Crim Pro -Midterm PDF

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR

Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FELICIANO,J.:

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving

his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it

is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad

Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and

shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurantwas able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting

and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land

Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.

The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they

were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a

facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the

bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan

Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.

On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being

hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the

shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the

police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecuto

of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence o

his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the

provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.

On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in court, the

victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an

information for murder 3before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the informationthe Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and

sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion fo

immediate release and proper preliminary investigation,4alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawfu

and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed tha

he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on

the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a

cash bond of P100,000.00.


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On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-partemotion for special raffle5in order to expedite action on the

Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date

approved the cash bond 6posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7Petitioner was in fact released that same day.

On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary

investigation8and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had

filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary

investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend

cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11July 1991.

Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order9granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling

the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprioissued an Order, 10embodying the following: (1) the 12 July

1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrende

himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was

recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11

July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.

On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing

the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had

been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of al

proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by

respondent Judge.

On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.

By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamusto the

Court of Appeals.

On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August

1991.

On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.

On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit

petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, o

his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case

for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22

November 1991. 11

On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus12in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in view ofpublic respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a

month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.

On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus.13

The petition for certiorari, prohibition

and mandamus,on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus,upon the other, were subsequently consolidated

in the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment

on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.


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On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness.

On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the

following grounds:

a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged

had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation. At the time he

showed up at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation

at the San Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.

b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived

his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the tria

court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to

law and justice.

d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment orde

(issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to

the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeascorpuscould not be granted.

On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also filed a

"Withdrawal of Appearance"15

with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.

On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a

Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders

from this Court.

In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful warrantless arres

had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively

waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.

In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had been validl

arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had

been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police

Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v.Station Commander, etc., et al.,16

one of the seven (7) cases

consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al.17

where a

majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in

connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions o

Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions o

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even

without preliminary investigation.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police

station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not

been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had

been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the

lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules o

Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of

petitioner.

The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v.Ramosis, in the circumstances of this case

misplaced. In Umil v.Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests o


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petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such

offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like

the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense

which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that

the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."

Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the

terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:

Sec. 5Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant

arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating

that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place

where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escapedwhile being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be

forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance

with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were no

present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest

effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been

committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "persona

knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the

police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting

one stated that

petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned ou

to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."18

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of

Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:

Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.When a person is lawfully arrested without a

warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Courtthe complaint or information may be filed

by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been firs

conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person

However,before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a

preliminary investigation by a proper officerin accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver o

the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and

in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver,

he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated

within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the

accused maywithin five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a


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preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed

in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)

is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station

accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that

he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon

Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the

Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there wa

probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutoproceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the

provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was

substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded

him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also

entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.

Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we note that

petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out

on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the

Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends tha

that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitione

should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver o

petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary

investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing o

petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is no

clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with

the Prosecutor. In Crespo v.Mogul,19this Court held:

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether aprima

facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the

information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the

criminal action against the accused in Court.Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation

of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured.After such reinvestigation thefinding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate

action.While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a

criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whateve

disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the

consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the

substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to due process of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any

disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in thesound discretion of the Court.Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of

criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court

The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. . . .20

(Citations omitted

emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-

investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the tria

court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary

investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's

omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a


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preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation

and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary

investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary

investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 o

Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held

to have been substantially complied with.

We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that right is statutory

rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of dueprocess in criminal justice.

21The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial fo

a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technica

right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation

humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to

hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him

the full measure of his right to due process.

The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant case

considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is

waived when the accused fails to invoke itbefore or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22In the instant case

petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment.At the time of his

arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamusprecisely

asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.

Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to

preliminary investigation. In People v.Selfaison, 23we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to

preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "withou

previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation."24In the instant case, petitioner Go

asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus

claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and

ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the

part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary

investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation, while

constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the

validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25

It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was equivalent

to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong

Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and

requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering tha

no evidence at alland certainly no new or additional evidencehad been submitted to respondent Judge that could

have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be releasedon bail as a matter of right.

