Consti Estrellado

8/11/2019 Consti Estrellado

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Sept. 18, 2013

Constitutional Law I

Transcribed by: Michelle Mae P. Andoy

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 4.The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years

which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon ofthe same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has

succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same

office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of

time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was

elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second

Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each

province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the

certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all

the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the

Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass

the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an

equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members

of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and

qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Lets continue w/ sec. 4, we already started w/ the first paragraph referring to election of the president and vice

president and their express prohibition.

Second paragraphprovides that No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary

renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service

for the full term for which he was elected

If you have this voluntary renunciation is not present in the first paragraph, it bolsters the argument that there is no

need to determine that the renunciation of the office of the president is voluntary or involuntary. The fact is he is still

prohibited from any re-election. That is why, that is not the argument because that is not present in the first paragraph.

You talk about renunciation of office for any length of time meaning if he is still allowed to be re-elected for another

term.

Paragraph 3,4,5 and 6refers to the congress as the national board of canvassers for presidential election as always

provided by law the election of the president and vice president should be held on the second Monday of Maywhere

returns of every election shall be transmitted to the Congress directed to the President of the Senate. So its the


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Congress who will canvass, done in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and

due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. When it comes to ordinary or regular elections

meaningselections other than the president and the vice president its the COMELEC is the authority of the over-all

canvass of the votes. Now when it comes to the president and the vice president the Constitution put that away from

the COMELEC and gave the authority to canvass to the CONGRESS. So the board of canvassers will be the Congress, now

take note of that because the multiple choice may ask who acts as the board of canvassers of the president or vice

president. Now you may say that maam we now have the automation of the election, so there is no point of counting

because before they will actually canvass/count the votes in a joint session. What they would receive right now is EACH

OF THE RETURNSof each Province. So, there is still subject for canvassing only that they are assisted by the computer.But, its not just the counting of the votes that is the function of national canvasser. Under the second paragraph, it is

also their function to proclaim the winner and if there is a tie. It is still the national board of canvasser who will break the

tie. In the case, there are two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be

chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The Congress

shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. So as national board of canvassers they will canvass the

vote and proclaim the winner. And in case of a tie, it has the authority to break the tie. All its functions are ministerial. It

does not require any discretion.

Last paragraph, the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judgeof all contests relating to the election,

returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. We call this

as the PET or the presidential electoral tribunal. Their function is more or less same on the SET [senate] or HRET [house

or representatives] only the subject.

Case: Tecson vs. COMELEC

Actually this case was originally filed w/ the COMELEC questioning the qualifications of FPJ, but it was appealed

certiorari w/ the Supreme Court, on certiorari Tecson questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine the

qualification of FPJ citing this last paragraph of Sec. 4 that according to the Constitution it is the SC w/c is the sole judge

of qualifications. Now is it correct? The same principle that we have learned with the SET or HRET meaning that its

jurisdiction will begin only when the candidate is proclaim to be a winner, has taken his oath & has assume the duties

and functions of his office. In other words, when who is involve is still a candidate the jurisdiction is not in the electoral

tribunal. When you say electoral tribunal and electoral protest this would not ordinarily refer to post election contest. So

the same principle, the contention of Tecson is incorrect.

Case: Defensor-Santiago vs. Ramos

There was a time that Ramos ran for president among several others including Defensor. It was a hot contested election.

Allegedly Ramos cheated so that Miriam Santiago will not win but the records allegedly showed that it was Santiago who

won. Muntik na tayo nagka president na Miriam Santiago. [lol!] Ramos was called tobacco, Salonga was called super lolo

& Miriam Santiago was called Brenda. Anyway, until now she is still saying that she won that election. After that

election, Ramos won. Santiago filed an election protest before the PET (Presidential Electoral Tribunal). Three years after

that there is again an election for Senators. She ran for senator. The question is does it affect her electoral protest w/

the PET? The SC said, the fact that she ran for senator will be tantamount to abandonment of her electoral protest

because she has effectively abandon/withdrawn her protest or at least abandon the determination to protect & pursuepublic interest in voting matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Also, consistently held even in the

case of Legarda vs De Castro. Legardaalso questioned the vice presidential race against Noli De Castro. But in the next

succeeding election she ran for senator. So citing this ruling she also abandoned her interest. Now for me, thats the

proper ruling because they won and the they took their oath of office w/ regards to the senate office.

My question is what is what if they lost in the election, would that still be tantamount to abandonment? The decision

did not say that & I dont think that the decision covers that. Anyway, there is still no casewhere there is someone who

ran as president placed second questioned the decision and ran as senator then lost.


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Case: Poe Jr. vs. Macapagal

Fernando Poe ran against Macapagal Arroyo & there is still a contention that Arroyo cheated & it was Fernando Poe

actually won the election which was later confirmed w/ no less than the COMELEC in a unofficial recount. Anyway, after

the election filed an electoral protest against Arroyo. They have several evidence w/ regards to cheating & massive fraud

in the election. But we know that what happened next, FPJ died. The next question is what happens to the electoral

protest, will it be vacated? Will the SC lose jurisdiction because the complainant died. The answer would be NO.

Although it is personal in the case claimed that he won, it is also a matter of public interest. The public would be

interested would know who actually won in the presidential race. But the next question is that, who may substitute FPJ?Because in this case, it was Susan Roces, the wife so that the case will continue. Sc said the wife as a widow has no

personal interest on the winner/ who will win because she will not take the seat in case FPJ will be declared as a winner

or in case it is declared that the actual votes for GMA does not really belongs to her. So, she is not the real party interest

so substitute FPJ it would have been more correct if it is the second or third placer died. The second placer died, the

third placer would have that interest to pursue the case. So in this case since public office cannot be transmitted by

inheritance, Susan Roces cannot substitute FPJ. Ultimately, the case was vacated.

Section 5.Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President

shall take the following oath or affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-Presidentor Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man,

and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be

omitted.)

Section 6.The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be

determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect

until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive

during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.

Sec. 6talks about salaries. This is more in testing w/ section 7 & 8. These are the rules on succession in case there is avacancy in the office of the president or in the office of the vice president. Sec. 7 will cover the instances where the

vacancy occurred at the beginning of the term.

Section 7.The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have

qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have

been chosen and qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently

disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or

become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a

President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials

mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.


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Now, section 8would found a vacancy w/c occurs midterm.Congress only refers to permanent vacancy. In case of death

or permanent disability removal from office or resignation of that president, what will happen? RULE ON SUCCESSION.

