Compendium of Cases Labor Rev3.5 Reasonable Causal ConnectionG.R. No. 148132 January 28, 2008SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,petitioner,vs.REGINA M. ASTORGA,respondent.x---------------------------------------------------xG.R. No. 151079 January 28, 2008SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,petitioner,vs.REGINA M. ASTORGA,respondent.x---------------------------------------------------xG.R. No. 151372 January 28, 2008REGINA M. ASTORGA,petitioner,vs.SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and ANN MARGARET V. SANTIAGO,respondents.D E C I S I O NNACHURA,J.:For the resolution of the Court are three consolidated petitions for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. G.R. No. 148132 assails the February 28, 2000 Decision1and the May 7, 2001 Resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 53831. G.R. Nos. 151079 and 151372 question the June 11, 2001 Decision3and the December 18, 2001 Resolution4in CA-G.R. SP. No. 57065.Regina M. Astorga (Astorga) was employed by respondent Smart Communications, Incorporated (SMART) on May 8, 1997 as District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD). She was receiving a monthly salary ofP33,650.00. As District Sales Manager, Astorga enjoyed additional benefits, namely, annual performance incentive equivalent to 30% of her annual gross salary, a group life and hospitalization insurance coverage, and a car plan in the amount ofP455,000.00.5In February 1998, SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations. This was made known to the employees on February 27, 1998.6Part of the reorganization was the outsourcing of the marketing and sales force. Thus, SMART entered into a joint venture agreement with NTT of Japan, and formed SMART-NTT Multimedia, Incorporated (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do the sales and marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorgas division.To soften the blow of the realignment, SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG personnel who would be recommended by SMART. SMART then conducted a performance evaluation of CSMG personnel and those who garnered the highest ratings were favorably recommended to SNMI. Astorga landed last in the performance evaluation, thus, she was not recommended by SMART. SMART, nonetheless, offered her a supervisory position in the Customer Care Department, but she refused the offer because the position carried lower salary rank and rate.Despite the abolition of the CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for work. But on March 3, 1998, SMART issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her employment on ground of redundancy, effective April 3, 1998. Astorga received it on March 16, 1998.7The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a Complaint8for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other benefits with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART and Ann Margaret V. Santiago (Santiago). She claimed that abolishing CSMG and, consequently, terminating her employment was illegal for it violated her right to security of tenure. She also posited that it was illegal for an employer, like SMART, to contract out services which will displace the employees, especially if the contractor is an in-house agency.9SMART responded that there was valid termination. It argued that Astorga was dismissed by reason of redundancy, which is an authorized cause for termination of employment, and the dismissal was effected in accordance with the requirements of the Labor Code. The redundancy of Astorgas position was the result of the abolition of CSMG and the creation of a specialized and more technically equipped SNMI, which is a valid and legitimate exercise of management prerogative.10In the meantime, on May 18, 1998, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under the companys car plan program, or to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition.11Astorga, however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) on August 10, 1998. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1936 and was raffled to Branch 57.12Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of (i) lack of jurisdiction; (ii) failure to state a cause of action; (iii) litis pendentia; and (iv) forum-shopping. Astorga posited that the regular courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts.13Pending resolution of Astorgas motion to dismiss thereplevincase, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision14dated August 20, 1998, declaring Astorgas dismissal from employment illegal. While recognizing SMARTs right to abolish any of its departments, the Labor Arbiter held that such right should be exercised in good faith and for causes beyond its control. The Arbiter found the abolition of CSMG done neither in good faith nor for causes beyond the control of SMART, but a ploy to terminate Astorgas employment. The Arbiter also ruled that contracting out the functions performed by Astorga to an in-house agency like SNMI was illegal, citing Section 7(e), Rule VIII-A of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code.Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter ordered:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of [Astorga] to be illegal and unjust. [SMART and Santiago] are hereby ordered to:1. Reinstate [Astorga] to [her] former position or to a substantially equivalent position, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, with full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits from the time of [her] dismissal to the date of reinstatement, which computed as of this date, are as follows:(a)Astorga

BACKWAGES; (P33,650.00 x 4 months)=P134,600.00

UNPAID SALARIES (February 15, 1998-April 3, 1998

February 15-28, 1998=P16,823.00

March 1-31, [1998]=P33,650.00

April 1-3, 1998=P3,882.69

CAR MAINTENANCE ALLOWANCE(P2,000.00 x 4)=P8,000.00

FUEL ALLOWANCE(300 liters/mo. x 4 mos. atP12.04/liter)=P14,457.83

TOTAL=P211,415.52

x x x x3. Jointly and severally pay moral damages in the amount ofP500,000.00 x x x and exemplary damages in the amount ofP300,000.00. x x x4. Jointly and severally pay 10% of the amount due as attorneys fees.SO ORDERED.15Subsequently, on March 29, 1999, the RTC issued an Order16denying Astorgas motion to dismiss the replevin case. In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated that:Assessing the [submission] of the parties, the Court finds no merit in the motion to dismiss.As correctly pointed out, this case is to enforce a right of possession over a company car assigned to the defendant under a car plan privilege arrangement. The car is registered in the name of the plaintiff. Recovery thereof via replevin suit is allowed by Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is undoubtedly within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.In the Complaint, plaintiff claims to be the owner of the company car and despite demand, defendant refused to return said car. This is clearly sufficient statement of plaintiffs cause of action.Neither is there forum shopping. The element of litis penden[t]ia does not appear to exist because the judgment in the labor dispute will not constitute res judicata to bar the filing of this case.WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.17Astorga filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on June 18, 1999.18Astorga elevated the denial of her motionvia certiorarito the CA, which, in its February 28, 2000 Decision,19reversed the RTC ruling. Granting the petition and, consequently, dismissing thereplevincase, the CA held that the case is intertwined with Astorgas complaint for illegal dismissal; thus, it is the labor tribunal that has rightful jurisdiction over the complaint. SMARTs motion for reconsideration having been denied,20it elevated the case to this Court, now docketed as G.R. No. 148132.Meanwhile, SMART also appealed the unfavorable ruling of the Labor Arbiter in the illegal dismissal case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In its September 27, 1999 Decision,21the NLRC sustained Astorgas dismissal. Reversing the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC declared the abolition of CSMG and the creation of SNMI to do the sales and marketing services for SMART a valid organizational action. It overruled the Labor Arbiters ruling that SNMI is an in-house agency, holding that it lacked legal basis. It also declared that contracting, subcontracting and streamlining of operations for the purpose of increasing efficiency are allowed under the law. The NLRC further found erroneous the Labor Arbiters disquisition that redundancy to be valid must be impelled by economic reasons, and upheld the redundancy measures undertaken by SMART.The NLRC disposed, thus:WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby reversed and set aside. [Astorga] is further ordered to immediately return the company vehicle assigned to her. [Smart and Santiago] are hereby ordered to pay the final wages of [Astorga] after [she] had submitted the required supporting papers therefor.SO ORDERED.22Astorga filed a motion for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it on December 21, 1999.23Astorga then went to the CA viacertiorari. On June 11, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision24affirming with modification the resolutions of the NLRC. In gist, the CA agreed with the NLRC that the reorganization undertaken by SMART resulting in the abolition of CSMG was a legitimate exercise of management prerogative. It rejected Astorgas posturing that her non-absorption into SNMI was tainted with bad faith. However, the CA found that SMART failed to comply with the mandatory one-month notice prior to the intended termination. Accordingly, the CA imposed a penalty equivalent to Astorgas one-month salary for this non-compliance. The CA also set aside the NLRCs order for the return of the company vehicle holding that this issue is not essentially a labor concern, but is civil in nature, and thus, within the competence of the regular court to decide. It added that the matter had not been fully ventilated before the NLRC, but in the regular court.Astorga filed a motion for reconsideration, while SMART sought partial reconsideration, of