The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on the merits has

already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's righ

to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to

have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be

released on bail?

Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary

investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in


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abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner.26

It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view

of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the

Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable

cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of

procedural due process.27

Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary

investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to

arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings held

before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment

counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the deniaof preliminary investigation. 28So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an

obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de

oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated

his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing

objection."29

Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court oncertiorari and prohibition to challenge the

lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention.30

If he did not walk ou

on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be

represented by counsel de oficioselected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his

right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail a

a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the

Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to

the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion fo

cancellation of bail.

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to bai

were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation o

due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute

important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord

petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a

ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not be idleceremony

rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of itobligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17

July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby

REVERSED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge

of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from

commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to

await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand

Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ,J.:

The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty

of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced

him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the

evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag andfinding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect

articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified a

marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.2Later, the information

was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise

investigated.3Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

4Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge

against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5The

motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused

appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana.7He was Identified by name.

8Acting

on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the

gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was

found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10who

testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the

corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a

jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.11

He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. Hi

bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he

was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried

the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that hi

business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have

been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PCheadquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo

City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00

for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket

below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were

they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the

other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17to a friend whose full name he said did not even

know.18

The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the

injuries sustained by him. 19


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There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate

access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of

tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose th

lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact

amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really

beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair o

realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PCauthorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been

allowed for his release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and

searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him

under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this

after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of

the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant

when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlie

received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with

marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the

arrest,20

another two weeks21

and a third "weeks before June 25."22

On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of

the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Ide

Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.

Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of

marijuana leaves on that date?

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from tha

particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular

operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with

respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9

For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.

COURT:


10/57

Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984

did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin

A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.

Q What were those activities?

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

Q From whom did you get that information?

A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe fo

security reason and we cannot Identify the person.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. LLARIZA:

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming

with drugs?

A Marijuana, sir.

Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was

received by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June

23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was coming

Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he was already

consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.

COURT:

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

A Yes, sir.

Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?


11/57

A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already

gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25

1984?

A Only on the 23rd of June.

Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subjecmentioned in your intelligence report?

A No, more.

Q Why not?

A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.

Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a

search warrant anymore?

A Search warrant is not necessary.23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme

Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects agains

unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no

search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally

by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may

produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by

him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was no

caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest

allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention o

the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to

warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of

the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they

had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was comingto Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And

from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to

justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was

ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own

authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it ha

always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of

the narcotics agents. 25Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act

of selling the prohibited drug.


12/57

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that

he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon

9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other

passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the

marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered hi

arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that

authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorshipwhen any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only

ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution

and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying

that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he

will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That

evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the

marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search

was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come

under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence

obtained thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our

law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible

youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the

protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with

the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the

authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of

order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some

criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free

society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt ha

not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he i

innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.


13/57


SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.

Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the judgment of 10 February

1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, finding him guilty of transporting, without

appropriate legal authority, the regulated substance methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section

15, 1Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further amended by

R.A. No. 7659,2and sentencing him to "die by lethal injection." In view thereof, the judgement was brought to this Court

for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659.

In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID), as Chief

of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While

monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from

Barangay Captain Juan Almoite (hereafter ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an

unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to ALMOITE, the vessel looked different from the boats

ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. CID and six of his men led by his

Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA), proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach and there

conferred with ALMOITE. CID then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. As it was routine for CID

to deploy his men in strategic places when dealing with similar situations, he ordered his men to take up positions thirty

meters from the coastline. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried

what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the

latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed

direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing

by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive

Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seem not to understand. CID thus tried

speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed "sign language;" he motioned

with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A

search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. CID then

gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man

to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and

escorted the latter to the police headquarters.