The vice president will become the president. (answered prayer again.haha) Now second question, what if they boarded

the same plane, they died under the Constitution the senate president or the speaker of the house will act as president.

Again, there is no way that the senate president of house of representative on rule on succession become the president.

Only the vice president will be given w/ that privilege. Another problem they boarded the same plane again, di na sila

natuto. There is no president, vice president, speaker of the house, senate president, who will act as president? The

congress will enact a law to provide for this kind of situation.

Case: Estrada vs. Desierto

If you observe, we have touch on the specific areas in relation to this topic because we have already discussed before

regarding de facto & de jure government then the constitution comparing with the Aquino & arroyo government,

political questions, immunity from suits. This time we are talking about RESIGNATION. There were several scandals

involving Estrada including is theJuetengscandal where he allegedly resigned. He submitted a resignation letter

immediately at the same day, Gloria Arroyo immediately took her oath of office. Now, Estrada contended that he never

resigned, that he only left his position temporarily & that Arroyo would only be in acting capacity as president. The SC

rule instead in a factual manner, whether or not Erap resigned. SC said lets us look at the prior contemporaneous andposterior facts & circumstances. Pinalalim pa noh? Before, during & after. Facts & circumstances surrounding his

resignation, among these that was credited by the SC is the diary of Angara, which for the SC serve as a window to the

mind of Estrada. Yun pala yun? If someone is writing about you, his diary to the mind of Estrada. Yun pala yun? If

someone is writing about you, his diary will be a window to my mind. [class laughs.] You have this person claiming that

he has not resigned and you have this diary the you have resigned. Between these two facts, in ordinary setting it would

be the person because he talks about the intention of the mind. For me this case would be the worst nightmare of Erap,

if they will say may all odds be in your favor. In this case, all the odds were against his favor. Because the SC said that he

did resigned. If we apply this ruling in a labor case, it would be a different ruling diba? The SC said the validity of

resignation is not governed by any formal requirement in labor case the resignation has to be accepted right? It can be

oral, written. There is no implied resignation. You can call it abandonment. In fact an ordinary worker submits aresignation & thereafter comes back to office & claims his salary & claims his statutory benefits under the labor

standards. In this contrary setting, the SC will give weight to the act of the labourer claiming its salary. Meaning it was no

really his intention to really resign. I can understand the reasoning of that because labor is your source of income, your

source of living. But if you will apply it here, you have the president elected at large by the general voting population.

To SC, they are now contradicting the general population in just one finding or holding that he resigned amidst his claim

that he did not resigned. Ganon lang ba kadali? Its just that I sent a letter but i did not intend to resign. Its just as

simple as that. And he made a claim, immediately after sending the resignation letter. SC said that he is resigned

because of the diary of Angara.

Lets go first in an instance where there is a vacancy of office of the vice president, who will be the vice president? Sec. 9states..

Section 9.Whenever there is a vacancy in theOffice of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the

President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives

who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,

voting separately.

In other words, anyonefrom the Congress may it be a senator or a member of the house of representative may become

a vice president by President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of


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Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority voteof all the Members of both Houses of the

Congress, voting separately.

It happened in the case of Arroyo assuming the office of the president so the vice president/c she left is vacant. Since

there is vacancy, she nominated Guingona, a senator, and his nomination was confirmed & supported by his peers in the

Congress. ANYONE as long as he is nominated by the president concurred by the congress.

Sec. 10talks about special election.

Section 10.The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the

President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven

days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than

forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed

certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third

reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations

and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening

of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the

vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

Question, when shall we have a special election of the president or the vice president? We will only hold therefore

mandatory special election when there is vacancy in both the offices of the president and the vice president. Why? If

there is a vacancy of the president what will happen? The rule on succession will apply so there is no need to hold a

special election. When there is a vacancy in the office of the vice president only? What will happen? The president will

nominate on who will become the vice president. In other words, a special election is only applicable when there is a

vacancy in BOTH offices. Calling a special election is in fact mandatory right? It states that The convening of the Congress

cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. Is there an exception? if the vacancy occurs within eighteen

months before the date of the next presidential election. Now this is an urgent matter w/c must be acted upon by the

congress. Now we know how laws are created from the time that they become bills. Must they undergo separate or

separate days? There is a provion that states The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified. You can

dispense the reading on 3 separate days w/ the printing of the copies. Another exception, it becomes a law immediately

upon approval of the third reading. Another exception,Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against

any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this

Constitution. They can take the funds anywhere w/o violating the transfer of funds. So this is how crucial& important the

calling of special election is.

Lets got to sec. 11..

Section 11.Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of

Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he

transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-

President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of

the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and

duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting

President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.


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Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the

Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to

discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress

shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days

after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President

is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the

President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

That is a very long section. When you read the provisions, it like a pingpong. When you read the first paragraph would

be the president would declare itself to be temporarily incapacitated, unable to discharge the powers of his office. So he

will declare this to the senate president & the speaker of the house, what will happen after that? The Vice-President as

acts as the president. Sec. 11 therefore covers situations of temporary incapacity or disability midterm. Hindi siya

kasama sa sec. 8 na permanent vacancy. So paragraph 1 is the president declaring the he is temporarily incapacitated

unable to discharge the powers & duties of his office. What if he will not admit it? There was a time in the history that it

was rumoured that when Marcos got sick & we did not know how critical his sickness was, it was another person who is

running the country. So it seems that there was at the time temporary disability on the part of Marcos to discharge the

powers of his office & he did not admit to it so hindi a-apply yung praragraph 1.

What will apply is paragraph 2. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the

Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to

discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the

office as Acting President.What will happen if they make that declaration? Mga traydor kayo!lol The vice president shall

act as president but because the president is given the benefit of the doubt by the Constitution, he can contradict or

counter the declaration of his cabinet members. So automatically upon saying NO there is no disability echapwerasi vice

president. Now is that the end of it? The cabinet members may pursue that declaration. What will happen? The

congress will side.Take note that controversy is w/ the congress & not the courts. The congress will decide the ability or

disability of the president only after the pingpong not immediately. Because in the first instance pwede pa i counter ng

president. Now last paragraph says that the desired vote is two-thirds voteof both Houses, voting separately, that the

President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President.

The vice president shall act as a president only when the congress has already decided that the president is already

unable to discharge his office. Otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.Bakit

mataas ang required vote? 2/3. Because you are declaring a person incapacitated. The presumption remains that he is

capacitated to perform its functions. Lets relate that to Estradas nightmare.

