A Common Renewable Energy Policy in Europe?

Explaining the German-Polish Policy Non-Convergence

Andrzej Ancygier & Kacper Szulecki

ESPRi Working Paper No. 4 – April 2014

Abstract While the European Commission envisaged the creation of a ╅common European energy market╆ by にどなね, it is quite clear that the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty protecting na-

tional sovereignty over energy policies and mixes are here to stay. We have, however,

seen some visible moves towards EU-wide energy governance coordination through

regulation and steering bodies. What about policy convergence? While some authors

argue that we are seeing policy convergence in the specific area of renewable energy

(regulated by the Climate and Energy Package targets), we investigate a case of clear

non-convergence: Germany and Poland.

This article analyzes the different channels and mechanisms of policy diffusion

and tries to explain why, despite the geographic proximity and compatibility of energy

systems, Germany and Poland have so far been very different in their renewable energy

policy choices. We focus on four mechanisms discussed in the political science literature:

learning, emulation, competition and coercion, and show why the Polish government is

largely ignoring the developments taking place in the neighboring country and following

its established pattern of development in the power sector. We show the limits and po-

tentials of each mechanism, and conclude with some policy implications for both neigh-

boring countries.

Contact: Andrzej Ancygier, Hertie School of Governance

E-mail: ancygier@hertie-school.org

Citation

Ancygier, A.; Szulecki, K. 2014. A Common Renewable Energy Policy in Europe? Explaining

the German-Polish Policy Non-Convergence. ESPRi Working Paper No 4. April 2014.

© にどな4 - All rights remain with the authors.

ESPRi Working Paper Series – ISSN 2083–7011

Editor: Kacper Szulecki, ESPRi – www.espri.org.pl

Language editing: James Longbotham

Acknowledgements This research is part of a larger project conducted by the working group ╉Governance and Policy Aspects of Climate Change╊ in the framework of the Dahrendorf Symposium 2013, hosted by the Hertie School of Governance, German Institute for Economic Re-

search (DIW Berlin) and the London School of Economics and Political Science, support-

ed by the Mercator Foundation. The authors would like to thank Zbigniew Karaczun, Andrzej Kassenberg, Karsten Neuhoff, Anna Pobłocka, Lidia Puka and Julia Szulecka as

well as the remaining members of the group and participants of the workshops in Berlin

and London where preliminary results were presented.

1. Introduction

So far, the idea of a common energy policy, building on the principle of energy solidarity

as well as the assumed priority of an Integrated European Market (IEM) for power and

gas, has remained rather vague. Although we see regional market integration initiatives – such as that in the North-Western European region or in Central Eastern Europe – and

although we witness an increase of coordination in European energy governance

through steering institutions such as Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators

(ACER) and European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (EN-

TSO-E), the sovereignty over energy policies remains on the national level. This is guar-

anteed by Article 194 of the Treaty of Lisbon, and reflects the generally dominant mind-

set in thinking about energy policy, which is considered a vital element of national poli-

tics, and member state governments are unlikely to let it go in the foreseeable future.

This does not mean that national energy policies are not becoming more alike,

that is, increasingly homogenous. The phenomenon of policy convergence in different

areas has been a major object of interest for political scientists for some decades al-

ready. In the complex realm of energy policy, one could expect most policy convergence

to take place in the sector of renewable energy sources (RES). This is due to the fact that

the RES sector is influenced not only by the regulatory and steering institutions in ener-

gy policy, but it is also seen as a tool of climate policy. While we have seen some conver-

gence in that area, recently we seem to be witnessing a shift in the opposite direction.

The question remains – why is policy convergence occurring between some countries

and not between others?

This article investigates policy convergence and the process of policy diffusion –

or lack thereof – in the case of Germany and Poland in the renewable energy sector. Such

diffusion is expected for a number of reasons. First of all, especially since 2007 the polit-

ical relations between these two countries have been better than ever before. In addition

to bilateral cooperation in a number of areas, there is an increasing collaboration at the

European level. Secondly, both countries enjoy very close economic relations, with Ger-

man investors willing to invest in Poland – including in the Polish energy sector. Thirdly,

Germany and Poland are neighboring states, and geographic proximity has long been

considered a major enhancer of policy diffusion (Obinger, Schmitt & Starke, 2013, p.

115). Finally, a close cooperation leading to policy diffusion would be in the interest of

both countries: German policymakers have already understood that the energy transi-

tion in Germany (Energiewende) can fully succeed and achieve its economic and envi-

ronmental goals only if it is scaled up into a pan-European transformation project. Po-

land at the same time could take advantage of the lessons learned in Germany and avoid

certain mistakes in moving towards a diversified power mix and thus limit the costs of

transition towards a renewable energy-based power system in the long-term. What we

are seeing in reality, however, is anything but convergence. We thus try to explain this

case of non-convergence, tracing the major mechanisms of policy diffusion present in

the theoretical literature, and investigating the reasons for their ineffectiveness.

The analysis proceeds as follows: next section provides an overview of the theo-

retical literature on policy diffusion, transfer and convergence, on which we build to de-

sign our own analysis of non-convergence between Germany and Poland. We describe

four policy diffusion mechanisms that receive the most attention in the literature. We

then provide some historical background on renewable energy policy in the European

Union (EU), and review existing analyses of renewable energy policy convergence. The

fourth section gives an overview of the RE policies of Germany and Poland, contextualiz-

ing our analysis. Subsequently we provide the empirical evidence for the presence or

absence (and the reasons for that absence) of the four policy diffusion mechanism. The

article concludes with a discussion of the findings and their policy implications, includ-

ing some propositions concerning the way the scope of policy diffusion and Polish-

German cooperation in the area of renewable energy can be improved.

2. Policy convergence, diffusion and transfer – concepts and theory

In some areas policies across countries are indeed becoming more and more homoge-

nous. Often quoted examples include economic liberalization (Simmons & Elkins, 2004) and environmental policy innovations ゅJörgens, にどどの; Tews, にどどのょ, but one could also

extend that logic to broadly conceived policies and rules, such as electoral democracy

(Gilardi, 2012). This homogenization is especially clearly visible across the European

Union, a political environment encouraging and enhancing convergence of norms and

policies (e.g. Liefferink & Jordan, 2005; Radaelli, 2003). The phenomenon spurred two

interlinked, but not identical bodies of literature. Those focusing more on the actual out-

come – the fact that policies are becoming similar – analyze patterns of policy conver-

gence. Those in turn who are more interested in the process by which ╅policies travel╆ from an innovator to followers, or the way certain policy choices cause reactions else-

where, focus on policy diffusion and policy transfer. These concepts are close, but not in-

terchangeable. In the remainder of this section we discuss the definitions of each as it is

most visibly present in the literature, the relations between the different concepts, as

well as their usefulness for our own analysis. We conclude with some notes on the

methodology and data collection methods adopted.

2.1 Policy convergence

Knill defines policy convergence as the ╉development of similar or even identical policies across countries and over time╊ ゅにどどの, p. ばはねょ. (e notes that policy diffusion and policy

transfer can – under certain circumstances – lead to policy convergence, yet the latter can also be, in theory, the ╉result of similar but relatively isolated domestic events╊ (2005, p. 767) or a similar response to common policy problems. This type of ╅conver-gence by coincidence╆ is, however, growingly unlikely in the globalized world and espe-cially in a political system such as the EU. According to Busch and Jörgens ゅにどどの, p. のょ, the growing density of communicative interlinkages among nations makes independent

and isolated policy decisions increasingly unlikely. In other words, pure policy innova-

tion is rare, and whenever policymakers are forced to make choices, they can – and often

do – look to other countries for advice, inspiration, information or warning. They can

also be forced to change their policies in more or less coercive ways.

What remains to be clarified is the operationalization of policy convergence. Hol-

zinger and Knill show that convergence can vary both in degree and in direction (2005, p.

776-7). This, however, is mainly a concern for large-n studies of convergence patterns.

In our qualitative analysis, we are able to trace the growing similarity of particular poli-

cy dimensions (see 3.4) or to show the evident incompatibility of other elements.

