学，管理

学和教育学等多种学科的教学科研中心，并致力于未来发展为世界一流大学。

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About Peking University

Founded in 1898, Peking University was originally known as the imperial university of Peking. It was the first national university covering comprehensive disciplines in China, and has been a leading institution of higher education in China since its establishment. It also served as the highest administration for Chinese education when it was founded.

In 1912, the university adopted its present name. at the end of the 20th century, the Chinese government put Peking University at the top of its agenda for promoting higher education, with the aim to build a world-class university in the 21st century. After merging with Beijing Medical University in 2000, the disciplinary structure of Peking University once again was strengthened.

Today Peking University is a comprehensive and national key university. The campus, which is known as “Yan Yuan” (the garden of Yan), is situated in the Haidian District in the western suburb of Beijing. With a total area of 2,743,532 square metres (or 274 hectares), it is located near the Old Summer Palace and the Summer Palace.

Peking University is proud of its outstanding faculty, including 53 members of the Chinese academy of science (CAS), 7 members of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), and 14 members of the Third World Academy of Sciences (TWAS). The university has effectively combined research on important scientific subjects with the training of personnel with a high level of specialized knowledge and professional skills as demanded by the country’s ongoing project of socialist modernization. It strives not only to improve teaching and research work, but also to promote mutual interaction among various disciplines. Peking University has risen to the 27th in the times higher education world university rankings 2018 and to the 30th in the recently released QS World University Rankings 2019.

Peking University has continually played the essential role of the flagship educational institution in the course of China’s modernization. The university’s tradition emphasis on patriotism, progress, democracy, and science, together with its educational standards of diligence, precision, factualism, and innovation, have been passed down from generation to generation.

Thus Peking University has become a center for teaching and research as well as a university of a new type, embracing diverse branches of learning such as basic and applied sciences, social sciences and the humanities, and the sciences of medicine, management, and education. It aims to rank among the world’s best universities in the near future.

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会议日程

Program

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会议日程

6 月 6 日： 14：00-18：00，报到（中关新园酒店大堂）

18：00，晚餐（中关新园时光西餐厅）

6 月 7 日： 9：00-10：30，大会开幕式（英杰交流中心阳光厅）

10：30-11：00，合影，休息

11：00-12：00，主旨发言

12：10-14：00，午餐，休息（农园三楼）

14：00-16：10，分组会议（一）

16：10-16：30，茶歇

16：30-17：55，分组会议（二）

18：10-21：00，欢迎晚宴（全聚德（清华园店））

6 月 8 日： 9：00-12：20，主旨发言

12：30-14：00，午餐，休息（简餐）

14：00-16：10，分组会议（三）

16：10-16：30，茶歇

16：30-17：55，分组会议（四）

18：10-20：00，晚餐（勺园中餐厅）

20：10-21：00，学会工作会议

6 月 9 日： 9：00-12：20，主旨发言

12：30-14：00，午餐，休息（简餐）

14：00-16：10，分组会议（五）

16：10-16：30，茶歇

16：30-17：55，分组会议（六）

18：10-20：00，晚餐（和园中餐厅）

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Program

6th, June: 14:00 – 18:00, Registration (Lobby, Zhongguanxinyuan Hotel)

18:00, Dinner (Time Western Restaurant, Zhongguanxinyuan Hotel)

7th, June: 9:00 – 10:30, Opening Ceremony (Sunlight Hall, Overseas Exchange

Center, Peking University)

10:30 – 11:00, Photo, Break

11:00 – 12:00, Keynote Address

12:10 – 14:00, Lunch, Break (Nongyuan Restaurant, Third Floor)

14:00 – 16:10, Parallel Sessions I

16:10 – 16:30, Tea Break

16:30 – 17:55, Parallel Sessions II

18:10 – 21:00, Welcome Banquet (Quanjude Restaurant)

8th, June: 9:00 – 12:20, Keynote Addresses

12:30 – 14:00, Lunch Break (Light meal)

14:00 – 16:10, Parallel Sessions III

16:10 – 16:30, Tea Break

16:30 – 17:55, Parallel Sessions IV

18:10 – 20:00, Dinner (Shaoyuan Chinese Restaurant)



14:00 – 16:10, Parallel Sessions V

16:10 – 16:30, Tea Break

16:30 – 17:55, Parallel Sessions VI

18:10 – 20:00, Dinner (Heyuan Restaurant)

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6 月 10 日：9：00-12：20，主旨发言

12：30-13：30，午餐，休息

14：00-17：00，参观游览（颐和园）

6 月 11 日：代表离会

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14:00 – 17:00, Tour, Summer Palace (Yiheyuan)

11th, June: Departure

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具体场次

2019 年 6 月 7 日周五上午主旨演讲

会场时间演讲人主持人题目英杰中心

阳光厅 11：00-12：00

韩水法谢地坤康德哲学的当代理论意义

2019 年 6 月 7 日周五下午分组会议（一）

会场主持人时间发言人题目人文

学苑 3107

Hans Feger

14：00-14：40

Dieter Sturma

康德论人性的本质

14：45-15：25

Vadim Chaly

康德论人性及其解读

15：30-16：10

Dieter Schönecker

实践理性能够是人工的吗？


学苑 2106

张志伟

14：00-14：40

钱捷几何学的可能性——设想一个第三版“超

绝演绎” 14：45-15：25

黄裕生康德对希腊理性观的突破——从纯粹概

念能力到纯粹实践能力 15：30-16：10

张能为康德“道德形而上学”的现代效应问题—

—基于现代人本主义哲学视角


学苑 2206

Patrick Frierson

14：00-14：40

Christian Wenzel（文哲）

康德哲学中的決定论与希望

14：45-15：25

Jochen Bojanowski

自由的价值

15：30-16：10

Samuel Kahn 康德伦理学的苹果：作为评价核心

的 I-准则

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Details

7th, Morning, Keynote Address

VENUE TIME SPEAKER MODERATOR TITLE Sunlight Hall, Overseas Exchange Center

11:00-12:00

HAN Shuifa

XIE Dikun The Contemporary Theoretical Significance of Kant’s Philosophy

7th, Afternoon, Parallel Sessions I

VENUE CHAIR TIME SPEAKERS TITLES Humanities Buildings (henceforth HB), 3107

Hans FEGER

14:00-14:40

Dieter STURMA

Kant on the Nature of Humanity

14:45-15:25

Vadim CHALY Kant’s Humanity and its Interpretations

15:30-16:10

Dieter SCHÖNECKER

Can Practical Reason be Artificial?

VENUE CHAIR TIME SPEAKERS TITLES HB 2106

ZHANG Zhiwei

14:00-14:40

QIAN Jie The Possibility of Geometry – Towards a Third Version of “Transcendental Deduction”

14:45-15:25

HUANG Yusheng

Kant’s Breakthrough on Ancient Greek’s Conception of Reason

15:30-16:10

ZHANG Nengwei

The Modern Effect of Kant's Moral Metaphysics


Patrick FRIERSON

14:00-14:40

Christian WENZEL

Determinism and Hope in Kant

14:45-15:25

Jochen BOJANOWSKI

The Value of Freedom

15:30-16:10

Samuel KAHN The Apple of Kant’s Ethics: iMaxims as the locus of Assessment

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学苑 2233

刘哲

14：00-14：40

赵敦华全球正义与正义战争：罗尔斯、康德和黑

格尔 14：45-15：25

Riccardo Pozzo

康德与二十一世纪的移民哲学

15：30-16：10

Martin Schönfeld

一种康德式的气候哲学

2019 年 6 月 7 日周五下午分组会议（二）会场主持人时间发言人题目人文

学苑 3107

韩东晖

16：30-17：10

Steve Palmquist

康德《未来形而上学导论》中科学的未来

17：15-17：55

Thomas Zwenger

“唯有批判之路尚通”——康德对哲学的

先验构想


学苑 2106

Violetta Waibel

16：30-17：10

Ulrich Schlösser

康德论可传达性

17：15-17：55

Martin Moors

“自然更知道…”：康德历史哲学中人性

的二律背反


学苑 2206

林晖

16：30-17：10

邓安庆人类学在康德道德哲学中的意义

17：15-17：55

方博康德的政治哲学——一个关乎言说和行动

的方案


学苑 2233

马寅卯

16：30-17：10

王建军康德的“自在之物学说”与人类未来

17：15-17：55

丁三东康德“理性建筑术”的两种模型

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LIU Zhe

14:00-14:40

ZHAO Dunhua

International Justice and Just War: Rawls, Kant and Hegel

14:45-15:25

Riccardo POZZO

Kant and Twenty-First-Century Philosophy of Migration

15:30-16:10

Martin SCHÖNFELD

A Kantian Philosophy of Climate

7th, Afternoon, Parallel Sessions II HB 3107

HAN Donghui

16:30-17:10

Steve PALMQUIST

The Future of Science in Kant’s Prolegomena

17:10-17:55

Thomas ZWENGER

„Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen.“ – Kant‘s Transcendental Conception of Philosophy


Violetta WAIBEL

16:30-17:10

Ulrich SCHLÖSSER

Kant on Communicability

17:15-17:55

Martin MOORS

“Nature knows better …”: The Antinomy of Humanity in Kant’s Philosophy of History


LIN Hui

16:30-17:10

DENG Anqing

Die Bedeutung der Anthropologie in Kants Moralphilosophie

17:15-17:55

FANG Bo Kant’s Political Philosophy – A Program about Speech and Action

VENUE CHAIR TIME SPEAKERS TITLE HB 2233

MA Yinmao

16:30-17:10

WANG Jianjun

Kant’s Theory of Things-in-themselves and the Future of Mankind

17:15-17:55

DING Sandong

Two Patterns in Kant’s Conception of Architectonic of Pure Reason

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2019 年 6 月 8 日周六上午主旨演讲会场时间演讲人主持人题目人文

学苑

1106

9：00-10：00

Paul Guyer

卞绍斌康德论道德的合理性

10：10-11：10

Yasushi Kato（加

藤泰史）

戴华作为启发式运用的康德的“理性的公

共运用”概念

11：20-12：20

关子尹刘创馥康德与自然法论争

2019 年 6 月 8 日周六下午分组会议（三）会场主持人时间发言人题目人文

学苑 3107

王齐

14：00-14：40

卞绍斌目的与自由：公共性视域中的康德自律概

念 14：45-15：25

杨云飞理性的公共运用与世界公民的哲学——

对康德启蒙观的一种探究 15：30-16：10

孙小玲法权论是否属于康德的道德形而上学？


学苑 2106

李忠伟

14：00-14：40

Colin McLear

自由与自我意识

14：45-15：25

Nick Stang

模态图型

15：30-16：10

宫睿当代康德研究中的概念主义与非概念主

义之争


学苑 2206

曾晓平

14：00-14：40

刘作论康德对义务体系的划分

14：45-15：25

袁辉德性义务需要普遍立法公式吗？

15：30-16：10

张会永直接义务还是间接义务——康德和康德

主义者的动物伦理观

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8th, Morning, Keynote Addresses VENUE TIME SPEAKERS MODE-

RATORS TITLES

HB 1106

9:00-10:00

Paul GUYER

BIAN Shaobin

Kant on the Rationality of Morality

10:10-11:10

Yasushi KATO

Hua TAI Kant’s Concept of “Public Use of Reason” as Heuristic Use

11:20-12:20

Tze-wan KWAN

Chong-Fuk LAU

Kant & Natural Law Debates

8th, Afternoon, Parallel Sessions III VENUE CHAIR TIME SPEAKERS TITLES HB 3107

WANG Qi

14:00-14:40

BIAN Shaobin

End and Freedom: Kant’s Conception of Autonomy from the Perspective of Publicity

14:45-15:25

YANG Yunfei

The Public Use of Reason and a Philosophy for World Citizen: An Inquiry into Kant’s Idea of Enlightenment

15:30-16:10

SUN Xiaoling

Does Kant’s Rechtlehre belong to his Metaphysics of Morals?


LI Zhongwei

14:00-14:40

Colin MCLEAR

Freedom and Self-Consciousness

14:45-15:25

Nick STANG

Modal Schemata

15:30-16:10

GONG Rui The Debate between Conceptualism and Non-conceptualism in Contemporary Kant Studies


ZENG Xiaoping

14:00-14:40

LIU Zuo On Kant’s Division of the System of Duties

14:45-15:25

YUAN Hui Is the Universal Law Formula Necessary for the Duty of Virtue?

15:30-16:10

ZHANG Huiyong

Direct Duty or Indirect Duty: Kant’s and Kantian Ethical Views of Animals

- 20 -


学苑 2233

石福祁

14：00-14：40

王庆节海德格尔的“基础存在论”是“哲学人类学”

吗？——试论达沃斯论辩中卡西尔对海德

格尔“康德解释”的一个责难 14：45-15：25

贺念康德式哲学与海德格尔哲学中关于“规范

性的来源”问题的争论 15：30-16：10

张伟 “形式主义”与作为“理律”的“他律”—

—再论舍勒对康德伦理学的批评与发展

2019 年 6 月 8 日周六下午分组会议（四）会场主持人时间发言人题目人文

学苑 3107

孙永平

16：30-17：10

Violetta Waibel

康德器官论式的“成形本能”概念与“根茎

式思维” 17：15-17：55

Ina Goy 康德论自然界中神的艺术创造——物理神

学论证的诸变体


学苑 2106

尚新建

16：30-17：10

Huaping Lu-Adler

(卢华萍)

本质与说明——康德对洛克-莱布尼茨论

争的回应

17：15-17：55

谢昭锐系统化：康德和费希特的观念论理想


学苑 2206

Steve Palmquist

16：30-17：10

Andrew Chignell

康德式的希望与人类未来

17：15-17：55

Patrick Frierson

康德论宽恕的二律背反：一种世俗化的理

解

- 21 -


SHI Fuqi

14:00-14:40

Qingjie WANG

Is Heidegger’s “Fundamental Ontology” a “Philosophical Anthropology”? – On Cassirer’s Objection to Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant in the Davos Dispute

14:45-15:25

HE Nian On the Controversy over the “Source of Normativity” between Kantian Philo-sophy and Heidegger's Philosophy

15:30-16:10

ZHANG Wei

“Formalism” and “Heteronomy” as “Logomony” – On Scheler’s Criticism and Development of Kantian Ethics

8th, Afternoon, Parallel Sessions IV VENUE CHAIR TIME SPEAKERS TITLES HB 3107

SUN Yongping

16:30-17:10

Violetta WAIBEL

Kant’s Organological “Bildungs-trieb” and “Rhizomatic Thinking”: Is there a Systematic Conflict?

17:10-17:55

Ina GOY Kant on Divine Artistry in Nature––Variants of the Physicotheological Argument


SHANG Xinjian

16:30-17:10

Huaping LU-ADLER

Essence and Explanation––Kant’s Response to a Locke-Leibniz Controversy

17:15-17:55

Plato TSE Systematization: The Idealist Ideal in Kant and Fichte


Steve PALMQUIST

16:30-17:10

Andrew CHIGNELL

Kantian Hope and the Future of Humanity

17:15-17:55

Patrick FRIERSON

Kant’s Antinomy of Forgive-ness: A Secular Account

- 22 -


学苑 2233

李秋零

16：30-17：10

张荣 “理性的致命一跃”：康德对恩典学的改造

及其意义辨析 17：15-17：55

吕超自爱的空洞性与恶的无穷表达

2019 年 6 月 9 日周日上午主旨演讲会场时间演讲人主持人题目人文

学苑

1106

9：00-10：00

Otfried Höffe

黄裕生康德的世界公民思考：作为我们的

全球化了的世界的榜样 10：10-11：10

Howard Williams

Tom Rockmore

康德的世界主义理想

11：20-12：20

李明辉王庆节康德伦理学与儒家伦理学

2019 年 6 月 9 日周日下午分组会议（上）会场主持人时间发言人题目人文

学苑 3107

Andrew Chignell

14：00-14：40

Rachel Zuckert

离开人类视角的尝试：“先验辩证论”中的先天试验

14：45-15：25

Jeremiah Alberg

超验本原与暴力的神圣者

15：30-16：10

南星智能与判断力


学苑 2106

梁亦斌

14：00-14：40

刘创馥康德存在论的景象

14：45-15：25

戴华康德的观念论、及其如何以批判方式来反

对超验实在论 15：30-16：10

梁议众康德的先验主体是认识对象吗？

- 23 -


LI Qiuling

16:30-17:10

ZHANG Rong

“Salto Mortale of Reason”: Analysis on Kant’s Reformation of Grace Doctrines and its Significance

17:15-17:55

LV Chao The Emptiness of Self-love and the Infinite Manifestations of Evil


RATORS TITLES

HB 1106

9:00-10:00

Otfried HÖFFE

HUANG Yusheng

Kants Kosmopolitisches Denken als Vorbild für unsere globalisierte Welt

10:10-11:10

Howard WILLIAMS

Tom RO-CKMORE

Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal

11:20-12:20

Ming-huei LEE

Qingjie WANG

Kants Ethik und die konfuzianische Ethik

9th, Afternoon, Parallel Sessions V


Andrew CHIGNELL

14:00-14:40

Rachel ZUCKERT

Attempting to Exit the Human Perspective: A Priori Experimenta-tion in the Transcendental Dialectic

14:45-15:25

Jeremiah ALBERG

Transcendent Principles and the Violent Sacred

15:30-16:10

NAN Xing Intelligence and Judgment


LIANG Yibin

14:00-14:40

Chong-Fuk LAU

The Landscape of Kant’s Ontology

14:45-15:25

Terence Hua TAI

Kant’s Idealism and His Critical Objection to Transcendental Realism

15:30-16:10

LIANG Yizhong

Is Kant's Transcendental Subject an Object of Cognition?

- 24 -


学苑 2206

Martin Schönfeld

14：00-14：40

Hans Feger

普世主义与“天下”——康德在中国

14：45-15：25

曲红梅关于孔子与康德的世界主义理想的比

较性研究 15：30-16：10

张睿明 “量论”心学的本体论——由康德对熊

十力“量论”思想的发展


学苑 2233

陈德中

14：00-14：40

江璐康德元伦理学中的道德归责之可能性

14：45-15：25

尚文华在崇高与虚无之间的自由意志——兼论

现代自由原则的局限及其可能的出路 15：30-16：10

董滨宇

康德与道德动机的“多因素决定论”

2019 年 6 月 9 日周日下午分组会议（下）会场主持人时间发言人题目人文

学苑 3107

Samuel Kahn

16：30-17：10

Halla Kim (金汉拏)

在《道德形而上学奠基》第三部分与《实

践理性批判》之间：康德“实践”演绎

的连续与断裂 17：15-17：55

朱会晖什么是康德的纯粹理性理念的“实践的

实在性”


学苑 2106

詹文杰

16：30-17：10

舒远招论康德 Sein 论题中的逻辑谓词与实在谓

词 17：15-17：55

胡好实在谓词难题的解决

- 25 -


Martin SCHÖN-FELD

14:00-14:40

Hans FEGER

Universalism versus “All-under- Heaven” (Tianxia) – Kant in China

14:45-15:25

QU Hongmei

A Comparative Study on Confucius’s and Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideals

15:30-16:10

ZHANG Ruiming

Doctrine of the Nature of the Mind of Lianglun – Development of Xiong Shili’s Lianglun through Kant


CHEN Dezhong

14:00-14:40

JIANG Lu The Possibility of Moral Responsi-bility in Kant’s Meta-ethics

14:45-15:25

SHANG Wenhua

Free Will between Sublimity and Nothingness – On the Limitation of Modern Principle of Freedom and Its Possible Way Out

15:30-16:10

DONG Binyu

Kant and the Overdetermination of Moral Motive

9th, Afternoon, Parallel Sessions VI VENUE CHAIR TIME SPEAKERS TITLES HB 3107

Samuel KAHN

16:30-17:10

Halla KIM

Between Groundwork III and the Critique of Practical Reason: Continuities and Discontinuities in Kant’s “Practical” Deductions

17:10-17:55

ZHU Huihui

What is the Practical Reality of Pure Ideas from Reason for Kant?


ZHAN Wenjie

16:30-17:10

SHU Yuanzhao

Über das logische Prädikat und das reale Prädikat in Kants These vom Sein

17:15-17:55

HU Hao The Solution of the Real Predicate Problem – From Kant's Criticism of Ontological Argument

- 26 -


学苑 2206

张荣

16：30-17：10

王咏诗数学对康德批判哲学的意义

17：15-17：55

石福祁卡西尔回答了“人是什么？”这一问题了

吗？


学苑 2233

宫睿

16：30-17：10

范大邯审美判断力与实践理性

17：15-17：55

周黄正蜜美作为德性的象征

2019 年 6 月 10 日周一上午主旨演讲会场时间演讲人主持人题目人文

学苑

1106

9：00-10：00

Manfred Baum

Christian Wenzel（文哲）

康德先验演绎中的统觉和自然

10：10-11：10

Béatrice Longuenesse

韩林合康德论意识及其限度

11：20-12：20

邓晓芒张廷国论康德美学的认识论结构及其改造

- 27 -


ZHANG Rong

16:30-17:10

WANG Yongshi

The Meaning of Mathematics to Kant’s Critical Philosophy

17:15-17:55

SHI Fuqi Did Cassirer Answer the Question: “Was ist der Mensch?”


GONG Rui

16:30-17:10

FAN Dahan Power of Aesthetic Judgment and Practical Reason

17:15-17:55

ZHOUHUANG Zhengmi

Beauty as a Symbol of Morality


RATORS TITLES

HB 1106

9:00-10:00

Manfred BAUM Christian WENZEL

Apperzeption und Natur in Kants transzendentaler Deduktion

10:10-11:10

Béatrice LONGUENESSE

HAN Linhe

Kant on Consciousness and its Limits

11:20-12:20

DENG Xiaomang

ZHANG Tingguo

Über die epistemologische Struktur von Kants Ästhetik und ihre Umgestaltung

*HB=Lee Shau-Kee Humanities Buildings

- 28 -

- 29 -

论文摘要

Abstracts

- 30 -

主旨演讲：

康德哲学的当代理论意义

韩水法

康德在《纯粹理性批判》第二版序言中指出，该著作主要是一个方法的著

作，而不是科学的体系。康德的这个论断和这部著作的意义，以及他的整个哲

学体系的理论意义，人们先前主要只是并且只能以人类理智的内在的自我反思

来进行研究、讨论和考察，甚至只能局限于康德哲学的某一个方面，或者人类

理智的某一种能力来进行讨论和研究。这样的研究对人们了解和把握康德哲学

的内在意义，无疑具有基础性的意义，而通过康德哲学，人们至少可以认识到

理性是一种多层面的现象，它是形式、能力和活动的统一。康德哲学的深远的

和现代的意义总是人们在探讨和解决现实的问题时被一再重新发掘出来。胡塞

尔在努力为科学重建基础时认识到康德理论哲学重大意义，因此他所研究的对

象与康德哲学竟有了直接的渊源，即意识活动，而他也接受了康德方法的若干

重要因素。今天，在塞尔等哲学家再度领会康德哲学某些内容的现实重要性之

时，一种革命性的科学和技术事件以及它阶段性的成就为我们提供了一个同样

革命性的参照，令我们更加深刻亦更加具体地了解和认识康德哲学的现代作用

和意义。

人工智能的崛起，尤其它在某些智能领域所展现的强大功能，以及它在进

一步发展中所遭遇的障碍，以及人们从人工智能的当下发展和潜能所推论和设

想的未来人工一般智能（AGI），为人们理解、研究和思考康德理论，包括他的

方法论论断的意义，提供了一种前所未有的参照和对比。人们现在可以从一个

与人类理性相似的智能（intelligence）来研究和思考人类理性本身。这就是

说，先前人们关于理性的研究仅仅局限于理性的内在的自我反思，而缺乏外在

的比较视角。现在，人工智能的现实和相关的理论假设在一定程度上为人们考

察和研究人类理性提供了外在的可能视角，从而可使人们获得前所未有的见

解。

- 31 -

Keynote Addresses:

The Contemporary Theoretical Significance of Kant's Philosophy Shuifa Han

Kant noted in the preface of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that this work is primarily methodological and is not a scientific system. The significance of Kant’s assertion and this work, as well as the theoretical significance of his entire philosophical system, were previously only (and could only be) studied, discussed and researched as an inner self-reflection of human reason. It was even limited to a certain aspect of Kant's philosophy, or was investigated and discussed in terms of a certain ability of human reason. Such research undoubtedly has fundamental significance in understanding and grasping the intrinsic meaning of Kant's philosophy. Through Kant's philosophy, people can at least realize that reason is a multi-faceted phenomenon; a unity of form, ability and activity. The deep and modern meaning of Kant's philosophy has invariably been re-discovered when people explore and attempt to solve real-world problems. Husserl realized the great significance of Kant's theoretical philosophy when he tried to reconstruct the foundation of science. Accordingly, the object he studied had a direct relationship with Kant's philosophy, namely, consciousness activities. He also accepted several important elements of Kant's method. Today, when philosophers such as J. R. Searle once again grasp the practical importance of certain aspects of Kant’s philosophy, a revolutionary scientific and technological event and its staged achievements provide us with an equally revolutionary reference. It brings us a deeper and more specific understanding and insight into the modern role and significance of Kant's philosophy.

The rise of artificial intelligence, especially its powerful functions in some areas of intelligence, the obstacles it encounters in its further development and the future artificial general intelligence (AGI) that people infer from the current development and potential of artificial intelligence provide an unprecedented reference and comparison to understand, study and think about Kant's theory, including the meaning of his methodological arguments. People can now study and think about human reason per se from similar forms of intelligence. That is to say, the previous research on reason was limited to the inner self-reflection of reason, but lacked an external comparative perspective. Now, the reality of artificial intelligence and related theoretical assumptions provide an external perspective for people to examine and study human reason, enabling unprecedented insights to be gained.

- 32 -

我们看到，人工智能的许多专域(domain-specific)能力固然让人们深刻地

领会到了人类理性的短处，而人工智能在向通域（domain-in general）层级发

展中所须突破的关隘，或者它所遭遇的那些今天看来难以克服——主要不知道

从何下手——的障碍和困境，亦正好突出了人类理性的优势。而从这种比较中

所凸显出来的人类理性的优势或人工智能的劣势之中，我们亦同样见识了康德

理论对人类理性或意识的独特性质或硬核的准确把握和深刻洞见。

本文关于康德哲学的当代理论意义的讨论，着重于分析其方法论的洞见和

理论的现实启发意义。为了清晰地突出这种洞见和它对人工智能的启发，本文

也讲究方法，采取一种直接和明晰的论述策略。本文的论述将从两个层面来进

行。

康德论道德的合理性 Paul Guyer 吕超译

康德声称道德的基本原则是由纯粹理性自己给出的。许多人将康德解释为从

纯粹实践理性（它对立于仅仅是审慎的推理，该推理关乎获得经验地给出的目的

之最有效的手段）的一个概念中衍生出了这个原则。但康德坚持只存在一个理性

能力，尽管它既有理论的、又有实践的应用。本文将展示，康德如何从理性自身

(reason as such)的诸一般原则，衍生出道德的基本原则和目标。为了完成这项工

作，本文将按照康德自己所设想的来看待理性，即，把理性当作首先按照“不矛

盾律”和“充足理由律”这两条基本原则、以及附属于其中第二条原则的第三条

原则（即“系统性”原则）来被定义的。本文的主要论证是：康德试图通过把“不

矛盾律”应用于“人是拥有自己意志的行动者”这个事实，将道德的基本原则在

它的几重表达中衍生出来，并从“充足理由律”中衍生出道德的完整目标，即至

善。进一步地，康德假定：不仅道德的基本原则之应用必须是系统性的、从而生

产出一套职责的系统，而且道德自身必须是理论认识和实践认识的一个完整系统

的一部分，或者更准确地说，道德是这一完整的认识系统之“理想”的一部分。

康德还认为，纯粹理性在能够推动人去行动的这个意义上是实践的；本文还将考

虑康德对这个主张的理论证成和它的经验后果。

- 33 -

We see that many of the domain-specific capabilities of artificial intelligence have enabled people to profoundly understand the shortcomings of human reason, and the barriers that artificial intelligence must break through on its way towards domain-general level, or the obstacles and dilemmas it encounters, which seem insurmountable today—mainly without knowing where to start—simply highlight the advantages of human reason. From the advantages of human reason or the disadvantages of artificial intelligence highlighted in this comparison, we can also see the accurate grasp and profound insights of Kant's theory into the unique nature or hard core of human reason or consciousness.

This article discusses the contemporary theoretical significance of Kant's philosophy, focusing on the analysis of its methodological insights and the implications of the theory. In order to clearly highlight this insight and its inspiration for artificial intelligence, this article also gives due consideration to methods and adopts a direct and clear discussion strategy.

Kant on the Rationality of Morality Paul Guyer

Kant claims that the fundamental principle of morality is given by pure reason itself. Many have interpreted Kant to derive this principle from a conception of pure practical reason (as opposed to merely prudential reasoning about the most effective means to empirically given ends). But Kant maintained that there is only one faculty of reason, although with both theoretical and practical applications. This essay shows how Kant attempted to derive the fundamental principle and goal of morality from the general principles of reason as such. To do this it takes reason as Kant himself conceived of it, namely, as defined above all by the two fundamental principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason, with a third principle of systematicity attached to the second of these. Its main argument is that Kant attempted to derive the fundamental principle of morality in its several formulations by applying the principle of non-contradiction to the fact that human beings are agents with their own wills, and the complete object of morality, the highest good, from the principle of sufficient reason. Further, Kant supposed both that the application of the fundamental principle of morality must be systematic, thus yielding a system of duties, and also that morality itself must be part of a complete system of both theoretical and practical cognition, or more precisely part of the ideal of such a complete system of cognition. Kant also held that pure reason is practical, in the sense of being able to motivate human beings to action; the essay will also consider his theoretical justification of this claim and its empirical consequences.

- 34 -

在发言中，我将聚焦于这一基本主张——康德试图将道德的基本原则仅仅奠

基在“非矛盾律”对于 “每个人都拥有他（或她）自己的意志”这一事实的应

用之上。

作为启发式运用的康德的“理性的公共运用”概念

Yasushi Kato （加藤泰史）

根据康德“原初契约”的理念，“国家/共同体”应当在其自身之内有对制度

的制度化，即基于理性的公开运用的高阶制度化。

当它能够发现违反人的尊严的现象，并将那（些）尊严受到侵犯的人与其他

现存制度等同起来，然后通过面向“真正的公众”、即“整个世界”的出版物，

将这一点作为一个社会问题提出来的时候，“理性”就得到了“公开”运用。

因此，康德的“理性的公开运用”的概念同时意味着“理性的启发式运用”，

而当“理性”被“公开”运用时，它至少可以起到启发作用。在我的演讲中，我

想对“理性的公开运用”的这一功能进行论证，将其与《道德形而上学》中母亲

谋杀她的孩子的案例联系起来。

康德与自然法论争

关子尹

有关自然法的论争可追溯到古希腊时期 Physis/Nomoi 两阵线关于正义之本质的

争议。借着点出希腊文 dikaion (正义) 与 dichaion (平分者或分割者) 于字源上

的关连，作者指出“正义”问题从一开始即涉及辨别对与错的需要。关于自然法

的争议本身，作者认为论争可分为两个不同的层面－法理学层面，和形而上学层

面。在法理学的层面，自然法其实从来都承认制定法有一定的“实践上的优先性”，

因为只有制定法才能保证日复一日的社会秩序。然而，由于制定法毕竟都是由人

类所制定，和会有偏颇的可能，自然法乃因而在这关键上争回其“形而上的优先

- 35 -

In the presentation, I will focus on the basic claim that Kant intends the fundamental principle of morality to be grounded simply on the application of the principle of non-contradiction to the fact that every human being has his or her own will.

Kant’s concept of “public use of reason” as heuristic use Yasushi Kato

According to Kant’s idea of “original contract”, “state/commonwealth” should have inside itself the institutionalization of institutions, that is, the higher order of institutionalization, which is based on the public use of reason.

“Reason” will be used “publicly”, when it can find out appearances of violations of human dignity and identify the person(s), whose dignity is violated, with the other(s) of existing institutions and then raise such a case as a social issue through publications toward “the real public”, i.e. “the world at large”.

Kant’s concept of “public use of reason” means therefore at the same time that of “heuristic use of reason” and when “reason” will be used “publicly”, then it may function at least heuristically. In my presentation I would like to argue about such a function of “public use of reason”, relating it to the case of mother’s murder of her child on the metaphysics of morals.

Kant & Natural Law Debates

Tze-wan Kwan

Natural law debates owe their origin to the Physis-Nomoi controversy in Greek antiquity over the nature of justice. By pointing out the etymological kinship of the Greek word dikaion (justice) with dichaion (halver, divider), the author maintains that justice has to do from the outset with the need to tell (divide) right from wrong. Regarding the natural law controversy, the author distinguishes between two levels of debates—jurisprudential debates and metaphysical debates. He observes that on the jurisprudential level, natural law is always ready to concede to positive law a certain pragmatic primacy because only positive law can guarantee day to day law and order. However, as positive laws are only man-made and can for various reasons be fallible, natural law claims back its metaphysical primacy as a “higher law” and as an appeal to

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性”，即在扮演作为正义的终极要求的“较高层的法则”这一角色。在当代社会

中，这种要求特别适用于有如独裁统治，多数人暴力，公民抗命，基本人权，国

际司法等方案。然而，尽管自然法具有很大的吸引力，自古以来它的认识论基础

却一直受到质疑。在本文中，作者将自然法（或康德的 Naturrecht）的观念与康

德的定言律令联系起来，并认为它们都表现出“自然模拟”的相同结构。正如定

言律令总是以虚拟语气构成，和并不是真正的自然法则，而只是借用自然法则的

律则性以便为道德实践者提供自我立法和自我规范的空间一样，我们在谈论自然

法时，也根本不需要真正去“证明”在自然界中正义真的普遍地存在。自然法的

提出，就是让我们在制定法被明显地滥用或明显地出现漏洞时能够合理地提出正

义的更高的要求。通过这种争辩方式，作者认为康德已经隐然地为自然法理论提

供了基础，使其从法律实证主义阵营发起的“两千年的形而上学的迷雾”的攻击

中解脱出来。

康德的世界公民思考：

作为我们的全球化了的世界的榜样 Otfried Höffe 范大邯译

两个现象对于人类的未来是不可或缺的：世界公民主义与全球化。前一个概

念域，世界公民主义，并不属于康德的主要概念。而第二个概念则在他那里没有

出现。尽管如此，康德在如下各个领域的思考都体现出了世界公民主义特征：（1）

知识，（2）道德，（3）宗教，（4）教育，（5）共通感以及艺术，（6）权利和国家，

（7）历史。

本报告阐述一个恰当的全球化概念的三个维度。然后它将从全球化的视角示

例性地阐发几个事实领域。康德的相关创新展现出了一种悖论：这位哲学家虽然

终生固守在其家乡哥尼斯堡，他却由于理智上的好奇和对其它文化的宽容成为世

界公民的榜样。

最后，受康德的世界公民主义的启发，为了人类的未来，我建议三个优先性。

第一，对于异域文化的好奇和宽容相较于频繁地乘坐飞机环游世界更加重要。

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final justice. In contemporary society, such an appeal is particularly applicable to scenarios such as dictatorship, tyranny of the majority, civil disobedience, basic human rights, international justice, and the like. However, in spite of the great appeal of natural law, its epistemological basis has since antiquity been questioned. In this essay, the author relates the idea of natural law (or Naturrecht in Kant) back to Kant’s categorical imperative and argues that they both exhibit the same structure of “analogy of nature”. Just as the categorical imperative, being always formulated in the subjunctive mood, is not a real law of nature, but only borrows from the latter its lawfulness so as to give room for the moral agent to be self-legislative and self-commanding, we also do not need to really “prove” the prevalence of justice in nature to be able to justifiably uphold natural law as a demand for higher justice upon abuse and the overt failure of positive law. In this way, the author suggests that Kant has implicitly paved a way to save natural law theory from the assault of “two millennia of metaphysical mist” as launched by the legal positivistic camp.

Kants Kosmopolitisches Denken

als Vorbild für unsere globalisierte Welt

Otfried Höffe Zwei Phänomene sind für die Zukunft der Menschheit unverzichtbar: ein Kosmopolitismus und die Globalisierung. Das erste Begriffsfeld, „weltbürgerlich“ und „kosmopolitisch“, gehört nicht zu Kants Hauptbegriffen, und der zweite Begriff taucht bei ihm gar nicht auf. Trotzdem hat Kants Denken in all seinen Sachbereichen einen kosmopolitischen Charakter: beim (1) Wissen, (2) der Moral und (3) der Religion, (4) der Erziehung, (5) dem sensus communis und der Kunst, (6) selbstverständlich beim Recht und Staat, nicht zuletzt (7) bei der Geschichte.

Der Vortrag erläutert die drei Dimensionen eines sachgerechten Begriffs von Globalisierung Sodann erörtert er im Blick auf die Globalisierung exemplarisch einige genannte Sachbereiche. Kants einschlägige Neuerungen weisen auf eine Paradoxie hin: Ein Philosoph, der zeitlebens an seine Heimat, Königsberg, fixiert bleibt, ist gleichwohl dank intellektueller Neugier und interkultureller Toleranz, auch das persönliche Vorbild eines Kosmopoliten.

Am Ende schlage ich für die Zukunft der Menschheit drei von Kants Kosmopolitismus inspirierte Prioritäten vor. (1) Wichtiger als ein jet-set-globetrotter sind interkulturelle Neugier und interkulturelle Toleranz. Werden sie „vor Ort“ praktiziert, haben sie den ökologisch willkommenen Nebeneffekt, Energie zu

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从生态角度来说这样也节约能源。第二，相较于通过荣誉和财富向世界证明自己，

一个道德上整全的人格更加重要。第三，（不只是经济上的）交易精神可以帮助

着克服人与人之间的战争状态。相较于经济上的交织和对政治上的主导地位的谋

求，通过权利取代暴力更加重要。按照世界公民意图，对于人类的未来来说，在

全部三个层次上的法的关系都是必要的：作为国家法，作为万民法，以及作为世

界公民法。

康德的世界主义理想

Howard Williams

我的报告旨在证明，康德的世界主义理想不仅仅是为他的哲学体系增加一个

有趣的政治维度的华丽修辞，而毋宁说是他的哲学大厦的一个核心论旨。世界主

义理想在《纯粹理性批判》的先验方法论第三章中尤其引人注目。在那里，康德

勾勒出他对哲学的理解背后的“世界概念”（Weltbegriff）。在康德看来，哲学中隐

含着最终使研究者走上实践或道德之途的对世界的理解。康德当然认为，哲学的

重中之重是发现可给予哲学以最大正确性的适当方法。他在德国人的意义上，即

“科学”以追求客观知识为职志，抱有对哲学的全面系统的理解。他从不回避或

轻视这种真理追求。然而，这一认识论研究一旦完成（比如在《纯粹理性批判》

中，纯粹理性的辩证法一旦得以呈现），一旦我们回过头来估量哲学有望成为什

么，我们就必须抱有一个超越学派正确性的更宽泛的哲学视野。在我们对哲学的

终极领悟中，古人的哲学概念，其中认为哲学家置身于道德和社会的语境，必须

得以完全展开。

我仔细地考察了康德对这个有关哲学和哲学家的世界主义理想的理解，并指

出这个理想所导致的实践哲学的首要地位。只要客观知识没有遭到败坏，道德行

动的需要就是第一位的。《永久和平论》的权利论中给出的对世界公民权利的说

明，就是按照作为哲学研究之核心要义的“世界概念”来解释的。政治世界主义

可视为康德整个哲学体现出的胸怀世界这一普遍信念的组成部分。在康德看来，

政治世界主义并非国内爱国主义的对立面，而是其实质性的补充。权利论有一个

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sparen. (2) Wichtiger als sich mittels Ehrsucht und Habsucht in der Welt behaupten zu können, ist eine moralisch integre Persönlichkeit. (3) Ein (nicht bloß ökonomischer)Handelsgeist hilft den Kriegszustand unter den Menschen zu überwinden. Wichtiger als wirtschaftliche Verflechtungen und Streben nach politischer Dominanz ist aber die Ablösung der Gewalt durch das Recht. Nach der wohl wichtigsten weltbürgerlichen Absicht für die Zukunft der Menschheit sind Rechtsverhältnisse auf allen drei Stufen geboten: als Staatsrecht, als Völkerrecht und als Weltbürgerrecht.

Kant’s cosmopolitan Ideal Howard Williams

My goal in this talk is to demonstrate that Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal is no mere rhetorical flourish that adds an interesting political dimension to his philosophical system, but is rather one of the central themes of his whole philosophy. The cosmopolitan ideal comes especially to the fore in the third part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method in the Critique of Pure Reason. Here he outlines the Weltbegriff (the world concept) that underlies his understanding of philosophy. For Kant there is implicit in philosophy an understanding of the world that leads the inquirer ultimately in a practical (or moral) direction. Kant of course accords philosophical priority to discovering the appropriate method for philosophy that gives it the greatest validity. He has a thoroughly systematic understanding of philosophy in the German sense of a Wissenschaft which prides itself on the pursuit of objective knowledge. He does not ever sideline or make secondary this pursuit of truth. However once this epistemological enquiry is complete (as occurs in the Critique of Pure Reason once the dialectic of pure reason has been presented), and we assess in retrospect what can be expected of philosophy we must embrace a broader vision of philosophy than that of scholastic correctness. In our ultimate appreciation of philosophy the ancient conception of philosophy, where the philosopher was situated in a moral and so social context has to be fully developed.

I look closely at how Kant understands this cosmopolitan ideal of philosophy and the philosopher and note the primacy of practical philosophy to which it leads. Where objective knowledge is not being prejudiced the needs of moral action take precedence. The account of cosmopolitan right which is provided in the Doctrine of Right and Towards Perpetual Peace is interpreted in the light of this Weltbegriff which is at the heart of philosophical enquiry. Political cosmopolitanism is seen as part of the general commitment to the openness to the world that characterizes Kant’s philosophy as a whole. Political cosmopolitanism is not by Kant seen as a counter to patriotism at home

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实质性的国际主义的和世界主义的维度。国内的权利与国际领域世界全体公民的

权利不可分割。这种世界主义的哲学观，对我自己的哲学追求有巨大影响。这是

我推荐的研究取径，也是哲学做得最好时显而易见的研究取径。

我要关注的那段话出自《纯粹理性批判》(A838/B866 – A840/B868)：

但直到那时以前哲学的概念只是一个学院概念，也就是一个知识系统的概念，这种知识

只被作为科学来寻求，而不以超出这种知识的系统统一、因而超出知识的逻辑完善性的

东西为目的。但还有一个总是为这个命名提供根据的世界概念（conceptus cosmicus），

尤其是当我们仿佛把哲学概念人格化并将它在哲学家的理想中设想为一个蓝本时。从这

方面来看哲学就是有关一切知识与人类理性的根本目的（teleologia rationis humanae）

之关系的科学，而哲学家就不是一个理性的专门家，而是人类理性的立法者。

康德伦理学与儒家伦理学

李明辉

康德本人或许不认为他的哲学与儒家哲学具有亲和性。但日后尼采

（Friedrich Nietzsche）在其《超乎善与恶之外》（Jenseits von Gut und Böse）中戏

称康德为“柯尼希贝尔格的伟大中国人”（der große Chinese von Königsberg），却

于无意中道出康德哲学与中国哲学（尤其是儒家哲学）在精神上的亲和性。

伦理学是康德哲学与儒家哲学共同的重点与核心。康德伦理学通常被加上三

个标签：“自律伦理学”（Ethik der Autonomie）、“存心伦理学”（Gesinnungsethik）

与“形式伦理学”（formale Ethik）。康德本人从未使用这三个标签来称呼自己的

伦理学，但它们都可以在康德的著作中找到根据。

众所周知，“自律”是康德伦理学的核心概念。康德系以“自律”的概念来

说明道德之本质，而“自律”即是作为道德主体的“意志”之自我立法。换言之，

我们的意志必须服从的道德法则是它为自己制定的；如果我们在意志以外寻求道

德法则之根源，便是“他律”（Heteronomie）；而以“他律”为根据的道德原则是

虚假的。

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but rather as its essential complement. The Doctrine of Right has an essential international and cosmopolitan dimension. Right at home is inseparable from right in the international sphere and amongst all citizens of the world. This cosmopolitan view of philosophy has strongly influenced my own appeal to philosophy. It is an approach I recommend, and is one that is evident when philosophy is done at its best.

The passage that will take my attention is from the Critique of Pure Reason (A838/B866 – A840/B868):

‘Until now, however, the concept of philosophy has been only a scholastic concept, namely that of a system of cognition that is sought only as a science without having as its end anything more than the systematic unity of this knowledge, thus the logical perfection of cognition. But there is also a cosmopolitan concept (conceptus cosmicus) that has always grounded this term, especially when it is, as it were, personified and represented as an archetype of the ideal of the philosopher. From this point of view philosophy is the science of cognition to the essential ends of human reason (teleologia rationis humanae), and the philosopher is not an artist of reason but the legislator of human reason.’

Kants Ethik und die konfuzianische Ethik

Ming-huei Lee (übersetzt von LI Mujin) Immanuel Kant selbst könnte nicht glauben, dass seine Philosophie mit der konfuzianischen Philosophie verwandt sei. Aber Friedrich Nietzsche gab ihm später in seinem Jenseits von Gut und Böse den Spitznamen „der große Chinese von Königsberg“; unabsichtlich äußerte er damit die geistige Verwandtschaft von Kants und der chinesischen Philosophie (insbesondere der konfuzianischen Philosophie).

Ethik ist der gemeinsame Fokus und Kern von Kants und der konfuzianischen Philosophie. Üblicherweise wird Kants Ethik versehen mit drei Kennzeichen, nämlich „Ethik der Autonomie“, „Gesinnungsethik“ und „Formale Ethik“. Kant selbst hat diese Kennzeichen nie benutzt, um seine Ethik zu bezeichnen, aber wir finden überall in seinen Schriften den Grund für solche Bezeichnung.

Wie wir alle wissen, ist „Autonomie“ der Kernbegriff von Kants Ethik. Kant verwendete den Begriff der „Autonomie“, um das Wesen der Moral zu begreifen, und „Autonomie“ ist die Selbstgesetzgebung des „Willens“ als moralisches Subjekts. Mit anderen Worten, das Gesetz, dem unser Wille gehorchen soll, ist dasjenige, das wir uns selbst bestimmen. Wenn wir den Ursprung des Sittengesetzes außerhalb unseres Willens suchen, ist dies Heteronomie, und das auf „Heteronomie“ beruhende Prinzip ist falsch.