Continuing the Estrada vs. Desierto case. On the same day, Estrada submitted his resignation letter. He left Malacaang,

Arroyo took her oath & on the same day Estrada sent a letter to the Senate president that he is temporarily

incapacitated to temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties & functions in his office. So for him, Arroyo would be

just an acting president. What is the ruling of the SC? I think the question is wrong was he temporarily incapacitated?Because who has the power to determine that he is temporarily incapacitated is not the SC. Anyway the SC said that is

the president unable to act as president? NO. The house issued resolution supporting the assumption of Arroyo as

president. So it was not denied that they receive the letter. Likewise in Feb. 7 it confirmed the nomination of president

Arroyo of senator Guingona as vice president on the same day the senate also confirmed the nomination xx. So the SC

recognized the domino effect after Erap left. Arroyo became president, Guingona became vice president, the senate has

vacancy. All of these where w/ the support of the congress. When Erap made his declaration & there was no dispute

that it was received. What did the Congress do? Make a resolution supporting Arroyo as president. Ask the COMELEC to

call for a special election supported Guingona as vice president, the question would have beenis this within it

authority of the congress? Because the SC in holding against Erap said in the phase of this determination of a co-equal

branch the court is w/o authority to review. It is a political question xx. Sabi ng court sabi ng Congeress eh na tama yun,


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president na si Arroyo. Then we cannot review that. After the declaration of the incapacity congress said Arroyo is

already the president. Is this within their authority?

Now you tell me, you read again paragraph 1 Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the

Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of

his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be

discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. The congress has no discretion or participation. What did the

congress do in this case? Declared Arroyo to be the president. What did the SC do in this case? It said that it is the

determination of the Congress that it cannot review for it to be a political question. All the odd are against Estrada. It issupported by the Constitution but co-equal branches in a way that it will fit the situation however they will rule that

Arroyo will be the president & Estrada will be ousted. But my question is, black & white, is this constitutionally correct?

Or was there a violation of the Constituion? By both departments, di naman tayo naririnig diba. Accprding to Atty.

Jumao-as: For me there is a violation, clear naman provision ng constitution, It is not the congress who will determine

the capacity of the president at the first instance that the president himself will declare that he is temporarily

incapacitated. The congress has no authority to declare him incapacitated nor declare the correctness of the assumption

of the vice president as the president & not the acting president. So ika nga naisahan si Erap. Personally I dont agree w/

the decision of the SC. Lets call him a victim of politics. Only to find out that the next president is far worst -> TRUE.

Section 12.In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The

members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness.

It was added in the 1987 Constitution to address the situation we had w/ Marcos at the time we do not know what

happen to him whether buhay pa ba siya or etc. The mandatory disclosure is with regards to serious illness. There was a

buzz aboutArroyos implants, anong paki-alam namin kung nag pasexy siya, that is not covered in this section.

Section 13.The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,

unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall

not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be

financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any

subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their

subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during

his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as

Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled

corporations and their subsidiaries.

Sec. 13 prohibitions, The president or the vice president shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any

other profession. Compare this with the congress, they can still practice their profession like being accountants, lawyers

xx. And,participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or specialprivilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned

or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his

tenure, be appointed as Members xx.

Case: Bitonio vs. COA

NAC vs. COA


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More or less in situations where the secretaries of the president are ruling ex officio functions. Sometimes they are

called to be a member of this committee or etc. As long as they are holding positions in their ex officio capacity there is

no violation in the Constitutional provision in holding other office. But still, they are prevented in receiving emoluments

in whatever they made thereof. In both this cases, they have delegated the attendance in meetings etc. to their

representatives. The law said that their representatives because secretaries cannot receive honorarium he

representatives are given honorarium. SC said since the principal is prohibited in the constitution so also are their

representatives. So they cannot also receive honorariums.

Case: Public Interest vs. Elma

The ruling of interest here is that the chairman of the PCGG is also a lawyer, cannot also be appointed as chief

presidential legal counsel. Why? Because this chief legal counsel has the function to reviewing all the acts, all the

consumptions of the cabinet secretaries & all offices including the PCGG. In other words, he will be reviewing his own

work. So there is here a conflict of function. So one person cannot hold this two offices even if he waived any

remuneration as he may receive as chief presidential legal counsel.

Section 14 of Article VII of the Constitution states that the Acting President is granted the authority to appoint officers

and other officials mentioned in Section 16 in the same Constitution. These appointments are valid even if the Elected

President assumes his office. The exception, however, is when the Elected President revokes the appointments made

by the Acting President.

The role of the Acting President is performed if the President is temporary unable to discharge the powers and duties ofhis office, as mentioned in Section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution.

PERSONS AUTHORIZED BY THE CONSTITUTION TO EXERCISE THE POWERS OF ACTING PRESIDENT:

1. The Vice-President

2. The President of the Senate (if the Vice-President is unable to assume the duty of Acting President)

3. The Speaker of the House of Representatives (If the Senate President is unable to assume the duty of Acting

President)

THE NATURE OF APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

1. The authority to appoint persons in office is an executive function. The appointing power is the exclusive

prerogative of the President.

2. Due to separation of powers of the executive and the legislative bodies, Congress may not usurp such

function, with the following exceptions:

a) Those appointments resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on

Appointments.

b) The prescription of the qualifications of the person who may hold the office.

SEC.14. APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY AN ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL REMAIN

EFFECTIVE, UNLESS REVOKED BY THE ELECTED PRESIDENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS

FROM HIS ASSUMPTION OR REASSUMPTION FROM OFFICE.


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IMPORTANT NOTE: The essence of the power to appoint persons for the President is to choose among the various

qualified choices that are best candidates for certain posts.

MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS

Midnight appointments are those done by an outgoing President of the Philippines, at least two (2) months immediately

preceding the presidential elections. The Constitution expressly states in Section 15 of Article VII, wherein a president

or acting president shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments, wherein vacancies will result to

prejudice to public service and danger to public safety. In the case of De Rama versus the Court of Appeals (353 SCRA

94; 2001), Mayor Conrado de Rama of the Municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon Province, questioned the appointment of

fourteen (14) local government officers by his predecessor in the final months of the latters term. The Supreme Court

held that the last-minute appointments of local government officers such as mayors, are not included in the

prohibition in Section 15 of Article VII of the Constitution. Section 15 refers only to the prohibition of the President of

the Philippines to make midnight appointments.