2.2 Policy convergence vs. policy diffusion

Policy convergence or non-convergence is thus the outcome – the dependent variable –

of different processes. Policy diffusion studies inquire about the actual process that

leads to convergence, its depth and speed (Fabrizio & Hawn, 2013), and the conditions

that favor or hinder the spread of policy innovations ゅTews, にどどのょ. Busch and Jörgens (2005) see policy diffusion as merely one of three possible mechanisms of policy con-

vergence, alongside international harmonization and the imposition of policies, and the

only one in which policy innovations are adopted voluntarily. This is an interesting ap-

proach, but may seem counter-intuitive and detached from a large body of policy diffu-

sion literature that defines the concept in much broader terms. Shipan and Volden,

drawing on a survey of nearly 1,000 research articles employing the concept of policy

diffusion, propose a generic definition according to which policy diffusion takes place when ╉one government╆s policy choices being influenced by the choices of other gov-ernments╊ ゅにどなに, p. ばばぱ; also: Graham, Shipan & Volden, にどなに, p. ぬょ. This seems to be a normal feature of contemporary politics, where policy choices, as Braun and Gilardi em-phasize, are interdependent ゅにどどは, p. にひひょ. )nterdependence as the ╉key defining com-ponent of diffusion╊ is thus what separates both approaches ゅMaggetti & Gilardi, にどなぬ, p. 3). The nature of the influence between governments and the degree to which free will is involved are left open, even if that influence is described as the ╉pressure for policy inno-vation╊ that comes from outside the polity╊ ゅShipan & Volden, にどどぱ, p. ぱねな – our empha-

sis).

2.3 Policy diffusion vs. policy transfer

The difference between policy diffusion and transfer varies depending on the research quoted. Dolowitz and Marsh define policy transfer as a process in which ╉knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is

used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place╊ ゅなひひは, p. ぬねねょ. They note that this is close to yet another concept – ╅lesson drawing╆ ゅwhich in policy diffusion literature translates to ╅learning╆ょ, but emphasize that policy transfer is also neutral about the (in)voluntary nature of the process. )t can thus cover both ╅voluntary╆ and ╅coercive╆ transfer, same as policy diffu-

sion in the broader definition. The difference between diffusion and transfer is else-

where. Marsh and Sharman (2009, p. 274-5) suggest that diffusion literature privileges

structure, while the transfer literature privileges agency. The difference seems to be also in the scope and research design. Studies of policy transfer ╉typically focus on a single policy in a single country to assess the extent to which the policy╆s origins are found to be heavily influenced by other countries╆ policy choices╊, while policy diffusion studies typically ask ╉how policies flow to and from multiple governments over time╊ ゅGraham et al., 2012, p. 7).

Although we analyze mutual influence, taking into consideration the fact that

Germany introduced policies aimed at increasing the role of renewable energies much

earlier than Poland, we assume that policy innovation should flow (diffuse or be trans-

ferred) from Germany to Poland. Thus defined, our study of the reasons behind German-

Polish renewable energy non-convergence is closer to the literature on policy transfer.

However, we treat policy transfer as part of the wider processes of policy diffusion, and

in the remainder of the article treat the two concepts as synonyms. This does not seem

to be heresy. Comparing the by now classic review of policy transfer literature by Dolo-

witz and Marsh with the recent diffusion review essays by Graham, Shipan and Volden,

we can see common ground emerging in which agency (that is concrete political actors, individualsょ is ╉brought back in╊ ゅDolowitz & Marsh なひひは, ぬねの-6; Graham et al., 2012, p.

12-passim). Marsh and Sharman on the other hand note that policy transfer studies can

benefit by drawing on the mechanism-oriented research developed in policy diffusion

studies (2009, p. 271-passim).

2.4 Defining a policy – different policy dimensions

For clarity╆s sake, our analysis requires a note on the way policy is understood. ╅Policies╆ in the area of policy diffusion or convergence studies can refer to quite specific proce-

dural choices, like parliamentary gender quotas (Bush, 2011), wider regulatory moves

aimed at concrete results, like anti-smoking policies (Shipan & Volden, 2006), or very

broad concepts and sets of overarching policies. The latter is the case of energy policy,

which is a vast issue area, composed of different policies and pieces of legislation, and

affecting other areas – like industrial, environmental or development policies. This makes the ╅diffusion╆ or ╅convergence╆ in energy policy more difficult to operationalize and analyze. In place of single, cut out policies (cf. Shipan & Volden, 2008), we need to

take into account such aspects as long term energy strategies (i.e. national roadmaps),

sectoral legislation (i.e. on RES), governance schemes for the coordination of different

energy sources in the energy mix, support mechanisms (including differences for vari-

ous technologies), administrative processes on sub-national levels or the organization of the power market. That makes the statement that ╅energy policies in two countries con-verge╆ quite debatable in itself, and requires further specification. Apart from the scope of different policy areas, there are also different policy di-

mensions. Heichel, Pape and Sommerer make a note of this problem in their review es-

say on policy convergence, arguing that it is necessary to distinguish between such ele-

ments as policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy outcomes, and policy style ゅにどどの, p. ぱにぱょ. Similarly, Dolowitz and Marsh ゅなひひはょ disentangle ╅policies╆ in their review of policy transfer scholarship into policy goals, content, instruments, structure

and policy concepts, attitudes, ideas as well as administrative structures and techniques.

In the case of our case study, we try to be as specific as possible in showing which pre-

cise policy dimensions are analyzed and which policy innovations were adopted or dis-cussed under the general umbrella theme of ╅renewable energy policy╆.

2.5 (Non)convergence and (non)diffusion

Most of the literature on policy convergence and policy diffusion focuses on successful

homogenization and spread of innovation (cf. Fabrizio and Hawn 2013). Van der Heiden

and Strebel note that the reasons why diffusion might not occur in a certain domain is ╉under-theorized and lacks an empirical test╊ ゅにどなに, p. ぬねはょ. This is not surprising, es-

pecially for quantitative studies that may operationalize non-convergence as constant,

thus outside of the area that can be explained. However, critics point out that to provide

compelling explanations of why policy diffusion may or may not occur, scholars have to

investigate a wider range of outcomes, including those of limited diffusion or non-

diffusion (Karch, Nicholson-Crotty, Woods & Bowman, 2013). Marsh and Sharman also

call for the examination of more negative cases (2009, p. 270).

2.6 Mechanisms of policy diffusion

To explain the case of German-Polish renewable energy policy non-convergence, we in-

vestigate the channels and mechanisms of policy diffusion to see where communicating

and exchange of experiences lead or could lead to convergence, but for different reasons

failed to. To organize our analysis, we distinguish four policy diffusion mechanisms that

are most often put forth in the by now very robust body of recent theoretical and empir-

ical literature (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Gilardi, 2012; Heinze, 2011; Maggetti & Gilardi,

2013; Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Obinger et al., 2013; Shipan & Volden, 2008, 2012). The four mechanisms include two ╅positive╆ ones – learning and emulation, in which govern-ments adopting a policy innovation do it voluntarily, and two ╅negative╆ ones – competi-

tion and coercion – in the case of which adoption is an involuntary necessity and is im-

posed upon the country in question. In the remainder of this subsection we define these

mechanisms and indicate their characteristic elements, through which they can be iden-

tified in the empirical analysis that follows.

Learning

Learning, the most important of policy diffusion mechanisms, means drawing conclu-sions from experiences of other countries ╉by observing the politics of policy adoption and the impact of those policies╊ (Shipan & Volden, 2008, p. 841). As a result, policies

may be partly or completely adopted (positive learning) or avoided (negative learning).

The latter concept is problematic, though. If policy diffusion means spreading of policies

and leads towards convergence, is then negative learning indeed part of that process? In

our analysis we try to inquire about the reasons for negative learning if it occurs. Berry and Baybeck note that ╉[w]hen confronted with a problem, decision makers simplify the task of finding a solution by choosing an alternative that has proven successful else-where╊ ゅにどどの, p. のどのょ. Thus, if a policy has been successful in another country, the like-

lihood is higher that it will diffuse (cf. Maggetti & Gilardi, 2013, p. 12). This formulation

should immediately draw our attention to two elements that condition the diffusion

through learning: a common definition of a policy problem, and the perceived success of a

policy. This means that learning in the sense of policy diffusion already requires some prior knowledge and interpretation of the situation, which are then ╉updated╊ through learning (cf. Braun & Gilardi, 2006, p. 306). This points to further conditions, such as the availability of reliable and accurate information and policymakers╆ rationality. Both can be problematic, as ╉even in routine situations, learning is incomplete because of bound-ed rationality╊ ゅMoynihan, にどどぱ, p. ぬのど; also: Weyland にどどのょ. According to Obinger et al. (2013, 114), in some cases decision makers may use cognitive shortcuts to reduce the

complexity of certain policy. Furthermore, there is the question of what the policymak-

ers in a given country want to achieve with the policy innovation – solve a problem, pro-

vide welfare or acquire political gains? (Heinze, 2011, p. 15).

