‘Political’NuclearDevelopmentintheArab World · 2012. 12. 4. · production.Dr.Abdullahal-Amiri,chairmanoftheEmiratesEnergy Authority, declared that the GCC states will be investing

30-2韓國中東學會論叢第號

, 2009, 1-30韓國中東學會

‘Political’ Nuclear Development in the Arab

World*

Seo, Jeong-Min**

Contents◁ ▷

I. Introduction

II. A Historical and Country Overview

III. Determinants of Nuclear Development

1. Economic Determinant

2. Security Concern

3. Political and Psychological Dimension

4. Diverse Determinants among the Arab Countries

IV. Conclusion

* This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ResearchFund of 2009.

** HUFS

2 30-2韓國中東學會論叢第號

국문초록< >

아랍세계의 정치적 핵개발‘ ’

서 정 민

한국외대

최근 아랍 국가들은 핵에너지 개발에 깊은 관심을 표명하고 있다 핵 부. ‘

흥 핵 경쟁 핵 경각 등의 용어가 언론에 등장할 정도도 많은 아랍 국가,’ ‘ ,’ ‘ ’

들이 핵개발 계획을 발표하고 있다 년 초 이후 여러 나라가 추가적으로. 2006

핵개발 의지를 표명함에 따라 핵에너지를 추구하겠다고 발표한 중동 국가의,

수는 이제 개가 넘는다13 .

어떤 환경이 아랍 국가들에게 핵발전소 건설과 같은 새로운 계획을 발표하

게 하거나 상당기간 중단되었던 핵개발을 재추진하게 만들고 있는가 이 논?

문은 최근 유행처럼 번져나가고 있는 아랍 국가들의 핵개발 경쟁의 배경을

파악하는 것을 목적으로 한다 더불어 여러 변수 중에 어떤 것이 각국의 핵.

개발 계획발표에 더 큰 영향을 주고 있는 지를 파악하고자 한다.

아랍 국가의 핵개발 추진 배경은 크게 세 가지로 분석될 수 있다 우선 경.

제적 목적이다 지속가능한 경제발전을 위해 아랍 국가들은 그동안의 석유 의.

존적 경제구조를 탈피하고자 한다 더불어 최근 고유가로 인한 급속한 경제성.

장 인구 증가 관광산업의 발전 등으로 인해 전력 수요가 크게 늘고 있다 일, , .

부 국가는 이미 전력부족으로 인한 제한 송전사태가 발생하고 있어 장기적인

전략으로 원자력 발전을 추구한다고 볼 수 있다.

두 번째 주요 변수는 안보다 이란의 핵 위협이 주변 국가의 핵개발 추진.

을 자극하고 있다는 분석이 주를 이루고 있다 특히 이란과 근접해 있고 수니.

파 종주국으로서 이란의 시아파 패권주의를 견제하고자 하는 사우디아라비아

중심의 걸프 국가들의 반응이 두드러진다 결과적으로 자국 혹은 지역의 안보.

를 위해 걸프 국가들은 일제히 년 이후 핵 개발 의사를 표명했다2006 .

‘Political' Nuclear Development in the Arab World: Seo, Jeong-Min 3

마지막으로 정치심리학적 원인이 있다 이란의 핵 개발로 인한 국내 및 지· .

역정치의 불안이 아랍 국가의 핵 경쟁을 가져왔다고 보는 시각이다 이란의.

핵 기술 발전 및 군사력 증대는 주변 아랍국가의 심리적 경쟁심을 자극하고

있다 미국과의 군사 및 핵우산 하에 만족하고 자체적인 핵 개발 노력을 기울.

이지 않는 자국 정부에 대한 아랍 언론 지식인 그리고 대중이 비난이 고조, ,

되고 있다.

이 연구는 위의 세 가지 변수를 분석하여 아랍 국가의 핵 개발 경쟁에 참

여하게 된 가장 큰 원인을 밝히고자 한다 서방과 이스라엘의 안보 연구소 그.

리고 언론에 등장하는 분석은 주로 이란의 핵 개발과 둘러싼 안보 변수를‘ ’

강조하고 있다 그러나 아랍 국가는 이란 안보 외에도 다른 여러 변수에 의해.

핵개발에 적극 참여하고 있다고 이 논문은 가정한다.

이를 위해 이 논문은 최근 핵개발 참여 혹은 재가동을 선언하고 또 추진하

고 있는 개 아랍국가의 핵 관련 정책과 활동을 분석한다 이를 통해 이란11 .

안보 변수가 지나치게 과장되어 있으며 이 보다는 국내 정치적 그리고 역내,

정세에 대한 심리적 원인이 아랍 국가의 핵개발을 자극하고 있다는 가설을

입증하고자 한다.