REGULAR APPOINTMENTS

There are four groups of regular appointees that are mentioned in Section 16 of Article VII, as follows:

a)

First Group (needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments)

Heads of the executive departments Ambassadors

Other public ministers and consuls

Officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain

Other officers whose appointments are vested by the President in this Constitution

b)

Second Group (No need for the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments)

All other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law

SEC.16.THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE AND, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, APPOINT THE

HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS, OR OFFICERS OF THE

ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN, AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE

VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION. HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ALL OTHER OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE

APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO

APPOINT. THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, VEST THE APPOINTMENT OF OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK IN THE PRESIDENT

ALONE, IN THE COURTS, OR IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS.

THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE RECESS OF THE CONGRESS, WHETHER

VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVAL BY THE

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.

SEC.15.TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT

MAKE APPOINTMENTS, EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE

POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC

SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY.


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c) Third Group (No need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments)

Those to whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint

d) Fourth Group (No need for the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments)

Other officers lower in rank, and appointed by virtue of the appointing power of the President

alone, as vested by Congress, as follows: Those lower in rank of the President

The courts/judicial branch of the government (such as the Judicial and Bar Council)

Heads of executive departments (secretaries of departments)

Heads of government agencies (such as the Philippine Information Agency)

Heads of commissions (such as Commission on Elections)

Heads of boards (government boards such as the Board of Election Canvassers)

CASES INVOLVING APPOINTMENTS OF HEADS OF COMMISSIONS

Appointments in the Bureau of Customs(Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549; 1987)

ISSUE: This was the first case decided, which tackled Section 16 of the Philippine Constitution of 1987the first test

case. The issue here was whether or not the appointment of Mr. Salvador Mison as the Commissioner of the Bureau

of Customs required the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

HELD: No, the appointee was not subjected to confirmation of the Commission on Appointments when he was made

the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. Based on the enumeration of the groups of appointees mentioned in

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, bureau heads are excluded from confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments. The appointment of government bureau heads were once included for confirmation, based on the

Philippine Constitution of 1935, but in the 1987 Constitution, they were no longer included. In addition, the President ofthe Philippines is authorized to appoint the chairman and commissioners of the Constitutional Commission, the Civil

Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, without the need for confirmation of

the Commission on Appointments.Wrong !the constitution requires confirmation( The civil service commission)

Appointments in the Commission on Human Rights (Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160; 1989)

FACTS: Then President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Atty. Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairperson of the

Commission on Human Rights and four other persons designated as her subordinate members. The President,

however, erroneously submitted these appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. These

appointments were rejected; thus, Atty. Bautista was instructed to vacate her position. Hence, there is a petition thatshe be retained in office, citing the constitutional provision that the appointments of heads of commissions are

exempted from confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES: If the Commission on Appointments rejects the appointees of the President that are exempted from

confirmation, will these appointments be invalid? Does the appointment of the position of the Chairperson of the

Commission on Human Rights need the confirmation from the Commission on Appointments?

HELD: The Commission on Human Rights was created by law, particularly under the provisions of the Constitution it is

an organ created by the Constitution itself. In this case, the Supreme Court observed that the Constitution did not have


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provisions on how the appointments will be made on the Commission on Human Rights and who will be the officers to

be appointed. The law is silent therefore. However, it was determined that the heads of commissions belong to the

fourth group mentioned in Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. It is the enabling law which vested the power

upon the President to appoint chairpersons of commissions without the need of confirmation from the Commission on

Appointments. Thus, the Supreme Court granted petitioner Bautistas request to be retained as Chairperson of the

Commission on Human Rights.

The Enactment of the Labor CodeRepublic Act No. 6715 (Calderon versus Carale, 208 SCRA 254; 1992)

FACTS: Provided in Article 215 of the Labor Code was a provision creating the Office of the Chairman of the National

Labor Relations Commission and some other officers, and therein provided that the chairman and the members of the

said Commission shall only be appointed by the President if subjected to the confirmation of the Commission on

Appointments. In this case, Congress enacted a law creating an office and vesting the authority of appointment upon

the President, but requiring that his appointments be subjected to confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE: Was the provision provided in Article 215 of the Labor Code constitutional?

HELD: The Commission on Human Rights was created by law, particularly under the provisions of the Constitution it is

an organ created by the Constitution itself. In this case the Supreme Court observed that while this office was created

by the said Constitution, it did not provide on how the appointments will be made and who will be its officers to be

appointed. The Constitution is silent therefore. Nevertheless, heads of commissions belong to the fourth group

mentioned in Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. Again, it is the enabling law which vested the power upon

the President to appoint the Chairman on the Commission on Human Rights. Hence, there is no reason why such

appointments must be subjected to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court

declared the provision in Article 215 of the Labor Code as unconstitutional.

The Enactment of the Local Government Code (Manalo versus Sistoza, 312 SCRA 329; 1999)

FACTS: In 1990, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975, which is the Local Government Code. It created certain offices

such as the Office of the Chief Superintendent and the Director of the Philippine National Police and therein also

provided that their appointments shall be vested upon the President but subject to the confirmation of the

Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE: Sections 26 and 31 of the Local Government Code provided that the newly created offices of the Philippine

National Police were subjected to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Was this provision of law

valid?

HELD: It was erroneous for the Congress to expand the list by providing for a law creating an office vesting the power

of appointment to the President and requiring further, that these appointments be subjected to the confirmation of

the Commission on Appointments.Thus, the Supreme Court struck down Sections 26 and 31 of the Local Government

Code as unconstitutional. Based on the general rule on presidential appointments, there are two doctrines:

1. The President is not given the authority to choose which appointments are to be submitted to the

Commission on Appointments for confirmationit is beyond jurisdiction of the President.

2.

Congress cannot expand the list of appointees of the President by creating a law providing for such

appointments of newly created offices to be submitted for confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.


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Appointments in the Philippine Coast Guard (Soriano v. Lista, 399 SCRA 437; 2004)

FACTS:In 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed the respondents in this case to various positions

in the Philippine Coast Guard. Their ranks range from naval captain, commodore, rear admiral and vice admiral of the

Coast Guard. There was a petition assailing the constitutionality of those appointments and prohibiting the

disbursement of salaries and emoluments to the appointees.

ISSUES:

1. Considering that their appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, were the

appointees authorized to assume their positions without violating the constitution?

2. Were their appointments subjected to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?

HELD: The Supreme Court stated that they must distinguish whether or not the Philippine Coast Guard is part of the

military. Indeed, up to now, it is a civilian officenot a part of the Philippine Navy or any branch of the Armed Forces of

the Philippines. Nor is it under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Defense. It is under the authority of the

Department of Transportation and Communications. Since Philippine Coast Guard personnel are not part of the

military, their appointments need not be subjected to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Thus,

the Supreme Court held that since the said appointments were constitutional, the petition assailing the illegality of

the appointments was denied.