Learning becomes further complicated in crisis situations, when policymakers

face an objective or a perceived threat. The scope of learning required during crisis is ╉greater, demanding new understanding of the most basic aspects of the causes, conse-quences and solutions╊ ゅMoynihan, にどどぱ, p. ぬのどょ. )n such cases, on the other hand, poli-cy makers tend to rely on their own networks to learn. This in turn means that transna-

tional channels of communication and wider expert communities, which are not recog-

nized as part of the close and trusted network, become blocked.

The latter issue raises the question of agency and the role of individual actors

such as policymakers, experts, activists – collectively described as policy entrepreneurs,

advocates or agents of transfer (Jacobs, 2012, pp. 201-202). These actors, under normal

conditions, help to transfer experience and information (go-between actors) (Shipan &

Volden, 2012, p. 3). But agency also implies the active support of policy diffusion that

could be dubbed ╉policy teaching╊. Van der (eiden and Strebel note that ╉the exporting entity can actively foster diffusion if it shares its knowledge with other entities╊ ゅにどなに, p. ぬねぱょ, which is linked to policy ╉observability╊. Learning can also be enhanced by in-

ternational actors – in our case, especially the EU institutions or the International Re-

newable Energy Agency (Stone, 2004; Roehrkasten & Westphal, 2013, Jacobs, 2012, pp.

204-209).

Emulation

Emulation is often equated with synonymous concepts like socialization or mimicry. We

opt for emulation, as it does not share the main problem of the popular socialization lit-

erature, namely, that it assumes a linear process with a visible normative bias towards

the trend-setting country or organization (for a critical discussion see: Saurugger, 2010;

Szulecka & Szulecki, 2013). Emulation results from the desire of the decision makers to fit into a ╉norm-based community╊, and means ╉copying the actions of others to look like them╊ ゅVan der (eiden & Strebel, にどなに, p. ぬ47). This can come from a deeply held con-

viction based on common values, norms and ideas, but can be purely strategic, which is

why emulation is also superior to socialization as an analytical concept. Certain policies

may be adopted even if there is no problem that they should solve, in that case just ╅for show╆. On the other hand, political forces of interest groups within a country may be di-

vided in respect to the values they share, and thus some may be more prone to policy

diffusion through emulation than others (i.e. Euro-enthusiasts vs. Euro-sceptics). Other

reasons for emulation include persuasion through intergovernmental organizations and

advocacy groups, or visible diffusion of a policy in many other countries (a critical

mass). Dolowitz (1997) shows how the diffusion of rhetoric can precede the diffusion of policy, and so governments may first start ╅talking the talk╆ before they move on to actu-

al policy adoption. We suggest, however, that engaging in a dialog over the need for poli-

cy change increases the chances for policy diffusion, as it opens the ground for policy

entrepreneurs and advocates (Szulecka & Szulecki, 2013).

Competition

Policy diffusion is not always voluntary and not always beneficial (Shipan & Volden,

2012, p. 3), and this is especially so in the case of the two ╅negative╆ mechanisms. Compe-

tition drives policy diffusion by making it necessary for some countries to introduce a

certain policy or remove environmental standards to avoid competitive disadvantage, and ╉attract economic activity╊ ゅSimmons & Elkins, にどどね, p. なばぬょ. This mechanism is most often associated with a ╅race to the bottom╆ ゅMarsh & Sharman, にどどひょ, and is also termed externalities (Heinze, 2011). But this picture can be more nuanced. In the case of

renewable energy policy, policy innovation coincides with technological and infrastruc-

tural innovation. In other words, diffusion through competition can mean that a country

changes its policy for something more ambitious and even more costly to remain com-

petitive and innovative. This can result in a ╅race to the top╆ in environmental or innova-tional regulation ゅcf. Jacobs, にどなぬょ. On the other hand, the desire to safeguard one╆s competitive advantage (i.e. low energy costs) can hinder the adoption of policy innova-

tion – in a ╅race to the bottom╆ fashion. There is also a third option – adopting a policy to

gain competitiveness in synergy with the trendsetting country.

Distinguishing between competitive and cooperative interdependence, Braun and

Gilardi (2006) note that it has the logics of a prisoner╆s dilemma. This means that alt-

hough cooperation and policy convergence could be desirable, lack of trust and infor-

mation lead to choosing a safer, individualistic option.

Coercion

Coercion aims at convergence, but many scholars do not see it as a mechanism of policy

diffusion. In our bilateral analysis, however, it seems highly relevant. A more or less ex-

plicit compulsion to adopt policy innovation may come from powerful states or from

international organizations (Marsh & Sharman, 2009, p. 272). The latter may result from

membership in an organization (compliance with community regulations in the case of

the EU) or the desire to benefit from aid or lending (Obinger et al. 2013, p. 114-115).

Powerful countries can also use intergovernmental fora and institutions to push for pol-icy convergence if they see it as beneficial, while in federal systems ╉steering by upper-level government ゅ…ょ can help to overcome the unwillingness to assist in diffusion to a certain extent╊ ゅVan der (eiden & Strebel, 2012, p. 356). Coercion is not just about sticks, it╆s also about carrots – as was most visibly the case with pre-accession EU condi-

tionality policy vis-à-vis Central Eastern European countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedel-meier, にどどねょ. )t thus ╉alters the relative size of payoffs associated with policy alterna-tives, while policy makers╆ perception of their effectiveness may remain the same╊ (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, p. 310). Thus defined, coercion shares a structural similarity

with emulation, only in purely material terms.

2.7 Note on the research design and methodology

While much of the research conducted on policy diffusion is quantitative and involves

large sets of cases, we analyze the issue of convergence of support mechanisms for re-

newable sources of energy in the EU by looking at a single case study. Germany and Po-

land, as has already been noted, are not a random choice, but exemplify two categories

of EU member states and two distinct attitudes towards RES expansion. At the cost of

generalizability, we can take on more questions at the same time and investigate the

process in depth at different levels. This research design is a form of the critical incident

case study (Weatherbee, 2010). In the framework of the case study we look for evidence

of the four diffusion mechanisms described above and, using process-tracing technique

try to understand through which channels and on which levels they were or were not

effective in bringing about policy change. The data for this analysis was gathered

through expert and stakeholder interviews, as well as archival and secondary literature

analysis.

3. Renewables: towards policy convergence in Europe?

Although this might seem peculiar from today╆s perspective it was neither climate nor other environmental concerns that made the states of the then European Communities

pay attention to the potential of alternative sources of energy already in the 1970s. It

was the question of energy security and import dependency. In its resolution from 1974,

the European Council pointed out that investment in research and development should make it possible for ╉new sources of energy╊ to replace ╉traditional sources╊ in the long run. At that time, however, priority was given to an increased exploitation of coal and

nuclear energy (Council of the European Communities, 1974). But with the catastrophe

in Chernobyl and the looming threat of climate change, renewables moved to the center of attention. )n the なひぱは resolution, the Council underlined the need to ╉optimize the exploitation of these sources of energy in the Community╊, while at the same time it en-couraged member states to closely cooperate in this area by undertaking a ╉tighter ex-

change of information on the development of the exploitation of new and renewable en-

ergy sources through concerted action and, if necessary, ensure coordination at Com-munity level╊ ゅCouncil of the European Communities, なひぱはょ. )n other words – policy

convergence in this area was from the start perceived as desirable and potentially bring-

ing synergistic benefits. Following the Commission╆s suggestion, the Council has also proposed the intro-

duction of measures at the Community level ╉designed to encourage the use of new and

renewable energy sources╊ ゅEuropean Council, なひぱはょ. But with the exception of some

programs financing R&D in the area of renewable sources of energy, such as JOULE or ÉCLA)R, the support for renewable sources was designed nationally. The major push came from the introduction of support mechanisms, which allowed producers of power

from renewable sources to access the market dominated at that time by a limited num-

ber of power producers. The guarantee that electricity from renewable sources will be

purchased at a certain price encouraged private actors to invest their own resources in

technological development. In Denmark, opposition against nuclear energy led local

communities to search for alternatives. Developments there were closely observed and

followed in Germany, where in 1991 a system of feed-in tariffs for energy from renewa-

ble sources was introduced (Bechberger, Mez & Sohre A 2008, p. 16). Three years later a

similar support mechanism was also introduced in Spain. Support for renewable ener-

gies in all these countries resulted not only in technological development and an in-

crease of installed capacity, but also in the development of a new industry. This led to

the success of such companies as Vestas, Enercon or Iberdrola, which for a long time

dominated the global wind energy market and contributed to the creation of thousands

of jobs in their respective countries.

The effectiveness of support mechanisms in facilitating technological develop-

ment and deployment of renewable sources caught the eye of the European Commission,

which during the negotiations over the first renewable energy directive in the late 1990s

insisted on the harmonization of the support schemes at the European level. But strong

opposition from member states, especially from Germany (which was reluctant to resign

from its own scheme), forced the Commission to take a more conciliatory position: it

would only monitor the situation and would come with a proposal for a community-

wide support scheme in the future if it was necessary (European Commission, 2000).