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我曾根据康德的《道德底形上学之基础》（Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der

Sitten）一书将其“自律伦理学”归纳出七项要点：(1)道德之绝对性；(2) 道德

之普遍性；(3)存心伦理学；(4)形式伦理学；(5)人格之尊严；(6)道德之自律；

(7)意志之自由。我发现这些要点均可在孔、孟的文本中找到对应的思想。

首先，儒家伦理学同康德伦理学一样，属于普遍主义伦理学，必然肯定道德

之普遍性与绝对性。其次，就“自律”意谓“道德主体之自我立法”而言，牟宗

三首度指出，孟子的“仁义内在”说即包含此义。孟子主张“仁义内在”说，显

然包含“道德之自我立法”之义。告子主张“义外”说，系代表实在论的“他律”

观点，以为道德法则是由客观的事实或对象所决定。

关于“人格尊严”的概念，则明确地包含于孟子的“天爵”与“良贵”之概

念中。“人爵”系由居上位者所授与的爵位，其价值亦由授与者决定，故是相对

的。反之，“天爵”系人藉由其道德实践而赋予自己的价值。由于这种价值是人

为自己创造的，它不虞为他人所否定，因而是绝对的，故孟子以“良贵”视之。

“良贵”一词便可以直接翻译为「尊严」（Würde）。

至于“意志自由”的概念，其内涵已出现于孔子所言：“仁远乎哉？我欲仁，

斯仁至矣！”它也见诸孟子与齐宣王的一段对话中对“不为”与“不能”的区分：

“挟太山以超北海，语人曰：‘我不能。’是诚不能也。为长者折枝〔按摩〕，语

人曰：‘我不能。’是不为也，非不能也。”这项区分对应于孟子的另一项区分：

“求则得之，舍则失之，是求有益于得也，求在我者也。求之有道，得之有命，

是求无益于得也，求在外者也。”这项区分其实对应于康德在《纯粹理性批判·先

验辩证论》中提到的“纯粹理性之背反（Antinomie）”的第三组背反，即“先验

的自由”（transzendentale Freiheit）与“自然底必然性”（Naturnotwendigkeit）之

背反，亦即“藉由自由的因果性”（Kausalität durch Freiheit）与“自然底因果性”

（Kausalität der Natur）之背反。惟有在前者的范围内才能言意志之自由。

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Nach Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten habe ich sieben Punkte seiner „Ethik der Autonomie“ zusammengefasst: (1) die Absolutheit der Moral; (2) die Universalität der Moral; (3) die Gesinnungsethik; (4) die formale Ethik; (5) die Würde der Person; (6) die Autonomie der Moral; (7) die Freiheit des Willens. Ich fand heraus, dass diese Punkte in den entsprechenden Texten von Konfuzius und Menzius gefunden werden können.

Erstens gehört die konfuzianische Ethik ebenso wie Kants Ethik zur universalistischen Ethik und muss die Universalität und Absolutheit der Moral bestätigen. Zweitens, soweit „Autonomie“ „Selbstgesetzgebung des moralischen Subjekts“ bedeutet, ist diese Bedeutung bereits in Menzius’ Theorie von der „Innerlichkeit der Menschlichkeit und Gerechtigkeit“, wie Mou Zongsan zuerst darauf hinwies. Menzius fand den Ursprung der Menschlichkeit und Gerechtigkeit in unserem „xin“ bzw. moralischen Ich, und es ist eindeutig, dass dies die Bedeutung von „moralischer Selbstgesetzgebung“ beinhaltet. Hingegen stellte Gaozi die These auf, dass die Gerechtigkeit etwas Äußeres sei, indem er glaubt, dass das Sittengesetz durch objektive Tatsachen oder Gegenstände bestimmt werde. Hiermit verweist er auf den moralischen Realismus bzw. den Standpunkt der „Heteronomie“.

Der Begriff von der „Würde der Person“ ist explizit in die Begriffe „tianjue“ und „lianggui“ von Menzius einbezogen. Für Menzius ist „renjue“ (menschlicher Titel) der vom Vorgesetzten gegebene Titel, und sein Wert wird auch vom Titelverleiher bestimmt, also ist er relativ. Im Gegensatz dazu ist „tianjue“ (himmlicher Titel) der Wert, den eine Person ihr selbst durch ihre moralische Praxis gibt. Da dieser Wert von der Person für sich selbst geschaffen wird, wird er nicht von anderen negiert, und also absolut, so dass Menzius ihn für „lianggui“ hält. Der Terminus „lianggui“ kann direkt mit „Würde“ übersetzt werden.

Was den Begriff der „Willensfreiheit“ angeht, so ist seine Konnotation bereits in Konfuzius’ Wort aufgetaucht: „Ist die Tugend der Menschlichkeit gar so fern? Sie ist durchaus zu erreichen, wenn ich sie wirklich will.“ In einem Dialog zwischen Menzius und König Xuan von Qi unterschied Menzius das „buwei“ (Unterlassung) vom „buneng“ (Unfähigkeit): „Wenn jemand aufgefordert wird, den Tai-Berg unter den Arm zu klemmen und das Nord-Meer zu überspringen, sagt er: ‚Ich kann nicht‘, so ist das wirkliche Unfähigkeit; wenn er aber aufgefordert wird, den Körper der älteren Menschen zu massieren, sagt er: ‚Ich kann nicht‘, so ist das Unterlassung, nicht Unfähigkeit.“ Diese Unterscheidung entspricht einer anderen Differenzierung von Menzius: „‚Suchet, so werdet ihr finden; lasset ab, so werdet ihr verlieren.‘ Das Suchen nützt also etwas zum Finden, weil wir in uns selbst suchen. ‚Das Suchen geht seinen Weg, das Finden ist aber vom Geschick bestimmt.‘ Das Suchen nützt also nichts zum

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但要注意的是：在孟子思想中作为道德主体的“心”比康德所说的“意志”

（Wille）在涵义上更为广泛而丰富。对康德而言，“意志”就是实践理性。孟子

的“心”则是指“本心”或“良知”，它除了理性面之外，还包含一个情感面。

或者说，孟子的“心”同时包含实践理性与道德情感。但是他不像康德那样，将

道德情感归入感性的层面，而是将它提升到先天的层面，属于德国现象学伦理学

所谓的“情感先天性”（das emotionale A priori）的领域。

至于将康德伦理学称为“存心伦理学”，也可在康德的著作中找到根据。他

在《道德底形上学之基础》一书中写道：“善的意志之为善，并非由于其结果或

成效，即非由于它宜于达成任何一项预定的目的，而仅由于意欲；也就是说，它

自身就是善的。”这便是“存心伦理学”的观点，而与此观点相对的是“功效伦

理学”（Erfolgsethik）。

我们可以依类型学（typology）的意义将“存心伦理学”与“功效伦理学”

视为伦理学的两种基本类型，将这两者对应于英美伦理学中所谓的“义务论伦理

学”（deontological ethics）与“目的论伦理学”（teleological ethics）。简言之，“目

的论伦理学”主张：道德义务或道德价值之最后判准在于其所产生的非道德价值，

如快乐、幸福、功利等。换言之，它将“道德之善”化约为“自然之善”。反之，

“义务论伦理学”则反对这种化约，而坚持：一个行为或行为规则之所以具有道

德意义，其最后的判准并不在于其所产生的非道德价值，而在于其自身的特性或

行为者的动机。在英美伦理学的讨论中，康德伦理学往往被视为“义务论伦理学”

的主要代表。

以孔、孟为代表的儒家主流伦理学属于“存心伦理学”，亦即“义务论伦理

学”。因为孔子的“君子喻于义，小人喻于利”之说与孟子的“义利之辨”便蕴

涵“道德之善”与“自然之善”的区分。

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Finden, weil wir draußen suchen.“ Diese Unterscheidung entspricht tatsächlich der dritten „Antinomie“ in der „transzendentalen Dialektik“ von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, nämlich der Antinomie von „transzendentaler Freiheit“ und „Naturnotwendigkeit“, bzw. von der „Kausalität durch Freiheit“ und der „Kausalität der Natur“. Nur im Rahmen des ersteren kann von der Willensfreiheit die Rede sein. Es sei jedoch darauf hingewiesen, dass das „xin“ (Herz) als moralisches Subjekt in Menzius’ Gedanken breiter und reicher als der „Wille“ bei Kant ist. Für Kant ist „Wille“ die praktische Vernunft. Aber Menzius’ „xin“ bezieht sich auf „bexin“ (ursprünglicher Geist) bzw. „liangzhi“ (ursprüngliches Wissen). Neben der rationalen Dimension enthält es auch eine emotionale Dimension. Mit anderen Worten, umfasst Menzius’ „xin“ sowohl die praktische Vernunft als auch das moralische Gefühl. Im Gegensatz zu Kant, der das moralische Gefühl in die sinnliche Ebene einordnet, erhebt Menzius es auf die apriorische Ebene, die zum „emotionalen Apriori“ gehört, wie die deutsche phänomenologische Ethik es bezeichnet. In bezug auf Kants „Gesinnungsethik“ ist es auch möglich, in Kants Schriften den Grund für diese Bezeichnung zu finden. In seiner Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten schrieb Kant: “Der gute Wille ist nicht durch das, was er bewirkt oder ausrichtet, nicht durch seine Tauglichkeit zu Erreichung irgend eines vorgesetzten Zweckes, sondern allein durch das Wollen, d.i. an sich, gut […]” Dies ist die Position der „Gesinnungsethik“, und das Gegenteil dieser Position ist die „Erfolgsethik“. Gemäß der typologischen Bedeutung dürfen die „Gesinnungsethik“ und die „Erfolgsethik“ als zwei Grundtypen von Ethik betrachtet werden, die der „deontologischen Ethik“ und der „teleologischen Ethik“ in der britischen und amerikanischen Ethik entsprechen. Kurz gesagt, die „teleologische Ethik“ behauptet, dass das letzte Kriterium für den moralischen Wert einer Handlung in dem unmoralischen Wert liegt, den sie erzeugt, wie etwa Freunde, Glückseligkeit, Nutzen und so weiter. Mit anderen Worten, reduziert diese Ethik „das moralische Gut“ auf „das physische Gut“. Im Gegensatz dazu widersetzt sich die „deontologischen Ethik“ dieser Art von Reduktion und besteht darauf, dass das letzte Kriterium für den moralischen Wert einer Handlung oder Handlungsregel nicht in ihrer unmoralischen Wert, den sie erzeugt, sondern in ihrer eigenen Eigenschaft oder der Gesinnung des Handelnden liegt. In der neulichen Diskussion der britischen und amerikanischen Ethik wird Kants Ethik gemeinhin als der Hauptvertreter der „deontologischen Ethik“ betrachtet.

Die Hauptströmung der konfuzianischen Ethik, vertreten durch Konfuzius und Menzius, ist eine „Gesinnungsethik“, d. h. eine „deontologische Ethik“. Konfuzius’ Wort: „Der Edle ist mit seinen Pflichten vertraut; der Gemeine sieht nur den eigenen Vorteil.“ und Menzius’ Unterscheidung zwischen der „Gerechtigkeit“ und der „Nützlichkeit“ impliziert die Unterscheidung zwischen dem „moralischen Gut“ und

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然而最足以显示儒家伦理学之义务论观点的，莫过于孔子与其弟子宰我关于

“三年之丧”的辩论。宰我要求缩短三年之丧为一年，并且提出两点理由：其一

是“君子三年不为礼，礼必坏；三年不为乐，乐必崩”；其二是“旧谷既没，新

谷既升，钻燧改火，期可已矣”。前者是“后果论”的观点，亦即一种目的论的

观点；后者由“实然”（自然规律）去论证“应然”（伦理规范），混同“道德之

善”与“自然之善”，因而也属于目的论的观点。这两项理由孔子都不接受，而

是要求宰我自问其心安不安，即是将三年之丧的意义建立在行为者的存心之上。

这自然是一种“存心伦理学”的观点，因而也是义务论的观点。

最后要谈到“形式伦理学”这个标签。康德在《道德底形上学之基础》中讨

论“目的自身”（Zweck an sich selbst）时区分“形式原则”（formales Prinzip）与

“实质原则”（materiales Prinzip），并且将前者视为真正的道德法则。在这个意义

下，“形式原则”与“实质原则”之区分即相当于“自律原则”与“他律原则”

之区分。

以孔、孟为代表的儒家主流伦理学属于英美伦理学界所谓的“义务论伦理学”，

而非“目的论伦理学”。但近数十年来，英美伦理学中出现一股名为“德行伦理

学”（virtue ethics）的思潮，试图在传统的伦理学型态之外走出一条新路。为了

强调“德行伦理学”的独特性，其提倡者往往强调它与“义务论伦理学”与“目

的论伦理学”之对比，而康德伦理学通常被视为典型的“义务论伦理学”。

晚近由于西方汉学家的推波助澜，出现一股藉“德行伦理学”来诠释儒家伦

理学的风潮。我是少数质疑这个诠释进路的人。首先我质疑“德行伦理学”的定

位。因为“义务论伦理学”与“目的论伦理学”之区分系基于一种二分法

（dichonomy）。如果“德行伦理学”要插进来，最自然的做法是将它定位为“义

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dem „physischen Gut“. Der wichtigste Punkt, um den deontologischen Charakter der konfuzianischen

Ethik zu zeigen, betrifft die Debatte zwischen Konfuzius und seinem Schüler Zai Wo über die dreijährige Trauerzeit. Zai Wo schlug vor, die herkömmliche dreijährige Trauerzeit nach dem Tod der Eltern auf ein Jahr zu verkürzen und stellte zwei Gründe dafür. Der erste Grund: „Wenn der Edle sich drei Jahre lang ritueller Zeremonien und feierlicher Gebräuche enthält, dann geraten sie in Gefahr. Wenn er sich drei Jahre lang der Musik enthält, dann ist sie unausweichlich dem Verfall preisgegeben.“ Der zweite Grund: „Das alte Korn ist bereits aufgebraucht, das neue Korn ist bereits aufgegangen, das für das Feuer verwendete Holz hat eine Reinkarnation durchlaufen, und es wird ein Jahr dauern.“ Ersteres bezieht sich auf den Standpunkt des „Konsequentialismus, mithin auf den der „teleologischen Ethik“. letzteres begründet das „Sollen“ (ethische Norm) auf das „Sein“ (Naturgesetz), und verwechselt das „moralische Gut“ mit dem „physischen Gut“. In diesem Sinne bezieht es sich auch auf den Standpunkt der teleologischen Ethik. Konfuzius akzeptierte die beiden Gründe nicht, sondern fragte Zai Wo, ob er Ruhe des Herzens finden könne, wenn er während der Trauerzeit gut esse und sich gut kleide. Das heißt: Konfuzius begründete die moralische Bedeutung der dreijährigen Trauerzeit auf die Gesinnung des Handelnden. Dies ist natürlich der Standpunkt der „Gesinnungsethik“ und somit der der „deontologischen Ethik“. Zum Schluss soll von der „formalen Ethik“ die Rede sein. Kant unterschied zwischen dem „formalen Prinzip“ und dem „materialen Prinzip“, als er in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten über den „Zweck an sich selbst“ diskutierte, und er erachtet das erstere allein als wahres Moralprinzip. In diesem Sinne entspricht die Unterscheidung zwischen dem „formalen Prinzip“ und dem „materialen Prinzip“ der Differenzierung zwischen dem Prinzip der Autonomie und dem der „Heteronomie“.

Wie gesagt, die Hauptströmung der konfuzianischen Ethik, vertreten durch Konfuzius und Menzius, gehört zur „deontologischen Ethik“, nicht zur „teleologischen Ethik“. In den letzten Jahrzehnten gab es jedoch eine Richtung von Gedanken, die im anglo-amerikanischen Sprachraum „virtue ethics“ (Tugendethik) genannt wurde und versuchte, einen neuen Weg außerhalb den traditionellen Typen von Ethik zu gehen. Um die Einzigartigkeit der „Tugendethik“ hervorzuheben, betonen ihre Befürworter oft ihren Kontrast mit der „deontologischen Ethik“ und der „teleologischen Ethik“, und Kants Ethik wird üblicherweise als typische „deontologischen Ethik“ angesehen.

Wegen der Anregung westlicher Sinologen wurde die konfuzianische Ethik neulich oft anhand der „Tugendethik“ interpretiert. Ich bin einer der Wenigen, die diese Interpretationsstrategie in Frage stellen. Zuerst frage ich nach der Positionierung der „Tugendethik“, denn die Unterscheidung zwischen der „deontologischen Ethik“ und der „teleologischen Ethik“ beruht auf einer Dichotomie. Wenn die „Tugendethik“

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务论伦理学”或“目的论伦理学”的次类。然而，“德行伦理学”的大多数提倡

者并不会接受这种定位，可是他们迄今仍无法为“德行伦理学”做更令人信服的

定位，反而不断扩张“德行伦理学”的涵盖范围，而使其面目更加模糊。进而言

之，根据涵义如此模糊的“德行伦理学”来诠释儒家伦理学，并无法使我们更明

确地把握其特点，反而使儒家伦理学的诠释陷于不必要的争论之中，可说是完全

背离了诠释的目的。

统觉与自然

——论康德范畴的先验演绎

Manfred Baum 展翼文译

“统觉”与“自然”属于康德《纯粹理性批判》第二版(1787)范畴先验演绎

中的基本概念。它们在康德那里分别指称知识的主体与客体（只要这样的知识是

先天可能的）。关于对象的先天综合的、非数学的知识被康德称为形而上学，而

《纯粹理性批判》的主要目的则是研究形而上学知识的可能性。这样的一种研究

被康德称之为“先验的”，而范畴的先验演绎则构成了被他称作纯粹知性原理的

先天综合知识体系的一项前提。基于这些纯粹知性原理，某些对象被归摄在被康

德视为纯粹知性概念的范畴之下。范畴是源于纯粹知性自身的，它们作为关于一

个对象的一般的概念先天地将感性中的某些对象认识为对象。根据康德对知识的

新的理解及其对形而上学作为关于对象的先天综合知识体系的全新刻画，这样一

种关于对象的先验知识有着两个前提：（1）认识的对象必须能够被先天地直观

到。这一可能性已被先验感性论所证明。作为感性论时空学说的后果，纯粹的与

经验的直观的对象都只能是显象（Erscheinung）而非物自身；而显象，作为感性

条件下的知识的对象，则只有作为可能经验的对象方能被思考。（2）这种可能经

验的对象必须同时作为先天综合知识的对象通过范畴而被思考。换句话说，

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eingefügt werden soll, ist es die natürlichste Art, sie als Untertypus der „deontologischen Ethik“ oder der „teleologischen Ethik“ zu positionieren. Die meisten Befürworter der „Tugendethik“ werden diese Position jedoch nicht akzeptieren. Sie erweitern die Reichweite der „Tugendethik“, macht aber ihre Position immer unklarer. Bisher können sie immer noch keine passende Position für die „Tugendethik“ finden. Übrigens: die Interpretation der konfuzianischen Ethik anhand solcher unscharfen „Tugendethik“ erlaubt es uns nicht, ihre Eigenschaften klarer zu erfassen, sondern führt dazu, die Interpretation der konfuzianischen Ethik in unnötige Streitigkeiten zu verwickeln - dies ist eine vollkommene Abweichung von dem Zweck der Interpretation.

Apperzeption und Natur

Zur transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien bei Kant Manfred Baum

Apperzeption und Natur sind Grundbegriffe der transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien in der zweiten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787). Sie bezeichnen bei Kant das Subjekt und das Objekt der Erkenntnis, sofern diese Erkenntnis a priori möglich sein soll. Eine nicht-mathematische, aber synthetische Erkenntnis a priori von Gegenständen ist das, was Kant Metaphysik nennt, und die Untersuchung der Möglichkeit metaphysischer Erkenntnis ist das Hauptziel der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Eine solche Untersuchung wird von Kant „transzendental“ genannt, und die transzendentale Deduktion der Kategorien ist eine Voraussetzung für das System der synthetischen Erkenntnisse a priori, die Kant Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes nennt. In ihnen werden gewisse Gegenstände unter die Kategorien subsumiert, die Kant als reine Verstandesbegriffe versteht, die diesem reinen Verstand selbst entspringen und die als Begriffe von einem Gegenstand überhaupt dazu dienen, gewisse Gegenstände der Sinne a priori als Gegenstände zu erkennen. Eine solche transzendentale Erkenntnis von Gegenständen hat nach Kants neuem Begriff von Erkenntnis und gemäß seiner neuen Bestimmung der Metaphysik als eines Systems synthetische Erkenntnis a priori von Gegenständen ihrerseits zwei Voraussetzungen: (1) die zu erkennenden Gegenstände müssen a priori angeschaut werden können. Diese Möglichkeit hat die transzendentale Ästhetik erwiesen, deren Lehre von Raum und Zeit zur Folge hat, dass die Gegenstände der reinen und empirischen Anschauung bloße Erscheinungen sind (und keine Dinge an sich), die als Gegenstände einer sinnlich bedingten Erkenntnis nach Kant nur als Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung gedacht werden können. (2) Diese Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung müssen zugleich als Gegenstände einer synthetischen Erkenntnis a priori durch Kategorien gedacht werden, d.h. die

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显象必须能够超出其作为感性直观纯形式条件限制下的经验直观的缺乏规定的

对象的角色，而作为对象被纯粹知性概念所思考，并由此成为“现象”

(Phänomena)。如果我们将范畴表视为纯粹原初知性概念的体系并以此作为基础

的话，那么可能经验的对象必须 (a) 由于其在时空中的广延而作为外延的量 (b)

由于其实在性而作为内包的量 (c) 作为影响其它实体并且在质和量的意义上被

其它所有实体所规定的实体，而被纯粹知性所思考。换言之，这些对象在一起构

成了一个自然。由于可能经验的对象作为对象具有了这样的一些基本规定，只要

对这样的对象的知识是可能的，那么范畴便必须先天地被视为这些对象的先验的

谓词。由于经验的可能性无法自身依赖于种种经验的条件，如果我们希望避免怀

疑论的话，这种可能性必须在先天的意义上得到保证。

因此，所谓范畴的客观演绎的基本思想在于：只要关于对象的经验知识是可

能的，范畴就必须是那种使得我们可以由此对在经验直观中被给予的显象的对象

性进行思考的概念。只要经验的可能性（如果这种可能性是基于知性的概念的）

取决于范畴，范畴便对经验对象有着先天的有效性。然而，至此我们其实所获不

多。因为怀疑论者依然可以反驳说，如果经验的可能性果真是基于如此庞大的、

被康德自己称之为是“形而上学的”的一系列前提的话，那么它则无法被视作是

所有保证的。更有分量的反驳则指出：由于康德认为知识是依赖于直观和概念的

对象的，而这些对象又是完全异质的且有着全然不同的来源，因此，即便人们已

经承认了存在着纯粹感性直观和纯粹知性概念，康德还需要进一步证明，不仅这

两者在知识中的联合仍然是可能的，而且它们是先天地彼此相协调的，并能够联

合起来对关于可能经验对象的先天知识进行证成。康德在范畴的主观演绎（第二

版的第 15 至 27 节）中从先天的理由出发对经验的可能性进行了证明。

在范畴的主观演绎中，康德探讨了知性在其逻辑的与纯粹的运用中的可能性

（B 131）。而恰恰在该语境中，他论及了纯粹或本源的统觉及其先验、分析、与

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Erscheinungen müssen über ihren Status als unbestimmte Gegenstände der durch die reine Form der sinnlichen Anschauung bedingten empirischen Anschauung hinaus als Gegenstände durch die reinen Verstandesbegriffe gedacht werden können, wodurch sie zu „Phänomenen“ werden. Legt man die Kategorientafel als System reiner und ursprünglicher Verstandesbegriffe zu Grunde, so müssen die Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung (a) ihrer Ausdehnung in Raum und Zeit nach als extensive Größen (b) ihrer Realität nach als intensive Größen (c) als Substanzen, die auf andere Substanzen einwirken und ihrerseits durch alle anderen Substanzen qualitativ und quantitativ bestimmt sind, durch den reinen Verstand gedacht werden, das heißt sie machen zusammen eine Natur aus. Da diese Grundbestimmungen den Gegenständen mögliche Erfahrung als Gegenständen zukommen, müssen die Kategorien als transzendentale Prädikate a priori von ihnen gelten, wenn Erkenntnis von ihnen möglich sein soll. Denn die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung kann nicht selbst von Erfahrungsbedingungen abhängig sein, wenn man den Skeptizismus vermeiden will, und muss deshalb a priori gesichert werden können.

Der Grundgedanke der so genannten objektiven Deduktion der Kategorien lautet deshalb: wenn Erfahrungserkenntnis von Gegenständen möglich sein soll, so müssen die Kategorien diejenigen Begriffe sein, durch die die Gegenständlichkeit von in der empirischen Anschauung gegebenen Erscheinungen gedacht wird. Kategorien haben also a priori Gültigkeit von Erfahrungsgegenständen, wenn die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung, sofern sie auf Begriffen des Verstandes beruht, von ihnen abhängt. Aber damit ist wenig gewonnen. Denn der Skeptizismus kann einwenden, dass die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung, wenn sie auf solchen massiven Voraussetzungen beruht, die Kant selber „metaphysische“ nennt, keineswegs als gesichert angesehen werden kann. Und ein noch gewichtigerer Einwand lautet: Da Kant die Erkenntnis von Gegenständen von Anschauungen und Begriffen abhängig macht, die völlig heterogen sind und einen völlig verschiedenen Ursprung haben, so müsste er selbst dann, wenn man ihm einräumt, dass es so etwas wie reine sinnliche Anschauungen und reine Verstandesbegriffe gibt, erst zeigen, nicht nur dass ihre Vereinigung, in dem was er Erkenntnis nennt, dennoch möglich ist, sondern dass sie a priori zusammenstimmen und sozusagen kooperativ eine Erkenntnis a priori von Gegenständen möglicher Erfahrung begründen können. Diesen Nachweis führt Kant in der subjektiven Deduktion der Kategorien (Paragraphen 15-27 der zweiten Auflage), die einen Beweis aus Gründen a priori für die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung enthält.

Diese subjektive Deduktion der Kategorien, in der die Möglichkeit des Verstandes (B 131) in seinem logischen und reinen Gebrauch untersucht wird, ist auch der Kontext, innerhalb dessen Kant von der reinen oder ursprünglichen Apperzeption und ihrer transzendentalen, analytischen und synthetischen Einheit spricht. Ebenso handelt er

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综合的统一。也是在这里，康德还探讨了自然作为“自然一般(Natur überhaupt)，

亦即时空中的显象的合规律性”（B 165）是被知性通过其范畴而“颁布了先天的

法则”（B 163）并因而变得可能。这一断言，与“判断的逻辑形式存在于[…]其

中所包含的概念的统觉的客观统一”的断言一起，都构成了康德对“迄今的形而

上学”所试图做出的“彻底的革命”（B XXII）。

康德论意识与意识的局限

Béatrice Longuenesse 展翼文译

在康德的批判哲学体系中，“意识到的”、“意识”、“意识的统一性”、和“自

我意识”这类概念扮演着核心性的角色。但这些概念在康德那里实际含义究竟为

何，却远不是很清楚的。此外，康德曾饱受争议地断言，在我们心灵的地图上有

着无穷多我们并没有意识到的表象。他还声称我们在多数情况下是对自己的心灵

活动自身没有意识的。康德在这里究竟是想表达什么意思，而这种断言的根据又

是什么呢？

本文的第一个任务将会是澄清康德为“伴有意识(mit Bewusstsein)的表象”

和“我们所意识到(dessen wir uns bewusst sind)的表象”这两种表述所赋予的不

同含义。这里涉及了作为名词的“意识”(Bewusstsein)和形容词形式的“意识到

的”(bewusst)这两种不同的表述方法。前者刻画了表象自身的某种质的特征；而

后者则在进行表象的主体一方刻画了其某种主动的态度。与此相关的一类区别也

在不同类型的单子表象（如感觉、直观或概念等）那里有所体现，亦即它们分别

可以在不同的意义上“伴有”或“不伴有”意识。

本文的第二个任务将是澄清“意识”、“意识的统一性”、和“自我意识”在《纯

粹理性批判》的核心论证即范畴的先验演绎中所分别扮演的不同角色。在 A版演

绎中，康德论证说我们的表象除非被“先验意识”统一在一起否则不会变为知识，

亦即那种我们所意识到的具有对象关系的那种表象。但他解释说先验意识自身可

以是“清晰”抑或“模糊”的。我将使用本文第一部分所做的关于“意识”的不

同含义的区分来澄清康德的这一观点。

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hier von der Natur als „Natur überhaupt, als Gesetzmäßigkeit der Erscheinungen in Raum und Zeit“ (B 165), der unser Verstand durch seine Kategorien „Gesetze a priori vorschreibt“ (B 163) und sie so allererst möglich macht. Diese Behauptung, zusammen mit der Behauptung, dass „die logische Form der Urteile […] in der objektiven Einheit der Apperzeptionen der darin enthaltenen Begriffe […] besteht“, gehören zu der „gänzlichen Revolution“ (B XXII), die Kant mit dem „bisherigen Verfahren der Metaphysik“ (ib.) vorzunehmen versucht.

Kant on consciousness and its limits

Béatrice Longuenesse The concepts “conscious,” “consciousness,” “unity of consciousness” and “self-consciousness” play a central role in Kant’s critical system. But what Kant means by them is far from obvious. Moreover, Kant notoriously asserts that there are, on the map of our minds, infinitely many representations of which we are not conscious. He also claims that our mental activities themselves are, more often than not, activities of which we are not conscious. What does he mean by that and what are the grounds for such assertions?

The first task of the paper will be to clarify the meaning Kant assigns to the two expressions: “representation with consciousness” [mit Bewusstsein] and “representation of which we are conscious” [dessen wir uns bewusst sind]. These are two different uses of the term Bewusstsein and its adjectival form, bewusst. One use characterizes a qualitative feature of the representation itself; the other characterizes an active attitude on the part of the representing subject. A related distinction is that between the different senses in which different types of monadic representations – sensations, intuitions or concepts – may respectively be “with” or “without” consciousness.

The second task will be to clarify the respective roles of “consciousness,” “unity of consciousness” and “self-consciousness” in the central argument of the Critique Pure Reason, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. In the A Deduction, Kant argues that unless they were unified by “transcendental consciousness,” our representations would not become cognitions, namely representations of which we are conscious and that are related to objects. But transcendental consciousness, he explains, can itself be “clear” or “obscure.” To clarify Kant’s point, I will draw on the different meanings of “consciousness” identified in the first part of the paper.

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本文的第三个任务将是追踪康德在其批判体系的不同部分中对“意识到的”、

“意识”、以及“我们所没有意识到的”的表述的使用。我将涉及三个比较突出

的例子：第一个例子出自《道德形而上学原理》，在那里康德一方面声称我们对

我们心中的道德法则是有所意识的，但另一方面又声称我们不论在任何表面上符

合道德法则的行动的个例中都无法知晓我们行动的动机确实是对道德法则的敬

重。第二个例子出自《人类历史起源臆测》，在那里康德声称人类对应将他人视

为目的本身这样的道德义务所具有的意识是被人类社会的历史发展所规定的。第

三个例子出自康德给索默林(Samuel Thomas von Sömmerring)所作的《答复》，在

其中康德声称大脑内物质的化学运动至多可以同感性表象间的经验联想联系起

来，但却无法用来解释意识的统一性。

作为本文的结论，我将表明，人类意识、意识的潜力与局限在康德进路中的

丰富性和复杂性生动地指明了我们在思考人类未来时所遇到的问题的艰巨性。

论康德美学的认识论结构及其改造

邓晓芒

康德美学中蕴含诸多有价值的东西，但只有经过改造才能彰显其中被掩盖了的审

美精神。康德作为理性派哲学家，首先考虑的是感性的审美活动背后的理性认识

能力的作用，即诸认识能力的自由协调活动，审美中的情感传达虽然被看作鉴赏

的“定义”，但却只是诸认识能力结合为反思判断力而造成的结果，其中的普遍

规律仍然要求助于知性的“准则”。必须从康德的四个鉴赏“契机”和反思判断

力的原理后面拯救出更深层次的“传情论”原理，并将传情视为植根于人类生产

劳动的本质中的基本人性结构。由此反过来解释四个契机和审美判断，可以更好

地理顺康德美学的各个要素的关系，并使传情的基础从理性派的认识论基础转移

到实践唯物论的人学基础上来，从而建立起一门崭新的“传情论美学”。

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The third task will be to track the uses of “conscious,” “consciousness,” and “that, of which we are not conscious” in different parts of the critical system. I will draw on three salient examples. The first, drawn from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, is the contrast between Kant’s claim that we are conscious of the moral law in us and his claim that we cannot know, in any individual instance of action in apparent conformity with the moral law, whether the motivation of our action is respect for the law. The second example, drawn from Conjectures on the Beginnings of Human History, is Kant’s claim that human beings’ consciousness of their moral obligation to treat all other human beings as ends in themselves is conditioned by the historical development of human societies. The third example, drawn from Kant’s Response to Sömmering, is Kant’s claim that chemical motions in the matter of the brain can at best be correlated with the empirical associations of sensory representations but cannot account for the unity of consciousness.

In conclusion, I will argue that the richness and complexity of Kant’s approach to human consciousness, its potentialities and its limits, gives us a vivid orientation into the immensity of the questions presented to us when we think of the future of humanity. Über die epistemologische Struktur von Kants Ästhetik und ihre Umgestaltung

Deng Xiaomang Kants Ästhetik enthält in der Geschichte der ästhetischen Theorien eine Reihe wertvoller Ideen, in denen aber der verhüllte ästhetische Geist nur auf der Grundlage ihrer Umgestaltung manifest ist. Als rationalistischer Philosoph hat Kant erstmals hinter dem sinnlichen Geschmacksurteil die intellektuelle Wirkung der freien und im Spiel miteinander übereinstimmenden Bewegung der Erkenntnisvermögen festgestellt. Die Mitteilbarkeit des Gefühls im Geschmackurteil wird zwar von ihm als die ,,Definierung des Geschmacks“ angesehen, aber nur als eine Wirkung, die darauf zurückzuführen sei, dass die Erkenntnisvermögen sich zu einer reflektierenden Urteilskraft verbinden und die Allgemeinheit des Geschmacks noch von den ,,Maximen“ des Verstandes abhängt. Man muss jedoch vor Kants vier Momenten des Geschmacksurteils und dem Prinzip der reflektierenden Urteilskraft ein noch tieferes Prinzip der Gefühlsmitteilungslehre retten und letzteres als die fundamentale Struktur der Menschheit, welche ihre Wurzeln im Wesen der menschlichen produzierenden Arbeit hat, ansehen. Indem man nun die vier Momente im Geschmacksurteil nicht als Basis, sondern umgekehrt als Wirkung eines Prinzips der Gefühlsmitteilung erklärt, kann man das Verhältnis der verschiedenen Elemente in Kants Ästhetik besser ordnen und die Grundlage der Mitteilbarkeit des Gefühls von der rationalistischen Epistemologie auf die anthropologische Einstellung des praktischen Materialismus verlagern, und so eine neue ,,Ästhetik von der Gefühlsmitteilungslehre“ gründen.

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分组会议（一）：

康德论人性的本质 Dieter Sturma 展翼文译

正如许多西方哲学家一样，康德会将当时流行的自然科学作为其研究的出发

点和参照点。这种做法历史上可以一直追溯到阿那克西曼德，并涵盖了包括亚里

士多德、伊壁鸠鲁、笛卡尔、斯宾诺莎、以及 20 世纪分析哲学在内的诸多哲学

传统。康德对自然科学所能达到的认识和技术上的成就感到震撼，然而与霍布斯

和法国唯物论者们所不同的是，康德并不希望伦理学被那些消除性的本体论

（eliminative ontologies）所蚕食。于是便导致了一项关键性的困难：即如何将人

性与自然科学的世界观概念性地整合起来。

对于康德对人或人性的本质的概念的理解，我们可以在其《实践理性批判》

的《结论》部分的著名段落中得到一个简略的阐述。此处康德说到星空与道德法

则在自我意识中被联系在一起。根据这一段落的表述，自然、自由、法则、道德、

与自我意识通过人的观点而得以交汇在一起。因而，人性并非是像通常所设想的

那样全然被规范性所规定的。相反，人掌握着具体的认知、道德、审美、和实践

的能力。这些能力使人与世界间得以建立起一种特别的关系（relation）而并非某

种特定的状态。

康德最终留下了些许大型的，关于人类生活形式的描述性和规范性的理论片

段（而非一个完整的体系）。这些片段主要由其关于自我意识的批判理论、理性

的事实、以及定言命令所构成。而对于这些描述性和规范性的要素彼此间是如何

相容的，他只留下了一些隐蔽的线索。鉴于这一明显的弱点，我们仅能从其《纯

粹理性批判》中对第三条二律背反的《解决》中得到非常有限的结论——尽管康

德明显欲示意问题得到了解决。

且不论其在试图统一理论哲学与实践哲学时所遇到的结构性问题，康德实际

上有着充分理由不去一次性地发展出关于人的理论。他关于人性如同曲木的比喻

可以如此地被诠释：亦即他认为人本质上是有限的、可错的、无法预测的、且只

能对其自身和他人产生模糊的理解。对康德来说，人类生活形式的规范性的关键

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Parallel Sessions I：

Kant on the Nature of Humanity Dieter Sturma

Kant belongs to the long history of Western philosophers for whom the prevailing natural sciences of their time are the starting and reference point. The history begins with Anaximander and reaches over Aristotle, Epicur, Descartes and Spinoza to the analytic philosophers of the 20th century. Kant is impressed by the epistemic and technical capabilities of the natural sciences, but contrary to Hobbes or the French Materialists he is not willing to let eliminative ontologies encroach on ethics. This approach causes major difficulties for the attempt to conceptually integrate humanity into the world-view of the natural sciences.

A concise manifestation of Kant’s conceptions of the nature of humanity is the famous pas-sage from the Conclusion of the Critique of Practical Reason in which he speaks of the starry heavens and the moral law connected in self-consciousness. According to this passage, nature, freedom, law, morality, and self-consciousness converge in the standpoint of a person. Humanity thus is not exclusively determined by normativity, as commonly assumed. Persons have specific epistemic, moral, aesthetic, and practical capabilities at their command, be-stowing them a special relation to the world––not a privileged status.

In the end, Kant has left behind big blocks of a descriptive and normative theory of the human life-form–though not a closed system. These blocks are mainly composed of his critical theory of self-consciousness, the fact of reason, and the categorical imperative. He has only left hidden clues as to how the descriptive and normative elements in his approach are compatible. Due to its obvious weakness, only little can be gained from the Resolution of the third antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason–although Kant apparently wants to suggest this.

Irrespective of the structural problems that come with the attempt to unite theoretical and practical philosophy, Kant has good reasons not to develop a theory of man in one piece. His metaphorical reference to the crooked timber out of which humanity is made may be interpreted in the way that he takes persons to be finite, fallible, literally unpredictable and only able to get a vague understanding of themselves and other persons.

According to Kant, the normative key to the human life-form is the formula of humanity and the corresponding prohibition of instrumentalization. Against this

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在于人性公式及其相应的对将人工具化的禁止。在这一背景下，我们需要进一步

回答如下重要问题：a) 什么是人？b) 人之作为人，是何以被纳入在世界之中的？

c) 康德的批判唯心论、科学实在论、和义务论伦理学是如何彼此一致的？

对于这些问题，康德仅仅给出了片断式的回答。我们的任务则是在当今科学

研究成果的基础上来弥补这些断裂。正如同康德所秉持的信念那样：哲学必须对

一切可靠的信息有着普遍性的把握。

康德论人性及其解读 Vadim Chaly 倪逸偲译

人类本质或本性的问题或观念是非常重要的。我们表达这一陈述的方式，比

如我们所使用的“观念”或“问题”，“本质”或“本性”这些术语，反映了我们

的基础信念，并为进一步的探讨设立了界限——或者说，这既揭示出这种探讨其

实根本没有价值，也暴露出我们的立场之间是无法沟通的。但是，这样的探讨毕

竟是无法回避的，而科学与技术的进步更是使得这样的探讨变得更加紧迫与复杂。

康德的观点在这些探讨中非常突出。那些奠定了当代立法与伦理学理论的概

念，比如人类尊严、自主、对他人的尊重等大都是由康德哲学奠定的。而正如康

德在思考这个关系到我们整个学科的问题时所说的那样，这也反过来让解释“这

些概念到底是什么？又不是什么？”成了一项紧迫的任务。这一重要的任务吸引

了康德学者以及来自哲学其他领域的学者的关注。一方面，这催生了大量且还在

稳步增长的康德研究文献；另一方面，这也导致了形形色色的在非康德甚至是反

对康德的语境下对康德的观念自作主张的解读。

笔者在本报告中将尝试一并展现康德的人性观念的四重含义，以及康德学者

还有其他学者对它们的态度（后者有时简直是不着边际的），并在一个宽泛的图

景下将它们彼此联系起来。首先，笔者将触及康德的“人性”概念的思想背景。

人性概念植根于康德关于“启蒙”的探讨，而这与普遍历史以及人类倾向的合目

的发展是联系在一起的。和伏尔泰与孟德斯鸠等人反对早先基督教的奥古斯丁与

多玛斯（阿奎那）传统中对于历史与人性的理解一样，康德的这些探讨也可以被

视为是在回应法国学者对于历史的机械论理解，康德试图将这种机械论理解与莱

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backdrop, we have to answer further significant questions: a) What is a person?, b) How is a person as person embedded in the world?, and c) How can Kant’s critical idealism, scientific realism and de-ontological ethics be consistent with each other?

Kant has given only fragmentary answers to these questions. It is our task to close these gaps in the light of current scientific research, the more so as Kant himself has held the belief that philosophy generally has to get hold of whatever reliable information is available.

Kant’s Humanity and its Interpretations Vadim Chaly

The idea or the problem of human essence or human nature is central. The very way we try to articulate this statement, using the words like “idea” or “problem”, “essence” or “nature”, reflects our foundational beliefs and sets the bounds for further discussion – or immediately reveals its futility, betraying the incommensurability of our positions. However, the discussion is unavoidable, and the pace of science and technology makes it ever more urgent and complex.

Kant’s voice is prominent in this discussion. The notions of human dignity, autonomy, respect for persons that are cornerstone to contemporary legislation and underlying ethical theories are often grounded by references to Kant’s philosophy. And this in turn awards importance to the task of explaining what was - and was not - stated by the great philosopher regarding the question that he saw as encompassing the whole of our discipline. This important task has attracted much attention from Kant-scholars as well as from other quarters of philosophy. This resulted, on the one hand, in a large and consolidated output of Kantian literature, on the other hand, in a wide variety of interpretations and adaptations of Kant’s ideas to non-Kantian and even anti-Kantian philosophical contexts.

In my presentation I will try to bring together and relate within one general scheme four key meanings of Kant’s idea of humanity and their treatments in Kant-scholarship and beyond (sometimes - far beyond). For this I will, first, touch upon the intellectual context of Kant’s humanity, or Menschheit. Its roots lie in the discussions of Aufklärung concerning universal history and the purposeful development of human predispositions. These discussions, in turn, came as a reaction to mechanistic view of history espoused by the French and an attempt to merry it to Leibniz-Wolffian teleology. And Voltaire and Montesquieu themselves were working against the earlier Christian views of history and humanity, expressed in Augustinian and Thomist traditions. Second, I will

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布尼茨–沃尔夫式的目的论整合起来。随后，笔者将继续考察康德在文本中赋予

给人性的诸多含义，而这其中有些含义是当下的讨论中尚未出现过的。笔者将论

证，康德的“人性”概念有四重背景，而这四重背景是通过自然与非自然（先验）、

部分与整体的形而上学条块分割而彼此区别的。就此我们在康德的“人性”概念

中辨识出四重含义：个体主义、集体主义、本质主义、与人格主义。最后，笔者

将考察迄今的对人性概念的一些解读，这些解读在不同程度上分别强调了这一术

语的不同含义，而笔者将考察这些解读会将我们导向何方。这些解读包括：罗尔

斯式自由主义的个体主义与本质主义、苏联式马克思主义的集体主义、以及二十

世纪中叶俄法思想家的宗教与世俗的人格主义。

通过展示这些对人性的片面理解的理论后果与实践后果，笔者希望能揭示出，

尽管人性概念的四重含义之间的关系是充满张力的，但它们并不能被还原，而这

四重含义在当下的讨论中缺一不可。

实践理性能够是人工的吗？ Dieter Schönecker

实践理性是认识和意欲善的能力。它可以是人工的吗？从一种康德式的视角

看来，答案显然是否定的：实践理性不可能是人工的。我首先会给出康德学说的

一些基本要点（1.1），以及关于康德式道德机器的可能性的预先评说（1.2）。在

这之后，我将论证，在一种关于道德义务的康德式模型中，典型的（人类）道德

主题必须拥有道德情感，以便认识到道德法则的有效性（1.3）。使用针对物理主

义和功能主义的知识论证，我将论证计算机没有情感，从而当然就没有道德情感；

因此，计算机不是道德主体（1.4）。这一结论建基于一种康德式的“我感受”而

非“我思”（1.5）。在这之后我将处理这一论证的两个问题（2），并且以一个类比

来结束（3）：正如行星不飞行一样，计算机不感受。

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proceed to examine Kant’s texts to pick out the meanings he attaches to humanity, some of which are relatively unattended in current discussions. I will argue that Kant’s Menschheit is used in four contexts that are separated by the metaphysical divides of natural vs. non-natural (transcendental) and element vs. whole. The four meanings one can discern in Kant’s Menschheit could be named individualism, collectivism, essentialism and personalism. Finally, I will look into some current and historical interpretations of humanity that with varying degree of intensity accentuate different meanings of the term and examine where this takes us. These interpretations are liberal individualism and liberal essentialism of Rawlsian thought, collectivism of Soviet Marxism, and religious and secular personalism of Russian and French mid-XX century thinkers.

By showing theoretical and practical ramifications of one-sided accounts of humanity, I hope to illustrate that, although its four meanings stand in strenuous relations, they’re irreducible, and each needs to be present in current discussions.

Can practical reason be artificial? Dieter Schönecker

Practical reason is the power to cognize and to will the good. Can it be artificial? From a Kantian point of view, the answer is clearly negative: Practical reason cannot be artificial. After providing some Kantian basics (1.1) and a preliminary remark on the possibility of Kantian moral machines (1.2), I will argue that in a Kantian model of moral obligation, the typical (human) moral subject must have moral feelings in order to cognize the validity of the moral law (1.3). Using the knowledge argument against physicalism and functionalism, I shall argue that computers have no feelings and, a fortiori, no moral feelings; therefore, computers are no moral subjects (1.4). This conclusion is based on a Kantian I feel rather than I think (1.5). I will then tackle two problems with this argument (2) and conclude with an analogy (3): Just as planets do not fly, computers do not feel.

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几何学的可能性

——设想一个第三版“超绝演绎”

钱捷

一、第二版“超绝演绎”的§26 论及知觉的可能性时提到了空间（以及时间）

作为自身包含着杂多的直观形式因为知性（体现为范畴的作用的）运作而“验前

地表象出来”（第 107 页）。这样表象出来的自然就是作为几何学的对象的空间，

它是任何知觉空间的基础。因此，正如 M. Fichant 已经指出的，这里所说的其实

应属于“超绝感性论”中的“空间概念的超绝阐明”。然而在《纯粹理性批判》

第二版中新增的这个超绝阐明中，我们却看不到任何关于几何学对象验前可能性

的证明，所给出的充其量只是对于这一验前可能性的断言。这就是我们在《超绝

发生学原理》第一卷中所说的“超绝感性论”中超绝演绎的缺失。相反，正如我

们所看到的，“超绝感性论”的这一所缺实际上却在“超绝逻辑”的“超绝分析

论”中作为“纯粹知性概念的演绎”的内容出现了。B160-161 上的那个注释可说

正是对这一不寻常的情况所做出的显然是勉为其难的说明。在这个说明中，我们

看到，空间的这样一种验前表象（作为几何学的对象）被称为“形式的直观”而

区别于“超绝感性论”中的直观形式。

二、在《超绝发生学原理》中，我们将形式的直观理解为一种运作化了的纯

粹直观。由此不难懂得，这种形式的直观概念只可能出现于“超绝逻辑”而非

“超绝感性论”之中，既然它是知性对于自身作为杂多的直观形式的运作的结果，

而这种运作只是在第二版“超绝演绎”的§24 中才多少可说是明确地提到了的。

这种运作的涉及如下机制：1）知性在使作为外感官形式的空间直观（即直观的

形式）成为运作化的，即成为形式的直观的同时，规定并因而激动内感官；2）

这一作用或运作（由于涉及纯粹的感性直观而）必定是通过想象力或更确切地

说，产生的想象力实现的。这并不难以理解，因为其实这种运作毕竟是以某种纯

粹的想象活动为前提的，如我们“在思想中引一条线”（这是康德常举的一个例

子）时所意识到的。但康德所做的也就到此为止了，他并没有对这种想象力做

出进一步的分析，未能解释它本身如何是可能的。在这种情况下，B160-161 上的

那个注释成为一个难于理解的文本便不可避免了。

三、我们以为，这样的想象力说到底就是柏拉图—笛卡尔传统中“精神的看”，

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The Possibility of Geometry

– Supposing a “Third Edition” of Transcendental Deduction Qian Jie

The ambiguity of the note in §26 of “transcendental deduction” of the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason indicates that Kant lacks a deduction of space and time for explaining how they are able to determine the material of sensation. This absence makes it impossible for Kant to give us a complete transcendental deduction, because it is accompanied by the absence of a constitutive description of the transcendental imagination which is in some way a key of the deduction. After studying many transcendental or quasi-transcendental philosophies in the history of philosophy, we construct a transcendental genetics. In this theory, Kant's transcendental imagination belongs to what might be called, in the platonic-cartesian tradition, "the look of the mind" (mentis intuitum, le regard de l’esprit), or at least is one of its consequences. If we call the look of the mind "intuition", then the original intuition is nothing but the self-distinctions of the absolute symmetry that we call "transcendental consciousness". Because it produces Kant's most important categories, such as causality, substance and quantity, and so on, we can say the transcendental genetics provides a “third edition” of transcendental deduction, since there is indeed a hidden clue of a genetics (System der generischen Präformation) in Kant's transcendental philosophy.