주제어 핵개발 아랍 중동정치 에너지 이란: , , , ,


I. Introduction

In recent years the Arab states show growing interest in acquiring

nuclear technology. This has let international media to use such terms

as 'nuclear renaissance,' 'nuclear competition,' and 'nuclear awakening'

in the Middle East. In fact, since early 2006, an expression of

enthusiasm for nuclear energy has swept the Middle East. No less

than 13 Middle Eastern countries have announced plans to pursue

nuclear energy programs.

It seems that the terms used by Western media or security

institutions are inappropriate when talking about the Arab World. This

is because there is not a single nuclear power reactor operating in the

region excluding Israel. Most of these plans are also at the initial

stage of announcing new plans and reactivating nuclear energy

programs. However, most feasibility studies on nuclear development in

the region have concluded that nuclear energy is not cost-competitive

(Raphaeli 2008). Given the economies of scale of nuclear power, the

large start-up costs, the cheaper alternative energy sources available

in the region and the costs of nuclear waste disposal, such studies for

three decades have disclosed somewhat negative evaluations (Kurt and

Einhorn 2004, 321).

Then, why have the Arab countries revived their long-deferred

quest for nuclear energy or announced their intention to explore a

nuclear development? There have been three main explanations on this

question. First, some analysts and especially Arab governments argue

that nuclear options would be crucial in sustainable development in the

region (Fitzpatrick 2008, 381). Thus the Arab countries that have

taken up the nuclear projects speak of their growing energy needs for


economic development, the need to diversify energy sources and to

conserve oil and gas supplies for export earnings, the high energy

requirements for seawater desalination, and the role of nuclear energy

to retard global warming and the attendant problematic effects of

climate change (Salam 2007, 28-29)

The second explanation would be security dimension. For some Arab

countries, the Iranian nuclear program is a key driver behind their

nuclear initiatives. Iran's firm stand on nuclear issues has motivated its

neighbours to seek fledgling nuclear capabilities of their own as a

security hedge. The Iranian nuclear issue is particularly acute for

countries that have a historical rivalry with Iran. Saudi Arabia and

other Gulf countries which neighbor Iran have reacted sensitively to

Iran's move toward enrichment of uranium (Ansari 2006, 34). Some

analysts even argue that there is legitimate concern that some Arab

countries are interested in a weapons option (Ramberg 2008, 366).

The final factor of the surge of interest in nuclear poser in the

Arab countries would be political and psychological. Iran's nuclear

initiatives and Israel's de facto acquisition of nuclear power plant and

weapons have led Arab citizens, media and intellectuals to criticise

their governments for weakness by contrast. This domestic factor

gives their leaders an additional, but important, reason to pursue

nuclear development as a show of strength and independence and to

bolster Arab pride. As much as Arab people distrust Iran and Israel

and fear their hegemonic motives, many Arab governments have been

obliged to persuade people to believe that the Arab leaders are doing

something.

This paper aims at exploring the above mentioned three

explanations in order to understand what is the most salient factor

behind the nuclear development in the Arab World. Considering the


differences that each Arab country has in political environment,

economic performance, and relations with neighboring countries, this

research assumes that each country has its specific need to pursue

nuclear power. To do this, I will deal with 11 Arab countries which

have announced nuclear programs, and further categorize each

countries in terms of determining factor behind its nuclear initiatives.

Through this inductive method, this paper would demonstrate that the

political and psychological factor are likely to be a more crucial

determinant than economic development or security concern.

II. A Historical and Country Overview

Nuclear power and the Arab world is not all that much of a novelty.

In fact long before Iraq and lately Syria toyed with the notion of

acquiring nuclear technology for civilian use or for military purposes.

Long before them, Egypt hoped to join the exclusive club of which to

date, Pakistan remains the only Muslim country to have nuclear

weapons.

Yet, as early as in the mid-1960s Egyptian President Gamal Abdel

Nasser displayed a keen interest in obtaining nuclear technology. And

the Egyptians under Nasser probably would have acquired the

know-how and the facilities, and possibly the bomb; had it not been

for the Six-Day War. The June 5, 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict changed

the map of the Middle East, literally, as the State of Israel, at that

time still in its teens, more than doubled its size. Israel captured the

Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from the Egyptians; the West Bank

and East Jerusalem from the Jordanians; and the Golan Hight from the


Syrians. The war also put a damper on any sales of nuclear

technology to the Arabs, lest they be tempted to use those weapons

against Israel in the next conflict, which there certainly was going to

be more than one (Salhani 2008, 27).

Since President Nasser's attempts in the 1960s there has been no

real desire on the part of Arab countries to go nuclear. Arab leaders

seemed quite content leaving that responsibility, cost and headache to

the super powers and anyone else who wanted to venture into that

field. And it stayed pretty much that way until recently.

