PLA DA

Table of Contents

ContentsPLA DA.........................................................................................................................................................1

Table of Contents...................................................................................................................................1

Explanation............................................................................................................................................1

Shell...............................................................................................................................................................1

1NC DA GDI.........................................................................................................................................1

1NC DA.................................................................................................................................................1

Overview....................................................................................................................................................1

2NC OV.................................................................................................................................................1

Uniqueness.................................................................................................................................................1

EXT – UQ..............................................................................................................................................1

A2 – UQ overwhelms the Link..............................................................................................................1

Link............................................................................................................................................................1

EXT – Zero Sum....................................................................................................................................1

Deep Sea Expo.......................................................................................................................................1

Energy Link...........................................................................................................................................1

Renewables/ Renewable Industry..........................................................................................................1

Energy Independence.............................................................................................................................1

Fishing....................................................................................................................................................1

Wind.......................................................................................................................................................1

Generic...................................................................................................................................................1

Arctic......................................................................................................................................................1

Aquaculture............................................................................................................................................1

Marine Reserves/Conservation..............................................................................................................1

Offshore Wind.......................................................................................................................................1

Zero Sum – Renewables........................................................................................................................1

Internal Link...............................................................................................................................................1

EXT – Internal Link...............................................................................................................................1

A2 – Reforms Don’t Solve....................................................................................................................1

Explanation This disadvantage is pretty basic. Let’s go over the key points that make it distinct from other China disadvantages. The Panda piece of evidence is really interesting because it indicates that the People’s Liberation Army has a lack of discipline. Specifically, the problem lies in the fact that the PLA is a nationalist army as opposed to a nationalized army. Recent activity, not authorized by the CCP, has created quite a sticky situation in places like India and Kashimir. Despite Xi Jinping’s call for discipline, the PLA continues to ignore the administration. As a result, Xi Jinping is implementing corruption reform and rooting out military leaders who are not listening. That’s the uniqueness. Since the PLA is nationalist, they will act in order to project power if they feel threatened by certain actions (especially those by the United States). Those confrontations escalate. Extinction.

The strategic value in this file is high. Many teams will not expect the impact chain and read generic China impact defense, which does not answer the impact that the disad sets up. This file has a 90% win rate for Chaminade CK. Included is two pretty recent shells, a fully typed out overview, ALL HIGHLIGHTED uniqueness blocks, a good amount of links on the ocean topic (but still effective on the surveillance topic), and internal link explanations. If you have any questions, message me on g chat. Jeremiahcha97@gmail.com

Shell

1NC DA GDI Structural anti-corruption reforms are being implemented now – Xi is cleaning up the PLA McCauley, a senior intelligence officer for the former Soviet Union Russia and China during 31 years in the federal government and writer for Jamestown Foundation, 2/4 /2015 (Kevin, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43498&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=3c905ec80c598bc9668e6324ed194a01#.VNzJDfnF-So, 2/13/2015, JC)

An unprecedented number of personnel moves and promotions within the PLA have occurred under President Xi. The Chinese press suggests that the promotions and shuffling of personnel are due to ongoing anti-corruption campaigns in the Chinese government and the military (Caixin, January 8; South China Morning Post, January 9). Others have noted that a number of officers with backgrounds in the Nanjing Military Region (MR), comprising Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Fujian provinces, have been promoted to bolster President Xi’s support within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This MR is noteworthy because President Xi served in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces and in Shanghai (see China Brief, January 9; The Diplomat, December 30, 2014). Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry spokesman, in response to press speculation, portrayed the personnel shuffle as routine (China Daily, January 5). These explanations for the large-scale reshuffling and promotions provide valid, but incomplete, explanations for the large number of PLA personnel moves occurring under President Xi. An important additional reason is to gain support as well as break ground force opposition based in the MRs to President Xi’s announced military reforms , which plans to adjust the MRs creating joint commands, thus reducing ground force dominance (see China Brief, December 5, 2014). Past opposition, mainly from entrenched interests within the ground forces to maintain the current MR structure, derailed earlier plans by former Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to adjust the MR structure and form joint commands, which form an important component of President Xi’s military reforms.

*LINK HERE*Plan incites rogue PLA action for power projection before reforms can stop them – PLA interventions and conflicts draw in United States military response Panda , the Diplomat, 9/23 /2014

(Ankit, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/chinas-military-may-have-gone-rogue-after-all/, China's Military May Have Gone 'Rogue' After All, JC, 11/3)

New evidence supports the commonly held view that the Chinese military isn’t entirely in line with the party leadership. Recently, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the PLA headquarters in Beijing with PLA chiefs of staff present. Notably he delivered this speech following his return from his South Asia tour which featured a particularly interesting visit to India when PLA troops crossed intro India- administered Kashmir as Xi arrived in the country . In his speech, Xi unusually emphasized the importance of the PLA’s “absolute loyalty and firm faith in the C ommunist P arty of C hina ,” according to Xinhua. Further supporting the idea that there may be some commanders in the PLA who have acted without the consent of the party leadership, Xi emphasized the need for a “ smooth chain of command ” and called on field commanders to “make sure all decisions from the central leadership are fully implemented.” In a particularly telling paraphrasal, Xinhua notes that Xi suggested that “Military commanders should have a better understanding of international and domestic security situations as well as the latest military development.” According to Xinhua, Fang Fenghui, chief of the PLA general staff,

was in attendance, along with other senior Chinese military leaders. A statement following Xi’s speech noted that “All PLA forces should follow the instructions of President Xi Jinping, also chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and update their operations to meet new goals and missions set by the CMC.” In light of Xi’s remarks, it seems highly likely that PLA leaders have at times acted without the consent of the Communist Party ’s senior leadership and , more critically, against the strategic vision of that same leadership. It is, of course, nearly impossible to ascertain the extent to which the PLA may have drifted from the party leadership without veering dangerously close to baseless speculation. All we know is that Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the chairman of the Central Military Commission, felt it necessary to issue a statement to the People’s Liberation Army that, in effect, says “Please listen to me.” In light of Xi’s remarks, it may bear reconsidering the verity of, for example, him telling Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that he honestly did not know the details of the stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in Kashmir as the two leaders met. The fact that Xi felt it necessary to deliver these remarks and issue a statement to the PLA immediately upon his return from India suggests that the Chinese incursion in Chumar may not have been carefully coordinated after all. The one oddity in all this is why we’re hearing about this speech at all. If Xi is truly concerned by lapses in China’s chain of command and fears that his leadership over the military is not absolute, why broadcast it via a report in state media? For a state apparatus so concerned with saving face, it’s somewhat curious that Beijing would choose to willingly broadcast these sorts of lapses in leadership to the outside world. Xi, like Hu Jintao before him, has issued statements expressing displeasure with the military before, but the frank language and the fact that the remarks were delivered following the incident in Kashmir between Indian and Chinese troops suggest that this time things might be different. One explanation might be that this speech and the report could be engineered specifically for consumption by the outside world. After all, given recent incidents involving Chinese troops in India , Southeast Asia, and the East China Sea , it may grant the leadership in Beijing some plausible deniability by suggesting that these actions were not sanctioned by the top leadership in Beijing . Of course, by the same token, this same admission makes Xi look weak in a way very much contrary to the image he has cultivated for himself (it is almost cliche to refer to Xi as anything but the 21st century reincarnation of Deng Xiaoping). Unfortunately for many of China’s neighbors, neither explanation of Chinese military behavior – be it top- down carefully planned strategy or “rogue ” field commanders– is particularly comforting . Leaders and strategists in India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and the United States will be less interested in cracking open the black box that is the Chinese military and more interested in responding effectively to China’s increasingly assertive military behavior .

Military conflicts go nuclear, causing extinction – turns all impacts Wittner – professor of history emeritus at SUNY Albany, 2011

[Lawrence, 11-30-2011, “Is Nuclear War with China Possible”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-war-china_b_1116556.html, DOI 7/12014]

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries international conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough . Disturbed by China's growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China's claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was "asserting our own position as a Pacific power." But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the

U nited S tates and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons . The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during their conflict over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." Of course, China didn't have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven't been very many -- at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for

an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don't nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy was to redspond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing "Star Wars" and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive -- and probably unworkable -- military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly 300. Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely

the United States would "win" any nuclear war with China. But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning . The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering , radioactive wastelands . Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter " around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction . Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade

1NC DA Structural anti-corruption reforms are coming now—Xi is pushing and has enough capital – China is on a path for strong leadership Mulvenon 7/28 (James, Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis Deputy Director and specialist on the Chinese military, “Groupthink? PLA Leading Small Groups and the Prospect for Real Reform and Change in the Chinese Military,” Hoover Institution, 7/28/14, China Leadership Monitor, Issue 44, p. 4 http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm44jm.pdf)

While the use of “leading small groups” and other ad hoc leadership organizations to manage specific tasks or oversee internal campaigns is nothing new for the CCP

and PLA, the appearance of a significant number of new PLA entities in the midst of the implementation of the Third Plenum reforms is hardly a coincidence. The real question is: Will these leading groups have any appreciable success in confronting and overcoming the important (and longstanding) structural problems that they were created to address? Or will they be yet another example of the Chinese system engaging in “feigned compliance”

with the reform directives, while trying to maintain the status quo and protect selected malefactors? It is tempting to see Xi Jinping as different, as

bolder and more decisive than his predecessors in breaking crockery and rooting out corruption, but from the outside it is sometimes challenging to distinguish the reality of the situation from the full-volume propaganda depiction of the situation that we are provided by the Chinese media

apparatus. Recent events, however, strongly suggest that we are witnessing some real change, particularly with respect to military corruption. If senior military officials like Gu Junshan, and even more significantly Xu Caihou, are officially charged and

prosecuted for abuse of power, then we can perhaps conclude that Xi Jinping has the “juice” to push through structural reform. If Xi succeeds in implementing real organizational reform of the military region system, even replacing it with an architecture better suited to integrated joint operations, one could conclude that he enjoys more influence and power within the PLA than any CCP leader since Deng Xiaoping.

