The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 12 | Issue 47 | Number 1 | Article ID 4221 | Nov 16, 2014

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Beyond reality – or – An illusory ideal: pro-nuclear Japan’smanagement of migratory flows in a nuclear catastrophe 幻想と現実の相克―― 原発を選んだ日本の核有事・住民移動管理政策

Cécile Asanuma-Brice

Japanese translation available

Three years have passed since the earthquakeand consequent tsunami of March 11, 2011,which led to the explosion of a nuclear powerplant in Northeastern Japan. Since then, acentral concern in managing the damage ishow to handle the relocation of peopledisplaced by the destruction of the earthquake-driven tsunami and the dangers of radiation. InDecember of that year, we wrote up a preciseassessment of the damage caused to thehousing sector, the system for rehousingvictims of the tsunami, and also the nuclearcontamination that has spread widely in part ofthe Fukushima region and neighboringdistricts.1 The government reported theexistence of 160,000 displaced persons, ofwhom 100,000 came from within the prefectureand 60,000 outside of it. Since the governmentadopted a policy favoring the return of thedisplaced to their home districts, which are stillheavily contaminated, the official estimatetoday is 140,000 refugees: 100,000 within theprefecture and 40,000 outside it. However,these official figures are the fruit of anextremely restrictive registration system, towhich a not insignificant number of inhabitantshave refused to submit.2 The displacedpopulation is in fact appreciably greater thanthe official statistics would have us believe.What is the situation of nuclear refugees inJapan today? What local policies have been putin place to protect the inhabitants during thesethree years, as the government sought to

manage a disaster of global proportions? Whatare the motivations of the authorities in seekingto compel the population to return to zones thatare still partly contaminated, despite theongoing risks and in the absence of any requestto return? These are a few issues that I willseek to clarify in this paper.

The stakes of the catastrophe

Temporary lodgings in Aizuwakamatsu,May 2013. Photo Cécile Asanuma-Brice

By “catastrophe”, I refer to what Jean-JacquesDelfour3 has defined as “the normal effects of aseries of real causes and the exposure of thatseries, that is, the negligence, minimizations,circumventions, and refusal to consider therisks created.” It is essential, when consideringa government’s management of migratory flowsand the choices it makes, to understand boththe relevant domestic and international politics.

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Moreover, among the greatest paradoxes thathave followed the catastrophe in question, isthe multiplication of international agreementsconcerning nuclear energy between France andJapan (notably between Areva and Mitsubishi)for the construction of new nuclear plants andthe operation of new uranium mines, 4

particularly in Asia. Additionally, thoughperhaps a coincidence, is the MitsubishiGroup’s first participation in Eurosatory, theworld’s largest armament trade show, in June2014.5

In a preparatory phase, the MinisterialConference on Nuclear Safety was held inFukushima in December 2012 by the IAEA

Temporary lodgings in Aizuwakamatsu,May 2013. Photo Cécile Asanuma-Brice

(International Atomic Energy Agency), bringingtogether representatives of countries all overthe world, where they resolved to developnuclear plants that would henceforth be secureand without danger. In the same year as theFukushima triple disaster, the political decisionwas made to pursue and develop nuclearenergy, placing a premium on the quickestpossible return to normalcy at the least cost.The tools devised by the InternationalCommission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)

for radioprotection, based on “concepts ofcollective doses and on cost-benefit analyses”are used as a foundation for calculatingprofitability in situations of risk. For the ICRP,the management of risk is guided by anequation, which assigns an economic value tohuman life, and from which the cost ofprotecting that life may be calculated, thusdetermining the cost-effectiveness of providingthat protection.6 As Jacques Lochard, a memberof the Main Commission of the ICRP anddirector of CEPN (Centre d'étude surl'Evaluation de la Protection dans le domaineNucléaire), stated during an interview with theauthor in November 2013, “Ethos is neverwithout Thanatos”.7 The key is to know onwhich side one wants to tip the scale. Assigninga monetary value to human life certainlyprovides an extreme example of the tendencyin our society toward the objectification ofhuman beings, one fully consistent with thepresent Abe Shinzo government’s attempts toreopen Japan’s closed nuclear facilities.

The politics of controlling population flows inpost-3/11 Japan can be divided into threephases, in accordance with the directivesformulated by the government in its annualpriority plans.