At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the facial features of the man, that he was probably

Taiwanese. CID then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance

of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, CID ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke

Chinese to act as an enterpreter. In the meantime, BADUA opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packet

containing yellowish crystalline substance which he and CID suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan

finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." The police authorities were satisfied

that the man and the interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their uncertainty as to what language was

spoken. But when the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merel

showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime


14/57

Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, CHUA

was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station.1wphi1.nt

Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the Philippine Nationa

Police, Region I, received a letter request3from CIDincidentally her husbandto conduct a laboratory examination

of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed inside a multicolored strawbag. In her Chemistry Report No. D-025-95,4she

stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be

positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the

case as Criminal Case No. 4037. However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, La

Union, that the facts of the case could support an indictment for illegal transport of a regulated drug, the information

was subsequently amended to allege that CHUA "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transpor(ted) 28.7 kilos o

[m]ethamphetamine [h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the necessary permit or authority to transport the same" in

violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659.

At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not guilty. The RTC was satisfied that CHUA understood the

amended information read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking interpreter, Thelma Sales Go.

Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a Taiwanese Interpreter through the auspices of theDepartment of Foreign Affairs. However, it was only after directing the request to the Taipei Economic and Cultura

Office in the Philippines that interpreters were assigned to CHUA.

Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to establish the above narration of facts which were culled

chiefly from the testimony of CID, its first witness, and whose testimony, in turn, was substantially corroborated by

witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE.

Experts witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her chemistry report in that the contents of the 29 plastic

packets weighing 28.7 kilos sent to her for chemical analysis were pure, unadulterated methamphetamine hydrochloride

or shabu. She also explained that they were unwashed, hence they appeared yellowish.

For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter Steven Yu. He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan

and was employed in a shipbuilding and repairing company. On 21 March 1995, he was instructed by his employer Cho

Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board the latter's 35-tonner ship which would embark for Nan Au Port, Mainland China

where they would buy fish. Upon arrival at their destination, RONG left the ship, came back without the fish, but with

two bags, the contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. RONG then showed to CHUA a document purportedly

granting them authority to fish on Philippine waters. So they sailed towards the Philippines and reached Dagupan

Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30 a.m., they disembarked on a small speedboat with the two bags RONG

brought with him from China. While, sailing, RONG made several phone calls using his mobile phone. CHUA heard RONG

asked the person on the other side of the line if he could see the speedboat they were riding. Apparently, the person o

shore could not see them so they cruised over the waters for about five hours more when finally, low on fuel and

telephone battery, they decided to dock. CHUA anchored the boat while RONG carried the bags to shore. The tasks

completed, RONG left to look for a telephone while CHUA rested and sat one and half (1 1/2) meters away from onebag. A child thereafter pointed out to him that one bag was missing much to RONG's dismay when he learned of it

When a crowd started to mill around them, the police arrived. CHUA then realized that RONG was nowhere to be found

The police immediately approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken word, only gestures and hand movements, they

escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police, led by an officer who CHUA

guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag. They presented the bag to him

opened it, inspected and weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methaphetamine hydrochloride.

CHUA denounced the prosecution's story as a distortion of the truth. He denied he was ever favored with an interprete

or informed of his "constitutional rights," particularly of his right to counsel. Consequently, his arrest was tainted with

illegality and the methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should have been regarded inadmissible as


15/57

evidence. He also maintained that CID never graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at Tammocalao

beach. BADUA certainly never prevented him from running away, as such thought failed to make an impression in his

mind. Most significantly, he denied ownership and knowledge of the contents of the bag, emphasizing that RONG alone

exercised dominion over the same.

Elmer Parong, (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan member, recalled that on the date in question, he arrived at

the beach with the police. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. He also remembered hearing from the people

congregating at the beach that CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain policeman Anneb had chased the latter's

car. He additionally claimed that when the crowd became unruly, the police decided to bring CHUA to policeheadquarters. There, the mayor took charge of the situationhe opened CHUA's bag with the assistance of the police

he called for a forensic chemist surnamed CID to take a sample of the contents of the bag, and he ordered his officials to

find an interpreter. Throughout the proceedings, photographers were busy taking pictures to document the event.

Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG, a farmer and resident of Tammocalao who narrated that he was standing with CHUA

on the beach when two men and a lady arrived. They were about to get a bag situated near CHUA when they detected

the arrival of the local police. They quickly disappeared. CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE and PARONG at the beach but not

CID.