*LINK HERE*Plan incites rogue PLA action for power projection before reforms can stop them – PLA interventions and conflicts draw in United States military response Panda , the Diplomat, 9/23

(Ankit, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/chinas-military-may-have-gone-rogue-after-all/, China's Military May Have Gone 'Rogue' After All, JC, 11/3)

New evidence supports the commonly held view that the Chinese military isn’t entirely in line with the party leadership. Recently, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the PLA headquarters in Beijing with PLA chiefs of staff present. Notably he delivered this speech following his return from his South Asia tour which featured a particularly interesting visit to India when PLA troops crossed intro India- administered Kashmir as Xi arrived in the country . In his speech, Xi unusually emphasized the importance of the PLA’s “absolute loyalty and firm faith in the C ommunist P arty of C hina ,” according to Xinhua. Further supporting the idea that there may be some commanders in the PLA who have acted without the consent of the party leadership, Xi emphasized the need for a “ smooth chain of command ” and called on field commanders to “make sure all decisions from the central leadership are fully implemented.” In a particularly telling paraphrasal, Xinhua notes that Xi suggested that “Military commanders should have a better understanding of international and domestic security situations as well as the latest military development.” According to Xinhua, Fang Fenghui, chief of the PLA general staff, was in attendance, along with other senior Chinese military leaders. A statement following Xi’s speech noted that “All PLA forces should follow the instructions of President Xi Jinping, also chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and update their operations to meet new goals and missions set by the CMC.” In light of Xi’s remarks, it seems highly likely that PLA leaders have at times acted without the consent of the Communist Party’s senior leadership and, more critically, against the strategic vision of that same leadership. It is, of course, nearly impossible to ascertain the extent to which the PLA may have drifted from the party leadership without veering dangerously close to baseless speculation. All we know

is that Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the chairman of the Central Military Commission, felt it necessary to issue a statement to the People’s Liberation Army that, in effect, says “Please listen to me.” In light of Xi’s remarks, it may bear reconsidering the verity of, for example, him telling Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that he honestly did not know the details of the stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in Kashmir as the two leaders met. The fact that Xi felt it necessary to deliver these remarks and issue a statement to the PLA immediately upon his return from India suggests that the Chinese incursion in Chumar may not have been carefully coordinated after all. The one oddity in all this is why we’re hearing about this speech at all. If Xi is truly concerned by lapses in China’s chain of command and fears that his leadership over the military is not absolute, why broadcast it via a report in state media? For a state apparatus so concerned with saving face, it’s somewhat curious that Beijing would choose to willingly broadcast these sorts of lapses in leadership to the outside world. Xi, like Hu Jintao before him, has issued statements expressing displeasure with the military before, but the frank language and the fact that the remarks were delivered following the incident in Kashmir between Indian and Chinese troops suggest that this time things might be different. One explanation might be that this speech and the report could be engineered specifically for consumption by the outside world. After all, given recent incidents involving Chinese troops in India , Southeast Asia, and the East China Sea , it may grant the leadership in Beijing some plausible deniability by suggesting that these actions were not sanctioned by the top leadership in Beijing . Of course, by the same token, this same admission makes Xi look weak in a way very much contrary to the image he has cultivated for himself (it is almost cliche to refer to Xi as anything but the 21st century reincarnation of Deng Xiaoping). Unfortunately for many of China’s neighbors, neither explanation of Chinese military behavior – be it top- down carefully planned strategy or “rogue ” field commanders– is particularly comforting . Leaders and strategists in India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and the United States will be less interested in cracking open the black box that is the Chinese military and more interested in responding effectively to China’s increasingly assertive military behavior .

Military conflicts go nuclear – extinction Wittner 11 – professor of history emeritus at SUNY Albany, 2011

[Lawrence, 11-30-2011, “Is Nuclear War with China Possible”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-war-china_b_1116556.html, DOI 7/12014]

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries international conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough . Disturbed by China's growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China's claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was "asserting our own position as a Pacific power." But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the U nited S tates and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons . The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during their conflict over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." Of course, China didn't have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven't been very many -- at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost

slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for

an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don't nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy was to redspond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing "Star Wars" and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive -- and probably unworkable -- military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly 300. Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely

the United States would "win" any nuclear war with China. But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning . The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering , radioactive wastelands . Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter " around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction . Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade

Overview

2NC OV China has placed its focus on the ocean - _________ has been outlined in official documents as KEY to Chinese interests and a priority for the government – China has status quo interest in the ocean as the place where they could take the lead from the US – PLA relies on nationalism to act, not the CCP – too much corruption and rogue leaders – the plan destroys all reform efforts by inciting the PLA to lash out – hardliners and the PLA project power by taking military action in places like Taiwan and Sentaku Islands and the US will respond – Their __________ specifically pisses off Chinese PLA officialsPLA entirely ignores the CCP and takes action on its own – that’s PandaImpact is immediate global nuclear war – PLA nuclear stocks and first strike capabilities are ways to project power and demonstrate Chinese dominance – the PLA enters a “try or die” framing where they will do anything to preserve Chinese nationalism – their lash out guarantees conflict with the US – enough to cause extinction CCP will also use biological chemical and nuclear warfare after strikeRenxing 5

(Epoch Times , 8/3/05http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else ,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP , that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans , coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons . Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives .

Uniqueness

EXT – UQ Group the uniqueness debate – actual action by Xi is the framing issue – only our evidence is in the context of what Xi’s agenda looks like and predicts CCP action – none of their evidence is in the context of general secretary actionHere are three reasons why corruption reform is happening First – weeding out corrupt officials is in process now – that’s (1NC evidence) Second – cultural justificationsChan , South China Morning Post, 11/3

(Minnie, 2014, “Xi Jinping calls on the PLA to remember the past in fight against graft”, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1630043/xi-jinping-calls-pla-remember-past-fight-against-graft)

President Xi Jinping has called on the military to reflect on discipline and uphold its revolutionary tradition in the wake of a corruption scandal involving a former top general. Xi ordered more than 400 senior military officials , including leaders of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the army's four headquarters and seven key

military commands as well as heads of military-related organisations to gather in the historically significant town of Gutian in Fujian province for a two-day conference that ended on Friday, Xinhua reported. Xi called for serious thought on the disciplinary and legal violations of disgraced former CMC vice-chairman Xu Caihou, telling the gathering that the lessons learned from Xu's case deserved profound reflection while the unfavourable influence of the case had to be thoroughly

cleared away. Xu had confessed to taking bribes, military prosecutors announced last Tuesday. Political analysts said the meeting indicated that Xi , who is also chairman of the CMC, is facing some resistance to his ongoing anti- corruption campaign and reform of the PLA . "In Communist Party history, party heads can consolidate their political status in

two ways, through ideological and military legitimacy," Beijing-based political commentator Zhang Lifan said. He said Xi had shown his control of ideology by chairing a forum of writers and artists last month. However, Xi had yet to gain full control over the PLA, since the party's fourth plenum did not promote his allies, Liu Yuan and Zhang Youxia, to CMC vice-chairmen, Zhang said. The PLA Daily reported separately that Xi had taken the military leaders to visit the venue of the historic Gutian Party Congress in 1929 and a memorial hall for Mao Zedong to reiterate the importance of upholding the traditional spirit of the PLA's predecessor, the Red Army . At that congress, Mao reaffirmed party leadership and proposed the principle of "the party leading the army", an important tenet in the history of the party and the PLA. Xi adopted that principle when he became head of the PLA two years ago. Xi also visited an experimental development zone in Pingtan county. Xi spent 17 years in official positions in Fujian.

Third – It’s at the top of Xi’s agenda Qiang, ChinaDaily USA, 1/26

(2015, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2015-01/26/content_19408932.htm, CHINA DAILY USA, JC)

China faces major as well as potentially minor security threats , and given the complicated international situation, the security environment in its neighborhood cannot be said to be satisfactory. This calls for further reform of the military , without which China cannot safeguard its national security. The reform of China's military is also necessary to keep pace with the military buildup across the world and to cleanse the force of bad elements, especially senior officers, that have indulged in corruption and pomposity and thus lowered the morale of patriots. An armed force's main responsibility is to safeguard a country's national security and defend its territorial integrity against attacks. With such a perception in mind, China's leadership under President Xi Jinping has accorded the highest priority to military reforms. The reforms are also expected to improve national governance. The severe crackdown on corrupt military

officers, including Xu Caihou, former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Gu Junshan, former deputy head of the People's Liberation Army General Logistics Department, shows the top leadership's determination to root out corruption from the military. But the ever-intensifying anti-corruption campaign, which has netted "tigers" (corrupt high-ranking officials) as well as "flies" (lower-raking officials), has prompted some people to ask whether the campaign would affect the fighting spirit of the military. Such people should be informed that the investigations into corrupt military officers will not dent the fighting capability or spirit of the military, or soil its image. If anything, the anti-corruption drive will further strengthen the PLA.