the Decision. On December 18, 2001, the CA resolved the motions,viz.:WHEREFORE, [Astorgas] motion for reconsideration is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. [Smart] is hereby ordered to pay [Astorga] her backwages from 15 February 1998 to 06 November 1998. [Smarts] motion for reconsideration is outrightly DENIED.SO ORDERED.25Astorga and SMART came to us with their respective petitions for review assailing the CA ruling, docketed as G.R Nos. 151079 and 151372. On February 27, 2002, this Court ordered the consolidation of these petitions with G.R. No. 148132.26In her Memorandum, Astorga argues:ITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF ASTORGAS DISMISSAL DESPITE THE FACT THAT HER DISMISSAL WAS EFFECTED IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE, CONSIDERING THAT THERE WAS NO GENUINE GROUND FOR HER DISMISSAL.IISMARTS REFUSAL TO REINSTATE ASTORGA DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 223 OF THE LABOR CODE, ENTITLES ASTORGA TO HER SALARIES DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL.IIITHE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF A CAR WHICH ASTORGA ACQUIRED AS PART OF HER EMPLOYEE (sic) BENEFIT.27On the other hand, Smart in its Memoranda raises the following issues:IWHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION WHEN IT RULED THAT SMART DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO TERMINATING ASTORGA ON THE GROUND OF REDUNDANCY.IIWHETHER THE NOTICES GIVEN BY SMART TO ASTORGA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS BEFORE TERMINATION.IIIWHETHER THE RULE ENUNCIATED IN SERRANO VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FINDS APPLICATION IN THE CASE AT BAR CONSIDERING THAT IN THE SERRANO CASE THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO NOTICE AT ALL.28IVWHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISION[S] OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN FILED BY SMART TO RECOVER ITS OWN COMPANY VEHICLE FROM A FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO WAS LEGALLY DISMISSED.VWHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE REPLEVIN CASE IS NOT THE ENFORCEMENT OF A CAR PLAN PRIVILEGE BUT SIMPLY THE RECOVERY OF A COMPANY CAR.VIWHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT ASTORGA CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED AS AN EMPLOYEE OF SMART UNDER THE LABOR CODE.29The Court shall first deal with the propriety of dismissing the replevin case filed with the RTC of Makati City allegedly for lack of jurisdiction, which is the issue raised in G.R. No. 148132.Replevinis an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property.30The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.31That the action commenced by SMART against Astorga in the RTC of Makati City was one for replevin hardly admits of doubt.In reversing the RTC ruling and consequently dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the CA made the following disquisition, viz.:[I]t is plain to see that the vehicle was issued to [Astorga] by [Smart] as part of the employment package. We doubt that [SMART] would extend [to Astorga] the same car plan privilege were it not for her employment as district sales manager of the company. Furthermore, there is no civil contract for a loan between [Astorga] and [Smart]. Consequently, We find that the car plan privilege is a benefit arising out of employer-employee relationship. Thus, the claim for such falls squarely within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters and the NLRC.32We do not agree. Contrary to the CAs ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorgas motion to dismiss. SMARTs demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations.33As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.InBasaya, Jr. v. Militante,34this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit, explained:Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.x x x xThe labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioners right to picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession of the Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to possess in addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws.The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it overturned the RTC ruling and ordered the dismissal of the replevin case for lack of jurisdiction.Having resolved that issue, we proceed to rule on the validity of Astorgas dismissal.Astorga was terminated due to redundancy, which is one of the authorized causes for the dismissal of an employee. The nature of redundancy as an authorized cause for dismissal is explained in the leading case ofWiltshire File Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,35viz:x x x redundancy in an employers personnel force necessarily or even ordinarily refers to duplication of work. That no other person was holding the same position that private respondent held prior to termination of his services does not show that his position had not become redundant. Indeed, in any well organized business enterprise, it would be surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or more people doing the work of one person. We believe that redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.The characterization of an employees services as superfluous or no longer necessary and, therefore, properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom and soundness of such characterization or decision is not subject to discretionary review provided, of course, that a violation of law or arbitrary or malicious action is not shown.36Astorga claims that the termination of her employment was illegal and tainted with bad faith. She asserts that the reorganization was done in order to get rid of her. But except for her barefaced allegation, no convincing evidence was offered to prove it. This Court finds it extremely difficult to believe that SMART would enter into a joint venture agreement with NTT, form SNMI and abolish CSMG/FSD simply for the sole purpose of easing out a particular employee, such as Astorga. Moreover, Astorga never denied that SMART offered her a supervisory position in the Customer Care Department, but she refused the offer because the position carried a lower salary rank and rate. If indeed SMART simply wanted to get rid of her, it would not have offered her a position in any department in the enterprise.Astorga also states that the justification advanced by SMART is not true because there was no compelling economic reason for redundancy. But contrary to her claim, an employer is not precluded from adopting a new policy conducive to a more economical and effective management even if it is not experiencing economic reverses. Neither does the law require that the employer should suffer financial losses before he can terminate the services of the employee on the ground of redundancy.37We agree with the CA that the organizational realignment introduced by SMART, which culminated in the abolition of CSMG/FSD and termination of Astorgas employment was an honest effort to make SMARTs sales and marketing departments more efficient and competitive. As the CA had taken pains to elucidate:x x x a careful and assiduous review of the records will yield no other conclusion than that the reorganization undertaken by SMART is for no purpose other than its declared objective as a labor and cost savings device. Indeed, this Court finds no fault in SMARTs decision to outsource the corporate sales market to SNMI in order to attain greater productivity. [Astorga] belonged to the Sales Marketing Group under the Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD), a distinct sales force of SMART in charge of selling SMARTs telecommunications services to the corporate market. SMART, to ensure it can respond quickly, efficiently and flexibly to its customers requirement, abolished CSMG/FSD and shortly thereafter assigned its functions to newly-created SNMI Multimedia Incorporated, a joint venture company of SMART and NTT of Japan, for the reason that CSMG/FSD does not have the necessary technical expertise required for the value added services. By transferring the duties of CSMG/FSD to SNMI, SMART has created a more competent and specialized organization to perform the work required for corporate accounts. It is also relieved SMART of all administrative costs management, time and money-needed in maintaining the CSMG/FSD. The determination to outsource the duties of the CSMG/FSD to SNMI was, to Our mind, a sound business judgment based on relevant criteria and is therefore a legitimate exercise of management prerogative.Indeed, out of our concern for those lesser circumstanced in life, this Court has inclined towards the worker and upheld his cause in most of his conflicts with his employer. This favored treatment is consonant with the social justice policy of the Constitution. But while tilting the scales of justice in favor of workers, the fundamental law also guarantees the right of the employer to reasonable returns for his investment.38In this light, we must acknowledge the prerogative of the employer to adopt such measures as will promote greater efficiency, reduce overhead costs and enhance prospects of economic gains, albeit always within the framework of existing laws. Accordingly, we sustain the reorganization and redundancy program undertaken by SMART.However, as aptly found by the CA, SMART failed to comply with the mandated one (1) month notice prior to termination. The record is clear that Astorga received the notice of termination only on March 16, 199839or less than a month prior to its effectivity on April 3, 1998. Likewise, the Department of Labor and Employment was notified of the redundancy program only on March 6, 1998.40Article 283 of the Labor Code clearly provides:Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof x x x.SMARTs assertion that Astorga cannot complain of lack of notice because the organizational realignment was made known to all the employees as early as February 1998 fails to persuade. Astorgas actual knowledge of the reorganization cannot replace the formal and written notice required by the law. In the written notice, the employees are informed of the specific date of the termination, at least a month