- 64 -

它因此是纯粹直观能力的一种具体体现。这样一种机制使得几何学对象的构造并

不局限于与知觉空间同一的欧几里得几何学。这里被知性运作的作为杂多的空

间直观形式（从而时间直观形式）本质地具有一种连续性，而这种针对连续性的

运作则是直接导致“广延的量”的分割。《超绝发生学原理》告诉我们，这说到

底是绝对对称性的自身区分（即所谓“超绝意识”）的结果。具体地说，这种具

有基础性意义的连续性乃是绝对对称性在区分条件下的表象，而这种区分则是绝

对对称性自身存在的方式——超绝意识的自我显现。量的范畴和空间（以及时间）

直观不过是这一显现中某个环节上的成就，它直接地（在认知层面上）导致了几

何学（以及算术）的产生。

四、以上所言多少已经提示了超绝发生学与康德的以超绝演绎为核心的理论

哲学之间的关联。这种关联，概言之，即前者是后者的彻底化与完备化。这尤其

体现在超绝发生学使得康德的范畴不再仅仅是借助于亚里士多德判断逻辑的一

个类比的结果，而是基于作为自身无前提的本源直观的超绝意识的纯粹发生学结

果。除了前面已经涉及到的量的范畴——它直接地是对于连续性的区分运作相关

于时间性，即不可逆性的结果——之外，超绝发生学还揭示了分别相当于康德的

因果范畴与实体范畴的因果性和对象性的构成。我们知道这些正是康德的范畴表

中对于可能经验的构成最为重要的范畴。另外，超绝发生学还揭示了这些范畴是

如何可能在其发生作用，即构成可能经验的时候处于自我意识之中的（这正是康

德所谓“‘我思’……必然能够伴随着所有其他表象”的根据之所在）。

由此可见，基于超绝发生学，我们不仅可以“找回”康德“超绝感性论”中

缺失了的超绝演绎，说明几何学的可能性，而且更揭示了康德的那些重要范畴自

身的起源。实际上，超绝发生学为给出一个系统、完备的超绝演绎（在其中想象

力的超绝综合的，其实也就是超绝图型的作用，从而统觉的综合统一原理将得到

彻底的明示）提供了一切必要的材料。显然，这样一个超绝演绎可说是《纯粹理

性批判》第二版超绝演绎的修订版，或者不如说，是一个第三版的超绝演绎。

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Kant’s Breakthrough on ancient Greek’s Conception of Reason

– From Pure Conceptual Ability to Pure Practical Ability Yusheng Huang

- 66 -

康德对希腊理性观的突破

——从纯粹概念能力到纯粹实践能力

黄裕生

自由问题是康德哲学的核心问题，因此要理解康德哲学必须澄清他对自由的

理解。但是他对自由的理解实际上是建立在他对理性的理解基础之上，因为他对

理性的理解的突破构成了他在自由问题上实现突破的前提。那么，康德在理性问

题究竟突破在哪里呢？这就需要对以柏拉图和亚里士多德为代表的希腊哲学对

理性的理解进行必要的讨论。因为正是希腊哲学奠定了对后世影响深远的理性观：

作为人身上的最高能力，理性拥有两种基本能力，给出概念并进行概念演绎的能

力与朝向整体并洞察整体的能力。这种理性观在拉丁化过程中被窄化为前一种能

力，并一直影响到近代哲学对理性的理解，以致理性成了一种被动的东西而被视

为情感与意志的奴仆。康德一方面恢复了理性朝向整体的能力，据此重新确立了

理念的必要（然）性，同时通过对理念与知识、规定性概念与引导性概念的区分，

对理性的知识能力加以限制，从而既为知识奠定了基础，也为宗教与自由留下了

位置；另一方面他通过把理性与意志统一起来，使自由意志成为理性的最高能力。

康德对自由意志与理性的这种统一，一方面使自由意志获得了立法的能力而成为

真正的自由意志，克服了自奥古斯丁以来自由意志与实践法则分离所带来的困境，

另一方面则使理性获得绝对的自主-自动性（die absolute Spontaneität）而具有单

凭自身就能直接给出行动的能力，从而成为“纯粹实践理性”。康德通过把自由

意志纳入理性，使理性不仅成为知识之所以可能的条件，而且成为道德律令的基

础与来源。不过，当康德把自由意志引入理性而使之成为理性的最高能力时，也

隐含着一个必须重新思考的问题，那就是理性与情感的关系。因为自由意志作为

一种高级欲求力，实际上总是包含着一种意向性的直接活动，这种能给出价值事

实的意向性活动就是一种先验情感。在这个意义上，康德对理性的突破性理解，

为理性与情感的“和解”提供了可能方向，尽管康德本人并没有意识到这一点。

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Freedom is the key issue of Kant’s philosophy, so the clarification of his understanding towards freedom would be necessary for the comprehension of his philosophy. However, Kant’s understanding towards freedom is actually based on his understanding towards reason, for the breakthrough he made on understanding towards freedom is the premise for his breakthrough on theory of freedom, So, what’s the breakthrough Kant has made on theory of reason? This question requires us to engage a necessary discussion on conception of reason in Greek’s philosophy, which is represented by Plato and Aristotle. Because it is the Greek’s philosophy that laid the foundation for the far reaching conception of reason: reason, as the highest ability of human being, contains two fundamental abilities, which include the ability of providing concepts and engaging conceptual deductions and the ability of orienting to the whole and having an insight of it. In the process of Latinization, the Greek’s conception of reason had been narrowed and it was thought that the reason only possesses the first ability. This change, which had a profound effect on understanding towards reason until the period of modern philosophy, led reason to passivity and thus became the servant of feeling and will. Kant recovered the reason’s ability of orienting to the whole on one hand, and hereby reestablished the necessity of idea. Meanwhile, by making distinctions between idea and knowledge, determinative concept and directive concept, restricting the cognitive ability of reason, Kant not only laid the foundation for the knowledge, but also made room for religion and freedom; on the other hand, through unification of reason and will, Kant made reason become the highest ability of human being again. The unification of reason and will done by Kant endowed the reason with the ability of legislation, and hence overcame the predicament brought about by the division between free will and practical law since Augustine. Furthermore, the reason obtained the absolute spontaneity of providing actions directly from itself through the unification and therefore became “pure practical reason”. By integrate free will into reason, Kant’s reason not only became the prerequisite for the possibility of knowledge, but also provided the foundation and source of moral imperatives. However, Kant’s integration free will into reason and making it the highest ability of reason conceals a question which deserves rethinking, that is the relationship between reason and feeling. As a kind of higher faculty of desire，free will always involves a kind of direct intentional activities which can provide value facts, and this kind of activities is in fact a kind of a priori feeling. From this aspect, Kant’s breakthrough understanding towards reason provides a possible direction for the “reconciliation” between reason and feeling, although Kant himself has not realized this.

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康德“道德形而上学”的现代效应问题

——基于现代人本主义哲学视角

张能为

西方哲学发展史上，康德具有重要的里程碑意义。康德终生沉思的两大主题

就是自然之必然与道德之自由，前者属于自然形而上学，后者属于道德形而上

学。

《纯粹理性批判》所揭示出的最主要见解就是如何不超越理性能力而避免错

误，因而是否定性的，无法扩充知识，它所涉及的是理性认知的形式和范畴规则；

但《实践理性批判》和《道德形而上学原理》不同，它是从积极意义上探讨人类

行为的合法性、普遍性和有效性问题，它所涉及的是人们行为原则的理性思考。

所以，前者处理的是纯粹理性批判的理论应用问题，主题是科学知识论；后者探

讨的是纯粹理性批判的实践应用问题，主题则是道德学。按照康德的看法，《纯

粹理性批判》只是未来的科学的形而上学的导论，归之根本，其一切理论工作，

都应该被理解成是在为创建实践哲学或道德哲学作理论准备。因此，在形而上学

上，道德形而上学便是康德研究的重点所在。此即为康德著名的实践理性优先原

理。

一、从“一般形而上学是如何可能的？”到“道德形而上学”

康德断定，直至目前，作为一门科学的（真正意义上的）形而上学尚不存在，

因为以往一切独断主义形而上学只是把哲学当作认识“自在之物”之工具，这与

真正形而上学的本质相去甚远。依照康德见解，形而上学的对象就是理性本身的

纯原则，即理性永恒不变的规律，当哲学探明这些规律，哲学也才会最终达到其

完满的状态。

当康德对“一般形而上学是如何可能的？”问题做了精心解答后，所倾心竭

力要做的就是将理论理性与实践理性、思辨形而上学与实践形而上学区分开来，

也就是要从理论上确定起道德形而上学高于自然形而上学，并构建起与人们的生

活实践息息相关的道德形而上学体系。康德认为，道德原理完全出自纯粹理性本

身，它是先天的，具有至高无上的尊严。真正纯粹的道德规律，只存在于纯粹的

哲学之中。因为只有纯粹理性中的实践理性才规定着意志，规定着它的最终的和

完全的目的。善良意志和自由意志则是纯粹理性实践运用的必然产物。道德形而

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The Modern Effect of Kant's Moral Metaphysics

--From the Philosophical Perspective of Modern Humanism

Zhang Nengwei Kant is an important milestone in the history of Western philosophy. The two themes of Kant’s life-long meditation are the necessity of nature and the freedom of morality. The former belongs to natural metaphysics, while the latter belongs to moral metaphysics.

The most important opinion revealed in Critique of Pure Reason is how to avoid errors without transcending rational ability, so pure reason critique is negative and cannot expand knowledge. It involves the form and category rules of rational cognition. But Critique of Practical Reason is different from Principles of Moral Metaphysics, It explores the legitimacy, universality and existence of human behavior in a positive sense and involves rational thinking of people's behavioral principles. Therefore, the former deals with the theoretical application of pure rational criticism, and the theme is scientific epistemology; the latter deals with the practical application of pure rational criticism, and the theme is morality. According to Kant, Critique of Pure Reason is only an introduction to the metaphysics of Science in the future. Basically, all its theoretical work should be understood as theoretical preparation for the creation of practical philosophy or moral philosophy. Therefore, in metaphysics, moral metaphysics is the focus of Kant's research. This is Kant's famous principle of priority of practical reason. 1. From “How General Metaphysics is Possible” to "Moral Metaphysics"

Kant concluded that up to now, a scientific (true sense) metaphysics does not exist, because in the past all authoritarian metaphysics only regarded philosophy as a tool to understand the "thing in itself", which is far from the essence of real metaphysics. According to Kant, the object of metaphysics is the pure principle of reason itself, that is, the eternal law of reason. When philosophy proves these laws, philosophy will finally reach its perfect state.

After Kant carefully answered the questions “how is general metaphysics possible?”, what he devoted himself to was to distinguish theoretical rationality from practical rationality, speculative metaphysics from practical metaphysics, that is, to theoretically determine that moral metaphysics is superior to natural metaphysics, and to construct a moral metaphysics system closely related to people's life and practice. Kant holds that the moral principle comes entirely from pure reason itself, is innate and has supreme dignity. Truly pure moral law exists only in pure philosophy. Because only practical reason in pure reason defines will and its ultimate and complete purpose. Good will and free will are the inevitable products of the application of pure rational practice. The main purpose of moral metaphysics principle is to find and establish the highest

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上学原理的主要目的就是“找出并确立道德的最高原则”，它自身一定要具有绝

对的必然性。

二、形而上学共同构成康德哲学与现代人本哲学的理论基础

现代哲学中科学主义与人本主义分野的一个重要标志，就是他们对待形而上

学的各自不同态度。与科学主义从经验主义立场竭力拒斥、否定和取消形而上学

不同，现代人本主义不回避反而是十分强调研究形而上学的重要意义，在相当程

度上，肯定了研究哲学与形而上学的同质性，主张形而上学是哲学的根本内容，

是否回答形而上学问题以及怎样回答形而上学问题，都直接关系到对哲学其它问

题的思考。

对形而上学重要性的这种共同认识，取决于对哲学本质所作的相似理解。就

康德而言，哲学的本质不仅仅是局限于经验现象界用感性直观形式和先天知性范

畴去讨论科学知识的范围、来源和必然性的问题，而从根本上，是出自人类自然

倾向的一种对作为有条件系列之整体的绝对者即物自体的探寻。康德哲学最终要

回答的问题就是“人是什么？”显然，这是一个离开了形而上学就无从谈起，更

不会有真正意义上回答的问题。同样，对于现代人本主义哲学来说，他们要去探

讨人类生活的境况、心态、价值与命运、社会发展的性质与前途，所有这些，都

必须建立在某种对世界、社会、人生本质的深刻理解上。如果没有一种对世界终

极本质和人生终极关怀的探索，现代人本主义就不可能对近一、二百年来世界发

展史上的人文处境进行深刻的思考，也就不可能提出多彩纷呈的各种人文主义理

论。

三、形而上学关注点由自然形而上学向道德形而上学的转变

通过对传统形而上学的批判，康德已从传统哲学中较为注重对物质自然界形

而上学的思考转向了对人类实践领域的道德形而上学的思考。

从形而上学的特色上来看，如果说古希腊哲学是一种本体论的形而上学，中

世纪是一种神学论的形而上学，那么，近代则是一种认识论的形而上学。对康德

来说，他最为重视的是“实践形而上学”抑或说“道德形而上学”。形而上学已

从以往的那种侧重于从知识论上所作的思考转向了侧重于从人的道德伦理行为

上来进行探索。应该说，康德对形而上学思考重心的转移直接影响到现代人本主

义哲学家对形而上学的肯定和对形而上学伦理学思考重心的认同。现代人本主义

- 71 -

principle of morality, and it must have absolute inevitability. 2. Metaphysics jointly constitutes the theoretical basis of Kant's philosophy and modern humanistic philosophy

In modern philosophy, an important symbol of the division between scientism and humanism is their different attitudes towards metaphysics. Unlike scientism, which tries to reject, deny and cancel Metaphysics from an empiricist standpoint, modern humanism emphasizes the importance of studying metaphysics instead of avoiding it. To a considerable extent, it affirms the homogeneity between philosophy and metaphysics, advocates that metaphysics is the fundamental content of philosophy, whether to answer metaphysical questions and how to answer metaphysics. The questions are directly related to the thinking of other philosophical issues.

This common awareness of the importance of metaphysics depends on a similar understanding of the nature of philosophy. As far as Kant is concerned, the essence of philosophy is not limited to the discussion of scope, origin and inevitability of scientific knowledge in the field of experiential phenomena, in the form of perceptual intuition and the category of innate knowledge. Fundamentally, it is a search for the absolute as a whole of conditional series, that is, the thing itself, arising from the natural tendency of human beings. The question Kant's philosophy ultimately has to answer is "What is man?" Obviously, this is a question that can not be talked about without metaphysics, let alone answered in a real sense. Similarly, for modern humanistic philosophy, they want to explore the situation, mentality, value and destiny of human life, the nature and future of social development, all of which must be based on a profound understanding of the nature of the world, society and life. Without an exploration of the ultimate nature of the world and the ultimate concern for life, it is impossible for modern humanism to think deeply about the human situation in the history of world development in the past one or two hundred years, and to put forward various theories of humanism. 3. The Change of Metaphysics Focus from Natural Metaphysics to Moral Metaphysics

Through the criticism of traditional metaphysics, Kant has shifted his focus from the metaphysics of material nature to the moral metaphysics in the field of human practice.

From the viewpoint of the characteristics of metaphysics, if ancient Greek philosophy is an ontological metaphysics and the Middle Ages is a theological metaphysics, then modern times is an epistemological metaphysics. For Kant, what he attaches most importance to is "practical metaphysics" or "moral metaphysics". Metaphysics has shifted its focus from the previous epistemological thinking to the exploration of human moral and ethical behavior. It should be said that Kant's shift of the focus of metaphysical thinking has a direct impact on modern humanistic philosophers' affirmation of metaphysics and their recognition of the focus of

- 72 -

哲学所谈的形而上学也基本上属于实践的形而上学，本质上是与人的行为相关的

道德形而上学，着重于从人的生活状态、道德行为来对形而上学进行探讨。

从康德开始的形而上学的实践转向，全面地影响到现代人本主义和神学人道

主义的形而上学理解和建设，他们的根本目的都是在立足于社会现实发展需要的

基础上，力图通过这种实践转向，来为人类的实践行为（认识行为、道德行为、

社会行为等）提供一种形而上学的思考和依据。与“本体论转向”、“认识论转向”、

“语言哲学转向”相应，“实践转向”也构成西方哲学当代发展的又一鲜明转向。

四、形而上学探索由构建体系向确立方法的转移

与传统形而上学家特别是近代思辨形而上学家总是试图构建起严密精致的

庞大形而上学不同的，对于康德的形而上学思考而言，重要的不是体系，而是方

法，存在一个由体系向方法的思考重心转变。康德在总结其三部代表作《纯粹理

性批判》、《实践理性批判》和《判断力批判》时，曾意味深长地指出，这些批判

是关于方法论的专论，而不是哲学形而上学科学本身的体系。在形而上学研究上，

康德采取的方法是否定性的和先验性的。

“否定性”是指从消极的或从反面去分析在什么领域在什么条件下作为科学

知识的形而上学是如何不可能的，进而指明形而上学的成立在什么领域在什么条

件下是可能的；“先验性”是指不是从经验事实中去按照从个别到一般的知性思

维归纳、整理、推论出形而上学的基本概念、命题和原理，而是立足于先于乃至

超出经验之外的纯粹理性本身去考察纯粹理性的原则、原理，是一种为人类的认

知行为、道德行为和社会活动提供终极性原理和根据的纯粹理性公设的哲学知识

研究。

康德形而上学研究由体系向方法的转变，留给了现代人本主义哲学家重要的

启迪和影响，并构成了联结现代人本主义与康德哲学的一条重要理论通道。正是

康德对道德形而上学的理解，对形而上学研究由体系向方法的转变，极大地影响

了现代人本主义的形而上学思考，影响了这种思考所表现出来的非体系化、非理

性化、神秘化等诸多特征。

其一是非体系性。形而上学世界观都不是一个具有内在逻辑性的、严密一致

的体系，正因为如此，所以有很多学派也并非是一个有着严格理论体系、观点的

统一学派，大多数情况下是就其总体倾向来称谓的。其二是非理性化。既然形而

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metaphysical ethics. The metaphysics of modern humanism philosophy is also essentially practical metaphysics, which is essentially moral metaphysics related to human behavior, focusing on the discussion of Metaphysics from human life and moral behavior.

Kant's practice turn of metaphysics completely influenced the understanding and construction of metaphysics of modern humanism and theological humanitarianism. Their fundamental purpose is to provide a metaphysical meditation and reliance for human practice (cognitive behavior, moral behavior, social behavior, etc.) on the basis of the development needs of social reality. Corresponding to the "ontological turn", "epistemological turn" and "linguistic philosophy turn", the "practical turn" also constitutes another distinct turn in the contemporary development of Western philosophy. 4. Metaphysical Exploration Transferred from Constructing System to Establishing Method

Different from traditional metaphysicians, especially modern speculative metaphysicians, who always try to construct a rigorous and delicate huge metaphysics, for Kant's metaphysical thinking, the important thing is not the system, but the method, there being a shift from the system to the method of thinking focus. In summing up his three representative works, Criticism of Pure Reason, Criticism of Practical Reason and Criticism of Judgment, Kant pointed out that these critiques are Monographs on methodology, not the system of philosophical metaphysics itself. In metaphysics, Kant's approach is negative and transcendental.

"Negativity" refers to the negative or negative analysis of how metaphysics as scientific knowledge is impossible in what fields and under what conditions, and then points out that the establishment of metaphysics is possible in what fields and under what conditions; "transcendentality" refers to the induction, collation and inference of metaphysics not from empirical facts according to individual to general intellectual thinking. The basic concepts, propositions and principles of science are based on pure reason itself, which is prior to or even beyond experience, to examine the principles and theory of pure reason. It is a philosophical knowledge study of pure reason, which provides the ultimate principle and basis for human cognitive, moral and social activities.

The transformation of Kant's Metaphysics from system to method left important enlightenment and influence to modern humanistic philosophers, and constituted an important theoretical channel connecting modern humanism with Kant's philosophy. It is Kant's understanding of moral metaphysics and the transformation of Metaphysics from system to method that has greatly influenced the metaphysical thinking of modern humanism and the characteristics of such thinking, such as non-systematization, irrationalization and mystery.

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上学研究的目标不是去构建出有严密逻辑联系的体系，那么，现代人本主义哲学

家对形而上学的研究方法就是多种多样的，最为突出的是非理性主义方法。这就

决定了他们对本体的思考、对形而上学的研究不是采取理性证明式的，而是推崇

和倡导“体验式的”、“直觉式的”感悟和设定。其三是神秘化。列宁说：“康德

贬低知识，以便给信仰留下地盘”。无论如何，信仰在康德形而上学研究中起着

举足轻重的作用，康德的形而上学研究是通过信仰来获得保证的，也是通过信仰

加以实现的。康德的“物自体”“意志自由”“灵魂不灭”作为一种纯粹理性的公

设，也充满着浓郁的神秘主义色彩，这一点在现代人本主义哲学家那里也同样突

出。既然现代人本主义哲学家不是从理性认识角度去从事形而上学的研究和建设，

那么一切相关的结论都不是能够通过人的理性加以认识的，非理性主义方法论强

化了他们对形而上学研究的神秘性。

通过上述的理论逻辑关联性梳理和分析，我们认为，形而上学和道德形而上

学，是联结康德思想和现代人本主义哲学的重要理论通道。正因为康德对于形而

上学性质和方向的重要改变，使得形而上学问题在现代哲学中依旧焕发出崭新的

生命力。形而上学的现代命运问题，根本上也是一个康德形而上学的现代效应和

道德形而上学的发扬光大问题。

康德哲学中的决定论与希望 Christian Helmut Wenzel（文哲）

早期康德同时受牛顿和自然科学，以及克鲁西乌斯和神学之争辩的影响，终

其一生他坚持物理的决定论，立场甚至比牛顿更为坚定；然而同时他也接受克鲁

西乌斯对绝对自由的要求，只不过和克鲁西乌斯之存在主义式的自由不同，康德

诉诸理性，以及对自由道德行为的解释。这造就了康德哲学中，自由意志和决定

论的强大张力，这股张力也成为他发展先验哲学的关键。康德不能被归类为兼容

论者或非兼容论者，因为它们是在分析哲学中发展出来的主张，而现今分析哲学

所接受的时空和表象概念已然迥异于康德之立场。

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One is non-systematic. The metaphysical world outlook is not an intrinsic logical and closely consistent system. Because of this, many schools are not a unified school with strict theoretical system and viewpoints. In most cases, they are called on their general tendencies. The second is irrationalization. Since the goal of metaphysics is not to construct a system with close logical connection, the research methods of metaphysics by modern humanistic philosophers are various, and the most prominent one is irrationalism. This determines that their thinking on ontology and Research on metaphysics are not based on rational proof, but on advocating "experiential" and "intuitive" perceptions and settings. The third is mystification. Lenin said, "Kant depreciates knowledge in order to leave a place for belief." In any case, belief plays an important role in Kant's metaphysics. Kant's metaphysics is guaranteed by belief and realized by belief. Kant's "thing-in-itself", "freedom of will" and "immortality of soul" as a pure rational axiom are also full of mysticism, which is also prominent in modern humanistic philosophers. Since modern humanistic philosophers are not engaged in the research and construction of Metaphysics from the perspective of rational knowledge, all relevant conclusions cannot be recognized through human rationality, and irrational methodology strengthens their mystery of metaphysics.

By sorting out and analyzing the above-mentioned theoretical logical relevance, we believe that metaphysics and moral metaphysics are important theoretical channels connecting Kant's thought and modern humanistic philosophy. Because of Kant's important change in the nature and direction of metaphysics, the problem of metaphysics is still glowing with new vitality in modern philosophy. The question of the modern fate of metaphysics is also fundamentally a question of the modern effect of Kant's metaphysics and the development of moral metaphysics.

Determinism and Hope in Kant Christian Helmut Wenzel

Early on, Kant was influenced by Newton and the natural sciences as well as by Crusius and theological debates. Throughout his life he held on to ideas of physical determinism, even more strongly than Newton did; but he also followed Crusius in his demand for absolute freedom. However, unlike Crusius, who at places reads like an existentialist, Kant demands reasons and explanations for free moral actions. Hence, a strong tension between free will and determinism arose for Kant, which plays a key role in the development of his transcendental philosophy. Kant cannot be classified as a compatibilist or an incompatibilist as these positions are generally understood in the current debates of analytic philosophy, since his notions of time, space, and

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康德的道德哲学似乎有遵循法则和严苛的特色，表现在例如绝对意志，存心

改变（Gesinnungswandel），以及根本恶这些概念中。但我认为实情不尽然如此。

即使在对普遍性的要求中，其道德哲学仍有“面向人的准则”。我会藉由讨论道

德形上学中的一个例子来呈现这个观点。

无论决定论是否为真，我们都有充分的理由不接受宿命论，而是尽力维持道

德高标准并且保持希望。一个理由来自克律西波斯对命运共同性的洞见。即使决

定论为真，努力仍然会造成差异。另一个理由则来自生活不能毫无希望与道德，

这一点对康德来说很重要。他的哲学建立在斯多葛学派反求诸己、操之在己的见

解之上，并且加上目的王国的观念：我们必须在世界公民的目的中行动并且了解

历史。康德提出严格的道德要求，但同时强调我们需要希望。这样的特色也呈现

在儒家哲学之中。

自由的价值 Jochen Bojanowski

康德关于自主的构想经常受到这样的批评，即它将自由的行动等同于道德的

行动。因此，许多康德主义者离开了康德关于自主的道德式构想，转而提出一种

我称之为“设定目的”或“两个方向的能力”的对自主的解说。我详细我们应当

抵制这些修正，并且这样做将会说清楚为什么只有道德自主的能力才拥有无条件

的价值。从根本上将我们自由意愿的能力区分出来的乃是我们是自主的这一事实。

这种能力使得我们能够拥有一种无条件的善的构想，它赋予了我们以尊严，亦即

无条件的价值，而非自主的存在者则缺乏这种价值。在本文中，我首先考察对自

由的价值的两种当代的康德式解说。二者都错误地解释了我们自主的能力，并最

终失败了。在第二部分中，我将表明，如果我们想要辩护内在和外在自由的无条

件价值，那么我们就必须采取康德关于自主的道德式构想。

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representation (Vorstellung) are often different from comparable notions employed today.

Kant’s moral philosophy often appears to be rule-governed and demanding, for instance in his idea of absolute free will, “Gesinnungswandel,” and radical evil. But I think this so-called “rigorism” is not as strong as is often believed. I think there is room for what one might want to call “maxims ad hominem,” even in the face of his demands for universality. I will show this by discussing an example from the Groundwork.

No matter whether determinism is true or not, there are good reasons not to be a fatalist but to make efforts and to keep both hope and moral standards high. One reason derives from Chrysippus’ insight into the idea of co-fatedness. Even if determinism were true, efforts would still make a difference. Another reason is that we simply cannot live without hope and morality. This was important for Kant. He built on Stoic insights about what is “inner” and “up to us,” and he added the idea of a “realm of ends” in the light of which we should act in our lives and understand history with a cosmopolitan aim. Kant makes strong demands but he also emphasizes the need for hope. Both features are similar to what we find in Confucius.

The Value of Freedom Jochen Bojanowski

Kant’s conception of autonomy has been criticised for identifying acting freely with acting morally. As a result, many Kantians have moved away from Kant’s moral conception of autonomy, instead proposing what I will call an “end-setting” or “two-way capacity” account of autonomy. I believe that we should resist these revisions and that doing so makes clear why it is only the capacity for moral autonomy that is of unlimited value. What fundamentally distinguishes our free capacity of volition is the fact that we are autonomous. This capacity enables us to have a conception of unlimited goodness that gives us the dignity, i.e. the unlimited value, that non-autonomous beings lack. In this paper, I first consider two contemporary Kantian accounts of the value of freedom. Both misconstrue our autonomous capacity and ultimately fail. In the second part, I show that we must adopt Kant’s moral conception of autonomy if we are to defend the unconditional value of inner and outer freedom.

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康德伦理学的苹果：作为评价核心的 I-准则 Samuel Kahn 展翼文译

准则(maxim)是意志的主观的原则。不过我想在三个不同的抽象层面上对准

则加以区分。在第一个层面我将其称之为个体的准则，或者 I-准则。这类准则被

具体而实际的个体所采纳。例如，考虑这样的准则：“为得到一笔现款而做出虚

假的承诺”。如果两个个体 A 和 B 都采取这样的准则，由于他们是不同的个体，

他们便采取了虽在质的意义上一致但在数量的意义上彼此并不等同的 I-准则。

然而某种意义上 A 和 B 显然是采取了同一个准则。这即是抽象的第二个层

面，在这一层面，准则被要求当做是一种抽象的原则，而这种原则是独立于任何

采纳它的个体的。我将其称之为抽象的准则，或 A-准则。

在抽象的第三个层面，当不同的准则集合在一起（往往是基于其内容），便可

被称之为准则类(maxim kinds)。比如说，考虑这样的 A-准则：“为得到一辆轿车

而做出虚假的承诺”。该 A-准则与被个体 A和 B所采取的那个A-准则是不同的，

然而它们在质上彼此相类似。而这些 A-准则可以被集合起来称为一个准则类，

或 K-准则。而我们现在遇到的问题便是：对康德伦理学来说，进行评估的位置

(locus)是在 I-准则、A-准则、和 K-准则中的哪一个层面？

这一问题涉及逻辑上的优先性。这里存在着以下三种可能：

1. 评估的位置在 I-准则层面：某个 A-准则或 K-准则是（不）被允许的，是由

于其相应的 I-准则（一般地来说）如此。

2. 评估的位置在 A-准则层面：某个 I-准则是（不）被允许的，是由于其相应的

A-准则如此；某个 K-准则是（不）被允许的，由于其相应的 A-准则（一般地来

说）是如此。

3. 评估的位置在 K-准则层面：某个 I-准则或 A-准则是（不）被允许的，是由

于它属于一个如此的 K-准则。

以上并没有穷尽所有的可能，但它们已经能够满足我的目的。在本文中，我

将为 1 展开辩护。我将提供两个不同方式的论证。首先，我将论证存在着文本证

据来支持 1。接着，我将论证存在着良好的哲学理由支持 1。由此，我将表明有

理由认为康德主张评估的位置是在 I-准则层面，并且他的这一主张是正确的。在

康德主义者中已有关于准则的合宜的形式究竟为何的争论。在康德主义者中也已

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The Apple of Kant’s Ethics: iMaxims as the locus of Assessment Samuel Kahn

A maxim is a subjective principle of volition. But I want to distinguish between maxims at three levels of abstraction. At the first level are what I shall call individual maxims, or imaxims. These are maxims as they are adopted by actual, concrete individuals. For instance, consider the maxim, “to make a lying promise in order to get some ready money.” If two individuals, A and B, adopt this maxim, then by virtue of being distinct individuals they have numerically distinct even though qualitatively identical imaxims.

But A and B clearly have adopted a single maxim between them in some sense. This is the second level of abstraction. It requires one to take a maxim to be an abstract principle distinct from any individual who adopts it. I shall call maxims at this level abstract maxims, or amaxims.

At the third level of abstraction are what might be called maxim kinds. This is when various maxims are grouped together, usually on the basis of their content. For instance, consider the amaxim, “to make a lying promise in order to get a car.” This amaxim is qualitatively similar to although nonetheless distinct from the amaxim adopted by A and B. These amaxims might be grouped together into maxim kinds, or kmaxims. The question that arises now is: should the locus of assessment in Kant’s ethics be imaxims, amaxims, or kmaxims?

The question has to do with logical priority. Here are three possibilities: 1. Imaxims are the locus of assessment: a given amaxim or kmaxim is im/permissible because its corresponding imaxims are (generally) so. 2. Amaxims are the locus of assessment: a given imaxim is im/permissible because its corresponding amaxim is so; a given kmaxim is im/permissible because its corresponding amaxims are (generally) so. 3. Kmaxims are the locus of assessment: a given imaxim or amaxim is im/permissible because it belongs to a kmaxim that is so.

These possibilities are obviously not exhaustive, but they suffice for my purposes. In this paper, I intend to argue for 1. I shall argue for it in two ways. First I shall argue that there is textual evidence in favor of 1. Then I shall argue that there are good philosophical grounds in favor of 1. Thus, I shall argue that there are reasons to think that Kant thought imaxims are the locus of assessment and, further, that he was right about this.

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有对于某些原则是否是真正意义上的准则的争论（譬如不作为的原则，抑或是“如

果我愿意的话，做 X”这样的原则等等）。此外也已经存在着关于一个原则需要

具有怎样的普遍性方能成为一个准则（而不仅仅是一个规则）的争论。但据我所

知，还没有关于康德伦理学中评估所进行的位置的争论。与此最接近的争论似乎

是在功利主义那里：功利主义者有时会将对于行动与规则的争论解释为涉及功利

主义原则运用的争论，亦即争论这一原则究竟是在行动殊例（act tokens）的层面

还是在行动类型（act types）的层面被运用。

尽管如此，我们还是可以推断出某些康德主义者在评估的位置的问题上的立

场。比如，罗尔斯认为康德的建构程序“是被视为包含了[...]一个正确地理解并

运用定言命令程序的理性且明智的人的理想状况”。由此我们可以推论说（我将

对此有所论述），罗尔斯（以及他的许多追随其建构程序的学生）将会不同意我

的看法：罗尔斯不会认为评估所进行的位置是在 I-准则层面。

我认为罗尔斯对此犯了错误，在本文中我将展示这一点。

全球正义与正义战争：罗尔斯、康德和黑格尔赵敦华夏语译

在 20 世纪 90 年代国际关系的背景下，约翰罗尔斯在其最后一部作品《万

民法》中对全球正义的问题进行了论述。虽然他只是简要地提到的了正义战争的

正当性问题，但这一部分对他全球正义的理论而言是非常重要的。早在《正义论》

中，罗尔斯就已经对“开战正义”（jus ad bellum）和“交战正义”（jus in bello）

作出了区分；在《万民法》中就这个问题也花了两个章节（13 和 14）来讨论，

只是其中的大部分聚焦在“交战正义”而非“开战正义”上。如果人们愿意接受

正义与正派的民族与非法政权的区分的话，那么正义民族向非法国家发动战争的

权利，在应然和实然层面都会被理所当然地视为正义的。罗尔斯也许会把美国

1991 年海湾战争后的外交政策作为正义战争的典范，并将其作为评判在阿富汗、

伊拉克、乌克兰、科索沃、利比亚、叙利亚发生的一系列战争及与基地组织和 ISIS

之间战争的准则。但是政治哲学的重心需要放在正义战争的正当性上。

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There are debates among Kantians about the proper form of a well-formed maxim. There also are debates among Kantians about whether principles of omission or principles “to do X if I like” count as genuine maxims. And there are debates about how general a principle must be for it to count as a maxim (rather than a mere rule). But as far as I know, there has yet to be a debate about the locus of assessment in Kant’s ethics. The closest thing to such a debate appears in utilitarianism: the debate between act and rule utilitarians sometimes is explained as a debate about whether to apply the principle of utility to act tokens or to act types.

Nonetheless, it is possible to extrapolate where some Kantians stand. For example, Rawls says that Kant’s constructive procedure “is thought of as embedding…the ideal of a rational and reasonable person who understands and applies the categorical imperative procedure correctly.” From this it may be inferred (I shall return to this below) that Rawls (and many students of Rawls who follow his constructivist procedure) would disagree with me: Rawls does not take imaxims to be the locus of assessment.

I think that Rawls is wrong about this, and that is what I intend to show in this paper.

International Justice and Just War: Rawls, Kant and Hegel Zhao Dunhua

In circumstances of 1990s international relations, John Rawls worked out an interpretation of global justice in his last work The Law of Peoples. Though the justification of just war is briefly mentioned, it is essential to Rawls’s theory of international justice. Rawls already distinguished between jus ad bellum and jus in bello in A Theory of Justice, and spent two sections (13 and 14) in The Law of Peoples on this issue. However, in most pages he discusses jus in bello, rather than jus ad bellum. It could be taken for granted that just and decent peoples’ right to war against outlaw states ought to be and is just, if one were willing to accept the differentiation between just and decent peoples and out-law regimes. Rawls might take the foreign policy of US after the Gulf War in 1991 as a model of just war, which became norms of judging a series of wars occurring in Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, Kosovo, Libya, Syria, and with al-Qaeda and ISIS. But the focus in a political philosophy needs to be upon the justification of just war.

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在《万民法》中，罗尔斯表达了他现实乌托邦理想。“乌托邦”是指一种指向

非自由民族宽容的理想理论，而“现实”则是指关于正义战争的非理想的理论。

罗尔斯说：“有两种观念促成了万民法的建立。一是人类历史上巨大的罪恶——

不义的战争和压迫、宗教迫害和奴役，以及诸如此类——都是由政治非正义及其

残酷无情所造成的。二是，政治的非正义一旦通过遵循正义（或至少合宜的）社

会政策和制度得以铲除，这些巨大的罪恶最终将会消失。”

罗尔斯强调，他的书遵循康德“和平联盟”的理想。康德对人类未来持乐观

态度。但书中的最后一句话却表达出一种悲观的情绪，“如果一个合理正义的万

民社会无法让其成员将他们的权力置于合理的社会目标之下，人类即使不是无可

救药地犬儒和以自我为中心，也在很大程度上是不道德的，那么人们便会像康德

一样问到：人类是否值得在地球上继续生存下去。”“不道德”，“无可救药的犬儒

主义和以自我为中心”这些词是指两个极端的群体。一种是原教旨主义，另一种

指那些以“战争即是地狱”，或者“我们都站在同一层次，谁都不能谴责他人和

受谴责”来表达其“道德虚无”的社会成员。

为了找寻更多的理论支持，罗尔斯宣称，“政治自由主义是一种自由的自由主

义——这同康德、黑格尔、约翰·斯图亚特·密尔的观点一致”。但他从来没有

提及黑格尔在政治自由主义中发挥着怎样的作用。

这篇文章试图解决一下问题：

（1）为什么黑格尔批评康德的“和平联盟”？

（2）黑格尔和康德的理论是否可能成为为人类历史上战胜那些极端邪恶所

必需的战争进行辩护的共同资源？

（3）黑格尔和康德如何能够帮助罗尔斯？

康德与二十一世纪的移民哲学 Riccardo Pozzo 夏语译

从康德那里，可以找到很多对“反思性社会”的支持。这一形容词是指在一

个以相互理解为目标的现代公共领域中公民协商交流所发挥的作用，并且可以追

溯到康德、黑格尔、哈贝马斯、菲什金、贝克和费拉拉。坚持自反性有助于在社

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The Law of Peoples expresses Rawls’s idea of realistic Utopia. The Utopia refers to an ideal theory concerning the toleration of non-liberal peoples while “realistic” means a non-ideal theory about the just war. Rawls says that “two ideas motivate the Law of Peoples. The first is that the great evils of human history — unjust war, oppression, religious persecution, slavery and the rest –– result from political injustice, with its cruelties and callousness. The second is that once political injustice has been eliminated by following just (or at least decent) social policies and institutions, these great evils will eventually disappear.”

Rawls emphasizes that his book follows the Kantian ideal of foedus pacificum. Kant was optimistic for human beings in future. The last sentence of Rawls’s book is, however, an expression in a pessimistic mood, “If a reasonably just Society of Peoples whose members subordinate their power to reasonable aims is not possible, and human beings are largely amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask, with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live upon the earth.” The words “amoral”, “incurably cynical and self-centered” refer to two extremes of groups. One are fundamentalists and the other are many social members with “their moral emptiness”, which expressed as “war is hell” or as “we stand on the same level and cannot rightly blame or be blamed”.

In hope to seek other resources for support, Rawls claims that “political liberalism is a liberalism of freedom — in this it stands with Kant, Hegel, and J. S. Mill.”. But Rowels never mentioned what role for Hegel to play in the political liberalism.

This essay tries to solve following problems. (1) Why did Hegel criticize Kant’s foedus pacificum ? (2) Is it possible for Hegel and Kant to be a joint resource for a justification of the

war necessitated by overcoming radical evil in the human history? (3) How could Hegel together with Kant help Rowels?

Kant and Twenty-First Century Philosophy of Migration Riccardo Pozzo

Kant has much to offer to the “reflective society.” The adjective refers to the role of deliberative communication of citizens in a modern public sphere aiming at mutual understanding and goes back to Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Habermas, Fishkin, Beck and Ferrara. Insisting on reflexivity helps to raise awareness for the importance of framing issues around engaging with science and society, identifying problems and defining solutions. The biggest challenge of this century, which is migration, asks for a new

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会科学问题的研究和探寻解决办法中认识到构建问题的重要性。移民问题是本世

纪最大的挑战，它需要一种对包容和反思新的叙述。康德的著作最能为我们提供

这一点。他对访问权、友好和主权的论述是创建新的移民哲学的基础。文化是多

元的、变动的、适应的和建构的。当我们在与他人相接触时，无论他们来自哪里，

都会建构起包容和反思。在 2018 年北京召开的第 24 届世界哲学大会上，杜维明

先生在他那篇精彩的论文中写道：“我们现在有一种对话的文明”。对话文明不

仅是文化的对话，它是一种天生就具有对话性的文化。学习为人是一项持续不断

的任务，我们通过与艺术和人文的接触来实现它。我们谈论的是共同的善，共享

的经验和交往的空间。这都属于文化革新的层面。我们有理由希望，2024 年，纪

念康德诞辰三百周年的庆祝活动会在一些重大的事件中到达顶峰，这可能最终成

为本世纪哲学进程的一个标志，就像上个世纪笛卡尔 400 周年诞辰庆典那样。我

们期待 2024 年《康德全集》第一卷的全新再版，第 14 届康德哲学大会以及其他

进一步的重要举措。我们将在 2023 年墨尔本第 25 届 WCP 会议上启动纪念康德

的庆典，这将促进在新的世代对系统性变革的研究，即那些旨在改变思维方式和

制度革新的研究。

一种康德式的气候哲学 Martin Schönfeld 张旭译

康德主义在环境伦理学和气候伦理学中是罕见的。这并不偶然，20 世纪环境

伦理学产生于对传统道德哲学的回应。英语世界（后文称“远西”）的第一代环

境伦理学家，如 E. Hargrove，J. B. Callicott 和 H. Rolston，以及动物伦理学的早

期支持者，如 T. Regan 和 P. Singer 都认同如何评判人类利益是一个伦理问题。

因此环境和动物伦理学产生于对人本主义的回应，旨在寻求人本主义外的其他可

能性。

康德被视为西方哲学中人本主义的代表，类似于东方哲学中的孔子。20 世纪

80 年代美国核心期刊《环境伦理学》刊登了一篇题为《康德令人反感的人文主

义》的文章，对康德的相关思想进行了猛烈的批评。这篇文章代表了至少一代环

境和动物伦理学家的观点。比起康德主义，其他思想如功利主义则更受青睐。

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narrative of inclusion and reflection. Kant’s works have the best chances to provide it. What Kant has written on the right of visit (das Recht eines Fremdlings), on hospitality (hospes) and sovereignty (hostis) is the basis for shaping new forms of philosophy of migration. Culture cannot be but plural, changing, adaptable, constructed. Inclusion and reflection are constructed whenever we are in contact with other human beings, regardless where they come from. “We now have a dialogical civilization”—has stated Tu Weiming 杜維明 introducing the magnificent paper he gave at the 24th World Congress of Philosophy Beijing 2018. A dialogical civilization is much more than a dialogue of culture. It is a culture that is born dialogical. Learning to be human is an on-going task and we fulfill it by means of exposure to the arts and the humanities. We are talking about common goods, shared experiences and spaces of exchange. This is the level of cultural innovation. There is reason to hope that the celebrations of the tercentenary of Kant’s birth in 2024 will culminate in major events, which might end up marking the philosophical course of this century in the same way as the année Descartes did for the last century. For the année Kant 2024 we expect the new edition of the first section of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, the 14th international Kant-Congress and a number of further significant initiatives. The 25th WCP Melbourne 2023 will kick-start the celebrations of Kant that will foster research on the systemic change in the new generations, namely for a change in the mind-set and for institutional change.

A Kantian Philosophy of Climate Martin Schönfeld

In environmental and climate ethics, Kantian approaches are few and far in between. This is no accident. In the 20th century, environmental ethics emerged in response to traditional moral philosophy. The first generation of environmental ethicists in the English-speaking world (henceforth, ‘Far West’), such as E. Hargrove, J. B. Callicott, and H. Rolston, and the early proponents of animal ethics, such as T. Regan and P. Singer, agreed that the central importance given to human interests is an ethical problem, and that environmental and animal ethics need to develop alternatives. Environmental and animal ethics accordingly emerged in response to anthropocentrism.

Kant was seen as a representative of anthropocentrism in Western philosophy, akin to Confucius in Eastern philosophy. In the 1980s, a blistering critique in the flagship journal Environmental Ethics on “Kant’s invidious humanism” (Hoff, 1983, Env. Eth. 5.1) settled the issue among environmental and animal ethicists, at least for a generation. Alternatives such as utilitarianism were preferred, just as Daoist approaches, in the Far East, were seen as superior to Confucian approaches for environmental thought.

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21 世纪，气候伦理学的兴起也并未改变这种情况。尽管气候伦理学有不同的

根源（经济理论，法律哲学），但其先驱者，如 J. Broome，H. Shue，S. Caney 和

S. Gardiner，采取了一种以罗尔斯和帕菲特的自由主义和功利主义为前提的分析

性视角。人类未来最严重的威胁是气候变化和环境问题，而在远西地区，解决这

些问题的理论模型拒斥了康德。这正是问题所在。这与康德在（欧陆）西方的

重要地位不同，康德在（欧陆）西方具有如同孔子在东亚地区的重要地位。我们

看到，当前欧洲和中国正在转向可持续性发展，而远西则囿于市场意识形态、扩

大化石燃料使用和否认现实之中。这是有问题的。尽管远西学界拒斥康德，但我

认为康德对人类的未来至关重要。

我认为康德被环境伦理学拒斥的问题已经得到了实质性的解决，即环境危机

的演变。康德仍是康德，但环境危机发生了演变，从某种程度上来说，它被纳入

到了康德的范围之内。困扰第一代环境伦理学家的问题只是我们正在遭遇的问题

的一小部分。危机的进化在气候变化方面最为明显。今天，气候变化的范围已经

超出了分析性气候伦理研究的范围。它不仅是一个道德问题，其答案可以在权利，

正义和善的背景下找到。而且是一个存在性的问题，其答案指向一个全新的背景

——责任，文明进化和可持续性发展。

因此，如果环境问题仅限于污染、生态退化和生物多样性的损失，则我们可

以绕过康德。但当问题已经发展成一种由地球承载极限的冲突、环境服务的削弱，

以及灾难性的大规模物种灭绝所导致的危机时，康德是绕不过去的。此外，如果

在洛克、斯密和密尔等人所定义的以市场和权利为出发点的自由主义框架下可以

解决气候变暖问题，那么在环境变化问题上对康德的拒斥是合理的。但是由于气

候变化已成为“有史以来最大的市场失灵”（N. Stern，《气候变化的经济学》，英

国政府 2006 年），这种方法已显得过时。正如这种尝试已显现的失败一样，在未

来继续诉诸个人利益、新古典经济学和成本-效益分析的方法，很可能还会在解

决气候变化问题时再次失效。

我认为，如今的情况使得康德从边缘重新回到了中心。用康德的术语，减缓

气候变化是绝对命令：如果人人都以远西和自由市场的方式来对待危机，那么将

是行不通的。因此，遏制危机和适应危机的影响指向了另一种选择：在渐进式启

蒙的框架下，加之基于科学而非信念的政策、基于严谨规划而非市场意识形态的

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In the 21st century, the arrival of climate ethics did little to change this situation. While climate ethics has different roots (economic theory, philosophy of law), its pioneers, such as J. Broome, H. Shue, S. Caney, and S. Gardiner, share an analytic outlook indebted to liberal-utilitarian premises à la Rawls and Parfit. This is the situation—and the problem: climate change and environmental issues are the worst threats to the future of humanity, but in the Far West, they are addressed by theoretical models that marginalize Kant. Yet for the (European) West, Kant is as important a figure as Confucius is for the Far East. At the same time, it is the European West and China that are now transitioning to sustainability, while the Far West is stuck in market ideology, fossil fuels, and reality denial. Something has gone wrong. Despite his marginalization in the Far West, I argue that Kant is vital for the future of humanity.

