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Adrian Nstase ROMNIA EUROPEAN UN PROIECT POLITIC SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT Prefa de Christoph Zpel Editura MondoMedia Institutul Social Democrat Ovidiu incai 2007 3

Institutul Social Democrat Ovidiu incai Bucureti, str. Atena nr. 11, sector 1 Tel. 2 30.24.34, 230.24.74, fax: 231.55.23, site: www.fisd.ro, e-mail: isd@rdsmail.ro Coperta: Octavian Penda Tehnoredactor: Oana Mocanu Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naionale a Romniei NSTASE, ADRIAN Romnia european: un proiect politic social-democrat / Adrian Nstase. - Bucureti: MondoMedia, 2007 Prefa: Christoph Zpel Bibliogr. Index ISBN 978-973-9997 7-9-9 32.01(498:4) Servicii editoriale: Editura URANUS, Bucureti

Reproducerea acestei lucrri, chiar i parial, prin orice procedeu fotocopiere, microf ilmare, band magnetic etc. este strict interzis i intr sub incidena Legii nr. 8 / 199 privind drepturile de autor i drepturile conexe. ISBN 978-973-99977-9-9 4

Nu mi propun s inventez noi probleme. ncerc s gsesc soluii la problemele existente. 5

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CUPRINS Prefa la un proiect de anvergur ........................................... ..19 CUVNT NAINTE ................................................................ .....59 I. DE UNDE AM PLECAT ................................................... .......67 I.1. Proiectul Istoric al Romniei ............................................... .......... 67 Lecia lui Nicolae Titulescu ....................................... ....................... 67 Dinamica modernizrii, de la Blcescu la Ceauescu. ....... ............... 71 "La Roma!" .................................................. ..................................... 74 Dou tipuri de societi .................... ................................................. 77 O oportunitate istoric...... ................................................................. 79 ansa Romniei de a intra n lumea dezvoltat................................. 82 Helsinki sau trec erea de partea bun a istoriei .................................. 83 Digresiune de spre o ilegalitate .......................................................... 85 Modernizarea Romniei, ca proiect naional..................................... 86 Declanarea procesului de modernizare, cu toate mijloacele posibile .............. ................................................................................ 90 I.2. Relaiile Romniei cu Piaa Comun i Uniunea European ..... 94 Legturile cu Com tatea European pn la cderea comunismului ........................................... ......................................... 94 Relaiile Romniei cu Piaa Comun/Uniunea European dup Revoluie ............................................................. .............................. 95 Ce s-a ntmplat dup alternana la putere din 1996? . .................... 102 I.3. Guvernarea pentru integrare (20012004)............. .................... 108 Premisele guvernrii PSD ................................ ............................... 108 Ctre o ar guvernabil. Macrostabilizarea economie i .................. 112 "Populismul" asumat al guvernrii PSD: combaterea srciei... ..... 115 Prioritate politic absolut: integrarea euroatlantic...................... . 120 O digresiune aparent: conceptele privatizrii ............................... . 123 7

O nou politic a privatizrii........................................................ ... 128 Curajul de a ne asuma realizarea capitalismului romnesc............. 132 Munca sau profitul?............................................................. ............ 135 Cotitura creterii economice..................................... ....................... 137 Trei procese economice ncurajatoare.................. ........................... 139 I.4. Opinia public n timpul guvernrii PSD (20012004) ............. 142 II. UNIUNEA EUROPEAN LA CARE AM ADERAT........149 II.1. Impactul aderrii .......................................................... ............. 149 Tratatul de Aderare a Romniei la Uniunea European document jurid ic esenial ...................................................................... ........... 156 Suveranitate, subsidiaritate i reform constituional................. ... 161 Un proiect deschis: europenizarea administraiei.......................... .. 165 Alegerile pentru Parlamentul European ................................... ....... 169 Pledoarie pentru o strategie romneasc post-aderare ................... . 174 II.2. Ce poate face Romnia pentru viitorul Europei? .................... 18 2 Necesitatea unei contribuii romneti ............................................ 182 Apreciere de ansamblu ...................................................... .............. 183 Politicile Comune............................................ ................................ 186 Uniunea Economic i Monetar (UEM).............. .................... 186 Politica agricol comun (PAC)............................. ................... 188 Fonduri structurale i de coeziune........................ ..................... 189 Politica comercial comun ............................... ....................... 190 Politica extern i de securitate comun ................. .................. 190 Justiie i afaceri interne.................................. ................................ 192 Aspecte instituionale ...................... ................................................ 192 Consiliul ................. ................................................................... 193 Consiliu l European.................................................................... 1 94 Comisia European ............................................................. ...... 194 Parlamentul European ................................................ ............... 195 Parlamentele naionale ....................................... ....................... 196 Constituia european................................... ................................... 196 Alte aspecte ........................... .......................................................... 197 8

III. DE LA ADERARE LA INTEGRARE: PENTRU O ROMNIE EUROPEAN ........................ ................................199 III.1. Repere posibile pentru o nou revizuire a constituiei i mbuntirea sistemului e toral .................................................... 199 III.2. Zece prior iti economice.......................................................... 227 1. Res tructurarea instituional..................................................... 228 2. Dezvoltarea infrastructurii transporturilor ............................... 2 29 3. Dezvoltarea produciei de energie electric ............................. 231 4. Dezvoltarea serviciilor turistice ........................................... .... 237 5. Modernizarea agriculturii i dezvoltarea rural ....................... 247 6. Mediu ................................................................... .................... 251 7. Valorificarea resurselor umane ..................... .......................... 258 8. Creterea productivitii i mbuntirea eficienei mun . 260 9. Sigurana contribuabilului i a proprietii............................... 261 10. Competitivitatea produciei ................................................. ... 262 Provocri europene i oportuniti pentru economia romneasc... 264 III.3. Zece pr ncipii pentru o Romnie social ................................. 270 1. Drepturi i r esponsabiliti pentru toi cetenii ....................... 270 2. Ocuparea deplin baz iitorului........................................... 271 3. Investiii n ceteni ..... ............................................................. 272 4. O societate solidar i incluziv ............................................... 273 5. Un servi ciu public pentru ngrijirea i educarea copiilor de vrst mic ......................... ................................................. 274 6. Egalitate n drepturi pen tru femei i brbai............................. 275 7. Dialogul social, un element i ndispensabil................................ 279 8. Diversitatea n integrare o fo r a Romniei ......................... 280 9. O societate durabil, capabil s fac fa ilor climatice.................................................................. ................. 280 10. Romnia activ n Europa i n lume pentru proprii ceteni.... ............................................................................ 281 Biserica Ortodox Romn, partener social al statului ................... 280 9

III.4. Satisfacerea nevoilor fundamentale ale romnilor i respectarea demnitilor..... ................................................................ 286 Demnitatea individual i naional ................................................ 290 Desfiinarea sistemelor de privilegii ......................................... 291 Demnitat ea ceteanului n faa autoritii publice.................... 294 Demnitatea ceteanului autoritii private .................... 296 Demnitatea naional....................... .......................................... 297 Construirea bunstrii .............. ....................................................... 299 Polarizarea social... .................................................................. 300 Reparaiile morale i materiale.................................................. 303 ranii ... ................................................................................ .... 303 Pensionarii............................................................ ..................... 305 Salariaii ............................................. ....................................... 306 Rectigarea valorilor muncii i solidaritii ................................... 311 Satisfacerea nevoii de informaie: spre o pres cu adevrat european .......................................................... .............................. 317 III.5. O provocare istoric: modernizarea mediu lui rural .............. 323 Cele "dou Romnii": ruralul tradiional i urbanul capital ist ........ 323 Urbanizarea ruralului.......................................... ....................... 325 Serviciile comunitare de tip urban i subvenionarea con sumului n rural.................................................................. .. 329 Modernizarea agriculturii................................................ ................ 335 III.6. O nou abordare a politicii fiscale .................. ........................ 339 Necesitatea unei strategii fiscale pe termen mediu ......................... 339 Politica economic "corect".......................... ........................... 340 Impozitul pe profit ............................ ........................................ 340 Impozitul pe venit................. ..................................................... 340 Contribuiile sociale CA S....................................................... 341 Politic fiscal azi... ......................................................................... 342 Co ncluzii asupra impactului cotei unice ................................... 353 Pr ovocrile noului Cod Fiscal ................................................... 35 5 Propuneri pentru o nou politic fiscal.......................................... 3 62 10

III.7. Creterea productivitii muncii n condiiile dezvoltrii durabile ................ ............................................................................... 370 Responsabilitatea social a corporaiilor....................................... .. 372 III.8. Reforma sistemului de sntate........................................ ........ 378 Stoparea tendinelor negative i crearea condiiilor pentru mbuntirea str sntate a populaiei obiectiv general al politicii n domeniul sntii............... .................................... 380 Sntatea public............................ ................................................. 382 Dezvoltarea serviciilor me dicale acordate persoanelor vrstnice ... 384 mbuntirea asistenei medicale din mediul ural......................... 385 mbuntirea strii de sntate a mamei i copilului ... ............. 386 Limitarea corupiei din sistemul sanitar ....................... ................... 387 III.9. Educaia, tiina i inovarea............................ .......................... 389 Dezvoltarea capitalului uman..................... ..................................... 389 Educaia prioritate absolut.............. ............................................ 392 Standarde europene privind efor tul financiar.................................. 394 Efortul de cercetare-dezvolt are ....................................................... 397 Cercetarea din nvmntu l superior.............................................. 398 Efortul de inovare. ........................................................................... 401 Organizarea managementului tiinei i al inovrii la nivel naional ..................... ....................................................................... 403 Cons ideraii finale .................................................................. ......... 407 III.10. Fondurile europene nerambursabile n perioada 2007 2013..... ................................................................................ ...... 409 Dimensiunea financiar a politicii de coeziune economic i social n Uniunea European pentru perioada 2007 2013 .......... 410 Suportul financiar al Uniunii E uropene pentru Romnia................ 415 Situaia fondurilor externe nerambursabil e, a cofinanrii acestora i a contribuiei Romniei la bugetul Uniunii Europene n perioa a 2007 2010 .................................................................. 4 23 Fluxurile financiare dintre Romnia i Uniunea European ........... 426 11