An overview of the nuclear landscape in the region reveals a very

diverse picture. Egypt and Algeria have significant nuclear activities.

The two may have attempted to embark in a full-fledged military

program in the past. Syria, an ally of Iran, was generally considered a

serious nuclear proliferation risk, but the revelation of the Al-Kibar

reactor has altered this assessment.

Saudi Arabia, an ally of the United States, has almost no known

nuclear activity but is widely believed to be a leading candidate when

assessing future proliferation risks in the region. Libya maintains a

small nuclear program but has recanted and does not face any major

security threat. Iraq was once considered the number one nuclear

threat in the region but has been stripped of any serious capability.

Morocco is an emerging player. Jordan, Tunisia and the United Arab

Emirates are willing to develop a nuclear program. The remaining

countries such as Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Yemen have no nuclear

research program and only announced vague plans. The more details

of the major Arab countries in terms of nuclear development are:

Egypt

Egypt already has a 1961-vintage 2 MW Russian research reactor


serviced by Russia, and a 22 MW Argentinean research reactor partly

supported by Russia and which started up in 1997. (Bowen and Kidd

2005, 64) Egypt has also had since 1998 two fuel-making installations,

a laboratory and a full-fledged plant which fabricates fuel for the MPR

reactor. It also has significant uranium reserves.

On the basis of the feasibility study for a cogeneration plant for

electricity and potable water at El-Dabaa, in October 2006 the

Minister for Energy announced that a 1000 MW reactor would be built

there by 2015. The US$ 1.5 to 2 billion project would be open to

foreign participation.

It has no intention to forego sensitive fuel cycle activities: for

Cairo, this could only be an acceptable option if it concerned “the

whole region” (Crail and Lasky-Fink 2008) Egypt is thus one of the

only Middle East countries which could envision a full-fledged,

autonomous nuclear program. Despite the apparent abandonment of

military-related projects decades ago, President Mubarak has stated

several times in oblique terms that the option remains.

Egypt has recently announced its intention to restart its civilian

nuclear program. Its rapid electricity consumption growth, dwindling oil

resources, and strategic location which makes its grid connected to

the two transnational regional electricity networks, make it well-placed

to be a future regional leader in nuclear electricity generation, despite

financial difficulties. Egypt’s longstanding nuclear experience makes

this ambition credible.

In December 2008 the Energy & Electricity Ministry announced that

following an international tender, it had decided to award a $180

million contract to Bechtel to choose the reactor technology, choose

the site for the plant, train operating personnel, and provide technical

services over some ten years. The ministry confirmed that Egypt aims


to begin generating nuclear electricity in 2017 at one of five possible

sites (World Nuclear Association 2009).

Algeria

Algeria produced 35 billion kWh gross of electricity in 2006, almost

all from natural gas, and it is a major gas exporter. In January 2007

Russia signed an agreement to investigate the establishment of nuclear

power there. Further nuclear energy cooperation agreements with

Argentina, China, France, and the USA followed over 2007-08, the

French one coupled with strong commercial interest from Areva. In

February 2009 the government announced that it planned to build its

first nuclear power plant to be operating about 2020, and might build a

further unit every five years thereafter. The country has operated two

research reactors since 1995, at Draria and Ain Ouessara. One was

built by INVAP of Argentina, the other by China.

Algeria has a significant national nuclear program and a fairly

developed nuclear infrastructure, which has raised suspicions in the

past. It includes two nuclear reactors as well as a small fuel

fabrication plant. It also has significant technical and scientific

competences, noteworthily within the Centre des sciences et de la

technologie nucléaire (CESTEN). Its Es-Salam 15MWth reactor,

operational since 1992, raises proliferation concerns.

Questions about the Algerian nuclear program are all the more

relevant since cooperation with China has continued throughout the

1990s, including through the sale of hot cells (Widnsor and Kessler

2007, 96) The status of Algerian plutonium separation capabilities is

uncertain. However, Algeria does not have any immediate reason to

launch or re-start military-related nuclear activities. Despite troubled

relations with some of its neighbors, it does not face any significant


and immediate military threat.

Libya

In 2006 Libya produced 24 billion kWh gross of electricity, 59% of

this from gas, 41% from oil. Early in 2007 it was reported that Libya

was seeking an agreement for US assistance in building a nuclear

power plant for electricity and desalination. In 2006 an agreement with

France was signed for peaceful uses of atomic energy and in mid

2007 a memorandum of understanding related to building a mid-sized

nuclear plant for seawater desalination. Areva TA would supply this. In

2008 Libya signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia.

In 2003 Libya had halted a clandestine program developing uranium

enrichment capability, and fully opened itself to IAEA inspections.