During the negotiations preceding the adoption of the second renewable energy di-

rective in 2008, the issue of harmonization returned on the agenda: although the Com-mission avoided the word ╉harmonization╊, the suggested mechanism of internationally tradable guarantees of origin was very similar to the quota-based instrument suggested

by the Commission in the late 1990s (Jacobs, 2012, p. 33). But this time the discussion

over harmonization was not as contentious as a decade earlier – the Commission did not

want to endanger the adoption of binding renewable energy targets by worsening its

relationship with Germany, the strongest advocate of the feed-in tariffs in the EU (Ancy-

gier, 2013a, p. 322-325).

In the meantime, some degree of convergence of the support mechanisms did

take place in the EU. The most visible policy tool – feed-in tariffs – has been adopted in

66 nation states (REN21, 2013, pp. 76-78). By 2010, 23 out of 27 EU countries have al-

ready adopted feed-in tariffs (Jacobs, 2012, p. 27), although in some cases only for small

installations. Some of this convergence can be attributed to policy diffusion through

competition – understood as a ╅race to the top╆. Some countries introduced generous feed-in tariffs to encourage investment and development of new technologies, which due

to the relatively low share of the installed capacity was not perceived as having a big

impact on energy prices. That was especially the case in France and Spain (Jacobs, 2012,

pp. 222-224).

After a close analysis the process of implementation of the feed-in tariffs in Ger-

many, France and Spain, Jacobs pointed out that certain ╉agents of transfer╊ were crucial for communicating policy outcomes in these countries and contributed to policy transfer

(2012). Communication between the green parties in Germany and France was especial-

ly important and had an impact on the content of the Renewable Energy Law (EEG)

adopted in Germany in 2000. Close cooperation between the renewable energy associa-

tions (BWE in Germany, ADEME in France and ASIF in Spain) allowed for policy transfer

between the three countries. The remuneration for solar photovoltaics in the German

Renewable Energy Law from 2000 and the introduction of additional tariff payments for

providing auxiliary grid services in the amendment of the law from 2009 was based on

the Spanish experiences. At the same time the introduction of tariff degression in France

was influenced by the content of the German EEG (Jacobs, 2012, pp. 201-209).

But most of the countries that introduced feed-in tariffs failed to predict the radi-

cal fall in the price of photovoltaic panels. Generous feed-in tariffs especially in Spain

and the Czech Republic and the low price of PV panels led to an explosion of investment

in new capacities. In Spain the installed capacity more than quadrupled within one year

and reached almost 3.4 GW in 2008 – almost ten times the goal set by the government

for 2010 (Environmental News Network, 2008). A similar situation took place in the

Czech Republic, where the installed capacity exceeded expectation and due to generous

tariffs led to an increase in energy prices (Colthorpe, 2013). Also in Germany the new

installed capacity of photovoltaic plants exceeded 7 GW annually between 2010-2012

(BSW-Solar, 2013). The impact of this development on power prices forced govern-

ments to take action. Whereas some countries, like Germany, decided to significantly

reduce feed-in tariffs for some forms of renewable sources of energy, others, like Spain

or Czech Republic, took more radical steps by introducing caps on the installed capacity

or retroactive changes to the support mechanism and additional taxes on income from

selling electricity from some renewable energy sources (Cala, 2013, Dorda & Ali-

Oettinger, 2010). Different to the process of introducing the support mechanism, it is

difficult to see any coordination between the countries affected by rising costs of sup-

porting the development of renewable sources of energy. In some other countries (i.e.

Italy and France) significant bureaucratic barriers decreased their effectiveness and

made the development of renewable energies much more expensive than it would have

been, had governments learned from the experiences of other member states. Further-

more, as Szarka (2007) notes, a policy instrument (or choice), such as the fit-in tariff

itself is not enough to drive RES deployment. Trying to explain the lack of a ╉wind rush╊ in France (although policy convergence with e.g. Germany existed), he points to national

institutional frameworks, industrial structures (infrastructural constraints and path-

dependency) and the lack of mobilizing discourses that would appeal to the French pub-

lic.

The Commission used the confusion over the retroactive changes in some member

countries to enforce further convergence of the support mechanisms. In December 2013

it presented a proposal to change the EU regulations on state aid in the area of energy

and environment. One of the major suggestions was the statement that feed-in tariffs can only be granted as a result of a ╉genuinely competitive bidding process╊, which de

facto means that the feed-in tariffs would be decided by competition between different

producers and not set by the government (European Commission, 2013). Although this

does not exclude other forms of supporting the development of renewable sources of

energy, the provisions of the state aid guidelines, if implemented, will significantly limit

the number of options that governments are able to choose from.

4. Germany and Poland: Policy (non)convergence

Taking into consideration the process of policy diffusion that took place between Ger-

many, France and Spain – at least at the stage of introduction of support mechanisms –

one could also expect a similar process to take place in the case of Poland and Germany.

This can especially be the case taking into consideration some factors signaled earlier:

close political and economic relations, active cooperation at the European level and geo-

graphical proximity (which also means similar weather conditions important for renew-

ables). And yet it is hardly possible to find EU member states with energy policies as di-vergent as those of Poland and Germany ゅĆwiek-Karpowicz, Gawlikowska-Fyk & West-

phal, 2013) – especially in the area of renewable energy. Asking along the lines of policy

convergence scholars, if conditions are so similar, but there is no convergence, what are

the facilitating factors that are lacking? We first sketch out the background conditions

for renewable energy policy in both Germany and Poland to understand the policy con-

text before moving on to the analysis of policy diffusion mechanisms.

For a long time Poland and Germany followed a similar path of development in

the area of energy: at the beginning of the 1990s Germany generated over 68% of elec-

tricity from fossil fuels, mainly lignite, and further 28% from nuclear power plants. In

Poland almost 99% of the power was generated in coal-fired power plants. In both cases

the role of renewable sources of energy was minimal: 4% in Germany and slightly over

1% in Poland (EIA). But over the following two decades the share of energy from renew-

able sources has increased in both countries to over 10% in Poland (GUS, 2013, p. 69)

and 24% in Germany (BDEW, 2014).

But a focus on the increased share of energy from renewable sources in the pow-

er mix does not show the full picture as the kinds of renewable energies developed in

each of these countries and their impact on the energy sector was very different. In

Germany the increase in the RES production resulted mainly from the development of

wind and photovoltaic energy, which led to the development of a brand new sector of

economy with 378,000 jobs and an annual turnover of almost €ぬば billion ゅEurObserv╆ER 2012, pp. 173-なばねょ. )n the case of Poland のぬ% of the energy acquired from ╉renewable sources╊ came either from biomass co-firing in coal-fired power plants, or from large

hydroelectric plants built decades earlier (GUS, p. 59). The impact of both sources of en-

ergy on the economic development and job creation in the country was minimal. Also

the installations used to develop other sources of energy, mainly wind and biogas, was

largely imported. In other words, there was very little of a value-added chain in Polish

renewables. As a result the number of jobs and the overall turnover in the renewable

energy sector in Poland was less than a tenth of the number of jobs and the turnover in Germany ゅEurObserv╆ER に012, pp. 173-174).

These differences in the development of renewable sources of energy are mainly

the result of the different policy mechanisms adopted in both countries. In Germany the

introduction of the feed-in tariffs in 1991 contributed to the increased support for R&D

and deployment of wind energy: by the end of the decade the cumulated installed capac-

ity exceeded 10 GW (Bechberger, Mez & Sohre, 2008, p. 7). Replacement of the Feed-in

Law (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, StrEG) by the Renewable Energy Law (Erneuerbare Ener-

gien Gesetz, EEG) in 2000 and the introduction of the generous feed-in tariffs for photo-

voltaic energy led – with some delay – to a rapid development of this source of energy:

the installed capacity increased from 3.8 GW in 2007 (EurObserv╆ER にどどひ, p. ににょ to over 32 GW in 2012 (BSW-Solar, 2013). But the rapid development of renewable sources of

energy did not happen without mistakes. The major side effect was an increase in the

cost of the support mechanism caused by the aforementioned delay in reducing the feed-

in tariffs for electricity from photovoltaic panels. Also the slow development of the elec-

tricity grid led to problems, such as unplanned flows of electricity through neighboring

countries, among other Poland (cf. Puka & Szulecki, 2013).