I think that the problem of Kant’s environmental marginalization has found a material solution: the transformation of the environmental crisis. While Kant remains the same, the crisis has evolved. It did so in a way that brings it into Kant’s purview. The environmental issues that troubled the first generation of environmental ethicists are now only a small part of the problems we are seeing now. The evolution of the crisis is most visible in the arrival of climate change. But the scope of climate change has also grown beyond the scope of the inquiry of analytic climate ethics. Today, climate change is not only an ethical question, whose answers are to be found in the context of rights, justice, and the good, but also an existential query that points to an altogether new context, of duties, civil evolution, and sustainability.

Thus, while it made sense to bypass Kant as long as environmental issues had been limited to pollution, ecological degradation, and biodiversity loss, it does not make sense to bypass Kant when the issues have grown to a crisis defined by a clash with planetary boundaries, a weakening of environmental services, and a mass extinction of catastrophic proportions. Moreover, for thinking about climate change, it used to make sense to marginalize Kant as long as global warming looked like a problem that could be dealt with market- and rights-based approaches in the liberal framework defined by the likes of Locke, Smith, and Mill. But since climate change has emerged as the “greatest market failure ever seen” (N. Stern, Economics of Climate Change, UK Gov 2006), such approaches appear obsolete. Trying to fix climate change by continuing to appeal to private interests, neoclassical economics, and cost-benefit analysis will likely be as ineffectual in the future as such attempts have already shown themselves to be in the past.

I contend that this situation brings Kant back from the margins, and puts him right into the center. In Kantian terms, mitigating climate change is a categorical imperative: if everyone reacted to the crisis in Far-Western and market-liberal ways, eventually no one could. Containing the crisis and adapting to its impacts accordingly points to an alternative: it can be done in a framework of progressive enlightenment, with politics

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经济手段和平衡自由与服从的开明政府管理，我们可以超越自身的不成熟, 走向

可持续性发展。

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based on science instead of faith, with economics based on careful planning instead of

market ideology, and with an enlightened governance that relies in equal measure on

freedom and obedience. This is how we can outgrow our self-incurred immaturity and

evolve to sustainability.

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分组会议（二）：

康德《未来形而上学导论》中科学的未来 Stephen R. Palmquist（庞思奋）展翼文译

康德 1783 年的《任何一种能够作为科学出现的未来形而上学导论》一书的

主要目的在于为其 1781 年的巨著《纯粹理性批判》中的核心论点提供一种简化

的综述，以便让师生们能够更好地去理解他对于形而上学的先验唯心论观点的革

命性意义。按照康德的说法，《批判》中的“综合叙述法”在这里被替换为“分

析叙述法”，而在对其理论体系进行重新包装的这一过程中，康德不仅澄清了理

性的理念（上帝、自由、与灵魂不朽）在其总体理论图景中所扮演的关键性角色，

而且还以令许多读者感到困惑的方式似乎略过了他起初的核心论点——即范畴

的先验演绎所发挥的至关重要的作用。

而往往被忽略的是，在康德为这一主旨完成其理论细节时，他也同时对科学

的本质自身发展出了新的理论。诚然，关于形而上学如何可以（在其第一批判之

后）成为一个科学的体系，康德认为只有通过对道德领域中理性理念的实践意涵

进行考察方能给出解释（且仅在若干年之后，他便在其 1788 年的著作《实践理

性批判》中尝试完成了这一预言），然而在此之前，他首先解释了数学（尤其是

欧几里得几何学）和自然科学（尤其是牛顿物理学）为何以及在什么意义上已经

发展成为了科学。简而言之，欧几里得和牛顿（以及任何真正意义上的科学的传

播者）都引入了先天综合的准则。这类准则都内嵌于人类心灵的形式结构之中，

并且对获取任何经验知识来说都是绝对必要的。理性的理念在形而上学中所应扮

演的角色，则应当如同时空（作为直观的形式）之于数学，或范畴（作为概念的

形式）之于自然科学那样。

然而这里众所周知的问题在于，真正的（先天的）科学都是在感性和／或知

性的边界（limits）的基础上产生确定的知识的，而由于理性的理念的缘故，形而

上学的作用则仅仅是作为理性的运用的界限（boundary）。我将指出康德的该论点

有着他也许并未料到的意外后果：在将科学的（在根本意义上属于哲学的）先天

奠基同（非哲学的）经验科学区分开来时，康德事实上为一种未来科学的新概念

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Parallel Sessions II:

The Future of Science in Kant’s Prolegomena Stephen R. Palmquist

The main purpose of Kant’s 1783 book, Prolegomena to Each and Every Future Metaphysics that will be able to Emerge as a Science, was to provide a simplified overview of the main arguments of his 1781 masterpiece, Critique of Pure Reason, so that students and teachers could more readily appreciate the ground-breaking implications of his transcendental idealism for metaphysics. In the process of repackaging his theoretical system by replacing the Critique’s (allegedly) “synthetic method” with what he now describes as an “analytic method”, Kant not only clarifies the crucial role of the ideas of reason (God, freedom, and immortality) in the overall project, but he also perplexes many readers by seemingly skipping over the core of the original argument—i.e., the all-important role of the transcendental deduction of the categories.

In the process of working through the details of this main theme, Kant also develops a new theory of the nature of science itself that has gone largely unnoticed. Before explaining how metaphysics can now (in the wake of the first Critique) become a system of science by examining the practical implications of the ideas of reason in the moral realm—a future prediction that he himself attempted to fulfill just a few years later, in his 1788 book, Critique of Practical Reason—Kant first explains how and in what sense mathematics (especially Euclidean geometry) and natural science (especially Newtonian physics) have already established themselves as sciences. In short, Euclid and Newton (and any other purveyor of genuine science) introduced synthetic a priori precepts which, being imbedded in the formal structure of the human mind, are absolutely necessary for attaining any empirical knowledge whatsoever. What space and time (as forms of intuition) do for mathematics and what the table of categories (as forms of conception) do for natural science, the ideas of reason must do for metaphysics.

As is well known, the problem is that, whereas genuine (a priori) sciences generate determinate knowledge based on the limits of sensibility and/or understanding, metaphysics—thanks to the ideas—serves only as a boundary for reason’s application. A (perhaps unintended) side-effect of this argument, I shall argue, is that, by distinguishing the a priori grounding of science (which is fundamentally philosophical) from empirical science (which is not), Kant paves the way for a new conception of a future science that will not have the kind of absolute necessity attributed to Euclidean

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开辟了道路。这种科学将并不会具有欧几里得几何学和牛顿物理学被认为所具有

的那种绝对必然性，与此相反，它将会运用概率论的假设。由此，理性的理念将

作为调节性的工具来用于辨识超出现象世界的（由于过大或过小而无法被人类所

直接经验到的）经验的范围。换句话说，康德在其《导论》中所预示的未来的科

学，不论是其有意还是偶然为之，都与后康德时代里的种种重新定义了（正如我

们如今所理解的）自然界许多特征的观念革命的科学不谋而合。

“唯有批判之路尚通”

——康德对哲学的先验构想

Thomas Zwenger 展翼文译

（1）“批判”的概念是康德对于哲学的真正表述。它所指涉的并非哲学反思

的对象，而是哲学反思活动自身。批判便是哲学，而且只有批判可能是哲学。只

有批判的道路（Weg，古希腊语：μέϑοδος，方法）对哲学来说是可用的，而且它

只对哲学可用。这一批判的道路便是启蒙运动：理性存在者的自由解放与自我认

知。

（2）尽管针对哲学唯一可行的批判性的方法的断言仅仅出现在《纯粹理性批

判》的结尾，我们并不能由此认为，这一断言所涉及的只是该著作的理路所最终

导出的结果。恰恰相反，这一关键性评论完成了一种循环，它不仅为《纯粹理性

批判》，而且为所有三部批判乃至康德该时期思想中的哲学意图给出了规定。

（3）在哲学的开端，在所有论证出现之前，作为使任何哲学得以可能的预设，

存在着一种能够在思维中对思维的最终无条件的有效性的理由进行思考的信念

抑或“需要”。对柏拉图来说，这种信念是基于对两种认知模式的没有也无法进

一步进行解释的预设：这两种认知模式分别是需要数学辅助的“理性”διάνοια（如

同康德那里的知性认识）和参与辩证法的“智性活动”νόησις。而预设人类（或

至少是进行哲学思考的人）能够具有这种先天的知识则是成问题的，因为为此的

任何解释的尝试在形式上都将导致循环。众所周知地，不计其数的诠释者——尤

其是黑格尔，部分出于其自以为是的错误理解——由此对康德提出了批评。

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geometry and Newtonian physics, but will instead employ probabilistic hypotheses: reason’s ideas thereby serve as regulative tools to decipher realms of experience that transcend the phenomenal world, by being either too small or too large for human beings to experience directly. In other words, the future science that Kant prefigures in Prolegomena, whether by design or by accident, turns out to be the science of the various post-Kantian revolutions that have subsequently redefined many features of the natural world as we now think of it.

„Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen.“ –

Kant‘s transcendental conception of philosophy

Thomas Zwenger (1) Der Begriff der „Kritik“ ist Kants eigentlicher Ausdruck für die Philosophie. Er bezeichnet nicht den Gegenstand des philosophischen Nachdenkens, sondern seine Instanz. Kritik ist Philosophie und nur Kritik kann Philosophie sein. Allein der Weg – gr. μέϑοδος – der Kritik steht der Philosophie zur Verfügung, und er steht nur der Philosophie zur Verfügung. Dieser kritische Weg ist die Bewegung der Aufklärung: Befreiung und Selbsterkenntnis des Vernunftwesens.

(2) Obwohl die Behauptung der ausschließlich kritischen Methode der Philosophie am Ende der KrV steht, so darf man nicht glauben, dass es sich bei ihr um ein Ergebnis des Gedankengangs der Schrift handelt. Vielmehr schließt sich mit dieser wichtigen Bemerkung ein Kreis, der die philosophische Absicht nicht nur der KrV, sondern aller drei Kritiken, und darüber hinaus von Kants Denken in der Phase, die immer als seine „kritische“ gilt, bestimmt.

(3) Am Anfang, noch vor allem Argumentieren, steht als alle Philosophie überhaupt erst ermöglichende Annahme der Glaube daran, oder das „Bedürfnis“, im Denken der letzten unbedingten Geltungsgründe des Denkens sozusagen eingedenk sein zu können. Bei Platon war dies die unbegründete und nicht begründbare Annahme zweier Erkenntnismodi, der διάνοια, die – wie auch bei Kant als Verstandeserkenntnis – der Mathematik bedarf, und der νόησις, die Platon der Dialektik zuweist. Die Annahme, dass die Menschen, oder wenigstens die Philosophierenden über diese Art apriorisches Wissen verfügen, ist insofern problematisch, als jeder Versuch der Begründung formal in einen vitiösen Zirkel führt. Dies ist Kant bekanntlich von unzähligen Interpreten, nicht zuletzt ja auch von Hegel – teils mit besserwisserischem Unverständnis – vorgeworfen worden.

(4) Doch Kants Philosophieverständnis ist – erklärtermaßen – transzendentaler

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（4）然而，康德对哲学的理解——根据其明确的说法——是一种先验唯心

主义。这一理解是基于一种似乎是极为“久远”且基于情感的对“智性活动”ν

όησις 的基本预设。先验的概念是一种知识论概念，它用于指称将人类识别为理

性动物（ζῷον λόγον ἔχον，或者用康德的话来说：“理性存在者”）的那类认识。

因此，理性的概念是康德批判哲学中的核心概念。

（5）存在着大量的文献证据可以证明康德试图在思维中对理性的起源进行

描述。仅是在《纯粹理性批判》的《方法论》中他便给出了重要的然而在康德研

究中往往被忽略的线索。我的报告将恰好围绕着这一点展开：康德对先验哲学的

启蒙式的理念是基于自我意识、自由、和合理性的交互的反思性结构。这一“康

德的原初洞见”将会通过以下三位知名德国康德学者及他们所使用的特定概念来

得到说明：瓦格纳(Hans Wagner)所探讨的理性的反思性(Reflexivität)、考尔巴赫

(Friedrich Kaulbach)关于理性的视角性(Perspektivität)的学说、以及胡特(Axel

Hutter)对康德关于“理性的关切(Interesse)”和“理性的需求”(Bedürfnis)的论题

的精确刻画。

（6）最后，我将为一种对晚期现代的科学主义的重新启蒙进行总结性的辩

护：“唯有批判之路尚通”。

康德论可传达性 Ulrich Schlösser

在《判断力批判》中，康德将审美感受的可传达性与我们有能力传达认识这

一事实联系在一起。然而，在他简要回顾第一批评中的认识理论的时候，康德改

变了原先的证明方向，并且为他的一些最重要的定理（例如统觉，还有他关于综

合以及综合对于组合和关系而言的根本功能的主张）赋予了新的角色。在本文中，

我将重构康德关于认识的可传达性的观点，并尝试表明，在哪些方面它是与一种

温和的唯心论联系在一起的。

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Idealismus, der auf eben der gleichsam „unvordenklichen“, gefühlsmäßigen Grundannahme der νόησις beruht. Der Begriff des Transzendentalen ist ein erkennntistheoretischer Begriff, der diejenige Erkenntnisart bezeichnet, die den Menschen als ζῷον λόγον ἔχον – in Kantischer Sprechweise als „Vernunftwesen“ – auszeichnet. Der Vernunftbegriff ist daher das zentrale Konzept in Kants kritischer Philosophie.

(5) Es gibt eine Fülle von Belegstellen, an denen Kant versucht, die Genese der Vernunft im Denken zu beschreiben, und gerade die Methodenlehre der KrV liefert wichtige, in der Kantforschung oft vernachlässigte Hinweise. In meinem Vortrag geht es mir genau um diesen Punkt: Kants aufklärerische Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie beruht auf wechselweisen reflexiven Strukturen von Selbstbewusstsein, Freiheit und Rationalität. Diese „ursprüngliche Einsicht Kants“ wird anhand von drei namhaften deutschen Kantforschern mit ihren besonderen Begrifflichkeiten erläutert: Hans Wagners Vorstellung von der Reflexivität der Vernunft, sodann Friedrich Kaulbachs Lehre von der Perspektivität der Vernunft, und schließlich Axel Hutters präzise Nachzeichnung der Kantischen These vom „Interesse“ bzw. „Bedürfnis der Vernunft“.

(6) Am Ende steht ein Plädoyer für eine erneuerte Aufklärung angesichts des spätmodernen Szientismus: „Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen.“

Kant on Communicability Ulrich Schlösser

In his Critique of Judgment, Kant relates the communicability of aesthetic feeling to the fact that we are in a position to communicate cognitions. In his sketchy references back to the theory of cognition in the first Critique, however, Kant alters the original direction of proof and attributes a new role to some of his most important theorems, e.g. to apperception and to his claims about synthesis and its foundational function for composition and relation. In this paper, I will reconstruct Kant’s views on the communicability of cognitions and try to show in what respect it is tied to a moderate form of idealism.

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“自然更知道…”：康德历史哲学中人性的二律背反 Martin Moors

我的报告聚焦在“自然目标”（aim of Nature）这个理念（idea），康德以这个

理念作为反思的指导原则来尝试理解普遍历史。这个理念在至少五个哲学思考领

域中具有多重面向的重要性，且在其中实现一个进程：

第一，“这个理念毕竟可以给我们充当导线，来至少在宏观上把人的行为的一

个通常没有计划的集合展示为一个系统。”（《关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史

的理念》 8:29）这与纯粹理性的建筑术（the Architectonic of pure reason）一致

（《纯粹理性批判》 B860 ff）。第二，这个理念为实现最高的政治上的善（论永

久和平）提供保证。（《论永久和平》附录一 8:360 ff）第三，人类事务进程中的

自然之机械的安排，与自然的目的论相结合。（这与目的论判断力的批判一致）

第四，有了“自然目标”(aim of Nature)这个理念，“将打开一幅令人欣慰的未来

远景（不预设一项自然计划，人们就不能有根据地抱此希望！）”。（这为康德的希

望哲学提供一个必要的衬底，而无须将“希望”完全转换至来世。）第五，“自然

目标”（aim of Nature）这个理念支撑着教育哲学。也就是说，这个理念引导着教

育上不同层级的努力，让“那些旨在运用其理性的自然禀赋得到全然且有目标地

发展”。（《关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念 8:18》）（在康德的教育学

及实用人类学中有详细说明）

然而，从哲学的观点来说，更加吸引人的是，“自然目标”这个理念令人困惑

难解的构成。在人类事务规定性的进程上，“自然目标”结合了自然盲目而隐藏

的机制（“自然蛮横地想要…”，《论永久和平》 8:364）；“自然更知道…”（《关于

一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念》命题四 8:21），偕同公共法权之理性的规

定命令（世界公民主义）。这方面的核心议题是如何将自然（神意，命运）和人

自然（human nature）结合起来，特别是考虑到在二者之中皆起作用的“禀赋”

（predisposition）。总的来说，我认为这个难题有着二律背反的形式，即人性的二

律背反。在反思模式的批判中，正题表现为“自然的约束意志”（Nature’s

constraining will）；而在规定模式的批判中，反题则表现为“人被道德约束的意

志”（man’s morally constrained will）。为解决这个二律背反，不同的模型可以而

且已经被提出。第一个模型是本体论的，将自然的“实然”（is）带入与道德的“应

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“Nature knows better …”:

the antinomy of humanity in Kant’s philosophy of history Martin Moors

My presentation focusses on the idea of ‘aim of Nature’ by which Kant attempts as with a guideline for reflection to work out universal world history. The idea has a multi-faced significance within at least five domains of philosophical thought in which it realizes an advancement: first, “this idea should serve us as a guiding thread for exhibiting an otherwise planless aggregate of human actions, at least in the large, as a system”( Idea 8: 29) (which accords with the Architectonic of pure reason in Critique of pure Reason B 860 ff); second, the idea affords a guarantee of achieving the highest political good, perpetual peace (as argued in the First Supplement of Towards perpetual Peace, 8: 360ff); third, Nature’s mechanic arrangement in the course of human affairs becomes united with a teleological doctrine of nature (which is fitting with Critique of teleological Judgment); four, with the idea of aim of Nature “there will be opened a consoling prospect into the future (which without a plan of nature one cannot hope for with any ground)” (Idea 8: 30) (herewith is a necessary underlay provided for Kant’s philosophy of hope without transferring this hope exclusively to another world); five, the idea of aim of Nature underpins the philosophy of education. This idea leads, namely, the educational stratified effort to bring all “those predispositions whose goal is the use of reason to develop completely and purposively.” (Idea 8: 18) (elaborated in Kant’s Lectures on Pedagogy and his Anthropology from a pragmatic Point of View)

More intriguing from a philosophical viewpoint, is, however, the rather puzzling constitution of this key-idea of ‘aim of Nature’. The latter conjoins, namely, Nature’s blind and secret mechanism in the determined course of human affairs (cf. “Nature despotically willed” (Perpetual Peace 8: 364); “Nature knows better” (Idea, 4th Prop. 8: 21)), with reason’s determining imperatives of Public Right (cosmopolitanism). A hard core issue in this regard is how to bring Nature (Providence, Fate) in union with ‘human nature’, especially with regard to the predispositions that are in the play at both sides. All in all, to my contention, the riddle takes the form of an antinomy – the antinomy of humanity – in which the thesis represents – in the modus of reflective judgment - Nature’s constraining will, the antithesis represents – in the modus of determinative judgment - man’s morally constrained will. Various models can/has be figured out to bring this antinomy to a solution. A first model is ontological. It consists in bringing the ‘is’ of Nature into an ontological unity with the ‘ought’ of morality and vice versa. A second model is built upon the (Hegelian) metaphor of cunning, in casu the cunning of Nature. We will finally assess these attempts negatively. The following proposal seems more promising: to think a symphusis (Kaulbach) of Nature and human

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然”（ought）的本体论合一之中，反过来也是一样。第二个模型则建立在黑格尔

式的机巧之隐喻，在这里指的是：自然的机巧。我们最终将给予这些尝试消极的

评价。以下是比较好的提议：考虑自然（Nature）和人自然（human nature）作为

一个 symphusis （symphusis 是 Kaulbach 所提出的概念）。为此我们必须清楚解

释：第一，在人自然（human nature）中，“人”作为形容词如何转变“自然”。第

二，在 symphusis 中，“人自然”的“人性”（the humanity of human nature）如何

与“自然”（Nature）整合成为一体。

人类学对于康德伦理学的意义邓安庆

人类学对于康德哲学具有重大的意义，这是毋容置疑的。康德在提出：“我能

知道什么（形而上学）”，“我应该做什么（道德）”，“我可以希望什么（宗教）”，

和最终“人是什么（人类学）”这样四个哲学问题时，不仅把哲学归结为“人是

什么”这个人类学问题，而且同时也把所有这些问题都归结为人类学：“我们可

以把所有这些都称之为人类学，因为前三个问题都与最后问题相联系。”（Kant,

Logik, Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen, AA Bd. 9, S.25）在《道德形而上学奠基》的

“前言”中，他依据斯多亚派的哲学分类把整个哲学分为“逻辑学、物理学和伦

理学”三门学科，提出了一个相对于“物理学”的“伦理学”概念，物理学研究

自然的因果性（必然），而伦理学研究自由的因果性。这样的伦理学又有一个纯

粹的部分，即纯粹的 Moral/道德哲学或者 Mataphysik der Sitten,和一个经验的部

分，叫作 die praktische Anthropologie(实践的人类学)。但是，这两个部分如果同

人类学相联系起来看，究竟是什么关系呢？既然全部四个哲学问题，包括回答“我

能知道什么的形而上学或知识论”都能属于人类学，那么作为研究道德性/伦理

性之最高原则的 Mataphysik der Sitten 却不能属于人类学？康德明确地回答，不

能！在这里，我们必须问，为什么？不是几乎所有的伦理学都说，伦理学既然是

研究人类如何过好生活，如何做才是对的，难道不需要建立在人性，建立在出于

人的本性的（die menschliche Natur aus dem Menschen 的人类学知识基础上吗？

康德断然地对此做出了否定性地回答：“所有的道德哲学完全建立在它的纯粹部

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nature. For this we will have to clearly define, first, how the adjective ‘human’ transfigures ‘nature’, and, second, how in symphusis with Nature the humanity of human nature is consistently integrated.

What does Anthropology mean to Kant’s Ethics?

DENG Anqing Translated by NI Yicai Doubtless is the anthropology of vital importance to Kant’s philosophy. When Kant raises the four fundamental philosophical questions: What can I know? (metaphysics) What should I do? (morality) What may I hope? (religion) What is the human being? (anthropology) He not only ascribes the philosophy to the anthropological question “what is the human being”, but also ascribes all these questions to the anthropology:

Fundamentally man could count all these to the anthropology, in that the first three questions are related to the last one. Im Grunde könnte man aber alles dieses zur Anthropologie rechnen, weil sich die drei ersten Fragen auf die letzte beziehen. (Logik. AA IX: 25)

In the preface of Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Kant divides the philosophy into three disciplines as “logics, physics, and ethics” following the stoic division of philosophy. There Kant comes up with the idea of an “ethics” contra “physics”. Physics deals with the causality of nature (necessity), while ethics handles the causality of freedom. There is a pure part (pure moral philosophy, or metaphysics of morals) as well as an empirical part (the practical anthropology) of such an ethics. However, how should we understand these two parts concerning the general anthropology? All the four questions (including the metaphysics or epistemology answering “what can I know”) can be ascribed to the anthropology, why would the metaphysics of morals concerning the highest principle of morality as well as ethicality be left aside then?

Kant’s answer would definitely be that the metaphysics of morals cannot be ascribed to the anthropology. However, nearly all kinds of ethics are concerned with the problem of living a good life and doing right things, would it still be possible that ethics is not based upon the humanity as well as the anthropological knowledge of “the human nature from the human being” (die menschliche Natur aus dem Menschen)? Kant rejects such challenges:

… but all moral philosophy is based entirely on its pure part; and when it is applied to the human being it does not borrow the least thing from acquaintance with him (from anthropology) but gives to him, as a rational being, laws a priori… … sondern alle Moralphilosophie beruht gänzlich auf ihrem reinen Theil, und auf

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分上，当应用于人类时，它不仅不需要从关于人的知识（人类学）借用丝毫东西，

反而给予作为理性存在者的人以先天的法则”（GMS, 4: 389）。一个基本的原因就

在于，康德看到了所有伦理学由于没有严格区分其纯粹部分和经验部分，即没有

严格地在纯粹道德哲学部分清除掉人类学、心理学等经验的、情感的因素，而导

致出一个不可忍受的混杂性，使得伦理学无法建立起纯粹的道德性/伦理性的最

高原则/标准，无法阐明道德的义务为何具有绝对的命令性和无条件的约束力。

就此而言，如果非要问，人类学对于纯粹道德哲学有何意义，那么就只能有一种

否定性的意义：只有完全清除和排除道德哲学对于任何人类学知识的借用，才可

能阐明伦理法则为何既是自由的法则，却有具体无条件地践行的必然性。

但另一方面，伦理学却又具有一个经验性的部分，即实践的人类学，也就是

说，丝毫不借用人类学知识的道德形而上学所确立的“先天的道德法则”却必须

运用到人性和人的伦理生活中，才能形成“实践的人类学”：“虽然纯粹的道德学

说不可奠基于人类学之上，它却能够甚至必须被应用于人类学”（Vgl. MdS,

Einleitung in die Metaph, d. Sitten II, 6: 217）。《伦理形而上学》被视为纯粹道德原

则的应用领域，康德在这里做出了第二个伦理学概念，即不再相对于物理学，而

是相对于“法权论”的德性论伦理学概念：“伦理学不为行为立法（因为那是法

学的事），而只是为行为的准则立法。”( MdS, Einleitung zur Tugendlehre, IV, 6: 388)。

德性论阐述的是道德原则应用于一般人性条件（condition humana）而形成的各种

义务的学说，最终成就出一个自由的德性人格，使人具有人格尊严的人本身，这

一部分显然是“实践的人类学”没有问题。但是，法权论（Rechtslehre）虽然康

德也把它称之为“伦理学的第一部分”，但如果我们严格地按照德性论伦理学概

念，常常并不把它算做伦理学，那么，它能够成为“实践的人类学”吗？在我的

这个报告中，试图按照康德的前一个伦理学概念，即相对于“物理学”的伦理学

概念，为其作为伦理生活中的法权人类学而辩护。完成了这一辩护，那么康德的

实践人类学对于伦理学的肯定性意义就能呈现出来。

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den Menschen angewandt, entlehnt sie nicht das mindeste von der Kenntniß desselben (Anthropologie), sondern giebt ihm, als vernünftigem Wesen, Gesetze a priori… (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. AA IV: 389)

According to Kant, all kinds of foregoing ethics fail to make the clear distinction between the pure and empirical parts within themselves, and to eliminate the empirical and emotional elements from the pure moral philosophy. Their failure lead to an unbearable complexity that further fails the ethics to establish the highest principle/standard of pure morality/ethicality, neither to clarify the absolute imperative and unconditioned obligation of moral duties. The anthropology has merely negative sense to pure moral philosophy: Only when the moral philosophy could totally get rid of borrowing anthropological knowledge, would it be possible to clarify why the ethical laws as laws of freedom have their unconditioned necessities to be conducted.

However, there is still an empirical part of ethics, namely, the practical anthropology. The practical anthropology is possible, only when the “moral laws a priori”, established by the metaphysics of morals not borrowing any anthropological knowledge, are applied into the humanity and the human ethical life.

This is to say, in effect, that a metaphysics of morals cannot be based upon anthropology but can still be applied to it.

Das will so viel sagen als: eine Metaphysik der Sitten kann nicht auf Anthropologie gegründet, aber doch auf sie angewandt werden. (Metaphysik der Sitten. AA VI: 217)

Kant considers his Metaphysics of Morals (1797) as the sphere for the application of pure moral principles. Here Kant gives his second idea of ethics, namely, a virtue ethics contra “the doctrine of right” instead of physics.

Ethics does not give laws for actions (ius does that), but only for maxims of actions. Die Ethik giebt nicht Gesetze für die Handlungen, sondern nur für die Maximen der Handlungen. (Metaphysik der Sitten. AA VI: 389)

The doctrine of virtue (Tugendlehre) is concerned with different kinds of duties produced by the application of moral principle into the general human conditions (condition humana). It is to generate a virtuous personality of freedom, the human being with dignity of personality, making the doctrine of virtue a “practical anthropology”. What about the doctrine of right (Rechtslehre) then? It seems incompatible with the role of ethics following the mode of virtue ethics, albeit Kant still takes it as “the first part of ethics”. Could the doctrine of right become a “practical anthropology” then? I would defend an anthropology of right in ethical life according to Kant’s first idea of ethics contra physics. The positive sense of Kant’s anthropology to his ethics could only be revealed through the defence as such.

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康德的政治哲学

——一个关乎言说和行动的方案

方博

汉娜·阿伦特在 1970 年的关于康德的政治哲学的讲座以这样的一个判断开

始：康德从未写过一部政治哲学。这一判断似乎已经被当代众多的关于康德的政

治哲学的研究文献直接反驳了。但这里有三个需要指明的事实：1，以罗尔斯为

代表的当代政治哲学对康德要素的重新激活，主要倚重的是后者的道德哲学的方

法；2，当代关于康德的政治哲学的研究所针对的主要是他在《权利学说》中所

阐发的权利的形而上学（法哲学）；3，阿伦特的判断基于这样一个前提之上：她

并不认可《权利学说》具有严肃的理论价值。当代关于《权利学说》的研究文献

已经反驳了阿伦特的这一前提，但阿伦特的判断仍然给我们提出了这样一个问题：

在康德那里是否存在一个不能等同于他的法哲学的政治哲学方案？

康德在《论所谓出自好意的说谎的权利》和《论永久和平》中明确提出了他

自己的政治概念，政治是“践行的权利学说”，是“将权利概念应用于经验情况”

的实践。是否可以基于这一政治的概念之上去构建一个康德的政治哲学方案？阿

伦特对康德的政治哲学的重构很显然并不基于其上，对《权利学说》的轻视使得

她所理解的政治背离了权利的优先性原则并因此失去了对现代政治的权利基础

的把握。但康德研究中的另一个极端是，将政治理解为对权利原则的机械应用，

并因此否认了政治哲学在康德体系中的可能性。但如果我们注意到康德的法哲学

所具有的形式主义特征，就将明了权利原则在经验中的实践不可能仅仅是机械的

应用，因为这样的应用预设了一个完备的规则体系，但这恰恰是作为形而上学的

法哲学所不可能提供的。而黑格尔对康德的道德哲学的形式主义的批判实际上也

揭示了康德意义上的政治必须解决的两个层次的问题：1，如何将形式的权利原

则转化为包含有内容的行动规则？2，如何将应然的规则转化为现实的规则？在

康德的语境内，这实际上指向了政治共同体之内持续的政治改良是如何可能的问

题。因此康德意义上的政治哲学如果存在的话，其主题只能是对使得持续的政治

改良成为可能的一般性条件的探究。而对此康德在他的文本中已经提供丰富的理

论资源，借此我们也得以构建一个康德的政治哲学方案，其核心概念包括共通感、

公共性、公共理性、公共参与启蒙等等。这些概念并不能在康德的作为形而上学

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Kant’s Political Philosophy

A Program about Speech and Action Bo Fang

Hannah Arendt’s lecture on Kant’s political philosophy in 1970 began with a judgment that Kant never wrote a political philosophy. This judgment seems to have been directly invalidated by the numerous contemporary literature on Kant’s political philosophy. However, there are three facts to be pointed out: 1. The reactivation of Kant’s elements in contemporary political philosophy, especially represented by John Rawls, relies mainly on the method of Kant’s moral philosophy. 2. Contemporary studies on Kant’s political philosophy almost exclusively refer to his philosophy of right elaborated in the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals, i.e., the Doctrine of Right. 3. Arendt’s judgment is based on a premise that she underestimated the theoretical value of Kant’s Doctrine of Right. This premise has been refuted by contemporary literature on Doctrine of Right, but Arendt’s judgment still raise an interesting question: Is it possible to construct a political philosophy of Kant which is not equivalent to his philosophy of right?

In Toward Perpetual Peace and On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, Kant explicitly put forward his own concept of politics. Politics is defined as “ausübende Rechtslehre” or the practice that applies the concept of right to empirical cases. Arendt’s reconstruction of Kant’s political philosophy is obviously not based on Kant’s own concept of politics. Her contempt for Kant’s Doctrine of Right makes her understanding of politics deviate from the principle of priority of right, and thus lack of an important characteristics of modern politics, i.e., its relation to human basic rights. The other extreme in Kant studies is, however, to understand politics as a merely mechanical application of principles of right and thus deny the possibility of political philosophy in Kant’s system. But if we notice the formalistic character of the principles of right, it will be clear that the practice of these principles in experience cannot be a mechanical application, because such an application presupposes a system of rules for action, which is exactly what the philosophy of right as metaphysics cannot provide. Hegel’s critique of the formalism of Kant’s moral philosophy has also revealed the problem at two levels that Kant’s politics must solve: 1. How to transform the a priori principles of right into rules for action that also contain empirical content? 2. How to promote the reasonable rules to be enacted by the actual legislation? In Kant’s context, this further refers to the question of how the continuous political reform in political community is possible. Therefore, if there could be a Kant’s political philosophy, it must be the exploration of the general conditions that make continuous political reform possible. In this regard, Kant has provided in his texts sufficient theoretical resources, in light of which we can construct a program of political philosophy which includes

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的法哲学中进行处理，但它们对于权利的实践，即先天的权利原则在经验中的实

现毫无疑问具有重要的意义，并构成了康德关于人的外在自由的学说的不可或缺

的一部分。

康德的“自在之物学说”与人类未来王建军

康德哲学的核心思想无疑是其现象与自在之物学说。这一学说虽然遭到后世

哲学家的批判与超越，但这并不影响其自身的真理性。历史已经证明了它对现代

西方哲学的广泛影响。并且更为重要的是，以今天的眼光来看，它在诸多基础领

域直接关乎人类未来的命运。

首先，就认识领域而言，自在之物学说揭示了人类认识的限度。这同时也是

真理的限度。这种对认识限度的揭示看上去只具有消极的意义。但就它真实地反

映了人类认识的内在机制而言，它对于人类如何摆正其真理的位置无疑具有极为

深远的意义。哲学中的真理观种类繁多。有些真理理论往往使人们陷入不必要的

狂热主义之中。实际上，根据康德的自在之物学说，我们所能认识的只是对象的

一些外部关系。我们只能认识自在之物在我们的感官上所留下的效果。这一结论

对于我们今天如何看待人工智能的认识具有一定的启发意义：即，既然认识的本

质只是一定的效果，那么，人类认识与人工智能在认识上的差别只能以效果上的

优劣为判别标准。

其次，就德性论而言，自在之物学说为实践的自由确立了基础性地位。并且

它在此基础上为理性的立法张目。康德在德性论部分强调自由是道德法则的存在

根据，而道德法则则是善恶概念的根据。由此他将对象的善恶与对象的有用性完

全区分了开来。这种区分的意义在于它一方面防止了实践理性的神秘主义，另一

方面也防止了实践理性的经验主义。前者会导致道德的狂热主义，后者则会以幸

福之名将德性给连根拔除。康德认为经验主义是德性论中的最大敌人，而他的义

务论则是这种幸福论的天敌。人类的未来在道德领域必将获得长足的进步，但其

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sensus communis, publicity, public reason and enlightenment as its core concepts. These concepts cannot be dealt with in Kant’s metaphysics of right, but they undoubtedly have important significance for the practice of right, i.e., the realization of the a priori principles of right in experience, and therefore constitute an indispensable part of Kant’s theory of human external freedom.

Kant’s Theory of Things-in-themselves and the Future of Mankind

Jianjun Wang The core idea of Kant's philosophy is undoubtedly its doctrine of things-in-themselves. Although this doctrine has been widely criticized, and “surpassed” by many later philosophers, it does not affect the truth of itself. It has been proved that it has exerted widespread influences on the modern Western philosophy. More importantly, from today’s perspective, it has something to do directly to the future of human beings in many basic fields.

Firstly, in terms of the field of cognition, the doctrine of things-in-themselves reveals the limits of human understanding. This is also the limit of truth. This revelation of the limits of understanding seems to have only a negative meaning. As far as it truly reflects the internal mechanism of human cognition, however, it undoubtedly has far-reaching significance for human beings how to position his truth. There are many kinds of theories of truth in philosophy and some of them often lead people to unnecessary fanaticism. In fact, according to Kant’s doctrine of things-in-themselves, what we can understand is just some external relations of the objects. We can only understand the effects that things-in-themselves left in our senses. This conclusion might have some enlightening significance for us to think about the artificial intelligence today, i.e. since the essence of cognition is only a certain effect, then the difference of cognition between human beings and artificial intelligences can only be judged according to such effects.

Secondly, as far as the theory of virtue is concerned, the doctrine of things-in-themselves has established a basic position for the freedom of practice. On this basis, it promotes the momentum for legislation of reason. Kant emphasizes in his theory of virtue, that freedom is the existential ground for the moral law, while moral laws are the ground of the concept of good and evil. Thus, he strictly distinguishes the good of the objects from the usefulness of the objects. The significance of this distinction lies in that it prevents the mysticism of practical reason on the one hand and the empiricism of practical reason on the other. The former would lead to moral fanaticism, according to him, while the latter would remove virtue from the roots in the name of happiness. Kant believes that empiricism is the greatest enemy in the theory of virtue, and his theory of obligation is the natural enemy of this kind of theories that are oriented to

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前进的方向只能以康德的义务论为基础，而不能一而再以滑向幸福论的老路上去。

康德的道德哲学无疑为未来社会的一切道德的改善与促进指明了重要的方向。

再次，就法权论而言，康德对占有、获得等基础概念进行了深入的考察。他

还对私人法权和公共法权进行了细致的探讨。由此，他将外在的自由（政治和法

权的自由）限定在理性的法则之下，从而为普遍法治社会（公民社会）的正当性

进行了哲学的论证。康德之所强调要建立普遍法治社会，其根本目的是为了实现

“永久和平”的政治理念。这一理念对于时时受到核战争威胁并有可能导致人类

文明彻底毁灭的现代社会来说具有重要的现实意义。

最后，康德的自在之物学说也是对宗教的拯救。传统宗教在现代科学的冲击

下不断受到挑战，并且面临着巨大的生存危机。康德从人的“根本恶”之不可根

本消除的角度，指出了宗教对于驯服人类恶的本性所具有重要意义。这是对上帝

存在的道德的证明，并且也是目前唯一可能的证明。虽然这样的上帝失去了传统

意义上作为世界创造者的上帝的位置，但通过这种证明，上帝的地位却由于它与

人的伦理生活世界的密切联系而得到了加强。这或许也是教会作为“伦理共同体”

而在以科学为主导的现代社会能够与科学并行不悖的根本原因。由于人的根本恶

永远无法消除，因此宗教在未来社会也必须继续存在下去。

总之，康德提出的自在之物学说，从理论领域和实践领域都会对人类的利益

起到重要的维护、而不是损害的作用。因此康德十分珍视这一学说，并把它上升

到启蒙的高度。他认为真正的启蒙就是要让后世接受人类理性的有限性、接受自

在之物不可知这一具有消极性的结论。

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happiness. In the future of mankind it would surely make great progress in the field of morality, but the direction of its advancement can only be based on Kant’s theory of obligation, and it cannot be repeated on the old road of happiness any longer. Kant’s moral philosophy undoubtedly points out an important direction for the improvement and promotion of all morality in the future society.

Thirdly, as far as the theory of rights is concerned, Kant conducts an in-depth examination of the basic concepts of possession and acquisition. He also conducts a detailed discussion of private and public rights. Thus, he limits the external freedom (the freedom of politics and rights) to the laws of reason, and thus he makes a philosophical argument for the universal state of the rule of law (civil society). The purpose of Kant’s emphasis on the establishment of such universal state of the rule of law is to realize the political idea of “permanent peace”. This idea has its realistic significance for modern societies, which are often threatened by the nuclear wars that may lead to the complete destruction of human civilization.

Finally, Kant’s doctrine of things-in-themselves is also a rescue of religion. Traditional religion is constantly challenged under the impact of modern science and faces a huge crisis of survival. From the perspective of the impossibility of elimination of the “radical evils” of human beings, Kant points out that religion has an important significance for taming the evil nature of human beings. This is a moral proof of God’s existence and it might be the only possible proof of God at present. Although the God proved in such a way has lost its position as the creator of the world in the traditional sense, through this proof, however, the status of God has been reinforced by its close connection with the ethical life of human beings. This might be the very cause that the churches, as “ethical communities”, can go hand in hand with the modern, science-led society today. Since the radical evil of human beings can never be eliminated, religion must continue to exist in future societies.

In short, Kant’s doctrine of things-in-themselves, from the theoretical field to practical field, will definitely play an important role in safeguarding, but not in impairing, the interests of human beings. Therefore, Kant himself cherishes this doctrine and raises it to the height of enlightenment. He believes that the real enlightenment is to let the later generations accept such a negative conclusion that the nature of human reason is limited and the things-in-themselves are unknowable.

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康德“理性建筑术”的两种模型

丁三东

虽然研究者们对康德“理性建筑术”的构想多有批评或者干脆忽视，但康德

本人却非常看重它，把它视为人类理性的本性。深入康德文本，具体分析“理性

建筑术”的理念、图型和喻像，可以厘清康德这一构想中蕴含的“先天划分”（按

照确定的原则对“全体的轮廓”进行不多不少的划分）和“内在生长”（从初始

的元素或状态发展出其后的元素或状态）两种模型，以及它们各自的哲学史脉络。

而基于当代哲学的有关立场，也可以发现康德这一构想的限度。理性建筑术要求

体系的封闭性和内在目的性，它并不适用于充满偶然性的开放体系。

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Two Patterns in Kant’s Conception of Architectonic of Pure Reason

Ding Sandong While scholars either criticize Kant’s conception of ‘architectonic of pure reason’ or totally neglect it, Kant himself regards it as an important idea, for human reason is by nature architectonic. This paper. based on a detailed reading of Kant’s original text, discusses the idea, the schema, and the images of ‘architectonic of pure reason’, distinguishes two patterns in Kant’s conception of ‘architectonic’ and their respective philosophical context. In the end, this paper, based on certain contemporary perspectives, discusses the limitation of Kant’s conception

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分组会议（三）：

目的与自由：公共性视域中的康德自律概念

卞绍斌

康德式自律观念长期以来被看做捍卫个体自主和独立价值的重要理论来源，

其中彰显的主体性哲学意向和形式性特征由此遭遇诸多批评。这也导致，尽管康

德被看做现代自律观念的开创者，自律观念也是康德的重要思想遗产，但是围绕

这一观念的论争始终未停歇。在我们看来，种种误解和批评的源头在于未能充分

厘清并呈现康德自律概念的公共性思想维度，特别是公共自律所指向的普遍平等

自由价值，由此导致相关论证或者偏向程序性的法则规范，或者强调个体自主特

质，使得康德哲学无法成为道德和政治证成的恰当思想资源。

实际上，自 1760 年代阅读卢梭的著作开始，康德不断意识到经由联合意志

确立普遍法则进而造就理想共同体并保障自由价值的重要性。理性存在者通过纯

粹实践理性或先天立法意志确立普遍道德法则，一方面能够免除自己和他人的感

官偏好的制约，另一方面可以确保每个人的自由与所有其他人的自由基于法则的

契合一致，从而通过普遍自由法则避免屈从于感官任性和他人意志，这是康德公

共自律观念蕴含的根本价值旨趣，也是其时康德走出经验主义和唯理论实践哲学

影响的重要思想契机。

公共自律后来成为康德构建其思想体系最为核心的概念之一，在 1780 年代

的《道德形而上学奠基》、《实践理性批判》以及同时期的历史哲学著作和自然法

讲义中得到丰富阐发，并且进一步扩展到 1790 年代的《判断力批判》以及《纯

然理性界限内的宗教》《理论与实践》《道德形而上学》《永久和平》等系列著作

中，成为破解审美判断、自然目的、道德宗教以及政治难题的锁钥。基于公共自

律的思想视域，自然和自由的分离与融合才能得到真正理解；唯有基于公共自律

的视域，才能恰当阐明康德在《纯粹理性批判》中意图建立的裁决纷争的“理性

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Parallel Sessions III:

End and Freedom: Kant’s Conception of Autonomy

from the Perspective of Publicity Bian Shaobin

The Kantian conception of autonomy has long been regarded as an important theoretical source for justifying individual autonomy and independent value. The subjective philosophical intentions and formal characteristics of it have received many criticisms. This also led to the fact that although Kant was regarded as the pioneer of modern conception of autonomy and the conception of autonomy was the important intellectual legacy of Kant, the debate surrounding this conception has not conclusion. In my point of view, the source of all kinds of misunderstandings and criticisms is that they fail to fully clarify and explain the public dimension of Kant’s concept of autonomy, especially the value of universal equal freedom pointed out by public autonomy, which leads to emphasis on the procedural law or individual’s self-legislation, then makes Kant's philosophy unable to become a proper intellectual resource for moral and political justification.

In fact, after reading Rousseau's work since the 1760s, Kant has continued to realize the importance of establishing universal law through united will to create an ideal community and protect free value. The rational beings establish universal moral laws through pure practical reason or a priori legislative will, on the one hand, they can exempt the control of sensual inclination from themselves and others, and on the other hand, they can ensure that everyone’s free choice can be co-exist with all others’ free choice in accordance with the universal law, then avoid everyone subject to the sensual choice and the arbitrary will of others through the universal law of freedom, which is the fundamental value of Kant’s conception of public autonomy, and it is also an important thinking moment for Kant to step out of the influence of practice philosophy based on empiricism and rationalism.