Libya has a Russian 10 MW research reactor which is under IAEA

safeguards. Thus, Libya’s nuclear program has been reduced to its

civilian research component. However, Tripoli retains significant

infrastructure and expertise, which would be useful if the country

wanted launch a military program again. Its IRT-1 has been

operational since 1981. It is a high neutron flux reactor, but one

whose plutonium production remains limited because of its power (10

MWth). 20 kilos of HEU stocked at Tajura have been taken to Russia

and the United States, and the reactor is being converted to use LEU

as fuel. However, it is argued that as of 16 May 2008 Libya still

retained 5 kilos of HEU (Monterey Center for Nonproliferation Studies

2008).

Numerous undeclared experiments of uranium targets irradiation

were conducted at Tajura between 1984 and 1990, with the production

of small quantities of plutonium. There is no indication today that

Libya could be willing to embark again in a military program, and the


country enjoys rather good relations with Algeria and Egypt. However,

Tripoli is keen on maintaining its expertise.

Syria

Syria produced 37 billion kWh gross in 2006, 51% of this from oil,

38% from gas, 11% from hydro. Syria had plans in the 1980s to build

a VVER-440 reactor but abandoned these after the Chernobyl accident

and due to the collapse of Soviet Union. With escalating oil and gas

prices, nuclear power is now being considered again.

Syria has two research centers, Scientific Research Institute and

Nuclear Research Center, which conduct such activities. Its only

installations declared to the IAEA are a Miniature Neutron Source and

a small cyclotron. Syria has never made public any military nuclear

ambition, though it has not hidden that it seeks to balance Israeli

superiority by unconventional means (Eisenstadt 2007). However, the

discovery of the Al-Kibar reactor project has changed the picture.

It has confirmed that a nuclear aspirant without an additional

protocol into force could escape detection for several years. Also, it

has revealed that North Korea was ready to embark on large-scale

nuclear cooperation plans abroad. The Syrian rationale for nuclear

weapons was probably to protect its territory against a U.S. or Israeli

attack. If this was the case, it means that Damascus did not believe

that Tehran would protect it even though the two countries probably

have a mutual defense commitment (Berman 2004, 81). Bashar El-Asad

may also have wanted to consolidate its power through such a

program which was apparently started right after he came to power—

(ODNI 2008, 74).

Saudi Arabia


Saudi experience in the nuclear field is extremely limited. The

Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI), established in 1988, and

Nuclear Engineering Department of King Abdul Aziz University,

founded in 1977, conduct research on the use of nuclear energy for

water desalination and medical treatment. The King Faisal Hospital has

a small cyclotron and five hot cells. The AERI has four laboratories

working on separation of elements. Having joined the NPT only after

the controversy over its acquisition of Chinese CSS-2 missiles (1988),

Saudi Arabia remains the only significant IAEA member which does not

have a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force. This is not

necessarily a cause for concern Saudis are not keen on having—

international inspections on their soil for religious reasons but it—

would allow the country to embark in clandestine activities with a low

risk of detection.

Saudi leaders are extremely worried about the Iranian nuclear

program, and the country’s diplomacy is trying both to limit Shia

influence in the region while maintaining a dialogue with Teheran.

Perhaps the country could live with an Iran at the threshold; but an

overt capability, including withdrawal from the NPT and maybe a

nuclear test, would be unacceptable to Saudi Arabia and force it to

reexamine its strategic options.

III. Determinants of Nuclear Development

The nuclear race is on among Arab states to build nuclear power

plants of their own. As I mentioned in the introduction, it is

unplausible to say that the motives of the race come only from the


Iranian threat. Economic needs and domestic or regional politics have

encouraged the Arab countries to pursue nuclear development. In this

regard, it is worth delving into the three determining factors behind

the new phenomenon.

1. Economic Determinant

High oil prices has given financial benefits to the oil producing

countries in the region. But, at the same time, it has brought a rapid

increase of consumption in various sectors. With growing urbanization,

the growth of industry and the expansion of the tourism sector in

many countries in the Arab world, the consumption of power has been

rising steadily. The table below provides data on electricity

consumption per capita per year for the period between 1990 and

2005. Most Arab countries in the sample show huge growth in

consumption per capita.

While many of the Arab countries, particularly the oil-producing

countries, are moving, often cautiously, in the direction of acquiring

the capacity to generate electricity by nuclear power, they are at the

same time allocating enormous resources to increase their power

production. Dr. Abdullah al-Amiri, chairman of the Emirates Energy

Authority, declared that the GCC states will be investing $160

billion-$200 billion in the next 10-12 years to develop 14-20 energy

projects to meet the increase in the Gulf's energy consumption. He

said the consumption in the United Arab Emirates was growing at an

average rate of 10% annually, while some emirates, like Dubai, will

probably reach a growth rate of 19% in 2008, doubling the country's

consumption in four to five years (Gulf News, July 17, 2008) With the

expansion of the tourism industry, in addition to growing urbanization,


in Morocco and Tunisia power consumption will also register rapid

growth. Dr. Al-Amiri did not indicate whether any of these power

plants planned for construction will be nuclear.

