Consti Digests3

7/29/2019 Consti Digests3

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Composition, Qualification and Term of Office (House of Representatives)

G.R. No. L-18684 September 14, 1961

LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ROGACIANO MERCADO and

MARIANO PERDICES, petitioners,

vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity as National Treasurer,

respondents.

BENGZON, C.J.:

FACTS:Petitioners request that respondent officials be prevented from implementing R.A.

No. 3040that apportions representative districts in this country.

Petitioners allege that it is unconstitutional and void because it apportioned districts without

regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.

The respondents aver they were merely complying with their duties under the statute, which

they presume and allege to be constitutional.

The respondent National Treasurer further avers that the Act complies with the principle of

proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No 3040 is unconstitutional for apportioning districts without regard to

the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.

HELD: The statute should be declared invalid..

Whereas such Republic Act 3040 clearly violates the said constitutional

provision in several ways namely, (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with

a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four members,

while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only;

RATIO: Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of

Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be

according to the member of their respective inhabitants."

Such disproportion of representation provided has been held sufficient to avoid

apportionment laws enacted in States having Constitutional provisions similar to ours.

Whenever this kind of inequality of apportionment has been before the courts, it has been

held to be contrary to the Constitution. It has been said to be "arbitrary and capricious and

against the vital principle of equality.

It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political

situation does not render it political instead of judicial.

The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse

for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify

the means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the exist ing inequality of

representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve

remedial legislation in accord with the precepts of the Cons titution.

Needless to say, equality of representation3

in the Legislature being such an essential

feature of republican institutions, and affecting so many lives, the judiciary may not with a

clear conscience stand by to give free hand to the discretion of the political departments of

the Government.

An unconstitutional apportionment law may be declared void by the courts, notwithstanding

the fact that such statute is an exercise of political power.

The constitutionality of a statute forming a delegate district or apportioning delegates for the

house of delegates is a judicial question for the courts, although the statute is an exercise of

political power.


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G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON,

CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO

LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners,

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROSOCCIDENTAL, respondents.

ALAMPAY,J.:

Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in

the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on

December 3, 1985,

Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various

cities and municipalities therein, , filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose

of stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which,

pursuant to and in implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New

Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.

Section 197 of the Local GovernmentCode enumerates the conditions which must exist to

provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are:

SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation

territory-at least 3,500 sq km, population-500,000 average estimated annual income- not less than 10M for the last three

consecutive years

creation shall not reduce the population and income of the motherprovince or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the

minimum requirements under this section.

The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory ofNegros del Norte.

Petitioners plead, nevertheless, that- Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of

the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental other than those living within the territory

of the new province of Negros del Norte to be not in accordance with the Constitution, that

a writ of mandamus be issued to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the

qualified voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate.

Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros

Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, do not fall

within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3

of Art. XI of our Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental other than those

living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte should be allowed to

participate in the challenged plebiscite.

HELD: the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental other than those living within the

territory of the new province of Negros del Norte should be allowed to participate in the

challenged plebiscite.

RATIO: Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of

Negros del Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around

in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the

Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We again quot e:

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,

merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in

accordance with the criteria established in the local government code,

and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in

the unit or units affected.


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It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that

there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or

units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial

alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the

existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the

division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new

province of Negros del Norte.

Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The

first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be

substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area

subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del

Norte.

We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said

constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component

political units.

2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it

means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be

divided such as in the case at bar or and of the people of two or more

municipalities if there be a merger.

This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of the ruling which

We now consider applicable to the case at bar

The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter under

consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems.

To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight

municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will

result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an

existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered.

It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects of the division of the parent province

necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and

the proposed province of Negros del Norte . The economy of the parent province as well as

that of the new province will be inevitably affecte d, either for the better or for the worse.

Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are,

therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which

must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.

We agree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a

separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a

substantial alteration of boundary.

As contended by petitioners,

Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the

constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated

from the mutually exclusive to each other. A Province maybe created

where an existing province is divided or two provinces merged. Such

cases necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and

definitely the boundary being substantially altered.

