Homework Help https://www.homeworkping.com/

Research Paper helphttps://www.homeworkping.com/

Online Tutoringhttps://www.homeworkping.com/

click here for freelancing tutoring sitesG.R. No. L-14595 May 31, 1960THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO LACERNA alias DODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES, respondents.Acting City Atty. Perfecto B. Querubin for petitioner.Hon. Gregorio Montejo in his own behalf.C. A. S. Sipin, Jr. for the other respondents.CONCEPCION, J.:This is a special civil action for certiorari , with mandamus and preliminary injunction, against Hon. Gregorio Montejo, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan, and the defendants in Criminal Case No. 672 of said court.In the petition herein, which was filed by the prosecution in said criminal case, it is prayed that, pending the final determination thereof, a writ of preliminary injunction issue, enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of said case; that, after due hearing, the rulings of respondent Judge, rejecting some evidence for the prosecution therein and not permitting the same to propound certain questions, be set aside; that said respondent Judge be ordered to admit the aforementioned evidence and permit said questions; and that Senator Roseller Lim be declared, contrary to another ruling made by respondent Judge, disqualified by the Constitution from appearing as counsel for the accused in said criminal case. Soon, after the filing of the petition, we issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, without bond.In their respective answers, respondents alleged, in substance, that the ruling complained of are in conformity with law.Respondents Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City, Detective Joaquin R. Pollisco, Patrolman Graciano Lacerna (alias Dodong) and Mohamad Hasbi, Special Policemen Dionisio Dinglasa, Moro Yakan, Hadjaratil, Moro Alo and several John Does, are charged, in said Criminal Case No. 672, with murder. It is alleged in the information therein that, during May and June, 1958, in the sitio of Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan, Mayor Brown "organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes", consisting of regular and special policemen, whom he "armed with pistols and high power guns", and then "established a camp", called sub-police headquarters hereinafter referred to as sub-station at Tipo-Tipo, Lamitan, which was placed under his command, orders, direct supervision and control, and in which his codefendants were stationed; that the criminal complaints were entertained in said sub-station, in which defendant Pollisco acted as investigating officer and exercised authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court; that, on or about June 4, and 5, 1958; one Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested by order of Mayor Brown, without any warrant or complaint filed in court, and then brought to, and detained in, the aforementioned sub-station; that while on the way thereto, said Awalin Tebag was maltreated, pursuant to instructions of Mayor Brown, concurred in by Pollisco, to the effect that Tebag be mauled until such time as he shall surrender his gun; that, once in the sub-station, Tebag, whose hands were securely tied, was subjected, by defendants Lacerna, Hasbi, Pollisco, Dinglasa, and other special policemen, to further and more severe torture, in consequence of which Tebag died; that, in order to simulate that Tebag had been killed by peace officers in the course of an encounter between the latter and a band of armed bandits of which he formed part, the body of Tebag was brought, early the next morning, to a nearby isolated field, where defendant Hasbi fired twice at said dead body from behind, and then an old Japanese rifle, supplied by Mayor Brown, was placed beside said body; and that, in furtherance of the aforementioned simulation, a report of said imaginary encounter, mentioning Tebag as the only member of a band of armed bandits whose identity was known, was submitted and respondent Hasbi caused one of his companions to shoot him on the left arm.During the trial of said criminal case, respondent Judge rejected the following evidence for the prosecution therein:1. Exhibit A A report of Capt. F. G. Sarrosa, Commanding Officer of the PC Detachment in Basilan City, who investigated the case, showing that on June 5, 1958, he and Lt. Clemente Antonio, PAF, found nine (9) detainees in the Tipo-Tipo sub-station. This was part of the chain of evidence of the prosecution to prove that persons used to be detained in the aforementioned sub-station by the main respondents herein, without either a warrant of arrest or a complaint filed in court.2. Exhibit C Letter of Atty. Doroteo de Guzman to the officer in charge of the sub-station, dated June 4, 1958, inquiring as to the whereabouts of Awalin Tebag, who, according to the letter, was arrested in his house, by policemen, on June 4, 1958. Capt. Sarrosa took possession of this letter in the course of his aforementioned investigation.3. Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3 These are the transcript of the testimony of Tebag's mother, before the City Fiscal of Basilan City, when she asked an autopsy of the body of her son.4. Exhibits J to V Consisting of the following, namely: a sketch of the sub-station; pictures of several huts therein, indicating their relative positions and distances; a picture depicting how the body of Tebag was taken from a camarin in the sub-station; a picture showing how Patrolman Hasbiwas shot by a companion, at this request; and a picture, Exhibit T, demonstrating how Mayor Brown allegedly gave the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, to Hasbi, to be planted beside Tebag's body.Although referred to by Yakan Carnain, Arit, Lianson, Kona Amenola, and Asidin, in the course of their testimony as witnesses for the prosecution, these exhibits were not admitted in evidence, which were presented to show how they were able to observe the movements in the sub-station, the same being quite small.5. Exhibits X (a "barong") and X-1 (a scabbard) Amenola said that these effects were given to him by Mayor Brown in the latter's office, and that he then saw therein the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, which was later placed beside the dead body of Awalin Tebag.6. Exhibits DD, DD-1, FF, JJ, KK and LL These show that on April 28, 1958, Yakan Kallapattoh and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) executed affidavits