The situation in Poland looked very different. Although Poland introduced a sup-

port mechanism for renewable sources of energy already in the 1990s, it did not con-

tribute to the development of renewable sources of energy: although the system adopt-

ed was similar to the one adopted in Germany at that time, the tariffs were too low to

attract investment in renewable sources of energy and were announced only a year in

advance, which made long-term planning that would justify investment in R&D by pri-

vate companies impossible (Ancygier, 2013a, p. 239). The system was abolished in 1999

and was to be replaced by another one that would help Poland achieve the ambitious

development goals mentioned in the Development Strategy of Renewable Energy Sector

from 2000. But after the 2001 elections, the new government had a different approach

to developing RES. Although investment in bio energy was described as beneficial for the

development of agricultural areas, wind energy was considered to be detrimental for the

Polish economy: not only had it to be developed on the basis of imported products, but it

would also replace jobs created in the conventional energy sector (Ministry of Economy,

2002, p.17). Nonetheless Poland as the future member of the EU had to introduce sup-

port mechanism for renewable sources of energy. With some delay, in October 2005, Poland introduced a quota mechanism based on ╉green certificates╊, which obliged pro-

ducers of energy to generate a certain percentage of their power from renewable

sources. Those companies that did not generate enough electricity from renewable

sources were obliged to cover the difference by purchasing a certain amount of green

certificates sold by the operators of renewable energy power plants. Thus investors in

renewable sources benefitted from two sources of income: the sale of electricity and

trade with green certificates (Ancygier, 2013a, 280-291).

The support mechanisms introduced in Poland and Germany differed in two re-

spects. Firstly, the German feed-in tariff system provided different levels of support for

different sources of energy. As a result it also led to the development of sources that

would not have the chance to develop in competition with other sources of energy. At

the same time the quota mechanism introduced in Poland guaranteed the same price for

all renewable sources of energy. This led to windfall profit for those investing in the

cheapest sources of energy, such as biomass co-firing, and practically no chance for

more expensive energy from photovoltaic panels to develop: by the end of 2013 the ca-

pacity of all photovoltaic panels connected to the grid in Poland was still below 2 MW

(WNP, 2014, January 27).

The second major difference between the support mechanisms introduced in Po-

land and Germany was the predictability for existing and potential investors. Whereas

fixed tariffs allowed German investors to relatively easily predict their return on in-

vestment, in Poland their income was dependent on the price of electricity and green

certificates, both of which could fall dramatically. This risk made investment possible

only at a higher rate of return, which made the quota system more expensive per unit of

invested capacity than a system based on the feed-in tariffs.

None of the countries was immune to the political risk of changing the support

mechanism, like the one that took place earlier in Czech Republic or Spain. The pro-

posals suggested by the former German Minister of Environment, Peter Altmaier, in ear-

ly 2013 led to insecurity among investors (BEE, 2013). Also the lack of clarity concern-

ing the changes that would be introduced in the Germany Renewable Energy Act in 2014

(Tagesschau, 2014, January 27) worsened the investment climate, although due to the

rapid development of renewable sources of energy in this country, significant changes to

the existing framework had been expected. Still, the reform of the EEG is preceded by

consultation with a number of stakeholders and has to be adopted by the German par-

liament. The situation in Poland is very different. The National Renewable Energy Action

Plan submitted to Brussels in December 2010 included a statement that regulations concerning development of renewable sources of energy ╉will be included in the bill on

energy from renewable sources that is going to be adopted in にどなな╊ ゅMinistry of Econ-

omy, 2010, p. 37). Indeed, in December 2011 a draft of the Renewable Energy Law that

included radical changes to the existing support mechanism was presented (Ministry of

Economy, 2011). After strong critique of the proposal, another, significantly changed

draft of the renewable energy was presented in July 2012. The major change concerned

introduction of feed-in tariffs for installations smaller than 200 kW (Ministry of Econo-

my, 2012). But after a number of modifications also this project was not adopted. In Sep-

tember 2013 the Ministry of Economy presented the main elements of a support mecha-

nism which was to be introduced in a renewable energy act (Ministry of Economy,

2013a). In December 2013 the Ministry published a draft RES Act which replaced the

quota mechanism with auctioning. The changes proposed complicate the system signifi-

cantly and due to its unpredictability make it even less probable that a domestic indus-

try producing for the needs of the renewable energy sector will develop (Ministry of

Economy, 2013b).

5. Analyzing mechanisms of diffusion and channels of communication

5.1 Learning

As mentioned in Section 2, learning is the most important diffusion mechanism and

takes place when governments, searching for a solution to a particular policy problem,

look to others for lessons. But solutions adopted elsewhere should also be presented in a

way that makes their implementation possible in another political and economic frame-

work. Therefore the impact of this mechanism of policy diffusion depends on three fac-

tors: the perception of a policy problem, the adequacy of the solution offered in the local

context, and the existence of actors, functioning as agents of transfer or go-between ac-

tors. We thus compare the two countries in these three dimensions.

The main reason for supporting renewable sources in Germany was the search

for an alternative to nuclear energy and fossil fuels that would on the one hand limit the

impact of the energy sector on the environment, while on the other decrease dependen-cy on energy imports. The solution to this problem was to be an ╉ecological industrial policy╊ which would make Germany a major ╉energy-efficiency and environmental engi-neer╊. Among other things this has also implied the development of a renewable energy

sector, allowing German companies to increase their exports to other countries (BMU,

2006). Thus the perception of the challenges facing the power sector in Germany has

changed significantly: instead of being presented as a problem, it has been shown as a

chance for the German industry. The growing prominence of climate change on the glob-

al political agenda strengthened this attitude further. Germany became one of the driv-

ers of global climate policy, hosting the first Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Berlin in なひひの, as well as the Convention╆s permanent secretariat in Bonn. The issue of environmental protection did play an important role in Poland in the

1980s, spawning a visible protest movement, framed it in terms of the impact of the outdated heavy industry and the power sector on citizens╆ health ゅSzulecki, にどなね forth-

coming). But the modernization of the most polluting sectors of industry in the early

1990s significantly improved air quality in the majority of the Polish cities and the sali-

ence of environmental concerns, weakening the environmental NGOs significantly until

the EU accession (Szulecka and Szulecki, 2013). At the same time the issue of climate

change was largely underestimated by Polish politicians and media alike. According to

the former Prime Minister and leader of the largest opposition party in the government, Jarosław Kaczyński, there is no evidence that CO2 emissions play any role in changing

the climate (Newsweek, 2012, March 17). Although the current Prime Minister Donald

Tusk referred to climate change as a problem during his speech at the COP 19 in War-

saw, in the same speech he underlined the role of coal in fueling economic growth and

failed to mention the impact of renewable sources of energy in mitigating the threat of

climate change (Tusk, 2013, November 19).

At the same time, the issue of energy dependency, especially with respect to gas

deliveries from Russia, was for a long time the main element of the Polish energy policy.

Although compared to the other EU states Poland remains to a large extent self-sufficient ゅbasing power generation on indigenous coalょ, the notion of ╉energy security╊ framed as security of supply and affordability, is high on the agenda. The solutions to the

problem of energy dependency suggested by the Polish government were very different

from those proposed by Germany. Although Polish Energy Policy 2025 underlined the

need to develop renewable sources of energy, the main focus was on the expansion of

hard coal and lignite mining (Ministry of Economy, 2005). A major difference in compar-

ison to the German energy strategy was the plan to start a nuclear power program with

the first nuclear plant to go online shortly after the last plant is planned to go offline in

Germany (Ministry of Economy, 2014).

These different solutions to common problems result from different perception of

policy problems and policy success.1 It needs to be emphasized that while for Germany

an ambitious renewable energy policy is presented as a solution to the problems of cli-

mate change and energy dependency, simultaneously providing a new impulse to the

German economy, the subsequent Polish governments did not take the issue of climate

change seriously and adopted a very different strategy in dealing with the issue of ener-

gy dependency (Ancygier, 2013b). In contrast to Germany, the Polish political elites

have, since 2007-2008, perceived the EU climate and energy policy package as the main

policy problem of the domestic policy sector. Any reforms of legislation or the sector╆s structure are thus a response not to the issue of climate change mitigation or energy

security, but rather a reaction to the externally imposed policy framework, which is to a

large extent perceived as German-inspired ゅMusiałek, にどなぬょ. This divergence in the per-

ception of policy problems explains the fundamental difficulty in learning from the Ger-

man experience.

Even if energy transformation could be framed as a response to significant policy

problems in Poland (i.e. to the risk of falling into the ╉middle income trap╊ or losing competitiveness), German energy transition is perceived as a policy that has proven suc-

cessful. On the contrary, media coverage and expert opinions dominating the public pol-

icy discourse are negative and critical of the German moves, suggesting policy failure.