In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged its burden o

proving that CHUA transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so

Invoking People v. Tagliben5

as authority, the RTC characterized the search as incidental to a valid inflagrante

delictoarrest, hence it allowed the admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also

noted the futility of informing CHUA of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have competent and

independent counsel preferably of his own choice, considering the language barrier and the observation that such

irregularity was "rectified when accused was duly arraigned and . . . (afterwards) participated in the trial of this case."

The RTC then disregarded the inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as

these referred to minor details which did not impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish the credence conferred on

the testimonies thus delivered.

The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged employer RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner

vessel in the illegal trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but with several other members of an organized

syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit traffic. Such predilection was plainly evident in the dispositive portion, to wit:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, as proven and established by convincing and satisfactory

evidence that the accused had conspired and acted in concert with one Cho Chu Rong, not to mention

Chen Ho Fa, the Skipper of the 35-tonner ship they used in coming to the Country from China and

Taiwan, this Court finds the accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

offense of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 as charged in the

Information, and considering the provisions of Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7659 that the maximum penalty shall

be imposed if the quantity sold/possessed/transported is "200 grams or more" in the case of Shabu, and

considering, further that the quantity involved in this case is 28.7 kilograms which is far beyond the

weight ceiling specified in said Act, coupled with the findings of conspiracy or that accused is a membe

of an organized syndicated crime group, this Court, having no other recourse but to impose themaximum penalty to accused, this Court hereby sentences the said accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San

to die by lethal injection; to pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00); and to pay the costs.

The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the Philippine National Police to

immediately form an investigating Committee to be composed by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity

who will conduct an exhaustive investigation regarding this case to determine whether there was

negligence or conspiracy in the escape of Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons who

approached the accused in the seashore of Tammocalao, Bacnotan, La Union, and attempted to take the

remaining bag from accused, as well as the whereabouts of the other bag; and to furnish this Court a


16/57

copy of the report/result of the said investigation in order to show compliance herewith sixty (60) days

from receipt hereof.

The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methaphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu is ordered turned ove

immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with the law.

The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and

to be turned over to the Philippine National Police, La Union Command, for use in their Bantay-Daga

operations against all illegal seaborne activities.

SO ORDERED. 6

Before this Court, CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting as competent evidence the 29 plastic packets of

methamphetamine hydrochloride since they were indubitably "forbidden fruits;" (2) granting weight and credence to

the testimonies of prosecution witnesses despite glaring inconsistencies on material points; and in (3) appreciating

conspiracy between him and an organized syndicate in the illicit commerce of prohibited drugs since this was not alleged

in the information.

The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting that: (1) the search was licitly conducted despite the

absence of search and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately preceding to and comtemporaneous with thesearch necessitated and validated the police action; and (2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's righ

against unreasonable searches and seizures since he consented to the search.

We reverse the RTC.

Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy home and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the

right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whateve

nature and for any purpose.7Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in

and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said righ

is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings.8

The Cosntitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable

searches and seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular case is purely a

judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.9Verily, the rule is, the Constitution

bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid

search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined on the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules o

Court; "otherwise such search and seizure become "unreasonable" within the meaning of the aforementioned

constitutional provision."10 This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and

such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence11in instances of (1) search

of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and frisk

situations (Terry search),12

and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and

seizure pursuan to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected

with a valid wararnt of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrestsin flagrantedelicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.

13

This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted under the

facts of the case at bar constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. Expectedly and quite

understandably, the prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident. But this Court i

certain that CHUA was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant.

In cases ofin fragrante delicto,arrests, a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when

in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense

The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such facts14

or as recent case law15

adverts to


17/57

personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. The term

probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently

strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is

charged.16

Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discree

and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be

arrested.17

In People v. Montilla,18

the Court acknowledged that "the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing

criminal charges, and correlatively, for effecting warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized." Noting that the

previous statutory and jurisprudential evidentiary standard was "prima facieevidence" and that it had been dubiously

equated with probable cause, the Court explained:

[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts (referring toprima facie evidence and probable

cause) were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment o

the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in

preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender as well founded belief" as to the fac

of the commission of the crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. It has the same meaning a

the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds

cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists." It should, therefore, be in

that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized."