THE NATURE OF RECESS AND AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS

The second paragraph of Section 16 is about ad interimappointments, in which, the President shall have the power to

make appointments during the recess of the Congress.

The characteristics of ad interimappointments are as follows:

1.

Ad interimappointments, therefore, are those requiring confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,that are made while Congress is in recess, whether the recess is compulsory or voluntary in their part. Not all

appointments made during the recess of Congress would be considered as ad interim. Based on the general

rule, appointments are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the President without the participation of Congress,

with a few exceptions. So when we say ad interim, in relation to recess, this would only cover appointments

which require the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

2. As for other appointments that do not require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it is

irrelevant, whether if Congress is in session or not.Ad interimappointments refer only to appointments which

require the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. So such appointments, because the Congress is

SEC.16.(LAST PARAGRAPH)

THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE

RECESS OF THE CONGRESS, WHETHER VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH

APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVAL BY THE

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE

CONGRESS.


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not in session, shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next

adjournment of the Congress.

CASES INVOLVINGAD INTERIMAPPOINTMENTS

Appointments in the Commission on Elections (Matibag v. Benipayo 380 SCRA 49; 2002)

FACTS:Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed ad interimMr. Alfredo Benipayo as Chairman of the

Commission on Elections as well as Ms. Resurreccion Borra and Florentino Tuason, Jr. as commissioners. The

appointment was made when the Congress was in session, so it was ad interim. Unfortunately, when President Arroyo

submitted these appointments to the Commission on Appointments, the Commission on Appointments did not act on

the same until the time came when Congress declared a recess. Meanwhile, Petitioner Maria Angelina Matibag was

Director IV of the COMELEC when Benipayo was appointed as Chairman. Petitioner was reassigned to a lower position;

thus, she filed administrative complaints against Benipayo. She questioned her reassignment as well as the latters

appointment as COMELEC Chairman, citing the provision in the Constitution particularly the Constitutional Commission,

which prohibits the appointment of any member of the Commission on Elections with a temporary or acting capacity.

ISSUES:

1. Is an ad interimappointment a temporary one, so that it is invalid for being in violation of this constitutional

prohibition with regards to Constitutional Commissions?

2. Can the President reappoint somebody whose appointment has been bypassed by the Commission on

Appointments?

HELD:

1.

The Supreme Court said that an ad interimappointment is a regular appointment. A regular appointment is

one that is already valid and the appointee can be only removed for valid causes: Either his appointment will

be disapproved or rejected by the Commission on Appointments, or if Congress adjourned without acting on the

appointment of the President. Meaning, the appointee is bypassed. These are the only valid causes for the

termination of appointments. In the meantime, the appointment was considered a regular appointment, not in

violation of the Constitutional prohibition on temporary appointments for the chairman and commissioners of

the Constitutional Commissions. Hence, the Supreme Court validated Benipayos appointment as COMELEC

Chairman.

2.

The reassignment of petitioner Matibag is valid because the COMELEC Chairman was vested with the power

to make temporary assignments, rotate and transfer personnel in accordance of the provisions of the Civil

Service Law and Section 7 of the Revised Administrative Code.

3. Yes, the President can reappoint a person whose appointment has been bypassed by the Commission on

Appointments.The Supreme Court said that bypass is different from disapproval. Disapproval means that

the Commission on Appointments has disapproved the appointment made by the President, in which the issue is

decided with finality, and they have decided to reject the appointment. Bypass, means that the Commission

on Appointments failed to act on it for some reason or another; such as lack of time to act or that they were not

able to constitute themselves or convene. There would be several reasons. Ultimately, however, when an

appointment is bypassed, there is yet no decision, unlike disapproval, which means that if the appointee is

rejected, he can no longer be appointed.


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IMPORTANT NOTE: Usually, confirmation of appointments is a political maneuver. Sometimes, it is some sort of

compromise between the President and the Congress. There are some situations, wherein the members of the

Commission on Appointments do not like the appointee but they do not want to disappoint the President. So instead

of acting on the appointment and rejecting it outright, the Commission on Appointments would just fail to act on it

bypass it. Anyway, the appointment may be terminated in the next adjournment. Actually, the President may still

reappoint the appointee, just like what happened in the case of Benipayo.

Appointments in Temporary or Acting Capacity (Pimentel Jr. v. Ermita 472 SRA 587; 2005)

FACTS: When the Congress was in session, and after the Commission on Appointments had been constituted, then

President Arroyo appointed eight (8) individuals as secretaries of various departments. Up to now, it is mandated in the

Constitution that secretaries of various executive departments require confirmation of the Commission on

Appointments. What the President did here was that she extended the appointments only in acting capacities. For

your information, appointees are primarily dependent on the preference of the President. Hence, President Arroyo,

instead of extending regular appointments for secretaries, she preferred appointments in acting capacities. The

relevance was that appointments of acting capacities did not require the confirmation of the Commission on

Appointments. So in order to prevent from being caught up in the highly politicized manner of the Commission on

Appointments as far as appointee confirmation was concerned, the President appointed acting or temporarysecretaries. Thus, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and eight (8) other senators filed a writ of preliminary injunction to

declare the appointments of then President Arroyo as unconstitutional.

ISSUES: Were the actions of President Arroyo proper, or was there a need to be confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments?

HELD:

1. The Supreme Court held that there was nothing wrong with appointing secretaries in acting capacities.

Secretaries of the Executive Departments had to sit there as alter egos of President Arroyo and they had the

confidence of the President. If there was a vacancy, an urgent need to fill up those seats, the President filled

that vacancy without approval from the Commission on Appointments. There was no violation of the

Constitution because she just extended those appointments in acting capacity. So, just like in the case of

Benipayo, President Arroyo appointed secretaries ad interim, were bypassed, and then reappointed them, and

was bypassed again by the Commission on Appointments. These were the instances wherein the Arroyo

administration had been testing the limits of the Constitution. The president discerned that her appointee

would most likely be rejected by the Commission on Appointmentsthat was why she decided to appoint

secretaries in acting capacities.

2. The Supreme Court also ruled that there was no violation of the Constitution. There was nothing wrong with

the actions of President Arroyo because there was no final determination about the status of thoseappointments made by her.

3.

Based on the grounds mentioned above, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions for certiorari and

prohibition filed by Senator Pimentel, Jr.