III.11. Un imperativ: justiia n slujba ceteanului ........................ 432 Justii a minim garantat ................................................................ .. 432 III.12. Relaia armat-societate: miz major a profesionalizrii forelor armate... .................................................... 452 III.13. Serviciile de i nformaii n Romnia European ................... 459 Locul i rolul serviciilor de infor maii n statul de drept................. 466 III.14. Racordarea Romniei la politica extern i de securitate comun i la relaiile externe ale Uniunii Europene ............. ........... 474 Extinderea Uniunii Europene .................................... ...................... 480 Migraia .............................................. ....................................... 482 Balcanii Occidentali ............... ................................................... 483 Politica european de veci ntate ............................................... 484 Procesul de la Barcelon a ........................................................... 486 Orientul Mijlo ciu....................................................................... 487 I rak ............................................................................ ................ 488 Iran ...................................................... ...................................... 489 Relaiile cu partenerii strategici i cu zonele geografice importante.................................................... .................................... 490 Relaiile transatlantice ................ ............................................... 490 Rusia....................... ................................................................... 491 Asia.... ................................................................................ ........ 492 Politica de dezvoltare ............................................ .......................... 494 III.15. Minoritile naionale, parte integrant a societi romneti, la bine i la greu........................................................ ........ 496 NCHEIERE ........................................................... ............................. 501 Un stat modern ca instrument al transformrii... ............................. 501 Soluiile autocratice nu sunt o opiune .......... .................................. 502 Efectele aderrii la Uniunea European asupra reformelor ............ 503 O nou strategie pentru piaa muncii................... ............................ 504 ndemn la concentrarea poziiilor i aciunilor........ ........................ 505 12

Anexa I: Proiect de lege privind sistemul public de pensii pentru agricultori... ................................................................................ .......... 507 Expunere de motive............................................... .......................... 507 LEGE privind sistemul public de pensii pentru agr icultori............. 513 Coexistena celor dou sisteme de pensii pentru agricultor i ........... 548 Evoluia tipurilor de pensionari................................ ....................... 549 Efort bugetar conform cu cele 2 legi................ ............................... 550 Efort bugetar global cu pensiile agricultori lor ................................ 551 Tabel comparativ proiect de lege/lege s istem public de pensii....... 552 BIBLIOGRAFIE SELECTIV ......................... ................................ 553 13

SUMMARY Foreword to a Long-span project................................................1 9 PREAMBLE...................................................................... ............59 I. WHERE DID WE START FROM ...................................... ....67 I. 1. ROMANIAS HISTORICAL PROJECT .................................. 67 I. 2. ROM ANIAS RELATIONS WITH THE COMMON MARKET AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ................... .... 94 I. 3. A GOVERNMENT FOR INTEGRATION (2001-2004)........ 108 I. 4. THE PUB LIC OPINION DURING THE PSD GOVERNMENT (2001-2004)............................... ............. 142 II. THE EUROPEAN UNION TO WHICH WE ACCEDED ..................................... .............................................149 II. 1. THE IMPACT OF THE ACCESSION .................................. 149 II. 2. WHAT CAN ROMANIA DO FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE?.................................. .......................................... 182 III. FROM ACCESSION TO INTEGRATION: FOR A EUROPEAN ROMANIA ..................... ......................................199 III. 1. POSSIBLE GUIDELINES FOR A NEW REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND IMPROVEME NT OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM...................................... 199 III. 2. TEN ECONOMIC PRIORITIES .......................................... 227 III. 3. TEN PRINCIPLES FOR A SOCIAL ROMANIA .............. 270 III. 4. SATISFYING BASIC NEED S OF ROMANIANS AND RESPECTING THEIR DIGNITY .................................... .. 286 III. 5. A HISTORICAL CHALLENGE: MODERNIZATION OF THE RURAL ENVIRONMENT .. ...................................... 323 III. 6. A NEW APPROACH OF TO FISCAL P OLICY................. 339 14

III. 7. INCREASING LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPME NT ..... 370 III. 8. HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM....................................... ...... 378 III. 9. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND INNOVATION ................ 389 III. 1 0. NON-REIMBURSABLE FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 2007-2013 .............................. ............................................. 409 III. 11. AN IMPERATIVE: JUSTIC E IN THE SERVICE OF THE CITIZEN ................................................ .............. 432 III. 12. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE SOCIETY: THE M AJOR STAKE OF PROFESSIONALIZING THE ARMED FORCES ............ 452 III. 13. INTEL LIGENCE SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN ROMANIA ....................................... .................................. 459 III. 14. CONNECTING ROMANIA TO THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .. ..... 474 III. 15. NATIONAL MINORITIES, PART AND PARCEL OF THE ROMANIAN SOCIETY, FOR BETTER OR WORSE............................................................ ................... 496 CONCLUSION ..................................................................... ......501 Appendix I: Draft Law Project Concerning the Public Pensions System for Farmers ............................................................................... 507 SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY ...............................................553 15

Lista de abrevieri A.M.R - Asociaia Magistrailor din Romnia A.S.E.A.N. - Asociaia Statelor Asiei de Sud -Est A.U.E. - Actul Unic European B.C.R. - Banca Comercial Romn B.E.I. - Banca Euro pean de Investiii B.N.R. - Banca Naional a Romniei B.M. - Banca Mondial C.A.E.R. - Co siliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc C.A.E.N. - Clasificarea Activitilor din Economi a Naional C.E. - Comunitatea European C.E.C. - Casa de Economii i Consemnaiuni C.E.C. O. - Comunitatea European a Crbunelui i Oelului C.E.E.A. (sau EURATOM) - Comunitatea European a Energiei Atomice C.D.R. - Convenia Democrat din Romnia (alian politic) C D.O. - Curtea European a Drepturilor Omului C.E.E. - Comunitatea Economic European C.F.M. - Consiliul Funciei Militare C.F.S.N. - Consiliul Frontului Salvrii Naionale C.N.R. - Consiliului Naional al Cercettorilor, Italia C.N.R.S. - Centrului Naional de Cercetri tiinifice, Frana C.O.R.E.P.E.R. - Comitetul Reprezentanilor Permaneni C. .A.. - Consiliul Suprem de Aprare a rii C.S.F.M. - Consiliul Superior al Funciei Mili tare C.S.I. - Comunitatea Statelor Independente C.S.I.C. - Consiliul Superior de Cercetri tiinifice, Spania C.S.M. - Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii D.A.E. - D epartamentul pentru Afaceri Europene E.C.O.F.I.N. - Consiliul minitrilor de finane din statele membre UE F.C. - Fondul de Coeziune F.D.S.N. - Frontul Democrat al Salvrii Naionale F.E.D.R. - Fondul European de Dezvoltare Regional F.E.I. - Fondul European de Investiii F.M.I. - Fondul Monetar Internaional 16

F.N.I. - Fondul Naional de Investiii F.P.P. - Fondul de Investiii Private F.N.R.S. - Fondul Naional pentru Cercetare tiinific, Belgia F.S.E. - Fondul Social European F .S.N. - Frontul Salvrii Naionale I.S.P.A. - Instrumentul de Politici Structurale d e Pre-Aderare .C.C.J. - nalta Curte de Casaie i Justiie J.A.I. - pilonul Justiie i A eri Interne M.A.E. - Ministerul Afacerilor Externe M.E.B.O. - Program de privati zare n mas M.E.R.C.O.S.U.R. - Piaa Comun a Americii de Sud N.A.T.O. - Organizaia Trat atului Atlanticului de Nord N.A.F.T.A. - Acordul Nord-American de Liber Schimb N .W.O. - Consiliul Cercetrii, Olanda O.C.D.E. - Organizaia de Cooperare i Dezvoltare n Europa O.M.C. - Organizaia Mondial a Comerului O.N.U. - Organizaia Naiunilor Unite O.S.C.E. - Organizaia pentru Securitate i Cooperare n Europa P.A.C. - Politica agri col comun P.E.S. - Partidul Socialitilor Europeni P.E.S.A. - Politica de Securitate i Aprare P.E.S.C. Politica Extern i de Securitate Comun P.D. Partidul Democrat P. .R.E. - Programul de Ajutor pentru Restructurarea Economic (iniial Polonia i Ungari a) P.I.B. - Produsul Intern Brut P.N.L. - Partidul Naional Liberal P.N..C.D - Part idul Naional rnesc Cretin Democrat PNUD - Programul Naiunilor Unite pentru Dezvoltare P.P.E. - Partidul Popular European P.R.M. - Partidul Romnia Mare P.S.D. - Partidu l Social Democrat P.S.D.R. - Partidul Social Democrat din Romnia R.I.C.O.P. - Pro gramul de Restructurare Industrial i Reconversie Profesional 17

S.A.P.A.R.D. - Programul de sprijinire a agriculturii i de dezvoltare rural n rile ca ndidate la UE, din Europa Central i de Est S.U.A. - Statele Unite ale Americii T.U .- Tratatul de la Maastricht (1992) T.V.A. - Taxa pe Valoare Adugat U.D.M.R. - Uni unea Democrat a Maghiarilor din Romnia U.E. - Uniunea European U.E.M. - Uniunea Eco nomic i Monetar 18