Costs are often exaggerated and the benefits of the energy transition, especially for the

local communities, are largely ignored by the key decision makers and analysts. Instead

of taking the opportunity to learn from the experiences and mistakes of Germany, the

whole idea of energy transition is questioned (Kasztelewicz, 2013, August 12). As one

analyst bluntly put it – ╉do not try this at home╊ ゅRuciński, にどなね, February なにょ. As-

sessing the success of a policy is a difficult challenge which indeed depends on many

factors, including the vantage point of the evaluator. Marsh and McConell (2010) distin-

guish between process, programmatic and political success. While in the German public

debate all three aspects are to some extent contested, it is clear that on the whole the

process of policymaking regarding renewables (in terms of i.e. legitimacy, sustainability

1 For an overview of the way the ╅success╆ of a policy can be conceptualized and evaluated see: Marsh and McConell, 2010.

and innovation) was successful; that in political terms the policy of energy transfor-

mation is still a success (it is popular among the German voters and remains high on the

agenda); and the crucial debates now focus on its programmatic aspects: was it imple-

mented according to the objectives? Did it achieve the intended outcomes? Was it effi-

cient? Who benefits most? The Polish observers completely abstract from the process

and political success, and out of the programmatic debate, focus almost entirely on re-

source efficiency, understood in very narrow terms – energy price for individual con-

sumers.

Obinger, Schmitt and Starke (2013) suggested that in case of complex policies,

policymakers may draw on certain mental shortcuts to make sense of other policy expe-

riences and evaluate their success. The lack of understanding of the motivations behind

the German energy transition and its tools is visible across Europe, not only in Poland.

The Polish media and analysts, as well as the policy-makers, concentrate on the cost-

benefit analysis of the Energiewende, but simplify the task of weighing the different pros

and cons by focusing on only one element, a synecdoche (part for a whole) of the energy

transition – the renewable energy surcharge (EEG Umlage). The cost of developing RES

in Germany is therefore evaluated by the level of the steadily increasing surcharge. Nei-

ther the falling wholesale energy prices nor the actual impact of the surcharge on final

consumer energy costs (which is limited, compared to other factors) are taken into ac-

count. This mental shortcut is used by some decision makers for negative learning,

whereas positive learning is missing.

The third dimension – the prominence of ╉agents of transfer╊ is also a very im-

portant factor that can explain why policy diffusion occurred between Germany, France

and Spain, but not between Germany and Poland. The major difference between the oth-

er two countries analyzed by Jacobs (2012) and Poland is the influence of non-

governmental actors on the policy process. Whereas in the case of France, Spain and

Germany associations representing renewable energy industry were consulted by the

respective governments and were actively participating in the policy-making process,

their impact on the Polish renewable energy policy is limited. This results from two fac-

tors: the small size of the renewable energy industry in Poland and the lack of effective

channels of influence that would allow these actors to contribute to the renewable ener-

gy policy in Poland. As the example of a recent environmental controversy in Poland has

shown, NGOs can become part of the policy process only in situations where their pres-

sure on the policymakers becomes impossible to dismiss (Szulecka & Szulecki, 2013). At

the same time the advocates of conventional sources of energy, mainly the partly state-

owned energy companies, play a decisive role in shaping Poland╆s energy policy and move it in a direction very different from the one promoted in Germany (Ancygier,

2013a, pp. 371-389). The current policy context of energy policy in Poland – European

economic recession, energy and climate pressures – are perceived as a crisis by the

Polish policymakers, and thus only trusted advisors close to the government (i.e. accred-

ited public think-tanks and industrial lobby experts) are treated as reliable sources of

information. This means that governmental think-tanks like the Center for Eastern Stud-

ies (OSW – under the Interior Ministry), the Polish Institute for International Affairs

(PISM – under the Foreign Ministryょ or reliable ╉independent╊ analytical agencies such as EnergSys are close to the policy process (although they play an auxiliary role); estab-

lished independent institutions – like the Institute of Sustainable Energy or de-

mosEUROPA – are consulted, but do not have direct access to policymakers, and envi-

ronmental NGOs as well as various think-tanks have to use various strategies to make

their arguments visible in the debate, without any guarantee of being involved in policy-

making even in the agenda-setting phase.

While there is very little positive policy learning at the level of central administra-

tion, our research elsewhere has shown that renewables are perceived in a very differ-

ent light by local government representatives (Ancygier & Szulecki, 2013). A survey of

Polish municipality and community level administration indicates that grassroots sup-

port for renewables is much higher than the policy of the central government suggests.

Renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind, were at the top of the preference

list of local administrators, while support for conventional energy development was low.

Furthermore, over 67% of the local authorities perceive RES as a chance for their com-munity╆s development.2

What can this difference be attributed to? There can be two explanations accord-

ing to the framework provided earlier in this section. Firstly, the policy problem that

RES are to tackle, according to local authorities, is a different one than that of the central

government. Dispersed energy sources are perceived as an investment opportunity and

source of both taxes and jobs for the community. They can also make the municipality

more independent and thus resilient, an important fact in the Polish countryside, fre-

quently haunted by electricity shortages. Secondly, the access of in-between actors (in-

vestors and NGOs) to local authorities is much easier. 84% of the respondents indicated

that they were contacted by investors, 22% by environmental activists and 19% by aca-

demics.

Policy problem

definition

Proposed solution Success and adequacy of policy Policy entrepreneurs

Germ

any

Climate change

Improving innova-

tiveness Economic/ industri-

al growth

Expansion of renewable

energy sources and en-

ergy efficiency promo-

tion Ambitious climate

policy

Political and process success

Visible impact on the political

economy of energy

Efficiency issues

Need for adjustments of support

schemes RES development not matched by

EE measures Growing CO2 emissions

Numerous go-between actors,

lobbyists and policy advocates

including in the policy process

Robust civil society; string

interest in energy issues Significant role of expertise

and science in policy debates

Poland

Economic growth

EU energy and

climate policy Aging energy infra-

structure (possible

けenergy gapげぶ

Expanding conventional

energy Developing nuclear and

shale gas Countering EU energy

and climate policy (veto,

discourse)

German RES policy:

Seen as a failure

Expensive and inefficient

Destabilizing the energy system

Polish energy policy: Affordable and rational

EU energy and climate policy Imposing unnecessary costs

Impeding competitiveness

Deepening けde-industrializationげ

Only trusted/governmental

experts and think-tanks in the

policy process

Weak NGOs with little influ-

ence

Small role of expertise and

science in policy debates

Table 1 – Policy diffusion through learning: conditions and influencing factors

5.2 Emulation

Emulation is a mechanism of policy diffusion in which a policy is adopted not simply

because the policymakers in the imitating country find it beneficial, but also because they believe that it is a ╉right thing to do╊ and to show adherence to a certain ╉club╊ of nations ゅi.e. ╉green╊ or ╉progressive╊ in our caseょ. Values and identities are thus crucial. It can be argued that on the path leading to EU membership, Poland (as well as other

CEE countries) was strongly motivated to adopt European policies to be ╉in the club╊ ゅcf. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, にどどねょ. )n the late なひひどs Poland╆s membership in the Eu-

2 The online survey was conducted between 1 August and 30 September by the authors. It was sent to the councils of

over 2100 Polish localities (gminy), and contained both closed and open questions regarding different aspects of local

and national level of energy policy. Results presented are based on 229 answers.

ropean Union was one of the major arguments that led to the adoption of ambitious re-

newable energy goals for Poland: 7.5% by 2010 and 14% by 2020 included in the Devel-

opment Strategy for Renewable Energy Sector (Ministry of Environment, 2000). During

the meeting of the Environmental Committee of the Polish parliament in March 2001 its

members largely agreed that the support for renewable energy sources was necessary because it was good for the environment, job creation and Poland╆s membership in the EU (Environmental Committee of the Polish Parliament, 1999).

Things changed visibly once Poland settled in the Union and understood that it is

now a mature member.3 Pragmatic considerations conducted according to the cost-

efficiency frame became fundamental. The Polish government in its rhetoric began to emphasize the need of ╉cheap growth╊, sometimes referred to in more diplomatic terms as ╉cost-effective development╊ ゅGazeta Wyborcza, にどどば, April にぬょ. Additionally, the consolidation of the energy sector in 2007-2008 and close links between the govern-ment and the energy companies changed Warsaw╆s perception of the European renewa-

ble energy and climate policy. This led to conflicts within the government and resigna-

tion of a strong supporter of RES, Professor Maciej Nowicki, from the post of environ-

ment minister in late 2009, complaining about his lack of impact on the development of

renewable sources of energy (Ancygier, 2013a, p 199).