1990 2000 2005 RANK

World 2066.6 2322.3 2595.7 •

Middle East &North Africa

1124.1 1706.8 2107.5 •

Saudi Arabia 3982.1 5665.7 6813.3 4

Kuwait 8108.2 13377.6 15347.9 2

Qatar 9781.6 14028.1 16453.9 1

Syria 667.5 1039.4 1400.1 7

Libya 1614.2 2243.5 3336.2 5

Algeria 541.4 696.3 898.6 10

Egypt 683.4 999.4 1225.5 8

Morocco 372.5 500.1 643 11

Tunisia 638.5 991.2 1193.9 9

UAE 8766.5 11885.7 12411.6 3

Jordan 1050.5 1360.1 1656.7 6

Electricity consumption per capita in the Arab World

* Units: Kilowatt-hours (kWh) per person

* Sources: The World Resources Institute (http://www.wri.org)

The other serious problem in the Arab world is how to solve water

shortage. The Arab region is the world's most water-stressed area.

The average availability of water is 1,200 cubic meters per person per

year, projected to be halved by 2050. This compares to a global

average of 8,900 cubic meters per person per year today, and about

6,000 per person per year in 2050. According to studies by the World

Bank and the United Nations, the Arab world has the highest rate of

total renewable water resource withdrawal (about 75 percent). Distant


second is South Asia, with 25 percent and the lowest is Latin

American and the Caribbean, with about 2 percent (Miriam 2008, 3).

About 60 percent of the region's water is trans-boundary water. It

means that water which flows across international borders, leaving a

number of countries, including Egypt, Iraq, and Syria to be affected by

decisions made by upstream riparian countries. The dependency ratio,

the share of the total renewable water resources originating outside

the countries, is as follows: Egypt 96.9%; Syria 80.3%; Iraq 53.3; and

Jordan 22.7%. By contrast, Kuwait's dependency ratio is 100%, while

Saudi Arabia's is 0.0%. According to a study by Palm Water LLC, the

region plans to spend around $120 billion through 2017 on water

investments to meet demand, especially from growth sectors such as

construction and tourism (MENA FN.com. September 8, 2008). The

potential for water conflict in the Middle East is real. Nuclear power

might provide a cost-effective way of meeting growing public demand

for water and, ironically, could reduce the potential for conflict.

In pursuit of electricity and water, two Arab countries have actively

proceeded their nuclear power initiatives. These are Jordan and UAE.

Jordan imports about 95% of its energy needs for its six million

people. It has 2400 MW of generating capacity and expects to need an

additional 1200 MW by 2015, and expects doubled electricity

consumption by 2030. Per capita electricity consumption is about 2000

kWh/yr. Also it has a “water deficit” of about 500 million cubic meters

per year.

Thus, Jordan's Committee for Nuclear Strategy has set out a

program for nuclear power to provide 30% of electricity by 2030 or

2040, and to provide for exports. In mid 2008 an agreement between

the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) and Atomic Energy of

Canada Ltd (AECL) with SNC-Lavalin is to conduct a 3-year feasibility


study on building an AECL 740 MW Enhanced Candu-6 reactor using

natural uranium fuel, for power and desalination. In August 2008 it was

reported that the government intended to sign up for an Areva reactor,

and discussions with Areva in November pointed to an 1100 MW unit,

presumably from Atmea, the Areva-Mitsubishi joint venture which is

developing such a unit for countries embarking upon nuclear power

programs.

Site selection is planned for 2009, though options appear to be

limited to 30 kilometers of Red Sea coast near Aqaba, and JAEC has

confirmed that the site will be in this area. Discussion of

environmental aspects is under way with Israel and Egypt. JAEC has

said that a tender is likely in mid 2010 with construction of a 1000

MW plant starting in 2013 and operation in 2017 or 2018. Further

nuclear projects are likely to focus on desalination.

