Appellee's Memorandum

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

BRANCH 70

RIZAL

RAMON NIETO

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-versus- Civil Case No. 100-2013

For: Forcible Entry

(Ejectment)

KEITH ILAGAN

Defendant-Appellee,

x----------------------------------------------------------x

APPELLEE’S MEMURANDUM

Defendant-Appellee KEITH ILAGAN, by undersigned counsel and to

this Honorable Court, in answer to the allegations raised by the Plaintiff-

Appellant in his Memorandum, respectfully states:

PREPARATORY STATEMENT

The appealed case steamed from an ejectment case filed by Plaintiff

Ramon Nieto (Plaintiff-Appellant), which sought to recover the material

possession of a parcel of land against Defendant Keith Santos (Defendant-

“Appellee’s Memorandum”Nieto vs. Ilagan

Civil Case No. 100-2013Page 2 of 11

Appellee) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cainta Rizal therein

docketed as Civil Case No. 100-2013. On February 11, 2014, the Municipal

Trial Court of Cainta rendered the decision dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff aggrieved with the dismissal of the case filed a Notice of Appeal on

April 15, 2014. Hence, this memorandum in response to the memorandum

filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant.

COUNTER STATEMENTS OF FACTS

1.Plaintiff-Appellant, Ramon Nieto, claims to be the lawful owner of a

parcel of commercial/residential land consisting of 1,200 sq. m., more

or less, that is located in San Andres, Cainta, Rizal. He acquired title

over the said land in 1985, by way of absolute sale from the previous

owner thereof, STEVE ONA, as shown by the Deed of Absolute Sale,

a copy of which is marked as “Exhibit A.” The said land is not

covered by a Torrens certificate of title.

2.That As a result of the sale, Plaintiff-Appellant was issued Tax Declaration

No. 11111-1985, a copy of which is marked as “Exhibit B,” as well as

official receipts evidencing the payment of real property taxes from

1985 up to 2012, copies of which are marked as “Exhibit C” and

“Exhibit C-1 to 27 .”

3.Plaintiff-Appellant then planted trees and other plants on the property. He

also erected a perimeter fence around the premises. In January 2009,

he also built a 1-room nipa hut, which since then he occupied from

time to time.

4.Sometime in July 2009, Plaintiff-Appellant went to Singapore, Hong

Kong, Malaysia, Japan and Vietnam for an extended vacation. Upon

his return in December 2012, Plaintiff-Appellant went to visit his



property in San Andres, Cainta, Rizal. He then discovered that

Defendant-Appellee was occupying the subject property.

5.Plaintiff-Appellant thereupon demanded from Defendant-Appellee to

vacate the subject premises. The Defendant-Appellee did not heed

said demand. Plaintiff-Appellant again sent another demand in March

2013, as shown by a copy of the letter dated March 3, 2013, a copy of

which is marked as “Exhibit D.” The Defendant-Appellee also did

not heed this later demand.

6.Due to Defendant-Appellee’s failure to heed the demand letters sent by

Plaintiff-Appellant, the latter filed the Complaint for Forcible Entry

with prayer to wit:

"x x x that Judgment be rendered ordering the defendant

KEITH ILAGAN to peaceably turn over the physical

possession of the subject property to plaintiff RAMON

NIETO; that defendant be directed to pay plaintiff the sum

of P3,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use of the

subject property, for every month starting February 2013

until the plaintiff is actually restored to the physical

possession of the property; and that defendant be

commanded to remove any and improvements he erected

on the property."

7.The answer was filed by Keith Ilagan in due time and materially alleges

that he started occupying the subject premises in October 2009, after a

storm (Typhoon Ondoy) destroyed his house in San Isidro, Cainta,

Rizal.



8.At that time, the subject premises were not occupied or claimed by any

person, including the plaintiff. In fact, there was nothing in the said

premises that indicated that the plaintiff owns the subject property.

There was no fence to enclose the property. There were no structures

erected thereat, not even those mentioned by the plaintiff in his

complaint.

9.The defendant declared the property for taxation purposes in October

2009, as shown by Tax Declaration No. 2000-2009, a copy of which

is attached and marked as “Exhibit 1”. Said tax declaration shows that

the property has a market value of P 850,000.00. He also paid real

property taxes in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, as shown by the official

receipts attached and marked as “Exhibits 2-5”. The defendant

likewise registered with the Municipal Assessor of Cainta, Rizal, and

an Affidavit of Ownership over the subject premises, a copy of which

is attached and marked as “Exhibit 6’.

10.Defendant contends that plaintiff has no right to claim the property, much

less oust the defendant from the possession thereof.

11.Defendant likewise prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

DECISION OF THE MTC

On April 11, 2014, the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta rendered a

decision which dismissed the complaint (page 7, Decision). In dismissing

the complaint, the MTC found that plaintiff cannot avail himself of the

provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, because an ejectment case

should not involve ownership issues. (page 3, Decision); that even assuming

that the plaintiff can raise the issue of ownership, the trial court has no

jurisdiction to resolve the same, since the property has a market value of P

850,000.00 ( page 4 Decision); that even if the trial court has jurisdiction to

decide the respective claims of ownership of the parties, it would appear that

defendant Keith Ilagan is the owner of the subject premises, because he has



an affidavit of ownership that was duly registered with the Municipal

Assessor of Cainta, Rizal ( page 4, Decision).

COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

Defendant-appellee raises the following counter-arguments to the

assignment of errors raised by the Plaintiff-appellant:

I.The Plaintiff-Appellant

cannot avail of the

provisions of Rule 70 of

the Rules of Court.