As an EU member country Poland also tried to actively stop the process of policy

diffusion from the European level by arguing that an ambitious energy and climate poli-

cy would lead to job losses and industry moving to other countries. A coalition of energy

companies organized under the name Green Effort Group and supported by the Ministry

of Economy started a campaign aimed at watering down some elements of the Energy

and Climate Package before it was adopted in December 2008 (Green Effort Group,

2009). Having understood that a fairly passive stance in the 2007 negotiations resulted

in adopting EU-wide policies that visibly constrain Poland╆s energy strategy, the ap-

proach towards the European energy and climate policy changed. Poland differed in its

standpoint from almost all other EU member countries: in 2011 and 2012 it was the only

country that vetoed EU plans to strengthen its climate and renewable energy policy. Af-

ter one of these vetoes, former Minister of Economy, Waldemar Pawlak, declared that ╉it does not matter for us that we are alone, but that we are right╊ ゅWNP, 2012, June 15).

Clearly, the Polish political elites (those opinions are widely shared between main-

stream political parties, as the nearly unanimous voting in the European parliament

shows) have understood that the European identity of the country does not need further

reassurance. What began to matter more, in turn, was a shared post-communist legacy

of CEE countries, which began to be articulated as a ╉Visegrad identity╊, and the Polish foreign ministry made continuous efforts to rally those countries together in EU negotia-

tions and votes. In any case, emulation stopped being an effective mechanism of policy

diffusion, simply because the Polish elites no longer see the wider Western European ╉norm-based community╊ as worth their efforts. As the previous subsection has shown, policy diffusion mechanisms work differ-

ently at different levels. The Polish policy debate on RES shows that while politicians are largely disinterested in learning from the German example and joining the ╉progressive renewables club╊, environmental and pro-European NGOs use identity-based arguments

to open-up the spectrum of policy options, effectively locked by conventional power lobbies. They thus ╉shame╊ the government as ╉backward╊, ╉short-sighted╊ and not mov-

ing in the spirit of the more innovative neighbors (Wiśniewski, にどななょ. However, while

this rhetoric has internal resonance and appeals to parts of the society, so far it has had

little effect on the policymakers.

3 We thank Agata Hinc for pointing this out.

A different explanation, although still in the social constructivist spirit, is given by Pronińska, who argues that Poland╆s failure to embrace renewables on a larger scale has to do with the country╆s energy culture. The latter is defined as ╉a system of behaviors in relation to energy system and energy consumption which are characteristic of a society╊ (2013, p. 56). According to this argument, Poland maintains a coal-based energy culture

with a strong post-communist heritage. While this seems to be true in a synchronic

analysis, where we only take into account the present day, such an approach runs the

risk of cultural determinism and petrifying certain social constructs as if they were un-

changeable. Germany once also had a coal-based culture, but is now going in a different

direction. It seems better to speak of energy discourses and understanding that while

one can have a hegemonic position at a certain time, there are still competing discourses

in the background that can gain the upper hand (cf. Szulecka and Szulecki, 2013).

EXPLAINING POLAND╆S SHIFTING ATTITUDE TO RES POLICY

Period Before 2005 2005–2007 2007 – present Policy Governmental support for RES Transition period (uncertainty) Government strongly opposing RES

Political-

economic ex-

planation

The Polish energy sector is

divided into small enterprises

(usually plants/utilities), and

the RES investors have a good

entry point; RE policy de-

signed to attract investment

Law and Justice party term; ener-

gy not high on the agenda, do-

mestic and other political con-

cerns distract attention from EU

energy and climate talks

Consolidation of the energy sector

into an oligopoly of four big semi-

public companies; companies

directly linked to state treasury;

movement of officials between

administration and companies; RES

seen as possible competition and

thus preventively suppressed; PE

policy designed to benefit utilities

Constructivist

explanation

Poland aspires to the EU;

before accession, not only

strict conditionality but also

the desire to emulate and be

part of the けdevelopedげ IluH drives policies in different

domains, including RES, seen

as innovation and modernity

The Euro-sceptical government of

Law and Justice is the first to

challenge this mindset and begin

to play hardball on the EU forum;

lack of expertise leads to conces-

sion in climate and energy policy

Although pro-EU, the Civic Plat-

form government no longer feels

that Poland needs to prove any-

thing – it is an EU member; grow-

ing disillusionment with the EU

resonates well with claims that

German and EU energy policy are

irrational and harm Poland

Cultural expla-

nation

Poland displays a coal-based, conventional and post-communist energy culture,

which is at odds with RE innovation ふPronińska, ヲヰヱンぶ. Attempts to alter the existing system met with opposition at various levels

Table 2 – Different explanations of Poland╆s changing attitudes in RE policy

5.3 Competitiveness

Three ways in which competition may lead to policy convergence are a ╅race to the top╆ ゅincreasing regulatory standards to compete on quality and innovationょ, ╅race to the bot-tom╆ ゅlowering standards to compete on costsょ and adjusting one╆s policy to acquire synergies with a more powerful trend-setting partner. )n the case of a ╅race to the bot-tom╆, companies investing in a particular country are, for example, relieved from paying for the external costs of environmental damage. Taking into consideration the im-

portance of the energy sector for all sorts of economic activity, cheap electricity prices would be one of the most important factors that would increase a country╆s competi-

tiveness. In most cases, however, this strategy of increasing the competitiveness is prof-

itable only in the short-term: due to lower energy prices, domestic companies do not

invest in innovation that would increase their energy efficiency. This political insistence

on energy prices overlooks the actual shares of production costs that energy accounts

for – which outside of energy intensive industries is often quite marginal. As a result,

despite low prices, their energy costs may be comparable to – if not higher than – the

costs of energy consumption paid by their competitors. Also the costs of environmental

damage and – in the case of fossil fuels – extraction of limited resources will have to be

borne by the citizens in a longer term. Another way of increasing a country╆s competitiveness is by introducing policies that trigger investment in innovation and development of new sectors of industry. In the

area of energy this can happen especially through the inclusion of the external costs of

energy in the electricity prices and introduction of policies that encourage development

of alternative sources of energy, which may not be economically competitive in the

short-term, but offer enormous potential in the long-term. Such policies can be especial-

ly beneficial if the policies allow long-term planning and predictability, which encourage

companies to invest in technologies that may turn out profitable in a longer term. Only

in this case is it possible not only to increase the installed capacity of renewable sources

of energy but also develop an industry that may cover domestic demand for the new

products, and also that of other countries thus contributing to the improvement of trade

balance.

The understanding of competitiveness in Germany and Poland differ significantly.

Although driven initially by the desire to limit energy dependency and environmental

impacts of the traditional sources of energy, the economic aspects of developing new

sector of industry started playing a much more important role in Germany over the last

decade. But at the same time the German government is protecting the competitive posi-

tion of its energy-intensive industry by relieving it from paying the surcharge financing

the development of renewable sources of energy. Such policy leads, on one the hand, to

an increased financial burden on individual consumers of electricity – although many of

them benefit from selling their own electricity – while at the same time the competitive-

ness of German economy increased as well (cf. Hallerberg, 2013). Energy-intensive sec-

tors of the economy benefit from lower electricity prices resulting from the development

of renewable sources of energy. At the same time the introduction of a support mecha-

nism that guarantees predictable income for investors led to the development of a new

industry, which also exports its products to other countries, i.e. Poland.

Another, more traditional understanding of competitiveness dominates in Po-

land. The role of low energy prices is underlined as the main determinant of economic

development and their increase as the main threat to the industrial development, not

only in Poland, but in the EU as a whole. The focus on electricity prices led representa-

tives of the Polish government to coin the notion of deindustrialization, for which – ac-

cording to them – European climate and energy policy is largely to blame (Piechociński, にどなぬょ. This was the argumentation behind Poland╆s international campaign dubbed ╉climateねgrowth╊, which the Foreign Ministry launched in にどなぬ through Warsaw, Berlin and Brussels-based PR firms, organizing public events with speakers voicing Poland╆s stance. Development of renewable sources of energy has been perceived as an important

element contributing to an increase of the energy prices therefore it should be achieved

at the lowest possible cost (WNP, 2013, March 26). This can explain introduction of sup-

port for biomass co-firing considered as the cheapest ╅renewable╆ sources of energy. At the same time, however, the insistence on low energy prices does not explain support

for the already existing hydro power plants, which led to windfall profits for the domi-

nant energy companies operating them.