In December 2008 JAEC signed a memorandum of understanding

with Korea Electric Power Corp (KEPCO, parent company of KHNP) to

carry out site selection and feasibility study on nuclear power and

desalination projects. This is related to Doosan Heavy Industries,

Korea's main nuclear equipment maker, carrying out

desalination-related work in Jordan under a separate recent agreement,

and KEPCO having won a tender to build a 400 MW gas-fired power

plant on a build-own-operate basis. KEPCO and Doosan are reported

to be offering Jordan their OPR-1000 nuclear reactor. However, the

OPR is designed for 200 Gal seismic acceleration and needs to be

upgraded to at least 300 Gal for Turkey and Jordan. Up to 40% of the

capacity of any nuclear plant would likely be used for desalination. In

mid 2009 the JAEC was evaluating proposals from four reactor

vendors: KEPCO, Areva, Atomstroyexport and AECL. In September

JAEC contracted with Tractabel Engineering, a subsidiary of GdF Suez,


to undertake a two-year siting study for the new plant some 25 km

south of Aqaba.

Jordan has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with the USA,

Canada, France, UK and Russia, in respect to both power and

desalination, and is seeking help from the IAEA. It has signed a

nuclear cooperation agreement with China, covering uranium mining in

Jordan and nuclear power, and others with South Korea and Japan

related to infrastructure including nuclear power and desalination.

Jordan joined the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) in 2007.

UAE, the fastest growing economy in the region published a

comprehensive policy on nuclear energy in April 2008. This projected

escalating electricity demand from 15.5 GWe in 2008 to over 40 GWe

in 2020, with natural gas supplies sufficient for only half of this.

Imported coal was dismissed as an option due to environmental and

energy security implications. Nuclear power emerged as a proven,

environmentally promising and commercially competitive option which

could make a significant base-load contribution to the UAE's economy

and future energy security (Gulf News, 13 May 2008) Hence 20 GWe

nuclear is envisaged from about 14 plants, with nearly one quarter of

this operating by 2020. Two reactors are envisaged for a site between

Abu Dhabi and Ruwais, and a third possibly at Al Fujayrah on the

Indian Ocean coast.

Accordingly, UAE is the furthest along among the Arab countries in

building nuclear power plants. It has invited expressions of interest

from nine short-listed companies for construction of its first nuclear

power plant. French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited UAE in May to

open France's first military base in the Gulf and to promote a French

consortium's bid to secure a $40 billion deal to build at least four, and

possibly six, reactors. The French consortium, which includes Areva,


GdF Suez and Total, is the front-runner for the winner-takes-all

contract.

Other bidders are General Electric of the United States with Hitachi

of Japan, and the Korea Electric Power Corp. with Hyundai

Engineering and Samsung C&T Corp. By 2020 it hopes to have three

1500 MW nuclear plants running and producing electricity at a quarter

the cost of that from gas. The USA signed a bilateral nuclear energy

cooperation agreement with the UAE in January 2009 and South Korea

did so in mid 2009. The UK and Japan have signed Memoranda of

Understanding on nuclear energy cooperation with UAE.

2. Security Concern

It can be said that the Arabs' desire for nuclear parity rests more

on the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran is engaged to develop its

program, than on trying to counter-balance Israel's nuclear strike

force. Realistically, the Arab leadership is cognizant of the fact that

they would never get away with deploying nuclear weapons against

Israel, at least not as long as the United States continues to stand by

its side. And nothing in the foreseeable future would indicate

otherwise.

Rather, one would imagine that proliferation of nuclear weapons in

the Middle East would be more to counter Iran's nuclear capability

than to challenge Israel. Unease started to grow in 2005 with the

radicalization of Iranian policy and the break-up of the negotiating

process. The Iraqi insurrection and the war in Lebanon heightened the

fears of a Shia regional revival which may be supported by Iran

(Russel 2005, 57). The GCC proposal for a WMD-free zone in the Gulf

in December 2005 was a clear signal that the Iranian program was


much more a problem for them than the Israeli program. Indeed the

rise in Arab interests in the nuclear field began to emerge only after

word leaked out that Iran was developing its nuclear program despite

strong objections from the international community.

It is certainly interesting to note that until February 2006, according

to a comprehensive study carried out by the London-based

International Institute for Strategic Studies titled 'Nuclear Programs in

the Middle East -- In the Shadow of Iran, “there was practically no

interest in nuclear technology in the Arab world. However, Within the

last 11 months, between February 2006 and January 2007, no fewer

than 13 Arab countries announced plans to revive, pursue or explore

civilian nuclear energy (International Institute for Strategic Studies

2008, 7).

What makes this sudden interest in nuclear technology by more than

half the member countries of the Arab League intriguing is the

abundance of traditional energy, mainly oil and natural gas. One could

therefore conclude that the main reason the Arabs show any interest

in nuclear energy is because of Iran. Much has been said about Iran's

quest for nuclear technology, and the desire of the ruling mullahs to

develop a thermonuclear weapon (Handerson 2005). Despite repeated

denials from the Ayatollahs and the maverick president, Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad, there is still great worry over Iran's projects and what

Israel might do about it.