Fourth – it’s slighted to continue onto this year – xi has no intention of stopping China Times 1/5

(2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150105000001&cid=1501, JC)

Beijing is set to dig deeper in its crackdown on corruption in the military as it aims to modernize its armed forces and improve combat ability, Guangzhou's South Reviews magazine reports. The ongoing crackdown began with the case of Lieutenant General Gu Junshan, deputy head of the General Logistics Department of the People's Liberation Army, who was removed from his post in February 2012 and indicted in March 2014 for taking bribes and embezzlement after a lengthy investigation, the magazine said. Also in March, an investigation was launched into Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission, with an indictment against him announced in late October. President Xi Jinping, who also served as the head of the Central Military Commission, raised Xu's case on two recent public occasions, once during a military political work meeting in October and again during his visit to the Nanjing Military Region in December. Xi said the armed forces need to learn the lesson from Xu's case and purge themselves of negative influences in the PLA's thinking, political work, organization and practices. The PLA Daily , the official newspaper of China's armed forces, reiterated Xi's determination to fight corruption in an op-ed piece on Dec. 17, pointing out that some people have (erroneously) stated that an end has come. In another op-ed published Dec. 23, the paper also said the armed forces might be a group with special tasks, but they enjoys no special privilege when it comes to rooting out corruption.

A2 – UQ overwhelms the Link False - it’ll be close—there’s doubt in the politburo about his anti-corruption campaign—capital is the deciding factor – US action makes Xi look weak SCMP 8/5 (Keith Zhai, SCMP reporter, “Xi’s ‘shockingly harsh’ Politburo speech signals tensions over anti-graft crackdown,” South China Morning Post, 8/5/14, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1567026/xis-shockingly-harsh-politburo-speech-signals-tensions-over-anti-graft)

President Xi Jinping told top officials he was disregarding “life, death and reputation” to fight corruption in a terse speech

signalling a possible dispute and doubts among party elites over the campaign. An official mainland newspaper and a person familiar with the matter confirmed the president’s statement. Xi was believed to have made the remark in a closed-door Politburo meeting on June 26, the details of which were publicly revealed only when the city newspaper Changbaishan Daily on Monday reported that local officials received instructions from the president. ”[I] had left life and death, as well as my personal reputation, out of consideration in the combat against corruption,” Xi said, according to Changbaishan city’s party chief, Li

Wei. Li said the top leadership’s remarks emphasised a sense of crisis, and some of the words were “shockingly” sharp and harsh. However, he did not provide more details. "We have to take the responsibility since the party and the country had put their fate in our hands,” the president was

reported to have said. Xi said “the two armies of corruption and anti-corruption are in confrontation, and are in a stalemate”, according to Li, adding that the leadership vowed to see the anti-graft campaign to the very end. The campaign launched by Xi against “tigers and flies” (high to low-ranking cadres) when he came to power has seen scores of officials, business associates and their families either jailed, investigated or sacked. The latest victim of the campaign is former security tsar Zhou Yongkang, the highest-level official to be netted in a corruption probe so far. The Changbaishan Daily also said that Xi urged graft busters to focus on four types of officials: those who are strongly opposed by the public; those who have not restrained themselves after the party’s 18th congress in 2012; younger cadres in key positions; and those who might potentially take on more important roles. The daily’s article was soon deleted from the website as some internet operators said they received a gag order from propaganda authorities. A person familiar with the president’s speech told the South

China Morning Post earlier that Xi made the strongly worded speech to the Politburo to counter some critics and silence doubts against his anti-corruption campaign. Xi warned the party elites that nothing would be off limits in his anti-graft drive, the person said. The president also rebuked the “school of thought” that the relentless drive against errant officials would only plunge the country in chaos and that Xi, in the end, would “eat humble pie”. According to the person, Xi retorted: “What is there to be scared of?” Zhang Ming, a political scientist at Renmin University in Beiing, said

the remarks showed the anti-corruption campaign had certainly threatened some interest groups in the upper echelons. ”The combat between Xi and the interest groups has been white-hot and Xi also realised that [it] is make or break,” he said.

Link

EXT – Zero Sum Ocean is zero-sum for the CCP – 1NC _____ evidence cites the fact that China believes that any increase in ocean policy by the United States that China is pursuing must be a direct challenge – even if the plan is a small dent in geopolitics, China doesn’t believe so, and the hardliners within the CCP will strategically spin the plan and blow up its importance as being a zero-sum venture vs. China to take power within the government

We can’t control the spin, Chinese hardliners will interpret the plan in the worst way possibleMead 12 (Walter Russell Mead, “High Noon in Beijing”, American Interest Blog, April 30, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/04/30/high-noon-in-beijing/)

What we all seem to be learning in Asia is that events have a logic and a pace of their own. America can set a policy in motion, but we can’t control or fine tune the consequences of our policies as they ripple out across the world . Many conversations with US officials in this and in prior administrations have left me convinced that the US is not trying to contain China the way we once contained the Soviet Union. While virtually all Americans at senior levels believe that over time economic progress will lead to political change in China, this is because most Americans are hardwired to think in those terms and this whiggish faith in the historical process is not

a statement of policy or intent. Leading Americans in both parties generally hope for a peaceful and gradual reform process rather than violent conflict in China; they do not want to dismember or impoverish China and they would not welcome its disintegration. Nor do Americans see the evolution of a future Asian security order in zero-sum terms. The United States wants to prevent Chinese

domination of Asia but we do not want to dominate the region ourselves. Many Chinese, I have found on my visits there, have a much darker view of our intentions, and see the US and China entangled in a zero sum battle for dominance which only one side can win. For now, it appears that the US, surprisingly to some Chinese analysts, is winning that contest. We should not expect Chinese hard liners to accept that situation with calm and resignation , even if their present options are limited.

AND specifically ocean policies are zero sumDujarric , Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies Director, 11

[Robert, His work has appeared in the Asahi Shimbun, The Financial Times and Nikkei Weekly, among other publications, The Diplomat, “China's Zero-Sum Game,” http://thediplomat.com/2011/07/chinas-zero-sum-game/, accessed July 11, 2014, EK]

Last, but not least, there has been a series of potentially explosive incidents at sea involving Chinese vessels and US and Japanese vessels. In some cases, Chinese

ships have impeded the activities of American survey ships in international waters. Though some have argued that Chinese opposition to US intelligence operations outside Chinese territorial limits but within its EEZ is legitimate , the Chinese side has clearly opted for a risky policy of confrontation . In others, Chinese helicopters have flown dangerously close to Japanese naval ships. The cumulative effect of all these events is to reinforce the position of the ‘hawks’ in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Hanoi, Canberra, and numerous other capitals, who see China as a threatening force that wishes to overthrow the status quote with force. Moreover, without getting into theorizing about escalation, it’s easy to see how a minor disturbance – say a Chinese naval helicopter crashing on a foreign vessel and killing crew members – could evolve into

something bigger. The other question is what is Beijing’s goal? Is it actually willing to use violence – and thus risk war – to break the regional status quo? If so, against whom? Does it understand what the costs would be? The fact is that Chinese policy making remains a black box. Some see a highly unified and disciplined CCP running the country the way the Soviet Communist Party did there. Others point out to factionalism, while some note the growing role of a public opinion (fed a nasty diet of nationalistic-chauvinistic propaganda in public schools). Arguments have been made that in the case of the sanctions against Japan, the measures were first taken by local officials and then approved by Beijing, which felt it had no choice. Understanding the sources of Chinese conduct is essential in formulating a response. But at some point, it becomes secondary. Regardless of who decided to embargo rare earth exports to Japan, the fact is that Japanese factories couldn’t get their orders fulfilled. Maybe young Chinese pilots find it fun to buzz the masts of foreign surface vessels, or possibly they are ordered to so by the senior leadership, but the probability of a lethal accident remains the same. Optimists will argue that the Chinese economy is now so intertwined with the rest of the world that it diminishes the possibility of armed conflict. They can also point to growing personal contacts in government between China and its neighbours (including the United States). But as

the US Civil War (the bloodiest war in American history), World War I in Europe, the Serbia-Croatia War, and many other conflicts indicate, in the end

human instincts to kill can overcome the urge to make money. Even the closest of financial, academic, and personal connections can be destroyed. The basic assumption that US and allied policymakers have made for the past two decades about

China is that relations with the Middle Kingdom are a positive-sum game. As China grows richer, everybody benefits. So far, this has proven to be the case. But in the past, it seems that CCP policymakers – whoever they are – not only have a zero-sum game approach, but wish to alter the status quo . Logically, the CCP should be particularly wary of destabilizing actions. Though winning wars can help regimes, picking a fight with a strong set of enemies (essentially the United States and its main allies) with far stronger domestic institutions is very risky. Maybe Beijing hopes that it can avoid military conflict, or just keep it limited to clashes with weak neighbours. But these are dangerous calculations that resemble Russian roulette.

Deep Sea Expo China is becoming leader in deep sea exploration – US action is seen as a threat to China’s maritime soft power Marlow 13 (Jeffrey, “China’s Deep Sea Ambitions,” December 30)

Recently, China’s Jiaolong manned sub mersible became the world’s deepest-diving state-sponsored research vessel , with four trips to 7,000 meters depth. Around the same time, news broke of plans for a National Deep Sea Center , a $78 million facility that will operate the sea-going fleet and serve as a central base for oceanographic research and tech nology development . Months later, the center’s director, Liu Baohua, announced a nationwide search for oceanauts , men and women who will pilot Jiaolong and its planned sister sub around the ocean’s depths. It’s all part of China’s rhetorical, financial, and strategic return to the sea, a realm that it dominated several centuries ag o. Chinese maritime strength reached its apex in the early 15th century, as admiral Zheng He crisscrossed the Indian Ocean with enormous fleets, returning with gifts (most famously a giraffe) for the Emperor. But a few years later, as political winds shifted, the Ming Dynasty ended the epic voyages, choosing instead to focus on other, more local, priorities. This abrupt 180 is frequently cited as a cautionary tale highlighting the dangers of isolationism, a poor strategic move that doomed the discoverers to become the discovered. So why the resurgence in sea-based activity ? Dean Cheng is a Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation and an expert on China’s technological ambitions.