(emphasis supplied)19

Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of

CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the

obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the

finding that was "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended." In short, there i

no probable cause. At least in People v. Tangliben, the Court agreed with the lower court's finding that compelling

reasons (e.g., accused was acting suspiciously, on the spot identification by an informant that accused was transporting

prohibitive drug, and the urgency of the situation) constitutive of probable cause impelled police officers from effecting

an inflagrante delictoarrest. In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive

of probable cause persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's

watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's

illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel documents or visa), CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e. he

attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigatehis speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.

This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package

emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20confidential report and/or positive identification

by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the

same,21suspicious demeanor or behavior22and suspicious bulge in the waist23accepted by this Court as sufficient to

justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark a

Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a

police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of

the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. And despite claims by CID and

BADUA that CHUA attempted to flee, ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely walking and oblivious to any attemptat conversation when the officers approached him. This cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the claim, thus:

Q: How far were you when the accused put the bag on his sholder?

A: We were then very near him about three meters away from the male person carrying

the bag.

Q: To what direction was he facing when he put the bag on his shoulder?

A: To the east direction.


18/57

Q: In relation to you, where were you.

A: With the company of Sgt. Reynoso and Maj. Cid we approached the accused and

when Maj. Cid went near him, he spoke in Tagalong, English and Ilocano which accused

did not understand because he did not respond.

Q: When Maj. Cid was talking, what was the accused doing at that time?

A: He was walking.

Q: To what direction he was walking?

A: He was walking to the east direction. (sic)

Q: He was walking away from you or going near you?

A: He was going away from us. That is why Sgt. Reynoso held the right arm of the

accused.

Q: Was Sgt. Badua able to hold the right arm of the accused?

A: Yes sir and he stopped.24

True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was not obvious to the police. But gossamer to the officers

sense perception and view were CHUA disembarking from a speedboat, CHUA walking casually towards the road, and

CHUA carrying a multicolored strawbag. These acts did not convey any impression that he illegally entered Philippine

shores. Neither were these overt manifestations of an ongoing felonious activity nor of CHUA's criminal behevior as

clearly established in CID's testimony, thus:

Q Was the accused committing a crime when you introduced yourselves:

A No, sir.

Q No, so there was no reason for you to approach the accused because he was no

doing anything wrong?

A No, sir, that is our objective, to approach the person and if ever or whatever

assistance that we can give we will give.25

The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person

arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime

and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon o

evidence he can destroy,26a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidenta

search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest

was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be

first a lawful arrest before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed.27

To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless

arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court28

as already shown. Fom all indications

the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. It is worth mentioning here that after introducing themselves


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the police officcers immediately inquired about the contents of the bag. What else could have impelled the

officers from displaying such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony had

indeed been committed by CHUA in effect to "retroactively establish probable cause and validate an illega

search and seizure."

The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a consented search, a legitimate waiver of the

constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches. It is fundamental, however, that to constitute a waiver, it must firs

appear that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence

of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.29

CHUA never exhibited thahe knew, actually or constructively of his right against unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the

same. This can be inferred from the manner by which the search performed, thus:

Q Together with your Chief Investigator, what was the first thing that you did when you

approached him (CHUA)?

A We introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.

Q Okey, in the first place why did you introduce yourselves?

A That is normal practice in our part, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q If it is possible. Okey (sic) now, after introducing yourselves what did you do?

A He did not answer me and he did not utter any word,

Q When he did not utter any word. What else did he do?

A I asked again a question that if he can open his bag sir.

Q And did he understand your question when you requested him to open his bag?

A No, sir, there is no answer.

Q No answer?

A Yes, sir, no answer.

Q And when there was no answer what did you do next?

A I used sign language sir.

Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you demonstrated that sign

language of opening the bag mr. (sic) witness?