I. Prefa la un proiect de anvergur

n decembrie 2001, l-am ntlnit pe Adrian Nstase pentru ntia oar, la cteva zile dup a PSD n alegerile parlamentare. Pe vremea aceea eram ministru de stat n Ministerul german al Afacerilor Externe. Am discutat despre procesul integrrii europene a R omniei i despre ridicarea regimului vizelor pentru Romnia. n anii ce au urmat, Adria n Nstase, n calitate de prim-ministru a pus n aplicare ceea ce anunase c va face. Ace sta este fundamentul unei relaii fructuoase i de prietenie ntre Adrian Nstase i mine, bazat pe mprtirea valorilor stngii democratice, a credinei n progresul uman i n a de a-i ajuta concetenii s-i construiasc o via mai bun, ntr-o lume mai echitabil oscut pe Adrian Nstase att n calitate de om de stat, pe vremea cnd era prim ministru , i n cea de preedinte al Partidului Social Democrat. Cnd era preedintele PSD, am luc rat mpreun la procesul de integrare a socialdemocrailor romni n Internaionala Sociali t. Am colaborat cu Adrian Nstase i cnd a coordonat negocierile de aderare a Romniei l a Uniunea European. A fost o experien politic i de via important i interesant, ca sformat o amiciie politic, precum attea altele, ntr-o strns relaie politic i perso a n orice astfel de relaie, au fost momente n care nu am fost de acord asupra unor subiecte, ca de pild, eu nu am 19

mprtit decizia Romniei de a trimite trupe n Irak, ne-am spus unul altuia sincer prer , ne-am ascultat argumentele i am cutat s nelegem interesele puse n joc. Cu toate ace tea, sau poate tocmai de aceea, relaia noastr de prietenie nu a fost alterat, nu a n cetat dup 2004, ea continund s fie aceeai chiar dup ce Adrian Nstase a intrat n Opoz Acum, Adrian Nstase a scris o carte important. Nu doar pentru sine, ci ndrznesc s sp un, i pentru Romnia. Scriu aceast prefa, din convingerea autentic a rolului pe care v lumul lui Adrian Nstase l poate avea n transformarea unei ri importante pentru i din uropa, Romnia, fa de care m simt atras sufletete, chiar dac nu pot fi de acord cu tot ce se ntmpl n ultima perioad n aceast ar, mai ales n viaa ei politic. Romnia ezultatul muncii unuia dintre oamenii de stat de succes ai Europei contemporane. Cartea lui Adrian Nstase este o sintez impozant a unui om de tiin social care aduce unoaterea tehnic a problemelor europene i romneti, mbinate n mod fericit cu instinct omului politic de a identifica i selecta prioritile societii, filtrate ns magistral n percepia filosofic a unui gnditor al stngii de avangard. De aceea, cred c titlul co plet al acestei cri ar putea fi Romnia european filosofia unui program de guvernare ei Adrian Nstase refuz explicit acest lucru, substana crii ar putea s constituie, n e privine, suportul ideatic al unui ciclu de guvernare prelungit, n urma cruia Romni a, aflat n interiorul Uniunii Europene, va fi capabil s realizeze marele salt de la condiia unui stat aflat la una din zonele de frontier ale Europei, la aceea a unei societi democrate i integrate social a secolului 21. Aceasta este miza esenial a vol umului Romnia european. 20

Subiectul central al crii are o dubl dimensiune: mai nti, cum s fie transformat soci tea romneasc, astfel nct ea s dobndeasc trsturile depline ale unei comuniti euro re, n msur s genereze progres, iar, n al doilea rnd, cum ar trebui reformat ansamblul instituional european n aa fel nct acesta s fie apt s ajute Uniunea European s fac ces globalizrii politice, economice, culturale i ecologice. Pentru nceput, merit de reinut faptul c Adrian Nstase stabilete o relaie de intercondiionare ntre europeniz omniei i adncirea integrrii ei n Uniunea European. Aceasta este perspectiva corect, arece nu poate fi conceput progresul unei societi n cadrul Uniunii Europene, dac soc ietatea european, respectiv instituiile comunitare, nu sunt n deplin stare de funcion are. Reeta politicii europene viabile pornete de la nivel local, prin naional spre comunitar i invers, dinspre comunitar, prin stat spre local i, n felul acesta, la f iecare cetean. n acest fel poate fi sintetizat paradigma n care este conceput cartea mnia European. Cercetarea realizat de Adrian Nstase este provocatoare att pentru omul politic, ct i pentru specialistul n relaii internaionale, sociolog, istoric sau jurna list. Sensul provocrii vine att din interpretarea dintr-o perspectiv personal a isto riei moderne a Romniei, mai ales a aceleia la care a participat sau a determinato, ct i din curajul de a propune un proiect pentru viitorul Romniei, ntr-o epoc n car prea puini oameni politici i asum vizionarismul, complcndu-se ntr-un prezenteism st l, generat i motivat de un aa-zis pragmatism electoralist. Pentru a-i atinge obiectiv ul, Adrian Nstase etaleaz n Romnia european o multitudine de metode i concepte, car esit din partea lectorului o atenie special pentru nelegerea 21

demonstraiei. Cu toate c este o carte complex n structur i masiv n coninut, clarit primrii i precizia conceptual sunt principalele atribute ale stilului autorului. Di n punct de vedere al metodelor folosite, n Romnia european poate fi identificat metod istoric-diacronic, pentru a pune n lumin etapele eseniale ale crerii statului romn m dern. Naraia cu caracter memorialistic pigmenteaz textul, mai ales n segmentele din carte dedicate analizei istoriei recente a Romniei. Formaia de specialist n drept i relaii internaionale este evideniat n numeroase pri ale volumului, precizia juristu fiind mpletit n mod armonios cu tiina diplomatului cu o adnc experien n probleme aionale. Dei Adrian Nstase recunoate c nu are o formaie de economist, n Romnia eur eroase subcapitole evideniaz o cunoatere subtil a macroeconomiei. Prin multitudinea de metode i concepte utilizate de ctre autor, aceast carte poate fi cu uurin ncadrat ul operelor care stau sub semnul cercetrii interdisciplinare. Cartea lui Adrian Ns tase ridic trei chestiuni: 1) evaluarea motenirii tranziiei post-comuniste n Europa C ntral i de SudEst; 2) proiectul Europei politice i al Europei sociale; 3) identitat ea Stngii n epoca globalizrii.

I. O necesar evaluare a tranziiei post-comuniste n statele aflate sub dictatura comunist pn n anul 1989, procesul de tranziie a avut t ei scopuri: introducerea drepturilor i libertilor ceteneti; dezvoltarea unei econ de pia, care s asigure un sistem economic eficient; independena fa de Rusia (fosta une Sovietic). Societile post-comuniste din Europa Central i de Sud-Est au actuala fi zionomie din cauza unei multitudini de factori: a) 22

tranziia a generat sau a adncit inegalitile sociale, srcia i diferenele regionale ferite ri dar i n interiorul acestora; mecanismele tradiionale de integrare politic ocietile i respectiv, statele europene, prezint delimitri culturale naionaliste fa te state sau strategii de securitate social n interiorul rilor. n timp ce Dreapta din statele ex-comuniste s-a folosit de primul mecanism, Stnga nu are nc o baz programa tic foarte clar definit pentru a realiza integrarea socio-politic, care s fie orient at ctre securitatea social. Programul Stngii necesit unele modificri. Doar prin reali area acestora, stabilitatea democratic va fi permanent asigurat n cadrul statelor m embre UE; b) trecerea la economia de pia a fost resimit doar parial ca o eliberare i a un succes pe de alt parte ns i ca o individualizare forat, necompensat pentru o majoritate nici mcar prin avantaje materiale; c) una din caracteristicile sociolo gice ale capitalismului postcomunist este lipsa unei clase a capitalitilor. Elite le economice ex-socialiste funcioneaz ca comprador intelligentsia, deci ca ageni loca li ai capitalului internaional i ca reprezentani ai societii locale fa de capitalul ernaional. Aceast afirmaie se cere nuanat, n statele n care elitele politice au recu la autoprivatizare (este i cazul Romniei), unde s-a creat o clas de capitaliti autoht ni; d) este caracteristic externalizarea unor funcii ale statului ctre actori privai , ceea ce nu a dus ns la creterea eficienei i la scderea costurilor, ci la o cretere ploziv a personalului alimentat indirect de ctre stat, la o cretere a costurilor i l a declinul calitii serviciilor publice; fragilitatea societii civile i orientarea ei spre Dreapta (spre deosebire de ceea ce se ntmpl n lumea occidental unde societatea c ivil este relativ bine dezvoltat i, n acelai timp, orientat spre Stnga); e) lipsa un clase de mijloc puternice, ceea 23

ce, pe fondul libertii rectigate dup 1989, a dat posibilitatea unui surogat de clas m jlocie format din potentai locali, s ctige influen asupra guvernelor i s-i promov esele private/de grup pe seama avutului public; f) partidele politice sunt legat e, prin relaii netransparente, de mediul economic, de unde impresia corupiei gener alizate, percepie care afecteaz ncrederea n soluiile politice democratice i n stat; mass-media are tendina de cartelizare, ca structur de proprietate, cultivnd ns politi ca-show, mesajul preponderent conflictual i adesea manipulator; h) justiia este nc s ub influena factorilor politici i a celor economici, proasta ei funcionare crend put ernice sentimente de frustrare social i manifestri politice radicale. Principala co ncluzie care trebuie extras din studierea peisajului politic, economic i cultural din cele zece state excomuniste care au aderat la UE de la 1 mai 2004/1 ianuarie 2007 poate fi faptul c integrarea european nu poate nlocui integrarea politic i soci al din interiorul acestor ri. Ca atare, consider c Europa post-comunist are nevoie de un program de Stnga pentru integrarea social. Romnia european contribuie la un astfe de program, pentru unul din statele importante ale Uniunii Europene.