Thus, the lower court

has no Jurisdiction to

hear and decide the

case on the merits.

There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical

possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,

strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the

beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de

facto; any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may

recover such possession even from the owner himself since such cases

proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs

merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof. 1

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court tells us the two mandatory

allegations in filling forcible entry cases for the municipal trial court to

acquire jurisdiction, to wit:

1 Munoz v. Yabut, G. R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011



“Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to

the provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the

possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,

strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person

against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully

withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold

possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal

representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other

person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful

deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper

Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully

withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons

claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together

with damages and costs.”

In the case of Abad v Farrales,2 the Supreme Court explained the two

mandatory allegations required in filing forcible entry cases, that:

“Two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to

acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff has prior physical possession

of the property. Second, the defendant deprived him of such

possession by force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.

As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff-Appellant had prior physical

possession of the property as evidenced by the fact of planting trees and

other plants and erecting a perimeter fence on the premises. Further,

sometime in January 2009, he also built a 1-room nipa hut, which since then

he occupied from time to time.

However the second requirement that the defendant deprived him of

such possession by force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth was

missing. The plaintiff-appellant failed to allege that defendant Keith Ilagan

deprived him of such possession under the circumstances required by the

law.

2 Abad v. Farrales, G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011



Further, it is not enough of course that the allegations of the complaint

make out a case of forcible-entry. The plaintiff must also able to prove his

allegation that he had prior physical possession that gives him the security

that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a better right

lawfully ejects him. 3

Here, the Plaintiff-appellant failed to prove that he had prior physical

possession over the disputed property. The alleged prior physical possession

of plaintiff is a self-serving claim because it was not supported by any

evidences. Whereas the defendant sufficiently prove that he has prior

physical possession over the disputed property as shown by the Tax

Declaration No. 2000-2009, the official receipts of the real property taxes in

2009,2010, 2011 and 2012 paid by the defendant, and the duly registered

Affidavit of Ownership.

Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta did not erred in

dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff because of his failure to allege the

two mandatory required allegations in forcible entry cases so that the MTC

acquired jurisdiction over the case.

II.Even assuming that the

MTC has Jurisdiction

over the complaint still

there was necessity to

determine the

ownership of the

subject property.

The defendant-Appellee agree with the Plaintiff-Appellant that in

ejectment suits the only issue for resolution is the physical or material

possession of property involved independent of any claim of ownership by

3 Abad v. Farrales, G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011



any of the party litigants. However, this recognized rule is not absolute

because when the defendant raises in his pleadings the issue of ownership

as defense and the question of who has the prior physical possession cannot

be determined without deciding the issue of ownership the court of first

level may determine the issue of ownership. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court

Section 16 specifically provides:

“Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense

of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without

deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to

determine the issue of possession”.

Also, the Supreme Court in Gustilo v. Gustilo ruled that:

“The Court has ruled in the past that an action to recover possession

is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better

and legal right to possess, independently of title. But where the parties raise

the issue of ownership, as in this case, the courts may pass upon such issue

to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property.

This adjudication, however, is not final and binding as regards the issue of

ownership; it is merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession

when it is inseparably connected to the issue of ownership. The

adjudication on the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an

action between the same parties involving title to the property”.4

From the above-quoted rule and the jurisprudence decided by the

Supreme Court that there is necessity in determining the issue of ownership

of the subject property when the defendant raises the issue of ownership as

defense in his pleadings. In defendant’s Answer he raised the issue of

ownership over the disputed property.

4 Gustilov Gustilo, G.R. No 175497, October 19, 2011



Hence, the MTC is still allowed assuming that it has jurisdiction to

determine the issue of who between the party litigants is the owner of the

property but only for the purpose of determining the issue of who has the

prior possession over the subject property.

III.Assuming that the MTC

has jurisdiction to

resolve the Complaint.

The amount of the

property is

P850,000.00

As previously discussed from the preceding paragraph the MTC did

not erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Even assuming that

it has jurisdiction the cause of action of plaintiff is not for forcible entry

cases but an ordinary civil action involving possession over the disputed

property. The MTC has still without jurisdiction to the complaint

because Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic

Act No. 7691, states:

(1) x x x x

(2) x x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which

involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein

where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not

exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro

Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos

(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's

fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not

declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be

determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."



Consequently, the MTC has jurisdiction over the claim of

possession if the jurisdictional amount required by the law is not

beyond the limit allowed. However, plaintiff-appellant’s claim does

not fall within the jurisdictional amount required by the law.

Therefore, the complaint must be dismissed.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is humbly prayed of this

Honorable Court that the Decision dated 11 April 2014 of the court a quo be

affirmed and that this appeal be dismissed.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed

for.

Quezon City for Rizal, 16 May 2014.

ATTY. MAESHACH M. SOMBILON

Counsel for Defendant-Appellee

Atty. Roll. No. 52284

IBP Lifetime No. 11087/Quezon City

PRT No. 1102584/01-05-14-Quezon City

MCLE Exemption No. 111-042386

Copy Furnished:



Atty. Marie Dianne V. Espiritu

Jhocson Espiritu Karim Law

Counsel for Petitioner

27th Floor Trafalgar Bldg.

888 HV Dela Costa St., Makati city

WRITTEN EXPLANATION

(Pursuant to Section 11, Rule 13

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)

Filing and service of this Memorandum of Appeal to the above-

mentioned parties was accomplished through registered mail since personal

service could not be effected due to the distance between the parties, and the

heavy volume of deliveries of the messengers of the law firm of the

undersigned counsel.

ATTY. MAESHACH M. SOMBILON

Documents

Appellee's Memorandum