IMPORTANT NOTE: Temporary appointments characterized the administration of President Arroyo. She tested the

Commission on Appointments: If her appointees were confirmed, then she made permanent their positions. If

bypassed, she assigned them to temporary or in acting capacities. So far, she had succeeded in her strategy. This was a

common ground for such appointments: If the President felt that one of the cabinet members was not be given favor by

the Commission on Appointments, the said member was appointed in a temporary or acting capacity. Thus, the time


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frame or tenure of the appointee was irrelevant, for as long as the latter was performing the functions of an acting

secretary.

ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF CONTROL

1. The President is given control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.

2. The power of control has been defined as the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a

subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment from the former to that of

the latter.

3. The President is not expected to exercise all his powers in person. He is expected to delegate some of his

powers to men of his confidence, particularly to the members of his Cabinet. This goes from the Executive Secretary,

down to the department secretaries and their subordinates. He can modify, nullify, or alter the decisions of the latter.

4. The principle of the power of control remained unchanged from the Philippine Constitution of 1935 up to the

1987 Constitution.

5. The President may reverse the decision of a department head.

CASES INVOLVING THE POWER OF CONTROL

The authority of the President vested on the Executive Secretary over the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources, as well as the Director of Lands (Lacson-Magallanes Co, Inc. v. Jose Pano, 21 SCRA 895; 1967)

FACTS: Jose Magallanes was a pioneering occupant of a 1,103 hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality

of Bansalan, Province of Davao (now Davao del Sur Province) in the year 1932. On January 9, 1953, he ceded his rights

and interests of the portion of the above public land/pasture land to petitioner Lacson-Magallanes Company,

Incorporated. This land was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land on

April 13, 1954. Jose Pano and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety (90) hectares of the released

area on January 26, 1955. Petitioner Lacson-Magallanes Company, Inc., in turn, filed its own sales application covering

the entire released area on March 29, 1955, and this was protested by Jose Pano and his companions upon the

averment that they are the actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. In resolving the

conflict, the Director of Lands rendered a decision on July 31, 1956 in favor of the application of the petitioner

corporation, and dismissed the claim of Jose Pano et.al. He and his claimant companions thereafter appealed their case

in the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now known as the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources). The appeal was dismissed. The case was elevated to the Office of the President of the Philippines.

In 1958, Presidential Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the President, decided on the controversy and

modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The

order allocated the portion of the disputed land to where Mr. Pano and his companions had actually settled and had

already made improvements. It also ordered that the said portion be subdivided into lots and that petitioner

corporation be reimbursed for the lots allocated to Mr. Pano et al. Petitioner Lacson-Magallanes Company therefore

filed a case in the Court of First Instance praying that (1) judgment be rendered annulling the decision of the Executive

Secretary, asserting that he had no authority to make such a decision; thus, contrary to law and (2) the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources had the sole authority to decide matters in settling land issues.


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ISSUE: Did the Executive Secretary have legal authority to intervene in agrarian matters, which belong to the jurisdiction

of the President and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources?

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the decision of the Executive Secretary, who was acting by the

authority of the President, in modifying the previous decision of the Director of Lands, due to the following reasons:

1. The Executive Secretary was the alter ego of the President; therefore, he acted by the authority of the President,

and his decision was that of the Presidents. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary was to be accepted, foronly the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary was not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the

action taken is disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and

cannot be successfully assailed.

2. The President was authorized to supersede the decision of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Director of Lands at that time was under the authority of the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the latter, in turn, was under the authority of the President.

In the light of the reasons mentioned above, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition of Lacson-Magallanes Company,

and upheld the decision of the Executive Secretary in allocating portions of the disputed property in Bansalan, Davao

Province to Jose Pano and nineteen other settlers.

The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation disobeyed an order of the Secretary of Justice (De Leon v. Carpio,

178 SCRA 457; 1989)

FACTS: Petitioners Cesar R. de Leon and Francisco R. Estavillo were employees of the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI), being Head Agent and Agent III, respectively. They were terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A.

Gonzales in separate orders both dated January 27, 1987. Estavillo was notified of his dismissal on March 6, 1987, and

De Leon on February 6, 1987. They appealed to the Review Committee for reconsideration of their termination so that

they will be reinstated to their former jobs, but their appeal was declined by the said Committee due to the reason that

it had lost jurisdiction because at that time, the newly ratified 1987 Constitution was in effect. Therefore, petitioners De

Leon and Estavillo were advised to ask for help in the Civil Service Commission. The Merit Systems Protection Board of

the Civil Service Commission declared that the termination of services/dismissal of petitioners were invalid and

unconstitutional. It ordered that De Leon and Estavillo be reinstated and to be paid back salaries. The Undersecretary

of Justice repeatedly sent orders to Antonio Carpio, then Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to comply with

orders to reinstate petitioners to their jobs, but it was disregarded by Carpio again and again. Finally, the new Secretary

of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez issued an order to NBI Director Carpio to reinstate petitioners, and was also disregarded.

Hence, De Leon and Estavillo petitioned the Supreme Court that they be reinstated, considering the fact that the

Secretary of Justice and the Undersecretary of Justice had approved and already ordered their reinstatement. NBI

Director Carpio contended that (1) The order of the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission was

illegal and void, (2) The Supreme Court should not have required the additional pleadings of the petitioners and (3) The

Secretary of Justice cannot ignore the final decision of the former Minister of Justice in terminating the employment of

petitioners in the NBI.

ISSUE: Was the contention of NBI Director Antonio Carpio tenable?

HELD: The Supreme Court held that there was no merit in the contention of NBI Director Carpio. The reasons are as

follows:


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1. The Secretary of Justice found no valid reasons why the orders of the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civi

Service Commission regarding the reinstatement of petitioners De Leon and Estavillo should not be implemented. The

dismissal of the petitioners from their jobs in the NBI did not conform to the requirements of due process consistent

with the security of tenure clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution, which was already in effect during the time of the

petitioners termination of services in the NBI.

2. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not strictly required in this case for petitioners were

raising a pure question of law. Even though the petitioners should have exercised administrative remedies so that theycan go back to their jobs, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to decide on the controversy because it involved a question

of law, on whether or not the dismissal of the petitioners in the NBI and the reinstatement issue were valid considering

the existing laws.

3. The Presidents power of control was directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn

and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive

department. This authority is delegated to his subordinates in the Executive Department. Hence, the acts performed by

the heads of the executive departments are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive, unless disapproved or

reprobated by the latter. In this case, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez was already the incumbent head of the

Justice Department. He was the alter ego of the President, and was acting under the authority of the latter when hedirected NBI Director Carpio to reinstate petitioners to their jobs. Former Minister of Justice Neptali Gonzales no longer

had jurisdiction over the issue regarding the termination of employment of the petitioners.