prior to the effectivity of such termination, to give them sufficient time to find other suitable employment or to make whatever arrangements are needed to cushion the impact of termination. In this case, notwithstanding Astorgas knowledge of the reorganization, she remained uncertain about the status of her employment until SMART gave her formal notice of termination. But such notice was received by Astorga barely two (2) weeks before the effective date of termination, a period very much shorter than that required by law.Be that as it may, this procedural infirmity would not render the termination of Astorgas employment illegal. The validity of termination can exist independently of the procedural infirmity of the dismissal.41InDAP Corporation v. CA,42we found the dismissal of the employees therein valid and for authorized cause even if the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code. This Court upheld the dismissal, but held the employer liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements.The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in sustaining Astorgas dismissal and at the same time, awarding indemnity for violation of Astorga's statutory rights.However, we find the need to modify, by increasing, the indemnity awarded by the CA to Astorga, as a sanction on SMART for non-compliance with the one-month mandatory notice requirement, in light of our ruling inJaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot,43viz.:[I]f the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should betemperedbecause the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee, and (2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should bestifferbecause the dismissal process was initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative.We deem it proper to increase the amount of the penalty on SMART toP50,000.00.As provided in Article 283 of the Labor Code, Astorga is, likewise, entitled to separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to at least one (1) months pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The records show that Astorgas length of service is less than a year. She is, therefore, also entitled to separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay.Finally, we note that Astorga claimed non-payment of wages from February 15, 1998. This assertion was never rebutted by SMART in the proceedingsa quo. No proof of payment was presented by SMART to disprove the allegation. It is settled that in labor cases, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer.44SMART failed to discharge theonus probandi. Accordingly, it must be held liable for Astorgas salary from February 15, 1998 until the effective date of her termination, on April 3, 1998.However, the award of backwages to Astorga by the CA should be deleted for lack of basis. Backwages is a relief given to an illegally dismissed employee. Thus, before backwages may be granted, there must be a finding of unjust or illegal dismissal from work.45The Labor Arbiter ruled that Astorga was illegally dismissed. But on appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters ruling and categorically declared Astorgas dismissal valid. This ruling was affirmed by the CA in its assailed Decision. Since Astorgas dismissal is for an authorized cause, she is not entitled to backwages. The CAs award of backwages is totally inconsistent with its finding of valid dismissal.WHEREFORE, the petition of SMART docketed as G.R. No. 148132 isGRANTED. The February 28, 2000 Decision and the May 7, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 53831 areSET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 isDIRECTEDto proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 98-1936 and render its Decision with reasonable dispatch.On the other hand, the petitions of SMART and Astorga docketed as G.R. Nos. 151079 and 151372 areDENIED. The June 11, 2001 Decision and the December 18, 2001 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP. No. 57065, areAFFIRMEDwithMODIFICATION. Astorga is declared validly dismissed. However, SMART is ordered to pay AstorgaP50,000.00 as indemnity for its non-compliance with procedural due process, her separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay, and her salary from February 15, 1998 until the effective date of her termination on April 3, 1998. The award of backwages isDELETEDfor lack of basis.GRANDTEQINDUSTRIAL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. and ABELARDO M. GONZALES,Petitioners,-versus-EDNA MARGALLO,Respondent.G.R. No. 181393Present:YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,Chairperson,VELASCO, JR.,CHICO-NAZARIO,NACHURA, andPERALTA,JJ.Promulgated:July 28, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]dated 21 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100012, which affirmed the Decision[2]dated 18 October 2006, as modified by the Resolution[3]dated 21 May 2007, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 045888-05.The NLRC effectively reversed the Decision[4]dated 11 July 2005 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-10803-04, which entirely dismissed the Complaint filed by respondent Edna Margallo (Margallo) against petitioners Grandteq Industrial Steel Products, Inc. (Grandteq) and Abelardo M. Gonzales (Gonzales); and, instead, ordered Grandteq and Gonzales to refund to Margallo her car loan payments, as well as to pay the latter sales commission and attorneys fees.Grandteq is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling welding electrodes, alloy steels, aluminum and copper alloys.[5]Gonzales is the President/Owner of Grandteq.[6]Grandteq employed Margallo as Sales Engineer beginning3 August 1999.[7]Margallo claimed that on an unstated date, she availed herself of the car loan program offered to her by Grandteq as a reward for being Salesman of the Year.She paid the down payment on a brand new Toyota Corolla,[8]amounting toP201,000.00, out of her own pocket.The monthly amortization for the car wasP10,302.00, of whichP5,302.00 was to be her share andP5,000.00 was to be the share of Grandteq.On29 December 2003, Margallo received a letter[9]signed by Gonzales and Rolando de Leon (DeLeon), Vice-President for Administration of Grandteq, which reads:Mrs. Edna E. Margalloc/o Grandteq IndustrialSteel Products, Inc.#2 Cooper St., cor. BenitezSFDM,Quezon CityDear Mrs. Margallo:This is to inform you that our records show the following:1)That, lastDecember 18, 2003, you instructed our company driver and helper to load 4 pcs. tool steel to be delivered at circle freight.2)That together with Mr. Steve Rivera, on or about 12:00 noon, you went at (sic) Eagle Global Logistics at Circle Freight, NAIA, Paraaque City to ship the following items to Moog Control Corp. Phils. Branch located at Baguio Ecozone,BaguioCity, using the Sales Invoice of JVM Industrial Supply and Allied Services.a) 2 pcs. tool steel 4140 x 2x 3b) 2 pcs. tool steel 4140 1x 2 x 33)That you are working with JVM Industrial Supply and Allied Services concurrent with your being employed with Grandteq Industrial Steel Products, Inc.4)That JVM Industrial Supply and Allied Services are supplying steel products to Moog Control Corp. Phils. Branch which is also a client of Grandteq and which you are the authorized salesman of the company.Because of this, you are given a (sic) twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt of this letter to submit a written explanation on why you should not be given a disciplinary action for allegedly violating/committing:a)Moonlightingb)Sabotagec)Breach of trust and confidence (labor code).You are also invited to attend a meeting with regards to the allegations onJan. 5, 2004at10:00 a.m.You may bring with you a lawyer or any representative to assist you on (sic) the said meeting.Failure on your part to submit a written explanation on the specified period and failure to attend the hearing would mean that you are waiving your rights to be heard and the appropriate action will be taken against you.Moreover, to protect the evidences and witnesses against you, management has decided to place you under preventive suspension effectiveDecember 29, 2003.Very truly yours,(Signed)(Signed)Abelardo M. GonzalesRonaldo A. de LeonPresidentVP AdministrationResponding to the foregoing letter, Margallo wrote the following letter-reply dated30 December 2003:December 30, 2003To:Mr. Abelardo M. GonzalesPresidentThru:Mr. Ronald A. de LeonVP AdministrationDear Sir,Last December 18, 2003, Mr. Steve D. Rivera instructed me to tell to our delivery people to bring the said item to circle freight.Which I did that (sic) I thought it was ok because it was inside the company.Sir I was just following orders from Mr. D. Rivera who is one of my boss (sic). Sir, what I did is the same thing that Ive been doing with my other bosses.That i[f] they instructed me to do things I immediately follow.Because I am only an employee.Sir never that I work with JVM (sic).Sir im (sic) sorry if I did wrong by not asking what to do.Which I think an ordinary employee like me would do is to follow orders from my superiors.IM SO SORRY SIR IF I FAIL YOU.(Signed)Edna E. Margallo[10]Margallo then averred that in January 2004, DeLeonasked her to just resign, promising that if she did, she would still be paid her commissions and other benefits, as well as be reimbursed her car loan payments.Relying on DeLeons promise, Margallo tendered on13 January 2004, her irrevocable resignation, effective immediately.[11]Margallo, however, alleged that she was never paid her money claims.Grandteq failed to pay her commissions in the sum ofP87,508.00, equivalent to 5% of the total sales that she collected as of January 2004, which amounted toP1,750,148.84.Grandteq likewise failed to refund the sales accommodations or advances she gave her customers.In addition, after Margallos resignation, Grandteq sold her car to Annaliza Estrella, another employee, forP550,000.00.