Inevit Even if other nations pursue space weapons pursuing space weapons isnt the solution other measures check. Christy µ6 Lieutenant Colonel Donald P. Christy, United States Air Force. ³United States Policy on Weapons in Space´. March 15, 2006. www .strategicstudiesi nstitute.army.mil/pdf files/ksil307.pdfThe argument for military necessity states that the military advantages of space weapons to the United States and potential adversaries will soon be so great that it is in the national security interest to pursue them.39 Space weapons will ³defend friendly satellite s« attack enemy space weapons and other satellites that perfo rm important military functions, shoot down long-range ballistic missiles, and conduct attacks against enemy air and surface forces.´40 The basis of this argument is that regardless of what the United States chooses to do, other nations will certainly develop space weapons over time. The United States relies heavily on the force enhancement aspect of military space systems including communications, navigation, warning and reconnaissance. We cannot afford to allow another space power to cripple the advantage these systems offer. This is similar to the economic argument above, but recognizes that our military space systems are far more indispensable.41 The counter to this argument is that it is not the development and deployment of space weapons that is the best solution to this vulnerability. Diversificatio n of capabilities to reduce reliance on space assets is a le ss costly, more achievable solution. Examples include the use of many more, but much smaller, satelli tes, cheaperand less complex launch vehicles, near-space balloo ns to provide communicatio ns over a theater, improved inertial navigation systems to reduce or eliminate reliance on space na vigation aids and the proliferation of small-unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance. As for space-to-earth weapons, the United States already possesses considerable ability to project force around the world.42 Space-to-earth weapons might offer some advantage in quick strike capability overcapabilities we have today, but is the expense worth it? Quick ³target of opportunity´ strikes in the Iraq war were unable to take out Saddam Hussein. Attacks against terrorist leaders in Pakistan were equally unsuccessful. Even strikes from space will require accurate intelligence support on the ground. In other words, a sniper on the ground with a $500 rifle could perform the same mission as a $500 million satellite in space that would still require the person on the ground to provide the target information. Any weapon is only as good a s the targeting intelligence and our record in that area is somewhat suspect. Basing the decision to weaponize space on inevitability is bad decision-making and lead conflict even if it is inevitable the U.S. should post-pone weaponization. Hardesty µ5 Captain David C. Hardesty, U.S. Navy, a member of the faculty of the Naval War College¶s Strategy and Policy Department. ³Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternativ es´. Naval War College Review, Spring 2005, Vol. 58, No. 2 If a decision to space-base weapons should not rest solely on arguments of historical inevitability, it is possible to argue that weaponization of space will occur at some time in the future. When humans ultimately explore deep space, they may indeed carry weapons for protection. A powerful weapons system may ultimately be deployed to protect the earth from asteroids. ³Ultimately ´ is a long time. However, it is not long-term predictive accuracy that is important but the almost complete irrelevance of ³inevitability´ to current efforts. Things that are inevitable can be either good or bad. If something is good and inevitable, it is logical to pursue acquisition now in order to obtain the benefits as early as possible; if something is inevitable and bad, it is logical to delay it as long as possible. Thus, our current decisions with regard to space-basing weapons must be dictated not by its inevitability but by whether it is good or bad ²by whether weaponization and its consequences will improve or degrade the national security environment. If analysis