II. Ce fel de Europ vor social-democraii? Aceasta este una dintre ntrebrile eseniale la care Adrian Nstase ncearc s dea un rs aceast carte. Patru chestiuni cred c sunt prioritare pe agenda politic european: a) reforma instituional, avnd drept corolar adoptarea unui Tratat constituional; b) ntr rea democraiei i combaterea mirajului populist; c) reforma sistemelor sociale, pen tru a le asigura 24

sustenabilitatea; d) problema energetic, aflat n strns corelare cu cea ecologic. a) O Constituie pentru Europa Respingerea Tratatului Constituional al Uniunii Europene de ctre Frana i Olanda, este n msur s blocheze att adncirea integrrii, ct i con nderii n Europa de Sud-Est. mprtesc mpreun cu Adrian Nstase preocuparea fa de nec ormare a instituiilor comunitare, astfel nct Europa s poat deveni un actor major i ma responsabil n procesele de globalizare. Pentru mine, ca european din Germania, e ste vital ca Uniunea European s dobndeasc o Constituie, chiar dac unii au reticene denumi astfel, deoarece n acest fel vom putea trece de la Europa pia la Europa polit c, de la Europa naiunilor la Europa ca actor global responsabil. Apreciez, de aceea, att mai mult propunerea lui Adrian Nstase, pe care-l consider un european din Romn ia, de a aduce o contribuie romneasc la construirea viitorului Europei, cu att mai mu t cu ct Romnia trebuie s aspire la o Uniune European constituit ca o federaie de sta construit pe doi piloni (primul, comunitar, consolidat, iar al doilea, interguve rnamental, restructurat), gndit ca o existen concomitent a dou Uniuni, una Economic netar, alturi de una Politic. b) Mirajul populismului Optimismul de la nceputul anilo r `90, generat de cderea comunismului n Europa a fost nlocuit, pas cu pas, de o sta re de nemulumire fa de soluiile politice tradiionale. Radicalismul a reaprut n Europ Mai nti, n mod aparent paradoxal, n 25

Occident: Partidul Libertii n Austria, Lista lui Pim Fortuyn n Olanda, pentru a nu m ai vorbi de Frontul Naional n Frana. ncepnd cu anul 2004, evenimente neateptate au in ervenit n viaa politic a statelor din Europa post-comunist. n acest an, 2004, guverna nii din ntreaga arie a Europei Centrale au pierdut alegerile pentru Parlamentul eu ropean. n anul 2005, alegerile parlamentare din Polonia au adus o nfrngere devastat oare pentru forele dezintegrate de centru-stnga i o victorie neateptat a partidelor n aionaliste radicale, precum Autoaprarea RP i Liga Familiilor Poloneze. Ulterior, ac este partide au devenit membre ale noii coaliii de guvernmnt de centru dreapta, car e nu a reuit s se consolideze i a trebuit s fac fa unui protest de mas ncepnd cu alegerile din 2006, n Slovacia, SMER, un partid democratic de stnga a ieit nvingtor, iar forele de centrudreapta, dezintegrate, au pierdut alegerile. Numeroi social d emocrai s-au artat ngrijorai de formarea unei coaliii cu Partidul Naional Slovac (SNS , un partid radical naionalist. Pn n toamna lui 2006, nici Ungaria, nici Cehia nu au reuit s evite destabilizarea vieii politice, dei aceasta nu a urmat modelul polonez . Doar n istoria democrat a Ungariei, votanii au acordat un al doilea mandat coaliie i de guvernmnt de centru-stnga, n timp ce naionalitii radicalii de Dreapta, Partidul ngar al Justiiei i Vieii (MIP-Jobbik) i Partidul Muncitorilor i-au pierdut susinerea are era oricum limitat. Totui, imediat ce coaliia de centru-stnga i-a nceput mandatul a trebuit s fac fa unui masiv protest al Opoziiei, dublat de un violent conflict ntre grupurile radicale de Dreapta. Ca i n Ungaria, alegerile din Cehia, din 2006, au a rtat o slbire a unei fore radicale, Partidul Comunist din Boemia i 26

Moravia (KSCM). n alegeri, att Stnga ct i Dreapta democratic au obinut un numr egal andate, neputnd astfel forma o coaliie. Impasul politic a transformat ara ntr-un sta t neguvernabil pentru o lung perioad de timp. La alegerile prezideniale din Bulgari a, din 2006, liderul partidului ultranaionalist ATAKA, Volen Siderov a ajuns n tur ul al doilea al alegerilor prezideniale. A pierdut n faa preedintelui Gheorghi Prvano v, care a candidat ca independent, nominalizat de un comitet de iniiativ, dar a fo st lider al Partidului Socialist Bulgar. Discursul lui Volen Siderov a fost pute rnic anti-european i anti-minoriti, i a vizat voturile nemulumiilor de reformele adop ate n vederea intrrii n Uniunea European. Ceea ce s-a ntmplat n Bulgaria seamn cu l francez din 2002, cnd socialitii l-au susinut pe candidatul de Dreapta Jacques Chi rac n faa celui de extrema-dreapt antieuropean Jean-Marie Le Pen. Alegerile pentru P arlamentul European au subliniat pericolul creterii extremismului antieuropean. V laams Belang-ul flamand, Aliana Sloven, Liga Familiilor Poloneze, Liga Nordului su nt doar cteva dintre formaiunile politice naionaliste care joac un rol din ce n ce ma i important pe scenele politice din statele central i est-europene. Susinerea lor electoral a fost limitat prin praguri electorale sau voturi nominale, care s le ndepr teze posibilitatea de a ajunge la putere. Totui, simpatia de care se bucur le tran sform n aliai de ocazie ai partidelor de Dreapta sau de Stnga la formarea coaliiilor. Trebuie s fac unele remarci privind ascensiunea populismului n ntreaga Europ n cursu l ultimului deceniu. n societile vest-europene se simte o dorin sporit de securitate, legalitate i ordine. Mesajele naionalist-populiste ce rspund acestei dorine sunt ast fel formate din: a) cei care se tem c 27

schimbrile aduse de globalizare le vor reduce nivelul actual de via; b) cei care se tem c nu vor fi n stare s foloseasc schimbrile aduse de globalizare spre a-i ridica ivelul de via i, din aceast cauz, vor rmne n urma celor care vor fi capabili s o f ei ce se tem c nu vor putea nici cunoate/nelege, nici controla i nici influena actele unei guvernri care, devenit global, va fi netransparent, neresponsabil i neprotecion O parte din aceste explicaii pentru rbufnirile radicalismului n Occident sunt vala bile i pentru Europa post-comunist. ns, sfritul etapelor de aderare formal la instit e euro-atlantice a adus cu sine crepusculul solidaritilor specifice epocii de tran ziie. Dac de la mijlocul anilor `90 tendinele negative ale societilor post-comuniste au putut fi moderate prin ncercarea de consensualizare n jurul marilor proiecte de aderare la NATO i integrare european, odat atinse aceste obiective nemulumirile au rbufnit. i n Est, ca i n Occident, teama fa de schimbare, personificat n noile sta ate n UE de integrarea european, genereaz opiunea fa de liderii care promit s rezolv oate problemele din societate, i aceasta ntr-un timp foarte scurt. Specificitatea valului de destabilizare din lumea post-comunist este dat de faptul c s-a dezvoltat simultan n ntreaga regiune, i nu numai ntr-o ar sau alta aa cum s-a ntmplat anter i mult, a artat fragilitatea democraiilor, care erau considerate ca fiind democraii consolidate. i, n sfrit, pierderea echilibrului n zon a aprut imediat dup aderarea tor state la Uniunea European, ceea ce a jucat, aa cum se susine adesea, un rol che ie n stabilitatea politic a regiunii. Una dintre diferenele dintre populismul din E st i cel din Vest faptul c n Europa celor 15 radicalismul s-a nscut n condiiile crize partidelor Dreptei tradiionale, n timp ce n 28

societile post-comuniste extremismul de Dreapta a survenit i ca urmare a degringola dei prin care a trecut stnga democratic. Exemplul polonez, n care social-democraii a u suferit grave nfrngeri electorale ca urmare a acuzaiilor de corupie i a certurilor fratricide, este elocvent n acest sens. Dar, Stnga din Europa Central i de Est este parazitat de populism i pentru c partidele social-democrate sau aflat n fruntea proc esului de aderare la Uniunea European, iar visul prosperitii dobndite peste noapte n u s-a realizat. Altfel spus, stnga pltete acum costul transformrilor sociale pe care le-a realizat, dar care nu au generat numai prosperitate ci i excludere social, src ie, un sentiment de inadaptare la schimbrile percepute a fi prea rapide i prea rad icale. Ca atare, combaterea populismului n Europa celor 27 nu va putea fi realiza t printr-o simpl retoric pro-democratic, ci doar n urma unui proces de transformare a l crui rezultat s fie rectigarea ncrederii n instituii, fie c ele sunt de la nivel l sau comunitar, n eficiena asigurrii securitii personale i colective de ctre Uniune uropean. De asemenea, partidele stngii democratice trebuie s devin mai credibile n re novarea mesajului democratic, s determine ntrirea ncrederii n valorile politice i n ciena participrii civice. c) Modelul Social European Suntem parte a unei discuii ge neral-europene n legtur cu adaptarea sistemului de securitate social, construit dup s fritul Primului Rzboi Mondial, la noile realiti impuse de trecerea la economia bazat e cunoatere. mbtrnirea populaiei, managementul conservator al fondurilor de pensii, a versiunea fa de risc privind transferul fondurilor publice n fonduri private de pen sii, concurena din partea unor ri cu salarii mici, dar cu capital 29