A Management policy to reverse migratoryflows

The first stage was set in motion during theyear following the catastrophe. The need torespond was urgent; this was primarily done byopening up the stock of vacant public housingthroughout Japan and constructing newtemporary barracks-like emergency housing,both made available free of charge, to take inthe victims. While this measure constituted aform of emergency relief, within FukushimaPrefecture, attempts to reassure the populationcreated rather an illusion of protection:temporary lodgings were built partly incontaminated areas, radiation measuringstations installed were tampered with, and

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decontamination efforts were largelyineffective.

The distribution of emergency temporaryhousing vs. the distribution of radiation

Measures at 1 meter in height0,20 µSv/h ≦or 1752 µSv/year or 1,7 mSv /year1 mSv (millisievert)=1 000 μSvLimit permitted for civil population exposure toartificial radiation in France (and in Japanbefore the explosion): 1 mSv / year / person(Code de la santé publique, Article R1333-8)Map created by Cécile Asanuma-Brice

The end of 2012 marked the first official call forthe refugees to return home, coinciding withtermination of the national program to providevacant public housing throughout the countryrent-free, but leaving the choice of requiringrefugees to leave public housing in the hands ofthe authorities in local communities. This is oneof the fundamental points characterizingofficial management of the disaster: thetransfer of responsibility from the central tolocal governments, and frequently from localgovernment to the v ict ims. Shi f t ingresponsibility from the central government tolocal communities is the first step in thisprocess. This translates into a considerabledelay in reconstruction projects, since thegenerally impoverished local communitiesconcerned lack the financial means and

resources to manage these problems. In short,while not actually reconstructing anything,luring refugees home with the claim of afictitious reconstruction guarantees reductionof costs to the center compared to the expenseof actual reconstruction. Above all, the nationalauthorities, who are working to resettle theinhabitants within the prefecture in order tobetter monitor them statistically andscientifically, are unwilling to invest in theprotection of people they view as the damnedand disposable. Why invest in public housing ina region that is already depopulated anddestined to become even more so?

The second stage in state abandonment of itsresponsibilities to victims consists oftransferring responsibility to individuals whohave been forced to adapt their lives to acontaminated environment or are faced withchoosing exile under conditions of extremeadversity. Specifically, the government offeredno financial or material assistance to those whowished to seek refuge or rebuild their liveselsewhere.8 An aggressive public relationscampaign was devised to discourage exile orrese t t l ement e l sewhere by w ide l ydisseminating images depicting how onerous itis for Japanese to leave their local areas andancestral homes. While leaving one’s home isparticularly traumatic for those who havefarmed that land all their lives, this feeling ishardly limited to Japanese farm families. Anumber of people that we interviewed duringour research expressed the desire to leavedespite their attachment to the land, only to beconfronted with the impossibility of this coursein the absence of government financialsupport.9

Reopening to better heal

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For 2011 Map (left): orange represents theevacuation zone; pink, the voluntaryevacuation zone; yellow a preparation zonefor evacuation in case of emergency. April1, 201111

The policy calling for the displaced to returnhome resulted in reopening part of therestricted zone at the end of May 2013. Thispolicy of shrinking the restricted zone hassignificant financial implications for evacueeswho are now eligible for less compensationfrom the Tokyo Electric Power Company(Tepco). So what may be good but undeservedPR for government decontamination efforts isbad news for people who now find their homesdeclared habitable when in fact that is a fictionsince their homes are located in st i l lcontaminated ghost towns. In April 2011, thegovernment established an evacuation zone of20 km around the Fukushima Daiichi plant,comprising the city of Futaba and eight other

local i t ies . The ent ire perimeter wasreorganized. The boundaries of the zone openfor return following decontamination (避難指示解除準備区域) (meaning areas in which thecontamination level was below 20 millisieverts),and the "difficult” return zone (帰還困難区域)(50 millisieverts) were revised to enablereopening of some areas (see map below). Thespecial regulation zone, to which return hadnot been permitted, comprised of nine localitiesaround the plant, was completely eliminated.10

A total of 76,420 people were affected by thesemeasures. Sixty-seven percent of them, or51,360 people, were from the zone in“preparation for cancellation of the evacuationdirective” (避難指示解除準備区域). They werepermitted to move freely throughout the zoneduring the day to visit and work on their homesand land, but not to remain over night. Thedirective was partially cancelled effectiveAugust 2014. The restricted residence zone (居住制限両区域 ) , which concerns 25% ofinhabitants (19,230 people), allows for freeentrance and exit from the zone during the day,but without authorization to work there. Thepossibility to return to work during the dayaffects 42% of the population, or 32,130people. Nonetheless, situations vary withineach locality. Supermarkets, medical centers,and other services cannot be reopened,meaning that these reopened areas remainuninhabitable for practical reasons.Nevertheless, part of the towns of Okuma andFutaba have been used as decontamination testzones, with a view toward opening the zone inpreparation for cancellation of the evacuationdirective.

