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COLLABORATION AND TRUST BUILDING AMONG STAKEHOLDERS IN CITARUM RIVER BASIN CONFLICT
Utomo Sarjono Putro; Dhanan Sarwo Utomo; Pri Hermawan
School of Business and ManagementInstitut Teknologi Bandung
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RIVER REGION UNIT in:
-Prov. Banten-DKI Jakarta
-Prov. Jawa Barat
POLA INDUK JAWA BARAT 2000/ MCC 2001
Citarum River Basin:6.080 Km2
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POPULATIONPRESSURE causes
deforestation
Untreatment waste disposal from
industries
UNCARE CULTUREcauses rubbish along
the river
TOO MUCH:
FLOOD
TOO LITTLE:
DROUGHT
TOO DIRTY:
DISEASE
Three Classical Problems of Citarum River basin Problem
RUSTAM SYARIF/ 2002
RUSTAM SYARIF/ 2002
RUSTAM SYARIF/ 2002
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STOP DEFORESTATION ----------------------NOT HAPPY UPPER LOCAL GOVERNMENTSTOP ILLEGAL LODGING ---------------- NOT HAPPY UPPER STREAM LOCAL PEOPLEAUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT--------------------------------NOT HAPPY COMMUNITYSELF INTERESTS UPSTREAM --------------------------------------- SUFFER DOWNSTREAMDOWNSTREAM DOESN’T CONTRIBUTE TO UPPER ------UNPROTECTED UPSTREAMBLAME INDUSTRIES---------------------------------------------------------------UNEMPLOYMENTOVERACT ENVIRONMENTALIST --------------------------STAGNANT DEVELOPMENT
Partial Proposals Create Confrontations
AT LAST THE ENVIRONMENT IS MORE AND MORE DEGRADED AND “ THE PEOPLE” IS THEN BEING VICTIMS
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Transformation System
Ideal Future (No dilemmas)
• Agents have common position;• Agents have no dilemmas of
cooperation.
Existing•Agents conflict each other•Agents blame each other•Partial Actions•Confrontations involving dilemmas
Drama Theory
How can dilemmas be eliminated?
Collaboration
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OBJECTIVES
This study aims to construct an agent-based simulation of the dynamics of negotiation based on drama theory frame-work in which the Agents are equipped with emotions and ability to change their emotions.
The simulation model is developed to mimic the dynamic of negotiation in real world.
Using the constructed model, this study will propose strategy that can promote collaboration among stake holders in Citarum River Basin Conflict.
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MethodologyVirtual experiment
Drawing Conclusion
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Modelling Conflict by Drama Theory
Agent based Model:How is the influence of Agents’ emotion on dilemma reduction?
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Climax: ABM of Dynamic Negotiation
Agent 1 Agent 2• New Payoff
• New Emotion• New
Perception
Current CRF
Next CRF
OptionsAgent 1`s position
Agent-2`s position
O1 Y (75) N (87)
O2 N (79) Y (89)
OptionsAgent 1`s position
Agent-2`s position
O1 Y(75) N (87)
O2 N (79) Y (89)
Negotiation
Current Dilemma
Next Dilemma
Internal attributes:•Payoff/Preference•Perception other agent’s payoff•Bargaining strategy•Emotion
Internal attributes:•Payoff/Preference•Perception other agent’s payoff•Bargaining strategy•Emotion
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OptionsAgent-1`s
positionAgent-2`s position
O11 Y (75) Y (87)
O12N (79) Y (89)
Modeling Negotiation ProcessIncompatible choice
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Options
Agent-1`s positi
onAgent-2`s position
O11 Y (75) Y (87)
O12N (69) Y (59)
Every agent who has a dilemma will negotiate based on his/her emotional state (positive or negative emotion).
Positive emotional state is more conducive to a person acting in a friendly and sociable manner with others;
Conversely, a negative emotional state tends to heighten chances that the individual will be unfriendly, inconsiderate, or even rude to others.
Payoff DistanceAgent-1’s proposal
Agent-2’s proposal
Agent-1 Agent-2
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Climax: Dilemmas
Confrontation dilemmas(happen when there is no common
position) Threat dilemma Rejection dilemma Positioning dilemma Persuasion dilemma
Collaboration dilemmas(happen when there is a common position) Trust dilemma Cooperation dilemma
12Threat Dilemma
Party 1 has threat dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1`s threat is not credible according to party 2, because party 2 knows that party 1 prefers another scenario than the threat.
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Rejection Dilemma
Party 1 has rejection dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1`s rejection of party 2’s position is not credible according to party 2, because party 2 knows that party 1 prefers party 2’s position than the threat.