It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit

is divided or its boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution

provides, only some and not all the voters in the whole unit which

suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are

affected. Rather, the contrary is true.


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G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,

MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG

TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO,NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN,

KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP,

VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN,

ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT,

AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B.

VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 136786 October 6, 2000

AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO

PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE

ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by

Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,

PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-

BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE,

FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA,

MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA

PILIPINAS, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 136795 October 6, 2000

ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL

COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL),

petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP,

AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-

BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L,

AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,

AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, K ATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS,

respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN,J.:*

FACTS: The party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or

sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate

in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation,

shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members .4

"Sec. 5. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total

number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms

after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list

representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,

peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other

sectors as may be prov ided by law, except the religious sector."

Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-

list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995.

The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law

(RA 7941) in this wise:
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"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall

constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of

Representatives including those under the party-list.

Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,

prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives

through the party-list system.

The first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national

elections. Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve

(12) parties and organizations. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner

APEC.

Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters

Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which

were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the t otal votes cast for the party-list system.

PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards

Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to

Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It

alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in

the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory.

Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's

Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the

14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the

total number of congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district

representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52

seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA

7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should

supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up."

The twelve (12) parties and organizations , which had earlier been proclaimed winners on

the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system,

objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for

Reconsideration.

ISSUE (1) :Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory

HELD: The 20% allocation is a mere ceiling.

RATIO: The pertinent provision15

of the Constitution on the composition of the House of

Representatives reads as follows:

"Sec. 5. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total

number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms

after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list

representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,

peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other

sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."

Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in

arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise

"twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-

list." This formulation16means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as

may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of

party-list seats.

Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under

all circumstances? Our short answer is "No."

Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
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The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty

per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list."

A simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple

message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the

mechanics of the party-list system of representation.The Constitution explicitly sets down

only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved forparty-list representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941 . It deemed it

necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to

obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be

entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have

"additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning

party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of

Representatives.

Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides: "(b) The parties, organizations,

and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list

system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two

percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total

number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled

to not more than three (3) seats."


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ISSUE (2):Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in

Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

HELD: Yes, thethree-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

RATIO:

The Two Percent Threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,

organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of

representation are actually represented in Congress.

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the

Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican

or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised

by representatives chosen by them.21

But to have meaningful representation, the elected

persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise

and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not

interpretation or circumvention.23

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a

multiparty system of representation.

Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition.

"Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit

ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature ; thus, no single

group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the

entire House.

ISSUE (3):If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a

qualified party be determined?

HELD:Method of Allocating Additional Seats

The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties,

organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according tothe votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total

number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at

least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House

of Representatives.

One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment

The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and

Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen

shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,

including those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent

of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the

House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually

obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, o ne "qualifying" and two additional

seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled

to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
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The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation"

into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-

mentioned parameters.

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One.rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to

the lowest based on the number of votes they each received . Then the ratio for each party

is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the

system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat

each.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in

order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on

proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot

possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most

number of votes..

A fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it

would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of

the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party

can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at

least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party

shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of

votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six

percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the

proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional

seat.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the

maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than

the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties

tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the

number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of

party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.

Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to

one additional seat or a total of two seats.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other

qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

Additional

seats

for

concerned

party

=

No. of votes of

concerned party

No. of votes of

first party

x

No. of

additional

seats

allocated

to

the first

party

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is

computed as follows:

Additional seats

for concerned

party (ABA)

=

No. of votes

of ABA x

No. of additional

seats allocated to

the first party


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No. of vites of

first party (APEC)

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein

by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,

vs.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS

LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS

MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL

ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.;

ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION

and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO

NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG

DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;

NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political

Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG

DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-

UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL

FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION,

respondents.

PANGANIBAN,J.:

FACTS: Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,

organizations and political parties.

The registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their

intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and

organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration,

together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154

parties and organizations, but denied those of several o thers.

Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names

of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political

Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in t he Party List System.

Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor

Party contends that the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most

objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution.

ISSUE (1): Whether or not political parties may participate in the party -list elections.

Participation of Political Parties

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot

be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political

parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of

Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,

and sectoral parties or organizations."


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Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may

be registered under the party-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be

valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this

Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-

list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of

election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they

shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law."30

The purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance

to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a

seat in Congress.34

The law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology

or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as

the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports

certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political

parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

"x x x

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis

of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of

the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in t he party-list system.

x x x"

Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the

party-list elections.


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ISSUE (2): Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and

underrepresented' sectors and organizations.

Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that

any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite

character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-

list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.

RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the

election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of

registered national, regional and sectoral parties or o rganizations or coalitions thereof, which

will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,

organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could

contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the

nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end,

the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the

broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of

Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,

and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by

means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of

Representatives of Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and

parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate

legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular

district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to

numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation

of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section

5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and

professionals."

The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and

underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.36

Concurrently, the persons

nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to

marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally

identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of

government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the

"marginalized or underrepresented."

The intent of the Constitution is clear : to give genuine power to the people, not only by

giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become

veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing

law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House

of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to

its express terms.37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list

system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:


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"SEC. 5. Registration. -- xxx Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,

urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,

veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the

party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed

in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference

to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning

of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate

association.38

The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits

that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized

and underrepresented sectors of society."39

In fact, it contends that any party or group that is

not disqualified under Section 640

of RA 7941 may participate in the elections.

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens

specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations

and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives.

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they

are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic

clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation.

In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope

for genuine change.


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Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized

and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. Verily, majority of its

membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must

demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of

such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the

Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared

statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other

words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties,

they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and

underrepresented.

Third, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not

be represented in the party-list system.

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which

enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for

religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,

foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or

members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at

least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two

(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."59

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity

funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party

or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It

must be independent of the government.

Sixth,the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees mustlikewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as

party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a

registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one

(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a

bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at

least ninety (90) days preceding the day o f the election, and is at least twenty-five

(25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more

than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and

underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees.


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Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the

nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of

appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO,

respondents.

KAPUNAN,J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position ofRepresentative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among others,

Aquino provided the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.

(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and 10 Months.

xxx xxx xxx

Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino

2on the ground that the latter

lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6,

Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year

immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.

Petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20,

1995. This time, petitioner stated that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to

be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days.3

After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC

promulgated a Resolution dismissing the petition for Disqualification.

In Makati City, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes.

private respondents filed a motion to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner..

COMELEC en bancissued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.

COMELEC en bancissued a Resolution reversing the resolution declaring petitioner ineligible

and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative

District of Makati City for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has complied with the constitutional qualification of residence to

be eligible to run as a Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City

HELD:

RATIO: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the

Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just

residence but domicile of choice.17

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives

should be a residentof the districtin which he seeks election for a period of not less than one

(l) year prior to the elections.18

Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning

in our jurisdiction.

The term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only

under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. It should be by

domicile and not physical and actual residence.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,"21

where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return

and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of


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residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the

usual conceptions of residency in law22

is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar

with the conditions and needs of the community " from taking advantage of favorable

circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.

Petitioner indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992

but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election.

23

Atthe time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district.

24

While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City, it

does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original

domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent

Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has

other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City.26

While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be

voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro

Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the

condominium unit in Makati "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring

his physical residence"27

is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to qualify

as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City ."28

Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare

assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not

easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual

removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former

place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the

purpose.30

These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of

petitioner's claims of a change ofdomicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati.


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G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN,J.:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte providing the following information in item no.

8:4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and sevenMonths.

Private respondent Montejo filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5

Elections

alleging thatpetitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.

Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven"

months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.

Petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacywas the result of an "honest misinterpretation"

10which she sought to rectify by adding the

words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she

has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.11

The COMELECen banc declared petitioner as not qualified to run for the position of Member

of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte.