uman valoros, fuga locurilor de munc n alte ri mai prietenoase din punct de vedere fi cal, eterogenitatea crescnd a politicilor sociale ale statelor membre UE, numrul ma re de omeri sunt tot attea ameninri care au adus n atenie nevoia de reform a modelul social european. n Germania, aceast tematic are o rezonan special, cunoscute fiind di cuiile legate de adoptarea Agendei 2010. O protecie social efectiv n Europa necesit li adoptate la nivel comunitar. Aceasta este mai important pentru noile state mem bre post-comuniste dect pentru cele occidentale: nivelul securitii sociale, precum ocrotirea sntii i pensiile, este o problem de mare importan nu numai n Romnia. Pr de baz sunt dou decizii politice asumate la nivel european: mai nti, toate statele membre ale UE trebuie s cad de acord c dezvoltarea economic i securitatea social sunt obiective la fel de importante. Teza potrivit creia trebuie mai nti s obinem cretere conomic, apoi s asigurm securitatea social nu este deloc acceptabil, pentru c politic le sociale trebuie nelese ca un factor productiv al economiei europene; n al doilea rnd, principiul fundamental trebuie s fie acela al competiiei ntre companii, nu ntre companiile din diferite state, sprijinite de acestea. Consecina acestui principi u va fi egalizarea condiiilor de pornire n competiia economic i a rezultatelor politi cilor economice de la nivel european. n lumina diferenelor de bogie dintre vechile i noile state membre ale Uniunii Europene, solidaritatea ntre acestea este absolut necesar. Fondurile structurale ale Uniunii sunt necesare pentru finanarea investiii lor n instituii i infrastructur, astfel nct s fie posibil creterea economic rapid l fundamental care distorsioneaz competiia n UE este taxarea 30

companiilor, iar standardizarea la nivel european a taxelor este necesar. Realiza rea unui nivel de taxare a companiilor n jurul procentului de 30% poate fi un rep er pentru toate statele membre ale Uniunii. ns, trebuie s acceptm faptul c finanarea nsuficient n statele nou intrate sau n cele mai srace nu ar putea fi compensat doar p rin transferuri dinspre cele mai bogate prin intermediul fondurilor structurale. Creterea economic a fiecrei companii poate asigura un succes de durat. Dumpingul sa larial este nociv pentru ntreaga Europ. Salariile care sunt prea mici sunt nocive pentru salariai n statele srace, deoarece nu le asigur dect puin din necesiti, dar nociv i n statele bogate, deoarece genereaz un nivel al omajului mai mare dect este n ecesar pentru competitivitate. Marea provocare a politicii sociale i a strategiil or sindicatelor n UE este egalizarea salariilor la un nivel ct mai nalt posibil. Co ndiia prealabil pentru ndeplinirea acestui obiectiv este crearea unui sistem de sal arii minime n toate statele membre ale Uniunii, urmnd ca acestea s fie ajustate pri n creterea punct cu punct. Principiul de baz ar trebui s fie acela al unor salarii comparabile pentru competene comparabile. n opinia mea, conceptul pieei-libere unid imensionale, a societii de pia este total greit. Doar securitatea social ca o precond e a libertii personale, oferit de Stnga democratic, poate supravieui n viitor. d) Pr cie i consum sustenabile Energie - Mediu n Romnia european autorul acord o import dezvoltrii sustenabile. Simt nevoia s mi exprim i eu poziia fa de aceast chestiune iune consonant cu cea a lui Adrian Nstase. 31

Ca parte constitutiv important a Strategiei de la Lisabona, viziunea dezvoltrii dur abile i perspectivele sale de mediu, economice i sociale sunt fundamentale pentru o societate bazat pe solidaritate i justiie o societate n care cetenii cred n viit articip activ la dezvoltare. n paralel i ncorporat n strategiile economice i de ocu e a forei de munc este necesar s accelerm lupta mpotriva degradrii mediului prin ac concertat pentru modele sustenabile de producie i consum. Nu doar Europa va benefi cia de pe urma progresului acesta va uura povara global asupra planetei noastre i v a genera noi tehnologii ecologice care s poat fi apoi rspndite n ntreaga lume. Scopul este ruperea legturii dintre creterea economic i presiunea exercitat asupra resurselo r naturale. Inovaiile, noile tehnologii i investiiile sunt fundamentale pentru reuit a strategiei. Tehnologia este o sabie cu dou tiuri. Este att o cauz a multor probleme de mediu, ct i o soluie a lor. Este de domeniul evidenei c tehnologiile trecutului dominante n transport, energie, industrie i agricultur submineaz sistemele noastre e lementare de meninere a vieii, apa i aerul curate i solul fertil. n toate aceste sect oare sunt disponibile sau pe cale s apar noi tehnologii. Ele nu vor reduce doar im pactul asupra mediului, ci, dac sunt folosite pe scar larg, pot rezolva probleme de mediu. Avem de ales ntre schimbarea tehnologic ntr-un ritm fr precedent sau o modifi care n compoziia atmosferei care s nu aib echivalent n trecut, nc din zorii umanit ea n tehnologiile mediului prin intermediul unor investiii mai mari ar putea s crea sc rata mbuntirii n ceea ce privete eco-eficiena. O astfel de evoluie ar mbunt creterea economic 32

i presiunile asupra mediului, permind evoluii mai favorabile n ambele. Nu exist o con radicie inerent ntre creterea economic i meninerea unui nivel acceptabil al caliti lui. Creterea economic permite de obicei societii s furnizeze oamenilor un mediu mai curat i mai sntos. Astfel, problema nu trebuie vzut ca una de cretere economic versu ediu, ci de cum poate fi nsoit creterea standardelor de via de protejarea i mbunt mediului. ntrirea integrrii ar trebui s fie benefic att pentru mediu, ct i pentru narea subsidiilor pentru activiti nocive mediului i politicii economice. Ecologizar ea politicii fiscale, de exemplu prin eliminarea subsidiilor pentru activiti nociv e pentru mediu ar trebui s creasc eficiena economic. Practic, sustenabilitatea este o chestiune de eliminare a tehnologiilor vechi i promovarea unor tehnologii mai e ficiente i productive. Ar trebui s cutm noi tehnologii, eficiente, noi, curate. Ele vor produce mai mult n termeni de valoare pentru consumatori, dar vor utiliza mai puin energie i alte resurse. nlocuirea vechilor tehnologii cu altele noi, orientate spre sustenabilitate impulsioneaz o puternic cretere economic de pe urma investiiilo r fcute. O rat mai mare de investiii va face loc unui ritm mai rapid de nlocuire a v echilor tehnologii. O strategie de dezvoltare durabil care s includ o politic hotrt a rectifica preurile va face introducerea de noi tehnologii mai profitabil i va aju ta investiiile i creterea economic. Astfel, strategia UE de dezvoltare durabil poate contribui la o astfel de strategie de investiii. Aceast abordare a problemei tehno logiilor sustenabile are, de asemenea, un aspect care privete dezvoltarea. Statel e membre 33

ale UE i alte state dezvoltate au elaborat, implementat i exportat n trecut tehnolo giile care stau la baza modelelor noastre nonsustenabile de producie. Aceste stat e vor avea principala responsabilitate pentru introducerea noilor tehnologii i pe ntru punerea lor la dispoziia rilor n curs de dezvoltare. Viziunea pe termen lung tr ebuie combinat cu un program ndrzne de aciune pentru investiii, cretere economic i nea asupra resurselor naturale. Pentru a face acest program realizabil, ar trebu i s se bazeze pe principiul performanei optime adic pe noi tehnologii, sisteme i pri ncipii care au demonstrat c funcioneaz bine. Strategie european privind energia (Ene rgy for a Changing World), recent adoptat, i asum obiective ndrznee: reducerea emisi r de gaze poluante de ctre statele dezvoltate cu 30% pn n 2020; creterea eficienei en rgetice cu 20% pn n 2020; creterea ponderii energiei regenerabile cu 20% pn n 2020; erea nivelului utilizrii biocombustibililor n transport cu 10% pn n 2020. Toate acest e obiective asumate la nivel comunitar, problema dependenei Uniunii Europene de r esursele energetice ale Rusiei i implicaiile politice pe care acest lucru l are dej a, necesit o atitudine realist i curajoas din partea politicienilor europeni.

III. Stnga democratic european n epoca globalizrii Dezvoltrile politice din rile europene, precum i impactul pe care l are globalizarea asupra realitilor social-politice, economice i culturale, impun o revedere i o moder nizare a programului partidelor social-democrate europene, precum i a gndirii poli tice social-democrate n general. Chestiunea esenial este dac distincia tradiional di e Stnga i Dreapta mai este relevant, chiar dac ele se vor 34

desprinde de mediul prozaic al politicii de partid tradiionale. n opinia mea, acea st semnificaie se va pstra, cel puin la un nivel general. n ansamblu, Dreapta va acce pta mai degrab existena inegalitii i va prefera s i susin pe cei puternici dect p tere. Aceast distincie trebuie s conduc n politica social a Stngii democratice la in rarea celor slabi i la eliminarea privilegiilor, la politica sa global de repudier e a unei singure superputeri i la susinerea unei ordini mondiale multipolare. Prog ramul de baz al partidelor social-democrate continu s fie orientat ctre o strategie flexibil dreapta-stnga. Acest lucru este valabil n ciuda tuturor discuiilor despre a treia cale sau noul centru. Anthony Giddens, consilier al Partidului Laburist, afir m n cartea sa Dincolo de stnga i dreapta (1994): Distinciile dintre stnga i dreap ntinua fr ndoial s existe n coerena practic a politicilor de partid. Simpla distin izat de Giddens i cele dou alternative politice fundamentale ce deriv din aceasta, a jut la depirea sentimentului de insecuritate ce rezult din eecul i fragmentarea stng comuniste, care a discreditat ambele valori i noiuni ale Stngii. Noul centru a consti tuit astfel delimitarea fa de Stnga nedemocrat. Slbiciunea conceptual a alternativei ntrului fa de Dreapta rezid n faptul c, totui, ea nu face distincia ntre Dreapta d Dreapta nedemocrat. Centrul, privit din punct de vedere matematic, este punctul de pe o lung linie care separ Dreapta de Stnga. O politic de centru nseamn practic aduc rea celor care sunt deschii ctre noi soluii, la partea opus din cele dou zone ale cen trului. ntr-un sistem bipartid aceasta va constitui o sarcin strategic funcional a st gii, dar i a dreptei, dac dorete o majoritate la centru. Ct 35