14Positioning Dilemma
Party 1 has positioning dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1 can not persuade party 2 to accept his/her position because party 1 prefers party 2’s position than his/her own position.
15Persuasion Dilemma
Party 1 has persuasion dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1 can not persuade party 2 to accept party 1`s position because party 2 prefers threated position than party 1`s position.
16Trust Dilemma
Party 1 has trust dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1 can not believe that party 2 commits with the common position (agreement), because party 1 knows that there is another scenario preferred by party 2 than the common position.
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Cooperation Dilemma
Party 1 has cooperation dilemma with respect to party 2, because party 1 has incentives not to commit with the common position (agreement), because another scenario is better than the common position.
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Climax: Dilemma can be identified from CRF
Current Dilemma
Current CRF
Negotiation
Next CRF
Next DilemmaNext Interaction
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Climax: Modeling Emotion
Emotion model used in this paper is the development from emotional negotiation model PAD (Jiang et.al.): Pleasure (rp): gives the direction of emotions; i.e; positive
emotion status (Pleasure)/negative emotion status (Displeasure).
Arousal (ra); the degree of effects from environments that strengthen (Arousal) or weaken the pleasure (Non-Arousal).
Dominance (rd); the degree of an agent`s ability to control the pleasure and arousal.
Therefore, each agent has the emotional state, i.e.:
.
;)1( ijijij dapij rrrES )1,1(,, dap rrr
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Modelling Emotion Dynamics based on experience from the last interaction
My current bargain is better than my previous bargain and my bargain is perceived better. OCC emotion : Satisfy, Joy
0&0 tji
tij OvOv
increase
increase
increase
tij
tij
tij
rd
ra
rp
My current bargain is better than my previous bargain but my bargain is perceived worse. OCC emotion : Anger
0&0 tji
tij OvOv
increase
increase
decrease
tij
tij
tij
rd
ra
rp
My current bargain is worse than my previous bargain but my bargain is perceived better. OCC emotion : Gratitude
0&0 tji
tij OvOv
decrease
increase
increase
tij
tij
tij
rd
ra
rp
My current bargain is worse than my previous bargain and my bargain is perceived worse. OCC emotion : Fear confirmed
0&0 tji
tij OvOv
decrease
decrease
decrease
tij
tij
tij
rd
ra
rp
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Common Reference Frame Before and After 2008 (based on focus group discussion)
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Common Reference Frame Before and After 2009 (based on focus group discussion)
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Experiments 1:Sensitivity Analysis
Experiment Scenarios:1 ) All agents begin the negotiation with negative emotion2 ) All agents begin the negotiation with neutral emotion3 ) All agents begin the negotiation with positive emotion
Each scenario was run 30 times
Using 95% confidence interval there is enough evidence that if agent begin the negotiation with negative emotion the times required to eliminate confrontation dilemmas and the collaboration dilemmas that remain will be higher than if agents use positive or neutral emotion
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Experiments 2
Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s emotionScenario 1: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2008
There is a phase in the simulation output that can mimics the actual agent’s emotional dynamics
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Experiments 2
Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s emotionScenario 2: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2009
There is a phase in the simulation output that can mimics the actual agent’s emotional dynamics
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Experiments 3
Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s positionsScenario 1: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2008
The model can predict the majority of agent’s position in the real world
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Experiments 3
Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s positionsScenario 2: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2009
The model can predict the majority of agent’s position in the real world
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CONCLUSIONS (1)
This study constructed an agent-based simulation of the dynamics of negotiation based on drama theory that incorporates agent’s emotions.
The model can show the evolution of a common reference, the time required to eliminates confrontation dilemmas and the collaboration dilemmas that remain after all agents reach compatible positions.
The model can also mimic the dynamics of agent’s position and the majority of agent’s position in the real world.
The model in this study can provide insight to stakeholders regarding the potential evolution of the conflict that may occur due to the action and reaction of each agent. Using table top exercise or FGD, the model can help to test possible scenarios and alternatives.
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CONCLUSIONS (2)
Based on the simulation results in Citarum River Basin conflict case, it can be concluded that:
If agents use negative emotions to other agents then, the time required to eliminate the confrontation dilemmas will be longer than if they use neutral or positive emotions.
If agents use negative emotions the numbers of collaboration dilemmas that remain are significantly higher than if they use neutral or positive emotions.
In the real world, positive emotions can be implemented in several forms for example:
willingness to compromise, give empathy to others, to convince others etc.
30 Thank You