Different understanding of the notion of competitiveness in Poland and Germany

only partly explains the lack of policy diffusion in the area or renewable energy. If low

electricity prices were the main determinant influencing the policy choice in Poland,

there would be no justification for supporting sources of energy, such as large hydro

power plants: the amount of electricity from this source remained stable between 2006

and 2012 despite significant subsidies (PSEW, 2013). Also the average support granted

for electricity generated from wind energy was for a long time higher in Poland than the

feed-in price introduced in Germany (TGE, 2011, 2012) and the lack of development of a

meaningful renewable energy industry is largely to blame on the lack of predictability of

the support mechanism.

5.4 Coercion

Development of renewable sources of energy was not the policy of choice for the subse-

quent Polish governments after 2001. Although the goal of 7.5% of energy from renewa-

ble sources by 2010 was mentioned in the Development Strategy of Renewable Energy

Sector from 2000, during the negotiations with the European Commission Polish gov-ernment suggested a target of ぬ.は% ゅWiśniewski, にどなにょ. )n the end, however, the goal of

7.5% of electricity from renewable sources was set for Poland in directive 2001/77/EC.

The Polish government was also not satisfied with the 15% goal for 2020 suggested for

Poland in the second renewable energy directive: instead it considered 9% to be much

more realistic. Still, due to a stronger focus put on the negotiations over Emissions Trad-

ing Scheme, Poland unwillingly agreed to the 15% goal, especially since changing the

goal for Poland would require changing the whole procedure according to which the

goals for all countries were defined (Ancygier, 2013a, 333). The German approach could

not have been more different. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was instrumental in

suggesting and convincing other countries to agree to the 20% average goal for the re-newable energies in the EU by にどにど ゅEuropean Council, にどどばょ. By ╅uploading╆ its policies to the European level, the German government not only contributed to the reduction of

greenhouse gas emissions (externally, much less domestically), but also created export

markets for its renewable energy industry.

It can be assumed that without the pressure from the European level the Polish

energy policy would have looked very different. Polish Energy Policy by 2025, adopted

in 2005, for the first time underlined the need to develop nuclear energy in Poland (Min-

istry of Economy, 2005). One of the main goals of the consolidation of the energy sector that followed was the creation of a ╅national champion╆ that could finance and conduct such an investment (Ministry of Economy, 2006). Even after a significant price reduction

of renewable sources of energy Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk described shale gas,

coal and nuclear energy as the three main elements of the Polish energy policy, without

any reference to renewable sources of energy (WNP, 2014, January 3).

This shows that the development of renewable sources of energy has been the re-

sult of pressure from the European Union and – indirectly – from Germany. (Mszyca,

2012, October 23) This pressure has led to some limited convergence of energy policy:

instead of concentrating on conventional energy sources, Poland also had to introduce

measures to develop renewable energies. But this pressure did not lead to convergence

of the renewable energy policy: as mentioned earlier, the way renewable energies are

supported in Poland differs significantly from the mechanisms introduced in Germany.

Although coercion may seem to be an effective tool that can contribute to some

convergence in the area of energy, and possibly policy diffusion between EU member

countries, it has an important limit: since coercion can only take place through the Euro-

pean institution, the country that would like to promote its policies in this way has to

gain the support of the majority of other countries. Currently such support is rather dif-ficult to expect, leading the Commission to propose only ╅politically╆ binding renewable energy targets for 2030 (European Commission, 2014).

6. Conclusions

Policy diffusion brings the chance for more effective governance. Governments do not

have to look for answers to particular problems individually but can use solutions that

have already been tested in other countries. These chances can be especially useful in

the case of renewable energy policy. In few other areas are problems that policy diffu-

sion can solve as universal. The issues of energy dependency, exhaustion of fossil fuels

and environmental degradation affect all countries. Even more importantly, in other ar-

eas the costs of faulty policy are higher, a fact that affected a number of countries that

failed to adapt their feed-in tariffs to the falling prices of energy from photovoltaic pan-

els. The chance to mutually learn from each other╆s successes and mistakes was missed in the case of Germany and Poland. Due to the reasons presented above, the pro-

cess of policy diffusion in the area of renewable energy did not take place. The Develop-

ment Strategy of Renewable Energy Sector, adopted by the large majority of Polish par-

liament six months after the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) was adopted by the German

Bundestag, has never been implemented. Although feed-in tariffs – at least for small in-

stallations – were close to being adopted in 2012, in the end it is highly probable that the

existing support mechanism will be replaced by a much more complicated system which

makes the development of a domestic renewable energy industry in Poland rather un-

likely.

But the Polish government not only did not adopt these elements of the support

mechanism for renewable energy, which did work for Germany, but also failed to learn

from German mistakes. Keeping the high feed-in tariffs despite a significant fall in the

prices of photovoltaic panels significantly increased the costs of the support mechanism

in Germany. But this mistake has been fixed and the tariffs for small installations were

reduced from over €ど.ねど per kilowatt hour in にどなど to less than €ど.なね per kilowatt hour in early 2014. At the same time, despite the rhetoric about the importance of low energy

prices for economic development, since the introduction of the support mechanism in

Poland in 2005 electricity consumers subsidize decades-old hydro power plants which

leads to windfall profits for energy companies.

The current moment of legislative change – drafting of new laws and necessary

novelization of existing acts in both countries – constitutes a window of opportunity for

policy diffusion. With the share of power from renewable sources increasing and the

need to better integrate volatile sources of energy in the energy grid gaining in urgency,

Poland and Germany can better cooperate and learn from each other╆s experiences. This is even more probable taking into consideration the rising pressure from the European

Commission to limit public aid for renewable energies and – by limiting the options

available to member states to support renewables – convergence of renewable energy

policies in the EU. Taking this into consideration, policy diffusion between both coun-

tries may not only be a possibility but also a necessity.

What does that mean for bilateral cooperation? So far, learning from Germany

was limited to avoiding what was perceived as ╉fallacies and mistakes╊, while positive examples were largely ignored. This was caused by Poland and Germany using different

solutions to the challenges faced by both countries such as energy dependency or the

impact of the energy sector on environment and economic development due to different

diagnoses of the problems. Whereas for Germany RES development has been considered

to be a way of decreasing the import of energy resources while having a positive impact

on the environment and economic development, for Poland the prevailing solution was

continued reliance on coal, plans to construct a nuclear power plant and possible extrac-

tion of shale gas. In fact, what has been perceived in Germany as the solution has in-

creasingly been treated in Poland as a problem: all Polish governments since 2002 have

shown a rather lukewarm support for the development of renewable sources of energy.

One reason for such an approach is the potential threat resulting from the development

of renewable sources of energy for the incumbent players in the energy sector. At the

same time, the voice of the in-between actors who could contribute to policy diffusion

between both actors is barely heard in Poland. This is caused to a large degree by the

lack of trust that German energy policy is really aimed at environmental protection and

not at merely increasing export of Germany products. The complexity of the German

energy transition, which due to the nuclear phase out led to an increase of the CO2 emis-

sions, makes the task of explaining the process of moving to low-carbon power sector

even more complicated.

And yet the situation is changing and the voice of the in-between actors that may

facilitate the process of policy diffusion is becoming increasing louder in the Polish me-

dia. An example is the statement of the former Polish ambassador in Germany, Janusz

Reiter, according to whom, even if Poland does not follow the German example, it can

learn much from it (WNP, 2014, February 4). Former prime minister and minister of

economy Waldemar Pawlak also quoted the German example when referring to the pos-

sibility of creating cooperatives at a local level that could invest in renewable energy

(WNP, 2014, February 3). Indeed, as our survey shows, it is at the local level, that the

communication between the two countries is increasingly active. When one keeps in

mind that the German energy transition also took root at the local level, it is promising

for the future of German-Polish cooperation in the area of energy – without the mistakes

made by both countries in the meantime. However, there are important differences in

the perception of RES. In Germany, prosumerism was largely seen as a movement to-

wards making individual households self-sufficient in energy supply, decreasing de-

pendence on energy companies etc. In Poland, on the other hand, the discourses of dis-

persed energy generation most visibly resonating with local populace are: economic

development of poorer areas and communities; additional source of income in rural are-

as; and security of supply (both nationally and regionally). Both approaches suggest the

need for slightly different regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, opting for dispersed energy generation would require a very deep ╅refurbishment╆ of the energy sector which

would alter the current balance of its political economy. If entrenched interests of the

energy lobby continue to shape Polish energy policy the only mechanism of policy trans-

fer left could be coercion through EU policies, as it has largely been the case until now.

February/March 2014, Berlin

About the authors:

Dr. Andrzej Ancygier – research associate at the Hertie School of Governance and the De-

partment of Cimate Policy, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.

Dr. Kacper Szulecki – research coordinator of the Environmental Studies and Policy Re-

search Institute (ESPRi), until recently Dahrendorf Fellow at the Hertie School of Gov-

ernance and Guest Researcher at DIW Berlin.

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