He points to the innocuously named “863 Program ” as an underappreciated game changer that reconfigured the country’s relationship with tech nology across a number of disciplines . In March of 1986 (hence the “863” title), four prominent engineers wrote to then-Chairman Deng Xiaoping, warning of impending doom for civil society’s scientific institutions. A long-standing focus on military might had neglected other aims of technological development, and if China didn’t redistribute its resources soon, it would be fated to watch the “new technological revolution” from the outside. Xiaoping took the argument to heart, initiating research and exploration programs focused on seven key fields: biotechnology, space, information technology, lasers, automation, energy, and materials science. Marine Tech nology was added to the roster in 1996, well coordinated with the country’s broadening regional influence and growing appetite for sea-based resources. “China has become much more dependent on the oceans and ocean-based trade for food and commerce ,” notes Cheng. “They’d also like to know what’s off the coast; there are vast unexplored swaths of their seabed as well as deeper ocean reaches that could prove useful.” And while Plan 863 indicates a formal commitment to ocean ographic exploration, China’s movement has been measured and deliberate, similar to its space faring progress . With all the fanfare surrounding the

country’s entry into manned spaceflight, it’s important to maintain historical perspective. In the decade since it became the third country to put a man in space, China has completed

four flights; the bulk of the Space Race, from Gagarin to Armstrong, happened in less time. It seems likely, then, that the oceanaut program will be a slow burning initiative, the leading edge of a larger oceanic strategy . Going forward, China will continue to consolidate its strategic interests and look to secure access to resources, whether in the form of deep ocean minerals or coastal fish . As Cheng explains, “there are relatively few sudden interests in Chinese politics. The broader set of research areas tend to be methodical in the development process – it’s been true for outer space and it’s true for inner space too.”

Energy Link Competition is zero-sum – PLA perceives threat and takes action - no risk of a link turn—nationalist and mercantilist access to resources is key to interestsHerberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Director, 2011[Mikkal, 6/21/11, New America Foundation, “China’s Energy Rise and the Future of U.S.-China Energy Relations,” http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/china_s_energy_rise_and_the_future_of_us_china_energy_relations, 7/6/14, IC]

Therefore, much will depend on the character of the energy relationship between China and the U.S. Nevertheless,

despite its desirability, establishing something resembling an E-2 seems likely to be elusive . China and the U.S. continue to have fundamentally different world views about energy security and how to achieve it. Beijing’s political

leaders see energy security in distinctly national terms of establishing national control over energy resources and transportation routes. It is a decidedly “19th Century”, mercantilist agenda . Maintaining adequate, reliable, and growing

supplies of energy is viewed as indispensible for ensuring rapid economic growth, job creation, and social and political stability; i.e. the continued claim to legitimacy to rule by the Communist Party . Beijing’s political leaders have little faith in global energy markets to ensure adequate, reliable, and affordable energy to China: energy is simply too important to be left to the markets. Despite gradual market reforms, state control and intervention remain central to China’s approach to energy security. Alternatively, the U.S. has built its conception of energy security over the past 40 years on an international energy structure based on integrated and transparent global markets, competitive pricing, private investment, private technological innovation, and multilateral cooperation. To paraphrase former President Bill Clinton, “it’s the market, stupid”. So each country views energy

security through very different prisms. Moreover, the potential to view our energy security problems as shared challenges continues to be undermined by the chronic overlay of distrust at a strategic level. Beijing’s leaders suspect that the U.S. seeks to use its energy vulnerabilities as part of a broader effort to contain China . Criticism of the

impact of China’s overseas oil investments in pariah states and elsewhere is seen as a cynical ploy to weaken China’s access to vital oil supplies. Pressure from Washington to reduce carbon emissions is seen as a thinly veiled attempt to slow China’s economic growth and frustrate it from achieving its rightful economic role in the world. Washington, on the other hand, sees China’s energy expansion globally as built on predatory collaboration between Beijing and its national oil champions to carve out

privileged access to petroleum supplies, an approach that many believe undermines future U.S. access to needed supplies. This strategic suspicion casts a pall of a “ zero-sum” atmosphere of national competition over energy access and security that is repeatedly reinforced by rhetoric on both sides. The 2005 episode when China’s CNOOC sought to acquire Unocal and was forced to withdraw its bid due to a firestorm of criticism of China’s strategic energy intentions epitomized the toxic mix of bilateral energy

suspicions and mirror-imaging. Further, to the extent that the U.S. might encourage China to take a stronger leadership role on global energy security cooperation, it is still very unclear what role Beijing would want to take on the world energy stage . This is a corollary to the broader

lack of clarity over what role Beijing wants to play in other global issues, from currencies to nuclear proliferation. Beijing remains largely inwardly focused

and driven by its domestic search for stability, economic development, and territorial integrity. Consistent with its traditional broader foreign

policy of “keeping a low profile”, Beijing has shown relatively little serious interest in multilateral energy cooperation.5 Conversely, assuming China were to show interest in a strategic energy partnership, it is not clear to what extent Washington is truly ready for a “shared global energy partnership”. This would require accommodating very different Chinese views on the role of energy markets and pricing, policies toward key petroleum producers and regions, the role of

the IEA and multilateral cooperation, and responsibility for reducing carbon emissions. Washington tends to view a partnership as China

simply joining in and becoming enmeshed and integrated into a set of U.S.-sponsored and led energy institutions and policy agendas established by the west . This is highly unlikely to be acceptable to Beijing’s leadership .6

Prefer our evidence it cites how the plan would be PERCIEVED AND SPUN in Beijing (If Mead not read)Center for American Progress 12 (5 Myths and Reliaties About US China Solar Trade Competition”) http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/05/16/11592/5-myths-and-realities-about-u-s-china-solar-trade-competition/

But the only honest way to address trade issues with China is on a case-by-case basis, as objectively as possible. That is exactly what the domestic trade resolution procedures at the U.S. Department of Commerce and the international procedures at the World Trade Organization are designed to do. Those institutions take trade complaints out of the hands of politicians—who almost always have political incentives to overreact or underreact to trade accusations against China regardless of the facts—and put them into the hands of independent arbiters. At present, a large portion of the trade allegations levied against China are in the clean energy sphere. The reason is clear: Chinese leadership decided that clean energy is their country’s “historic opportunity ” to finally surpass the U nited S tates in a major technology sector. Chinese government institutions at all levels— national, provincial, and local—are directing massive subsidies to green energy companies in direct support of that goal . When U.S. clean energy companies face stiff competition from Chinese rivals and the latter appear to be benefitting from such generous government support, that can easily trigger suspicion and trade complaints on the U.S. side, particularly when low Chinese prices are driving U.S. companies out of the market.

Renewables/ Renewable Industry New U.S. federal support for renewables crowds out chinaMathews 13 [John, Mathews holds the Chair of Strategy at the Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University, Sydney. 2/1/13, “The Globalist Debate: Renewable Energy and the Clash of Civilizations” http://www.theglobalist.com/the-globalist-debate-renewable-energy-and-the-clash-of-civilizations/ //jweideman]

Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations is considered one of the foundation texts of our time, given its appearance in the decade prior to the destruction of the World Trade Center towers in September 2001. But Huntington’s focus on “the West” and “Islam” has done little to illuminate an even more fundamental and far-

reaching clash — the one pitching the waning fossil fuel civilization against the waxing civilization based on renewables and resource-efficiency. We see the evidence for this “ civilizational clash ” in terms of the struggle of the renewables industries to be born and prosper, while the fossil fuel industries — along with the companies, subsidies, regulations and laws that uphold their privileges — refuse to leave the field.

China and the United States represent the polar extremes in this clash — with China acting to build renewable energy industries. It is racing ahead as fast as is physically possible in order to ensure energy security, even as it builds a coal- and nuclear-fired thermal energy system. The U nited S tates, in contrast, is focusing on innovation, while Congressional leaders are subject to heavy fossil fuel l obbying and act to delay the transition to renewables. The clash is heating up in the current spat over trade in solar photovoltaic modules, where the United States now (and potentially the European Union as well) is levelling countervailing tariffs on Chinese solar PV imports into the United States. This move is inviting tit-for-

tat retaliation by China against U.S. exports of polysilicon and PV equipment, where the United States currently runs a strong trade surplus with China. The dispute even threatens an all-out trade war. That this is actually a clash of civilizations becomes evident when we examine the ideological support for each side’s position in this dispute. China is supporting its policies to promote its solar PV industry at home, and for companies that then export their product, on the grounds that it is a developing industry that needs support in order to become established in the face of incumbent intransigence. It is a market-oriented strategy that is proving to be extremely effective. The United States, by contrast, is ideologically promoting a transition away from fossil fuels (insofar as any transition is allowed by Congress) through support for innovation and Schumpeterian creative destruction. In its first term, the Obama Administration promoted renewables against fossil fuel incumbents through tax credits and loan guarantees, sometimes at very high levels (such as the $535 million allocated to Solyndra as a loan guarantee, which became a public liability when the company went bankrupt). This policy was aimed at offering strong support for a few chosen recipients to help them bring new versions of existing products to market. In Solyndra’s case, this was CIGS thin-film PV technology, which has been falling rapidly in cost — but not as fast as first-generation c rystalline silicon cells, which have overtaken the thin-film innovators and made life very difficult for them. Where things become interesting is on the ideology-based flanking moves undertaken by Washington-based think tanks in support of the U.S. position. Consider the example of the ITIF, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, which is very active on this issue. It conveniently labels the two sides in this clash as “innovation” on the one hand (the U.S. approach) and “green mercantilism” on the other (China’s approach). Innovation is “good” and green mercantilism is “bad.” The ITIF (and other think tanks along with it) have taken sides in the current trade dispute, arguing that the U.S. Department of Commerce and the companies urging it forward (a coalition led