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For 2014 Map (right): pink is the “difficultr e t u r n z o n e ” ( m o r e t h a n 5 0millisieverts/year), yellow is the limitedresidence area (20 to 50 msv/y), green isthe “preparation for cancellation of theevacuation directive” area (below 20msv/y). June 201411

Subdued by the illusion of protection: Let’sbe resilient!

The second phase of the migration controlpolicy was marked by the attempt to mobilizeconceptual tools, principally that of resilience.The title of the 2012 white paper of theJapanese Ministry of Education revealed thisintention: “Toward a robust and resilientsociety”. Research budgets were orientedtoward the study and implementation of thisconcept in a variety of fields. In the sciences,the notion of resiliency is used in materialsphysics to describe the elasticity of a body andits ability to return to its original form after

suffering a shock. Emmy Werner introducedthis idea in psychology, via the identification offactors that could help certain children toovercome trauma. Boris Cyrulnick spread thisconcept in France.12 Cindynics, the science ofrisk management, uses this idea today as a wayto frame models that might allow cities tobetter resist dangers. Recognizing theirvulnerability to hazards, cities must adopt aresilient character in order to handle the manyrisks that confront them, whether natural, man-made or a combination of the two.13 In thepresent case, all the tools have been mobilizedand a subtle mix of approaches to resilience--psychological, ecological, urban, and manyothers--developed, so as to counter peoples’natural instinct for self-preservation. Extollingresilience is also a strategy for shiftingresponsibility for recovery from the nationalgovernment to this region of hardscrabblepeople who have a history of overcomingadversity, turning their virtue into an excusefor the government to do as little as possible.No wonder that locals bristle at the endlesspraise for their culture of gamanzuyoi(perseverance). Yet, when speaking ofresilience in the case of nuclear catastrophe,one should nevertheless recognize that fear, asan engine of human behavior, can sometimesplay a salutary role.

Relying on urban resilience as a tool formanaging catastrophe is problematic. Thedisconnect between territory and the“producers of urban space” is increasedbecause the individual is absent from analysesthat treat the city as an object, but also as asubject--i.e., a living, autonomous being, whichone must either support or attempt to care for,without considering that it is just a thing, asimple product constructed by humans. Theessential problem that this creates is, again,irresponsibility14 regarding the consequences ofhuman activity on the environment. This leadsto the nullification of the individual as an actorin the production and management of space, asa person living in these areas, and de facto

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destroys the interaction between a place tolive, its setting, its inhabitants, its producers,and its administrators (with the last threecategories possibly overlapping).

The town of Tomioka in the zone of limitedresidence, October 25, 2013. Radiationlevel at 3 µSv/h.

An expert at Fukushima University in charge ofprotection against catastrophes, interviewed inJune 2014, spoke of the great resilience of theJapanese during earthquakes. His remarkswere illustrated by a slide presenting a simpleequation: a scale is shown with, on one side, aheavy circle representing resilience and, on theother, a light circle representing catastrophe.In this schema, the heavier the resilience, thelighter the effects of the catastrophe. When Iasked what that meant to him in concreteterms, he answered uncomfortably that threedays earlier a magnitude-4 earthquake hadnegated these concepts: “for us, now, it’s aboutenlarging the roads, so that people can flee andthe blockages of 2011 don’t reoccur in the caseof a new catastrophe, [which should beconsidered] since we are relocating them at thefoot of a nuclear plant that is still unstable.”The need to reduce the present, and growing,distance between science and conscience couldnot find a clearer example.