[12]These events prompted her to file before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint[13]against Grandteq and Gonzales, for recovery of sales commission, cash incentive andcar loan payment, damages and attorney fees, which was docketed as NLRC Case No. 0009-108-03-04.Grandteq and Gonzales opposed Margallos claims.They maintained that Margallo was not entitled to sales commissions because the computation thereof, according to company policy, should be based on actual collections within 180 days from invoice date.All of Margallos credit sales transactions were unpaid, outstanding, and past due.Margallo was also not entitled to any sales incentive, because said benefit was intended for customers, and not for the sales personnel.[14]Grandteq and Gonzales further insisted that Margallo had no right to the refund of her car loan payments under the car loan agreement she executed with Grandteq, which expressly provided that in the event that Margallo resigned or was terminated for cause during the effectivity of said agreement, her car loan payments would be forfeited in favor of Grandteq, and Grandteq would regain possession of the car.The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision on11 July 2005, dismissing all of Margallos claims, thus:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant case for lack of merit.[15]The Labor Arbiter held that Margallo was not able to prove by substantial evidence her entitlement to the sales commission:After a careful review of the records, this Office finds that considering [Margallo] already receives a basic salary plus allowances, her claim for sales commission is therefore an added benefit wholly dependent upon her sales performance based on existing company policy.As such, it is an affirmative allegation or claim that is not normally included in the regular course of business and for which law presumes that an employee is generally not entitled to.Thus, it behooves, upon the employee to prove that he is entitled to said affirmative allegations and the onus is upon him to establish his right thereto (see Eternit Employees and Workers Unions vs. De Veyra, 189 SCRA 752 and Nucum vs. Inciong, 204 SCRA 697).In the instant case, this Office finds [Margallo] to have failed to substantially discharge her burden of proving that she is entitled to theP87,508.00 in sales commissions since other than her bare allegations, [Margallo] did not show any other proof, including prior payment of said sales commissions, to justify her claim.And, quite noteworthy too is that under the [Grandteq]s policy, rules and regulations on the grant of sales commissions, the computation thereof shall be based on actual collection against all sales on credit and the validity of the said commission shall be 180 days from invoice dates; otherwise, the salesman shall not be entitled thereto and forfeits any right to demand payment of the commission thereon as the sales are considered bad debts as uncollectible.Since the records of [Grandteq] showed that [Margallo]s credit sales remain unpaid and outstanding for over 180 days, [Margallo] is therefore not entitled to sales commissions.No denial whatsoever of the above-discussed company policy was made by [Margallo] in her Reply.Thus, having failed to establish entitlement to said sales commission, the same is hereby denied.[16]For a similar reason, the Labor Arbiter denied Margallos claim for payment of cash incentive:As regards to cash incentives, once again this Office finds that the same is also an affirmative allegation and the burden of proving entitlement thereto rests upon the employee.And having failed to even mention how much of the alleged cash incentive she is entitled to in Annexes A and 2-a of her position paper, the same is hereby denied.[17]Finally, the Labor Arbiter found that Margallo had no right to the reimbursement of her car loan payments under her car loan agreement with Grandteq:And as regards of (sic) the car loan, the same should be governed by the undisputed terms and conditions of the Agreement between complainant and respondent company (Annex A of respondents position paper).And page 2 of said Agreement clearly stipulates that in case of resignation, all payments made by the personnel shall be forfeited in favor of the company.Thus, the claim for refund of the car loan should likewise be denied.[18]Margallo filed an appeal with the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 045888-05.Although the NLRC, in its Decision dated18 October 2006, stated that it merely modified the Decision dated11 July 2005of the Labor Arbiter, it effectively reversed the same by granting Margallo her claims for sales commission, reimbursement of her car loan payments, and attorneys fees.Thefalloof the NLRC Decision is quoted below:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED.[Herein petitioners] Grandteq Industrial Products, Inc. and/or its President/General Manager, [petitioner] Abelardo M. Gonzales, are hereby ordered to refund to the [herein respondent Margallo] her car loan payments amounting toP217,815.94 and to pay her the amount ofP10,870.79 representing her unpaid sales commissions plus ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award as attorneys fees.[19]In ordering that Grandteq and Gonzales reimburse the car loan payments made by Margallo, the NLRC reasoned:It is unlikely for an employee who has invested his time and industry in a particular job to simply give it up after being accused of violating company rules and regulations.It is more likely that he did so upon the expectation that she would derive a certain benefit from it.Thus, the claim that the [herein respondent Margalllo] resigned because she was promised that she would be paid her money claims if she did, is more credible than the contention that she did so without any prodding from the [herein petitioners Grandteq and Gonzales].It would therefore appear that the provision, in the agreement (records, pp. 32-340) executed by the parties, that in case of resignation of the PERSONNEL from the COMPANY, all payments made by the PERSONNEL shall be forfeited in favor of the COMPANY has been superseded by the above-mentioned subsequent agreement between the parties.Besides, it is uncontroverted that the car loan program was offered to the complainant as a reward for being the Salesman of the Year.Moreover, nowhere in their pleadings did the [petitioners Grandteq and Gonzales] controvert the claim that the [respondent Margallo] paid the down payment, entire first amortization, insurance, and her share in the monthly amortizations for seventeen months, or the total amount ofP214,395.90 for the car.It is also uncontroverted that after the [respondent Margallo]s negotiated resignation, her car was resold to another employee for the original price.Under the circumstances, the above-quoted contractual provision is null and void for being contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy.The law overrides contracts which are prepared by employers to circumvent the rights of their employees (Baguio Country Club vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA 643).Thus, the above-quoted contractual provision does not bar the [respondent Margallo] from recovering her car loan payments from the [petitioners Grandteq and Gonzales].[20]As for Margallos other claims, the NLRC affirmed her entitlement to the unpaid sales commission, but not to the cash incentive:Insofar as the [respondent Margallo]s claim for unpaid sales commission is concerned, it is noteworthy that in the list (records, pp. 16-18) of sales she adduced in evidence, the column bearing the heading collected indicates that, as of January 2004, the total collections from her sales amount to onlyP217,815.94.Since it is undisputed hat her sales commission are equivalent to 5% of her collections, she may recover unpaid sales commissions amounting toP10,890.79.Finally, since there is no showing that the [respondent Margallo]s claim for cash incentive is based on a particular contract or company practice, it was correctly dismissed for lack of merit.[21]Grandteq and Gonzales filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[22]while Margallo also filed an Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Issuance of Subpoena.[23]The NLRC denied the Motions for Reconsideration of all parties in a Resolution dated21 May 2007, but modified the NLRC Decision dated18 October 2006by slightly reducing the amount of car loan payments to be refunded to Margallo:WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.However, the dispositive portion of this Commissions (2ndDivision)October 18, 2006Decision is hereby corrected to read:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED.[Herein petitioners] Grandteq Industrial Products, Inc. and/or its President/General Manager, [petitioner] Abelardo M. Gonzales, are hereby ordered to refund to [herein respondent Margallo] her car loan payments amounting toP214,395.90 and to pay her the amount ofP10,870.79 representing her unpaid sales commissions plus ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award as attorneys fees.[24]Grandteq and Gonzales elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition forCertiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 100012.In its Decision dated21 January 2008, the Court of Appeals agreed with the NLRC, dismissing the therein Petition of Grandteq and Gonzales in this wise:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.Costs against petitioners.[25]Like the NLRC, the Court of Appeals found that Margallo had a right to be reimbursed her car loan payments, and the terms of the car loan agreement between Margallo and Grandteq should not be applied for being highly prejudicial to the employees interest:Truly, the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they want, and their agreement would have the force of law between them.However, those terms and conditions agreed upon must not be contrary to law, morals, customs, public policy or public order.Precisely, the law overrides such conditions which are prejudicial to the interest of the worker.The law affords protection to an employee, and it will not countenance any attempt to subvert its spirit and intent.The sheer inequality that characterizes employer-employee relations, where the scales generally tip against the employee, often scarcely provides him real and better options.Moreover, in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the formers favor.