by SolarWorld) are simply trying to enforce the rules of global competition, while the green mercantilists are threatening the survival of the rest of the industry. The problem with this position is that it ignores the reasons for China’s success. Chinese firms are not “dumping” product on the rest of the world, but are benefiting from the cost advantages they have reaped through scaling up production. This is a time-honored approach to reducing costs and enlarging the market, perfected in the United States ever since it was applied so effectively by Henry Ford to the (at the time) luxury automotive market . In the solar race, U.S. firms like Solyndra and Konarka are in difficulties not because of Chinese dumping, but because their market in the U nited S tates was not allowed to expand fast enough — thanks to Congressional hostility linked to fossil fuel lobbying. The American slowness to diffuse renewable energies does not so much reflect a lack of innovation as a plethora of regulatory and institutional blockages . Take the case of Google and its promotion of renewables — a quest launched with much fanfare in 2007 and quietly abandoned

in November 2011. Google invested in the Atlantic Wind Connection, an ambitious project to establish wind farms off the Northeast coast and link them to the mainland grid by a single connection. But the project has gone nowhere, as one regulatory barrier after another has had to be negotiated. In China , by contrast, there is strong focus on building a national smart grid as counterpart to policies promoting renewables . This is not just a “fast follower” technology strategy, but one where China intends to take the lead through development of new standards and their promotion through domestic market creation.

Energy Independence Energy independence actions by the US cause an already tumultuous China to perceive the US as undermining their own energy securitySun , fellow with the East Asia program at the Stimson Center, 2014

(Yun, March 20th, “US Energy Independence: Disaster or Blessing for China?”, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/201178-us-energy-independence-disaster-or-blessing-for-china, accessed 7/6/14)

With revolutionary shale gas and shale oil technologies, the U.S. is, as President Obama said in his State of the Union

address in January 2014, closer to energy independence than ever. How such independence affects China has been a popular issue

for studies in China in recent years. The assessment of the impact of the U.S. energy independence on China is characterized with a strong sense of uncertainty , vulnerability and insecurity . China states three main goals in its energy policy: security, efficiency, and environmental protection, with energy security being the top priority. In the Chinese lexicon, energy security first and most importantly means the secure and uninterrupted supply and transportation of foreign energy resources back to China. According to recent studies by

the State Council, by 2030, China will import about 75 percent of the 800 million tons of its annual domestic oil consumption. How to secure the stable and constant supplies of such a large volume, diversify the sources to mitigate vulnerability, and ensure

their safe transportation back home has become a serious challenge for China. China’s insatiable need for energy security is the primary motivation for its fervent global acquisitions of energy assets and development of pipelines

with Russia, Central Asia, and Myanmar in recent years. Since 2009, Chinese oil companies have spent more than $100 billion on oil and gas assets to boost imports. From the pure perspective of energy security, the Chinese perception of U.S. energy independence is largely negative : an energy - secure U nited S tates, in the view of many Chinese, will damage China’s energy security through either actively manipulating or passively fostering the instability of oil-producing regions /countries . Many Chinese analysts believe that from a geopolitical point of view, the independence of the U nited S tates from Middle Eastern oil will translate into reduced interests and deployment in the area , leading to regional chaos that will significantly damage China’s energy supply and shipment. China relies on the Middle East and Africa for the largest share of its crude oil supplies, freeriding with the security and stability Washington currently provides.

However, if the United States is to reduce its role in the region, it would expose China to tremendous geopolitical and security risks. Some Chinese analysts believe that an energy-secure United States will undercut China’s energy supplies by stirring up tension in the region because Washington will conceivably be less-constrained and potentially more radical in imposing democratization or nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East. Conspiracy theorists argue that Washington

might even purposefully pursue such policies so as to disrupt China’s energy supply. For the pessimists, U.S. energy independence is bad for China’s economic development. In their view, after the United States becomes an exporter of energy resources, it will manipulate the energy price on the international market to maximize its own profits while suppressing the growth of emerging markets, especially China. As long as the United States can balance the reaction of domestic consumers, it will chase up the price of the primary commodities

globally to increase the costs of China’s industrial development. The hypothesis further extends into the ideological realm, that U.S. will use its own example of energy technology innovation and independence to boost the legitimacy and desirability of the western development model and demonize China’s growth model.

Fishing Increased fishing threatens Chinese resources and naval power and holds the potential for military conflictGoldstein 09 [Lyle, director of China Maritime Studies Institute, August 7th, 2009, Asia Times Online, originally published by the Jamestown Foundation, “China’s Fishing Fleet Sets Challenge to US”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KH07Ad01.html]

With much attention focused on China's growing naval, shipbuilding and port infrastructure developments, it is easy to forget another important dimension of China's maritime rise: China's status as a major global fishing power . With a total haul of over 17 million tonnes in 2007, China's take is four times that of the nearest competitor, and far exceeds the catch of Japan, the United States and other major Pacific maritime powers. China's massive fishing fleet is concentrated in the Western Pacific, but is also active now on all the world's oceans . This issue should foremost be evaluated in an environmental context since the world's oceans

are now under severe strain from overfishing. Yet, there are also vital foreign policy and international security aspects to Chinese fisheries developments that cannot be neglected by US policymakers . Indeed, fisheries issues are a significant security concern among Chinese maritime strategists , because they fit squarely into perceived resource and sovereignty imperatives now driving current maritime development [2]. As a whole, China's actions as the largest world fishing power can serve as an important signal for determining Beijing's willingness to conform to global maritime norms as a "responsible maritime stakeholder". During 2009, Chinese fishing vessels and fishing policies made global headlines with increasing frequency. Beginning in March with the so-called Impeccable incident, in which a few Chinese fishing trawlers in the company of two other enforcement ships and at least one Chinese naval vessel surrounded and harassed a US surveillance vessel 120 kilometers south of Hainan, one of a number of recent and similarly dangerous incidents at sea. Shortly thereafter, China's largest fishery enforcement vessel,Yuzheng 311, was sent on a lengthy patrol in the South China Sea following legislation by the Philippines to formalize its offshore claims to several islets in the South China Sea. In June, Chinese enforcement of fishery claims came under international scrutiny when Vietnam lodged a series of protests concerning alleged rough treatment of their own fishing vessels by Chinese authorities. According to one report, incomes of Vietnamese fishermen have declined because of "China's stepped up [fisheries] enforcement", in the vicinity of the Paracel Archipelago. Then in late June, a major incident erupted between Beijing and Jakarta after Indonesian authorities seized eight Chinese fishing vessels and detained 75 Chinese fishermen, who were allegedly fishing illegally in Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) - 59 of the 75 Chinese fishermen detained were

permitted to return to China in July. Such incidents illustrate how the activities of fishing vessels and related enforcement authorities of the Western Pacific region represent one of the jagged edges of volatile maritime territorial disputes. There is a real potential in China - and also among its neighbors - for fishing nationalism to take hold because resources coupled with sovereignty disputes are at the heart of naval development in the East Asian region. Unfortunately, fishing tensions could aggravate these disputes to the point of military conflict.

Wind China plans to lead the world in offshore wind turbine tech by 2015 Patton 2012 (Dominque, November 26, China correspondent at ReCharge Newspaper “China’s government wants 10MW offshore wind prototypes in operation by 2015 under a plan for industrial innovation.” http://www.rechargenews.com/wind/article1297333.ece)

In its ‘wind power science and technology development five-year plan’ under China’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the government urges industry to achieve a “ breakthrough ” on assembly of 10MW offshore wind turbines within the plan’s timeframe of 2011-2015 . It also encourages equipment makers to “master the manufacturing of 3-5MW direct-drive wind turbines as well as 7MW wind turbines and components”. The turbines' “functions and reliability should reach world-leading levels” and they should enter commercialisation. The plan, published on the MOST website, is part of Beijing’s long-term push to raise the level of innovation in Chinese industry. It reveals the strength of high-level support for turbine makers such as Sinovel and Goldwind, both of which have begun development of large offshore turbines, including 10MW models. In a statement yesterday, Goldwind said it will continue development of its direct-drive turbines and accelerate commercialisation of its 3MW hybrid machine. A 6MW direct-drive prototype is scheduled for completion in the first half of this year. Goldwind's chief engineer, Cui Xinwei, told a conference last year that large turbines will be in demand in China’s offshore industry “especially in the South China Sea, where wind farms will be far from the shore". MOST has already provided significant funding for R&D to wind power companies, including through the national 863 programme which supports high-tech industries. Goldwind, Sinovel and others have participated in this programme. It is not clear whether MOST will provide funding to support the targets in the new five-year plan for wind power. Liming Qiao from the Global Wind Energy Council says the plan is “a good signal. Policy signals come first and tend to drive funding, focus and attention to targets.”