Petitioner got the highest number of votes in the election however COMELEC issued a

resolution suspending proclamation ofpetitioner in the event that she obtains the highest

number of votes.19

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District

of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

HELD: Petitioner has complied with the residency required to run as Representative of the

First District of Leyte

RATIO:Domicile - an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for

business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in

the sense that they disclose intent."; includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or

physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there

permanently; denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the

intention of returning.

Residence - It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country;

used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;

The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves

the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If

a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as

his purpose is established it is residence.22

It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual

to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single

domicile, unless, for various reasons,

The term residence is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside

in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative

of such intention."

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied

the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what


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significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her

residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisiv.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting

the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement.

The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the

subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay

in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since

childhood" in the space provide;d

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,

Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years

and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte

instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her

period of stay in her legal residence or domicile.

An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in

different places. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to

study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute

loss of residence.

Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None

of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in

Tacloban, Leyte.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a

new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,

Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one

must demonstrate:37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place o f residence and

establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by

operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in

1952.


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G.R. No. 137329 August 9, 2000

ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M. SERIO, petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y. EMANO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN,J.:

FACTS: During the 1995 elections, Respondent Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and

proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as

governor of the province. In his Certificate of Candidacy his residence was declared to be in

Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.

While still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration Record inCagayan de Oro City, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. He filed his Certificate of

Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two

years and five months was Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.

PETITIONERS filed a Petition before the Comelec in which they sought the disqualification of

Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-

year residence requirement.

Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor, private respondent

remained a resident of the province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification

that an elective official must possess throughout his term..

Petitioners further contend that the following were not sufficient to constitute a change of

domicile: having a house in Cagayan de Oro City, residing therein while exercising one's office

as governor, securing a residence certificate and registering as voter therein.

Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually and physically resided in

Cagayan de Oro City while serving as provincial governor for three consecutive terms.

Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto

divest him of his position as provincial governor.

First, there is no law that prevents an elected official from transferring residencewhile in office.

Second, an elective official's transfer of residence does not prevent theperformance of that official's duties, especially in private respondent's case in

which the seat of government became his adopted place of residence.

Third, the loss of any of the required qualifications for election merely renders theofficial's title or right to office open to challenge. In Emano's case, no one

challenged his right to the Office of Provincial Governor when he transferred his

residence to Cagayan de Oro City. Naturally, he continued to discharge his

functions as such, until he filed his candidacy for mayor in March 1998.

COMELEC ruled in favor ofRESPONDENT EMANO.

ISSUE:Whether private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro

City at least one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the

mayorship thereof;

HELD: Private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least

one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship

RATIO:

Law on Qualifications of Local E lective Officials

The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code

(LGC) of 1991,18

which provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:
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"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a

registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be

elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the

election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in

which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibilityof a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community

and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that

community."19

Facts Showing Change of Residence

In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually

been residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City , in a house he had

bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of

Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial

government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city.

These facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City

for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein.

Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a

geographical part of the province. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out

their functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with

its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental

for three terms and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could

not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term, when

he decided to adopt it as h is permanent place of residence.

Private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City while

discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and

resided there together with his family

In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in

Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of

mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship.

Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate

There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the people of

Cagayan de Oro City.1wphi1 He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes.24

Thus, we find it

apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the

ballot must be given fullest effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give

life and spirit to the popular mandate.25

[T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in

order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a

reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the

issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound

public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority.
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ELECTION OF OFFICERS

G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,

vs.

SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.

PANGANIBAN,J.:

FACTS:

Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B.

Fernan. Sen.Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defenser

Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2,8Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of

the Senate.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader.

He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while

only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier

manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party minority hadchosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.

Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original petition seeking the ouster of Senator

Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the

rightful minority leader.

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising

the position of Senate minority leader?

4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in

recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

ISSUE: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate

or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?

The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a

certain number out of a total or aggregate , it simply "means the number greater than half

or more than half of any total."36

The plain and unambiguous words of the subject

constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more

than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who

comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in t he said body.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected

by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide

that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who

could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated

candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the

political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged , while the "minority"

normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.

Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,"41

not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast,

minorityis "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the

majority."42

In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by

petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be


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indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general

elections.

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House

Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both

chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other

officers as it may deem necessary."

43

To our mind, the methodof choosing who will be suchother officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the

aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the

Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the

rules of its proceedings."44

Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:

Rule I

ELECTIVE OFFICERS

Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a

President, a President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-

Arms.

These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the

discharge of their duties.

Rule II

ELECTION OF OFFICER

Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of

all its Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same

office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by

viva voce or by resolution.

But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is

devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative

thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may

not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courtsto direct Congress how to do its work.

46This Court is of the opinion that where no specific,

operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real

and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before

the courts may intervene.47

Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem .

And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for

the exercise of this prerogative.


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QUORUM

G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949

JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.

MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

Senator Taadare requested to speak on the next session day to formulate charges against

the then Senate President Avelino. His request was approved.

Hours before the opening of the session Senator Taada and Senator Sanidad filed a

resolution enumerating charges against the Senate Presidentand ordering the investigation

thereof.

Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session

hall at the appointed time. and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner

delayed his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M.

The petitioner finally called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in

a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States,all the Senators were present.

Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed saidmotion. The roll was called.

Senator Sanidad moved to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but this motion was

likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-

mentioned conspiracy.

Senator Taada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege

speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuosly ignored him

The petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would speak

without being previously recognized by him.

Senator Pablo Angeles David moved for adjournment of session in pursuance of the above-

mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.

Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this

opposition was seconded by herein respondent.

Suddenly, the petitioner hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by six senators,

while the rest of the senators remained.

Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those

senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.

RESPONDENT was designated to preside.

Senator Taada was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.

Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and

submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.

Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the

position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus

Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimouslyapproved.

Senator Cuenco took the oath.

President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the

Philippines Senate.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines senate

and oust respondent.


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ISSUE: (1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session

validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was

there a quorum in that session?

RULING: When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a

quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members

constitute "the House".

There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number

than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one

(23) constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr.

Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum,

they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been

so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been

elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one

abstained.

In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation

that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the

days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at

most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the

latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends

exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure

of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any

session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy

arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all

concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could

ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.


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RULES of PROCEEDING

G.R. No. L-25895 July 23, 1971

FELIZARDO S. PACETE, petitioner,

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, respondents.

FERNANDO,J.:

Petitioner Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on

as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on and discharged his

duties as such.

As his appointment was made during the recess of Congress , it was submitted to the

Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965.

On May 20 of that year, he was unanimously confirmed. As a matter of fact, two days later,

he was sent a congratulatory telegram by the then Senate President Ferdinand E. Marcos,

who was likewise the Chairman of the Co mmission on Appointments.2

More than nine months after such confirmation, the then Secretary of Justice advised

petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the ground being that his appointment

had been by-passed.

He was informed that a day after his confirmation, one of the members of the Commission

on Appointments, Senator Guanzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a

motion for the reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner.

Respondent Secretary of Justice advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as

municipal judge, as he had not been duly confirmed.

Petitioner contends that:

the confirmation of his appointment had become final and executory upon the

adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress

the power to approve or disapprove appointments is conferred by the Constitution on the

Commission on Appointments as a body and not on the members individually. The

Commission exercises this power thru the vote of the majority of the members present at a

quorum as provided by Section 10 of its Rules.

Once an appointment is approved by that majority, the approval becomes an act of the

Commission and it cannot be changed, voided, vacated or set aside except by the same

Commission acting thru the required majority.

ISSUE:

HELD:

RULING: Rule 21 of the Commission on Appointments reads "The President shall nominate

and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the

executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the

Navy and air forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the

Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom

he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the

appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of

departments."18

The other provision is worded, thus: "The President shall have the power to make

appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective

only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of

the Congress."


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A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring

confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it

is in recess.