Especially neighboring countries with Iran like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,

Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman are not happy with the fact that they

lie within the range of Iran’s medium-range Shahab-3 ballistic

missiles. These missiles are not known to be equipped today with

anything other than conventional war heads, but their inaccuracy

makes them of little strategic purpose except as delivery vehicles for


weapons of mass destruction.(IISS 2007, 23)

3. Political and Psychological Dimension

Iran’'s nuclear program has not only caused the security concern but

also domestic political and psychological influence in the minds of

Arab people. It means that the regional military crisis may also serve

as an indirect driver of secondary shocks to the Arab world. In the

eyes of much of the Arab world, Iran’s nuclear programme is a sign of

technological progress and political strength in standing up to the

United States-led West. Some countries in the region may not feel

directly threatened by an Iranian nuclear program, but may

nevertheless feel threat of the so-called 'shia crescent.' The concerns

of Iran’s neighbours have been heightened by what are perceived to

be Tehran’'s attempts to extend its influence throughout the Middle

East.

According to my recent analysis of the opinion section of the

Pan-Arab newspaper, al-Sharq al-Awsat, the sheer number of articles

which contain the word of ‘Iran' increased three times during the

period between 2005 and 2008 from 85 to 232. It indicates that the

interest of Arab media in the Iranian nuclear issue has surged

dramatically in recent years. This means that the Iranian nuclear issue

or Shia crescent has more and more brought the interest or fear and

anxiety from the Arab side (Seo 2009, 73).

Iran's active involvement in the nuclear activities and its

'courageous' resistance to the US pressure can be seen as a symbol

of sovereignty and prestige to the eyes and minds of Arabs whose

governments have been under the control of US-led Western powers.

Some analysts note that events in the region since 2001 have resulted


in “unprecedented severe criticism of Arab leadership by Arab citizens,

Arab media and Arab intellectuals, which has motivated some Arab

leaders to publicly discuss plans of nuclear acquisition to restore the

appearance of strength and independence” (Salama and Weber 2006).

This symbolic value of nuclear programs is thus particularly strong

in the region. In this situation of domestic political and psychological

dilemma, a nuclear military option would fully play such a role only if

it is openly exercised. However, even in secret, a nuclear program

can be a way to bolster the domestic legitimacy of the leadership.

These political and psychological factors, represented by the

anti-government sentiment among the public, has pushed the Arab

governments to reviving the nuclear option. In September 2006, Egypt

announced plans to restart its nuclear energy programme, some 20

years after it was suspended in the wake of the Chernobyl meltdown,

and invited international bidders for the construction of a nuclear

reactor that could come online in 8 10 years. Morocco, Tunisia and–

Algeria all separately said in 2006 that they too would launch nuclear

energy programs. In December 2006, the six nations of the Gulf

Cooperation Council announced their intent to explore a joint nuclear

development program. Jordan’'s King Abdullah followed suit in January

2007, saying that the changing political climate in the region had

prompted him also to consider alternative energy means (Al-Sharq

al-Awsat 25 January 2007).

4. Diverse Determinants among the Arab Countries

In terms of the above three determinants, this study will try to

categorize the 11 Arab countries, which announced their intention to

develop nuclear facilities, into four groups. Although it is almost


impossible to draw clear demarcation lines among the groups, political,

security-related, and economic determinants can be utilized to

understand the reasons behind the nuclear plans of each country.

The first group can be described as countries which initiate the

nuclear programs for their economic needs. The 'economy oriented'

group includes two countries, Jordan and UAE as explained in detail

above. Jordan, which is heavily dependant on importing electricity from

outside, sincerely is looking forward to having nuclear power plants.

UAE is also facing a dramatically increasing demand for electricity

thanks to fast economic growth. Furthermore, UAE's initiative has

some commercial purposes. It is well known that electricity produced

in the northwestern areas will be exported to the neighboring eastern

areas of Saudi Arabia.

The second group can be named as 'politico-economy oriented.'

Morocco and Tunisia would be members of this group. These two

countries are relatively freer from the Iranian nuclear threat and even

from Israel's. As countries which do no enjoy vast production of oil,

the nuclear option as an alternative energy source may be more

plausible (Nuttall 2005, 121-129). However, their driving force of

nuclear pursuit are relatively weaker than that of the

'economy-oriented' group due to financial reasons.

Tunisia produced 14 billion kWh gross in 2006, almost all of this

from gas. The government is reported to be evaluating the possible

construction of a 600 MW nuclear plant costing US$ 1.14 billion. In

December 2006 a nuclear cooperation agreement was signed with

France, focused on nuclear power and desalination, and in April 2008

this was amplified.

Morocco has growing electricity demand and produced 23 billion

kWh gross in 2006. It also has requirements for desalination. In 2006


59% of electricity was supplied by coal, 20% by oil, 13% from gas.