A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made an action like this sir.

xxx xxx xxx

SHERIFF:


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The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the straw bag and then manifesting a sign

to open the zipper of the straw bag moving his right hand from left to right or from the

opening to the end of the zipper.

COURT: From the start of the zipper where you open it up to the end of the zipper.

Witness: Yes, sir, and then I made a motion like this.

(The witness repeating the motion described on record.)

COURT: Did you open that personally?

WITNESS:

A No, your honor.

Q Now, mr. (sic) witness, why did you request the accused to open the bag?

A Because it is our duty also to inspect his belongings sir.

Q Why, why was it no, I reform my question your honor. Is it normal procedure fo

you to examine anybody or to request anybody to open his bag?

A The fact that he was a foreigner, sir, it is also our duty to inspect the baggage, it is our

routine duty of a police (sic), sir.

Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to request a person to open his bag?

A yes, sir.

Q Okey, (sic) you did not ask the accused, mr. (sic) witness, to open his bag?

A No, sir.

Q But you simply requested him to open the nag?

A Yes, sir.30

CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and overwhelmed him. The police officers already

introduced themselves to CHUA in three languages, but he remained completely deadpan. The police hence concluded

that CHUA failed to comprehend the three languages. When CHUA failed to respond again to the police's request to

open the bag, they resorted to what they called "sign language." They claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand

motions and gestures. This Court disagrees. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could

he understand the police's "sign language." More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance

of the "sign language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive

search. This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in

these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such

language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instances, the

accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences o

such request.31


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It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated subtance. But this is a trifling matter. If evidence

obtained during an illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or suspicion of

felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, the same being the fruit of a

poisonous trees32

how much more of "forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise

as in this casebecause the police admitted that they never harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated

substance as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain CHUA'

conviction.

Indeed, the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported methamphetamine hydrochloride cannot be quicklydispelled. But the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly

disregarded, as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the Constitution and the rights i

guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they

have blundered. "There are those who say that . . . 'the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.'. . . In

some cases this will undoubtedly be the result. But . . . 'there is another consideration the imperative of judicia

integrity . . . The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government

more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."33

As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the posecution witnesses, this Court considers them trivia

as they refer to insignificant details which will not affect the outcome of the case. On a passing note, this Court calls the

attention of the trial court regarding its erroneous appreciation of conspiracy. This aggravating circumstance is without

question unsupported by the records. Conspiracy was not included in the indictment nor raised in the pleadings or

proceedings of the trial court. It is also fundamental that conspiracy must be proven just like any other crimina

accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable doubt.34

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, San Fernando, La Union in

Criminal Case No. 4037 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is

hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence not being sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt.

Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.


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SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the accused Anita

Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 asamended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua , to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the

costs.

The information filed against the accused alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without being lawfully authorized, did

then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which

are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)

The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's evidence as follows:

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document and testimonia

evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of suspected marijuana dried leave

weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained

in the plastic container; "B-1-a"another plastic container; "C"Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1"

Findings: Positive for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of accused with

Pat. Daniel Obia and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"

Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obia, "H" Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused

by P/Lt. Antonio V. Galindo;"H-1"date of of the request; "L"Certificate of Field Test dated July 22

1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses of the prosecution,

Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obio, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio

Bagang.

Theresa Ann Bugayong22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of 1150 Sampaloc, Metro

Manila testified that she received a request from the Task Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated

July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana submitted for examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams

of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a

marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").

The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her examination, she

prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981 (Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted three

eliminations; microscopic examination, the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory


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examination of thin layer chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo

Santiago, a representative of the CANU, Olongapo City.

The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obia, 37 years old, married, policeman and residing

at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obia testified that he has been a member of the INP

since 1970 up to the present. He was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative

His job then was among other things to follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items and

apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit; and

that on that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in theafternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going

back to Olongapo City. His family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the

second seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and

took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obia

The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven buri bag made of plastic containing some

vegetables. The act of the accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obia's seat aroused his suspicion and

made him felt (sic) nervous. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search

the woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag

He inserted

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