Public autonomy later became one of the most central concepts for Kant’s construction of his thought system. It was extensively elucidated in books written in the 1780s, such as “Groundwork for Moral Metaphysics”, “Critique of Practical Reason”, and the writings on historical philosophy and lectures on natural right at the same time. And it was further expanded in the series of “Critique of Power of Judgment” and “Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason”, “Theory and Practice”, “Moral Metaphysics” and “Toward Perpetual Peace" in the 1790s, and became the guidance to

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answer the questions on the judgment of taste, natural purpose, moral religion and

法庭”；由此也能够对康德不同时期的思想文本及其根本致思取向做融贯一致地

解读，呈现康德所倾注于确立并捍卫“人的权利”进而反对专制的思想进路。

正是基于公共自律，康德才最终确证伦理义务和法权义务合法性前提，也才

真正明晰基于普遍法则达至最大程度全体自由这一人类根本目的的理想目标，纯

然实践理性、普遍法则、自由理念、人格中的人性目的与目的王国建构理想方能

契合一致，进而成为伦理和政治共同体建构的精神价值前提。换句话说，康德的

法权学说与其整个思想建构的精神实质是契合一致的，那就是通过联合的意志

（公共自律）确立普遍性道德法则（分别呈现为伦理义务和法权义务），进而确

证每个人和所有其他人一道平等享有普遍的自由价值。这是康德学说指向的最终

目的，也由此规定着人类的崇高使命。

对康德而言，基于公共自律基本前提进入公共法权状态乃是一种必须履行的

责任，这是康德证成公共法权的重要思想创造。不同于单纯的依据强力及其达至

的福利（共同善）来说明公共法权的充分必要性，康德强调主张法权的各方首先

考虑的是应该承担基于公共承认的相互责任，公共承认的基础在于要求各方经由

联合的意志而非单边的意图确立公共法权原则，该原则也是构成公民状态的前提

条件，也由此才能保障/确证每个人与其它所有人一样享有平等自由价值。因此，

经由公共承认理念，康德最终实现了平等自由、道德责任和普遍立法意志的紧密

契合，这也正是作为纯粹理性的源初契约观念的根本价值旨趣，而这同时也与其

先前提出的道德自律理念相互印证。

在此意义上，公共自律不仅是一种规范性的程序性法则，作为一种普遍意义

上的道德人格理想亦具本质主义规范内涵。其中蕴含基于纯然实践理性或普遍立

法意志确立普遍法则进而达至最大程度的平等自由价值，公共自律由此与源初契

约观念相互融贯并具有重大的政治意向。公共自律也与正义原则相互关联，成为

康德构建世界主义法权共同体的前提条件。

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political problems. Based on the perspective of public autonomy, the separation and integration between nature and freedom can be truly understood; we also can properly clarify the “court of reason” established for settling disputes in the “Critique of Pure Reason”. It is also able to interpret Kant’s thought texts and their fundamental thinking orientations in different periods in coherent ideal, and present Kant’s ambition for opposing despotism through determining and defending “rights of human being”.

Kant finally confirms the lawful premise of ethical and rightful duties based on public autonomy, and also truly clarifies the ideal goal for achieving the greatest degree freedom of all in accordance with universal law as fundamental purpose of human beings. Pure practical reason, universal law, the idea of freedom, the concept of humanity in person, and the ideal of constructing realm of ends can be consistent, and all of these become the spiritual value premise for the construction of ethical and political communities. In other words, Kant’s doctrine right is consistent with the spirit of his entire thought construction, that is, establishing universal moral law (represented as ethical and rightful duties) through the united will (public autonomy) , thus confirming that everyone share universal values of equal freedom. This is the final end of Kant’s doctrine toward, and just this end also determine the vocation of mankind.

For Kant, entering the state of public law based on the basic premise of public autonomy is a kind of responsibility that must be fulfilled. This is an important thought innovation of Kantian justification for public rights. Rather than simply expressing the full necessity of public right based on the strength and the welfare (common good) reached, Kant emphasizes that the parties who advocate the right should consider mutual responsibility based on public recognition firstly. The basis of public recognition is to require the parties to establish the principle of public right through united will rather than a unilateral intention. This principle is also a precondition for constituting civil state, and thus can confirm that everyone can enjoy the equal freedom. Therefore, Kant finally realized the coherence of equal freedom, moral responsibility and universal legislative will through the idea of public recognition, which is also the fundamental meaning of the idea of original contract as pure reason, and it can be also validated with the moral autonomy that Kant proposed earlier.

In this sense, public autonomy is not only a normative procedure, but also a essentialist normative value as a universal ideal of moral personality based on the purely practical reason or the universal legislative will for achieving the maximum value of equal freedom. The public autonomy which is coherent with the idea of original contract has significant political meaning. The public autonomy and the principle of justice are interrelated and become the preconditions for Kantian cosmopolitan rights.

The public dimension of the conception of Kant’s autonomy constitutes not only the basic thought premise of Kant’s moral and political justification, but also the fundamental thinking path and value orientation of Kant’s philosophy. Exploring the

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康德自律观念公共性向度不仅构成康德进行道德与政治证成的基本思想前

提，也是整个康德哲学的根本致思路径和价值指向。探询并呈现康德自律概念的

公共性维度及其蕴含的平等自由价值旨趣，不仅能够澄清误读并回应相关批评，

也在理清并阐明康德不同时期思想文本的基本价值取向上，为当代道德和政治证

成提供有益的思想资源。

理性的公共运用与世界公民的哲学

——对康德启蒙观的一种探究

杨云飞

本文尝试从理性的公共运用与思想意义上的世界公民理念之关联的角度，对

康德的启蒙观进行考察。康德把启蒙观念的核心阐释为每个人勇于独立思考，并

提出为了克服公权力和意识形态的扭曲等启蒙的障碍，需要确立公共地运用理性

之自由。理性的公共运用指任何一个人作为学者面向全体公众表达和阐释自身的

思想，其目的在于自由交流和寻求真理。对康德而言，理性的公共运用体现了每

个人都具备思想意义上的世界公民身份。对应于政治意义上的世界公民身份之相

应性质，思想意义上的世界公民的三种基本特征分别是：第一，以交流为旨趣；

第二，以自由讨论与理性争辩的手段追求真理（哲学事业中的永久和平）；第三，

以批判和自我批判实现理性的成熟这一最终目的。思想意义上的世界公民理念意

味着每个人都可以通过批判达到理性的成熟，而这正是康德批判哲学的构想。由

此可见，作为启蒙思想的典型，康德的批判哲学之实质，正是一种世界公民哲学。

这种哲学充分凸显了人作为理性存在者之自由思想的本性和平等的特质。“勇于

求知”的启蒙口号，或许也可以改写为“勇于成为世界公民”。

法权论是否属于康德的道德形而上学？

——兼论康德在政治与道德之间的区分

孙小玲

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public dimension of Kant’s concept of autonomy and implications of equal freedom, we can clarify misunderstanding and then respond to relevant criticism, highlight the basic value through all of Kant’s texts in different periods, then provides inspiring source of thought for contemporary moral and Political justification.

The public use of reason and a philosophy for world citizen:

An inquiry into Kant’s idea of enlightenment YANG Yunfei

The aim of this paper is to explore Kant’s idea of enlightenment by connecting the public use of reason with the very idea of a philosophy for world citizen. The ability to make use of one’s understanding independently is described by Kant as the essential character of an enlightened man. According to Kant, what is required to achieve enlightenment is the freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters, which basically means that everyone can express himself and communicate with each other freely in a public area. This public use of reason signifies that every man is entitled to be a world citizen in a philosophical sense. Being symmetrical to the citizenship of world citizen in a political sense, this philosophical version of cosmopolitan citizenship consists in three main features: 1) communication as its basic right; 2) seeking truth or seeking perpetual peace in philosophy by reasoning and argumentation; 3) to achieve the maturity of reason as its ultimate end by critique. Since Kant’s critical philosophy, which itself constitutes a typical approach of thinking toward enlightenment, aims at the maturity of reason as well, it could be properly understood as a philosophy for world citizen. A Kantian philosophy for world citizen explicitly demonstrates human beings as free and equal thinkers. If such a philosophy for world citizen embodies what is essential for enlightenment, then the motto of enlightenment, “sapere aude (have the courage to use your understanding)”, could be properly expressed as “have the courage to be a world citizen” as well.

Does Kant’s Rechtlehre belong to his Metaphysics of Morals? Xiaoling Sun

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在“法权论导论”，康德给出了一个法权的普遍性法则，即“如此外在地行

动，使你的任性的自由应用能够与任何人根据普遍法则的自由共存”（6: 231），

这一法则规定了法权的正当。鉴于这一法则与康德在《奠基》中给出的定言命令

第一（普遍性）公式形式上的相似性，许多康德评论者倾向于将其看成是康德道

德定言命令的推论，或者说是定言命令在外在自由领域的应用，而法权论也被视

为康德道德形而上学的一个组成部分，即法权的形而上学。这一对法权论的解释

可以被称为连续说，因为其主张法权论与康德伦理学的连续性。

但是，另一方面，康德同时也给出了一种生而具有的自由的法权，并且表明

它是获得的法权的根据，由于法权论在其开展中关涉的主要是诸种法权或者说权

利，一些康德论者更多地将康德的法权论看作权利论的政治哲学。由于康德强调

严格意义上（狭义）的法权的非伦理性，并且在法权论与德性论（严格意义的伦

理学）之间做出了切分，对康德的权利论解读在很大程度上坚持法权论与康德的

伦理学，从而也是其政治与道德学说的分离，其结果是法权论是否如康德所宣称

的那样属于其道德形而上学，或者说是否存在着一种法权的形而上学也成为问题。

我们可以将后一种对法权论的读解称为分离说，因为其坚持法权论对于康德道德

学说的独立性。

本文旨在寻求这两种读解之间的中间路径，我们一方面肯定康德对自然法传

统的承继以及对经验论的法律实证主义的拒斥，由此，其法权学说首先是关于正

当与义务的学说，这充分体现在其法权的普遍性原则——这一法则的先行给出表

明了正当对于权利的优先性。但是，与道德的定言命令（比如普遍性公式）不同，

法权的普遍性法则是先天分析而非综合的，所以，我们事实上无法从中推导出任

何具体的义务与权利，所以，生而具有的权利的导入就必不可少，它在某种意义

上赋予法权的普遍性法则以质料，唯有结合两者，康德才得以建构其法权学说。

由于生而具有的自由权是在与先天的法权的普遍性法则关联中得以界说的，

康德的法权学说可以在弱意义上被视为一种法权的形而上学。何以如此？因为正

如康德自己承认，“法权概念是一个纯粹的，建立在实践（出现于经验中的事例

上的运用）上面的概念，因而一个法权形而上学体系在其划分上也必须考虑那些

事例的经验性的多样性，……所以对于道德形而上学的第一部分的唯一恰当的表

述就是法权论的形而上学的初始根据”（MS， 205）换而言之，正如分离论者

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In the Introduction to the Rechstlehre, Kant formulates the universal law of right as following: “So act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law”(6: 231).This law defines formally what is right(iustum) and the corresponding obligations. In view of the formal similarity of this law and the first formula of the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork, many Kantian scholars are inclined to take the universal law of right as the result of the application of the moral categorical imperative to the sphere of external freedom. Kant’s Rechtlehre is thus viewed as a part of his metaphysics of morals, namely, metaphysics of right. This line of interpretation can be called “continuity view” insofar as it insists on the continuity between Kant’s ethics and the Rechstlehre.

However, in the same Introduction, Kant also proposes an innate (angeborne) right of freedom, and further designates it as the bases of acquired (other) rights. Since the Rechtlehre concerns mainly with various legal rights, some Kant Scholars tend to regard it as a political theory of rights. In addition, Kant defines a strict right as nothing but reciprocal coercion and purges it of all moral implications on the one hand, and makes a clear distinction between Rechstlehre (right) and Tugendlehre (virtue) on the other hand. It becomes questionable whether Rechstlehre belongs to Kant’s metaphysics of morals, or whether there can be metaphysics of right? We may call this latter interpretation “separation view” because it insists on the independence of Kant’s Rechstlehre to his moral theory.

This paper aims to seek the intermediate path between these two readings. On the one hand, we affirm Kant’s inheritance of the natural law tradition and the rejection of empirical empirical legal positivism. Rechstlehre is therefore primarily a doctrine of what is right as defined by the universal law of right, which gets presented before Kant’s introduction of the innate right. This clearly indicates that iustum (and lex) has priority over rights (ius). On the other hand, different from moral categorical imperative that is synthetic a prior, the universal law of right is analytic per se, from which we cannot derive any special obligations and rights. This explains the reason why Kant must introduce a concept of innate right to give the formal law of right a certain material, so as to be able to construct his Rechtlehre.

Since the innate right of freedom is defined in connection with the a priori universal law of right, Kant’s Rechtlehre can be taken as metaphysics of right, though in a fairly weak sense. As Kant himself acknowledges “the concept of right is a pure concept that still looks to practice (application to cases that come up in experience), a metaphysical system of right would also have to take account, in its divisions, of the empirical variety of such cases…So the only appropriate title for the first part of The metaphysics of Morals will be metaphysics first principles of doctrine of Right”(6:205) As seen rightly by those who hold the separation view, the concept of right cannot be completely separable form empirical experience. Because external freedom operates

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所见：法权概念不能完全与法权经验相分离，因为外在自由运作的领域是现象的

领域，所以，也就不可能有一种纯粹的法权形而上学，但这并不表明康德的法权

论只是经验和实证的科学，完全依赖于外在强制，因而与伦理无涉。分离论者的

错误在于他们对康德的法权论做了一种霍布斯式的解释，完全切断了法律（正当）

与权利的关系。

文章通过细致的分析证明康德的法哲学创造性综合了为传统自然法强调的

正当和法与近代契约论主张的平等的自由权利，就后者而言康德所借鉴的并非霍

布斯，而是洛克和卢梭的契约论传统，所以，康德的法权论尽管有别于其伦理学，

但仍然具有某种道德底蕴，并因此可以被归入广义的道德学说。与此相应，道德

与政治也在康德那里呈示出一种分与合的复杂关系。

自由与自我意识

Colin McLear 展翼文译

在批判哲学中，一项广为人知的要点在于声称只有先验唯心论可以保证理性

行动者可能具有自发性和任其施动的意志自由。如果这样的自由并不存在，那么

根据康德的推断，我们便无法将理性行动者设想为是道德上负有责任的；如果理

性行动者仅是全然由时空世界中的决定论式的因果链条所掌控的，那么道德要求

将会不再适用。

然而，康德不仅将自然的因果链条视作对道德的威胁，他还将其视作对我们

作为（理性）思维者的地位的可能性的威胁。对康德来说，我们作为行动者不仅

是道德的而且是理性的。我们理性的状态的获得取决于独立于自然因果链条的理

智行为。若要令一个行动者的行为适用于理性批评，该行为必须得是该行动者控

制下的要素的结果。康德对此有着清晰的表述：“[如果一个行动者]仅是在自然

法则引导下行动，那么我们便无法将任何行动的责任归属给他，因为其行动的根

据根本不在他的控制范围内，而是预先被决定了的。”(Metaphysik Vigilantius (K3),

1794/95, 29:1020)

该立场导致了一个问题：这里康德似乎是将人类的理性状态与其认知上的控

制能力，亦即其自由地（独立于自然的因果的决定论式法则的）行动的能力联系

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mainly in the phenomenal world, there can never be a pure metaphysics of right. But this does not mean that Kant’s Rechstlehre is empirical and positivist science, which relies only on external sanctions, hence has nothing to do with morality. The problem with separation view is that it in fact interprets Kant’s Rechtlehre in light of a Hobbesian separation of lex (law)and jus (right).

Through careful analysis, this essay tries to show how Kant creatively (though not always successfully) integrates iustum emphasized for the traditional natural law with the equal freedom right advocated by the modern contract theories. But concerning the latter he is inclined to Locke and Rousseau rather than Hobbes. Therefore, though distinguished from ethics (doctrine of virtue), Kant’s Rechtlehre still carry within it a certain moral implications, and therefore can be included in his broad theory of morality. Accordingly, morality and politics present a complex relationship between division and integration in Kant’s “Metaphysics of Morals”.

Freedom & Self-Consciousness Colin McLear

One well-known point of emphasis in the critical philosophy is that only Transcendental Idealism can safeguard the possibility of the spontaneity and agent-causal libertarian freedom of rational agents. If such freedom were not possible, then in Kant’s estimation there would be no hope for conceiving of rational agents as morally responsible; if rational agents were totally in the grip of the deterministic causal nexus of the spatio-temporal world then moral requirements could not apply.

However Kant also took the causal nexus of nature to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as (rational) thinkers. According to Kant, we are rational and not just moral agents. Our rational states depend for their generation on intellectual acts that are independent of the natural causal nexus. For any of an agent’s acts to be open to rational criticism, it must be the case that the acts are the result of factors under the agent’s control and Kant is clear that if “[an agent] were led merely by natural laws [nach Natur Gesetzen geleitet würde], it would be impossible to impute to him any action, since the ground of action then would never lie in his control, but rather would be determined in the previous time” (Metaphysik Vigilantius (K3), 29:1020 (1794/95).

This position raises a problem, for it seems that Kant ties the rational status of human beings to their capacity for cognitive control, and thus their capacity to act freely—i.e. independently of the causally deterministic laws of nature. But Kant also denies that nite thinkers could ever know that such causation (i.e. absolutely or

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在一起。然而，对于有限思维者能否对这种绝对的或先验的自发性因果关系的可

能性有所认识，康德的答案是否定的。由此，康德似乎不得不接受这样的立场：

亦即我们无法知道自己是理性的存在者。

而康德将思维活动同一种通过使用第一人称的“我”(I)的概念来表达的“纯

粹”的或智性的自我意识相联系在一起的做法，似乎更加重了这一问题的严重性。

康德认为，“当我思考时，我意识到，是我的‘我’(I)，而不是其它什么东西，

在我中思考”(Religion Pölitz, 1783/84, 28:1042，亦参考 Metaphysik L1, 1777-

80, 28:268)。根据这种对纯粹自我意识的解释，康德似乎甚至认为它能够在思

维者进行思维活动时向其提供关于其思维活动的因果的开端的信息，而这将会违

背第三条二律背反的结论，亦即我们至多只能理性地对这种最初因果开端的可能

性持有信念。

在本报告中，我将解释康德对先验自由与理性间的联系的理解何以与其批判

的认识论限制相兼容。我将指出，根据康德所必须采纳的批判的立场，对于我们

能够对自己的思想加以控制这样的事实，我们无法产生任何理论认知，因而我们

也无法对我们是否事实上正确地使用了第一人称概念产生任何理论认知。然而，

尽管我们在终极的意义上并不知道我们是否处于理性存在者的状态，康德依然可

以论证说，我们还是有着充足的理由对我们确实是理性存在者这一事实抱有理性

的信念(Vernunftglaube)。

模态图型

Nick Stang

康德关于模态范畴（可能性、现实性和必然性）的图型的论述既晦涩又简短，

即使与他关于其他范畴的图型的论述相比也有过之而无不及。在本文中，我尝试

对这些图型意味着什么给出一种说明。我首先对作为“先验时间规定”的图型给

出一个总体的概述。而后我将这一一般性的说明专门应用到模态图型上。我将论

证，图型是先验时间规定，这是因为它们是用来表象关于对象的表象之间的确定

的时间关系的规则（在应用它们的时候，我们就将那些对象归属到相应的范畴之

下）。在这之后我将论证，模态图型表达或阐明了其他图型隐含的模态特征：我

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transcendentally spontaneous causation) is possible. This leaves Kant in the position of seemingly having to deny that we could know that we human beings are rational beings.

The nature of this problem is exacerbated by the fact that Kant seems to tie the activity of thinking to a form of “pure” or intellectual self-consciousness expressible by use of the rstperson concept <I>. According to Kant “when I think, I am conscious that my I, and not some other thing, thinks in me” (Religion Pölitz 28:1042 (1783/84); see also Metaphysik L1 (1777-80) 28:268). It would seem then that Kant construes pure self-consciousness as capable of informing a thinker of their causal ultimacy in bringing about acts of thinking, which would seem to violate the Third Antinomy conclusion that we can at best rationally believe in the possibility of such ultimate causal progenitors.

In this talk I will explain how Kant’s conception of the connection between transcendental freedom and rationality is compatible with the strictures set by his critical epistemology. I argue that the critical position Kant must take is one according to which we cannot have theoretical cognition of the fact that we are in control of our thoughts, so we cannot have theoretical cognition of whether we are in fact correct users of the rst-person concept. However, despite our ultimate ignorance concerning our status as rational beings, Kant can also argue that we have suf cient grounds for the rational belief (Vernunftglaube) that we are such beings.

Modal Schemata Nick Stang

Kant's schemata for the modal categories (possibility, actuality, and necessity) are both obscure and brief, even by the standards of the notorious obscurity and brevity of his schemata for the other categories. In this essay I attempt to give an account of what these schemata mean. I begin by sketching an overall interpretation of schemata as 'transcendental time-determinations.' I then apply that general account to the modal schemata in particular. I argue that schemata are transcendental time-determinations in that they are rules for representing determinate temporal relations among representations of objects (in applying which, we thereby subsume those objects under corresponding categories). I then argue that the modal schemata express or make explicit the implicitly modal character of the other schemata: we determine the relation of representations, not only to past present and future actual representations, but to possible representations. I conclude by drawing consequences for other key aspects of Kant's transcendental theory of experience: the relation of modality to the matter/form

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们不仅规定表象与过去、现在或未来的实际表象之间的关系，而且还规定它们与

可能表象之间的关系。我将以这一点在康德先验的经验理论的其他重要方面的后

果来结束本文：模态与质料/形式二分的关系，模态与时间的关系，以及康德对

休谟关于必然联结的观点的批判等。

当代康德研究中的概念主义与非概念主义

宫睿

概念主义和非概念主义之争是当代认识论中的一个重要话题，争论的焦点在

于概念是否作为感知内容的必要成分。这场争论也渗透到康德研究之中，形成了

两种对立的解读立场。本文首先呈现双方的主要观点和论证，进而阐明康德的独

特立场。

在第一节中，本文从三个方面概括了非概念主义解读的内容。首先，罗伯

特·汉纳以及露西·阿莱等人认为“无概念则盲”并不表明概念对于感知是必要

的，只是相对于感知对象的判断来说才是必要的。其次，形成感知对象所必需的

综合功能够在非概念的条件下完成，如想象力就可以承担同样的角色。第三，他

们提出了一些感知的非概念特征以针对概念主义，如汉纳利用左右手论证表明了

感知的空间性特征，阿莱强调直观给予的对象具有单一性和直接性的特征。

在第二节中，我将考察概念主义针锋相对的观点。文哲、金斯堡等人对于康

德仍然做了一种全面的概念主义解释，即概念渗透到感知内容的所有方面。但在

后来的解释中，越来越强调范畴与其他概念的区分。格里菲斯、舒尔廷以及戈麦

斯等人都基本上按照这个论证为概念主义解读做辩护。范畴在感知中扮演着不可

或缺的角色，综合功能也有赖于知性的作用，而且如果排除概念在感知对象中的

作用的话，先验演绎的任务就是失败的。本文也基本上接受了概念主义的解读。

在第三节“非概念内容”中，我通过对于非概念主义的三个论证表明，那种

康德式的概念主义，是能够经受这些非概念主义的论证的。无论是感知与信念的

区分，还是细腻性论证，抑或汉纳的双手论证所揭示的无法被概念化的感知内容，

都能在康德式的感知对象中被接纳，但这并不危及到康德作为一个概念主义者的

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distinction, the relation of modality to time, and Kant's critique of Hume on necessary connections.

The Debate between Conceptualism and Non-conceptualism

in Contemporary Kant Studies Rui GONG

The dispute between conceptualism and non-conceptualism is an important theme in contemporary epistemology. The focus of the debate is whether the concept is an essential component of perceived content. This controversy also had a profound impact on Kant's study and formed two opposing interpretive positions. This article first clarifies the main ideas and arguments of the two interpretations, and then attempts to disclose the uniqueness of Kant's theory.

In the first section, this article summarizes the non-conceptualist interpretation in three points. First, Robert Hanna, Lucy Allais and others argued that “intuitions without concepts is blind” does not entail that concepts are necessary for perception, but only necessary for judgment of perceived objects. Second, the synthesis function necessary to form a perceptual object can be done under non-conceptual conditions, such as imagination can undertake the same role. Third, they raised some non-conceptual features to accuse the conceptualism of omissions. For instance, Robert Hanna used the two-handed argument to demonstrate the spatial attributes of perceptual objects, Lucy Allais claimed that intuitions are singular and immediate presentations that give us objects.

In the second section, I will inquire the conceptualist refutation. Wenzel, Ginsborg and others have made a comprehensive conceptualist interpretation of Kant, that is, the concept penetrates into all aspects of perceived object. However, in later explanations, the distinction between categories and other concepts has been increasingly emphasized. Griffith, Schulting, and Gomes basically defended the conceptualist interpretation in accordance with this distinction. The categories play an indispensable role in perception. The synthesis function also depends on the role of understanding. If the role of the concept in the perception is removed, the task of transcendental deduction is bound to fail. Roughly, I’m inclined to accept the conceptualist interpretation.

In the third section, "Non-conceptual content," I demonstrate through the three arguments for non-conceptualism that the Kantian conceptualism can withstand these non-conceptualist arguments. These non-conceptual traits of perceived object, revealed by the distinction between perception and belief, or the fine-grained argument, or the

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核心立场。

在第四节中，我将通过与概念主义及非概念主义的对照说明康德式的概念主

义的特征。康德并不像麦克道威尔式的概念主义者那样，认为在任何的感知内容

上都存在着概念性因素。但他也并不具有非概念主义的奠基性主题，也没有采纳

非概念主义的第一人称视角。最后，三者概括如下：麦克道威尔式的概念主义：

（1）概念对于感知对象是必要的；（2）一切感知内容都是概念性的，不存在非

概念性的内容；非概念主义：（1）概念对于感知对象是不必要的；（2）不是一切

感知内容都是概念性的，存在着非概念性的内容。康德式的概念主义：（1）概念

或范畴对于感知对象是必要的；（2）但不是一切感知内容都是概念性的，可以容

纳非概念性的内容。

论康德对义务体系的划分

刘作

学界对康德的义务体系的划分尤其对自我的完全义务的归属问题存在争议，

有的学者认为，康德最终放弃对自我的法权义务，在德性论中的对自我的完全义

务不是严格的德性义务。这种争议与康德对义务体系的划分有关。

康德的义务学说处在普芬多夫所代表的近代自然法的大背景下，这主要体现

在康德也把是否可以被外在强制作为区分法权义务和德性义务的标准。但是康德

做出一种创造性的改变，自然法也是道德法，法权义务和德性义务都是基于道德

法则，履行义务的行动者是自由的，这两种义务的区分不是可否被强制，而且是

可否被外在的强制。沃尔夫对自我义务的强调，对康德的义务学说有很大的影响，

但是与他不同，康德严格区分了理性的理论运用和实践运用，把理论和实践看做

两个不同的领域，我们认识到行动是善的，并不意味着我们必然会以之行动。理

论和实践的区分凸显动机的作用，这是康德区分法权义务和德性义务的一个重要

方面。

在 1793 年的《伦理学讲义——维格兰提伍斯》（Kant’s Lectures on Ethics—

—Vigilantius，简称《讲义》）中，康德把理性的立法与普遍法则结合起来，法权

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学

two-handed argument, can be adopted in the Kantian conceptualism, but this does not jeopardize Kant’s essential points as a conceptualist.

The task of the fourth and final section is to elaborate the Kant's uniqueness as a conceptualist by contrasting with conceptualism and non-conceptualism. Kant would not approve McDowell’s comprehensive conceptualism, which maintains that there always are conceptual factors in any perceived content. But he also does not entail the foundation theme of non-conceptualism, nor does he adopts the first-person perspective of non-conceptualism. Finally, these three views can be summarized as follows: McDowell’s conceptualism: (1) the concept is necessary for the perceptual objects, (2) all perceptual content is conceptual, there is no non-conceptual content; Non-conceptualism: (1) Concepts are not necessary for perceptual objects; (2) not all perceptual content is conceptual, and there are non-conceptual content. Kantian conceptualism: (1) Concepts or categories are necessary for perceptual objects; (2) but not all perceptual content is conceptual, some of non-conceptual content survived Kantian conceptualism.

On Kant’s Division of the System of Duties LIU Zuo

The academia are controversial about the attribution of the perfect duty to himself in Kant's philosophy. Some scholars believe that Kant finally gave up the duty to himself in the doctrine of right , and the perfect duty to himself in the doctrine of virtue is not true the duty of virtue. This controversy involves how to understand the division of Kant`s system of duty. Pre- Kant`s doctrine of duty emphasizes the duty to himself , and the division of the perfect duty and the imperfect duty constitutes the context of understanding Kant`s doctrine of duty; in the 1793 lectures on ethics -Vigilantius, Kant proposed Some of the arguments that are not detailed in 1797 Metaphysics of Moral but help to understand his division of the system of duty: the key to lawgiving of reason is the universal law, the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue are respectively lawgiving of reason to external actions and internal maxims. If the perfection duty to self concerns the right of personality, it is the legal duty to himself. If the end of personality is involved, it is the virtuous duty to himself, and the two may have the same duties as actions. But the way to take responsibility (obligation) is different, so they each exist, which is also the requirement to maintain the integrity of the doctrine.

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说和德性学说分别是理性对外在行动和内在准则的规范性要求。二者的对象分别

是普遍自由和普遍意志。伦理原则不仅是形式的，而且在这种形式上加上了对意

志的质料的规定，因而伦理学说的对象是普遍的意志。普遍自由涉及外在的行动，

普遍意志涉及准则，与行动的目的有关。理性对行动的目的的规定扩大了形式的

普遍自由，使得自由的概念有了质料的内容。

康德在《讲义》中用两页的篇幅集中分析了对自我的法权义务。在他看来，

如果每一个法权都必然对应着一个义务，那么人性拥有对自我作为人的法权。这

需要从人的双重本性解释这种法权。人一方面被设想为作为本体的理念，另一方

面被设想为作为现象的感性状态的存在者。前者具有对后者的法权，后者受到前

者的限制。这是从类比的角度来说对自我的法权义务。康德通过关系的三种范畴

具体论述了对自我的法权义务。几年后，康德把其中一些义务放在《道德形而上

学》中的对自我的德性义务之中，但是这并不能说明康德放弃了对自我的法权义

务。因为前者涉及对自身的人格中的人性的法权，针对的是相关的行动，后者涉

及对自身的人格中的人性的目的，针对的是相关的准则。

同样，也不能认为德性论中对自我的完全义务是消极的，就不是真正的德性

义务。因为，这些义务对应于内在自由的消极方面，它构成了内在自由积极方面

的基础，是实现对自我的不完全义务的基础。

德性义务需要普遍法则公式吗？

——关于康德“同时是义务的目的”

袁辉

康德在《道德形而上学奠基》中认为，定言命令的普遍法则公式判定一个行

为是义务，其根据不在于行为的目的而只在于其准则普遍立法的形式。但是，他

在后期出现的《道德形而上学》中又认为，定言命令可以判定行为的目的是德性

义务，即同时是义务的目的。康德是否改变了自己最初的观点？举例来说，帮助

他人的道德价值究竟在于其准则可以被普遍化为一个法则的行为，还是在于行为

所服务目的，即他人的幸福？

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Is the Universal Law Formula Necessary for the Duty of Virtue?

About Kant’s “Ends Which Are Also Duties” Hui Yuan

In GMS Kant claims that the formula of universal law of categorical imperative determines an action as duty according to the universal legislative form of its maxim rather than its end. Meanwhile, in the MS later on he holds the opinion that the categorical imperative can define the end of an action as duty of virtue, that is, the end which is also duty. Does the duty of virtue need the formula of universal legislation? Has Kant changed his earlier idea about duty? For example, where exactly is the moral value of helping others? Is it the action whose maxim can be universalized as a law, or the end which the action serves, namely the happiness of others?

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本文将证明，定言命令普遍法则公式对行为准则普遍立法的形式的要求是德

性义务未被明说的、充足标准：它不仅规定了一个行为是原初的义务，还以综合

的方式规定了该行为的目的是派生意义上的义务，即同时是义务的目的。

第一，义务目的的必然性源自于义务行为的必然性。具有普遍立法的形式的

准则判定一个行为是具有客观必然性的义务。但这种客观必然性必须在主体上具

有内在的必然性，就是说，任何理性存在者的意志都必然地建立具有普遍立法形

式的准则，以保证义务行为内在必然地得到履行。这时，不仅准则对行为而言是

普遍立法的，而且意志对准则而言也是普遍立法的。

但是，自由意志如果要采纳一个普遍立法的准则，必须设定行为的目的作为

准则主观根据。因此，只有将一些普遍的目的视为带有必然性的东西，才能保证

任何人的意志都会采纳实践法则作为他的准则，由此产生了同时是义务的目的，

当然，义务目的只是为了保证义务行为的内在必然性而具有必然性，因此它只是

派生的义务。例如，帮助他人的行为因其准则的普遍立法特征而是第一层次的义

务，为了保证这个准则能被每个主体所所采纳，需要每个人都将他人的幸福视为

自身的目的，由此这个目的也成为了第二层次的义务。

第二，从义务行为派生出义务目的原则是一个综合的判断。两种普遍的目的

同时是义务行为的目的，自身的完善性和他人的幸福，但它们并不是从对准则的

形式性要求的内涵中分析出来的，而是纯粹实践理性的思想实验的结果。这个实

验中，两种目的的对立面的内在必然性是不可思考的。因此，形式和目的结合是

一种综合。

第三，目的对需要外在立法的法权义务和针对神圣存在的纯然道德论而言都

不是必然的，因此不是义务。行为需要满足准则的形式性标准以成为法权义务，

但其普遍执行由外在强制来保证，不需要普遍立法的个人意志，因此法权义务没

有派生出同时是义务的目的。例如，财产权不是同时是义务的目的，即便如此人

们会相互强制对方履行契约以避免诈骗财产行为的发生。

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My article will argue that the requirement of the universal law formula on the universal legislative form of the maxim of an action is the unspoken sufficient criterion for the duty of virtue. This requirement not only identifies an action as original duty, but also determines its end in a synthetical way as derivative duty, viz. the end which is also duty.

Firstly, the necessity of the end which is also duty, originates from the necessity of the action which is duty. The maxim with the universal legislative form determines an action as a duty that has objective necessity. But this objective necessary action should also be internal necessary by the subject, that means, the will of every rational being must necessary establish the universal legislative maxim, so that the action which is duty, could be internal necessary executed by everyone.

However, the free will of human, if it has to establish a maxim, should set the the end of an action as its subjective ground of maxim. It follows that, in order to guarantee that everyone’s will can establish a universal legislative maxim, some universal ends should be treated as something necessary to be perused. That means, there should be ends which are also duties. Thus, not only the maxim, but also the will is universally legislative.

It should be noticed that end which is also duty, has necessity just because it can guarantee the internal necessity of action which is duty, it is therefore a derivative duty. For example, helping others is in virtue of the universal legislative form of action’s maxim a duty on the first level, but in order to guarantee that everyone will adopt this maxim, every human being must treat the happiness of others as his own end, in this way this end turns out to be a duty on a second level.

Secondly, the principle that derivates the end from the form of action’s maxim is a synthetic judgment. Two kinds of universal ends are ends which can also be duties, they are own perfection and the happiness of others. These ends are not contained in the intension of the formal requirement on maxim, but are simply the result of a thought-experiment of the pure practical reason: It is impossible to think about the opposites of these two ends as internally necessary. Thus, the relation of form and end in the derivation is synthetic.

Thirdly, end is neither necessary to the duty of right which needs external legislation, nor to the mere doctrine of morals which is valid only for holy being, consequently end in these two cases is not duty. It is necessary for the candidate of duty of right to satisfy the formal requirement on action’s maxim, meanwhile the necessary execution of duty of right can be guaranteed by external necessity, while the universal legislative personal will is unnecessary. Hence, the end which is also duty, cannot be derived from duty of right. For example, even when the right of property is not everybody’s end, people will force each other to fulfill the contract for the sake of protection of property.

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另外，纯然道德论包含满足准则的形式标准的行为，但神圣存在者不需要义

务地强制就能必然地如此行为，因此，它也不包含任何义务，因此也不会包含同

时是义务的德性目的。例如，神圣的存在者也许会帮助他人，也许也要设定他人

的幸福为目的，但无论行为还是目的对他而言都不会是义务。

直接义务还是间接义务

——康德和康德主义者的动物伦理观

张会永

康德的动物伦理观认为人对动物没有直接义务，而是具有间接义务，既人之

所以不能虐待动物，并不是因为动物具有相应的权利，而是善待动物会提升人的

德性品格，最终会善待自己和他人，而后者是人应负的直接义务。康德的间接义

务论被许多批评者贴上人类中心主义、理性中心主义和物种主义的标签，被认为

是和当代动物伦理学的关切不兼容的。也导致许多当代康德主义者尝试以不同方

式重新解释或建构康德的理论，以期使它不仅能够与许多当代生态伦理思想相容，

甚至更具有说服力。以伍德、科斯嘉德和蒂默尔曼为代表的康德主义者试图建构

关于动物的康德式直接义务论。伍德批评康德的人格化原则，即只有有理性的人

才具有值得尊重的自在价值这一原则，主张具有片段（不完全）理性的非人格的

动物或其他自然物也具有自在价值（这也是康德认同的）并不与其理性中心主义

的伦理学相冲突。伍德进而主张应当把康德的直接义务也扩展到对特定的非人生

物上。科斯佳德认为理性概念不是一个禀赋概念，而是一种功能方式，并不是由

于人有理性才是自在目的，而是理性把能赋予价值（目的）的人设定为了目的本

身。由于动物也具有赋予价值(目的)的能力，理性也必须把动物设定为目的本身。

这样，目的王国中不仅包含有理性的存在者，也包含作为人类伙伴的其他动物，

人不仅对有理性的存在者负有直接义务，也对无理性的动物负有直接义务。蒂默

尔曼一方面强调动物苦乐的直接的道德重要性，另一方面重新解释直接义务和间

接义务的关系，进而指出对动物的义务是人对自身的直接义务的一部分，从而也

是一种直接义务。而以奥尼尔、丹尼斯、阿特曼和凯恩为代表的康德主义者则为

康德的间接义务进行辩护。奥尼尔和迪恩等人指出，康德的人类中心主义立场并

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Furthermore, the mere doctrine of morals contains actions which match the formal condition, yet the holy being can necessarily perform such actions without any internal coercion from duty. It follows that this doctrine does not contain any duties, including the end which is also duty. For example, the holy being would help others, would set happiness of others as end, but neither action nor end would be duty for him.

Direct Duty or Indirect Duty

-Kant’s and Kantian ethical Views of animals Huiyong Zhang

According to Kant’s indirect duty view, human beings have no direct duty to non-human animals, but our direct duties to ourselves and other humans give rise to indirect duties regarding non-human animals. Kant’s view is criticized as anthropocentrism, logocentrism, and speciesism, which cause some reconstruction and reconsideration of Kant’s view by many contemporary Kantians. A. Wood, C. Korsgaard, and J. Timmermann attempt to reconstruct Kantian direct duty to non-human animals. Wood argue that Kant goes wrong regarding nonrational animal is in his accepting personification principle, which says that rational nature is respected only by respecting humanity in someone’s person. Similar to Tom Regan, Wood thinks that non-human animals possess recognizable fragments of rational nature, which made non-human animals have direct moral rights on human beings. Korsgaard argues that Kant misuses his concepts such as reason, value, and the end in itself. She thinks that reason is not a concept of capacity, but a concept of function, and value depends on activities of valuing. Both human beings and non-human animals can value their good for their own sake, so reason can value them as ends in themselves. As a result, non-human animals, as ends in themselves, can go into the kingdom of ends with human beings, and human beings owe direct duties to them. Timmermann emphasizes the direct moral significance of animal’s pleasure and pain, and holds that the proper treatment of animals is part of a direct to the self and therefore direct morally relevant. So there is a direct duty to treat animals well. O. O’Neill, L. Denis, R. Dean, M. Altman and P. Kain show that all these three Kantian theories of direct duties go beyond Kant’s framework of ethics, and they attempt to return to defense Kant’s indirect view. O’Neill and Dean argue that anthropocentric starting point is needed for Kant to establish moral agents, which neither assumes nor establishes any form of speciesist moral conclusion. Altman and Kain hold that Kant’s slippery-slope arguments can be support by modern scientist experiments such as “violence graduation hypothesis”. Kain and Denis point out that

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不必然导致物种歧视，它只是用来确定谁是道德行为者。阿特曼和凯恩等人指出，

康德的滑坡论证并不是依赖于偶然的经验联系或类比，它能够得到现代科学研究

的证实；凯恩和丹尼斯认为科斯嘉德和蒂默尔曼都混淆了康德对尊重和其他道德

情感的区分，强调在康德那里，动物虽然不是尊重的对象，却是爱、同情、感激

和仁慈的对象，人并不能任意对待动物。奥尼尔甚至认为，与奠基于个体权利的

动物权利论相比，康德的间接义务论更能容纳诸如保护物种、生物多样性和生态

栖息地这样的整体生态伦理主张。通过分析比较上述当代康德主义者的理论，本

文支持间接义务论的立场，并尝试通过探讨康德被争论双方忽视或误解的“类比”

和“双关性”概念，为康德的间接义务论提供新的辩护。

海德格尔的“基础存在论”是“哲学人类学”吗？

-- 试论达沃斯论辩中卡西尔对海德格尔“康德解释”的一个责难

王庆节

主观主义和相对主义责难本来是后期新康德主义和当时的哲学主流对哲学

心理主义和哲学人类学的责难，而哲学人类学也被认为是哲学上的心理主义的一

支。无论分析哲学还是现象学哲学，都是从新康德主义的知识论的康德解释背景

中兴起的。更进一步地说，它们在某种意义上都是对这一传统的突破，而这个突

破就肇端于对哲学史上的各种心理主义或哲学人类学进行批判。现在的问题是，

海德格尔的康德解释以及同时期的《存在与时间》，它们在本质上仅仅是一种新

型的哲学人类学吗？我们知道，这不仅是卡西尔对海德格尔的责难，也是包括现

象学宗师胡塞尔在内的大多数当代哲学家对海德格尓《存在与时间》以及其康德

解释的定性。这一定性根深蒂固，至今仍为许多人信奉。而反过来，海德格尔将

康德，狄尔泰，卡西尔，甚至胡塞尔哲学，乃至同时代许多重要哲学家，也都视

为哲学人类学的哲学家。或者说，在海德格尔的眼中，他们对问题的发问仍旧处

在存在者的层面上，未能达到存在发问的深度或层次。

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Korsgaard and Timmermann confuse the difference between respect and other moral feeling in Kant’s ethics. Non-human animals are not objects of respect, but objects of love, sympathy, gratefulness and benevolence. O’Neill argues that Kant’s indirect view can help to preserve species, habitats, or biological diversity, which are incompatible with the view of direct duties. This paper goes along with the view of indirect duties, and attempts provide new proof to support it by discussing Kant’s concepts of “analogy” and “amphiboly”.

Is Heidegger’s “Fundamental Ontology” a Form of “Philosophical

Anthropology”? – On Cassirer’s Objection to Heidegger’s “Kant

Interpretation” in the Davos Dispute

Qingjie Wang (Translated by Yiwen Zhan) The subjectivism objection and the relativism objection are originally made, according to the late Neo-Kantians and the then philosophical mainstream, against philosophical psychologism and philosophical anthropology, while philosophical anthropology was deemed to be a branch of psychologism in philosophy. Both analytic philosophy and phenomenology emerged from the background of Kant interpretation in Neo-Kantian epistemology. Furthermore, they are both in certain sense a breakthrough in this tradition, and such breakthrough originated from the criticism of the various forms of psychologism or philosophical anthropology in the history of philosophy. Now comes the question: Is Heidegger’s Kant interpretation, together with his Being and Time in the same period, in essence just another form of philosophical anthropology? As we know, this is not only what amounted to Cassirer’s criticism of Heidegger, but also how most contemporary philosophers, including Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, characterized Heidegger’s Being and Time and his Kant interpretation. The characterization is so influential that it is still adopted by many scholars. Conversely, Heidegger also took philosophers such as Kant, Dilthey, Cassirer, even Husserl, and many other important philosophers of his time to be philosophers of philosophical anthropology. In other words, from Heidegger’s perspective, they were still asking questions at the level of entities or beings (das Seiende) and failed to reach the deeper level of inquiries about Being as such (das Sein).

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在著名的达沃斯论辩中，卡西尔对海德格尔的“康德解释”以及与之相关

“基础存在论”，就有一将之批评为哲学人类学和相对主义的“责难”。本文通

过对达沃斯论辩中一处文本的具体分析，试图论述和阐明，海德格尔在这里为自

己辩护的策略是要撇清，《存在与时间》关于人的亲在的生存论分析，作为新时

代的形上学的疑难发问，非但在本质上不是什么哲学人类学。相反，它是可能跳

出并克服传统哲学人类学，进入对存在本身进行疑难发问的真正尝试。相形之下，

卡西尔对海德格尔康德解释的批评以及沿循新康德主义的康德知识论解释，反倒

是自陷在哲学人类学的存在者层面上，不能真正进入康德哲学发问形而上学疑难

和为形而上学奠基的核心要义。

康德式哲学与海德格尔哲学中关于“规范性的来源”问题

的争论

贺念

规范性问题，是人类精神领域中不可或缺的一环。我们不仅使用陈述来描述

一些事态，如“好的哲学家通常都是善于提问的人”；我们也可用陈述来表达价

值，如“勇敢是一种美德”，或者表达善恶，如“不尊重他人是一种恶的行为”；

此外，我们还使用“应当”来表达一种要求，如“每个人都应该保持终身学习”。

这些都涉及到一种“规范性”，它不是事实性描述，不指向关于对象的知识，而

是一种命令和要求，它指向的是我们实践行为的准则。自康德区分“是”（Sein）

与“应当”（Sollen）以来，关于实践行为的规范性问题便成为了伦理学和道德

哲学的核心内容，也成了哲学的根本任务之一。海德格尔作为现代哲学最重要流

派之一“现象学”的代表，其秉承的“描述性的现象学方法”和对“Sein问题”

的执着似乎都看起来与“规范性问题”背道而驰，从而使其招致了诸多批评。然

而，自上世纪 90 年代末以来，西方学界的康德研究专家与海德格尔研究专家，

就规范性问题进行了深入而激烈的争论，对这一争论的研究不仅有利于看清海德

格尔如何别开生面地对这一问题进行了富有成果的探讨，而且有利于看清现代现

象学在何种意义上补充和发展了康德理性主义传统中的规范性论题，并为这一问

题带来了新的深度和开放性。

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In the famous Davos dispute, Cassirer has raised an ‘objection’ to Heidegger’s ‘Kant interpretation’ and its related ‘fundamental ontology’, which involves characterizing them as philosophical anthropology and relativism. My essay will provide a detailed analysis of a text drawn from the Davos debate, to show that Heidegger’s defense strategy was to clarify that the existential analysis of human Dasein in his Being and Time, as a metaphysical inquiry for a new era, is essentially not a form of philosophical anthropology. Quite the contrary, it is a genuine attempt to go beyond and overcome the traditional philosophical anthropology and to inquire into Being itself. In comparison, it is rather Cassirer’s criticism of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation and his interpretation of Kant’s epistemology following the path of Neo-Kantians that has fallen victim to philosophical anthropology at the level of entities, so that it is unable to get hold of the core insights of Kantian philosophy of inquiring into the problem of metaphysics and laying the foundation for it.