privete programele fundamentale, nu trebuie s se renune la votanii tradiionali de Stn a, ci trebuie s fie atrai i ali votani poteniali. Valorile Stngii democratice trebui conin distinciile formulate de Anthony Giddens, care se reflect n valorile democraiei justiiei sociale. Aceste valori au un corespondent n triada de valori rezultate d in Revoluia francez Libertate, Egalitate, Fraternitate. Pentru social-democraia int ernaional s-au adoptat, prin documentul emis n 2003 la Congresul Internaionalei Soci aliste Guvernarea ntr-o societate global o nou triad de principii: dezvoltarea dura drepturile omului, democraie. Fiecare dintre aceste principii are cte trei dimens iuni. Dezvoltarea durabil include un mediu sntos, progres economic i justiie social; repturile omului includ dreptul la securitate individual, identitate cultural i int egrare social; iar democraia include buna guvernare, transparena i participarea. Red efinirea social-democraiei este cerut i de faptul c valorile politice privind dreptu rile omului i naiunea, cultura sau integrarea social devin mai concrete pentru real itatea social dect circumstanele social-economice i ateptrile populaiei. Tendina de ateptrilor sociale este orientarea ctre stadiul n care lucrurile vor deveni mai bun e, iar situaia va nceta s se deterioreze. n acest context, compararea cu propriile p oziii mai proaste din trecut este inutil, n timp ce comparaiile cu ceilali, care sunt dup cum pretind pe o poziie mai bun, vor fi mult mai relevante. Aceast atitudine invidie este semnificativ att pentru strategiile de delimitare ale Dreptei, ct i pent ru strategiile de integrare ale Stngii. Succesul acestui program depinde de pregti rea i abilitatea de a ndeplini obligaiile partidelor; aici se afl avantajul permanen t 36

al partidelor de Stnga fa de partidele populiste, a cror incapacitate de a-i ndeplini promisiunile se va vedea foarte curnd. Sunt de acord cu Adrian Nstase c noi, social -democraii europeni, trebuie s fim n avangarda micrii pentru crearea unei naiuni civi e europene, fundamentat pe conceptul de cetenie european, care va trebui s constituie unul din pilonii identitii cetenilor europeni. Societatea cosmopolit pe care o dorim creat n Europa nu poate fi bazat dect pe principii precum cele ale respectului dive rsitii, construciei valorilor comune, subsidiaritii i coeziunii spirituale. n acest s, trebuie reafirmat faptul c politica social-democrat nelege coexistena dintre major itate i minoritate ca o surs de bogie. Coeziunea social sau, mai bine spus, refacerea coeziunii sociale reprezint o alt sfidare major aflat pe agenda reformei ideologice social-democrate. Social-democraia promoveaz principiul egalitii anselor. Dar egalit atea anselor trebuie s fie echilibrat cu ansa egalitii, ca mijloc de includere pentru fiecare individ. Aceasta implic, la rndul su, realizarea unui alt echilibru i anume acela dintre integrarea n familia democrat i integrarea familiei n structura colecti vitilor deschise. Asemenea colectiviti urmeaz, la rndul lor, a se agrega n societate ivic multicultural i n cea cosmopolit. Politica anselor de integrare i a egalitii grare ar trebui definit ct mai concret cu putin, astfel nct s identifice calea ctre rea libertii i securitii individuale prin creterea adaptabilitii, ca i prin realiz ei juste corelri ntre libertatea de opinie i rspundere, ntre riscul asumat i ctigul t. Organizarea societii civile, explicarea rolului clasei mijlocii i trebuie s fie pr integrante ale actualei ideologii social-democrate. 37

* n final, doresc s-mi exprim nc odat aprecierea pentru rezultatul efortului tiinifi doctrinar al autorului, spernd c volumul Romnia european se va bucura de atenia pe c o merit pe deplin din partea publicului cititor, c aceast provocare la dialog i ref lecie va fi acceptat, iar peste un deceniu Adrian Nstase va scrie o carte de istori e pe care ar putea-o denumi Memorii. Cum am realizat Romnia european! Sunt convins c Adrian Nstase va contribui la traducerea acestui proiect n realitate! Dr. Christoph Zpel Preedinte al Comitetului Economic, Coeziune Social i Dezvoltare al Internaionalei So cialiste Berlin, mai 2007 38

Foreword to a Long-span Project It was December 2001, when I met Adrian Nstase the first time, a few days after t he success of PSD in the parliamentary elections. At this time I was Minister of State in the German Foreign Office. We discussed the process of Romanias Europea n integration and the lifting of the visa-regime vis--vis Romania. We agreed in c rucial issues. In the following years Adrian Nstase as Prime Minister implemented , what he had announced. This is the fundament of a fruitful and friendly relati on between Adrian Nstase and me, grounded on joint sharing of the democratic Left values, of the faith in human progress and in the force of him to help his fell ow citizens to build for themselves a better life in a more equitable world. I h ave known Adrian Nstase both as statesman, when he was Prime Minister, and as Pre sident of the Social Democratic Party. When he used to be the PSD leader, we wor ked together in the process of the integration of Romanian Social Democrats into the Socialist International. I have also cooperated with Adrian Nstase when he co ordinated the negotiations for Romanias adherence to the European Union. It was a n important and interesting political and life experience, which turned a politi cal amity, like so many others, into a close political and personal relationship . And, as it happens in any such relationship, there were moments when we could not agree with one another on some 39

topics, as for instance, I did not agree to Romanias decision to send troops to I rak, but we sincerely spoke out our views, we listened to arguments and we tried to understand the interests at stake. Nevertheless, or maybe therefore, our rel ationship has not been altered, did not come to an end after 2004, and continued to be the same even after Adrian Nstase joined the Opposition. Now Adrian Nstase has written an important book not only for himself, but I dare say, for Romania as well. I am writing this preface because I am genuinely convi nced of the role Adrian Nstases book can play in the transformation of a country i mportant for and in Europe, Romania, to which I am spiritually attracted, even i f I cannot agree with everything happening of late in this country, particularly in its political life. European Romania is the fruit of the work of a successfu l statesman of contemporary Europe. Adrian Nstases book is an imposing synthesis m ade by a social scientist who contributes his technical knowledge of European an d Romanian topics, happily combined with the politicians instinct to identify and select societys priorities, filtered nevertheless through the philosophical perc eption of a thinker belonging to the vanguard Left. Thus, I think that the compl ete title of this book might be European Romania the Philosophy of a Governing P rogram. Although Adrian Nstase refuses explicitly this, the substance of the book might form, in many ways, the conceptual underpinning of a prolonged cycle of g overnment, in the wake of which Romania, within the European Union, would be abl e to do the great leap forward from the condition of a state at the frontier lin es of Europe, 40

to the condition of a democratic and socially integrated society of the 21 centu ry.. This is the essential stake of European Romania. The central subject of the book is double-seized: first, how can Romanian societ y be transformed so as to get the full features of a prosperous European communi ty, able to generate progress, and, secondly, how should the European institutio ns be reformed so as to be capable to help European Union successfully cope with political, economic, cultural and ecologic globalization. For the beginning, worth noting would be that Adrian Nstase establishes an interconditioning between Romanias Europenization and the deepening of its integration i nto the European Union. This is the correct prospect, as the progress of the soc ieties in the EU-member states cannot be conceived within the European Union, if the European society, i.e. communitarian institutions, is not functioning at fu ll capacity. A viable European policy recipe starts from a local level, via stat al towards communitarian and, the other way round, from communitarian, via stata l towards local, and in this way to each and every citizen. This is the way one may synthesize the paradigm on which European Romania has been conceived. The re search made by Adrian Nstase is challenging both for the politician and for the e xpert in international relations, sociologist, historian or journalist. The mean ing of the challenge is the result of interpreting from a personal vista Romanias modern history, particularly the history in which he participated or which he d etermined, as well as the result of his courage to propose a project for the fut ure of Romania, at an epoch when an insufficient number of politicians assume a visionaires outlook, indulging in a sterile present-stickiness, generated and mot ivated by a so called electoral pragmatism. 41