[26]The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the order of the NLRC that Grandteq and Gonzales pay Margallo her sales commission, placing the burden upon the employer to prove that the employees money claims had been paid:With respect to the unpaid sales commissions ofP10,870.79 to be paid by petitioners in favor of private respondent, it is incumbent upon petitioner employer to prove that said money claim has been paid.This is in tune with the general precept that: one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it, and even where the employees must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove (payment), rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer.In the present case, petitioners [Grandteq and Gonzales] failed to discharge the burden of proving that the amount ofP10,870.79 representing [herein respondent Margallo]s sales commissions has already been paid to the latter.Thus, the NLRC (Second Division) did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding said money claim in favor of [respondent Margallo].[27]Assiduous, Grandteq and Gonzales are now before this Courtviathe Petition at bar.Grandteq and Gonzales assert that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the car loan agreement between Grandteq and Margallo, particularly the provision therein on the forfeiture of car loan payments in favor of Grandteq should Margallo resign from the company, as null and void.[28]The Court, however, is in agreement with the Court of Appeals and the NLRC.Generally speaking, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties.The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.[29]The questionable provision in the car loan agreement between Grandteq and Margallo provides: In case of resignation, of the personnel from the company, all payments made by the personnel shall be forfeited in favor of the company.[30]Connected thereto is the provision in the same car loan agreement, which reads:1.The COMPANY shall have the right to regain the possession of the car before the expiration of the term of the loan in the event of any of the following:a.The PERSONNEL resigns from the COMPANY during the effectivity of this agreement.[31]Said provisions plainly are contrary to the fundamental principles of justice and fairness.It must be remembered that Margallo herself paid for the down payment and her share in the monthly amortization of the car.However, she did not get to leave with the car when she resigned from Grandteq.In effect, Margallo parted with her hard-earned money for nothing, being left, as she is, with an empty bag.The inequitableness in the conduct of Grandteq and Gonzales is heightened by the fact that after they regained possession of the car, they resold the same to another employee under a similar contract bearing the same terms and conditions signed by Margallo.The principle that no person may unjustly enrich oneself at the expense of another (Nemo cum alteris detrimento locupletari potest)is embodied in Article 22 of the New Civil Code, to wit:ART. 22.Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; [are] guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice.There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains the money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.[32]As can be gleaned from the foregoing, there is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.The main objective of the principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching oneself at the expense of another.It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at anothers expense.One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on a contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict, or any other provision of law.This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting a positive provision of law or judicial rule.Rather, equity is exercised in this case as the complement of legal jurisdiction [that] seeks to reach and to complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so.[33]The principle against unjust enrichment obliges Grandteq and Gonzales to refund to Margallo the car loan payments she had made, since she has not actually acquired the car.To relieve Grandteq and Gonzales of their obligation to reimburse Margallo would, indeed, be to sanction unjust enrichment in favor of the first two and cause unjust poverty to the latter.[34]The Court rigorously disapproves contracts that demonstrate a clear attempt to exploit the employee and deprive him of the protection sanctioned by both the Constitution and the Labor Code.The Constitution and the Labor Code mandate the protection of labor.Hence, as a matter of judicial policy, this Court has, in a number of instances, leaned backwards to protect labor and the working class against the machinations and incursions of their more financially entrenched employers.[35]Although not strictly a labor contract, the car loan agreement herein involves a benefit extended by the employers, Grandteq and Gonzales, to their employee, Margallo.It should benefit, and not unduly burden, Margallo.The Court cannot, in any way, uphold a car loan agreement that threatens the employee with the forfeiture of all the car loan payments he/she had previously made, plus loss of the possession of the car, should the employee wish to resign; otherwise, said agreement can then be used by the employer as an instrument to either hold said employee hostage to the job or punish him/her for resigning.The Court further finds no error in the grant by the Court of Appeals and the NLRC of Margallos claim for sales commission.In cases involving money claims of employees, the employer has the burden of proving that the employees did receive their wages and benefits and that the same were paid in accordance with law.[36]It is settled that once the employee has set out with particularity in his complaint, position paper, affidavits and other documents the labor standard benefits he is entitled to, and which the employer allegedly failed to pay him, it becomes the employers burden to prove that it has paid these money claims.One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; and even where the employees must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment.[37]Under the terms and conditions of Margallos employment with Grandteq, it is provided that she will do field sales with commission on sales made after a months training.[38]On this basis, Margallos entitlement to sales commission is unrebutted.Hence, it was actually the Labor Arbiter who erred in denying Margallos claim for sales commission for failure to state the particulars to substantiate the same.Grandteq and Gonzales have the burden of proof to show, by substantial evidence, their claim that Margallo was not entitled to sales commissions because the sales made by the latter remained outstanding and unpaid, rendering these sales as bad debts and thus nullifying Margallos right to this monetary benefit.Grandteq and Gonzales could have presented pertinent company records to prove this claim.It is a rule that failure of employers to submit the necessary documents that are in their possession as employers gives rise to the presumption that the presentation thereof is prejudicial to its cause.[39]WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit.The Decision dated21 January 2008of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 100012 isAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners Grandteq Industrial Steel Products, Inc. and Abelardo M. Gonzales.SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISIONROBERTO T. DOMONDON, G.R. No. 154376Petitioner,Present:Puno,J., Chairman,Austria-Martinez,- versus - Callejo, Sr.,Tinga, andChico-Nazario,JJ.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Promulgated:COMMISSION, VAN MELLE PHILS.,INC. and NIELS H.B. HAVE,Respondents. September 30, 2005x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONPUNO,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariseeking the reversal of the February 28, 2002 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65130 and its July 17, 2002 Resolution,[2]denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Labor Arbiter, which held that petitioner was not illegally dismissed but voluntarily resigned.On November 20, 1998, petitioner Roberto T. Domondon filed a complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, Quezon City, against private respondent Van Melle Phils., Inc. (VMPI) and its President and General Manager, private respondent Niels H.B. Have. He claimed illegal dismissal and prayed for reinstatement, payment of full backwages inclusive of allowances, 14thmonth pay, sick and vacation leaves, share in the profits, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[3]Petitioner alleged that on January 8, 1997, private respondent VMPI, a manufacturing company engaged in the production and distribution of confectionaries and related products, hired him as Materials Manager through its then President and General Manager Victor M. Endaya. He was tasked to supervise the Inventory Control, Purchasing, and Warehouse and Distribution Sections of the company. He was given a guaranteed monthly salary of ninety-eight thousand (P98,000.00) pesos for fourteen (14) months with annual merit adjustment, profit sharing bonus from 0-2 months based on individual, company and corporate performance,[4]and a brand new1600cc Honda VTEC[5]with 300 liters monthly gas allowance.[6]Petitioner claimed that things worked out well for him in the beginning until Endaya was transferred to China in August 1997 and was replaced by private respondent Have, a Dutch national. According to petitioner, private respondent Have immediately set a one-on-one meeting with him and requested his courtesy resignation. Alleging that the decision came from the Asia Regional Office, private respondent Have wanted to reorganize and put his people in management. Petitioner refused to resign and life got difficult for him. His decisions were always questioned by private respondent Have. He was subjected to verbal abuse. His competence was undermined by baseless and derogatory memos, which lay the bases for his removal from the company. He also did not receive his 14thmonth pay.