On the Controversy over the “Source of Normativity”

between Kantian Philosophy and Heidegger's Philosophy Nian He

Normative issues are an indispensable part of the human spiritual realm. We not only use statements to describe facts, such as "good philosophers are usually people who are good at asking questions"; we can also use statements to express values, such as "braveness is a virtue" or express good and evil, such as "to disrespect others is a bad act; in addition, we also use "ought to" to express a requirement, such as "everyone is ought to stay engaged with lifelong learning." These all signify a kind of "normativity", which is not a factual description, because it doesn’t point to knowledge about objects, but rather a command and requirement that points to the norms of our action. Since Kant distinguishes "Sein" from "Sollen", the issue of the source of the normativity of our practical action has become the core content of ethics and moral philosophy, and even one of the fundamental tasks of philosophy in general as well. As a representative of "phenomenology", one of the most important philosophical movements of 20th century western philosophy, Heidegger’s adherence to the "descriptive phenomenological method" and the obsession with the "Sein problem" seem to run counter to the issue of normativity. It has caused a lot of criticism. However, since the end of the 1990s, research experts in Kant and in Heidegger in Western academic circles have conducted in-depth and fierce debates on issues of source of normativity. The study of this debate is not only conducive to seeing how Heidegger does have explored this issue in a fruitful manner, and also to seeing in what sense modern phenomenology

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当代康德式哲学的主要代表人物科斯嘉德将规范性解释为从第一人称视角

瞄准行动者的要求，它命令我按照准则而行动，并给出行动的理由；基于何种理

由而行动本身就是对我的实践同一性的展示，规范性问题因此同时是“生存论”

式的主体性的自我建构问题。科斯嘉德对康德哲学的改造工作一方面可以看成是

将普遍性的先验主体性改造成了具有个别性的生存论的主体性，而另一方面，科

斯嘉德始终还是捍卫着康德主义的理性立场，因为具体的实践同一性是偶然的，

然而规范性却有一个最终的必然基础：作为普遍人性的道德同一性，规范性的最

终来源被理解为人性中自我意识的反思能力。海德格尔生存论现象学中同样蕴含

着对规范性从第三人称向第一人称转化的要求，此是（Dasein）从非本真的常人

状态向本真状态的过渡，要求的实则就是对规范性进行“现象学还原”，即：从

“合于规范”转向“出于规范”，从而实现本真性的共是（Mitsein）。不同于科

斯嘉德，海德格尔将本真性的规范性的来源最终解释为理解中的“自身觉知”，

而不是自我反思。本文对两种哲学思想之间的互通和争论进行了深入分析和探讨。

“形式主义”与作为“理律”的“他律”

——再论舍勒对康德伦理学的批评与发展

张伟

如何理解舍勒对于康德伦理学的批评？这个问题涉及到舍勒对康德的批评

或理解，还涉及到这种理解所带来的效应。就舍勒对康德伦理学本身的批评而言，

主要聚焦于如下两个问题：

首先是关于康德伦理学中的“形式主义”这个问题。据笔者的有限阅读经验，

对康德伦理学形式主义的解释有三种方式：一种是席尔普（Paul A. Schlipp）

式的，一种是黑格尔式的，一种是舍勒式的。关于舍勒对康德的批评，通常的看

法都基于将形式主义单单理解为黑格尔式的这一种理解，也就是说将黑格尔式的

理解和舍勒式的理解混同为一。因此，在笔者看来，舍勒对康德的批评和康德学

界对康德的维护，其实是在两个不同层面上的。

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complements and develops the normative issue in Kantian rationalistic tradition and brings new depth and inspirations to the discussion about this issue.

As the main representative of contemporary Kantian philosophy, C. Korsgaard interprets the normativity as a requirement from the first-person perspective to the actor. It commands me to act according to the rules and give reasons for the action. For what reason my action is conducted itself is for me meanwhile the demonstration of my practical identity, therefore the normative problem is also the existential self-constitution of the subjectivity. On the one hand, Korsgaard's reconstruction of Kant's philosophy can be seen as an“existentialistic”transformation of the universal transcendental subjectivity into the subjectivity of individual existentialism. On the other hand, Korsgaard still defends the Kantian rationalism, because the specific practical identity is accidental, but the normativity has a final inevitable basis: the universal identity of humanity, the ultimate source of normativity consists in the ability of reflection or the self-consciousness in human nature. Heidegger's existential phenomenology also contains the requirement of normativity for the conversion from the third person perspective to the first person. This is namely the transition from the inauthentic state as “the they” to the authentic state. This requirement should be understood as the carry out of "phenomenological reduction" in the field of normativity, that is, the transition from "in conformity to norms" to "in light of norms", so as to achieve the authentic “being-with” (Mitsein). Unlike Korsgaard, Heidegger interprets the source of the authentic normativity as “self-awareness" in understanding rather than rational self-reflection. This paper makes an in-depth analysis and exploration on the intercommunication and debate between the two philosophical ideas.

Formalism and Heteronomy as Logonomy:

Max Scheler’s Critique and Development of Kant’s Ethics ZHANG Wei Translated by NI Yicai

How should Scheler’s critique of Kant’s Ethics be interpreted? It is concerned with Scheler’s critique or understanding of Kant, as well as the impact of such an understanding. This present paper focuses on the following two points concerning Scheler’s critique of Kant’s ethics:

1. The problem of “formalism” in Kant’s ethics. According to the author’s knowledge, there are three different interpretations of the formalism in Kant’s ethics offered respectively by Paul A. Schlipp, Hegel and Scheler. For long Scheler’s interpretation has been confused with Hegel’s. The author would nevertheless argue that the defence of Kant given by Kantian scholars miss the point where Scheler

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其次是关于“自律伦理学”和“他律伦理学”的问题。康德区分了“自律”

和“他律”，舍勒认为他接受了康德的工作，他跟随康德把亚里士多德主义归为

“他律”之后，他在“自律”的大框架下开展工作，他自己认为他做的工作是比

康德更加“自律”的。舍勒认为，康德讲的“自律”（即“理性为自身立法”）最

终是一种“法则的律”，即“理律”。舍勒认为康德的“自律”还是一种“他律”。

舍勒区分了“双重的自律”。在舍勒看来，因无视双重的自律的区分，康德

会因担心堕入“他律”，而将排斥一切的道德教育、道德顺从乃至于那种对作为

价值人格之典范的“榜样”的跟随。而这些道德教育、道德顺从以及所谓的“榜

样跟随”，对于舍勒来说，恰恰是其“人格教化”或“人格生成”学说重要部分，

而且，它们无疑都可被纳入其“人格自律”说的总体框架之内。

根本上，舍勒整个思考的出发点是更为现代的，他的工作是建立在康德对亚

里士多德的拒绝或者批判之上的。或者最核心地说，在他看来，他的“质料的价

值伦理学”（“人格伦理学”）最终是“自律”的，他是跟随着康德把亚里士多德

判为“他律伦理学”，之后又在“自律的伦理学”内部跟康德进行竞争，并进一

步发展出他自己的“人格自律的伦理学”。

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criticizes Kant. 2. The problem of “ethics of autonomy” and “ethics of heteronomy”. Kant has

made a clear distinction between “autonomy” and “heteronomy”. Taking himself a successor of Kant, Scheler launches his project under the general framework of “autonomy”, and even considers his project more “autonomous” than that of Kant. According to Scheler, Kant’s “autonomy” (self-legislation of reason) falls into the “nomos of law”, namely, “logonomy”. Kant’s autonomy cannot get rid of heteronomy.

Scheler emphasizes the double characters of autonomy. In Scheler’s view, regardless of the distinction between the double characters of autonomy, Kant has rejected any moral education, moral obedience, as well as “following the model” as the exemplar of value personalism. However, what lost by Kant constitutes the central part of Scheler’s theory of “cultivation of personality” or “emergence of personality”, which could also be incorporated into the theory of “autonomy of personality”.

Generally speaking, Scheler’s project has a “modern” starting point, that’s to say, his work starts with rejection or critique of Kant and Aristotle. Most essentially, Scheler’s “value ethics of materials” (ethics of personality) must stay autonomous. Following Kant, Scheler takes Aristotle’s theory as an “ethics of heteronomy”, then Scheler competes with Kant within the “ethics of autonomy”, and further develops his own “ethics of the autonomy of personality”.

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分组会议（四）：

康德器官论式的“成形本能”概念与“根茎式思维”

——一种系统性的冲突是否存在？

Violetta L. Waibel 展翼文译

在《判断力批判》的目的论部分，康德借鉴并使用了布鲁门巴赫(Johann

Friedrich Blumenbach)的“成形本能”(Bildungstrieb)这一术语。通过这一术语，他

得以引入自然中的（这种自然是通过目的论的方式被客观目的的概念所规定的）

力学的与特殊的物的概念。康德由此将自然的目的同归属给人类行动的目的概念

区别了开来。我们往往习惯于依照康德的思路，通过与人的目的进行类比来思考

许多自然现象。然而这里我们必须意识到，自然的目的是比人类的或人为的目的

更为丰富的。而这种丰富性恰恰可以通过“成形本能”这一概念得到表述。在这

里，我们甚至可以依照并超越康德的思路，将这一概念运用到人类行动上去。通

过将欧洲传统中的目的导向的思维用树木的图式去表现，德勒兹(Gilles Deleuze)

和加塔利(Félix Guattari)试图将这种目的导向思维宣布为无效的或至少对其加以

限制。这里他们用到了所谓“根茎”(Rhizom)的比喻来表达那种增生或混乱生长

的图式。在生物学中，根茎指往往在地下或紧贴地面生长的植物根部茎干系统。

本报告将阐发康德对于“成形本能”这一概念的理解，并进一步考察：现代的根

茎式思维是否的确如其所要求的那样引入了一种根本性的转变，抑或它不过是表

达了康德以权威的方式所表达的器官论式(organologisch)系统性思维的一种特定

形式？

康德论自然界中神的艺术创造——物理神学论证的诸变体

Ina Goy 倪逸偲译

笔者在本文中将论证，同步于他的自然界秩序的概念的变化，康德在改变了

他的物理神学论证的前提之后，又发展出诸多不同的物理神学论证。在他早期的

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Parallel Sessions IV: Kants organologisches Konzept des „Bildungstriebs“und das

„rhizomatische Denken“

Ein systematischer Konflikt? Violetta L. Waibel

In der Teleologie der Critik der Urteilskraft verwendet Kant, in Anlehnung an Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, den Terminus des Bildungstriebes. Mit ihm bringt er das Dynamische und das Besondere der teleologisch durch den Begriff der objektiven Zwecke bestimmten Natur in den Blick. Damit unterscheidet er Zwecke der Natur von dem Begriff der Zwecke, der dem menschlichen Handeln zugeschrieben wird. Wir denken Kant zufolge mancherlei Erscheinungen der Natur nach einer Analogie menschlicher Zwecke, müssen dabei aber im Blick haben, dass Naturzwecke reicher sind als die menschlichen künstlichen Zwecke. Dieses Mehr kommt im Begriff des Bildungstriebes zum Ausdruck, der nun seinerseits, mit Kant über Kant hinaus, auf menschliches Handeln anwendbar wird. Mit Gilles Deleuze und Félix Guattari wird das zweckorientierte Denken der abendländischen Tradition, repräsentiert durch das Bild vom Baum, außer Kraft oder zumindest in seine Schranken zu setzen gesucht durch die Metapher des Rhizoms als Bild von Wucherung und chaotischem Wachstum. Rhizome sind in der Biologie meist unterirdische oder dicht über dem Boden wachsende Wurzelachsensysteme. Der Vortrag will Kants Konzeption des Bildungstriebs herausstellen und dann fragen, ob das rhizomatische Denken der Neuzeit tatsächlich eine radikale Wendung eingeleitet hat, wie es zuweilen beansprucht wird, oder vielmehr eine besondere Ausformung des organologischen Systemdenkens darstellt, das Kant in maßgeblicher Form zur Darstellung gebracht hat.

Kant on Divine Artistry in Nature

--Variants of the Physicotheological Argument Ina Goy

In this paper, I will argue that Kant developed a variety of physicotheological arguments

throughout his career since he changed the premises of the physicotheological argument in accordance with his changing concepts of the order of nature. While in his early

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《一般自然史与天体理论》（AA I: 228.3-230.26）一文中，康德仅仅承认了宏

观宇宙的宏观机械论秩序的统一体中存在着神的设计的迹象；在《展示上帝存在

唯一可能的证明根据》（AA II: 123.15-137.7）中，康德主张，在微观宇宙的高

度复杂的微观机制的统一体中也存在着神的设计的迹象，后来他将其称为“有组

织的存在”（《展示上帝存在唯一可能的证明根据》；AA II: 126.5-127.8）。虽然

引入有机秩序作为神的设计的迹象加强了物理神学的论证，但是，康德，和先前

的休谟一样，同时也意识到这一物理神学证明在推论上的缺陷。这一物理神学证

明的主要逻辑缺陷在于，它从从可感的美与自然秩序中推论出上帝的理念，也即

是说，它从经验前提推论出了非经验的结论。在批判时期一开始，康德不再尝试

证明一个建构性的上帝理念，而只去证明一个范导性的上帝理念。在《纯粹理性

批判》中，康德毁灭性地主张，物理神学论证仰赖于本体论论证，而本体论论证

是错误的（《纯粹理性批判》，A625/B653），因而康德在整本《纯粹理性批判》中

都回避了物理神学论证。但是，在《判断力批判》中，康德在伦理神学论证之外

还重新引入了物理神学论证的一个变体（《判断力批判》；AA V: 436.3-447.13）。

康德在《判断力批判》中新的物理神学论证还是仰赖于关于自然界秩序的全新洞

见：康德发现了自然界的目的论法则、与自然目的的必然统一体。这两大发现都

使康德得以不再将物理神学论证置于一个基于机械论的宏观宇宙或微观宇宙的

自然秩序的后天的经验前提之上，而是代之以一个基于自然的目的论秩序与自然

目的的必然统一体的先天前提。自然目的的必然统一体的概念虽然是后天的、经

验的，但仍然蕴含了所有合乎自然目的的属性的非经验的、先天的必然统一体。

康德将物理神学论证的前提从后天的经验领域转移到先天的非经验领域，从而能

够消弭物理神学论证中的逻辑学障碍，并能从被设计者的概念中的先天环节有效

地推证出一个先天的设计者。这一改进使得康德不仅能够修复他自己在《纯粹理

性批判》中对物理神学论证的破坏，也能回应康德本人所熟知的来自休谟传统的

批评。

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Theory of Heavens (1:228.3–230.26) Kant recognized marks of divine design in the unity of the major mechanical orders of the macrocosmos only, in the Ground of Proof essay (2:123.15–137.7) Kant claimed that marks of divine design appear in the unity of the highly complex minor mechanisms in the microcosmos also, in what he later called ‘organized beings’ (Ground of Proof 2:126.5–127.8). But although the inclusion of organic orders as marks of divine design improved the strength of the physicotheological argument, Kant, as Hume before him, at the same time realized its syllogistic defectiveness. Its main logical failure consisted in the derivation of a non-empirical conclusion, the idea of God, from empirical premises, the observable beauty and order of nature (Ground of Proof 2:161.4–19). With the beginning of the critical period, Kant no longer tried to prove a constitutive notion, but only a regulative idea of God. Kant followed a destructive path in the first Critique, claiming that the physicotheological argument relied on the ontological argument, whereby the latter was false (CPR A 625/B 653), and avoided the physicotheological argument in the second Critique entirely. But in the third Critique, Kant reintroduced a further variant of the physicotheological argument beside the ethicotheological argument (CPJ 5:436.3–447.13). Kant’s new physicotheological argument in the third Critique relied, again, on a new insight into the order of nature: the detection of teleological laws of nature and of the necessary unity of a natural purpose. Both allowed Kant to no longer ground the physicotheological argument on a posteriori, empirical premises related to the mechanical macrocosmic or microcosmic orders of nature alone, but on a priori premises instead related to the teleological order of nature and the necessary unity of a natural purpose. The concept of the necessary unity of a natural purpose, though a posteriori and empirical, implied the non-empirical, a priori necessary unity of all properties that fall under the idea of a natural purpose. Moving the premise of the physicotheological argument from the empirical a posteriori into the non-empirical a priori realm enabled Kant to close the logical gap in the physicotheological argument and to validly derive a conclusion from the a priori moment in the notion of the designed to the a priori notion of its designer (against Sala 1990, Dell’Oro 1994, Swinburne 2013, Ginsborg 2014, and alternative to Kravitz 2018). This modification allowed Kant to overcome both, his own deconstruction of the argument in the first Critique and the traditional Humean criticisms of the argument that Kant was all too well aware of.

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本质与说明

——康德对洛克-莱布尼茨论争的回应

Huaping Lu-Adler（卢华萍）倪逸偲译

洛克与莱布尼茨关于本质问题的论争如今常常是透过自然类理论而被考察

的，但这一进路似乎模糊了这一论争中更为基础的哲学问题，而这牵涉到本质与

（科学的）说明之间的关系：我们能否使得物质对象的本质去阐释他们所显现的

性质与关联？

洛克所针对的是如下观点：作为本质的实体形式是说明事物之为存在的因果

根据，而这一根据有着本体论意义上的优先地位。洛克关于唯名论与实在论本质

之间对立的理解则从两个层面上回应了这一观点：第一，将诸多存在分为不同的

类并赋予之以相应的本质仅仅是理智的活动。尽管分类有助于知识的组织与共联，

但它们不具备说明功能；第二，如果物质对象真的有本质作为它们的显象的因果

性说明根据，这一本质也只能在属类意义上被刻画为物质对象的非可感部分的内

部构造。尽管我们无从知晓这一构造本身到底是什么，但我们还是可以从方法上

采取具体步骤对其加以考察：在波义耳的微粒论假说启发下的实验项目可以把我

们导向一个与自然的机械法则相一致的因果说明的整全体系。

尽管莱布尼茨在《人类理智新论》中对洛克的回应看上去非常负面甚至是轻

蔑的，但一旦我们将莱布尼茨的回应与他在别处关于本质或“本性”（尤其是身

体的本质/本性）的论述联系起来，一幅更为微妙的图景便会浮现出来：莱布尼

茨恢复了亚里士多德的“实体形式”概念来表征第一推动力，在莱布尼茨看来，

如果我们要充分地说明物质现象，就必须要将第一推动力包含在身体的本质/本

性之中。但莱布尼茨仅仅试图借此为物理学提供一个更好的形而上学基础，因此

那个被恢复了的实体形式概念“只能关联一般性原因”，而且我们不应该像经院

哲学家一样使用这一概念“去说明现象”（《动力学文范》，1695 年）。在此意义

上，莱布尼茨与洛克一样都认为，我们需要重新以不同于经院哲学的方式去思考

“本质”，从而将近代科学置于更为坚实的哲学基础之上。

康德在其逻辑学与形而上学拓展讲座以及一些公开出版作品中关于本质问

题的评论切中了洛克-莱布尼茨论争中的关键点。康德保留了洛克的基本立场，

即坚持名义本质与实在本质的区分，并将两者最终都联系到我们的自然倾向，从

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Essence and Explanation

--Kant’s Response to a Locke-Leibniz Controversy Huaping Lu-Adler

The controversy over essence between Locke (Essay, III.iii & vi) and Leibniz (New Essays, III.iii & vi) is often interpreted through the lens of recent theories of natural kinds. This approach tends to obscure the more fundamental philosophical issue in that controversy. It concerns the relation between essence and (scientific) explanation: can we invoke the essences of corporeal objects to explain their manifest qualities and relations?

Locke’s target is the view on which substantial forms, as essences, are the ontologically prior causal grounds that explain why things exist the way they do. His account of nominal versus real essence contains a two-fold response to that view. First, sorting beings into different kinds and ascribing distinct essences to them is only a work of human intellect. While the sortals can be instrumental to the organization and communication of knowledge, they explain nothing. Second, if corporeal objects indeed have an essence as the causal-explanatory ground of their appearances, this essence can only be generically described as the inner constitution of their insensible parts. Although we cannot know what this constitution is in itself, we may take concrete steps to probe it methodically—e.g. through the experimental program informed by Boyle’s Corpuscular Hypothesis, which directs us toward a unified system of causal explanations in accordance with mechanical laws of nature.

Although Leibniz’s reaction in the New Essays appears to be largely negative or even dismissive, a more nuanced picture emerges when we connect it with what he writes elsewhere about essence or “nature” (especially of bodies). Leibniz revives the Aristotelian notion of “substantial form” to represent the primitive active force that in his view must be included in the essence/nature of body if we are to adequately explain corporeal phenomena. But he intends thereby only to provide a better metaphysical foundation for physics (regarding its most basic laws), so that the revived substantial form “relates only to general causes” and we should not use it, as many Scholastics did, “to explain phenomena” (Specimen Dynamicum 1695). In this way, Leibniz shares Locke’s concern that we need to rethink “essence”—against how the Scholastics treated it—so as to put modern science on a more secure philosophical footing.

Kant’s remarks about essence in his expansive lectures on logic and metaphysics as well as some of his published works reflect an appreciation of what’s really at stake in the Locke-Leibniz controversy. He preserves the basic Lockean distinction between nominal and real essences, connecting both ultimately to our natural tendency to make sense of the world as a law-governed and ordered system of appearances. He

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而将世界理解为一个受法则支配的有秩序的显象体系。康德也同意莱布尼茨的观

点，即我们至少应当让身体本质/本性中拥有“力量”，从而更好地思考那些对物

理学说明至关重要的自然法则。但不同于莱布尼茨，康德并不认为这就意味着事

物本身有着实在本质。

系统化：康德和费希特的观念论理想

谢昭锐

在康德哲学的眼中，人性的未来在于理性目标的实践，这表明启蒙运动是一

个永无止境的项目。理性的立法规定要求“我们不同的知识模式不能仅仅是一个

狂想曲，而必须形成一个系统。”（A833 / B861）这对系统性的热切追求往往被认

为决定和驱动了德国观念论发展的哲学野心。我们有两种方法理解这宣称。在大

多数关于德国观念论的叙述中，费希特的知识学（在受到莱因霍尔德的元素哲学

影响下）最初的出现是为了系统化康德的批判哲学，而达到这目标便要找出超验

观念论的隐藏前提 -- 即所谓的第一基本原则。从这个角度来看，整个系统化的

事业只是超验观念论的历史发展中出现的内在理论修正。但从另一个（甚或是一

个更好的）角度来看，要掌握从康德到费希特的过渡中所涉及的系统化目标和其

意义，便须考虑费希特如何重新定位人类认知和意志的结构并将之与所谓的“哥

白尼式革命”联系起来。这表明，不仅系统化是一个无限的奋进过程，而且费希

特中，非我的关系特性其实呼应着自然的先验目的性。

康德式的希望与人类未来

Andrew Chignell

在本次简短的报告中，我要讨论康德对于“我可以希望什么？”这一问题的

回答，并且将其与我们当下关于类族的未来的焦虑和愿景联系起来。以这种方式，

我将把康德的一个道德证明重构为一种广义上的心理学论证（“出自绝望的论

证”），并指出它的一个版本在当代语境中仍然具有吸引力。

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agrees with Leibniz that we should somehow include “force” in the essence/nature of body in order to think properly about the laws of nature that are fundamental to physical explanations. Unlike Leibniz, however, Kant would not treat this as a claim about the real essence of things considered in themselves.

Systematization: The Idealist Ideal in Kant and Fichte Plato Tse

The future of humanity, in a Kantian light, consists in an ideal accordance with the ends of reason, which suggests that Enlightenment is a never-ending project. Reason’s legislative prescriptions demand that “our diverse modes of knowledge must not be permitted to be a mere rhapsody, but must form a system.” (A833/B861) The zeal for systematicity has been said to be the philosophical ambition that determines and drives the development of German idealism. There are two ways to unpack this claim. In most accounts of German idealism, Fichte’s agenda of Wissenschaftslehre, being influenced by Reinhold’s Elementarphilosophie, was initially conceived as an attempt to systematize Kant’s transcendental idealism by identifying its hidden premise – the so-called first fundamental principle. Taken in this light, the enterprise of systematization was then largely concerned with a theoretical modification internal to the historical development of transcendental idealism. Another way, perhaps a better way, of grasping the ideal of systematization involved in the transition from Kant to Fichte is to consider how Fichte’s re-orientation of the structure of human cognition and conation ties into the general spirit of Copernican revolution. This suggests not only that systematization is an infinite process of striving, but also that the relationality of the Not-I in Fichte is consequent upon the a priori ascription of purposiveness to nature.

Kantian Hope and the Future of Humanity Andrew Chignell

In this brief talk, I discuss Kant’s answers to the question “What may I hope? (Was darf ich hoffen?)” and relate them to our present anxieties and aspirations regarding the future of the species. Along the way, I reconstruct one of Kant’s moral proofs as a broadly psychological argument (an “argument from despair”), and suggest that a version of it still has attractions in our contemporary context.

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康德论宽恕的二律背反：一种世俗化的理解

Patrick Frierson 倪逸偲译

本论文将用康德《单纯理性界限内的宗教》中鲜为人知的几个二律背反（AA

6:116-8）来讨论人们生活中宽恕的本质与作用。首先，笔者将以解经的方式解

读这一二律背反，即讨论这一二律背反的若干独到要点，并凸显上帝的宽恕“凭

借外来的救赎”（AA 6:117）与人性之恶和解的关键作用。本文的核心部分则专

注于以一种世俗的方式来读解这一二律背反。笔者将考察那些引发了这一二律背

反的问题，并且考察“人际宽恕”是否能够、以及多大程度上能够发挥康德所赋

予给神圣宽恕的作用。

最后，笔者将论证，人际宽恕大有拓展空间，而拓展这一理论对于思考康德

的二律背反学说的影响而言有两重积极意义：首先，专注于人际宽恕而不是神圣

宽恕使我们得以用另一角度考察宽恕的二律背反的反题。康德只考虑了从思辨理

性或者说需要宽恕的能动者的立场来看会怎么样；而一旦我们从人际的角度思考

宽恕，我们也就能去问，从给出宽恕的一方的角度来看，能做什么？又该做什么？

在神圣宽恕的语境下要实现这些，就意味着要以逾越（人类）理性为前提。而本

文的一大目标便在于在讨论宽恕时维护康德的立场，即坚持正题优先的同时也更

公正地对待反题的洞见。

但是，为了使得笔者的世俗化读解能够彻底替代康德的神圣恩惠学说，笔者

对于人类道德境况的基本立场是强建构主义的。康德式的建构主义一般来说与罗

尔斯、科斯嘉德、与奥尼尔联系在一起的，专注于道德或政治的法则、规则、与

规范的本质。而笔者试图进一步推进建构主义的立场。康德《单纯理性界限内的

宗教》的一个基础洞见便是道德生活不仅仅是去决定遵守何种法则或是以什么准

则为行为基准。道德生活也包括从整体上去评估一个人的生活的道德状态。我在

本文中要论证的便是，一个人的生活的整体的道德状态，或者说人类生活所有道

德可能性范围，都是被以能动者们能够并且应当回应其他能动者的行动的方式建

构出来的。本文的基本观点便是，当个体彼此宽恕时，他们也引发了新的道德可

能性。一个被宽恕的人虽然在道德上是恶的，但仍能够拥有一种特定的善良意志，

而这不是一种（上帝的）神圣意志抑或是一种（耶稣的或是斯多亚圣贤们的）完

善的有限意志，这种特定的善良意志是一种从邪恶中改悔并被宽恕的意志。

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Kant’s antinomy of forgiveness: a secular account Patrick FRIERSON

This paper uses one of Kant’s lesser known antinomies (from Religion 6:116-8) to think about the nature and role of forgiveness in human life. I start with a brief and properly exegetical reading of this antinomy that discusses several unique features of the antinomy and highlights the central role for God’s forgiveness in order to “reconcile through foreign satisfaction” human evil. The core of the paper, however, focuses on a secular reading of the antinomy. I examine the problem that generates the antinomy and consider whether and to what extent interpersonal human forgiveness can play that role that Kant’s ascribes to divine forgiveness.

In the end, I will argue that interpersonal forgiveness can go quite far, and seeing how far it can go has two helpful implications for thinking through the implications of Kant’s antinomy. First, focusing on interpersonal rather than divine forgiveness opens up the possibility of another perspective on the antithesis of the antinomy. Kant considers only what can be said from the standpoint of speculative reason or from the standpoint of an agent who needs forgiveness. Once we start thinking about forgiveness in interpersonal terms, however, we can also ask what can and should be done from the perspective of the one proffering forgiveness. To attempt this in the context of divine forgiveness would be a presumption that would, at least arguably, involve overstepping the limits of (human) reason. One claim of this paper is that looking at forgiveness from this perspective vindicates Kant’s prioritization of the thesis while doing better justice to the insight of the antithesis.

More radically, however, in order to make my secular reading do the work that Kant does with divine mercy, I posit a strongly constructivist account of humans’ moral condition. Kantian constructivism in general, most commonly associated with interpreters like John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, Onoro O’Neill typically focuses on the nature of moral or political laws, rules, or norms. I want to push constructivism a step further. One fundamental insight of Kant’s Religion is that moral life is not merely about deciding what laws to obey or maxims to act upon. Moral life also involves assessing the moral state of one’s life as a whole. What I argue in this paper is that the moral state of one’s life as a whole, and even the range of moral possibilities for human lives, is constructed by the ways that agents can and should respond to one another’s actions. The basic idea is that when individuals forgive one another, they bring about new moral possibilities. Rather than merely being morally evil, a forgiven person can have a certain kind of good will, neither a holy will (which only God can have) nor even a perfect, finite will (which a stoic sage or Jesus might have), but a repentant-from-evil-and-forgiven will.

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“理性的致命一跃”：康德对恩典学的改造及其意义辨析

——兼论奥古斯丁与康德自由意志思想的张力

张荣

“理性“致命的一跃”虽然是在《宗教》一书中讨论教会信仰向纯粹宗教信

仰的过渡时提出来的，彰显出理性与恩典之间的张力，但这种张力同样存在于康

德的整个哲学中。

在《纯粹理性批判》“先验感性论”部分，康德提到的原初给予者（物自体）

是一个“绝对者”，离开这个绝对者，杂多的身份就是一个奥秘。这构成康德理

性哲学中最大的奥秘，面对这样的物自体，我们必须对人类理智进行悬置（das

Wissen aufheben)。除了感性物（杂多）的被给予，康德还必须面对感性和知性

“形式”的绝对被给予。一切自我所具有的先天认识形式和能力，说到底也是一

个奥秘。再如为为人所只的感性与知性的共同根——“先验想象力”以及“不为

我们人类所拥有的理智直观”。这种“本源直观"是和有限的理性存在者相区别的

原初存在者所独具的能力。最能反映传统的恩典与自由这一主题的莫过于绝对自

发性与先验自由这一奥秘。理性的绝对自发性说到底和（实践）理性之被给予这

一事实有关，和恩典有关，尽管这种恩典已不再是传统的恩典，而是理性参与其

中的恩典。

在奥古斯丁的“双重自由”观中，一种理性的视野被蕴含在恩典学说中，在

康德的理性自由观中也存在恩典的影子。真正的自由不单单（nicht bloss）是意志

的自律，“决断的他律”也是一个维度，只有通过它，“上帝的他律”才会与“意

志自律”真正对应，作为道德公设的“意志自由”之假定才能成为必然且必要的，

从道德走向宗教的必然性才是可理解的。因此，康德在《单纯理性界限内的宗教》

中才着手解决上帝的他律和人的自律的关系问题，恩典与理性的关系才会成为

《宗教》的主要课题。

奥古斯丁基于神义论讨论人的自由，更多地是在惩罚意义上讨论原罪之被惩

罚的合法性根据，法则是外在于人的自由决断的，宇宙法则（包括道德法则）的

颁布者不是人的自由决断，而是上帝的永恒意志，上帝有绝对的自由，他才能立

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“Salto Mortale of reason”: Analysis on Kant’s Reformation

of Grace Doctrines and Its Significance

– On the Tension of Free Will Thought between Augustine and Kant

Zhang Rong “Salto Mortale of reason” shows the tension between reason and grace when it was put forward in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone on discussing the transition from church beliefs to purely religious beliefs. The tension, however, exists in all Kant’s philosophy.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic in Critique of Pure Reason, Kant mentions that the primitive giver (the thing in itself) is an “absolute” and without which the identity of the manifold is a mystery. This constitutes the greatest mystery in Kant’s rational philosophy. Facing such the thing in itself, we must make the epoche (das Wissen aufheben) of human reason. Besides the sensory things (manifold) being given, Kant must face the absolute given of the form of sensibility and understanding. All our a priori cognitive form and ability, after all, is a mystery. Another examples are the uncomprehending common root of sensibility and understanding— “the transcendental imagination” and “the intelligible intuition which is not owned by us”. This “intuitus originarius” is a unique ability of the original being which differs from finite intellectual being. The traditional theme of grace and freedom best reflected in the mystery of absolute spontaneity and transcendental freedom. The absolute spontaneity of reason, after all, is related to the fact of the given of (practical) reason, that is, to grace. Although this grace is not the traditional grace anymore, but the grace of reason’s participation.

In the notion of “dual freedom" from Augustine, a horizon of the reason is involved in the doctrine of grace. And in the notion of rational freedom of Kant, there is also the shadow of grace. The true freedom is not solely (nicht bloss) the autonomy of will (Wille). The heteronomy of will (Willkür) is also a dimension and only through it the God’s heteronomy will truly correspond with the autonomy of will (Wille). The assumption of freedom of will as moral postulate can be inevitable and necessary, and the inevitability from morality to religion is understandable. Hence, not until in Religion does Kant begin to solve the problem of the relation between God’s heteronomy and human’s autonomy, the relation of grace and reason become the main subject of Religion.

Augustine’s discussion of man’s freedom on the basis of theodicy is more about the legitimacy of the punishment of original sin in the sense of punishment. The law is outside of man’s free will (Willkür), and the promulgator of the law of the cosmos

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法。在康德那里，人可以为自己立法，自由意志是道德法则的颁布者，康德把道

德法则与自由意志始终看做一个整体。道德法则是自由的认识根据，自由是道德

法则的存在根据，自由的本质是自律。从根本上看，奥古斯丁的决断自由终归服

从于恩典的自由，只有这样，才能成就“善良意志”，即对上帝的服从。所以奥

古斯丁的自由是意志的他律。而康德的自由意志学说虽然也和他对人性根本恶的

解释有关，但他更关注改恶从善，成就善良意志，为道德立法的关键还是意志自

律。这就是康德对传统恩典学的改造，也是他那个著名的“恩典学是理性致命的

一跃”的题中应有之义。

自爱的空洞性与恶的无穷表达

吕超

根据康德在《纯然理性限度内的宗教》中对道德恶的定义，恶存在于自由决

断(Willkür)将“道德法则”（以及从属于它的道德动机）和“自爱原则”（以及可

归于它之下的非-道德动机）同时纳入准则时，将后者置于前者之上的行动。然

而在许多研究者眼中，康德的自爱原则太过平庸、太过狭窄、也太过温和，以至

于他对道德恶的定义，无法解释恶在人类现实生活中近乎无穷无尽的表现。事实

上，这是柏拉图意义上的“一如何统辖多”的老问题在康德哲学中的翻版：即，

康德哲学中恶的单一本质，如何解释现实中恶的多重表达？

针对以上对康德的批评，Sharon Anderson-Gold、Allen Wood、和其他辩护者

试图证明以下观点：康德的自爱原则并不仅仅局限于个人幸福这个目标，自爱原

则也并不只关涉到自然欲望的满足。实际上，当被置于社会语境时，自爱原则可

以通过个人对某些意识形态的认同，把共同体的幸存和繁荣当作目标，并且扩展

到追求“社会性激情”(social passions)的满足，然而，对个人而言，这些激情却

可能给他（她）带来伤害甚至毁灭。康德的辩护者声称，以上这种对自爱原则的

更广义的理解，可以从《纯然理性限度内的宗教》中讨论“人性禀赋”、“比较性

的自爱”、和“文化恶习”的段落发展出来，这种理解可以轻易地解释人类现实

生活中各种各样的恶行。

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(moral principle included) is not the man’s free will (Willkür), but God’s eternal will, for that God has absolute freedom and therefore he can legislate. In Kant, people can legislate for themselves, and free will (Wille) is the promulgator of moral laws. Kant always regards moral laws and free will as a whole. The moral law is the cognitive ground of freedom, and freedom is the existential ground of moral laws. The essence of freedom is autonomy. Fundamentally, Augustine’s freedom of will (Willkür) ultimately obeys the freedom of grace, and only in this way can the “good will” be accomplished, that is, obedience to God. Therefore, Augustine’s freedom is the will’s heteronomy. Kant’s doctrine of free will is related to his explanation of the fundamental evil of human nature. However, he is more concerned about reforming evil to be good, achieving good will, and the key to moral legislation is still will’s autonomy. This is Kant’s reformation of the traditional doctrine of grace, and his proper meaning of the famous “the doctrine of grace is salto mortale of reason".

The Emptiness of Self-love and the Infinite Manifestations of Evil

Lv Chao According to Kant’s definition of moral evil in Religion within the Boundaries of

Mere Reason, evil consists in Willkür’s act of prioritizing the principle of self-love (along with non-moral incentives) over the moral law (along with moral incentives) when Willkür incorporates both principles into its maxims. However, Kant’s principle of self-love is often criticized by scholars for being too banal, too narrow, and too mild to explain almost infinite manifestations of evil in real human life. As a matter of fact, this criticism concerns the Kantian version of that old Platonic question of “how the One subsumes the Many under itself”: namely, how does the single essence of evil in Kant’s philosophy make sense of the manifold expressions of evil in reality?

Against the aforesaid criticism, Sharon Anderson-Gold, Allen Wood, and other defenders of Kant try to make the following point: the Kantian notion of self-love should by no means be restricted to pursuit of individual happiness, nor does this self-love merely involve satisfaction of natural desires. In fact, when the principle of self-love is posited under a social context, it can be re-oriented towards survival and prosperity of a community through individuals identifying themselves with certain ideologies. Also, self-love may extend itself to pursuit of social passions, while these passions will probably cause harm or even destruction to individuals. Moreover, Kant’s defenders argue that this broader understanding of self-love, which easily explains manifold expressions of evil in reality, can be developed from Kant’s discussion of the predisposition to humanity, comparative self-love, and cultural vices in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.

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本篇论文旨在进一步发展上述更广义的自爱概念，由此为康德对道德恶的

理解，提供一种逻辑上更彻底的辩护。

本文的基本论证分为三步。

首先，在先验层面，道德法则和自爱原则可以被重新解释为属于人类自由的

两条基本原则。其中，道德法则是构成自由存在者所组成的共同体的“普遍性”

原则，因为它规定了自我与自我的关系、自我与他者的关系所应当采取的“普遍

性形式”。而自爱原则是自由存在者所组成的共同体的“特殊性”原则，因为它

代表着共同体中每个自我的“特殊质料”。于是，在先验层面，道德恶可以被我

们重新理解为：在自由存在者的共同体中，将“特殊性”置于“普遍性”之上。

其次，自爱作为“特殊性原则”的这一先验规定，并不能预先决定它拥有这

样或那样的经验规定。换言之，从先验的角度看，自爱原则并不必然需要拥有某

种特定的经验内容。这意味着：在现实经验中，该原则可以自由地附着于任何对

象，将该对象采纳为自我概念的经验内容，由此任意地规定自我的善和自我的幸

福所涉及的要素。同时，自爱原则永远可以通过不断地更换附着的对象，使自我

概念的经验内容不断变更，从而改变自我的善和自我的幸福所涉及的要素。

最后，由于自爱原则在经验层面的这种本质上的空洞性，以及由此而来的自

我概念的经验内容的永恒可变性，在先验层面被我们重新理解为“将特殊性置于

普遍性之上”的道德之恶，在经验层面便可以获得无穷多样的表达，甚至在某些

极端处境中，体现在貌似魔鬼性的恶行之中（然而实际上，这些恶行依旧被自爱

原则所驱动，因此，严格地说，只是“类似”魔鬼性的、而并非真正是魔鬼性的）。

总之，和许多批评者的最初印象相反，从康德看似平庸、狭窄、温和的自爱概念、

以及他对道德恶似乎过于简单的定义中，我们可以发展出对现实生活中无穷多样

的恶行的非常充分的解释。

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Inspired by Sharon Anderson-Gold and Allen Wood, my article will attempt at a further development of this broader notion of Kantian self-love and in this way offer a logically-speaking more thorough defense of Kant’s understanding of moral evil.

The general line of my argument is divided into three steps. First and foremost, I will argue that the moral law and the principle of self-love

can be re-interpreted at the transcendental level as two fundamental principles of human freedom. Among these two principles, the moral law can be called “the principle of universality” constitutive of the community of free agents, because it prescribes “the universal form” that every self-relation and relation to others among free agents should take up. On the contrary, the principle of self-love can be called “the principle of particularity” constitutive of the community of free agents, because it represents “the particular material” belonging to every particular self in this community. Hence, at the transcendental level, moral evil can be re-understood by us as “placing particularity above universality in the community of free agents”.

However, the transcendental determination of self-love (i.e. “particularity”) by no means pre-destines that self-love should take this or that empirical determination. To put it in another way, if we observe the principle of self-love from the transcendental perspective, we will find that this principle does not necessarily need to have this or that empirical content. This means: when it comes to real experience, the principle of self-love can freely fix itself onto any object, take this object as the empirical content of one’s self-conception, and in this manner arbitrarily decide what kind of crucial elements his/her good or happiness involves. In the meanwhile, the principle of self-love is always able to unceasingly change the very object it fixes itself onto, thereby unceasingly changing the empirical content of one’s self-conception and the crucial elements his/her good or happiness involves.

Finally, due to this essential emptiness of self-love at the empirical level and the eternal changeability of empirical self-conception resulting from such emptiness, moral evil (which is re-defined by us as “prioritizing particularity over universality” at the transcendental level) may acquire infinitely manifold expressions at the empirical level. Under extreme circumstances, moral evil may even manifest itself through those so-called diabolical behaviors, while these behaviors are actually motivated by self-love and hence strictly-speaking only quasi-diabolical rather than truly diabolical. So, quite opposite to many critics’ initial impression, from Kant’s prima facie banal, narrow, and mild notion of self-love as well as his seemingly over-simplistic definition of moral evil, we are able to develop a very sufficient account for infinite expressions of evil in our real human life.

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分组会议（五）：

离开人类视角的尝试：“先验辩证论”中的先天试验

Rachel Zuckert 倪逸偲译

如果大家认为康德的先验唯心论是在主张，人类是从一个特定的人类视角来

认识事物的话，笔者会认为这是有问题的。这也即是说，一般而言，当我们说有

人是从一个视角来观察事物的时，我们会认为其他人有着其他视角，而且会认为

其他人能够改变他们的视角，从一个视角转移到另一个视角。人之所以可以认定

自己的视角是一个视角，是因为他将自己的视角与他人的视角比对，或是通过从

一个新的角度来回顾先前的视角。但是，康德从他的人类认知视角出发，拒斥了

视角的复多性与可变性。因而人们有理由担心康德的观点是不一致的：康德主张

我们只能从一个视角来认识事物，但是我们必须同时置身于如此这般的视角“之

外”，才能认定这一视角。而笔者尝试通过解读《纯粹理性批判》中的“先验辩

证论”来对这一问题提出一个康德式的回应。当我们试图认识那些超越于我们的

经验之外的事物时，我们会试图去离开人类的视角；在“先验辩证论”中，康德

论证了这会使得人陷入矛盾与空洞的思中。但笔者认为，这些失败的尝试使得人

类认识者（如康德所描述的）得以从一个新的视角出发来认定先前的人类视角；

但是，这些失败的尝试并不能真正替代那个被普遍共享的必然的人类认知视角。

因此，笔者提出，我们可以这样解读康德在《纯粹理性批判》B 版前言中的主张：

离开人类视角是一个试验性的、失败的尝试，而先验辩证论则是由这个先天试验

确证的结果——“一个极好的试金石”（《纯粹理性批判》，B XVIII）。

超验本原与暴力的神圣者

Jeremiah Alberg 倪逸偲译

康德在认知意义上使用视觉陷阱的比喻，提出了一种独特的关于错误的理论，

即所谓的“先验幻象”，也即是说，事物显现为它们本来不是的样子。而更费解

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Parallel Sessions V:

Attempting to Exit the Human Perspective:

A Priori Experimentation in the Transcendental Dialectic

Rachel Zuckert I consider a problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism if one construes it as a claim that human beings know from a particular, human perspective. Namely: ordinarily, when we speak someone seeing from a perspective, we understand other people to have other perspectives, and think that people can change their perspectives by moving away from them, to a different one. So one may recognize that one’s own perspective is a perspective: by comparing to others, by seeing a former perspective from a new vantage point. But Kant denies such plurality and variability for his human cognitive perspective. Thus one may worry that Kant’s view is incoherent: Kant claims that we can know only from one perspective, yet, in order to recognize that perspective as such, he himself must stand “outside” of it. I consider a potential Kantian response to this charge, by way of interpreting the Dialectic of the first Critique. When one attempts to know things that lie beyond experience, one attempts to exit the human perspective; in the Dialectic, Kant argues that in doing so, one falls into contradictions and empty thinking. These failed attempts, I suggest, allow human knowers (and Kant describing them) to recognize the human perspective as such – by taking up a different vantage point, as it were – but also, as failures, do not constitute a true alternative to the universally shared, necessary human cognitive perspective. So, I propose, can one interpret Kant’s claim in the B Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason that the Dialectic is a confirming result – a “splendid touchstone” -- in an a priori experiment: it is an experimental, failed attempt to exit the human perspective.

Transcendent Principles and the Violent Sacred

Jeremiah Alberg In his optical metaphor for a cognitive trompe-l’œil, Kant proposes a unique theory of error, the ‘transcendental illusion.’ It is a theory that things appear to be what they are not. More puzzlingly, the problems arising from this condition, i.e. the illusion’s chronic influence, are, Kant argued, apparently “unavoidable” and “inevitable.” Each person is

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的问题是，康德认为这些幻象的持续影响显然是“不可避免的”。每一个人都会

受到有害的幻象的影响，“这种幻象影响着那些根本不是着眼于经验来运用的本

原”（《纯粹理性批判》，B 352）。这一思维的失调导致我们认为这些本原可以是

建构性的，而我们能够认识物自身。但根据《纯粹理性批判》，这些同样的本原

却是范导性的，它们给思想带来秩序、体系、与建筑术的要素。但秩序与失调这

两组对立的结果不仅来源于一个共同的源头，更是不可分割地紧密相连地。我们

如果不把这些本原当作是建构性的，不凭靠怀疑论的方法识破我们的错误，就无

法达到秩序、体系、与建筑术。这正是《纯粹理性批判》的常见“工作”。这种幻象究竟如何产生？而又是什么导致了这样的不幸？康德对此没有解

释，正如他也没有解释意志是如何转向邪恶的。但是，康德直观到，一种欲求的

能力先行于那些先验本原。理性欲求无条件者。这一欲求导致了辩证论及其问题。

我们可以从两个方式分析这个问题：我们可以看到，人们对于无条件者的欲求是

成问题的，是会导致冲突的，或者，我们可以看到，人类自身之内的冲突导致了

无条件者。超越得以出现，是因为冲突产生了超越。

理想回溯到无条件者是为了理解自身；因为理性外在于它得以生成的东西。

但是理性试图凭靠那个最初产生了理性的东西来回溯起源：暴力，尤其是论辩的

暴力，或者说，二律背反。康德在纯粹理性的二律背反中所勾画出的冲突是一种

斗争的形式。斗争加剧了两部分间的对立，却又同时抹去了两者间的差异。它导

致了一种无差异化。两种立场互相争斗，每一种都试图击败另一种从而实现统一

体。因此，对统一体本身的欲求产生了无尽的冲突。这就意味着，理性回溯自身

起源的每一步都变得在远离那个起源。康德察觉到，斗争的互相暴力使得理性设

定了一个先验对象 X，这是斗争的两者都欲求却都不能拥有的。这就是人类理性

的“绝对者”，而这又把理性迫向它的“理想”——一位暴力的神。

智能与判断力南星

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under a baleful illusion that “influences principles whose use is not ever meant for experience” (Transcendental Dialectic, B 352). A disorder of thinking leads us to conclude that the principles are somehow constitutive, that we can know things in themselves. But these same principles, seen in their proper light, the light of the critique, can be understood as being regulative, in which case they bring order, system, and an architectonic element to thought. These two opposed outcomes, disorder and order, not only spring from a common source but they also are indissolubly connected. One does not get to the order, the system, and the architectonic without thinking these principles as constitutive and then seeing through one’s error thanks to a skeptical method. This is the familiar “work” of the Critique of Pure Reason.