admitting participation in a given robbery; that an information therefor (Exh. KK) was filed against them on May 2, 1958, with the municipal court of Basilan City (Criminal Case No. 1774); and that, in compliance with warrants for their arrest then issued, they were apprehended and detained in the sub-station, thus corroborating the testimony of prosecution witness Yakans Amenola, Carnain Asidin and Arip to the effect that Kallapattoh and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) were together with them, in the aforementioned sub-station, when Tebag was maltreated and died therein, on June 4, 1958, as well as confirming Pollisco's statement, Exhibit TT-18, before the City Fiscal of Basilan city, on June 21, 1958, admitting that Fernandez was in the sub-station on June 5, 1958, on account of the warrant of arrest adverted to. Through the exhibits in question the prosecution sought, also, to bolster up its theory that Kallapattoh and Fernandez disappeared from the sub-station after Tebag's death, because the main respondents herein illegally released them to prevent them from revealing the circumstances surrounding said event.7. Exhibits II, II-1, and MM These are sketches of a human body and pictures purporting to show the points of entrance, as well as of exit, of two (2) bullets wounds found on the body of Tebag. Respondent Judge rejected these exhibits and did not allow Dr. Rosalino Reyes, Chief of the Medico-Legal Section of the National Bureau of Investigation, to answer questions asked by the prosecution, to establish that the trajectories of said bullets wounds were parallel to each other, which, the prosecution claims, would have been impossible had Tebag been alive when he sustained said wounds..8. Respondent Judge sustained, also, the objections to certain questions propounded to said Dr. Reyes, to show that the injuries sustained by Tebag in the large intestines must have been inflicted when Tebag was dead already, and did not allow Dr. Reyes to draw lines on Exhibits II and MM, indicating the connection between the points of entrance and those of exit of said wounds.9. Exhibits Z, Z-1, Z-2 These are records of the office of the City Fiscal of Basilan City showing that the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, two rounds of ammunitions and one empty shell were received by said Office from the Police Department of Basilan City on June 17, 1958. These exhibits were presented to show that said rifle tallies with the description thereof given by prosecution witness Kona Amenola, in his affidavit, dated June 14, 1958, when said weapon was still in the possession of respondent Pollisco, and hence, to establish Amenola's veracity.Likewise, the following rebuttal evidence for the prosecution were rejected by respondent Judge, viz:1. Exhibits OO to OO-8 These are daily records of events of the police department, Lamitan District, Basilan City, including the Tipo-Tipo region. They do not mention the killing therein, by the police patrol, of any outlaw on June 5, 1958, thereby contradicting the reports (Exhs. 12 and 12-A) of respondent Pollisco and Hasbi about it. Respondent Judge did not allow the record clerk of the City Fiscal's office to identify said exhibits, upon the ground that it was too late to present him although when the exhibits were marked by the prosecution it reserved the right to identify them as part of official records.2. Exhibits PP, QQ to QQ-3 Respondent Pollisco had testified that on June 4, 1958, Hadji Aisa inquired about one Awalin; that he told Aisa that Awalin was taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of the city government; and that he (Pollisco) suggested that Datu Unding be advised not to worry, because there was no evidence against Awalin. To impeach the veracity of Pollisco, the prosecution presented the exhibits under consideration, for the same show that one Dong Awalin (who is different from Awalin Tebag) was apprehended on May 27, 1958, and released on bail on June 23, 1958; that Pollisco could not have truthfully informed Aisa on June 4, 1958, what Dong Awalin had been taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of the city government and that there was no evidence against him; for he was then a detention prisoner; and that Pollisco could not have had in mind, therefore, said Dong Awalin as the Awalin about whom Aisa had inquired. Indeed, Exhibits TT-13 to TT-16 show that, testifying before the City Fiscal, respondent Pollisco said that he twice ordered Patrolman Lacerna on June 4, 1958, to bring Awalin Tebag to him (Pollisco) for investigation.3. Exhibits SS to SS-7 These are the testimonies before the City Fiscal, of defense witness Mohammad Sali who, on cross examination by the prosecution, denied having given it. Thus the predicate therefor was established by the prosecution which sought thereby to impeach Sali's veracity.4. Exhibits TT, TT-1 to TT-25 These are the testimonies, before the City Fiscal of the main respondents herein, who gave a different story before respondent Judge. The prosecution thus sought to impeach their veracity as witnesses in their own behalf, after laying down the predicate in the course of their cross examination.5. Exhibits UU, UU-1 to UU-3 These are sworn statements made by defendant Hasbi before the City Fiscal. They were presented in rebuttal, after laying down the predicate, to impeach his testimony in court.6. Exhibits RR, RR-1, XX and XX-1 With these exhibits the prosecution tried to rebut Pollisco's testimony to the effect that prosecution witness Lianson Arip had a grudge against him, he (Pollisco) having charged him with theft in the City Fiscal's Office. It appears from said exhibits that Arip's affidavit, implicating Pollisco, was dated June 8, 1958, whereas Pollisco's affidavit charging Arip with theft, was dated June 20, 1958, so that said statement of Arip could not have been influenced by Pollisco's subsequent act.In contrast with the severe and rigorous policy used by respondent Judge in dealing with the aforementioned evidence for the prosecution, petitioner herein cites the liberality with which the lower court admitted, as evidence for the defense, records of supposed achievements of the Tipo-Tipo sub-station (Exhibits 9 to 9-G, 10 to 10-I, 17 to 17-C, 19 to 19-A, 20 to 20-I 21 and 22), a congratulatory communication (Exh. 24), and a letter of commendation to a peace officer assigned thereto (Exh. 7), including an article in the Philippine Free Press (Exhs. 23 and 23-A).Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that the lower court had, not only erred, but, also, committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolutions complained of, in rejecting the aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, and in not permitting the same to propound the questions, already adverted to. It is obvious to us that said direct and rebuttal evidence, as well as the aforementioned questions, are relevant to the issues involved in Criminal Case No. 627. Although it is not possible to determine with precision, at this stage of the proceedings, how far said exhibits may affect the outcome of that case, it is elemental that all parties therein are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to establish their respective pretense. In this connection it should be noted that, in the light of the allegations of the amended information in said case and of the records before us, the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused therein is bound to hinge heavily upon the veracity of the opposing witnesses and the weight attached to their respective testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed a certain latitude in the presentation of their evidence lest they may be so hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated. The danger of leading to such result must be avoided, particularly in cases of the nature, importance and significance of the one under consideration.With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim may appear as counsel for the main respondents herein, as defendants in said criminal case, the Constitution provides that no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall "appear as counsel ... in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation of his office ... (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Const. of the Phil.). The issue, therefore, is whether the defendants in Criminal case No. 672 are "accused of an offense committed in relation" to their office.A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns" and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his "command, ... supervision and control," where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof.It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.The case of Monllito vs. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49, relied upon by respondent Judge, in overruling the objection of the prosecution to the appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not in point, for, as stated in the decision therein:From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the official positions of the accused were connected with the offense charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution stated that the motives for the crimes were personal with political character. It does not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the crimes were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the performance of their official functions. (Emphasis supplied.)Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.Wherefore, the rulings complained of are set aside and reversed and respondent Judge is hereby enjoined to admit the aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, as well as to permit the formulation, of the questions already referred to, with costs against the respondents herein. It is so ordered.Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR., Petitioners, vs.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES, J.:Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order1 of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution2 of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance.Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family ("in particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan),4 a criminal complaint,5 before the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com. Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot6 under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan."8 He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x 9 (emphasis in the original)By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations11 charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads:That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory article as follows:Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x xFor sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x xA copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex "F" of the complaint.That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public.CONTRARY TO LAW.12Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,13 reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash16 the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel. Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.19 It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,20 insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban21 which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment.22By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue." The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007,24 the accusatory portion of which reads:That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information25 which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be sufficient in form.Petitioners motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for: 1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27With the filing of Gimenezs Comment28 to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondents admission of the Amended Information. The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,29 as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.30 A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.31 The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions. Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.32 In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo35 which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals36 explained the nature of these changes:Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.1avvphi1Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Courts pronouncements in Chavez37 are instructive: For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainants place of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143047 July 14, 2004RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for the nullification of the September 23, 1999 Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division), which denied the petitioner's omnibus motion with supplemental motion, and its Resolution dated April 25, 2000, denying the petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the same.The AntecedentsOn January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,2 committed as follows:That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 August 1997 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Ricardo S. Inding, a high-ranking public officer, being a Councilor of Dapitan City and as such, while in the performance of his official functions, particularly in the operation against drug abuse, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, faked buy-bust operations against alleged pushers or users to enable him to claim or collect from the coffers of the city government a total amount of P30,500.00, as reimbursement for actual expenses incurred during the alleged buy-bust operations, knowing fully well that he had no participation in the said police operations against drugs but enabling him to collect from the coffers of the city government a total amount of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury to the government as well as the public interest.3The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion4 for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the alternative, for the referral of the case either to the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for appropriate proceedings. The petitioner alleged therein that under Administrative Order No. 270 which prescribes the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, he is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary Grade (SG) 25. He asserted that under Republic Act No. 7975, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction to try cases involving crimes committed by officials of local government units only if such officials occupy positions with SG 27 or higher, based on Rep. Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the "Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." He contended that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has original jurisdiction over the crime charged against him. The petitioner urged the trial court to take judicial notice of Adm. Order No. 270.In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor asserted that the petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte, one of those public officers who, by express provision of Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7975,5 is classified as SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has original jurisdiction over the case, regardless of his salary grade under Adm. Order No. 270.On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the petitioner's omnibus motion. According to the court, the Information alleged that the petitioner has a salary grade of 27. Furthermore, Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, which amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, provides that the petitioner, as a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, has a salary grade of 27.6On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion to his omnibus motion,7 citing Rep. Act No. 8294 and the ruling of this Court in Organo v. Sandiganbayan,8 where it was declared that Rep. Act No. 8249, the latest amendment to the law creating the Sandiganbayan, "collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan," and that "the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on the penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of accused government officials and employees."In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally arraigned on October 28, 1999 and entered a plea of not guilty.9On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's September 23, 1999 Resolution.10 The motion was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April 25, 2000.11Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, contending as follows:A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took effect last 05 February 1997 made the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court depend not only on the penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of accused government officials and employees.B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in "Lilia B. Organo versus The Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines," G.R. No. 133535, 09 September 1999, settles the matter on the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court which is over public officials and employees with rank and salary grade 27 and above.The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly committed, he was already occupying the position of Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I with SG 25. Hence, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He asserts that under Adm. Order No. 270,12 Dapitan City is only a component city, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I with SG 25. Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and retained by Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, contend that Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, expressly provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, committed by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, without qualification and regardless of salary grade. They argue that when Congress approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and Rep. Act No. 8249, it was aware that not all the positions specifically mentioned in Section 4, subparagraph (1) were classified as SG 27, and yet were specifically included therein, viz:It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of law that the members of the sangguniang panlungsod are specifically included as among those falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise, show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to such officials of the executive branch other than the regional director and higher and those specifically enumerated. To rule, otherwise, is to give a different interpretation to what the law clearly is.Moreover, had there been an intention to make Salary Grade 27 and higher as the sole factor to determine the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan then the lawmakers could have simply stated that the officials of the executive branch, to fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should have been occupying the positions with a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. But the express wordings in both RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 specifically including the members of the sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only means that the said sangguniang members shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court regardless of their Salary Grade.In this connection too, it is well to state that the lawmakers are very well aware that not all the positions specifically mentioned as those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. Yet, the legislature has explicitly made the officials so enumerated in RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because of the nature of these officials' functions and responsibilities as well as the power they can wield over their respective area of jurisdiction.13The threshold issue for the Court's resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, who was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.The Court rules in the affirmative.Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled "An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606," took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 2 thereof enumerates the cases falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 7975 was amended by Rep. Act No. 8249, entitled "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." The amendatory law took effect on February 23, 1997 and Section 4 thereof enumerates the cases now falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act No. 7975 or Rep. Act No. 8249, applies in the present case, the reckoning period is the time of the commission of the offense.14 Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the crime.15 However, Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No. 8249, constitutes an exception thereto as it expressly states that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the reckoning period is the time of the commission of the offense. This is plain from the last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of these two provisions which reads:Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise [exclusive]16 original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, [Book II]17 of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the crime charged was committed from the period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The applicable law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, thus:Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:18a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,19 where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;20(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;21(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.22c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.23A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of determining the government officials that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, Rep. Act No. 7975 has grouped them into five categories, to wit:(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher. . . (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, Rep. Act No. 7975 further specifically included the following officials as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as "occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." In other words, violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, regardless of their salary grades, likewise fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, then it could just have ended paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, with the phrase "officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." Or the category in paragraph (5) of the same provision relating to "[a]ll other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989" would have sufficed. Instead, under paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, Congress included specific officials, without any reference as to their salary grades. Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these officials, regardless of their salary grades, to be specifically included within the Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise, then there would have been no need for such enumeration. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that words in a statute should not be construed as surplusage if a reasonable construction which will give them some force and meaning is possible.24That the legislators intended to include certain public officials, regardless of their salary grades, within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is apparent from the legislative history of both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 and 8249. In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 1353, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No. 7975, Senator Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, explained:Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying high positions in the government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the court.As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.The President of the Philippines and other impeachable officers such as the justices of the Supreme Court and constitutional commissions are not subject to the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan during their incumbency.The bill provides for an extensive listing of other public officers who will be subject to the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It includes, among others, Members of Congress, judges and justices of all courts.25More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of Senator Roco, of Senate Bill No. 844, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No. 8249. Senator Roco explained the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Rep. Act No. 7975, thus:SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCOBy way of sponsorship, Mr. President we will issue the full sponsorship speech to the members because it is fairly technical may we say the following things:To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding important positions in government regardless of salary grade;26Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, amended Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, were specifically included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the lawmakers considered them "big fish" and their positions important, regardless of their salary grades.This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by the Department of Budget and Management in 1989, then in effect at the time that Rep. Act No. 7975 was approved. For example:CategoryNew Position TitleGrade

16. FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE

Foreign Service

Foreign Service Officer,Class II272328

Foreign Service Officer,Class I292430

18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Local Executives

City Government Department HeadI2431

City Government Department HeadII2632

Provincial Government Department Head2533

City Vice MayorI26

City Vice MayorII28

City MayorI2834

City MayorII30

19. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE

Sangguniang Members

Sangguniang Panlungsod MemberI25

Sangguniang Panlungsod MemberII27

Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member2635

Office of the City and Provincial Prosecutors36

ProsecutorIV29

ProsecutorIII28

ProsecutorII27

ProsecutorI26

Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and prosecutors, without any distinction or qualification, were specifically included in Rep. Act No. 7975 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the consuls, city department heads, provincial department heads and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, albeit classified as having salary grades 26 or lower, were also specifically included within the Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction. As correctly posited by the respondents, Congress is presumed to have been aware of, and had taken into account, these officials' respective salary grades when it deliberated upon the amendments to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Congress passed into law Rep. Act No. 7975, specifically including them within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By doing so, it obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1) (a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan.Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.37 From the congressional records and the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the legislature undoubtedly intended the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by the aforesaid subsequent laws, to be included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction,38 can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1)(a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts "where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole.39 And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word.40In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are specifically included as among those within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,41 or even Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 824942 for that matter. The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has original jurisdiction over the petitioner's case docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated September 23, 1999 and April 25, 2000 are AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 161784-86. April 26, 2005DINAH C. BARRIGA, Petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR., J.:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27435 to 27437 denying the motion to quash the Informations filed by one of the accused, Dinah C. Barriga, and the Resolution denying her motion for reconsideration thereof.The AntecedentsOn April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for the admission of the three Amended Informations appended thereto. The first Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27435, charged petitioner Dinah C. Barriga and Virginio E. Villamor, the Municipal Accountant and the Municipal Mayor, respectively, of Carmen, Cebu, with malversation of funds. The accusatory portion reads:That in or about January 1996 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH C. BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and custody public funds amounting to TWENTY- THREE THOUSAND FORTY-SEVEN AND 20/100 PESOS (P23,047.20), Philippine Currency, intended for the payment of Five (5) rolls of Polyethylene pipes to be used in the Corte-Cantumog Water System Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, for which they are accountable by reason of the duties of their office, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, take, embezzle and convert into their own personal use and benefit said amount of P23,047.20, and despite demands made upon them to account for said amount, they have failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.2The inculpatory portion of the second Amended Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27436, charging the said accused with illegal use of public funds, reads:That in or about the month of November 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, above-named accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH C. BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and control public funds in the amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIVE PESOS (P1,305.00) Philippine Currency, representing a portion of the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund) intended and appropriated for the projects classified under Level I and III particularly the construction of Deep Well and Spring Box for Level I projects and construction of water works system for Level III projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/recipients, and for which fund accused are accountable by reason of the duties of their office, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there, willfully unlawfully and feloniously disburse and use said amount of P1,305.00 for the Spring Box of Barangay Natimao-an, Carmen, Cebu, a barangay which was not included as a recipient of CVWSP Trust Fund, thus, accused used said public fund to a public purpose different from which it was intended or appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the government, particularly the barangays which were CVWSP Trust Fund beneficiaries.CONTRARY TO LAW.3The accusatory portion of the third Amended Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27437, charged the same accused with illegal use of public funds, as follows:That in or about the month of January 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused Virginio E. Villamor and Dinah C. Barriga, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and control public funds in the amount of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN and 96/100 (P267,537.96) PESOS, representing a portion of the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund), intended and appropriated for the projects classified under Level I and Level III, particularly the construction of Spring Box and Deep Well for Level I projects and construction of water works system for Level III projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/ recipients, and for which fund accused are accountable by reason for the duties of their office, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously disburse and use said amount of P267,537.96 for the construction and expansion of Barangay Cantucong Water System, a project falling under Level II of CVWSP, thus, accused used said public funds to a public purpose different from which it was intended and appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the government, particularly the barangay beneficiaries of Levels I and III of CVWSP.CONTRARY TO LAW.4The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and admitted the Amended Informations. The petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the said Amended Informations on the ground that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8294, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged. She averred that the Amended Informations failed to allege and show the intimate relation between the crimes charged and her official duties as municipal accountant, which are conditions sine qua non for the graft court to acquire jurisdiction over the said offense. She averred that the prosecution and the Commission on Audit admitted, and no less than this Court held in Tan v. Sandiganbayan,5 that a municipal accountant is not an accountable officer. She alleged that the felonies of malversation and illegal use of public funds, for which she is charged, are not included in Chapter 11, Section 2, Title VII, Book II, of the Revised Penal Code; hence, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the said crimes. Moreover, her position as municipal accountant is classified as Salary Grade (SG) 24. The petitioner also posited that although the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office, the mere allegation in the Amended Informations that she committed the offenses charged in relation to her office is not sufficient as the phrase is merely a conclusion of law; controlling are the specific factual allegations in the Informations that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of her official duties and the commission of the offenses charged. To bolster her stance, she cited the rulings of this Court in People v. Montejo,6 Soller v. Sandiganbayan,7 and Lacson v. Executive Secretary.8 She further contended that although the Amended Informations alleged that she conspired with her co-accused to commit the crimes charged, they failed to allege and show her exact participation in the conspiracy and how she committed the crimes charged. She also pointed out that the funds subject of the said Amended Informations were not under her control or administration.On October 9, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution9 denying the motion of the petitioner. The motion for reconsideration thereof was, likewise, denied, with the graft court holding that the applicable ruling of this Court was Montilla v. Hilario,10 i.e., that an offense is committed in relation to public office when there is a direct, not merely accidental, relation between the crime charged and the office of the accused such that, in a legal sense, the offense would not exist without the office; in other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute. The graft court further held that the offices of the municipal mayor and the municipal accountant were constituent elements of the felonies of malversation and illegal use of public funds. The graft court emphasized that the rulings of this Court in People v. Montejo11 and Lacson v. Executive Secretary12 apply only where the office held by the accused is not a constituent element of the crimes charged. In such cases, the Information must contain specific factual allegations showing that the commission of the crimes charged is intimately connected with or related to the performance of the accused public officers public functions. In fine, the graft court opined, the basic rule is that enunciated by this Court in Montilla v. Hilario, and the ruling of this Court in People v. Montejo is the exception.The petitioner thus filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the aforementioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner claims that the graft court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the same.In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Special Prosecutor averred that the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari, from a denial of a motion to quash amended information, is improper. It posits that any error committed by the Sandiganbayan in denying the petitioners motion to quash is merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It asserts that as ruled by the Sandiganbayan, what applies is the ruling of this Court in Montilla v. Hilario and not People v. Montejo. Furthermore, the crimes of malversation and illegal use of public funds are classified as crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, which by their nature fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It insists that there is no more need for the Amended Informations to specifically allege intimacy between the crimes charged and the office of the accused since the said crimes can only be committed by public officers. It further claims that the petitioner has been charged of malversation and illegal use of public funds in conspiracy with Municipal Mayor Virginio E. Villamor, who occupies a position classified as SG 27; and even if the petitioners position as municipal accountant is only classified as SG 24, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction over the said crimes. The Office of the Special Prosecutor further avers that the petitioners claim, that she is not an accountable officer, is a matter of defense.The Ruling of the CourtThe petition has no merit.We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that based on the allegations of the Amended Informations and Rep. Act No. 8249, it has original jurisdiction over the crimes of malversation and illegal use of public funds charged in the Amended Informations subject of this petition.Rep. Act No. 8249,13 which amended Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by public officers and employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories thereunder enumerated at the time of the commission of such crimes.14 There are two classes of public office-related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249: first, those crimes or felonies in which the public office is a constituent element as defined by statute and the relation between the crime and the offense is such that, in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the office;15 second, such offenses or felonies which are intimately connected with the public office and are perpetrated by the public officer or employee while in the performance of his official functions, through improper or irregular conduct.16The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and felonies under the first classification. Considering that the public office of the accused is by statute a constituent element of the crime charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the Information specific factual allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged, or that the accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties. However, the Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or felonies committed by the public officers and employees enumerated in Section (a) (1) to (5) under the second classification if the Information contains specific factual allegations showing the intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the discharge of his official duties or functions - whether improper or irregular.17 The requirement is not complied with if the Information merely alleges that the accused committed the crime charged in relation to his office because such allegation is merely a conclusion of law.18Two of the felonies that belong to the first classification are malversation defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and the illegal use of public funds or property defined and penalized by Article 220 of the same Code. The public office of the accused is a constituent element in both felonies.For the accused to be guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:(a) The offender is a public officer;(b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.19For the accused to be guilty of illegal use of public funds or property, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements:(1) The offenders are accountable officers in both crimes.