The Supreme Court plainly said that NBI Director Carpio should have dutifully obeyed the orders of Justice Secretary

Ordonez as his immediate superior in the Department of Justice. The former should have humbly recognized the limits

of his authority. Thus, the Supreme Court ordered respondent NBI Director Carpio to immediately reinstate petitioners

De Leon and Estavillo to their former posts in the National Bureau of Investigation.

The Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac refused to vacate his post after the appointment of the new Provincial

Prosecutor by the President (Bermudez v. Torres, 311 SCRA 733; 1999)

FACTS: Attys. Oscar Bermudez, Arturo A. Llobrera, and Claudio L. Dayaon were then Acting Provincial Prosecutor,

Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and Fourth Assistant Provincial Prosecutor respectively of the Province of Tarlac.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was vacant at that time, and Atty. Bermudez was recommended by then Justice

Secretary Teofisto Guingona, while Atty. Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Jose Yap of the Second

Legislative District of Tarlac. On June 30, 1997, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed Atty. Conrado Quiaoit as the

Provincial Prosecutor, and the latter took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of Branch 65 of the

Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. However, even if Quiaoit had already been performing the functions and duties of his

office, Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor due to his reason that the original copy of

Quiaoits appointment had not yet been released by the Secretary of Justice. Thus, the two contesting parties weresummoned by Justice Secretary Guingona to have a conference in Manila to settle the issue, and Bermudez was ordered

to finish his remaining tasks up to October 15, 1997 and to turn-over his post to Quiaoit the following day. The original

copy of Quiaoits appointment was forwarded to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor based on San Fernando,

Pampanga. In spite of these developments, Bermudez, with his co-petitioners Llobrera and Dayaon, filed a petition in

the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac challenging the appointment of Quiaoit. The court dismissed the petition; hence, it

was elevated to the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that the appointment of Quiaoit lacked the

recommendation of the Secretary of Justice based on the provision of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 which

states that All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the

recommendation of the Secretary.


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ISSUE: Did the act of the President in appointing Atty. Quiaoit as Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac violated the Revised

Administrative Code of 1987?

HELD: No, the Supreme Court ruled that the appointment of Atty. Quiaoit was in accordance with the law, due to the

following reasons:

1) The Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate office, such

conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The appointingpower has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best

qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is the prerogative of the President.

2) The recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the appointment of the President are acts of the Executive

Department itself. There is no sharing of power to speak of, the President or the Secretary of Justice. The President

exercises higher authority than the latter.

The Supreme Court denied the petition of Atty. Bermudez and upheld that the appointment of Atty. Quiaoit as valid.

The Metro Manila Development Authority had been tasked directly by the President to start a major traffic mitigating

project instead of the Department of Transportation and Communications (MMDA v. Viron, 530 SCRA 341; 2007)

FACTS: Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 on February 10, 2003, Providing

for the establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System. This order authorized the Metro Manila Development

Authority (MMDA) to undertake measures to ease traffic congestion in Metro Manila and ensure the convenient and

efficient travel of commuters within its jurisdiction. The order specifically mentioned in its 5th Paragraph that, the

MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro

Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public. It

proposed the construction of integrated terminals for provincial bound buses in the north and south of Manila. Viron

Transport Company, Incorporated (a public utility bus company) filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Regional

Trial Court of Manila questioning the validity of E.O. No. 179, since it would mean the closure of its bus terminals in

Sampaloc, Manila and Quezon City. Mencorp Transportation System, Incorporated, which is another bus company filed

for declaratory relief in the same court. It also asked the court to declare the same order as unconstitutional and illegal

for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective

terminals. It also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to restrain the impending closure of its bus

terminals in Quezon City. The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the Executive Order No. 179.

Both bus companies filed separate motions for reconsideration, and these were granted by the Regional Trial Court.

Hence, petitioners Executive Secretary and the MMDA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the

court. Subsequently, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Petitioners filed for declaratory relief and contended

that (1) There was no justiciable controversy of the cases and (2) That Executive Order No. 179 was only an

administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use

government property along Epifanio de Los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and South Expressway corridor, and (3) That the only

relation created by the Executive Order was that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not

third persons.

ISSUES:

1) Was the issue justiciable, and was the filing of declaratory relief an appropriate action by the petitioners?


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2) Was the Executive Order in violation of Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act, which was to furnish safe,

adequate, and proper service as well as to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its

existing facilities such as bus terminals?

3) Was the Executive Order done beyond the scope of authority granted to the President?

HELD: The Supreme Court held the following:

1) The issue was justiciable because there was controversy between persons whose interests were adverse. The

party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, and the issue invoked must be ripe for

judicial determination. In this case, the bus companies had legal interest in the controversy because the closure of their

bus terminals may adversely affect their business operations.

2) The Executive Order was in violation of the Public Service Act because the maintenance of the bus terminals was

considered a necessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators. These bus companies have put so much

investment in the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. The closure of these facilities would counter with the

provisions of the said Act.

3) The Executive Order was done beyond the scope of authority granted to the President. The government

instrumentality authorized to establish and implement such a project should have been the Department of

Transportation and Communications. The DOTC, by law, (is up to now) the primary implementing and administrative

entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation.

Based on the following premises, the Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 179 as null and void.

CASES INVOLVING THE POWER TO REMOVE

Personnel in the Bureau of Customs (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 895; 1963)

FACTS: Isidro Ang-Angco was the Collector of the Customs. He was tasked to have custody of concentrates of Pepsi-

Cola products, which were found to have been imported and were not covered by proper documents from the Central

Bank of the Philippines. When these documents were already prepared, it was discovered that only a negligible portion

of the products were left. After an investigation conducted by the Office of the President, he was found guilty of

conduct prejudicial of the best interest of the service and was considered resigned effective from the date of notice.

Upon learning of the decision, Ang-Angco wrote a letter to then President Ramon Magsaysay, calling attention to the

fact that the decision deprived him of the statutory Civil Service right to have his case originally decided by the

Commissioner of Civil Service. He also wrote to Hon. Natalio Castillo, the Acting Central Bank Governor, that the

decision also deprived him of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. According to him, the decision

allegedly violated the constitutional mandate which said that an officer or employee in the Civil Service cannot be

removed without cause as provided for by law. The Office of the President stated that provisions of the Civil Service Law

applicable to employees in the competitive service did not apply to the particular case of Ang-Angco because if it was so,

it would deprive the power of the President to have control over the officers and employees of the executive branch of

the government.

ISSUE: Can the President remove employees without violating the Civil Service Law mentioned in the Constitution?