[7]Petitioner further stated that the final straw came on June 10, 1998, in another one-on-one meeting with private respondent Have. Private respondent Have informed petitioner that things would get more difficult for him if he does not resign. Private respondent Have threw a veiled threat at petitioner to the effect that a dignified resignation would be infinitely better than being fired for a fabricated lawful cause. Private respondent Have offered financial assistance if petitioner would leave peacefully but the offer must be accepted immediately or it would be withdrawn. Thus, petitioner signed a ready-made resignation letter without deliberation and evaluation of the consequences. His main concern then was to prevent the end of his professional career.[8]Petitioner stated that on the same day that he handed in his resignation letter, private respondent VMPI posted a memorandum with information of his replacement. He claimed that to lend a semblance of credibility to his forced resignation, private respondents released to him a portion of the offered financial package.[9]On their part, private respondents admitted hiring petitioner under the circumstances set forth by him but denied illegally dismissing him. They maintained that with his educational and professional background, petitioner could not have been coerced and intimidated into resigning from the company. Instead, they claimed that he voluntarily resigned to embark on management consultancy in the field of strategic planning and import/export.[10]They stated that petitioner informed them about his intention to resign and requested a soft landing financial support in the amount of three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos on top of accrued benefits due him upon resignation. Private respondents granted the request. Subsequently, however, petitioner proposed the transfer of ownership of the car assigned to him in lieu of the financial assistance from the company. Since company policy prohibits disposition of assets without valuable consideration, the parties agreed that petitioner shall pay for the car with theP300,000.00 soft landing financial assistance from private respondent VMPI.Private respondents averred that petitioner, who was then in charge of the disposition of the assets of the company, effected the registration of the car in his name.[11]Joannes Cornelis Kuiten, then Vice-President for Finance, signed for the company.[12]On July 30, 1998,P300,000.00 was credited to petitioners payroll account[13]but he did not use it to pay for the car as agreed upon. Repeated demands for payment were unheeded. In its letter of demand dated October 28, 1998, private respondent VMPI gave petitioner an option to apply theP169,368.32 total cash conversion of his sick and vacation leave credits, 13thand 14thmonths pay less taxes as partialpayment for the car and pay the balance ofP130,631.68, orreturn the car to the company.[14]Petitioner did not exercise either option. Instead, on November 20, 1998, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondents.On June 14, 1999, the Labor Arbiter[15]ruled for private respondents,viz:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal dismissal is hereby dismissed for lack of merit, and the claim for damages and attorneys fees denied.The complainant has the option to reconvey to respondents the car sold to him and thus retain full credit of theP300,000.00 soft landing assistance, or retain ownership of the car by paying respondents the purchase price ofP300,000.00 minus any amount due him corresponding to his accrued benefits that has been applied by respondents as partial payment for the car.The NLRC affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter[16]on January 26, 2001 and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on March 5, 2001. Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action forcertioraribut failed for the third time. The appellate court dismissed the petition on February 28, 2002 and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on July 17, 2002; hence, this petition for review oncertiorari.Petitioner raises as error the failure of the appellate court to apply the rule in termination of employment that the burden rests upon the employer to prove by substantial evidence that the employee was removed for lawful or authorized cause. He also questions the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter to resolve the issue of the transfer of car-ownership by private respondents.I.The first issue raises factual matters which may not be reviewed by the Court. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. Not being a trier of facts, the Court cannot re-examine and re-evaluate the probative value of evidence presented to the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, which formed the basis of the questioned decision and resolution.[17]Indeed, their findings when in absolute agreement are accorded not only respect but even finality as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[18]In any event, we combed the records of the case at bar and found no compelling reason to disturb the uniform findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. There was no arbitrary disregard or misapprehension of evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.Petitioners letter ofresignation, his educational attainment, and the circumstances antecedent and contemporaneous to the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are substantial proof of petitioners voluntary resignation.Petitioners letter of resignation was categorical that he was resigning to embark on management consultancy in the field of strategic planning and import/export.[19]Petitioner was holding a managerial position at private respondent VMPI and he was previously Vice-President for strategic planning at LG Collins Electronics. Thus, management consultancy in the field of strategic planning was a logical reason for the resignation, which either petitioner or private respondents may provide.Import/export, whether inclusive or exclusive of the clause managerial consultancy, on the other hand, could neither be inferred from petitioners nature of work with private respondent VMPI nor from his past work experiences. Thus, even if petitioner was correct in arguing that he could not have considered it given the state of the countrys economy, anyone may provide it as reason for the resignation, including him and private respondents.But assuming that private respondents prepared the letter of resignation for petitioner to sign as claimed, the Court is not convinced that petitioner was coerced and intimidated into signing it. Petitioner is no ordinary employee with limited education. He has a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Economics from the University of Santo Tomas, has completed academic requirements for Masters of Business Economics from the University of Asia and the Pacific, and studied law for two (2) years at Adamson University. He also has a good professional record, which highlights his marketability. Thus, his reliance on the case ofMolave Tours Corporation v. NLRC,[20]where the employee found to have been forced to resign was a mere garage custodian, is clearly misplaced.In termination cases, the employer decides for the employee. It is different in resignation cases for resignation is a formal pronouncement of relinquishment of an office. It is made with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by an act of relinquishment.[21]In the instant case, petitioner relinquished his position when he submitted his letter of resignation. His subsequent act of receiving and keeping his requested soft landing financial assistance ofP300,000.00, and his retention and use of the car subject of his arrangement with private respondents showed his resolve to relinquish his post.Thus, we affirm the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that private respondents were able to prove through substantial evidence that petitioner was not illegally dismissed.[22]II.The next issue involves the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide the question on the transfer of ownership of the car assigned to petitioner. He contends that it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction over the question and not the Labor Arbiter.This is not an issue of first impression. The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is provided underArticle 217(a)of theLabor Code, as amended,viz:(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:1. Unfair labor practice cases;2. Termination disputes;3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations;5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.In all these instances, the matrix is the existence of an employer-employee relationship. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner is an employee of the respondents. InBaez v. Valdevilla,[23]we held:x x x Presently, and as amended by R.A. 6715, the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in Article 217 is comprehensive enough to include claims for all forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations.Whereas this Court in a number of occasions had applied the jurisdictional provisions of Article 217 to claims of damagesfiled by employees,[24]we hold that by the designating clause arising from the employer-employee relations Article 217 should apply with equal force to theclaim of anemployerfor actual damages against its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claimarises from or is necessarily connected withthe fact of termination, and should be entered asa counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case.Baezis in accord with paragraph 6 of Article 217(a), which covers all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,viz:6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits,all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.In the case at bar, petitioner claims illegal dismissal and prays for reinstatement, payment of full backwages inclusive of allowances, 14thmonth pay, sick and vacation leaves, share in the profits, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[25]These causes of action clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, specifically under paragraphs 2,3 and 4 of Article 217(a). On the other hand, private respondents made a counterclaim involving the transfer of ownership of a company car to petitioner. They maintain that he failed to pay for the car in accordance with their agreement. The issue is whether this claim of private respondents arose from the employer-employee relationship of the parties pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article 217(a) under the general clause as quoted above.The records show that the initial agreement of the parties was that petitioner would be extended a soft-landing financial assistance in the amount ofP300,000.00 on top of his accrued benefits at the time of the effectivity of his resignation. However, petitioner later changed his mind. He requested that he be allowed to keep the car assigned to him in lieu of the financial assistance. However, company policy prohibits transfer of ownership of property without valuable consideration. Thus, the parties agreed that petitioner shall still be extended theP300,000.00 financial support, which he shall use to pay for the subject car. On July 30, 1998, private respondent VMPI deposited the agreed amount in petitioners account.