Generic Expansion of US influence into the ocean is perceived as containmentDingli 2013 (Shen, Fudan University Associate Dean, “Managing China’s Maritime Interests,” ChinaUS Focus, 8/20/13, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/managing-chinas-maritime-interests/)Second, it is natural that China needs to safeguard all its core interests, including territory, territorial water and space. With China’s sea baseline spreading as long as 18,000 km, it is a daunting task to assure that all its territorial water is under proper sovereign control. When foreign reconnaissance planes and intelligence ships approach quite often, it is important to keep alert, dissuading such behavior while following relevant global codes. It is never easy to achieve both ends at one time, with the 2001 China-US air collision off Hainan Island in mind. Over the past decade, Chinese armed forces seem to have enhanced their capacity and skill to do so. Third, with the creation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, China’s maritime economic

rights have been much enlarged, in a sense. China has to ensure that this area will be tapped both exclusively and sustainably. China’s EEZ could overlap with that of its close neighbors at sea, which requires proper bilateral talks to divide various overlapping interests. Meanwhile, it is necessary to command UNCLOS in a sensible way. As China revealed its navy’s access to the US EEZ in the Shangri-La Dialogue this June in Singapore, it shall have room to

relax its interpretation of the legality of foreign navy’s access to its own EEZ. Fourth, assuring free access to high sea is increasingly of China’s vital maritime interest . Given China’s status as both a top exporter and importer, China is gaining wealth through trade from the ocean. In this regard, it is not incomprehensible that China is becoming more interested in building its blue water navy so as to assure that the international code of free access to maritime global common will remain undisrupted. This certainly has particular bearing on China-US relations. On the one hand, China and the US are sharing more common

interests so as to roll back the threat of pirating; on the other hand, Beijing strongly perceives Washington’s maritime hegemony due to the latter’s dominance in East Asia , especially in the Taiwan context, which affects the mainland’s freedom of option in dealing

with the island province. It is not impossible that the Beijing-Washington security dilemma would generate their arms competition, even unintendedly, though not at a full scale to repeat what occurred between the US and the former Soviet Union.

Arctic China is increasing influence in the ArcticSpears, Horseshoe Bay Marine Group Principal, 2011

(K. Joseph, 1/28/11, “The Snow Dragon Moves Into the Arctic Ocean Basin,” China Brief, 11:2, p.13, IC]

On March 5, 2010 the official China News Service relayed comments made by Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, with respect to the Arctic at the Third Session of the Eleventh Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) when he advised Chinese leaders not to fall behind on Arctic Ocean exploration . Admiral Zhin stated “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the North Pole and surrounding area are the common wealth of the world’s people and do not belong to any one country.” He went on to say “China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one fifth of the world’s population.” He went on to criticize some countries for contesting sovereignty over the region, which impacts other nations (China News Service, March 5, 2010). Is this a new Arctic specific statement or part of a larger strategy with respect to China approach to its foreign policy with respect to the Arctic Ocean Basin and international law and the law of the sea? Or was this simply a restatement of existing Chinese policy on the Arctic or ocean issues generally? Many commentators took Admiral Zhin’s statement as a new direction with China taking a more aggressive stature and a potentially increasing militarization and singular approach to the Arctic . In recent years, the expansion of China military and especially its navy has been increasing. China’s new approach seeks to enhance the perceived legitimacy of Chinese operations at sea. This has led to recent incidents involving U.S. vessels with in China’s EEZ . The Law the Sea Convention allows foreign vessels including naval vessels the right of innocent passage in the EEZ. International law Professor Cmdr. James Kraska in a number of articles has coined this concept or notion of “lawfare” whereby China seeks to use international law to advance its strategic interests.

[DO NOT READ AGAINST LOST] China resents United States involvement in the Arctic- involvement supports Chinese fears of regional exclusionRainwater , Senior PoliSci Major @ Pepperdine U., ‘ 13

[Shiloh, Spring 2013, Naval War College Review, “Race to the North: China’s Arctic Strategy and Its Implication,” https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/31708e41-a53c-45d3-a5e4-ccb5ad550815/Race-to-the-North--China-s-Arctic-Strategy-and-Its.aspx, 07/02/2014, PD]

Despite its many achievements in terms of investment and cooperation, China fears it is being shut out of the Arctic. In 2008, for example, the "Arctic Five"— Canada. Russia, the United States. Denmark, and Norway—signed the Ilullssat Declaration, committing themselves to peaceful resolution of territorial sovereignty disputes in the Arctic.15 However, with its narrow definition of Arctic matters as regional ones, the declaration perceptually attempts to exclude non-Arctic states tram them." China fears that in this fashion the arc unipolar stales will 'gang up and 'carve up the Arctic melon' and its natural resources among them- selves , to the exclusion of everyone else."" To secure its position in Arctic affairs, therefore. Beijing propagates the notion that it has rights in the Arctic, engages in "lawfare" to obfuscate the legal framework, advocates institutional reform, and cultivates hard-power measures to secure its interests. First and foremost. China harbors a deep sense of entitlement to Arctic re- sources, sea-lanes, and governance. This entitlement relies on various justifications. As a Northern Hemisphere country that is affected by Arctic warming, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the world’s most populous state. China sees its role in Arctic affairs as indispensable. Chinese rear admiral Yin Zhuo made

this point in March 2010, proclaiming that "the Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over It Similarly, in 2009 Hu Zhengyue. Chinas assistant minister of foreign affairs, warned that Arctic countries should "ensure a balance of coastal countries' interests and the common interests of the international community."'' Hu, it seems, was advising the circumpolar states not to lock up for themselves the resources and sea-lanes of the Arctic. China further asserts its rights by employing the language of UNCI.OS to argue that the Arctic and its resources are the "common heritage of all humankind" and do not belong exclusively to the Arctic Five." In reality, "common heritage" in UNCLOS refers to the high seas, designated by UNCLOS as the area that lies beyond EEZ boundaries. If the current territorial and continental-shelf claims of the circumpolar states are ultimately accepted as presented. 88 percent of the Arc lit seabed would likely (all under their combined sovereign EEZ jurisdictions, with the small "doughnut hole" in the center qualifying as the common heritage. Since, however, most of the resource wealth in the Arctic lies within these claims. China perpetuates the notion that the entire Arctic Ocean is the common heritage of humankind so as to expand its legal rights there." This sort of "lawfare." or misuse of the "law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective." is an essential component of Chinas strategy, enabling the PRC to circumvent its weaker status as a non-Arctic state through asymmetrical means." China also appears bent on reforming the institutions governing the Arctic so as to create for itself a more favorable legal environment Chinas national news magazine Beijing Review has boldly asserted that every treat)* and organization constituting the Arctic legal regime—including UNCLOS, the International Maritime Organization, and the Arctic Council—is riddled with flaws and must be reformed. For example, in Chinas view the laws enacted by the Arctic Council are not legally binding and "a politically valid ... Arctic governance system has yet to be established." Moreover. China resents the fact that Arctic affairs are dominated by the littoral states , claiming that "it is unimaginable that non-Arctic states will remain users of Arctic shipping routes and consumers of Arctic energy without playing a role in the decision-making process.... [A]n end to the’ Arctic states' monopoly of Arctic affairs is now imperative

Aquaculture US aquaculture expansion trades off with China’s market share Bondie and Wolf 2013[Marcella and Anna – U of I – Chicago. “Planning for Sustainable Aquaculture” 2013 http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/upp/research/research/Student%20Pages/pdf/bondie_wolf_project.pdf]

As many studies assert, the United States is the largest Western importer of tilapia, China is the largest global exporter of tilapia , and both will continue to be so into the future. This suggests that contemporary food systems are primarily influenced by global market forces and large food distributors, such as Wal-Mart and Costco. These distributors, though in a position to incentivize aquaculture producers to practice sustainable methods, merely react to current unsustainable practices, rather than taking a proactive approach to avoiding unsustainable practices at the start. To counter this trend of importing unsustainably farmed fish, countries that have the economic means and the need to increase food security should encourage legislation that enables municipalities and regional areas to participate in the creation and support of local aquaculture systems. The growth of small, local aquaculture operations will allow consumers a healthy supply of fish protein and may reduce the global market share of Chinese aquaculture. This is likely to result in reducing the often- unavoidable unsustainable practices that stem from large-scale production and export of fish product.