From resilience to the communication ofrisk

The third stage of controlling population flowsinvolves risk communication. Each year isanother step towards an ever greaterabstraction. The State has never stoppedcalling for refugees to return home, citing thepsychological suffering caused by theirseparation from their native land anddownplaying the physical and hereditary risk ofradiation.15 According to experts at FukushimaMedical University and at the IAEA, whogathered on November 24, 2013 for aninternational conference, the psychologicaldisorders observed, notably among inhabitantsof the temporary housing estates or residentsof zones “perceived” as contaminated, stemfrom, among other things, over protection.P r o f e s s o r H i r o f u m i M a s h i k o , aneuropsychiatrist in the medical department ofFukushima University, explains that the need towear a facemask, the various restrictions onusing playgrounds and pools and on theconsumption of food, etc., are stress factorsand could be at the root of psychologicaldisorders, especially among people who may bepredisposed to mental illness. At no time did hemention the possibility that such depressionmight stem from the inability to leave thecontaminated zones.

In order to get the message out to those mostconcerned and to regain the trust of thecitizenry, a communication strategy wasadopted supported by a budget target for 2014of more than two million euros. 1 6 Thisaggressive policy aims to reassure the public byteaching it that the health risks of radiation areminimal while psychological risks are severe,particularly through the organization ofworkshops on radiation and cancer designedfor primary school classes in FukushimaPrefecture17 and by distributing manuals onmanaging life in a contaminated environment.18

A strategy of indoctrination, in the literal sense,has been in place from this point on, affirming

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the absolute necessity to accept the doctrine.

Upbeat publicity poster for a March 29,2014 event at a Fukushima primaryschool19:

Kids cancer seminar

Because you live in Fukushima there is anecessity for education about cancer!

Government anxiety over a resurgence ofdeaths

There were more than 1,170 deaths (関連死)related to the explosion at the TEPCOFukushima Daiichi nuclear plant as ofSeptember 11, 2014.20 This includes deathsamong those who fled the explosion andcontamination, and emergency workers atDaiichi. The first to be touched by thisphenomenon were the elderly relocated to

“temporary” housing; their health hasgradually deteriorated as time has passed.Because the Japanese government did notaccord the right to refuge to people located inc o n t a m i n a t e d a r e a s , d e s p i t e t h erecommendations made in 2012 by AnandGrover, the UN Special Rapporteur for humanrights,21 no financial support is available fornuclear refugees seeking to relocate. Thosewho can, leave at their own expense. “Those”refers to people who are not in the officiallydesignated evacuation areas described abovewho decide to take refuge. They are considered"voluntary refugees" and thus the Governmentprovides no financial assistance. The descentinto a spiral of pauperization often leads todepression and alcoholism, and, in extremecases, suicide. If we focus on the distribution ofFukushima nuclear disaster related deaths bylocality, the towns of Namie (333 deaths),Tomioka (250 deaths), Futaba (113 deaths),and Ōkuma (106 deaths), which are adjacent tothe plant--where leakage of contaminatedwater is still not under control--togetheraccount for 802 deaths identified as resultingfrom nuclear disaster; fifty-five these occurredwithin the six months from January to June2014, indicating that the crisis persists despitegovernment propaganda that it is undercontrol. The newspaper Fukushima Minpōsounded the alarm in an article on June 21,201422 reporting the remarks of the Minister ofInternal Affairs and communications on therising number of suicides.

Increased incidence of thyroid cancer, orthe battle of the experts

The proliferation of the number of cases ofthyroid cancer must also be taken into accountin assessing the health consequences of thenuclear accident. According to results madepublic on August 24, 2014 by the FukushimaPrefecture board of inquiry, 104 of 300,000children under age eighteen were diagnosed ashaving thyroid cancer.23 The Japan Associationof Clinical Regents (JACRI-日本臨床検査薬協会),

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estimates that the natural rate of thyroidcancer in Japan is 1-3 persons per million.Epidemio log is ts , both in Japan andinternationally, have challenged the insistenceof experts on the Fukushima PrefectureCommission that these cases are not linked tothe nuclear disaster. The Commission claimsthat the rise in the number of cases of thyroidcancer for the last three years is attributable tothe “screening” effect, i.e., the comprehensivetesting of Fukushima children and advancesmade in radiological testing which now allowfor a much more precise detection of cancer. Atthe same time, it prevents any meaningfulcomparison with earlier test results. Keeping tothe strategy of providing moral comfort to thepopulace—with an eye, not only to reopeningthe evacuation zone so as to rehouse thepopulation as quickly as possible, but also tothe scheduled restart of two nuclear plants inSeptember-October 2014—the Minister of theEnvironment stated in a report made public onAugust 17, 2014, that below the level of 100msv/year, there would be no apparentconsequences on human health.24 A previousgovernment report published in February 2014designated the low risk to health of anenvironment with 100 msv/year as that of alow-dose environment.25 Professor TsudaToshihide of Okayama University, whospecializes in epidemiology, publicly contestedpoint by point a study by the FukushimaMedical University, which he found erroneous;to support his case, he cited the 2013 WHO(World Health Organization) report,26 whichclearly warns of an increase, both at presentand still to come, in the number of cancer casesin Fukushima; conversely, he criticizes theposition of the Japanese government’s denial ofthe health risks below 100 msv, noting that it isa position that few foreign epidemiologistswould support.2 7 Epidemiologist KeithBaverstock, a docent at the University ofEastern Finland and former member of theWHO, criticized the results presented in the2013 report by UNSCEAR (United NationsScientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic

Radiation); in an open letter to UNSCEAR, hepointed out that the report did not come outuntil three years after the study it was basedupon due to disagreements between membersof the commission. One of these members, Dr.Wolfgang Weiss, particularly opposedpublication of this document, as it rejected aconnection between an increase in cancerincidence and the plumes of radiation releasedby the explosions at Fukushima Daiichi.However, the report does not deny the fact thatthe effects of the accident are in no way over,since, as TEPCO acknowledges in statements inMay 2014, large quantities of radiation are stillescaping from the plant, both into the air andinto the Pacific Ocean.28

A remedy for migration: communication

In the face of quarrels among experts, therehave been efforts by others from the sameorganizations (WHO, IAEA, ICRP) to ‘rebrand’the issues through aggressive marketing ofreassuring messages. This was the case duringthe two days of the 3rd International ExpertSymposium in Fukushima, organized by theSasakawa Foundation and the FukushimaMedical University on September 8-9, 2014. Itstitle explicitly heralded a desire to transcendthe epidemiological disputes to reach thepromis ing heights of res i l ience andreconstruction: “Beyond Radiation and HealthRisk – Toward Resilience and Recovery”.

For Abel Julio Gonzales, Academician at theArgentine Academies of EnvironmentalSciences and of the Sea, as well as a member ofUNSCEAR and of the IAEA Commission onSafety Standards, everything is a question ofcommunication. After having repeated manytimes that protection has a price and that themigration of some of the population should notbe a goal, he asserted that residents’ fears aredue primarily to the term “contamination”,which, given its association with pathology, hassaddled irradiation with a purely negativeimage, despite the fact that we also receive

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radiation from the sun. This idea was picked upby Emilie Van Deveter (WHO), who proposedorganizing a workshop on radiation exposure,including that from the sun, so as to teachprimary school students basic knowledge of thesubject. “In any event,” she concludes, “wemust win the cost-benefit challenge.” In orderto do so, and to manage the anxieties of theaffected population, Jacques Lochard of theICRP has taken on the task of creating a senseof security, in particular “by persuading theinhabitants to accept this new element that willfrom now on be a part of their everyday life:contamination.” Everyone is agreed that thereis not sufficient data to evaluate the internalcontamination of the populace, but be that as itmay, this does not seem to be at the heart oftheir concerns. According to Lochard, it is not amatter of establishing a threshold, but rather ofrestoring people’s confidence by disrupting therecourse to f l ight--which comes fromarchetypes like Chernobyl--through individualmeasures, and thus allowing for self -determination over life in a contaminatedenvironment.” To do so, he has adopted themethods proposed by Ishay Ostfeld of theIsraeli Ministry of Health, at the secondsymposium organized by Fukushima MedicalUniversity and the IAEA on November 21-24,2013. Mr. Ostfeld explained that “the Israeliexperience in responding to conventional terrordemonstrates significantly more psychologicalthan physical trauma victims… thus thisexperience may also serve in the field ofradiation terror.”29 He therefore suggested theuse of techniques developed in Israel duringwar to achieve resil ience, such as theorganization of small groups of committedresidents, spread throughout the affectedterritory, who would take charge of reassuringthe neighboring populace. This work has beenundertaken in Fukushima by the ICRP, throughworkshops and seminars in concert with EthosFukushima, the 9th edition of which was held inAugust 2014.

Continuing with the war analogy, the Battle of

Fukushima is thus not about using the publicpolicy tools of post-disaster social protection toprovide help for displaced people, but requiresdiverting these resources to serve the politicalagenda of normalizing the consequences of thisnuclear disaster to facilitate nuclear reactorrestarts. This is in no way a governmentconspiracy, they insist. Rather, it is a plan formanaging migratory flows of people in the faceof a nuclear disaster, in this instance one inwhich a state (Japan) has opted to maintain itsnuclear industry. One can nonetheless wonderif the experts, despite firmly held assumptionsabout the unl imited possibi l i t ies formanipulating public opinion, should notreconsider their position, given the macabreimplications.