[26]Despite having registered the car in his name and repeated demands from private respondents, petitioner failed to pay for it as agreed upon. Petitioner did not also return the car. Without doubt, the transfer of the ownership of the company car to petitioner is connected with his resignation and arose out of the parties employer-employee relations. Accordingly, private respondents claim for damages falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.III.Petitioner was not illegally dismissed but voluntarily resigned. His claims for reinstatement, payment of full backwages inclusive of allowances, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees must necessarily fail. However, he is entitled to his 14thmonth pay, cash conversion of accrued sick and vacation leaves and profit share in the aggregate amount ofP169,368.32, the total of which is not disputed. The amount shall be applied to his obligation to payP300,000.00 for the company car, which ownership was transferred to him. The return of the company car to private respondents, given the period that has lapsed from the offer, ceased to be an option open to petitioner.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Roberto T. Domondon is ORDERED to pay private respondent Van Melle Phils., Inc. the amount ofP130,631.68, representing the balance of the purchase price of the car in his custody after deducting his entitlement to 14thmonth pay, cash conversion of accrued sick and vacation leaves and profit share in the total amount ofP169,368.32 from theP300,000.00 soft-landing financial assistance he received from private respondent.SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 141093.February 20, 2001]PRUDENTIAL BANK and TRUST COMPANY,petitioner, vs.CLARITA T. REYES,respondent.D E C I S I O NGONZAGA-REYES,J.:Before the Court is a petition for review oncertiorariof the Decision,[1]dated October 15, 1999of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 30607 and of its Resolution, dated December 6, 1999 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of said decision.The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the resolution[2]of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 009364-95, reversing and setting aside the labor arbiters decision and dismissing for lack of merit private respondents complaint.[3]The case stems from NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-03462-92, which is a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal with prayer for moral and exemplary damages, gratuity, fringe benefits and attorneys fees filed by Clarita Tan Reyes against Prudential Bank and Trust Company (the Bank) before the labor arbiter.Prior to her dismissal, private respondent Reyes held the position of Assistant Vice President in the foreign department of the Bank, tasked with the duties, among others, to collect checks drawn against overseas banks payable in foreign currency and to ensure the collection of foreign bills or checks purchased, including the signing of transmittal letters covering the same.After proceedings duly undertaken by the parties, judgment was rendered by Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, finding the dismissal of complainant to be without factual and legal basis, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent bank to pay her back wages for three (3) years in the amount of P540,000.00 (P15,000.00 x 36 mos.).In lieu of reinstatement, the respondentis also ordered to pay complainant separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, in the amount of P420,000.00 (P15,000 x 28 mos.).In addition, the respondent should also pay complainant profit sharing and unpaidfringe benefits.Attorneys fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award should likewise be paid by respondent.SO ORDERED.[4]Not satisfied, the Bank appealed to the NLRC which, as mentioned at the outset, reversed the Labor Arbiters decision in its Resolution dated 24 March 1997.Private respondent sought reconsideration which, however, was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution of 28 July 1998.Aggrieved, private respondent commenced on October 28, 1998, a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.[5]The subject petition was referred to the Court of Appealsfor appropriate action and disposition per resolution of this Court dated November 25, 1998, in accordance with theruling inSt. Martin FuneralHomes vs. NLRC.[6]In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals adopted the following antecedent facts leading to Reyess dismissal as summarized by the NLRC:The auditors of the Bank discovered that two checks, No. 011728-7232-146, in the amount of US$109,650.00, and No. 011730-7232-146, in the amount of US$115,000.00, received by the Bank on April 6, 1989, drawn by the Sanford Trading against Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Jurong Branch, Singapore, in favor of Filipinas Tyrom, were not sent out for collection to Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation on the alleged order of the complainant until the said checks became stale.The Bank created a committee to investigate the findings of the auditors involving the two checks which were not collected and became stale.On March 8, 1991, the president of the Bank issued a memorandum to the complainant informing her of the findings of the auditors and asked her to give her side.In reply, complainant requested for an extension of one week to submit her explanation.In a subsequent letter, dated March 14, 1991, to the president, complainant stated that in view of therefusal of the Bank that she be furnished copies of the pertinent documents she is requesting and the refusal to grant her a reasonable period to prepare her answer, she was constrained to make a general denial of any misfeasance or malfeasance on her part and asked that a formal investigation be made.As the complainant failed to attend and participate in the formal investigation conducted by the Committee on May 24, 1991, despite due notice, the Committee proceeded with its hearings andheard the testimonies of several witnesses.The Committees findings were:a)The two (2) HSBC checks were received by the Foreign Department on 6 April 1989.On the same day, complainant authorized the crediting of the account of Filipinas Tyrom in the amount of P4,780,102.70 corresponding to the face value of the checks, (Exhibits 6, 22 to 22-A and 23 to 23-A).On the following day, a transmittal letter was prepared by Ms. Cecilia Joven, a remittance clerk then assigned in the Foreign Department, for the purpose of sending out the two (2) HSBC checks for collection.She then requested complainant to sign the said transmittal letters (Exhibits 1, 7 and 25;TSN, 11 March 1993, pp. 42-52), as it is complainant who gives her instructions directly concerning the transmittal of foreign bills purchased.All other transmittal letters are in fact signed by complainant.b)AfterMs. Joven delivered the transmittal letters and the checks to the Accounting Section of the Foreign Department, complainant instructed her to withdraw the same for the purpose of changing the addressee thereon from American Express Bank to Bank of Hawaii (ibid.) under a special collection scheme (Exhibits 4 and 5 to 5-B).c)After complying with complainants instruction, Ms. Joven then returned to complainant for the latter to sign the new transmittal letters.However, complainant told Ms. Joven to just hold on to the letters and checks and await further instructions (ibid.).Thus, the new transmittal letters remained unsigned.(See Exhibits 5 to 5-B).d)In June 1989, Ms. Joven was transferred to another department.Hence, her duties, responsibilities and functions, including the responsibility over the two (2) HSBC checks, were turned over to another remittance clerk, Ms. Analisa Castillo (Exhibit 14; TSN, 4 June 1993, pp. 27-29).e)When asked by Ms. Castillo about the two (2) HSBC checks, Ms. Joven relayed to the latter complainants instruction (Exhibit 14; TSN, 4 June 1993, p. 42).f)About fifteen (15) months after the HSBC checks were received by the Bank, the said checks were discovered in the course of an audit conducted by the Banks auditors.Atty. Pablo Magno, the Banks legal counsel, advised complainant to send the checks for collection despite the lapse of fifteen (15) months.g)Complainant, however, deliberately withheld Atty. Magnos advice from her superior, the Senior Vice-President, Mr. Renato Santos and falsely informed the latter that Atty. Magno advised that a demand letter be sent instead, thereby further delaying the collection of the HSBC checks.h)On 10 July 1990, the HSBC checks were finally sent for collection, but were returned on 16 July 1990 for the reason account closed (Exhibits 2-A and 3-A).After a review of the Committees findings, the Board of Directors of the Bank resolved not to re-elect complainant any longer to the position of assistant president pursuant to the Banks By-laws.On July 19, 1991, complainant was informed of her termination of employment from the Bank by Senior Vice President Benedicto L. Santos, in a letter the text of which is quoted in full:Dear Mrs. Reyes:After a thorough investigation and appreciation