To reach his aim, Adrian Nstase displays in European Romania a multiplicity of me thods and notions, spurring the readers special attention so as to make him under stand the authors demonstration. Although this book is complex in its structure a nd massive in content, the clear phrase and the conceptual precision are the mai n attributes of the authors style. As for the methods used, in European Romania o ne can identify the diachronichistorical method, so as to highlight the essentia l stages crossed in creation of the modern Romanian state. Narrative with memoir s flavors are coloring the text, particularly in the segments dedicated to the e xamination of Romanias recent history. His Law and International Relations profes sional background is evident in many parts of the volume, the jurists accuracy be ing harmoniously intertwined with the knowledge of a diplomat with thorough expe rience in international problems. Although Adrian Nstase admits he has not an eco nomists training, in European Romania, there are a lot of subchapters that prove his knowledge of macroeconomics. Owing to the multitude of methods and notions u sed by the author, this book has a rightful place among the works written under the sign of interdisciplinary research. Three questions are raised by Adrian Nsta ses book: 1.) assessment of the post-communist transition legacy in Central and Sou th-Eastern Europe; 2.) the project of political Europe and social Europe; 3.) id entity of the Left in the globalization age. I. A necessary assessment of post-communist transition In the states under communist dictatorship until 1989, the transition process ha d three goals: introduction of civic rights and liberties; development of a mark et-oriented economy, able to 42

secure an efficient economic system; independence of Russia (former Soviet Union) . The post-communist states in Central and South-Eastern Europe have the present physiognomy due to a multitude of factors, a) Transition has generated or deepe ned social inequalities, poverty and regional differences between countries but also within them; traditional mechanisms of political integration in societies a nd in European states, respectively, are nationalist cultural delimitations from other states or strategies of social security within the countries themselves. While the Right in the former communist countries has used the first mechanism, the Left has not got yet a very well defined programmatic basis to achieve the s ocio-political integration, to be oriented towards social insecurity. The Progra m of the Left needs alterations. Only after completing these alterations, the de mocratic stability will be permanently secured within EU member-states; b) Trans ition to the market-oriented economy has been only partially felt like a liberat ion and a success on the other hand yet, it has been felt like a forced individu alization, for which not even the material advantages have been able to make up for a great majority; c) One of the sociologic characteristics of post-communist capitalism is the absence of a capitalists class. Ex-socialist economic elites a re functioning like comprador intelligentsia, thus as local agents of the internat ional capital and as representatives of local society of the international capit al. This assertion needs a more nuanced specification, in the states in which po litical elites resorted to self-privatization Romanias case, too - , where a class of autochthonous capitalists has been created; d) Characteristic is the external ization of some functions of the state by private actors, a fact which has not l ed to higher efficiency and lower costs, but to the explosive growth of 43

the personnel indirectly supported by the state, to higher costs and a lower qua lity of public services; a frangible civil society and its orientation towards t he Right, in contradistinction to societies, where the civil society is comparat ively well developed and, at the same time, oriented to the Left. e) Absence of a powerful middle class, which, against the background of a liberty re-conquered after 1989, offered the possibility to a substitute middle-class, formed of loc al potentates, to gain influence over the governments and promote their private/ or group interests to the detriment of public property; f) Political parties are linked, by non-transparent relationships, to the economic environment, wherefro m the impression of a generalized corruption, a perception that is harmful to th e confidence in democratic political solutions and in the state; g) Mass-media h as a tendency to associate in cartels, as their property structure is concerned, though cultivating the so-called policy-show, the pre-eminently conflicting and quite often manipulating message. h) Justice is still under the influence of po litical and of economic factors, its poor functioning creating strong feelings o f social frustration and radical political manifestations. The main conclusion t o be drawn from the study of the political, economic and cultural landscape in t he ten ex-communist states which adhered to EU since May 1, 2004/January 1, 2007 may be the fact the European integration cannot replace political and social in tegration within those countries. Therefore, I think that post-communist Europe needs a Leftist program for social integration. European Romania contributes to such a program, for one of the important states of the European Union. 44

II. What kind of a Europe do the social-democrats want? This is one of the essential questions to which Adrian Nstase tries to give an an swer in the present book. I think that four items have priority on the European political agenda: a) institutional reform, having as natural consequence the ado ption of a constitutional Treaty; b) strengthening of democracy and contesting t he populist mirage; c) reform of social systems, to secure sustainment; d) the e nergy problem, closely correlated with the ecological one. a) A Constitution for Europe Rejection of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union by France a nd the Netherlands is able to block both the deepening of integration, and its f urther extension in South Eastern Europe. I share with Adrian Nstase the concern for the necessary reform of the community institutions, so that Europe may becom e a major and more responsible actor in the globalization processes. For me, as a European in Germany, it is vital that the European Union should get a Constitu tion, even if there are some people reticent enough to call it by that name, for in this way we would be able to progress from Market-oriented Europe to Political Europe, from the Europe of Nations to Europe as a Responsible Global Actor. Therefore I appreciate even more the proposal advanced by Adrian Nstase, whom I consider a European in Romania, to make a Romanian contribution to the build-up of Europes fu ture, so much the more as Romania should aspire to a European Union constituted a s a federation of states, built on two pillars, the first, communitary, reinforc ed, and the second, intergovernmental, restructured, thought out as a concomitan t existence of two Unions, one Economic and Monetary, side by side with a Politi cal One. 45

b) The mirage of Populism The optimistic effervescence of the early 1990s, gener ated by the fall of communism in Europe has been replaced, little by little, by a feeling of dissatisfaction with the traditional political solutions. Radicalis m reappeared in Europe. First, apparently as a paradox, in the West: Austrian Fr eedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei sterreichs), Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Party) in the Netherlands, not to speak about the Front National (National Front) in F rance. Starting 2004, unexpected events occurred in the political life of the st ates in post-communist Europe. Then, in 2004, ruling parties all over Central Eu rope lost the elections for the European Parliament. In 2005, parliamentary elec tions in Poland brought about a devastating defeat of the centre-Leftist disinte grated forces and an unexpected victory of radical nationalist parties, like Sam oobrona RP (Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland) and Liga Polskich Rodzin, LP R (League of Polish Families). Later these parties became members of the new cen tre-Right government coalition, which did not succeed to consolidate itself and was obliged to cope with a mass protest starting that date. In 2006 elections, i n Slovakia SMER, a democratic-left party had success, the centre-Right forces di sintegrated, lost the elections. But many Social Democrats are concerned on a Co alition with Slovensk nrodn strana (Slovak National Party), a radically nationalist ic party. Till the fall of 2006, neither Hungary, nor Czech Republic succeeded t o avoid the destabilization of political life, although they did not follow the Polish model. Only in Hungarys democratic history, the voters granted a second ma ndate to the centre-Left coalition, while the Right radical nationalists, Magyar Igazsg s let Prtja (in short: MIP-Jobbik) (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) and Mag yar Munksprt (Hungarian Workers 46

Party) lost their anyway limited support. Nevertheless, shortly after the centre -Left coalition had begun its mandate, it was obliged to cope with a massive pro test of the Opposition, doubled by a violent conflict between the radical Right groups. Like in Hungary, the Czech elections, in 2006, proved a weakening of the a radical force, the Komunistick strana ech a Moravy KSM (Communist Party of Bohem ia and Moravia). In the elections, both the Democratic Left and the Democratic R ight obtained an equal number of mandates, being thus unable to form a coalition . The political deadlock turned the country into a non governable state for a lo ng period of time. At the presidential elections in Bulgaria, in 2006, the leade r of the ultra nationalist party, ATAKA, Volen Siderov, reached the second round of the presidential elections. He lost to President Georgi Parvanov, an indepen dent candidate, nominated by an initiative committee, but he was leader of the B ulgarian Socialist Party. Volen Siderovs discourse was powerfully anti-European a nd anti-minorities, and was targeted on the votes of people dissatisfied with th e reforms adopted with a view to joining the European Union. What happened in Bu lgaria looks very much like the French scenario of 2002, when the Socialists suppo rted the Right-wing Jacques Chirac against the extreme-Right Jean-Marie Le Pen. The elections to the European Parliament underlined the dangerous strength of th e extreme anti European right. The Flemish Vlams Belang, the Slovene Alliance, t he League of Polish Families, the are only some of political nationalist groupin gs playing a increasingly important part on the political stages in the Central and East European countries. Their electoral support was restricted by electoral lower limits or nominal votes, likely to remove their possibility to ascend to power. Nevertheless, 47

the sympathy they are enjoying turns them from occasional allies of the Right or Left parties in forming coalitions. It is necessary to make some remarks concer ning the ascent of populism all through Europe during the last decade. In West E uropean societies there is an increasing desire of security, legality and order. Nationalist-populist messages responding to this desire are thus formed of: a) people fearing that changes brought about by globalization would lower their pre sent living standards; b) people fearing that they would not be able to use the changes brought about by globalization in order to raise their living standards and, therefore, they would lag behind those proving capable to do it c) people f earing they would not be able to know/understand, control or influence the acts of a government which, turned global, will be non-transparent, irresponsible, no n-protective . Some of these explanations for the outbursts of nationalistic pop ulism in West Europe are also valid for post-communist Europe. But, the end of t he formal adherence stages to EU and NATO brought in the twilight of the solidar ities specific for the transition epoch. If in the mid-1990s the negative tenden cies of the post-communist societies could be tempered by the attempt at reachin g consensus about the great adherence to NATO and European integration projects, once these targets reached, dissatisfactions broke out. In the East and the Wes t alike, the fear of change, personified by European integration in the new stat es adhered to EU, generates an option for leaders who are promising to solve all problems in a society in a very short time. The specific feature of the destabi lization wave in the post-communist world is the result of its simultaneous deve lopment in the whole region, and not only in this or that country as it happened previously. Moreover, it proved the brittleness of democracies, considered as 48

being consolidated democracies. And, last but not least, the loss of balance in this zone appeared shortly after the adherence of these states to the European U nion, a fact which played, as frequently sustained, a key part in the political stability of the region. One of the differences between eastern and western popu lism in Europe is the fact that in EU 15 area, radicalism was born when the cris is of the traditional Right-wing parties was prevailing, while in post-communist societies Right-wing extremism occurred in wake of the tumble suffered by the d emocratic Left. The Polish example, where Social Democrats had suffered serious electoral defeats as a consequence of the accusations of corruption and of the f ratricide quarrels, is quite eloquent in this sense. But, the Left in Central an d Eastern Europe is infected by populism also because the Social Democratic part ies took the lead in the process of adherence to the European Union, and the dre am of prosperity won overnight did not come true. In other words, the left is pa ying now the price of social changes achieved by it, social changes which have n ot generated prosperity alone, but also social exclusion, poverty, a feeling of nonadjustment to the changes seen as too swift and too radical. Thus, the combat ing of populism in EU 27 will not be achieved by a simple pro-democratic rhetori c, but only following a process of transformation whose result must be the regai ning of confidence in institutions, be they at a state or at community level, in the efficiency of ensuring private or collective security by the European Union . The parties of democratic Left should also gain more credibility in their capa city to rejuvenate the democratic message, to determine a strengthened confidenc e in the political values and the efficiency of civic participation. 49