How does this illusion come about and what eventuates this misfortune? Kant leaves this unexplained much in the same way he leaves unexplained the will’s turn to evil. However, Kant intuits that underlying the transcendent principles is a faculty of desire. Reason desires the unconditioned. This desire leads to the dialectic and its problems. We can analyze this in two ways. We can see that human desire for the unconditioned is problematic and causes conflict or we can see that the conflict between human beings themselves causes the unconditioned. Transcendence arises because of the conflict that produces it.

Reason reaches back for the unconditioned in order to understand itself; because it is out of that which it emerged. But reason tries to find its way back to its origin via the very thing that produced it in the first place: violence, in particular the violence of polemics or the Antinomy. The conflict that Kant delineates in the Antinomy of Pure Reason is a form of rivalry. Rivalry increases the opposition between two parties while erasing the differences between them. It leads to undifferentiation. Two positions battle each other, each seeking to vanquish the other and thereby achieve a kind of unity. Thus, the desire for unity itself produces endless conflict. This simply means that every step towards its origin becomes a step away. Kant senses that the reciprocal violence of rivalry leads reason to posit a transcendental object X, that both rivals desire but which neither can have. This is the ‘absolute’ of human reason, and it pushes reason to its “Ideal” - a violent god.

Intelligence and Judgment Xing Nan

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西方哲学传统中，人们长期以来都将理性或理智看作最主要的认识能力，而

直到康德的时代，人们才开始注意到判断力的重要性。另一方面，英国哲学家吉

尔伯特·赖尔通过在“智能”与“理智”间做出区分，对他称之为“唯理智论的

传奇”对传统学说进行了强有力的攻击。在本文中，我尝试将康德的判断力学说

和赖尔的智能概念联系起来，指出二者间存在着根本性的相似之处，从而对传统

哲学中关于理智的学说形成了重要的补充。与此同时，我试图表明，赖尔的智能

概念中还存在着一些困难，而康德的判断力学说至少在某些方面对于我们更加深

入地理解乃至解决这些困难来说，具有重要的启发作用。

具体而言，赖尔首先将智能理解为一种“无规则的合规则性”的能力，它使

得人们在不诉诸明确规则的情况下，通过遵守规则来完成一系列复杂的任务。其

次，最终说来，我们无法给出如何遵守规则的规则；换句话说，遵守规则的能力

无法化约为关于规则的理论知识。最后，这一能力并非天赋的，而是在实践中习

得的，并且在每一次行使的过程中，人们仍然在学习和创新。然而，赖尔并没有

说明“无规则的合规则性”这一颇为吊诡的现象是如何可能的，也没有对在学习

与创新中展现出的那种“举一反三”的特征作出更加深入的解释。

康德对判断力的看法与赖尔的智能概念极为相似，而他同样没有对刚才提到

的那些难题给出直接的解答。不过，借助于康德在《判断力批判》中提出的“无

目的的合目的性”这一概念，我试图为判断力在运用中展现出的“无规则的合规

则性”找到一定的根据。在康德看来，我们在纯粹品味判断中所获得的快感，其

来源在于想象力和知性的自由游戏中展现出的和谐，而这一和谐的根据则在于我

们在对象中发现的某种无目的的合目的性。

但在我看来，尽管我们在审美判断中会产生一种和谐感，但将它归结为两种

心灵能力的自由游戏的说法是难以理解的，同时这种感受也并不仅仅局限于审美

判断当中。正是这种和谐感使得判断力的运用中展现出无规则的合规则性成为可

能。这一和谐感可以出现在许多新的、未曾预料的情形下；它的获得和培养是一

个生物学过程。我们虽然可以对这一过程进行研究和控制，但无法对这一和谐感

本身做进一步的说明。我们也许无法在不同的载体上完全模拟产生这一和谐感的

生物过程，但只要我们能够模拟其中与认知相关的那一部分，就能够在这一载体

上实现智能的功能。

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In the Western philosophical tradition, intellect or reason has been long regarded as the most important cognitive faculty, and it was not until Kant that people began to notice the importance of judgment. More recently, Gilbert Ryle launched a powerful attack on the traditional doctrine, which he aptly called “the intellectualist legend”, by means of the distinction between “intelligence” and “intellect”. In this paper, I try to link Kant's theory of judgment with Ryle's concept of intelligence, pointing out that there are fundamental similarities between them, which form an important supplement to the traditional theory of the intellect. At the same time, I try to show that there are still some difficulties in Ryle's account of intelligence, and Kant's theory of judgment may contribute, at least in some aspects, to a deeper appreciation and even the solution of these difficulties.

More specifically, Ryle understands intelligence as a capacity of “regularity without rules”, which enables us to complete a set of complex tasks by following the rules without appealing to explicit rules. Then he argues that we cannot, in the end, give rules about how to follow the rules. In other words, the activity of rule-following cannot be reduced to theoretical knowledge about the rules. Finally, this capacity is not innate, but must be learnt in practice. And in the exercise of it, people are still learning and innovating. However, Ryle does not tell us how the phenomenon of “regularity without rules”, which seems rather paradoxical, is possible; nor does he provide any substantive explanation of the mechanisms of learning and innovation.

Kant’s view of judgment is very similar to Ryle’s concept of intelligence, and he does not give any direct answer to the problems just mentioned, either. However, by appealing to Kant's concept of “purposiveness without purpose” in the Critique of Judgment, I try to find a basis for the “regularity without rules” that is displayed in the exercise of the judgment. In Kant's view, the pleasure we find in pure judgment of taste results from the harmony attained in the free play between imagination and intellect, and the ground of this harmony lies in certain kind of “purposiveness without purpose” we find in the object.

In my opinion, however, although we have a sense of harmony in aesthetic judgments, the thesis that it results from a free play of two cognitive faculties is hardly intelligible. On the other hand, this feeling is not limited to aesthetic judgment alone. It is this sense of harmony that makes the regularity without rules in the use of judgment possible, and this sense of harmony can occur in many new and unanticipated ways. The acquisition and cultivation of this sense is a biological process. Although we can study and even manipulate this process, we cannot explain this sense of harmony itself any further. And while we may not be able to fully simulate the biological process that produce this sense of harmony on different bases, the function of the intelligence can be realized on them if we can simulate the part of the process that is relevant to cognition.

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康德存在论的景象

刘创馥

本文首先对康德在“先验分析论”末尾关于“无”的四重区分展开分析。这

一分析表明，每一种“无”都在某种方式上对应着一个特定的对象概念，而所有

这些概念都统一在作为先验哲学的最高统一体的对象一般的概念之下。这四种对

象概念将被分别刻画为意义的对象、思想的对象、想象的对象和认识的对象。我

们将对想象的对象与认识的对象之间的区分给予进一步的关注，并且会提出一种

反对关于先验唯心论的现象主义解读的论证。

康德的观念论、及其如何以批判方式来反对超验实在论

戴华

康德在《纯粹理性批判》的“谬误论证”中指出：“所有反对都可分为独断的、

批判的和怀疑论式的等三种”(A 388)。关于前两种，他告诉我们：“独断的反对

旨在推翻一个命题，批判的反对则旨在推翻一个命题的证明”。如果被反对的是

一个具有“A 是 B”这样形式的命题 P，那么独断的反对者想要主张的是“P 不

成立”，批判的反对者想要主张的则是“P 欠缺理据（groundless)”。特别是在《批

判》的分析篇和辩证篇中，康德常用其超验观念论所诉诸的“显相”(appearances)

和物自身这个区分来设想，如果“显相是物自身”，则会有怎样的知识论上的结

果。此一设想的前提“显相是物自身”表面上是个“等同语句”，且似乎用来表

达康德所反对的超验实在论。果真如此，则康德对于该学说的反对乃属独断而非

批判的类型，而他自己的超验观念论则主张“显相不是物自身”，亦即二者在数

目上不等同。该主张让康德在显相和物自身之间所作的“超验区分”，可以经由

伍德(Allen Wood)所谓的“因果(causality)诠释”来理解。根据该诠释：事物透过

影响我们的感官而在我们心灵中产生表征；尽管这些表征构成我们可认知的显相，

与之对应但不等同的物自身则不可知。

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The Landscape of Kant’s Ontology Chong-Fuk Lau

The paper begins with an analysis of Kant’s fourfold distinction of nothing at the end of the Transcendental Analytic. It argues that each kind of nothing corresponds, in a certain way, to a particular concept of object, all united under the concept of an object in general as the highest unity of transcendental philosophy. The four concepts of objects will be characterized as the object of meaning, the object of thought, the object of imagination, and the object of cognition respectively. Closer attention will be given to the distinction between objects of imagination and of cognition, and an argument will be made against the phenomenalist reading of transcendental idealism.

Kant’s Idealism and His Critical Objection to

Transcendental Realism

Terence Hua Tai In the A-Paralogisms chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant points out that “[a]ll objections can be divided into dogmatic, critical and skeptical ones” (A 388). Of the first two kinds of objections, he says, “A dogmatic objection is one that is directed against a proposition, but a critical one is directed against the proof of a proposition”. Thus, a dogmatic objection to a proposition in the form of an identity statement “A is B” will argue that A is not B, and a critical one will hold it to be, in Kant’s word, “groundless”. Now, in the Analytic and the Dialectic, Kant often uses the distinction in which his transcendental idealism is couched between “appearances” and “things in themselves” by arguing hypothetically about what would be the case if “appearances were things in themselves”. As it stands, the antecedent may seem to be an identity statement that Kant uses to represent the position of transcendental realism. If so, his transcendental idealism must be understood in terms of the non-identity statement that appearances are not things in themselves. His objection to transcendental realism must then be “dogmatic” rather than “critical”. This “dogmatic” reading will have Kant hold that appearances and things in themselves are numerically distinct. It further leads to what Allen Wood terms the “causality” interpretation of Kant’s “transcendental distinction” between appearances and things in themselves: things cause representations in us by affecting our senses, and while these representations are to be taken as appearances that we can cognize, we cannot cognize things in themselves as such.

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然而，康德在《批判》第二版序言中，曾特别使用他所谓的“双重观点”来

说明上述“超验区分”：从该观点，“相同的对象可一方面被理解成我们透过感官

和知性所认知的对象，另一方面被理解成理性独自努力超越经验时，充其量仅只

加以思考的对象”(B xviii-xix, footnote)。这项双重观点使得康德稍后又指出，“对

象”一词必须透过一种“双重意义”来理解，亦即：一方面意指显相，另一方面

意指物自身(B xxvii)。在此，显相和物自身是同一对象的“一体两面”，因此其间

不可能存在因果关系。伍德将此一理解称为“等同(identity)诠释”。

等同和因果诠释看似彼此水火不容。不过，我认为可以将它们调和在一起，

尽管前者更贴近康德的“超验区分”。康德在特定脉络中使用“显相”一词时，

有时候会完整地用“作为表征的显相”(appearances as representations)或者“作为

经验对象的显相”(appearances as objects of experience)来表明他的意思。这两个

意味的“显相”同时出现在“第二类比”的以下一句话中：“就显相而言，如果

我们不是因为（作为表征的）显相是对象[译按：可理解成所谓的‘意向对象’

(intentional objects)]，而只是因为它们指称[客观存在的]对象，那么，‘对象’一

词的意思为何，就需要我们更深入探究”(A 189-90/B 234-5)。让我们用“R-显相”

来代表“作为表征的显相”，另外用“O-显相”来代表“作为经验对象的显相”。

对康德而言，R-显相可被视为我们意识的“意向对象”，而 O-显相则必须是“对

应于、因此也不等同于[R-显相]”(A 104)的客观对象。R-显相是否以及如何可能

指称客观对象，是康德认为“我们需要更深入探究”的课题。有了 R-显相和 O-

显相的区分，我将用论证来支持“等同诠释”，但该论证不会将“因果诠释”弃

之不顾。为了提出这套论证，我会试着厘清两件事：当康德用“显相是物自身”

来表达他所反对的超验实在论，那句话究竟该如何理解？他是以独断还是批判的

方式来反对该实在论？

康德的先验主体是认识对象吗？

梁议众

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But this causal relation between things in themselves and appearances runs counter to what Kant calls in the B-Preface a “twofold standpoint” from which “the same objects can be considered from two different sides, on the one side as objects of the senses and the understanding for experience, and on the other side as objects that are merely thought at most for isolated reason striving beyond the bounds of experience” (B xviii-xix, footnote). This gives the “twofold meaning” in which Kant later says the word ‘object’ “should be taken…, namely as appearance or as thing in itself” (B xxvii). According to the twofold standpoint or meaning, “appearances” are what Kant speaks of as “objects of experience [or possible experience]”, where these same objects, which we can cognize as “appearances”, can also be considered as “things in themselves”. Here we have what Wood terms the “identity” interpretation of Kant’s troublesome transcendental distinction.

The “identity” and “causality” interpretations are incompatible as they stand. But I will argue that they can be reconciled, though only in a way that makes the former better suited to account for Kant’s transcendental distinction. Kant sometimes makes clear what he means by “appearances” by using either the phrase ‘appearances as representations’ or ‘appearances as objects of [possible] experience’. This distinction between two senses of the word ‘appearances’ is involved in a single statement when he says in the Second Analogy that “what this word [‘object’] is to mean in the case of appearances, not insofar as they are (as representations) objects, but rather “appearances” are what Kant speaks of as “objects of experience [or possible experience]”, where these same objects, which we can cognize as “appearances”, can also be considered as “things in themselves”. Here we have what Wood terms the “identity” But this causal relation between things in themselves and appearances runs counter to what Kant calls in the B-Preface a “twofold standpoint” from which “the same objects can be considered from two different sides, on the one side as objects of the senses and the understanding for experience, and on the other side as objects that are merely thought at most for isolated reason striving beyond the bounds of experience” (B xviii-xix, footnote). This gives the “twofold meaning” in which Kant later says the word ‘object’ “should be taken…, namely as appearance or as thing in itself” (B xxvii). According to the twofold standpoint or meaning, interpretation of Kant’s troublesome transcendental distinction.

Is Kant's transcendental subject an object of cognition? Liang Yizhong

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Allison 教授在其声名卓著的著作中指出，康德的第一批判包含了两种不同

而不相容的关于统觉的主体和本体自我的关系的理论。根据其中的一种理论，所

谓康德的正式理论，统觉的主体简直和本体的,或者实在的自我是同一的（Allison

1983：286）。他认为，康德把现象和本体的区别直接运用到对自我知识的分析上，

把统觉主体和本体的自我等同起来，这既是不融贯的，又与康德在谬误推理中的

论证相抵触。而根据康德的另一种替代性理论，统觉的主体和本体的自我不同，

而且和任何理智的对象不同。（Allison 1983:287）这种替代性的观点认为，统觉

是对思想的主动性的意识（the activity of thinking），而非对思想者的意识。内感

官和统觉的对比是对心灵的内容的意识（作为主观的对象），和思想的主动性之

间的对比。（Allison 1983:290）Allison 似乎认为，康德混淆了，至少是有时，先

验的自我意识和本体的自我，同时 Strawson 的批评针对的仅仅是康德这种有缺

陷的观点，即仅仅针对本体自我和经验自我意识的同一性，因此，假设康德严格

地坚持了先验自我意识和本体的自我的区分，Strawson 的批评就落空了，而康德

这种先验主体（既非现象，也非物自身），本体的自我（事物自身）和经验主体

（现象）三分的处理方式就能够被辩护。

我认为，Allison 的解读无论对 Strawson 还是对于康德都是不公正的。康德

强调，统觉中意识到的我，既不是如我向自己显现那样（I appear to myself），也

不是如我自身所是那样（I am in myself ），而仅仅是我在（I am）。（B 157）康德

一直坚持着先验主体、经验自我和本体自我的三分的观点。先验主体作为纯粹的

“我思”，对于康德而言，从概念上说就不能是时空中呈现的经验对象。康德知

道这一点，Strawson 也知道康德知道这一点。我认为，Allison 对于康德是不公正

的，因为，康德肯定并试图解释先验的，经验的和本体的主体三者之间的同一性，

且不管他是不是以可理解的方式解释了这种同一性。Strawson 批评的要点在于，

康德的先验主体，即统觉的 “我思”，不单是经验的连结性（connectedness），

不单是经验自我意识的可能性的基础条件，而且提供了在现象世界和本体领域之

间的一个联系的切点（the tangential point of contact）（Strawson 1966:173）。只要

康德需要一个以同一性的方式的，在超感性世界和人类世界之间的，在事物自身

（在此指主体）和第一人称代词和所有格的通常指称之间的，联系点（point of

connexion），那么，康德就必须以可以理解的方式去解释，发生在在时间内的

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Professor Allison pointed out in his admirable book that Kant's first Critique contains two distinct and incompatible doctrines about the relation between the subject of apperception and the noumenal self. According to one, the so-called Kant's official position, the subject of consciousness is identified with the noumenal or real self. (Allison 1983: 286). He believes that Kant directly applies the phenomenal-noumenal distinction to the analysis of self-knowledge, identifying the subject of apperception with the noumenal self. This is both incoherent and in conflict with Kant's argument of the Paralogisms. According to Kant's alternative doctrine, the subject of apperception is different from the noumenal self, and is different from any kind of intelligible object. (Allison 1983: 287) This alternative view holds that apperception is a consciousness of the activity of thinking, not of a mind or a thinker. The contrast between inner sense and apperception is the contrast between the consciousness of the contents of the mind (as subjective objects) and the activity of thinking. (Allison 1983: 290) Allison seems to think that Kant confuses, at least sometimes, the transcendental self-consciousness and the noumenal self(a special kind of object), while Strawson's criticism is directed only at Kant's flawed view that it is only for the identity of the empirically self-consciousness subject and the real or supersensible subject, therefore, assuming that Kant strictly adheres to the distinction between transcendental self-consciousness and noumenal self, Strawson's criticism is lost, and Kant's three-fold treatment of subject, transcendental subject (neither the phenomenon nor the thing in itself) the noumenal self (the thing itself) and the empirical subject (appearance), can be defended.

I think that Allison's interpretation is unfair to both Strawson and Kant. Kant emphasizes that in the transcendental consciousness, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. (B 157) Kant has always adhered to the three-fold view of the transcendental subject, the empirical self, and the noumenal self. The transcendental subject as "I think", for Kant, conceptually cannot be an empirical object presented in space and time. Kant knows this, and Strawson knows that Kant knows this. I think that Allison is unfair to Kant because Kant affirms and tries to explain the identity between transcendental, empirical and noumenal subjects, whether or not he interprets it in an intelligible way. The main point of Strawson's criticism is that Kant's transcendental subject, the "I think" of the apperception, is not only the connectedness of experience, but also the basic condition for the possibility of experiencing self-awareness, and it provides the tangential point of contact between the field of noumena and the world of appearances. (Strawson 1966: 173). As long as Kant needs a point of connexion, in the way of identity, between the supersensible world and the world of human beings, between the things as they are in themselves (subjects) and the ordinary referents of personal pronouns and possessives, then, Kant must explain, in an intelligible way, the relationship between the empirical consciousness occurs in time and the non-time, supersensible unknowable something

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意识现象如何和非时间的、超感性的不可知的某物之间的同一性关系。（Strawson

1966:247）

我认为，康德哲学中有两个形而上学的图画，或者说，康德的先验唯心论企

图提供两幅形而上学图画。第一幅是世界在先验主体中的图画，第二幅是经验主

体在世界中的图画。我认为，Allison 坚持康德的替代性理论，为第一幅图画辩护

就必须承认一个超越的视角。正是在这幅歪曲的关于主体、知识和世界三者关系

的图画中，才有先验主体是不是认识对象的问题。Allison 抛弃的康德的正式理

论，包含着康德最有价值的观点。但是假设康德坚持现象和物自身的区分，康德

就无法为第二幅图画辩护，也无法说明经验主体和世界的关系。其不可能的原因，

正如 Strawson 的批评所指出的。

普世主义与“天下”—— 康德在中国 Hans Feger

康德在其历史哲学的著作中，特别是在《世界公民观点之下的普遍历史观念》

（1784）里展开的关于自由的论述是一种道德视角的重要组成环节，构成这一道

德视角的核心理念是自由观。这就是康德所谓批判哲学有自己的“千禧年期望”

的原因所在。批判哲学家是一个先知，他自己“引发并制造他所预测的事件”。

关于正确使用自由的问题，比如当个人想要符合道德地行事时，他如何在自己的

个人伦理中定位自由；当集体把借助法律促进和平的功能融入自由国家时，如何

将自由置于法律伦理中；或者当自由怀着世界主义意图而致力于和平时，国家联

合体如何在国际法中定位自己——这些都是从批判的裁决过程中产生的针对自

由概念的问题。

在当今关于地缘政治的讨论中，中国的天下思想——通常译作“普天之下”

（all-under-Heaven）已经成为了一个可与西方的普世主义观念相抗衡的概念，原

因是天下思想基于其世界主义的目标，以儒家传统中典型的家、国、天下序列取

代了西方的道德、法律以及宪章或地缘政治秩序的序列。与现代普世主义相反，

在儒家视野中，天的超验地位反映了一种宇宙观，其形成的基础是认为善的种种

现世体验与普遍性相关联。这一儒家宇宙观致使现代政治视角诱导下的天下思想

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in general. I believe that there are two metaphysical pictures in Kant's philosophy, or that

Kant's transcendental idealism attempts to provide two metaphysical pictures. The first picture is the picture of the world in the transcendental subject, and the second picture is the picture of the empirical subject in the world. I think that Allison insists on Kant's so-called alternative theory, and defending the first picture needs to recognize a transcendental perspective, which requires a high price. This is a distorted picture of subject, knowledge and world. The question of whether the transcendental subject is the object of cognition will only arise in this picture. I think the official doctrine abandoned by Allison contains Kant’s most valuable views. But supposing Kant insisted on the distinction between appearance and things in itself, he could not justify the second picture, nor could he explain the relationship between the empirical subject and world. Strawson's criticism points out the reason why it is impossible.

Universalism versus ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tianxia) – Kant in China

Hans Feger

The discourse on freedom that Kant unfolds in his writings on the history of philosophy, especially in his essay Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent (1784), is a constitutive component of the moral perspective whose key concept is the notion of freedom. This is why critical philosophy, as Kant says, has its own “chiliastic expectation”, and the critical philosopher is a prophet who himself “occasions und produces the events he predicts”. Questions concerning the proper use of freedom – how does freedom position itself in the individual ethics of each person when he/she wants to act morally, how does it position the community in legal ethics when it merges in a liberal state through the peacemaking function of the law, or how does the community of states position itself in international law when, with cosmopolitan intent, freedom devotes itself to a utopian peace mission – these are always questions concerning the concept of freedom which has emerged from a critical process of arbitration.

The Chinese idea of Tianxia, conventionally translated as "all-under-Heaven", has become a rival concept of the Western concept of universalism in the current geopolitical discussion, because of its cosmopolitan purpose to replace the (western) sequence of moral, legal and constitutional or geopolitical order with the typically Confucian sequence of “family” (Jia ), Country (guo) and world (tianxia) in. In contrast to modern universalism is the transcendent authority of the heaven in the Confucian vision a cosmology that develops from the ground up where the worldly experiences of

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研究要求将超越民族国家作为最高的政治目标，并以家的模型重新构建世界。在

西方的理论中，国际关系以意向性原则（principle of intentionality）为基础，而天

下体系的原则基础是“兼容并包”（non-exclusion）。维持这一体系一贯性的因素

是内部的“和而不同”（internal harmony of diversity）而非一权独霸（hegemony）。

为了找寻中国思想中相对于普遍性的等效替代物（alternative universality），

我意所提出的解决方案是将普世主义与天下解读为两种彼此等值且互补，而非相

互竞争的模型。中国思想发展出了一个与欧洲思想对立的方向，而两者之间巨大

的差异使我们能够窥探欧洲理性潜在的“前提性决定”（preliminary decisions）。

对此，谢林试图做出的解释是：在中国，神系原则（theogonic principle）转变成

了内在超越（immanent transcendence）, 从而，“天神之灵”（the spirit of the

Heavens）并没有发展成为宗教，而是成为了现世体验。

关于孔子与康德的世界主义理想的比较性研究曲红梅

自上个世纪九十年代以来西方哲学界出版了大量关于世界主义的文献。当

我们试图找寻人类文明史上关于世界主义观点的早期思想时，克利西波斯的观

点可以说是西方哲学的代表，而孔子的思想则是东方哲学的代表。但从哲学家

们提出的世界主义理想来看，孔子的看法与康德的看法具有更大的可比较性。

本文从四个方面对上述两者的世界主义理想进行比较性分析：（1）两者都比以

斯多葛学派为代表的古希腊世界主义版本更具现实性；（2）就两种世界主义理

想的理论框架来看，它们都是将道德理论应用于政治世界；（3）两者的具体规

划具有相似性；（4）两者都可以被归属于世界主义理论中最为常见的领域，即

道德的世界主义。

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the good are related to the universal. As a result, in modern political-inspired Tianxia research, the overcoming of the nation state is demanded as the highest political goal, and the world is reconstructed on the model of the family. While in the (Western) theories international relations are based on the principle of intentionality, the Tianxia system is based on the principle of “non-exclusion”. The coherence of the system is maintained through the internal harmony of diversity, not by hegemony.

I would like to resolve the question of an alternative universality in Chinese thinking by interpreting both models not as competitive but as equivalent and complementary. In Chinese thought, a direction independent of European thinking has been developed, which is so different from the foundations of Western thinking that we can get insight into the hidden “preliminary decisions” of European reason. Schelling’s attempt at an explanation is that the theogonic principle became inverted into an immanent transcendence, that in China instead of the development of a religion “the spirit of the Heavens” became worldly.

A Comparative Study on

Confucius’ s and Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideals Qu Hongmei

A large number of papers and books on cosmopolitanism have been published since 1990s, marking a renewed interest in the field among western scholars. When we try to locate the original source of cosmopolitan ideas in human civilization, we find Chrysippus’s thought in western philosophy, and Confucius’s as its eastern counterpart. But as to the cosmopolitan ideal raised and justified by the philosophers, it is more reasonable to put Kant’s and Confucius’s into comparison. In this paper, I offer a comparative analysis of Confucius’s and Kant’s cosmopolitan ideals from the following four aspects. I begin with the characteristics of the two theories which are more secular than the ancient Greek version of Cosmopolitanism in the Stoics. In Section Two, I focus on the theoretical structure of the two Cosmopolitan ideals, which, as concerning their moral philosophies, are mainly about how to apply the moral principles of human beings into political world. Then, I explain the concrete schemes that they set forth for a cosmopolitan society in Section Three. In Section Four, I conclude that both of their doctrines can be located within the continuum of “the most common cosmopolitanism—moral cosmopolitanism”.

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“量论”心学的本体论

—由康德对熊十力“量论”思想的发展

张睿明

熊十力“量论”心学的本体论，回应着时代对 “民主”与“科学”的诉求，

也拓展出与基督教对话的契机，它是承续心学传统、开出立足于人的自由意志之

上的天理新伦常的尝试，并弥补了宋明心学在认识论方面的不足。这一反本开新

的实现，建立在五个条件之上：作为人伦关系之基点的个人之开显，成就认识心

的作用，本体之显豁，呈显本体的本心对康德自由意志的承纳，以及良知本体与

康德理性宗教中三位一体的区分。

熊十力的“本体”以“翕辟成变”的方式显豁出来。本体“翕”的收凝的动

势，开显出作为人伦关系之基点的个人。翕势所成的个人是形躯所显的个人。顺

此翕势的趋向，人顺躯壳起念，锢蔽于人的私欲当中，迷逐外物，把自在的物转

变为为我的物。

人迷逐外物是认识心作用的结果。认识心是感识与意识的总称。感识刹刹创

起了境，意识忆持了境并综合之而现起物象。意识对已迁谢物象的执持是背离感

识当念无执的外逐。当人从迷逐外物返证到感识的创境不息，健进不已的本体就

呈显于物象的生生流转。

人体证到本体，就能够从对外物的迷逐中超脱出来，让物复还到它自在的生

息中；人呈显本体、推扩本心，当躬于物我一体中的知周万物与道济天下，就有

人合于本体、性智的发显。

在推致良知、呈显本心的“联比”（联系与辅助）中，单个的人认取自由意

志为内在的主宰，并在使自己的行为准则上升为与他人的行为准则相协调一致之

法则的过程中，使贯通人我的人伦新秩序逐次地实现出来。同时，在推致良知的

本心呈显中，物既然从人的私欲支配下被放归到它的自在的存在，天理之流行就

呈现于天人相与的万物生生之化育。内圣由此开出新外王：在人推致他良知的本

心呈显中实现出天理新伦常。

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Doctrine of the Nature of the Mind of Lianglun

– Development of Xiong Shili’s Lianglun through Kant Zhang Ruiming

Xiong Shili’s doctrine of the nature of the mind related to Lianglun echoed the general quest for democracy and science at his times and opened up possibilities for dialogues with Christianity. It transmits the conventional doctrine of the mind, makes up for the deficiency of Song-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy in epistemology and is the attempt to establish new heavenly principles by adopting Kant’s free will. The realization of the new heavenly principles is based on five premises: individuals presented as the cardinal points for ethical relationships, elaboration of the function of the cognitive mind, realization of the Reality, adoption of Kant’s free will by the innate moral consciousness which manifests the Reality, distinction between the Reality in Lianglun and the Trinity in Kant’s rational religion.

The Reality in Lianglun manifests itself by way of the change of Xi and Pi. Xi is the contracting tendency, which forms the individuals as the cardinal points for ethical relationships. Individuals formed through the Xi tendency are physical ones. They tend to pursuit external cognitive objects and transform these objects in themselves into objects for oneself.

Pursuing external objects is the function of the cognitive mind, which is the joint name of the five sensory consciousnesses and the sixth mental consciousness. The sensory consciousnesses cognize instant upon instant the cognitive materials. The mental consciousness keeps the materials and synthesizes them into particular objects. Holding objects, which pass constantly into the past, is the mental consciousness’s outward pursuit against the sense consciousnesses, which have no attachment to anything thus remains inwards. When one returned from the outward pursuit and realized the constantly cognizing sense consciousnesses, the flow of phenomena would manifest the productive Reality.

When one realized innerly the Reality, he would transcend the outward pursuit of external objects and let objects go back into their real existence in themselves. And when he extended his innate moral consciousness to everything, his innate wisdom, which manifests the Reality, would show up.

When one extends his innate moral consciousness, this consciousness manifests itself also as connection and assistance. And when an individual adopted free will as his inner master, and made his maxims coherent with that of the others, a new ethical order would be realized. Now that things are back into their real existence, when one extends his innate moral consciousness to them, the heavenly principles are realized with respect to the productive co-existence of human-beings and the things.

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康德的自由意志出于对至善的要求，导向了上帝理念以保证至善的可能；其

次，为使人向善的无限进步得以被视为一个完成了的整体，作为纯粹意念与人性

原型的圣子就被悬设。由此，康德的自由意志终结于圣父、圣子与作为圣灵的实

践理性的三位一体。但是呈显良知本体的人在道德上已然自足，人的工夫落实处

就是本体的当下呈显处，所以并不需要在工夫之外另设一个本体；其次，良知的

本体因为已经涵着物我一体，至善就此实现在人推致良知、与万物的相生相济中，

所以也不需要在物我一体之外另设一个使物我成为一体的存在者。因此，在实践

理性上彼此共通的良知本体与康德的三位之一体是有着彼此相区别的终极关怀。

康德元伦理学中的道德归责之可能性江璐

当前的英美康德诠释者们大多对形而上学持有怀疑态度，例如罗尔斯以及他

的追随者们在他们的康德诠释中，试图将形而上学的要素排除在康德的批评哲学

之外。在他们看来，康德式的道德规范并不需要任何形而上学的奠基，而出自道

德主体的自我构建。科斯加尔德则认为，康德关于自由的学说并不需要任何本体

论的预设。当也有人持相反意见，例如盖耶尔（Paul Guyer）等人指出，一种恰

当的康德研究是不可忽视其实践哲学之形而上维度的。

针对这个对峙，本文将基础在对康德文本的细致研读和分析之上，指出盖耶

尔等人立场是一种更加全面和负责的康德诠释。本文所要讨论的主题是康德哲学

中的道德归责问题。在《道德形而上学》中，康德写到，归责“在道德的意义上

就是使某人被视为一个后来叫做行为（factum）并受法则支配的行动之事主（causa

libera [自由因]）的判断”（李秋零，2013年，第 25页）。同时，康德将人格（Person）

定义为“其行为能够归责的主体”（同上，第 21 页）。而“道德上的人格性不是

别的，就是一个理性存在者在道德法则下的自由”（同上）。从而可见，归责也就

是判断在一件既成事实和一个主体之间存在着因果联系。而作为行为发起因的主

体同时是一种自由因，也就是说，这是一个自发的（spontaneous）、自我规定的

主体。

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Kant’s free will requires the highest good and leads to a God, who makes the highest good possible. And to have as a unity the infinity of constant progress from the bad to the better, the pure attitude and the archetype of humanity is assumed as the Son of God. Therefore, Kant’s free will ends up in the Trinity, of which the Holy Spirit is the practical reason. However, the innate moral consciousness is in itself complete, since the Reality manifests itself where one extends his moral consciousness, so it is not necessary to assume another Reality beyond the extension of this moral consciousness. And because the Reality has involved human-beings and the things in itself, the highest good lies already in the extension of the moral consciousness, so it is not necessary to assume a God to connect human-beings and the things for a purpose. So although the Reality and the Trinity shares the same free will, they are of different ultimate concerns.

The Possibility of Moral Responsibility in Kant’s Meta-ethics Jiang Lu

Contemporary Anglo-American interpreters of Kant are mostly skeptical towards metaphysics, for example Rawls and his follows try to exclude metaphysical elements from their Kant interpretation. In their view, Kantian moral norms don’t need and metaphysical groundings, and are self-constructions of the moral subject instead. And Korsgaard holds the opinion that Kant’s doctrine on freedom doesn’t need any ontological presuppositions. But there are also scholars holding the opposite opinion, Paul Guyer for example points out that an adequate Kant research cannot disregard the metaphysical dimension of his practical philosophy.

This article shall show upon an in-detail analysis of Kant’s text that the position held by Paul Guyer is a more responsible Kant interpretation. The main subject of this article is the problem of moral responsibility in Kant. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that “imputation in the moral sense is the judgement by which someone is regarded as the author (causa libera) of an action, which is then called a deed (factum) and stands under laws” (AA VI: 227). At the same time, Kant defines person as “a subject whose actions can be imputed to him” (AA VI: 223), and “moral personality is therefore nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws” (ibid.) Imputation is the judgement which establishes a causal relationship between a deed and a subject. This subject as the agent and author of the action which leads to a deed is a free cause, i.e. a spontaneous and autonomous agent.

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在康德的实践哲学中，实践理性即意志，意志的自由实际上是一种特殊的因

果关系：它不同于被规定了的自然之中的因果关系，因为它是一种不受规定的，

自发的原因，而自然的因果链中，却是没有一个作为终极起点的这种原因的。如

何能够将一个现象界的事件视为行为（Tat），从而将其视为一种由一个具有自由

意志的行为主体所导致的结果，这与承认有着一种有别于自然因果性的另一种因

果性密切相关。这一种因果性却不可被视为仅仅是一种附随性（supervenience），

因为附随性不足于给义务提供充足的合法性，也无法为对行为人加以奖赏或惩罚

的法权提供充足的基础。因而康德必须将自由视为一种实在的，有别于自然因果

链的因果性。在此，康德诠释者所面临的难题为，是否必须将康德在其实践哲学

著作中一再提到的两个世界，即理知世界和现象世界，作为康德的形而上学之基

础，并且承认本体（noumena）在康德那里不仅仅为一种边缘概念，而是他本体

论空间的成员。这种做法将回到康德的前批评阶段，并具有独断论的嫌疑。本文

的目的是给予康德的两个世界理论一种批判哲学的解读，也就是认为第一批判中

康德关于本体的观点在他的实践哲学中同样得到坚持。康德区分两个世界只是为

了阐述两种不同的因果性，却并非因为他有着一种身心二元式的形而上学。自由

作为一种理智世界的因果性所具有实在性却是我们必须接受的康德道德哲学中

的形而上学预设，它构成了道德归责性的元伦理学基础。

在崇高与虚无之间的自由意志

—兼论现代自由原则的局限及其可能的出路

尚文华

自由原则是现代社会的基本原则，如何面对自由，以及面对怎样的自由决定

了我们对现代性的基本态度。本文从目前学界热议的意志的缺席与出场“现象”

出发，分析了现代自由意志的崇高性和无根基性，前者是现代性由以论证自身的

基本前提；后者则揭示了现代性自身的局限。为了克服自由意志的无根基性，我

们或者以自由为根据建立一套“尴尬”的“自由体系”，或者从人类实际的生存

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In Kant’s practical philosophy, the will is the practical reason, the freedom of will is actually a special kind of causality: it differs from the causality in the thoroughly determined nature, because it is a undetermined, spontaneous cause, a uncaused cause, a causa sui, so to speak, while the causal chain in the nature has no causes of this kind. The question in how far it is possible to regard an event in the phenomenal world as deed (Tat), and therefore as an effect caused by an agent with free will, is closely related to the question whether we are ready to recognize this kind of non-natural causality. This kind of causality cannot be regarded as a mere supervenience, as supervenience is not enough to provide sufficient justification for obligations, neither does it suffice to give a sound foundation for the laws which justify punishment and reward. For this reason, Kant must accept freedom as a real non-natural causality. In this regard, the problem a Kant interpreter will face is whether she should adhere to the two-world-interpretation which accepts Kant’s pre-critical distinction between the intelligible and sensible world as the metaphysical foundation of Kant’s post-critical writings on practical philosophy, and in doing so, also accept that noumena are not mere boarder concepts in Kant, but are proper members of his ontological space. The problem of this solution is however that it brings Kant’s practical back to his pre-critical assumptions and smacks of dogmatism. This article shall give a coherent critical reading of the two worlds as mentioned in Kant’s practical philosophy. It will show that regarding noumena Kant doesn’t abandon his position in his First Critique, mentioning the two worlds in his practical philosophy serves the purpose of making the distinction of two kinds of causalities intelligible but it doesn’t establish a mind-body-dualism as a underlying metaphysics. However, the reality of the freedom as a causality of the intelligible world is a metaphysical presumption we must accept, as it constructs the meta-ethical foundation for the moral responsibility in Kant.

Free Will: between Sublimity and Nothingness

—On the Limitation of Modern Principle of Freedom and

Its Possible Way Out Shang Wenhua

The Principle of Freedom is the basic principle of Modern Society. How to face Freedom and to face what kinds of Freedom determines our basic attitude towards Modernity. This paper analyzes the Lofty and Unfounded nature of Modern Free Will from the phenomenon of the absence and the appearance of the concept of Will that the current academic debates. The former is the basic premise of Modernity to prove itself;

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处境出发经受其存在身位的无根基性，并希冀对其自由身位作出另一种理解。本

文的分析显示，无论何种意义上“克服”，自由总是让人处于一种“尴尬”的境

地，这种尴尬刻画了现代个体和现代社会的“准-无限”深度，及其深度的悖论

性。

康德与道德动机的“多因素决定论”

董滨宇

一般而言，康德的伦理学主张，只有出于义务的行动才具有道德价值。但是，

针对行为者的道德动机，研究者们却发现在康德那里似乎存在着相互矛盾的解释。

汉森就指出，康德所说的道德动机是一种“多因素决定论”，具体而言，其内在

构成有两种可能性：一是“冲突论”，即理性通过约束感性欲望而促发行动；二

是“一致论”，即在理性与感性欲望相互协调一致的状态下所产生的行动。在两

种情况下，行动都可以说具有康德所要求的道德价值。但在前者那里，行为者的

内心是压抑甚至痛苦的；在后者那里，行为者的内心却是轻松愉悦的。对此，究

竟哪一种状态更加具有道德价值？或者说更加符合康德的义务论诉求？

本文认为，两种理论确实都存在于康德的文本之中，而这也正如汉森所说的，

其实它表明了现实生活中一种真实的困境：一方面，我们容易认为，当义务观念

与其他感性欲望相互一致时，行为者将会以更为轻松甚至愉悦的态度去履行职责，

这无疑是值得人们追求的。但是，相比于那种经历了内心理性与感性的搏斗，然

而最终仍然遵守道德义务的人来说，其道德价值似乎并不那么大。但在另一方面，

如果说只有在内心激烈挣扎的情况下行为本身才会具有更为充足的道德价值，那

么这不仅在理论上是可疑的，而即便在现实中也并非值得我们向往。面对这样的

疑难，汉森并没有给出清楚的解决方案，他只是认为，两种理论就自身而言都是

融贯的，而且相互之间也可能是互补的，它或许是康德理论的一个优势。

本文则认为，道德动机的“多因素决定论”在康德那里确实存在，而它主要

体现于康德不同阶段的思考中。在《道德形而上学奠基》与《实践理性批判》中，

康德更偏向于“冲突论”，但在《道德形而上学》的“德性论”中，康德更偏向

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the latter reveals the limitation of the Modernity itself. In order to overcome the Unfounded nature of Free Will, we either establish an embarrassed “System of Freedom”; or experience its Unfounded nature in the actual living conditions of human beings, and find another kind of comprehension for our Freedom. The analysis of this paper shows that, Freedom always makes people in an embarrassed situation, which depicts a kind of “quasi-infinite” and paradox situation of modern individuals and modern society.

Kant and the Overdetermination of Moral Motive Dong Binyu

Generally, Kantian ethics argue that only actions out of duty have moral values. However, on the agent’s moral motive, researchers found that there seemed to be contradictory interpretations in Kant. Richard G. Henson believes that Kant’s interpretation on moral motive is a kind of theory of overdetermination. To be specific, there are two theories. One is the “conflict theory”, that is, rationality promotes action by restraining sensible inclinations or emotions; the other is the “coherence theory”, that is, action produced under the condition that rationality and sensible inclinations or emotions are in harmony with each other. In both theories, the agent’s actions are driven by his moral values. In the former, the agent is depressive and afflictive, whereas in the latter, he is cheerful. So, which theory has more moral values? Or which is more in line with Kant’s claim of deontology?

In this paper, the author believes both theories exist in Kant’s works. And as Henson says, this shows a real dilemma in life. On the one hand, it is easy to think that when the duty is consistent with emotional desires, the agent will perform his duty in a more relaxed and even pleasant manner, which is worth pursuing. However, his moral values seem not so great as compared with those who have experienced the struggle between inner rationality and emotion, but still abided by their moral duties in the end. On the other hand, if only in the case of intense inner struggle can the behavior itself have more sufficient moral value, then this is not only doubtful in theory, but also not worthy of our pursuing even in reality. Confronted with this dilemma, Henson has not provided a clear solution. He just thinks that the two theories are cohesive in themselves and may complement each other. It may be an advantage of Kant's theory.

This paper holds that overdetermination of moral motive does exist in Kant, and it is mainly reflected in Kant's thinking at different stages. In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason, Kant preferred conflict theory, but in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant preferred coherence theory. In the chapter of “Ethical ascetics” (484-485), Kant seemed to be inclined to coherence theory. Since

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“一致论”，其中的“伦理的修行法”一章（484-485）中，康德似乎表明了这一

点。由于很多学者认为《道德形而上学》代表着康德伦理学更为成熟的阶段，因

此，在最终意义上，“一致论”才代表其道德心理学的主要论点。

但是，本文作者的观点仍然与此不同。本文作者首先仍然承认《道德形而上

学》属于康德伦理学真正的“完成”，但是，在其中的“德性论”中，康德在不

同地方表明了对于“冲突论”与“一致论”同样的支持态度。据此，汉森所说的

“冲突论”与“一致论”之争并不能由此得到较好的解决。本文认为，其实，康

德最终的观点既不是“冲突论”，也不是“一致论”，因为两种理论都有可能带来

不好后果，从而影响道德动机的纯粹性。

在康德那里，道德主体所真正应该追求的心理状态应该是“道德平静”，这主

要体现在《道德形而上学》的 408-410 部分，在这里，康德提出了“不动情”应

该作为道德心理的主要状态。也就是说，在依照道德法则而行动时，行为者的心

态应该并不是以快乐或者痛苦为根源的，此时，我们仅仅怀着对义务的尊重，以

敬畏之心自愿履行自己的职责，无论是痛苦或者快乐的感性情感都不应该作为我

们的道德动机的根本的心理体验。当然，由于其中展现出了人格的高贵，康德认

为，我们将会间接地感受到一种“纯朴的愉悦”，它是消极的、无害的，也是有

节制的。

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many scholars believe that Metaphysics of Morals represents a more mature stage of Kantian ethics, therefore coherence theory represents the main argument of his moral psychology.

However, the author’s views are still different. The author of this paper still admits that Metaphysics of Morals belongs to the real “completion” of Kantian ethics. However, in the “virtue theory”, Kant shows the same support for “conflict theory” and “coherence theory” in different places. Hence, the dilemma between “conflict theory” and “coherence theory” mentioned by Henson cannot be settled well. In fact, Kant's ultimate view is neither “conflict theory” nor “coherence theory”, because both theories may bring bad consequences, thus affecting the purity of moral motive.

In Kant's view, the agent’s mental state should be “moral tranquility” as shown in pages 408-410 in Metaphysics of Morals. Here, Kant puts forward that “apathy” should be the main state of moral psychology. That is to say, when we act in accordance with the moral law, we should voluntarily perform our duties with respect for our obligations and in awe. Painful or happy emotions should not be the fundamental psychological experience of our moral motive. Of course, because it shows the nobility of personality, Kant believes that we will indirectly feel a kind of "simple pleasure", which is negative, harmless and restrained.

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分组会议（六）：

在《道德形而上学奠基》第三部分与《实践理性批判》之间

康德“实践”演绎的连续与断裂

Halla Kim (金汉拏) 倪逸偲译

正如 Henry Allison 与 Karl Ameriks 所指出的，康德在《道德形而上学奠基》

的第三节中的实践演绎与第二批判中的实践演绎之间有着一个明显的方向倒转。

在《奠基》中，康德恰当地建立起道德与自由之间的交互关系，并进一步证明：

因为我们的自由立足于我们的理性能动性，所以我们要服从道德法则。但是，康

德很快就发现了这一推论中的“循环”，并尝试着通过引入先验唯心论以及本体

与现象的区别来修复这一缺陷。但康德仍然没能完成一个令人满意的演绎，而仅

以实践理性的“极限边界”，即不可理解的道德动机草草告终。康德终究没能辩

护我们对于道德法则的服从，他仅仅捍卫了这一点，但却没能给出一个全面有力

的证明。

在第二批判中，康德彻底改变了《奠基》第三部分中道德法则的演绎，他宣

称道德法则的演绎是不可能的（正如理论哲学中的“演绎”一样），并代之以诉

诸“理性事实”。但是，这并不是说就突然要去诉诸一个对我们的道德本性的盲

目直观，因为康德已经指出了，我们那些构建准则的日常实践与基于准则的推证

过程都导出了理性的纯粹行动，而这又导向了理性的唯一事实——我们关于道德

法则的意识。就此，康德进一步推证了我们的自由的存在论意义上的实在性，而

这正是被视为道德法则的凭据的东西。

总的来说，除去这两部巨著的演绎部分之间声名狼藉的方向倒转，我们还是

可以发现，康德在两部著作中都始终坚持认为，自由是演绎的支点（正如 Dieter

Henrich 那著名的论断所说的那样）。笔者就此总结：只要自由还是道德法则的支

点性凭据，那么康德的预设前提就始终是论证的一部分。从不可还原的实践的立

场，即从理性的实践者的立场来看，关于纯粹实践理性的法则的意识是先天的，

相应地，从第一人称的视角来看，康德的理性事实也关系到我们关于理性行动的

意识。就此而言，道德法则被重新肯定，并能与自由的实在性彼此妥善相合。

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Parallel Sessions IV:

Between Groundwork III and the Critique of Practical Reason:

Continuities and Discontinuities in Kant’s “Practical” Deductions

Halla Kim (金漢拏) In the practical deductions that Kant performs in Groundwork III and the Second

Critique respectively, one finds that there is a ‘great reversal’ that takes place between them, as Ameriks (2000, 226) and Allison (1990, 238) point out. In Groundwork III, Kant aptly establishes the reciprocity between morality and freedom, and then goes on to argue that we are subject to the moral law because our freedom is anchored in our rational agency. However, Kant soon finds a ‘circle’ in this reasoning and attempts to remedy the perceived defects by injecting his transcendental idealism together with the distinction between the phenomena and the noumena. Still falling short of a satisfactorily completed deduction, he ends up with the ‘extreme boundary’ of practical reason, i.e., the incomprehensibility of moral motivation. He simply finds himself unable to justify our subjection to the moral law and closes off with a mere defense of it instead of a strong, full-fledged proof.