In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission

Appointments may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad

interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and

perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the language

of the Constitution, the appointment is effective "until disapproval by the Commission on

Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."20

The constitutional requirement is clear. There must either be a rejection by the Commission

on Appointments or nonaction on its part . No such thing happened in this case. Petitioner,

as pointed out, had instead in his favor a unanimous vote of confirmation. He could thus

invoke constitutional protection.

For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to

set it aside, even in the absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose

sight of what is provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover tantamount to

imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad

enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what

respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. It is

indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the

constitutional prescription. Rather it makes a mockery of what is therein ordained.

Petitioner's stand is thus unassailable.


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G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA,

and RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners,

vs.

JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE

SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA,J.:

FACTS: Petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the Court's decision dismissing

their petition for certiorariand prohibition.

Basically, their contention is that when the Majority Leader (Rep. Rodolfo Albano) moved

for the approval of the conference committee report on the bill that became R.A. No. 8240,

leading the Chair to ask if there was any objection to the motion, and Rep. Joker P. Arroyoasked, "What is that, Mr. Speaker?", the Chairallegedly ignored him and instead declared

the report approved.

Petitioners claim that the question "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" was a privileged question

or a point of order which, under the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters,

with the exception of motions to adjourn.

ISSUE: Whether the question "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" was a privileged question or a

point of order which, under the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters, with

the exception of motions to adjourn.

HELD: The contention has no merit.

RULING:Rep. Arroyo did not have floor. Without first drawing the attention of the Chair,

he simply stood up and started talking. As a result, the Chair did not hear him and

proceeded to ask if there were objections to the Majority Leader's motion. Hearing none, he

declared the report approved. Rule XVI, 96 of the Rules of the House of Representatives

provides:

96. Manner of Addressing the Chair. When a member desires to

speak, he shall rise and respectfully address the Chair "Mr. Speaker."

The Rules of the Senate are even more emphatic. Rule XXVI, 59 says:

59. Whenever a Senator wishes to speak, he shall rise and request the

President or the Presiding Officer to allow him to have the floor which

consent shall be necessary before he may proceed.

If various Senators wish to have the floor, the President or Presiding

Officer shall recognize the one who first made the request.

When the Majority Leader moved for the approval of the conference committee report and

the Chair asked if there was any objection to the motion, Rep. Arroyo stood up again and,

without requesting to be recognized, asked, "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" Apparently, the

Chair did not hear Rep. Arroyo since his attention was on the Majority Leader. Thus, he

proceeded to ask if there was any objection and, hearing none, declared the report

approved and brought down the gavel. is not, therefore, true that Rep. Arroyo was

ignored. He was simply not heard because he had not first obtained recognition from the

Chair.

Nor is it correct to say that the question ("What is that, Mr. Speaker?'') he was raising was

a question of privilege or a point of older. Rule XX, 121 of the Rules of the House defines a

question of privilege as follows

Sec. 121. Definition. Questions of privilege are those affecting the

duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the

House or of its members, collectively or individually.

while a point of order is defined as follows


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Points of order or questions of order are legislative devices used in

requiring the House or any of its Members to observe its own rules and

to follow regular or established parliamentary procedure. In effect, they

are either objections to pending proceedings as violative of some of

those rules or demands for immediate return to the aforementioned

parliamentary procedure.2

The practice in cases involving the approval of a conference committee report is for the Chair

simply to ask if there are o bjections to the motion for approval o f the report.

MR. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous

action of the House. It has been the procedure in this House that if

somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the

voting comes in.


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DISCIPLINE of MEMBERS

G.R. No. 22041 September 11, 1924

JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,

vs.

MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.

MALCOLM,J.:

The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the

respondent Senators depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and

emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of January, 1924. The

resolution reads as follows:

Senator Alejandrino - guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the

privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente

de Vera, Senator

ISSUE:Whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power

granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to

"remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution

HELD: Neither is the correct hypothesis.

Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two

senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine

Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the

Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine

Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is

granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the

concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House

may thus punish an appointive member fo

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