Cécile Asanuma-Brice, an urban sociologist,is an associate researcher at Clersé–Universityof Lille 1 and at the research center of theMaison Franco-Japonaise in Tokyo. Apermanent resident of Japan since 2001, she isthe author of numerous journal and newspaperarticles on the handling of the Fukushimanuclear disaster, including: (2014 forthcoming)“De la vulnérabilité à la résilience, réflexionssur la protection en cas de désastre extrême:Le cas de la gestion des conséquences del’explosion d’une centrale nucléaire àFukushima,” Revue Raison Publique, “Au-delàdu risque Care, capacités et résistance ensituation de désastre,” co-dir° Sandra Laugier,Solange Chavel, Marie Gaille; (Sept. 2014)Mobilisations, controverse et recueil desdonnées à Fukushima, La Lettre de l’INSHS,CNRS; (March, 2013) Fukushima, unedémocratie en souffrance, Revue Outre terre-Revue Française de géopolitique; (June 2012)Les politiques publiques du logement face à lacatastrophe du 11 mars, in C. Lévy, T. Ribault,numéro spécial de la revue EBISU n°47 de laMaison Franco-Japonaise, Catastrophe du 11mars 2011, désastre de Fukushima – Fractureset émergences.

Newspaper articles include (2014) «La légende

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Fukushima», Libération, septembre, and (2013)«Crime d’Etat» à Fukushima: «L’uniquesolution est la fuite», Le Nouvel Observateur-Rue 89, juillet, with T. Ribault.

Recommended citation: Cécile Asanuma-Brice,“Beyond Reality -or- An Illusory Ideal: Pro-nuclear Japan’s Management of MigratoryFlows in a Nuclear Catastrophe,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 47, No. 1,November 24, 2014.

Notes

1 C. ASANUMA-BRICE (2011): Logement socialau Japon: Un bilan après la crise du 11 mars2011, Revue Urbanisme, Nov.

2 C. ASANUMA-BRICE et T. RIBAULT (2012):Quelle protection humaine en situation devulnérabilité totale? - Logement et migrationintérieure dans le désastre de Fukushima -Report within the program Nucléaire, risque etsociété of the Interdisciplinarity Project of theCNRS.

3 J.-J. Delfour (2014): La condition nucléaire,réflexions sur la situation atomique del’humanité, Paris, éditions L’échappée.

4 Among others: Le Monde (02/05/2013): «LeDuo Mitsubishi-Areva va construire quatreréacteurs nucléaires en Turquie»; Le Parisien(26/10/2013): “Nucléaire: accord de partenariatentre Areva, Mon-Atom et Mitsubishi”.

5 Le Monde (16/06/2014): «Le Japon revientdans la course aux ventes d’armes».

6 F. Romario (1994): Energie, économie,environnement: Le cas de l’électricité enEurope entre passé, présent et futur, ed.Librairie DROZ, Genève.

7 Interview conducted with T. Ribault inFukushima in November 2013. Lochard wasreferr ing here to the ETHOS projectestablished by the CEPN in Chernobyl in 1986

and Fukushima in 2012, with the aim ofproviding the population living in contaminatedareas with knowledge of radioactivityprotection, so as to shift responsibility for theirprotection from the state and/or TEPCO to localpeople. We may call this the self-managementof its protection.

8 The Fukushima court ordered TEPCO to paycompensation of 49,000,000 JPY.

9 C. ASANUMA-BRICE (2013) Fukushima, unedémocratie en souffrance, Revue Outre terre-Revue Française de géopolitique, Mars.

10 Yomiuri, 9 mai 2013: “Announcement on May7 , 2 0 1 3 b y t h e n u c l e a r d i s a s t e rcountermeasures headquarters [joint measurescouncil for nuclear disaster] (原子力災害対策本部) of the elimination of the previously off-limitsspecial surveillance zone starting on the 28th ofthis month.»