In the Second Critique, Kant turns the deduction of the moral law in Groundwork III on its head, declaring it impossible (as it is modelled after a theoretical deduction,) and instead directly appeals to the “fact of reason.” But this is not a blind resort to an intuition about our moral nature out of the blue because he points out that our usual practice of maxim-building and maxim-based deliberative procedures demonstrates the pure activity of reason, which then leads to our consciousness of the moral law as the only fact of reason. From this, he goes on to demonstrate the ontological reality of our freedom, which is then perceived as the credential for the moral law.

All in all, then, in spite of the notorious reversal in the direction of the deduction found in the two monumental works, one nevertheless finds Kant consistently voicing his view of freedom as the pivot of the deduction in both places as Henrich (1975, 55) famously claims. I conclude that his underlying purpose as well as the major argumentative components remain the same as long as freedom is employed as the pivotal credential for the moral law. From the irreducibly practical standpoint, i.e., from the standpoint of the practitioner of reason, the consciousness of the law of pure practical reason is a priori and, in this respect, the Kantian fact of reason refers to our consciousness of the activity of reason from the first-person standpoint. In this way, the moral law is reaffirmed and suitably credited as it lends itself to the reality of freedom.

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什么是康德的纯粹理性理念的“实践的实在性”

朱会晖

自由是康德哲学的精神，道德法则理念体现了康德伦理学的基本原则，道德、

上帝、灵魂不朽等理念都是哲学上十分重要的基本概念。笔者反思和批判国际学

者关于康德理念观的超验化解释和主观化解释，提出新的“实践化的解释”——

论证自由与道德法则等理念之所以具有实践的实在性，不是由于这些理念与超验

的本体相符合，也不只是基于主观的视角、立场，而是由于这些理念影响甚至决

定现实的实践活动。

无论人是否在本体界有意志自由，自由理念仍可通过影响人的行动准则而有

实在性。据《康德全集》三十多处的论述，自由理念有“实践的实在性”（die

praktiche Realität)，只意味着此理念有“可实现性（Ausführbarkeit）”，在“诸

意向和准则中有具体表现出来的现实应用”，自由概念的实在性只通过它“在感

官世界中可能的结果而言的原因性（Kausalität）”得到证实。即便人没有本体层

面的意志自由，，自由理念仍然能影响乃至决定我们现实的行动，仍具有实践的

实在性或现实性；换言之，我们不一定拥有先验自由，但都拥有实践自由。

以下五个方面的理由可表明，康德基于理念与行动的联系来理解实践的实在

性：

首先，康德从理念在准则与行动中的运用来理解理念的实在性。他把自由概

念的“ 实践的实在性”等同于“这概念在诸意向和准则中有 in concreto(具体

地)表现出来的现实应用”（S. 56）

其次，纯粹理念的实践的实在性是基于它能够对经验领域中的行动等经验因

素发生影响。自由概念“是通过理性就某些由于它而在感官世界中可能的结果而

言的原因性来充分表明自己的实在性的”。(5：475)

再次，康德断言上帝和不朽灵魂的理念也具有实践的实在性，这一点可以明

显看出康德对这种实在性的定位。对上帝和灵魂不朽的悬设构成了道德行动的必

要条件，因而上帝和灵魂不朽的概念能够影响经验，由此才有了实在性。(S. 4-

5)

又次，从早期的《纯粹理性批判》，直到后期的《道德形而上学》，康德一贯

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What is the Practical Reality of Pure Ideas from Reason for Kant?

Zhu Huihui Freedom is the spirit of Kant’s philosophy, and moral law is the fundamental principle in Kant’s practical philosophy. The exact understanding of the distinction between the theoretical reality and the practical reality of pure ideas of the reason is a key to the apprehension Kant’s fundamental way of conceptualizing freedom, morality and religion, and it is indispensable for realizing the ground and the coherency of Kant’s philosophy.

Kant takes the third way between common libertarianism and determinism and between ontological dogmatism and (idealistic or empiricist) subjectivism: he understands the reality of the ideas of reason, such as the ideas of freedom and God, neither as the existence of supersensible beings or qualities, nor as the existence of merely subjective beings or qualities based on subjective perspectives or supposition, but as the quality of the ideas’ universally affecting empirical actions through affecting on maxims and dispositions. Kant takes the middle way, i.e., the transcendental way between the supersensible way and empirical way of philosophizing, attempting to prove neither the supersensible capacity of absolute freedom nor the mere subjective freedom, but the transcendental capacity of rational autonomy. By that third way, Kant establishes grounds for inner value and normativity while avoiding questionable transcendent thinking about the supersensible.

I provide a practical approach of interpretation about the reality, claiming that the ideas from reason have practical reality on the basis of the processes of ideas’ affecting of actions in the empirical world (through dispositions and maxims). This understanding of the practical reality of transcendent ideas from reason rests mainly on the following five reasons:

Firstly, Kant notes that the practical reality of a pure idea from reason is the idea’s realistic application in maxims and actions. In discussing ‘the concept of an empirically unconditioned causality’ Kant clarifies the meaning of ‘practical reality’, by equaling it with its real application exhibited in dispositions or maxims. (KpV, AA 5:56)

Secondly, Kant claims explicitly that pure ideas have practical reality because they are efficient causes in the empirical realm, that is, by their affecting the sensible world, rather than on the real existence of noumena that the ideas correspond to. (KU, AA 5:475)

Thirdly, from Critique of Pure Reason and Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals (abbreviated Groundwork) to Metaphysics of Morals in Kant’s later writings, Kant uses the concept ‘practical reality’ (Praktische Realität) just in terms of the process of ideas’ affecting practice. (KrV, A808/B836; MS, AA 6:252-253)

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地通过理念与实践的联系活动来理解理念的实践的实在性。道德的世界这一理念

是“实践的理念，它能够、也应当对感官世界现实地有其影响……因此一个道德

世界的理念具有客观的实在性……”(Kant, 1993, A808/A836；6：252-253）

复次，康德对理念实践的实在性的理解也可以从他对其它相关概念（如“在

实践眼光中的自由”概念）的解释中被推断出来。

澄清实践的实在性概念，有助于消除人们对康德哲学的三个重要批评：在实

践哲学中，康德一直都对实在性、因果性这些知性范畴进行了超验的运用，将它

们运用于本体领域，由此，《道德形而上学奠基》通过说明人必然肯定自由来说

明自由本身的现实性，这种论证是失败的，而《实践理性批判》中，康德退回到

了独断论，他预设了道德法则这一“理性的事实”，以便说明自由。

借助理念的理论的实在性与实践的实在性之区分，康德在超验本体论与主观

主义之间、在独断论形上学与怀疑主义之间、在一般意志自由论与决定论之间开

辟了哲学上的第三条道路，如何力图在取消关于本体的理论性断言、坚持其批判

形而上学之立场的同时，又为作为知识的形而上学、道德与宗教等提供稳靠的根

基。

论康德 Sein 论题中的逻辑谓词与实在谓词

舒远招

康德在《纯粹理性批判》中提出的“Sein 不是实在谓词”论题，在学界中引

发了广泛争议。该论题所涉及的逻辑谓词与实在谓词究竟指什么，学者们的理解

众说纷纭，莫衷一是。在此问题上，杨云飞博士在其《康德对上帝存有本体论证

明的批判及其体系意义》一文中发表的观点很有代表性，也表达得十分明晰。他

的主要观点是：区分逻辑谓词和实在谓词，是康德反驳本体论证明的主要论据。

所谓逻辑的谓词，就是“是（存在）”（Sein）；所谓实在的谓词，就是“存有”

（Dasein）或“实存”（Existenz）。本体论证明错误地混淆了这两类谓词，才导

致了直接从上帝概念推出上帝存有。他力图说明，通过“是”（存在）与“实存”

的区别，康德揭示了本体论证明所说的上帝存在还不是真正的实存，即思想中的、

或单纯可能的存在区别于思想外的现实存在。他的观点是通过认真解读康德文本

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Fourthly, the fact that the practical reality of ideas does not imply their noumenal status is apparent in Kant’s affirmation of the reality of the ideas of God and immortality. Fifthly, Kant’s understanding of the practical reality of pure ideas can be inferred from his explanation of some other concepts closely relate to the reality, such as the concept of freedom from the practical perspective.

The precise apprehension of Kant’s understanding of the reality of ideas makes much sense in showing that these three important criticisms of Kant’s theory about the reality of ideas are unhelpful: Kant makes transcendental use the categories of understanding, such as causality and reality, and it is a failed argument for Kant to prove transcendental freedom through the spontaneity of reason in Groundwork, and he eventually adopts dogmatism with the presumption of moral law as a ‘fact of reason’ in Critique of practical Reason.

Über das logische Prädikat und das reale Prädikat

in Kants Seins-These Shu Yuanzhao übersetzt von Zhang Xu

Kants These über „Sein ist kein reales Prädikat“, die in Kritik der reinen Vernunft vorgebracht wird, hat in den akademischen Kreisen breite Kontroversen ausgelöst. Was bedeutet genau das logische Prädikat und das reale Prädikat in dieser These? Die Gelehrten sind über diese Frage gespalten. In dieser Hinsicht sind die Ansichten von Dr. Yunfei Yang, die er in seinem Artikel „Kants Kritik des ontologischen Beweises vom Dasein Gottes und ihr systematische Sinn“ zum Ausdruck gebracht hat , sehr repräsentativ und klar. Sein Hauptpunkt ist, dass die Unterscheidung zwischen diesem logischen Prädikat und diesem realen Prädikat das Hauptargument von Kants Widerlegung zu den ontologischen Beweisen ist. Das sogenannte logische Prädikat ist „Sein“, während das sogenannte reale Prädikat „Dasein“ oder „Existenz“ ist. Das heißt, aus dem Sein (ist) im Begriff Gottes wird das Dasein oder Existenz (existiert) ausser dem Begriff Gottes gefolgert, der ontologische Beweis hat aber diese beiden Arten von Prädikaten verwirrend verwendet. Dies führt also zur Schlussfolgerung vom Dasein Gottes direkt aus dem Begriff von Gott. Dr. Yang versucht zu zeigen, dass Kant durch den Unterschied zwischen „Sein“ (ist) und „Existenz“ (existiert) offenbart, dass das Dasein Gottes noch nicht wirkliche Existenz ist. D.h., das bloße mögliche Sein innerhalb des Gedankens unterscheidet sich von der wirklichen Existenz außerhalb des Gedankens. Sein Standpunkt stammt aus der sorgfältigen Interpretation von Kants Buch, es sollte aber tiefer diskutiert werden. Er weiß nicht, dass „Dasein“ oder „Existenz“ die gleiche Bedeutung außer Kopula „Sein“ sind. Daher benutzt Kant sie abwechselnd im

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而得到的，但依然值得进一步商榷。他没有意识到，除掉系词含义的 Sein（存在），

就是 Dasein（存有）或 Existenz（实存），它们的含义相同，因而康德交替地使

用，它们在实存性命题（Existenzialsatz）中还以 existiert（动词）、ist（系词）、

甚至 ein Gott（主词）等形式出现，但指的是同一个逻辑谓词，即不包含先验内

容的实存谓词。与此相关，他的解读还有两个问题：其一，未能进一步追究本体

论证明是以何种方式把实存性命题弄成同义反复式的分析命题的，因而未能看出

它对逻辑谓词与实在谓词的混淆才是其中的根源，更未能看出混淆逻辑谓词与逻

辑系词才是它混淆逻辑谓词与实在谓词的深层根源，于是，他不仅未能准确把握

本体论证明所混淆的逻辑谓词，而且忽略或错失了真正的实在谓词，这就是包含

在上帝概念中的上帝的全部实在性，即“全能”、“全能的”等实在谓词；其二，

对“实存概念的精确规定”这一关键词有所忽略，因而未能意识到他所谓的实在

谓词，其实就是康德所强调的综合的实存性命题的谓词，即得到精确规定的实存

谓词，也未能意识到他所说的逻辑谓词与实在谓词的区别，仅仅是实存谓词内部

的区别：在与实在谓词相混淆的情况下，实存谓词与主词的关系是分析性的，而

在康德澄清了与实在谓词的混淆、并对之作出精确规定的情况下，实存谓词与主

词的关系却必须是综合性的。这些问题，暴露了仅仅关注逻辑谓词与实在谓词这

一“二项解读模式”的局限。这一解读模式忽略了本体论证明所强调的上帝的全

部实在性，不合理地把“一物的规定”与“实存概念的精确规定”相混淆，忽略

了康德的例句“上帝是全能的”所具有的展现实在谓词的意义，没有意识到只有

“全能的”这个谓词才符合康德关于实在谓词的第二个说明。因此，逻辑谓词与

实在谓词这两项必须扩充为以下三项：1.指称上帝实在性的实在谓词（如全能或

全能的）；2.被混淆为实在谓词（上帝实在性）的逻辑（实存）谓词；3.精确规

定的实存谓词，它必须是一个超出主词概念的综合性谓词。康德对本体论证明第

二个版本的系统反驳，正好是按照首先澄清逻辑谓词与实在谓词的混淆、接着精

确规定实存概念这两个步骤展开的。

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Buch. Sie erscheinen im Existenzialsatz auch in Form von „existiert“ (Verb), „ist“ (Kopula) und sogar „ein Gott“ (Subjekt), aber sie beziehen sich auf das gleiche, logische Prädikat, also das Prädikat der Existenz, das nicht den transzendentalen Inhalt enthält. Neben dieser Frage gibt es noch zwei weitere Fragen zur Beantwortung: Erstens hat er daüber nicht nachgeforscht, in welcher Weise der ontologische Beweis den Existenzialsatz in einen tautologischen-analytischen Satz verwandelt. Deshalb sieht er nicht, dass die Verwechslung zwischen dem logischen Prädikat und dem realen Prädikat in dem ontologischen Beweis die Wurzel davon ist; auch nicht, dass die Verwechslung zwischen logischem Prädikat und logischer Kopula die tiefere Wurzel der Verwechslung zwischen logischem Prädikat und realem Prädikat in dem ontologischen Beweis ist. Daher ist es nicht nur das logische Prädikat, das durch ontologische Beweise verwechselt wurde, nicht genau zu begreifen. Er ignoriert und versäumt auch das eigentlich reale Prädikat, nämlich „Allmacht“ und „allmächtig“. Das ist die ganze Realität Gottes, die im Gottesbegriff enthalten ist. Zweitens ignoriert er das Stichwort „eine genaue Bestimmung des Existenzbegriffs“ und erkennt daher nicht, dass das, was er als reales Prädikat bezeichnet, eigentlich das Prädikat des synthetischen Existenzialsatzes ist, nämlich ein genau spezifiziertes Prädikat der Existenz, das Kant betont. Auch erkennt er nicht, dass der Unterschied zwischen dem logischen Prädikat und dem realen Prädikat, wie er sagt, einfach der Unterschied innerhalb des Prädikats der Existenz ist: Im Falle der Verwechslung mit dem realen Prädikat ist das Verhältnis zwischen dem Prädikat der Existenz und dem Subjekt analytisch. Aber als Kant die Verwechslung mit dem realen Prädikat klärt und eine genaue Bestimmung dazu trifft, muss das Verhältnis zwischen dem Prädikat der Existenz und dem Subjekt synthetisch sein. Diese Probleme offenbaren die Grenzen des Modells, das sich nur auf das logische Prädikat und das reale Prädikat konzentriert. Dieses Modell ignoriert alle Realität Gottes, die durch ontologische Beweise betont werden; verwechselt unangemessen „die Bestimmung eines Dings“ mit „einer genauen Bestimmung des Existenzbegriffs“; ignoriert den Sinn, das reale Prädikat zu zeigen von Kants Beispiel „Gott ist allmächtig“; nicht erkennt, dass nur das Prädikat „allmächtig“ zu Kants zweiter Notiz zum realen Prädikat passt. Daher müssen die beiden Punkte des logischen Prädikats und des realen Prädikats auf die folgenden drei Punkte erweitert werden: 1. das reale Prädikat (wie Allmacht oder allmächtig), das sich auf alle Realität Gottes bezieht. 2. das logische (existenziale) Prädikat, das als das reale Prädikat (die Realität Gottes) verwechselt wird. 3. Das genau bestimmte Prädikat der Existenz, das ein sythetisches Prädikat außerhalb des Subjektbegriffs sein muss. Kants systematische Widerlegung ontologischer Nachweise (die zweite Ausgabe) erfolgt in den folgenden zwei Schritten: Erstens wird die Verwechslung zwischen logischem Prädikat und realem Prädikat geklärt. und dann wird zweitens der Existenzbegriff genau bestimmt.

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实在谓词难题的解决——从康德对本体论证明的批判看

胡好

实在谓词难题由以下命题构成：1、存在（Sein）不是实在谓词；2、存在等

同于实存（Existenz）；3、实存是综合命题的谓词；4、所有综合命题的谓词是实

在谓词；5、所以，存在既是实在谓词，又不是实在谓词。

目前学界有两种解决方案，一种是否定命题 2，认为存在不同于实存；另一

种是否定命题 4，认为所有综合命题的谓词都不是实在谓词，即实在谓词是分析

命题的谓词。然而，它们都难以成立。实际上，存在和实存是一回事，并且实在

谓词是综合命题的谓词。

本文同样否定命题 4，但与上述解决方案不同，笔者主张并非所有综合命题

的谓词都是实在谓词，也就是说，有些综合命题的谓词是实在谓词，有些综合命

题的谓词是现实谓词。现实谓词是对主词对象进行绝对肯定的谓词。这类谓词不

是康德本人使用的术语，但被用到了。

笔者认为谓词分三类：逻辑谓词、实在谓词和现实谓词。逻辑谓词是跟主词

不矛盾的谓词；实在谓词是在主词和谓词的关系中扩大主词概念的谓词；现实谓

词是在主词概念和它的对象的关系中，超出这个概念将它的对象肯定下来的谓词。

逻辑谓词、实在谓词和现实谓词分别对应逻辑可能性、事物可能性和现实性，三

者的要求依次增强。逻辑可能性只要求事物符合不矛盾律；除此之外，事物可能

性还要求事物符合经验的形式条件；现实性除了要求事物符合不矛盾律和经验的

形式条件，还要求提供经验的质料条件（知觉）。

由于实在谓词难题涉及对象的内容，而逻辑谓词抽掉了一切内容，因而重要

的是对实在谓词和现实谓词进行区分。实在谓词表示，假如有主词对象，那么主

词拥有一切可能的新谓词；现实谓词表示，真的有连同其一切谓词的主词对象。

也就是说，实在谓词表示事物的单纯可能性，现实谓词则表示事物的现实性。单

纯可能的概念和现实的对象包含的谓词一样多，但后者多出来一点，即它将对象

肯定下来了，因而对象被给予出来，得到知觉的充实。

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The Solution of the Real Predicate Problem

—— From Kant's Criticism of Ontological Argument

Hu Hao

The real predicate problem consists of the following propositions: 1. Being is not a real predicate; 2. Being equals existence; 3. Existence is the predicate of synthetic proposition; 4. The predicates of all synthetic propositions are real predicates; 5. So, being is both a real predicate and not a real predicate.

At present, there are two solutions in academia. One is the negation of proposition 2, which believes that being is different from existence. The other is the negation of proposition 4, which holds that the predicates of all synthetic propositions are not real predicates, that is, the real predicates are predicates of analytic propositions. However, none of them hold up. In fact, being and existence are the same thing, and the real predicate is the predicate of synthetic propositions.

In my view, proposition 4 is to be negated, but different from the above solution, I believe that not all predicates of synthetic propositions are real predicates, namely, some predicates of synthetic propositions are real predicates, others are actual predicates. An actual predicate is the predicate that is the positing of the object of the subject. This kind of predicate is not a Kant’s term, but it is used by him.

There are three kinds of predicates: logical predicates, real predicates and actual predicates. A logical predicate is one that does not contradict the subject. A real predicate is one that enlarges the concept of the subject in the relationship between the subject and the predicate. An actual predicate is a predicate beyond which the subject concept posits its object in relation to its object. These three predicates correspond respectively to logical possibility, possibility of things and actuality of things, and the requirements of the three are enhanced in turn. Logical possibility requires only that things do not conform to the law of contradiction. In addition, the possibility of things additionally requires things to conform to the formal conditions of experience. Actuality requires not only that things not conform to the law of contradiction and to the formal conditions of experience, but also that they provide the material conditions of experience (perception).

Since the real predicate problem concerns the content of the object, and logical predicates strip it all away, therefore, it is important to distinguish between real and actual predicates. A real predicate means that if there is an object of the subject, the subject has all possible new predicates. An actual predicate indicates that there is really an object of the subject with all its predicates. That is to say, a real predicate expresses the mere possibility of things, while an actual predicate expresses the actuality of things. The concept of mere possibility contains as many predicates as the actual object, but

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所以，实在谓词扩大了主词概念，是客观综合的谓词。现实谓词尽管没有扩

大主词概念，但却超出主词概念，将它的对象肯定下来，是主观综合的谓词。这

说明有些综合命题的谓词是实在谓词，有些综合命题的谓词是现实谓词。因此，

实在谓词难题的前提 4不能成立。存在（或实存）不是实在谓词，而是现实谓词。

数学对康德批判哲学的意义王咏诗

康德批判哲学的实质在于对现象和本体作出不同于大陆理智主义传统的理

解。要达到对现象和本体的新理解，就要结合他对可感世界与理知世界的划分。

而对数学的普遍有效性及其界限的思考，与康德的二分思想密切相关。文章第一

部分主要处理前批判时期到批判时期的过渡当中康德对数学知识的来源和性质

的思考如何导源了他的二分思想。这一节通过对康德思想发生史的梳理，分析出

几何学命题的普遍有效性和空间的先天主观性在其前批判时期思考中的比重和

变化。主要处理康德与莱布尼茨-沃尔夫传统和牛顿主义之间的张力。1769-1771

年康德实现了他思想中的“翻转”。这个翻转体现了感性和理智作为两种不同的

人类能力这一思想最终得到确立，而这样一种确立与康德逐渐清晰的新时空观密

不可分。本文主张康德的新时空观与感性和理智的不连续论题具有内在一致性，

并且康德这一策略背后恰好隐含着他对数学命题的普遍有效性以及有效性界限

的思考。即，他逐渐认识到旧有的独断论在形而上学立场上的不可取：1.莱布尼

茨-沃尔夫的构想中，时间和空间是一种“有基底的现象”，这意味着人类可以直

达实在。2.人类凭借什么能力去抵达实在呢？理智。而其中最强大的工具是数学。

3.但明显，数学和形而上学具有完全不同的特征，所以它们的根据不可能是同质

的。如果说数学是处理“有限”的模式，那形而上学恰恰是思考“无限”，从有

限到无限并不是一个平滑的计算过程，而是一个断裂。如果把人类设想为“有限

的理性存在者”，“从前的进路”就不可能有结果。康德也就走上了他自己的批

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the latter involves a little more, which posits the object and thus it is given and enriched by perception.

The real predicate, therefore, enlarges the concept of the subject, and serves as the predicate of the objective synthesis. Although the actual predicate does not extend the concept of the subject, it goes beyond the concept of the subject and posits its object. It is a predicate of the subjective synthesis. This shows that some of the predicates of synthetic propositions are real predicates and others are actual predicates. Therefore, proposition 4 of the real predicate problem cannot be true. Being (or existence) is not a real predicate, but an actual predicate.

The Meaning of Mathematics to Kant’s Critical Philosophy WANG Yongshi

The essence of Kant’s critical philosophy is the differential treatment of phenomenon and noumenon from the continental intellectualism’s. And according to Kant, a new understanding between phenomenon and noumenon is based on the distinction of mundi sensibilis and mundi intelligibilis. Kant’s thought of universal validity and its boundary of mathematics is closely related to his dualist approach. The first part of this paper is concentrated on the transition which contains Kant’s thinking of the origin and character of mathematics leading to his dualist approach from the pre-critical period to the critical period. This section is based on carding the genetic history of Kant’s critical thoughts to clarify the correlation between universal validity of geometry and subjectivity a priori of space in the pre-critical period. And it is mainly dealing with the tension between Kant’s new position and the traditions of Leibniz-Wolffian and Newtonian. In 1769-1771 Kant realized the so-called “Umwälzung” in his thinking. This Umwälzung embodies the idea that intelligence and sensibility are two different human cognitive abilities, and such a distinction is inseparable from Kant’s gradually clear new conception of space (and time). On these grounds, this paper proposes that here is inherent consistence between Kant’s new ideas of space and time and the discontinuity thesis of intelligence and sensibility. And behind Kant’s combination of these two lies his reflection on the universal validity and its boundary of mathematics. In another word, he became more and more aware that the old metaphysical standpoint of dogmatism was unacceptable: 1. In Leibniz-Wolffian system, space and time is a kind of phaenomenon bene fundatum, through which human beings could be with the REALITY. 2. Intelligence is the proper human ability to help human beings to be with the REALITY, and the most powerful medium is mathematics. 3. But mathematics and metaphysics have completely different characteristics, so their basis cannot be homogeneous. For Kant, mathematics is a cognitive pattern to deal with finite things,

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判之路。第二部分则集中考察批判时期数学在康德哲学中的体系效应，即康德是

如何具体地理解数学的有效性以及有效性的界限的。康德认为只有数学化的自然

学说才配称为科学，这是因为时间和空间是可感世界的形式和原则。只要处理时

空中的运动之物，数学模式的说明效力就无可置疑，但刻画不在时空中的事物，

数学模式起不到如在自然领域当中的作用。反之，任何精确刻画超越之物的意图

都会落空（带来幻相）。这个立场的推论就是自然科学与行动科学不遵循同样的

原理。康德的理论目标是双重的：一方面，数学构造不是某种理智直观，如果是

理智直观，则意味着数学对象是一种独立的自在存在者，类似于一种柏拉图型。

数学领域就会是独立于感性自然的一个特殊领域，它虽然可以是永恒的真的，但

与我们处理自然现象无关，或者至少说，数学并非自然科学的必要条件，反而指

向超越的理念世界。另一方面，数学构造也不是概念式理智的综合。如果是，则

感性和知性进而理性就是连续的人类能力。一旦感性和理智是连续的，虽然自然

科学可以数学化，自然学说的确可以由数学得到更好的刻画，但数学命题有效性

的界限就不可能证成。在康德的认同中，这等于承认独断论的形而上学立场是可

以得到辩护的。即，在机械论的宇宙图景之下，人具有自由就是一句空话。最后

本文得出结论：康德式批判立场的证成必须借由对数学的普遍有效性和有效性界

限的证成。批判哲学体现了不同于大陆理智主义所持有的“数学与善”之间具有

一致性的立场。

卡西尔回答了“人是什么？”这一问题了吗？

石福祁

作为新康德主义学派的代表，卡西尔曾经在其《人论》（1944）一书中尝试

回答“人是什么？”这一问题。我们知道，这一答案就是：“人是符号动物。”

然而，当我们追问“卡西尔是在什么意义上回答了这一问题？”的时候，我们仍

然不免疑惑。既然卡西尔在《人论》中明言，《人论》在回答“人是什么？”这

一问题时，还是沿用了《符号形式哲学》采用的功能性定义方法。这就要求我们，

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but metaphysics is THINKING of the infinite. And there is a gap between the finite and the infinite. If human beings are conceived as “finite rational being”, “the old approach” (refers to point 1 and 2) will not have a result. After the Umwälzung, Kant embarked on his own new career so-called critique. The second part of this paper focuses on systematic effect of mathematics in Kant’s critical philosophy, that is, how Kant specifically demonstrates the validity and its boundary of mathematics. Kant claims that only mathematizing natural theories can be called science, because space and time are the forms and principles of mundi sensibilis. As long as the subjects of a theory are movable objects in space and time, the function of mathematical patterns are not in any doubt. But if a theory depicts things in themselves not in space and time, mathematics cannot be so functional as it is in mundi sensibilis. In addition, any attempts of exact depiction on things-in-themselves (Transzendenz) would fail (transcendental illusion). This position has its implication that natural science and theory of action do not follow the same forms and principles. Then Kant’s theoretical target branching out into twofold: on the one hand, mathematical construction cannot be a product of intellektuelle Auschauung or itself. If so, it means that an object of mathematics is some kind of being-in-itself like Platonic eidos, and the field of mathematics would be a special field independent of perceptual nature in which propositions refer to the world of eidos Transzendenz (intellektuelle Welt, not mundi intelligibilis or intelligible Welt in Kant’s own distinction) can be eternal true but have nothing to do with natural phenomena. Or at least mathematics is not a necessary condition of natural science. On the other hand, mathematical construction cannot be a product of conceptual synthesis intellectualis or itself. If so, the discontinuity thesis of intelligence and sensibility would be defeated. Once intelligence and sensibility are proved to be continuous, although natural science can be mathematized, the boundary of mathematics’ validity will not be properly justified. In Kant’s conception map, it is tantamount to acknowledging that the metaphysical standpoint of dogmatism can be defended. And this standpoint will lead to determinism (e.g. mechanistic cosmology) in which the autonomy of ICH means nothing. The conclusion of this paper is that justification of universal validity and its boundary of mathematics is a necessary condition of justification of a Kantian critical position. And continental intellectualism embodies the consistent standpoint between mathematics and the Good, which is different from Kantian critical philosophy.

Did Cassirer Answer the Question: “Was ist der Mensch?” Fuqi SHI

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如果不回溯到《符号形式哲学》，我们其实不能贸然断定，卡西尔究竟有没有回

答“人是什么？”这一问题。

然而，“人是什么？”这个问题既并没有直接出现在《符号形式哲学》之中，

也非该书的主题性设问。后者的目标是使康德建立的理性批判转变为一门“文化

批判”，即符号形式哲学。在他看来，这门文化批判“包含着对唯心论历史传统

内的学院概念（Lehrbegriff）的拓展”。作为一门分析论，它不再只是针对“知性”

和纯粹知识的条件，而是要概括“世界理解”（Weltverstehen）的全部范围。按

照他的理解，不同符号形式，如语言和科学，无非是世界理解的不同方向和维度

而已。因此，对“人是什么？”这一问题在符号形式哲学中的地位而言，“世界

理解”就成为一个关键概念。

本文把世界理解视为卡西尔哲学中的一个“操作性概念”，并认为它为其哲

学不同阶段提供了根本动力。而且，这一概念可以回到到康德在《逻辑学讲义》

中关于哲学的学院概念（Schulbegriff）和世界概念（Weltbegriff）的区分，以及

在此基础上提出的哲学的四个问题：1）我能知道什么？2）我应该做什么？3）

我能期待什么？4）人是什么？按照康德本人的说法，最后一个问题则由人类学

来回答，并且“可以把一切都归结为人类学，因为前三个问题都与最后一个问题

有关系。”

显然，卡西尔回答了“人是什么？”这个问题吗？，这个问题只有在康德式

的“人是什么？”这个问题上才能得到回答。要回答这个问题，我们需要做如下

的考察：1.这个问题在康德哲学中意味着什么？2.卡西尔是如何回答这个问题的？

3.卡西尔是否回答了这一问题？对于问题 1，本文认为，康德其实并没有一本与

这一问题相对应的著作，或者，他并没有真正回答这一问题。对于问题 2，本文

认为，尽管“人是什么？”是作为新康德主义者的卡西尔从康德那里历史地接过

来的一个问题，而且他的“世界理解”哲学也应当被看作对康德“世界概念”之

理想的一个继承，但是，“世界理解”具有更为广阔的外延，他对人的本质的考

察，是建立在“精神做为（Tun）的自由”之中的。因此，对于问题 3，本文认

为，如果我们要问卡西尔是否回答了康德在《逻辑学讲义》中提出的那个独特问

题，答案将是否定的。但是，卡西尔的确以自己的方式回答了这一问题，他的回

答包含着更多有趣的内容。

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As the most eminent representative of the Neo-Kantianism School, Ernst Cassirer did give an answer to the question “what is man? ”in his late work An Essay on Man. As we all know, the answer is: man is animal symbolicum. However, when we raise the question, namely, in what sense did Cassirer answer the question? We fall into doubt to some extent. Cassirer mentioned in An Essay on Man that, in answering the question “what is man?”, he followed the approach of functional definition derived from his opus magnus Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Given this fact, we need to turn back to this work to seek the answer.

As a fact, the question “Was ist der Mensch?” neither appeared over there nor seemed to be the priori concern of the book, which aimed to establish a philosophy of symbolic forms in order to make the transformation from a critique of reason to a critique of culture possible. In his view, the critique “implies a broadening of the traditional and historical concept of idealism.” As an “more modest analysis”, it will no longer merely be related to the capacity of understanding as well as its conditions, but will include the whole scale of Weltverstehen. According to him, the symbolic forms such as language and myth are nothing but different directions and dimensions of Weltverstehen. Hence, the concept of Weltverstehen plays a key role in understanding the Mensch-question within the framework of philosophy of symbolic forms.

The concept of Weltverstehen is regarded as a “operative concept” in this paper and further as the fundamental motive in the different stages of the philosophy Cassirer’s. Moreover, the concept goes back to the distinction between Schulbegriff and Weltbegriff made by Kant in Logik. logically, it is also related to Kant’s four questions, mamely, was kann ich wissen, was soll ich tun, was darf ich hoffen and the last one, was ist der Mensch. According to Kant, it is the task of anthropology to answer the last question, for “we could reckon all of this to anthropology, because the first three questions refer to the last one.”

Did Cassirer Answer the Question: “Was ist der Mensch?” Obviously, our answer depends on the interpretation of the Kantian question “Was ist der Mensch?” Then we need to investigate the following three divided questions: 1, what the question “Was ist der Mensch?” actually means in Kant’s philosophy? 2, How did Cassirer answer the question? 3, Did Cassirer Answer the Question: “Was ist der Mensch?”. To Q1, this papar holds that an anthropology which Kant hopes to be was indeed lacking, therefore he did not give a sound answer to it. To Q2, the author believes that, although the Neo-Kantian Cassirer took over the Mensch-question historically, and his concept of Weltverstehen should also be taken as a new-birth of the Kantian ideal of Weltbegriff, he nevertheless deepened his understanding of man in his notion “das Tun des Geistes”. To Q3, therefore, we can only address that Cassirer DID NOT answer the very question raised by Kant himself in a strict meaning, however, he DID answer it in his own way.

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审美判断力与实践理性

范大邯

本报告尝试探讨康德哲学中审美判断力与实践理性的关系。审美判断力与实

践理性的关系历来为研究者所重视，而康德自己也在《判断力批判》中以第 42

节的理性对自然美的智性关切、第 59 节的美是德性善的象征，以及美的理想和

崇高学说而对此主题有所触及。不过本报告将阐发两个在审美判断力与实践理性

关系的讨论中较少受到关注的点。

一个点是：“没有任何关切”不但是康德美学的标志性的特征之一，这一表

述早在《实践理性批判》中就已经出现，被用于说明主体的意志在做自我规定时，

不以任何给定的关切、或者说目的为根据，道德法则对意志的规定须先行于对某

一个具体对象的关切。这一点可以视为是《实践理性批判》的基本原理之一。康

德在《实践理性批判》的开篇，即分析论的§ 2 和§ 3，所谈者即是此。（“一切

实践原则，如果将意愿能力的对象预设为意志的规定根据，则全都是经验性，无

法给出实践法则”）。看起来康德是将自己的道德哲学的基本原理在略作调整之

后放入了美学框架，并且这一原理构成了他的美学的基本出发点。在此报告中，

我将叙述在何意义上审美无关切构成了《审美判断力批判》的出发点。我将提出

下面这一问题：如何理解这件事情，即康德的道德哲学的基本原则在变形之后成

为了他的美学的基本出发点？

第二个点是：在《判断力批判》的§ 40 节，康德阐发了所谓“判断力的准则”，

即将自己放置在普遍的立足点上，站在每一个人的位置上来思考。由于这是一条

关于“思维方式”的准则，康德说它并不属于鉴赏批判。但尽管如此，对这一原

则的阐发却可以“用来阐明鉴赏批判的基本原理”。这一条关于思维方式的准则

是内在于鉴赏判断的一条准则吗？按说不是，这样的一条具有规范性的“准则”

按说应该是源自于理性，并且鉴于其是准则，应当是源自于实践理性。但是这一

条准则并不只是规定行动，而且规定如何思想，因此它看起来并不单纯是实践理

性的要求，且亦是对理论理性的要求。这样的一条亦涉及到理论理性的准则与定

言命令以及鉴赏判断是何关系呢？它是一条比定言命令更源始的命令吗？

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Power of Aesthetic Judgment and Practical Reason Fan, Dahan

This report attempts to explore the relationship between the power of aesthetic judgment and practical reason in Kant's philosophy. This relationship has often been researched in Kant-studies, and Kant himself has touched on this subject in §§ 42, 59 and so on in Critique of Judgment. However, this report will elucidate two points that have received less attention in the discussion.

One point is: "without interest" is not only one of the characteristics of Kant's aesthetics; this expression has appeared as early as in the Critique of Practical Reason, where it is used to show that the will of the subject in its self-determination is not based on any given interest, or purpose. The determination of the will by moral law must precede any interest for a particular object. This point can be regarded as one of the basic principles of the Critique of Practical Reason. At the beginning of that Critique of Practical Reason, that is, in §2 and §3, this is what Kant talks about. It seems that after a slight adjustment Kant puts this basic principle of his moral philosophy into the aesthetic framework. That the beautiful satisfies without any interest constitutes in a significant sense the starting point of the Kantian aesthetics. In this report, I will describe, in what sense “without interest” constitutes the starting point of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. And then I will ask the question: How is it to be understood that the basic principle of Kant's moral philosophy becomes after a slight transformation the basic starting point of his aesthetics?

The second point is the following one. In § 40 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant elucidates the so-called "maxim of the power of judgment": one should place himself on a universal standing point, in that he sets himself in the position of everyone to think. Since this is a maxim of the "way of thinking" (Denkungsart), Kant says it does not belong to the critique of taste. Nevertheless, the elucidation of this principle can be "used to elucidate the basic principles of taste". Is this maxim of the way of thinking a principle within the judgment of taste? Surely, such a normative maxim should be derived from reason, and given that it is a maxim, it should be derived from practical reason. But this maxim seems not to be a mere requirement of practical reason, but also a requirement of theoretical reason. What is the relationship between this maxim, which involves both theoretical and practical reason, and categorical imperative? Is it a more original principle than the last one?

Starting from the above two points, I will discuss the relationship between the

autonomy of aesthetic judgment and that of practical reason. I will go back to Kant's

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从上述两点出发，我将讨论审美判断力的自律与实践理性的自律二者之间究竟是

怎样的关系。我将回溯到康德在《实践理性批判》中的基本立场：每种心灵能力

皆有其关切，而理性为每种心灵能力规定其关切。

美作为德性的象征

周黄正蜜

如果说《判断力批判》两个最为重要的任务——论证审美自律和连接理论哲

学和实践哲学的体系性建构——之间是存在着一定张力的，那么“美作为德性的

象征”这一命题恰好处于这种张力的节点之上。一方面美的象征性必须以审美自

律为前提，另一方面，通过象征美却成为从自然到自由过渡的重要途径之一。对

这个复杂的命题学界也存在不少误解——或者将审美理念与美对德性的象征性

相混淆，或者无法精准说明美象征德性的方式，或者无法确定象征命题在康德哲

学体系中的功能。消除这些误解需要首先澄清象征一词在康德哲学中的功能（对

理念的感性展示）和运作方式（对反思规则的类比），美对对德性的象征才能被

确定为审美反思和道德意向中主体内在心灵状态和属性的类似性——纯粹性（或

无涉感性关切）和自我立法的主动性，或者说是消极意义上和积极意义上的自由。

在这种意义上，美对道德的象征首先与审美理念区分开来，后者或者涉及智性的

兴趣（在自然美中），或者预设了目的（在艺术美中）；也不能建立于超感性基

底之上，后者作为康德在审美判断力的辨证论中给出的鉴赏原则与分析论中给出

的鉴赏原则（主观合目的性）并不相同，是在理性对绝对性的要求下的一种形而

上学提升。通过这种形式性的关系，美和道德不仅在经验人类学意义上互相促进

——虽然二者都并非对方的充分或者必要条件。而且，在先验层面，美得以展望

理知之物，成为从自然到自由的过渡。

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basic position in the Critique of Practical Reason: every faculty of the mind has its own interest, and reason determines for each faculty its interest.

Beauty as a Symbol of Morality

Zhouhuang Zhengmi Kant uses the concept of symbol to show the tricky relationship between the autonomy of beauty and its systematic function as a transition from nature to freedom which are the two most important topics in the third Critique. Beauty’s symbolism of morality lies in the analogue between aesthetic reflection and moral disposition, concretely, the purity or disinterestedness and self-legislation as negative and positive freedom in both subjective status of mind. In this scenario, beauty’s symbolism does not refer to the aesthetic ideas, which either involves intelligent interests (in the beauty of nature) or presupposes an end (in the beauty of art); and it can also not ground on the supersensible substrate which is an elevated and metaphysical principle of the judgment of taste given in the Dialectic, but not the original principle of subjective purposiveness in the Analytic. With this formal relationship, beauty and morality accelerate each other in the empirical-anthological sense — but they are also not sufficient or necessary condition for each other. Furthermore, through the symbolism, taste looks toward the intelligible and serves as a transition from nature to freedom from the transcendental perspective.

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会议信息

Conference Information

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注册

与会者可于 6 月 6 日 14：00–18：00 在中关新园 1 号楼大堂处进行注册并领取会

议资料。如无法在这一时段进行注册，亦可于 6 月 7 日或 6 月 8 日上午 8：30 –

9：00 在会场入口处进行注册并领取会议资料。为方便进入北大校园，请随身佩

戴注册时发放的胸卡。

交通从首都机场前往中关新园酒店，可乘坐出租车，依车型不同，价格约在 120-150

元之间。亦可乘坐地铁机场线至三元桥站，在该站转乘地铁十号线至海淀黄庄站，

再转乘地铁四号线至北京大学东门站。从 C 口出站后，参照本手册最后一页所附

地图，步行约 5 分钟即可到达中关新园酒店。

从北京站、北京西站或北京南站前往中关新园酒店，可乘坐出租车，价格都在 100

元以内。如乘坐地铁，从北京站可乘坐二号线至宣武门站转乘四号线、从北京西

站可乘坐九号线至国家图书馆站转乘四号线、从北京南站可直接乘坐四号线，至

北京大学东门站，从 C 口出站后，参照本手册最后一页所附地图，步行约 5 分钟

即可到达中关新园酒店。

6 月 7 日-6 月 10 日上午 8：30，会议志愿者会在中关新园 1 号楼大堂处将与会

嘉宾引领至会场。

餐饮本次会议主办方为全体正式参会人员提供从 6 月 6 日晚至 6 月 10 日中午的正餐

以及会议当中的茶点。住在中关新园的参会者可享受酒店提供的自助早餐。

无论是宴会还是便餐，我们都为饮食上有特殊需求的参会者准备了专门的膳食，

请这些参会者届时留意工作人员的指引。

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Registration Participants can register and receive conference materials at the lobby of Zhongguanxinyuan Hotel from 14:00–18:00 on June 6. If you are unable to register at this time, you can also register at the entrance of the venue on June 7 or June 8 at 8:30-9:00. In order to facilitate access to the Peking University campus, please always wear the badge included in the conference materials.

Transportation The easiest way to come from the Capital Airport to Zhongguanxinyuan Hotel is to take a taxi. The price is about 120-150 CNY. You can find clear instructions in the airport in order to get a taxi. You may just show the line below to the driver and s/he will understand where s/he should go. 请将我送至北京大学中关新园一号楼大堂（中关村北大街 126 号），谢谢！ You can also take the subway Airport Line to Sanyuanqiao Station（三元桥）, then take the subway Line 10 to Haidian Huangzhuang Station（海淀黄庄）, then transfer to subway Line 4 to Peking University East Gate Station（北京大学东门）. After exiting from Exit C, confer the map attached on the last page of this brochure and walk to the Zhongguanxinyuan Hotel in about 5 minutes. From June 7 to June 10, conference volunteers will pick up the speakers from the hotel to the venue at 8: 30, in front of the lobby of Zhongguanxinyuan Hotel.

Meals The hosts will provide all formal participants of our conference the meals from 6th evening to 10th noon and refreshments during the conference. Participants who live in Zhongguanxinyuan can enjoy the buffet breakfast provided by the hotel. We shall prepare special meals for participants with special requirements in the diet, and these participants are advised to pay attention to our guidelines.

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网络中关新园酒店和北京大学校园内均有免费的无线网覆盖。在校园内使用无线网，

可使用 PKU Visitor 连接，使用前需先用智能手机进行注册。

观光我们将于 6 月 10 日下午带领与会者前往颐和园进行观光活动，请有意参加的与

会者提前在报到台处登记，以便我们的组织工作。

颐和园简介：颐和园前身为清漪园，坐落在北京西郊，距城区十五公里，占地约

二百九十公顷。它是以昆明湖、万寿山为基址，以杭州西湖为蓝本，汲取江南园

林的设计手法而建成的一座大型山水园林，也是保存最完整的一座皇家行宫御苑，

被誉为“皇家园林博物馆”。

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Internet There will be free Wi-Fi both at the hotel and in the conference venue (with the link PKU Visitor, a registration through a smart phone is necessary to use link). It should be noted that there is no Google Service in the mainland China. So if you want to use Google, YouTube, etc. during your stay in China, you may need to prepare a VPN by yourself.

Tour On the afternoon of June 10th, we will lead the participants of our conference (and their companions) to the Summer Palace for sightseeing. Please tell our stuffs if you would like to join the tour (and how many people will come with you) at the registration desk. A brief description of the Summer Palace: Summer Palace, a former royal garden with more than 200 years of history, temples, lakes and walkways, is the best-preserved imperial garden in the world and the largest of its kind in existence in China today. Roaming along the long corridor there, you will definitely be amazed by the tranquil beauty of the picturesque garden.

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Local information

Weather Beijing has a sub-humid continental monsoon climate, characterized by hot and rainy summers, cold and dry winters. Summer in Beijing could be very humidly hot with fierce sunlight, with an average temperature ranging from 21℃ to 30℃ in June. All participants are suggested to wear light and breathable clothes, while adequate sun protection needs to be done.

Currency exchange Most banks provide exchange service for foreign currencies. Credit cards such as master, visa, JCB, diners, an American express are accepted in most hotels, shopping centers and restaurants.

Electricity The voltage is 220V in China.

Tips & tax Tipping is not strongly expected or commonly practiced in Beijing. Taxes are already included in the stated prices.

Dialing code The country dialing code for China is 86, while the regional code for Beijing is 10.

Emergency contacts

Ambulance 120 Police 110

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通讯录/Address Book

（编辑中/in preparation）

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北京大学校园地图

Peking University Campus

1 中关新园酒店/Zhongguanxinyuan Hotel

2 李兆基人文学苑/Lee Shau-Kee Humanities Buildings

3 英杰交流中心/Overseas Exchange Center

4 “北京大学东门”地铁站/Subway Station “Peking University East Gate”

Documents

1 · 2019. 6. 4. · Zilong, Zheng Zhiqing and Zhang Xuhelped in preparing th isbrochure. Many thanks to them for their excellent works! - 6 -