(2) The offender in illegal use of public funds or property does not derive any personal gain or profit; in malversation, the offender in certain cases profits from the proceeds of the crime.(3) In illegal use, the public fund or property is applied to another public use; in malversation, the public fund or property is applied to the personal use and benefit of the offender or of another person.20We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the public office of the accused Municipal Mayor Virginio E. Villamor is a constituent element of malversation and illegal use of public funds or property. Accused mayors position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended Informations alleged that the petitioner conspired with her co-accused, the municipal mayor, in committing the said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant is classified as SG 24 and as such is not an accountable officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases lodged against her. It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of her official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds or property.In United States v. Ponte,21 the Court, citing Viada, had the occasion to state:Shall the person who participates or intervenes as co-perpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the crime of malversation of public funds, committed by a public officer, have the penalties of this article also imposed upon him? In opposition to the opinion maintained by some jurists and commentators (among others the learned Pacheco) we can only answer the question affirmatively, for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) we have already advanced in Question I of the commentary on article 314. French jurisprudence has also settled the question in the same way on the ground that the person guilty of the crime necessarily aids the other culprit in the acts which constitute the crime." (Vol. 2, 4th edition, p. 653)The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support their views as to the correct interpretation of the provisions of the Penal Code touching malversation of public funds by a public official, is equally applicable in our opinion, to the provisions of Act No. 1740 defining and penalizing that crime, and we have heretofore, in the case of the United States vs. Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4), imposed the penalty prescribed by this section of the code upon a public official who took part with another in the malversation of public funds, although it was not alleged, and in fact clearly appeared, that those funds were not in his hands by virtue of his office, though it did appear that they were in the hands of his co-principal by virtue of the public office held by him.22The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with the provincial treasurer in committing six counts of malversation is also a co-principal in committing those offenses, and that a private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation.23We reiterate that the classification of the petitioners position as SG 24 is of no moment. The determinative fact is that the position of her co-accused, the municipal mayor, is classified as SG 27, and under the last paragraph of Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the position of one of the principal accused is classified as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offense.We agree with the petitioners contention that under Section 474 of the Local Government Code, she is not obliged to receive public money or property, nor is she obligated to account for the same; hence, she is not an accountable officer within the context of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, under the said article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. Even then, it cannot thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can never be convicted for malversation under the Revised Penal Code. The name or relative importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor.24 The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or municipal government may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136806. August 22, 2000EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent.D E C I S I O NGONZAGA-REYES, J.:In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it issued its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 denying his demurrer to evidence and the subsequent Resolution dated December 17, 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 23069.The factual background of this case is set out herein:On December 1, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an information with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Eduardo A. Alarilla with the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, a second information was filed charging petitioner of having violated section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. These informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 23069 and 23070, respectively. Criminal Case No. 23070 was raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Acting upon a motion for reinvestigation filed by petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information, which motion was eventually granted by the Sandiganbayan on July 16, 1996.Meanwhile, Criminal Case No. 23069 was assigned to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also filed a motion for reinvestigation with the court on May 8, 1996, to which the prosecution objected. On June 18, 1996, the court issued a resolution deferring action on petitioners motion for reinvestigation until compliance by the prosecution with the courts resolution of March 20 and 28, 1996, requiring the amendment of the information so as to indicate the office-related character of the crime charged. On November 8, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an ex-parte motion for the admission of an amended information which reads -That on or about October 13, 1982, in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage of his official functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously level and aim a .45 caliber pistol at and threaten to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi, during a public hearing about the pollution from the operations of the Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after the said complainant rendered a privilege speech critical of the abuses and excesses of the administration of said accused. In its resolution of January 30, 1997, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the court reconsider its admission of the amended information. He claimed that the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 23069 and 23070 arose out