Marine Reserves/Conservation China hates ocean protection efforts – they would be angered by the plan because they perceive it as infringing upon their development efforts – empirical evidenceDSO 2012[Der Speigel (Prominent German publication) Online. “Saving the Southern Ocean: China, Russia Block Plan to Protect Antarctic Waters” 11/2/12 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-and-russia-block-plan-to-create-ocean-sanctuaries-in-antarctica-a-864962.html]

Proposals to establish marine reserves in two critical areas of the Southern Ocean were stymied by Russia, China and Ukraine at the end of a two-week international summit in Australia on Thursday. Commercial fishing restrictions in the proposed sanctuaries proved to be the main sticking point. ¶ A meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in Hobart, Australia ended in deadlock on Thursday when member nations failed to reach agreement on new protected areas across Antarctica, home to the world's most intact marine ecosystem.¶ The two-week CCAMLR talks, attended by representatives from 24 nations and the European Union, were geared at establishing giant marine sanctuaries in two critical areas of the Southern Ocean.¶ One of the most pristine ocean regions in the world, its waters are home to penguins, seals, whales and seabirds, whose food sources are increasingly under threat from climate change and overfishing. At stake are the region's stocks of krill, a valuable crustacean which is the keystone species of the Antarctic ecosystem. The growing global demand for animal feed and fish bait is causing a rapid decline in its numbers .¶ "Antarctica is home to unique ecosystems," said German Agricultural Minister Ilse Aigner ahead of the talks, pledging that Germany would "actively support protection of its oceans."¶ A US-New Zealand plan foresaw a 1.6 million square kilometer protected area in the Ross Sea, while nations led by the EU and Australia had proposed a series of reserves encompassing 1.9 million square kilometers -- an area bigger than Alaska.¶ Commercial Versus Conservation Interests ¶ But these efforts were thwarted by resistance from China , Russia and Ukraine, which raised objections to fishing restrictions in the proposed reserve on the grounds they would have too much impact on their annual hauls.¶ "(Establishing marine reserves) is a complex process involving a large amount of scientific research as well as international diplomacy," said CCAMLR in a statement. "It was decided … that further consideration of the proposals is needed." Amid the lack of consensus, the decision on the ocean sanctuary was postponed until a special session to be held in Germany in July 2013.¶ Environmentalists expressed their concern at the outcome of the CCAMLR talks. "We're deeply disappointed," Steve Campbell of the Antarctic Ocean Alliance told Reuters. "Members failed to establish any large-scale Antarctic marine protection because a number of countries actively blocked conservation efforts."¶ "CCAMLR has behaved like a fisheries organization instead of an organization dedicated to conservation of Antarctic waters," railed Farah Obaidullah of Greenpeace.¶ Gerry Leape from the Pew Environment Group agreed, telling AFP that "In 2011, participating countries agreed to work together to protect and conserve the unique marine life that thrives in the ocean surrounding Antarctica. Instead, they are heading home and leaving the door wide open to unchecked commercial fishing in these areas."

Offshore Wind Lack of U.S. production lets china dominate the offshore wind market – US market crowds out Zoninsein 10 [Manuela, writer for the new York times. 9/7/10, “Chinese Offshore Development Blows Past U.S.” http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/09/07/07climatewire-chinese-offshore-development-blows-past-us-47150.html?pagewanted=all //jweideman]

As proposed American offshore wind -farm projects creep forward -- slowed by state legislative debates , due diligence and environmental impact assessments -- China has leapt past the U nited S tates, installing its first offshore wind farm. Several other farms also are already under construction , and even the Chinese government's ambitious targets seem low compared to industry dreaming. "What the U.S. doesn't realize ," said Peggy Liu, founder and chairwoman of the Joint U.S.-China Collaboration on Clean Energy, is that China "is going from manufacturing hub to the clean-tech laboratory of the world ." The first major offshore wind farm

outside of Europe is located in the East China Sea, near Shanghai. The 102-megawatt Donghai Bridge Wind Farm began transmitting power to the national grid in July and signals a new direction for Chinese renewable energy projects and the initiation of a national policy focusing not just on wind power, but increasingly on the offshore variety. Moreover, "it serves as a showcase of what the Chinese can do offshore ... and it's quite significant," said Rachel Enslow, a wind consultant and co-author of the report "China, Norway and Offshore Wind Development," published in March by Azure International for the World Wildlife Fund Norway.

Planned to strategically coincide with the World Expo in Shanghai, which is being fed electricity from the offshore farm, China is ready to show the world what its own homegrown wind tech nology can do . All of Donghai Bridge's 34 turbines, 3 MW capacity each, were built by Sinovel Wind Group, China's largest wind turbine manufacturer, though designed in

cooperation with American Superconductor. The Beijing-based company began building the farm at the mouth of the Yangtze River Delta in September 2008. CCCC Third Harbor Engineering Co. Ltd., also based in Beijing, installed the turbines, completing construction in February 2010. Shanghai's Zhongtian Technologies Submarine Optic Fiber Cable Co. Ltd. manufactured the 78 km of submarine cable. Powering 200,000 households while reducing CO2 In China, one key challenge will be developing foundations for the soft seabed commonly found off the coast of the East China Sea, especially since "most offshore wind farms that will be developed in China will be intertidal," said Gerald Page, managing director of Equinox Energy Partners, a venture capital firm in Beijing. The $337 million project, located 8 to 13 km (about 5 to 8 miles) from the coast, was erected on soft seabed conditions using a multi-pile foundation structure. About eight to 10 legs are placed on concrete piles, on top of which are stacked a concrete tack and then the turbines. Shanghai Investigation, Design and Research Institute conceived the foundation. During low tide, the turbine foundations are exposed; during high tide, they become submerged in about 5 meters (16 feet) of water. Unlike in Europe, which is much more focused on developing deepwater (greater than

50 meters, or 164 feet, deep) turbine technology, China is exploring unique foundation technology and demonstrating innovative pursuits. The farm is expected to eventually generate an annual 267 million kilowatt-hours of electricity -- enough to power 200,000 Shanghai households. China's government claims that annually, the wind farm will cut use of 100,000 tons of coal, reducing carbon emissions by 246,058 tons. Currently, the wind farm's capacity is equivalent to only 1 percent of the city's total power production of about 18,200 MW, which is generated mostly from traditional fuel-based sources, according to China Daily, the state-run English-language daily newspaper in Beijing. Construction of the Donghai project's second phase, on the west side of the bridge, has been approved by authorities. It, too, is projected to produce about 100 MW. An additional four farms surrounding Shanghai are currently under negotiation, and the city hopes to complete 13 wind farms by 2020, with the majority of the expected 1,000 MW capacity supplied by offshore wind farms. An industry's itch to expand The "Development Plan on Emerging Energies" released July 20 outlines wind production goals through 2020 by the Chinese government. According to the plan, offshore wind power is expected to reach 30 gigawatts, and coastal provinces were required to start drafting offshore wind-grid implementation plans. This includes Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces. In the next three to four years, according to the Azure-WWF report, in total, 514 MW should be installed along this coastline. As of March this year, pipelines accommodating 17 MW were already installed between Donghai and a pilot wind project in Bohai Bay near Tianjin. The expected long-term cumulative pipeline, at 13.7 GW, is nearly halfway to the estimated 2020 goal, but this doesn't necessarily mean that the Mandarins are fully behind renewable technologies and warmly welcoming a greener future. "The top-level people are cautiously optimistic," explained Andrew Grieve, a senior researcher at J Capital Research, an equities research company based in Beijing. "They are far more optimistic on the local and provincial level." Behind closed doors, industry insiders hear buzz and speculation that coastal provinces' plans far exceed the existing Chinese central government's plans. Grieve stressed that the real force for wind comes from manufacturers that are itching to expand the market. "Comparatively speaking," he said, "the central government is the most conservative of the lot." All this is without official numbers, as the 12th Five-Year Plan (for the 2011-2015 time period) has still not been formally unveiled. It remains in final draft form, and though the original release date was slated for March, approval keeps moving backward. Analysts expect the implementation date should, at the latest, arrive on Jan. 1, 2011. The central government's aim was to hit 10 GW by 2010, a goal that was quickly surpassed. "Industry is either going to take their number and beat it, or government is going to have to step in and calm down growth," Grieve said. Rumors support the latter, but given historical trends, the former would seem more likely. The Azure-WWF report describes the offshore wind energy generation potential in China as huge -- calculated as 11,000 terawatt-hours, similar to that of the North Sea in western Europe. "China has the largest wind resources in the world, and three-quarters of them are offshore," Barbara Finamore, director of the Natural Resources Defense Council's Beijing office, told Scientific American. The existing industry is nowhere near that large. As Grieve explained, "apart from the 1 gigawatt of bids this year, there are no central government national targets for offshore wind, although possible national targets of 5 gigawatts by 2015 and 30 gigawatts by 2020 have been suggested." The provincial government-proposed provincial offshore development plans amount to 10.2 GW by 2015 and 22.7 GW by 2020. The growth in China's wind manufacturing market remains focused on the domestic market -- for now. Dheeraj Choudhary, who runs Parker Hannifin Corp.'s Global Renewable Energy business unit, said "60 to 70 percent of wind turbine market growth has

come from domestic manufacturers, and not the international guys." Joanna Lewis, an assistant professor of science, technology

and international affairs at Georgetown University who works as a China program adviser to the Energy Foundation, agreed: " No one has nearly as much capacity [as China ] installed in the world." As a result, there is

still "very strong demand for wind turbines in China, and they're not at stage where supply exceeds demand." Eyeing markets abroad Talk to wind turbine and technology experts and manufacturers , and they see a day not too far off when Chinese- produced (and in some cases, Chinese-invented) turbines will service foreign markets. Anthony Fullelove, project

manager for North Brown Hill Wind Farm, based in Sydney, Australia, expects that his country, as well as Europe and the U nited S tates, will see a sharp increase in turbines sourced from China -- as the technology rises to meet global standards and prices drop -- to make wind farms viable especially in a generation sector without a carbon price. "Turbine manufacturers in China are starting to look for markets abroad upon seeing Chinese market getting tighter and tighter , with more companies selling in China ," Lewis added. For the time being, Chinese manufacturers still work hand in hand with foreign engineers and designers. But that is starting to shift. "Reliance is much lower," noted Choudhary. Instead, Chinese manufacturers look to foreign companies to provide subsystems and components. All of China's top five turbine manufacturers have worked with foreign engineers yet retained the intellectual property rights on

the technologies. Meanwhile, as China moves forward with installing water-based wind farms as well as developing its domestic technological know-how, not a single offshore wind turbine is in use in the U nited S tates. Though the 130-turbine Cape Wind project, in Nantucket Sound off the coast of Massachusetts, has received federal approval, several potential regulatory and judicial hurdles lurk. Similarly, the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission recently approved a power purchase agreement proposed for the Block Island farm off of Rhode Island, which would start with an initial eight turbines as a model, yet Attorney General Patrick Lynch (D) has vowed to appeal the decision to the state Supreme Court. When discussing the creation of an Atlantic Offshore Wind Energy Consortium in February, U.S. Interior Secretary Ken Salazar said it currently takes seven to nine years for offshore wind project to receive approval. At this point, Cape Wind is moving into its 10th year of negotiations. In comparison, China's Renewable Energy Law was implemented in January 2006. By November 2007, the Bohai model turbine was installed. So important was the Donghai farm to the Chinese

Communist Party, it footed the bill to ensure the project would be completed in time for Expo 2010 in Shanghai, during which time China has the eyes of the whole world watching.