The government has plans for building an initial nuclear power plant in

2016-17 at Sidi Boulbra, and Atomstroyexport is assisting with

feasibility studies for this. It is also setting up the infrastructure to

support a nuclear power program, including establishment of a nuclear

safety authority and a radiation protection authority (Albright, David

and Andrea Scheel 2008).

Morocco now has a 2 MW Triga research reactor under construction

at Mamoura near Rabat. For desalination, it has completed a

pre-project study with China, at Tan-Tan on the Atlantic coast, using

a 10 MW heating reactor which produces 8000 m3/day of potable

water by distillation. In October 2007 a partnership with France to

develop a nuclear power plant near Marrakesh was foreshadowed and

a nuclear energy cooperation agreement was signed. Also Areva

signed an agreement with Morocco's Office Cherifien des Phosphates

(OCP) to investigate recovery of uranium from phosphoric acid. The

amount of uranium in Morocco's phosphates is reported to be very

large.


Determinants of Nuclear Development in the Arab World

Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt are categorized into the third group

of 'econo-policial.' As I explained above, these countries have had

relatively longer history of nuclear development although they were

not facing the direct Iranian nuclear threat. These countries have also

witnessed an increase of electricity demand and desalination.

Nevertheless, they have been likely to focus on the use of nuclear

initiatives as a political propaganda towards Israel and the West as

well as the domestic public opinion.

The final group has recently shown 'politico-security oriented'

nuclear development attitudes. These are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and

Qatar, which most recently affiliated themselves to the newly emerging

nuclear energy countries. It can be said that they have significant

financial capabilities and justified political motives, and some of them

have fears about the future of oil on which their economies rely

(Singh, Sonali and Christopher Way 2007, 23-26). Statements by Gulf

officials indicate that they are ready to go ahead with the program.


Serious studies are already being carried out on the economic and

technical dimensions of a nuclear program. However, their current

initiatives have not been so active like UAE and Jordan. Thus, their

intention to develop nuclear power are not likely based on imminent

economic needs, but rather on political gesture to soothe the

anti-government sentiment of media, intellectuals and the public as

well as on countering adjacent threat of Iran.

I have already dealt with Saudi Arabia above. Qatar has undertaken

its own investigation into the viability of nuclear power and late in

2008 announced that there was not yet a strong case for proceeding,

especially in the absence of modern 300 to 600 MW reactors being

available. Qatar expects to need 7900 MW of capacity by 2010, along

with desalination capacity of 1.3 million cubic meters per day in

addition. In 2006 it produced 15.3 TWh, all from gas.

Kuwait is considering its own nuclear program for power and water,

with French assistance, and in March 2009 moved to set up a national

nuclear energy commission, in cooperation with the IAEA. Most of its

47.6 TWh production in 2006 was from oil.

V. Conclusion

It may be said that the development of civilian nuclear programs in

the Arab world will be a slow-motion process. The magnitude of

projects and intentions announced by countries in the region is

striking. According to an internal study made by the French firm

Areva in 2008, there are no less than 30 - 26 proposed and 4

ordered - reactors in the Middle East and Africa (Al-Jazeera 3


January 2009). Such plans are not likely to be realistic. The

international suppliers, which have reduced their capabilities in the

1990s after the Chernobyl accident, cannot meet such a growth in

demand. Their preference will thus go to countries which already have

a well-endowed nuclear infrastructure, and then only to Arab

customers choosing those who are the most willing and able, such as—

the UAE. Excluding oil producing countries, other Arab countries will

not be able to satisfy the financial, legal and infrastructure

requirements of nuclear power plants before a long time.

In this regard, this paper examined three determinants of nuclear

development and the current nuclear-related situation in the Arab

world. The examination has demonstrated that each Arab country is on

different stages of nuclear initiatives and somewhat diverse economic,

political, and security-related determinants. Thus, it may be said that

the differences in political environment, economic performance, and

relations with neighboring countries have led each country to pursuing

its specific nuclear power.

The results also show that the most salient factor behind the

current nuclear development in the Arab World can be found in

political and security concern, rather than imminent economic needs.

According to the examination of 11 Arab countries dealt with in this

paper, the political and psychological factor are likely to be a more

crucial determinant than economic development or security concern.

Taking into account all factors that are likely to come into play in

the strategic calculus that Arab countries will make in the future, it

seems that the nuclear temptation will indeed be strong. What follows

is an attempt to determine which countries are more likely than others

to go down the nuclear path in the future. Furthermore, this

unpredictable diversity would be an obstacle to respond to the


fluctuation of their nuclear initiatives.

Key Words: Nuclear Development, Arab, Middle East Politics, Energy,

Iran


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