c) The European Social Pattern There is a general-European discussion about adap ting the social security system, built-up since the end of World War I, to the n ew realities imposed by transition to an economy based on knowledge. The ageing of the population, the conservative management of pension funds aversion to risk concerning the transfer of public funds into private pension funds competition caused by low salary countries but with a valuable human capital, the flight for jobs in other more tax-friendly countries, the growing heterogeneity of social po licies in the EU member-states, the great number of jobless people are all menac es that brought into focus the need of reforming the European social pattern. In Germany, this topic has a special echo, the discussions about the adoption of t he 2010 Agenda being well-known. An effective social protection in Europe requires rules adopted at a community level. That is more important for the new post com munist member states than for the western; the level of social security like hea lth care and pensions is a reason of major concerns not only in Romania. Basic p re-requisites are two political decisions assumed at a European level: first, al l the EU memberstates should come to terms that economic development and social security are equally important goals. The thesis according to which we should fi rst obtain an economic growth and only then ensure social security is altogether unacceptable, for social policies should be understood as a productive factor o f European economy; secondly, the basic principle should be competition between companies, not between companies from different states backing them. The consequ ence of this principle will be the equalization of starting terms in the economi c competition and of the results of economic policies at a European level. 50

As the differences of wealth between the old and new EU member-states are concer ned, their solidarity is absolutely necessary. The structural funds of the Union are necessary for the financing of investments in institutions and infrastructu re, so that a swift economic growth is made possible. The fundamental distorting element in the EU competition is the taxing of companies, while standardization at a European level of taxes proves necessary. The achievement of a 30% taxatio n level of the companies may be a guide mark for all the EU member-states. We sh ould nevertheless accept the fact that the insufficient financing of the newcome r states or of the poorer ones cannot be compensated only by transfers from the richer countries through the intermediate of structural funds. The economic grow th of each company can assure a durable success. Salary dumping is noxious for t he whole of Europe. Too low salaries are noxious for employees in poor states as they cannot cover their bare necessities, but they are also noxious in richer c ountries, as they generate a higher level of unemployment than required by compe titiveness. The great challenge of social policy and of trade-union strategies i n EU is the equalization of salaries at an as high level as possible. The pre-re quisite condition for reaching this objective is the creation of a minimum salar y system in all the EU member-states, which would be later adjusted point by poi nt. The basic principle should be that of comparable salaries for comparable com petencies. In my opinion, the notion of a uni-dimensional free market, of a mark et-oriented society is altogether wrong. Social security alone as a pre-requisit e of personal freedom, offered by the democratic Left, may survive in the future . 51

d) Sustainable production and consumption Energy Environment The author pays in his European Romania a particular importance to sustainable development. I feel like expressing my own opinion about this question, a viewpoint consonant with A drian Nstases. As a constitutive part of the Lisbon Strategy, the vision of a dura ble development and its environmental, economic and social prospects are fundame ntal for a society based on solidarity and justice a society in which its citize ns believe in the future and participate actively in development. Simultaneously and incorporated into the economic and labor occupation strategies we need to a ccelerate the struggle against the degradation of environment by a concerted act ion for sustainable production and consumption patterns. Europe will not be the sole beneficiary of progress, as progress would lighten the global burden on our Planet and would generate new ecologic technologies likely to be disseminated a ll over the world. The aim is the breaking of the link between economic growth a nd the pressure exerted on natural resources. Innovations, new technologies and investments are fundamental for a successful strategy. Technology is a double-ed ged sword. It is both a cause of and a solution for many environmental problems. It is a matter of evidence that past technologies still prevailing in transport s, energy, industry and agriculture are undermining our elementary systems of ma intaining the purity of life, water and air and keeping soil fertility. New tech nologies are or will be soon available in all these sectors. They will not reduc e only the impact on environment but, if 52

used on a large scale, they will be able to solve environmental problems. We hav e to choose between technological change at an unprecedented pace and an alterat ion of the atmosphere composition with no equivalent in the past, as early as th e dawn of humanity. Improvements in environmental technologies with the help of bigger investments might raise the improvements rate in eco-efficiency. Such an evolution would better the relationship between economic growth and pressure on environment, allowing for more favorable evolutions in both of them. There is no inherent contradiction between economic growth and the maintenance of an accept able level of environmental quality. Economic growth usually allows society to o ffer people a cleaner and healthier environment. So, this problem should not be considered as an economic growth versus environment issue, but as a question of how higher living standards can be accompanied by improved environmental quality . The strengthening of integration should be beneficial both for the environment and for the elimination of subsidies for activities noxious to environment and to economic policy. The ecologic improvement of fiscal policy, by eliminating fo r instance subsidies for activities noxious to environment should raise economic efficiency. Practically speaking, sustainability is a matter of eliminating old technologies and promoting more efficient and more productive ones. We must loo k for new, efficient, clean technologies. They will produce more in terms of val ue for consumers, but will use less energy and other resources. The replacement of old technologies with fresh ones, oriented towards sustainability stimulates a strong economic growth in wake of investments. A higher rate of investments wi ll allow for 53

a replacement of old technologies at an accelerated pace. A longlasting developm ent strategy including a firm policy of price readjustment will make more profit able the introduction of new technologies and will spur investments and economic growth. Thus, the EU lasting development strategy can contribute to such an inv estments strategy. This approach of the sustainable technologies problem has got an aspect concerning development. The EU member-states and other developed stat es have drawn up, implemented and exported in the past technologies that are at the basis of our non-sustainable production patterns. These states will bear the main responsibility for the introduction of new technologies and for putting th em at the disposal of the developing countries. The long-term vision should be c ombined with a daring action program for investments, economic growth and pressu re upon natural resources. For such a program to be feasible, it should be based on the principle of optimum performance that is on new technologies, systems an d principles that have already demonstrated their good functioning. The recently adopted European strategy concerning energy Energy for a Changing World - , ass umes daring objectives: reducing greenhouse polluting gas emissions from develop ed countries by 30% by 2020; improving energy efficiency by 20% by 2020; raising the share of renewable energy to 20% by 2020; Increasing the level of bio-fuels in transport fuel to 10% by 2020. All these objectives assumed at a community l evel, the problem of the dependence of the European Union upon the energy resour ces of Russia and the political implications this fact has already got need a re alistic and courageous attitude of the European politicians. 54

III. The European democratic Left in the Globalization Age Political developments in European countries, and the impact of globalization on socio-political, economic and cultural realities, require a review of the Europ ean social democratic parties program, as well as of the social-democratic politi cal thinking in general. The essential question is if the traditional distinctio n between the Left and the Right is still relevant even if they would detach the mselves from the prosaic environment of the traditional party policy. In my opin ion, such significance will be preserved, at least at a general level. On the wh ole, the Right will rather accept inequality and will prefer sustaining the powe rful ones instead of the powerless. This distinction should lead in the societal policy of the democratic Left to an integration of the weak and the elimination of privileges, to its global policy of repudiating a single superpower and of s ustaining a multi-polar world order. The fundamental program of social democrati c parties continues to be oriented towards a flexible right-left strategy. This is valid in spite of all discussions about a third way or a new centre. Anthony Gidd ens, an adviser of the Labour Party, states in his book Beyond Left and Right (1 994): Distinctions between Left and Right will further exist in the practical coh erence of party policies. The simple distinction made by Giddens and the two fund amental political alternatives deriving from it, are helpful in surpassing the f eeling of insecurity resulting from the failure and the fragmentation of the com munist Left, which had discredited both values and notions of the Left. The new c entre constituted 55

thus a delimitation from the non-democratic Left. The conceptual weakness of the centre alternative as compared to the Right resides in the fact that, it does not make any distinction between the democratic and the non-democratic Right. The Ce ntre, seen from a mathematical vantage point, is the point on a long line separat ing the Right from the Left. A centre oriented policy practically means to bring people open to new solutions over to the opposite side from the two zones of th e Centre. As for the fundamental programs, one should not give up the traditiona l Left voters, but, should attract other potential voters. The values of the dem ocratic Left should contain the distinctions formulated by Anthony Giddens, whic h are mirrored in the values of democracy and social justice. These values have a correspondent in the triad of values resulted from the French Revolution Liber ty, Equality, Fraternity. For the international democracy there have been adopte d, by the document issued in 2003 at the Congress of the Socialist International Governance In A Global Society The Social Democratic Approach a new triad of pri nciples: durable development, human rights, democracy. Each of these principles has three dimensions. Durable development includes a healthy environment, econom ic progress and social justice; human rights include the right to individual sec urity, cultural identity and social integration, and democracy includes good gov erning, transparency and participation. A redefinition of social democracy is di ctated also by the fact that the political values concerning human rights and th e nation, culture or social integration become more palpable for the social real ity than socio-economic circumstances and the populations expectations. The basic tendency of social expectations is orientation towards a stage in which things will 56

improve, and the situation will cease to deteriorate. In this context, compariso n with their own worse past positions is useless, while comparison with the othe rs, who are as they claim in a better position, will be more relevant. This covet ous attitude of envy is significant for the delimitation strategies of the Right, as well as for the integration strategies of the Left. The success of this prog ram depends upon the training and ability to fulfill the parties duties; here is the permanent advantage of the Left parties as to populist parties, whose incapa city to fulfill their obligations will be evident very soon. I agree with Adrian Nstase that we European social democrats should stay in the front-ranks of the m ovement in order to create a civic European, grounded on the notion of European citizenship, which should be one of the pillars of the European citizens ident