Zero Sum – Renewables Renewables competition is zero sumBennhold 10 [Katrin, Writes for the New York Times Business. 1/29/10, “Race Is on to Develop Green, Clean Technology” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/business/global/30davos.html?dbk&_r=0 //jweideman]

It is shaping up to be the Great Game of the 21st century. To top officials and business executives here at the World Economic Forum, Topic A this year was the race to develop greener , cleaner tech nology, which is emerging as one of the critical factors in reshaping the world economy as emerging powers snap at the heels of battered Western economies. With the U nited S tates and China sizing each other up across the

Pacific and Europe seeking to maintain its economic stature, it is a battle for potentially millions of jobs and trillions of dollars in export revenues. The outcome — which pits a venture capital -driven market approach relying on government subsides against a top-down system of state capitalism — has the potential to influence how economic and political

systems evolve. Concern that China may be edging ahead in potentially lucrative growth sectors like renewable energy was palpable here, where senior officials from the United States and Europe warned that the West could not afford to be complacent. “Six months ago my biggest worry was that an emissions deal would make American business less competitive compared to China,” said Senator Lindsay Graham, a Republican from South Carolina who has been deeply involved in climate change issues in Congress. “Now my concern is

that every day that we delay trying to find a price for carbon is a day that China uses to dominate the green economy.” He added: “China has made a long-term strategic decision and they are going gang-busters.” Christine Lagarde, the French finance minister, agreed. “It’s a race and whoever wins that race will dominate economic development ,” she said. “The emerging markets are well-placed.” The global economic downturn, which hit the aging developed world far harder than fast-growing emerging markets, has focused attention on the job-creating potential of green technology, seen by many here as the next industrial revolution. In the energy sector alone, the deployment of new technologies, like wind and solar power, has the potential to support 20 million jobs by 2030 and trillions of dollars in revenue, analysts estimate. Ms. Lagarde estimated that as many as 240,000 jobs could be added in France over the next few years, helping offset the 400,000 lost last year in the slump. While new energy sources will initially be more expensive than fossil fuels, politicians in the West, mindful of a stagnant or shrinking manufacturing base, are hopeful that clean technology offers a way of rebuilding older industrial areas by

creating a comprehensive green supply chain. The quest for a new comparative advantage, economists say, is all the more urgent as the crisis has left the financial-services sector reeling — a sector that was long considered one of the last bastions of Western sophistication. From China’s perspective , experts here said, climate change offers the opportunity to leapfrog Western competitors. “The low-carbon economy is the future,” said David Li Daokui, a professor at the Center for China in the World Economy in Beijing.

Internal Link

EXT – Internal Link Ocean is key – in light of military corruption, the nation’s legitimacy is based on incoming reforms –the US’s ocean policies are seen as an obstacle for China and the US is pinned as the enemy – that means the only scenario for PLA lashout in Taiwan and Senkaku Island is the plan– ocean is seen as China’s last way out in supremacy– this is just uniqueness for us*Insert Zero Sum Card*Rogue actions are likely by the PLA in order to support nationalist interests – internal discipline is lacking nowWorld Review, indpt non partisan NY magazine, 7/28

(July, http://www.worldreview.info/content/why-chinas-pla-weak-dangerous-army, “Why China’s PLA is a weak but dangerous army”, JC, 11/3)

CHINA's military capability and intentions are causing significant concern among its regional neighbours and the United States, writes guest expert Rogier Creemers. But Beijing continues to stress that its rise will be peaceful despite growing military budgets, increased tensions across the South and East China Seas, and seemingly calculated incidents and displays of power. And while China increasingly throws its weight around, its neighbours are exploring cooperative coalitions to counter the perceived threat. However, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not a professional fighting force when compared with the US, South Korea and its neighbours. It is a ‘party army’ – an armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. China, which last fought an external war in 1979 in Vietnam, is strong on sophisticated military technology, but weak in manpower. The PLA lacks military professionalism and combat experience - which makes China potentially very dangerous. While different elements of the PLA have been involved in peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations around the world, the main focus of the PLA has remained limited to the interests which the government - the People’s Republic of China (PRC) - has traditionally designated as central. Primarily, these are its power and sovereignty within the first line of islands off its shore - Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. China is now pursuing these interests in a more aggressive manner than before. Beijing has sought stability in its region until very recently. But it has become more forthright in the assertion of its naval claims, and seems less concerned with the ire its activities may cause its neighbours. There is an element of strategic risk involved here. An important element is the presence of the United States. The 2012 ‘Pivot to East Asia’ has been understood in Beijing as a move to counter its growing regional power, and considerable planning efforts have been spent to deny US units area access in case of conflicts. But perceptions of goals and interests tell us little about whether or not the People’s Liberation Army is able to achieve the objectives outlined by the leadership, and reach its own performance standards. The PLA suffered from poor command and crude tactics, leading to extensive casualties and an indecisive outcome in its last external conflict which was in the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979. Since then, the PLA has seen structural streamlining, modernising its material and professionalising its troops. Yet, while the technological capabilities of China’s new weapons systems are well known, much less is clear about the PLA's ability to use them. Perhaps the biggest challenge for China’s military is creating the internal discipline and esprit de corps required in a modern military . The PLA , like other parts of the Chinese state, remains deeply involved in a culture of bribery and corruption and patrimony. One of the most important question is: what is the relationship between the new leadership and the PLA? Within the army itself, there are officers who

claim that ideological correctness must be restored, while there are others who propose deeper modernisation. The PLA occupies a particular position within the Party-State apparatus. It was the PLA which powered the CCP to victory in the wars against Japan and the Republicans. Most of the first generation leadership, including President Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, held military command positions. PLA support was essential in overthrowing the political faction, the Gang of Four, and bringing the reformist Deng Xiaoping to power. The pact between the army and the party was re-sealed in blood on the streets of Beijing and in Tiananmen Square in student-led demonstrations in 1989. There is only one point of interaction between the civil and military command structure - the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party ‘s Central Military Commission – currently President Xi. There are political risks involved in having a large, well-trained body of armed men and women, and loyalty must be maintained in order to prevent the emergence of a Praetorian Guard of ambitious self-servers which might interfere with party processes. This might be why political indoctrination still occupies a considerable part of military training and also influences strategic calculations at the highest levels of power. The armed forces seem to be treated relatively generously. President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign , for instance, seems not to have extended to the ranks of the PLA. Military budgets continue to grow at a speed vastly outstripping GDP growth. They have been given more rein to act in the East and South China Seas. But it is unclear whether this new hawkishness reflects a greater willingness of President Xi to act, or an inability to restrain his commanding officers who want to give their new equipment a whirl. It is exactly this lack of clarity , together with the risks and hazards which Chinese forces are increasingly taking, which is concerning to foreign observers. This lack of clarity brings risks. While China may not display overt aggression, the likelihood of unintended hostilities is growing . Equally disturbing is that it is not yet clear whether China’s discipline and command structures are sufficiently robust to prevent rogue actions on its own side.

A2 – Reforms Don’t Solve Panda evidence extensionNo official allegiance – reforms make pla loyal to the CCP leadership and root out unloyal high ranking officialsStatus quo PLA is extremely corrupt – doesn’t listen to CCP Garnaut, correspondent for Foreign Policy, 2013

(John, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/xis_war_drums).

Despite the hype, however, high-ranking insiders have come forward to say the Chinese military is rotten to the core. Formal hierarchies are trumped by personal patronage , coordination between branches is minimal, and corruption is so pervasive that senior positions are sold to the highest bidders while weapons funding is siphoned into private pockets. "Corruption has become extremely institutionalized and significant," says Tai Ming Cheung, director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California/San Diego. "It makes it much more difficult to develop, produce, and field the weapons systems required to achieve world-class power projection." It's not just corruption. More than three decades of peace, a booming economy, and an opaque administrative system have taken their toll as well, not to mention that the PLA is one of the world's largest bureaucracies -- and behaves accordingly. "Each unit has a committee with a commander, political commissar, and deputies, to the point they have a meeting now for everything," says Nan Li, associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute. Li told me that PLA military universities have even been reduced to printing textbooks that instruct commanders how to transcend the tyranny of committee-style decision-making. "That shows how much the PLA has been defeated by -- corroded by -- peace," he says. Nor is the military necessarily 100 percent loyal to its political masters in the Communist Party -- a terrifying prospect for a new leader trying to consolidate his power. In theory, the PLA has always been subordinate to the civilian side of the party, but the actual command linkages are largely limited to its top leader and sometimes his deputy . In 2012 -- in the wake of the political destruction of Xi's potential rival, Bo Xilai, who boasted extensive informal ties within the military -- the drumbeat of official demands that the PLA demonstrate the proper obeisance to the party and the party's outgoing general secretary, Hu, suggested the chain of military command might be more fragile than commonly understood .