of the charges against you as contained in the Memorandum of the President dated March 8, 1991, the Fact Finding Committee which was created to investigate the commission and/or omission of the acts alluded therein, has found the following:1.You have deliberately held the clearing of Checks Nos. 11728 and 11730 of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in the total amount of US$224,650.00 by giving instructions to the collection clerk not to send the checks for collection.In view thereof, when the said checks were finally sent to clearing after the lapse of 15 months from receipt of said checks, they were returned for the reason Account closed. To date, the value of said checks have not been paid by Filipinas Tyrom, which as payee of the checks, had been credited with their peso equivalent;2.You tried to influence the decision of Atty. Pablo P. Magno, Bank legal counsel, by asking him to do something allegedly upon instructions of a Senior Vice President of the Bank or else lose his job when in truth and in fact no such instructions was given; and3.You deliberately withheld from Mr. Santos, Senior Vice President, the advice given by the legal counsel of the Bank which Mr. Santos had asked you to seek.As a matter of fact, you even relayed a false advice which delayed further the sending of the two checks for collection.Likewise, you refused to heed the advice of the Banks legal counsel to send the checks for collection.These findings have given rise to the Banks loss of trust and confidence in you, the same being acts of serious misconduct in the performance of your duties resulting in monetary loss to the Bank.In view thereof, the Boardhas resolved not to re-elect you to the position of Assistant Vice President of the Bank.Accordingly, your services are terminated effective immediately.In relation thereto, your monetary and retirement benefits are forfeited except those that have vested in you.In her position paper, complainant alleged that the real reason for her dismissal was her filing of the criminal cases against the bank president, the vice president and the auditors of the Bank, such filing not being a valid ground for her dismissal.Furthermore, she alleged that it would be self-serving for the respondent to state that she was found guilty of gross misconduct in deliberately withholding the clearing of the two dollar checks.She further alleged that she was not afforded due process as she was not given the chance to refute the charges mentioned in the letter of dismissal.Hence, she was illegally dismissed.On the other hand, respondent argues that there were substantial bases for the Bank to lose its trust and confidence on the complainant and, accordingly, had just cause for terminating her services.Moreover, for filing the clearly unfounded suit against the respondents officers, complainant is liable to pay moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[7]The Court of Appeals found that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the dismissal of Reyes is valid.In effect, the Court of Appeals reinstated the judgment of the labor arbiter with modification as follows:WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondentBank as follows:1.To pay petitioner full backwages and other benefits from July 19, 1991 up to the finality of this judgment;2.To pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of servicein lieu of reinstatement; and3.To pay attorneys fee equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award.SO ORDERED.[8]Hence, the Banks recourse to this Court contending in its memorandum that:IN SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION DATED 24 MARCH 1997 AND THE RESOLUTION DATED 28 JULY 1998 OF THE NLRC AND REINSTATINGWITH MODIFICATION THE DECISION DATED 20 JULY 1995 OF LABOR ARBITER CORNELIO L. LINSANGAN, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED, IN VIEW OF THE FOLLOWING:I.IT IS THE SEC (NOW THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) AND NOT THE NLRC WHICH HAS ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING THE REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.II.EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE NLRC HAS JURISDICTION, THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENTS MISCONDUCT JUSTIFYING THE BANKS LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON (sic) HER.III.EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING UNLIMITED AND UNQUALIFIED BACKWAGES THEREBY GOING FARBEYOND THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION LIMITING THE SAME TO THREE YEARS, WHICH DECISION RESPONDENT HERSELF SOUGHT TO EXECUTE.[9]In sum, the resolution of this petition hinges on (1) whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal; (2) whether complainant Reyes was illegally dismissed; and (3)whether the amount of back wages awarded was proper.On the first issue, petitioner seeks refuge behind the argument that the dispute is an intra-corporate controversy concerning as it does the non-election of private respondent to the position of Assistant Vice-President of the Bank which falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (now the Regional Trial Court) under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A.More specifically, petitioner contends that complainant is a corporate officer, an elective position under the corporate by-laws and her non-election is an intra-corporate controversy cognizable by the SEC invoking lengthily a number of this Courts decisions.[10]Petitioner Bank can no longer raise the issue of jurisdiction under the principle of estoppel.The Bank participated in the proceedings from start to finish.It filed its position paper with the Labor Arbiter.When the decision of the Labor Arbiter was adverse to it, the Bank appealed to the NLRC.When the NLRC decided in its favor, the bank said nothing about jurisdiction.Even before the Court of Appeals, it never questioned the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.It was only when the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondentdid it raise the issue of jurisdiction.The Bank actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened.In this regard,Baaga vs. Commission on the Settlement of LandProblems,[11]is most enlightening.The Court therein stated:This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.Here, the principle of estoppel lies.Hence, a party may be estopped or barred from raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time in a petition before the Supreme Court when it failed to do so in the early stages of the proceedings.Undeterred, the Bank also contends that estoppel cannot lie considering that from the beginning, petitioner Bank has consistently asserted in all its pleadings at all stages of the proceedings that respondent held the position of Assistant Vice President, an elective position which she held by virtue of her having been elected as such by the Board of Directors. As far as the records before this Court reveal however, such an assertion was made only in the appeal to the NLRC and raised again before the Court of Appeals, not for purposes of questioning jurisdiction but to establish that private respondents tenure was subject to the discretion of the Board of Directors and that her non-reelection was a mere expiration of her term.The Bank insists that private respondent was elected Assistant Vice President sometime in 1990 to serve as such for only one year.This argument will not do either and must be rejected.It appears that private respondent was appointed Accounting Clerk by the Bank on July 14, 1963.From that position she rose to become supervisor.Then in 1982, she was appointed Assistant Vice-President which she occupied until her illegal dismissal on July 19, 1991.The banks contention that she merely holds an elective position and that in effect she is not a regular employee is belied by the nature of her work and her length of service with the Bank.As earlier stated, she rose from the ranks and has been employed with the Bank since 1963 until the termination of her employment in 1991.As Assistant Vice President of the foreign department of the Bank, she is tasked, among others, to collect checks drawn against overseas banks payable in foreign currency and to ensure the collection of foreign bills or checks purchased, including the signing of transmittal letters covering the same.It has been stated that the primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer.[12]Additionally, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.[13]As Assistant Vice-President of the Foreign Department of the Bank she performs tasks integral to the operations of the bank and her length of service with the bank totaling 28 years speaks volumes of her status as a regular employee of the bank.In fine, as a regular employee, she is entitled to security of tenure; that is, her services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause.[14]This being in truth a case of illegal dismissal, it is no wonder then that the Bank endeavored to the very end to establish loss of trust and confidence and serious misconduct on the part of private respondent but, as will be discussed later, to no avail.This brings us to the second issue wherein the Bank insists that it has presented substantial evidence to prove the breach of trust on the part of private respondent warranting her dismissal.On this point, the Court of Appeals disagreed and set aside the findings of the NLRC that Reyes deliberately withheld the release of the two dollar checks; that she is guilty of conflict of interest that she waived her right to due process for not attending the hearing; and that she was dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence.We quote pertinent portions of the decision, to wit:FIRST:Respondent Bank heavily relied on the testimony and affidavit of Remittance Clerk Joven in trying to establish loss of confidence.However, Jovens allegation that petitioner instructed her to hold the subject two dollar checks amounting to $224,650.00 falls short of the requisite proof to warrant petitioners dismissal.Except for Jovens bare assertion to withhold the dollar checks per petitioners instruction, respondent Bank failed to adduce convincing evidence to prove bad faith and ma