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HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the petition of Ang-Angco. It held that since, it was not the President who appointed

him, but the Secretary of Finance, pursuant to the rules, laws and regulations of the Civil Service Commission, the

President cannot remove him from office. The decision was tough because the Supreme Court was faced with the

problem of reconciling the Presidents power of control with the guarantee of security of tenure found in the

constitutional provisions on the Civil Service. Nevertheless, the Ang-Angco case provided important jurisprudence, as

follows:

1) The power of control is the power to alter, modify or annul the acts of a subordinate officer. Its focus is on theact and not on the actor. So the power of control does not carry with it the removal of an erring officer. Rather the

effect would be the annulment of his decision, the modification of his decision or the substitution of the decision of the

President for that of his decision. The President may set aside a judgment or action taken by a subordinate officer. In

other words, the power of control is not the source of the power to remove.

2) The power of control is not the source of the Chief Executives disciplinary power over persons of his

subordinates. Rather, his disciplinary power flows from his power to appoint. The power to remove is inherent in the

power to appoint. In this case, the officer belongs to the classified Civil Service and his appointment is subject to the

civil service laws, rules and regulations. So is also his disciplinehis suspension, removal, and termination is subject to

civil service rules, laws and regulations. The power to remove is inherent to the power to appoint, but not with regardto those officers or employees who belong to the classified serve for as to them that inherent power cannot be

exercised. Classified public employees are those which have a more permanent designation and function, and not

appointed by the President.

3) The power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and

employees who belong only to the Executive Department if they are presidential appointees. An example is a

department secretary. Since it is the President who appoints the department secretary, he may remove him. Since his

stay in the office is at the pleasure and confidence of the President, if that pleasure and confidence of the President is

already gone, the President may remove him because precisely this person is supposed to be his alter ego. If they no

longer have one vision, he cannot be the alter ego of the President. So it is true, therefore, that the power to remove issourced from the power to appoint.

Personnel in the Bureau of Customs (Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710; 1965)

FACTS: Ruben Villaluz was the Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office and was a presidential appointee occupying a non-

competitive position. In 1965, this office was among those that needed nomination and appointment required

confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and he was confirmed. Due to allegations of wrongdoing, he was

investigated and removed by the Office of the President.

ISSUE: Was the act of the President in investigating and removing Villaluz lawful?

HELD: Yes, the act of the President was lawful. The Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative

charges against petitioner Ruben Villaluz. The authority of said Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension,

separation, or removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified

service to which classification of petitioner did not belong.


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2. Since petitioner Villaluz was an appointee of the President, the latter was authorized to subject the former for

disciplinary action, suspension and removal in case of wrongdoing.

THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF REORGANIZATION

The nature of the power of reorganization is based on the second sentence of Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution

which says that the President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Just like in American jurisprudence,

the power of the President of the Philippines includes the rights and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself,our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution.

The following are rules regarding the power of reorganization vested on the President:

1. The power of reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices or abolition thereof, by

reason of economy or redundancy of functions. The President may alter it, including the rights to control the authority

and responsibility in them.

2. The power to abolish an office generally is sourced from the power to create offices, and it is vested on the

Legislative Department alone.

3. Pursuant to Section 31 of the Administrative Code of the Philippines, the President is vested the authority to

regularly reorganize the Executive Department for purposes of simplicity, efficiency and economy, based on the

following premises:

a. The President has that continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Executive

Department. So the President, subject to the policies of the Executive Office, can do that in order to achieve simplicity,

economy, and efficiency.

b. The power to reorganize the Executive Department is a statutory grant under the Administrative Code of the

Philippines. As explained by the Supreme Court, the Congress may grant the President this power and it is not

usurpation of legislation because the power is delegated to him. This is in recognition of the recurring need of every

President to reorganize his office for economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the

executive branch, and in order to keep it effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped in the manner to

carry out his directives and policies.

c. The President is authorized to reorganize the Executive Department in order to address the conflicting needs of

the country. He must have that leeway of freedom to shape and reshape his administrative office every now and then

so that he can respond to the needs of the country. After all, he is the Chief Executive Officer after all and he cannot do

that if he is limited by the present structure of the Executive Department.

CASES INVOLVING THE POWER TO REORGANIZE

Transfer of agencies under the Office of the President to certain Executive Departments (Anak Mindanao v. Executive

Secretary, 530 SCRA 583; 2007)

FACTS: Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo transferred the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP for

brevity) and the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) from the Office of the President to the office under

the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).


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ISSUE: Can she do that without usurping the legislative authority to create office?

HELD: According to the Supreme Court, she had under that continuing authority to reorganize the Executive

Department. She can transfer agencies from the Office of the President to other departments as she may see fit. Take

note that this is only a transfer of an agency, and the agency itself is already in existence.

Organizational changes made by the President within the Department of Health (Malaria Employees v. Executive

Secretary, 528 SCRA 673; 2001)

FACTS: Then President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102 on May 24, 1999. This was pursuant to the

Administrative Code of 1987 and Republic Act No. 8522, also known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. E.O. No.

102 provided for structural changes and redirected the functions and operations of the Department of Health (DOH).

President Estrada also made changes in the Executive Branch by creating the Presidential Committee on Executive

Governance (PCEG) composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and

Management (DBM) as co-chair. The PCEG issued Memorandum Circular No. 62 implementing Executive Order No. 102

in redefining the functions and operations of the Department of Health, and directed the rationalization and

streamlining of the said Department. The Secretary of Health issued orders which were 1) Directed all employees in the

DOH to accomplish and submit Personal Information Sheet due for DOH approval for rationalization of streamlining plan2) Initiated the process of selection, placement or matching of personnel to the approved organizational chart and 3) Set

the guidelines for the restructuring process on personnel selection, placement, retirement and resignation. Lastly, the

Secretary of Health issued Notice of Organization Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA) directing employees to

report to their new assignments and facilitate the transfer of personnel, properties and documents. The Malaria

Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP), a union of affected employees of the Malaria

Control Service of the Department of Health, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila seeking to nullify

the Department Memorandum, the NOSCA and the Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and other

issuances implementing Executive Order No. 102. Petitioner MEWAP also filed a petition for certiorari at the Supreme

Court of Manila and sought to nullify the said Executive Order. It questioned the authority of the President to

reorganize a department, bureau or office within the Executive Department.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the President had authority under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution in reorganizing a

department under the executive branch.

2) Whether there had been abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the

President in issuing Executive Order No. 102, which redirected the functions and operations of the Department of

Health.

HELD: The Supreme Court de

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