11 Fukushima Minpō, 23 juin 2014: 10 yearsafter the accident, the government takes stock,with measures established following thedecontamination of the difficult return zone, atless than 20 msv 事故後１０年全て２０ミリシーベルト未満　帰還困難区域除染後の線量　国が試算

12 Emmy E. Werner et Ruth S. Smith (1989),Vulnerable but Invincible: A Longitudinal Studyof Resilient Children and Youth, Broché; BorisCyrulnick (1999), Un merveilleux malheur, éd.Odile Jacob (2011), Resilience: How your innerstrength can set you free from the past,Tarcher.

13 G. DJAMENT-TRAN, M. REGHEZZA-ZITT(2012): Résiliences urbaines Les villes face auxcatastrophes, ed. Le Manuscrit.

14 This irresponsibility is a product of cuttingthe link between the different actors of thecity’s production and practice that is necessaryfor effective responsibility. Cf. J.TRONTO «Theterm responsibility (…) refers to the idea of a

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«response», that is to say to a clearly rationalattitude.» (p.103), in Carol Gilligan, ArlieHochschild, Joan TRONTO (2013): Contrel’indifférence des privilégiés, éd. Payot.

15 Fukushima Minpō, Oct. 10, 2013: Rise insuicide rates due to the prolonged period ofexile - in the (Fukushima) prefecture, and in thethree devastated prefectures.

“The Minister of Internal Affairs has recognizeda tendency towards a greater number ofsuicides in the prefecture due to the accident atthe Daiichi nuclear plant and the disaster inEastern Japan. As of the end of August of thisyear, the figure rose to 15 people; through allof last year, the tally was 13 people, while thenumber of suicides had already reached 10 twoyears ago. With five times as many suicides asin the prefecture of Iwate, Fukushimaprefecture has the greatest number of the threedevastated prefectures. Specialists point to thepsychological burden presented by the lengthof their refuge far from home. It is to be fearedthat this tendency [to commit suicide] toincrease will accelerate; emergency measuresare becoming necessary.”

16 平成２６年度　原子力関係経費既算要求額、第３４回原子力委員会資料第６号。

17 The 52nd Annual Meeting of Japan Society ofClinical Oncology: Kids cancer seminar-Because you live in Fukushima there is anecessity for education about cancer!

18 NHK, June 10, 2014, a manual teaching how«to live with radioactivity»“放射能と暮らす”ガイド is henceforth being distributed in localcommunities.

19 The 52nd Annual Meeting of Japan Society ofClinical Oncology

20「原発関連死、１１００人超す　福島、半年で７０人増 (the number of nuclear-relateddeaths surpasses 1100 people, with an increaseof 70 people in six months) Tōkyō Shinbun,

Sept. 11, 2014.

21 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rightof everyone to the enjoyment of the highestattainable standard of physical and mentalhealth, Anand Grover, ONU, Mission to Japan(15- 26 November 2012).

2 2「関連死で自殺歯止めかからず　福島県内(suicides tied to the accident continueunabated inside Fukushima Prefecture),Fukushima Minpō, 21 juin 2014.

23「甲状腺がん、疑い含め１０４人　福島の子供３０万人調査」(Thyroid cancer, 104 personnes,enquête sur 300 000 enfants de Fukushima),Asahi, 24 août 2014.

24 2014年8月17日「放射線についての正しい知識を。」という政府広報が、朝日新聞、毎日新聞、読売新聞、産経新聞、日経新聞の大手５紙と、福島民報と福島民友の地方紙２紙に掲載された。(Report made public on August 17, 2014 underthe title “For an exact understanding ofradiation” in five national papers: Asahi,Mainichi, Yomiuri, Sankei, Nikkei; and twolocal ones: Fukushima Minpō et FukushimaMinyū.) The report was also carried by thegovernment’s internet-TV channel. See Dr.Keiichi Nakagawa (Associate Professor, TokyoUniversity Hospital)

25 Basic reconstruction information.

26 WHO, Health Risk Assessment, 2013.

27 津田敏秀、「100msvをめぐって繰り返される誤解を招く表現」、科学、岩波、2 0 1 4年 5月、pp.534-530. TSUDA Toshihide, «Around 100msv, dec larat ions that mul t ip ly themisunderstandings » Science Review, Iwanami,May 2014, pp. 534-540.

28 Keith Baverstock, «2013 UNSCEAR Reporton Fukushima: a critical appraisal», August 24,2014.

29 Conference Program, International AcademicConference: Radiation, Health, and Society:

APJ | JF 12 | 47 | 1

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Post – Fukushima Implications for Health Professional Education, 21-24 Nov. 2013, p.79.