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The New Chroniclers of Peru: US Scholars and Their 'Shining Path' of Peasant RebellionAuthor(s): Deborah Poole and Gerardo ReniqueSource: Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1991), pp. 133-191Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Society for Latin American StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3338175Accessed: 31/08/2008 21:34

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2/60

Bull.

LatinAm.

Res.,

Vol.

10,

No.

2,

pp.

133-191,

1991. 0261-3050/91S3.00

+

.00

Printed

n

GreatBritain.

Society

for LatinAmerican

Studies

Pergamon

Press

plc

The NewChroniclers fPeru:US Scholarsand

their

Shining

ath'

of

PeasantRebellion

DEBORAH

POOLE

New

Schoolfor

Social

Research,

New

York,

USA

and

GERARDO

RENIQUE

CityCollegeofNew York,USA

'Elpapel

aguanta

odo

'-(Peruvian

proverb)

INTRODUCTION

On

19

April

1980,

Abimael

Guzmain,

ecretary

general

of the

Partido

Comunistadel Peru

'Sendero

Luminoso'

(PCP-SL)

gave

a

speech

in

the

closing

session

of

the

party's

first

military

school. The

school

had been

created

ollowing

he 1978

Ninth

Central

Committee

Plenary

n

which

PCP-

SL leaders declaredthat theirpartyhadcompleteda processof consolida-

tion

and was therefore

eady

o

assume ts role as the

revolutionary

anguard

for the Peruvian

working

lass.

Guzman's 980

speech

marked he

beginning

of

yet

another

tage

n

which

he

party

would

now

initiate

he armed

struggle:

Somos los

iniciadores.

Comenzamos

iciendo

omos los

iniciadores,

er-

minamos

diciendo somos los

iniciadores.

gIniciadores

de

que?

De

la

guerra

opular,

de la

lucha

armada,

que

estden

nuestras

manos,

brillaen

nuestra

mente,

palpita

en nuestro

orazon,

e

agita

ncontenible n

nuest-

ras voluntades.

Eso es lo

que

somos. Un

puhado

de

hombres,

de

comu-

nistas,

acatando

el mandato

delpartido,delproletariado delpueblo.

1

One month

later,

members

of

the PCP-SL

burnt

presidential

electoral

ballots

n

the rural

own of

Chuschi

(Cangallo

province,

department

f

Ayac-

ucho).

The

followingday

other PCP-SL

militants

abotaged

he

air

control

tower

n

the

departmental

apital

of

Ayacucho.

A

month

ater,

hey

attacked

the

police

infirmary,

government-sponsored

ouristhotel and the

political

headquarters

f

the

then

governing

party

Acci6n

Popular)

n

the

same

city.

Later

hat

month,

n

their

most

spectacular

ttack,

hey

burntdown

the muni-

cipalbuilding

n

the

working-class

istrict

of San

Martin

de

Porras,

half

a mile

from

the Plazade

Armas

and

seat

of

government

n

the

Peruvian

apitalcity

of Lima.In the nextmonths,theytargettedminingcamps,governmentand

municipal

ffices,

electrical

and

communications

ffices

and the tombof

the

former

PresidentJuan

Velasco

Alvarado.

These

actionswere meant

o mark

the

co-ordinated

and

interdependent

atureof

the

PCP-SL's wo

theatresof

military

operation:

he

sparsely

populated

and

impoverished

Andean

coun-

tryside

and the

urban

political

and economic

power

centres

situated,

or

the


3/60

BULLETIN

OF

LATIN

AMERICANRESEARCH

most

part,

on

Peru'sPacificcoast.

The

objective

f

the armedacts

carried ut

in

these two arenas

was to

destroy

he Peruvian tate and constructa 'New

Democracy'.2

Unbeknown o the membersof this Peruvian oliticalparty, heiractions

also

gave

birthto

another

group

of

political deologues

whose

careers,

ike

those

of

Sendero's

militants,

would

come to

depend

on

both the

unfolding

political

truggle

n Peru

andUS

foreign

policy.

This

new

group

was

formed

of

US

scholars,

rained

n

the

disciplines

of

political

cience,

sociology

and

anthropology,

ut now

specialising

n

the

study

of Sendero's

place

in

the

Peruvian

political

arena.As US

foreign

policy regroups

around he

newly

emergent

vilsof terrorism ndthe Third

Worldnarcotics

rade,

he

political

positions

and

academic,

or

'scientific',

authority

of

these self-annointed

Sendero

expertsacquired

an

even more

important

tatus

n

the

'post-ColdWar'

deological

machinery

f American

mperialism.

t is this fact which

gives

cause for

concern

that the US

Senderologists' ogma-unlike

that

of

Sendero-focuses

on

only

one 'theatre

f

operations'

nd one

type

of social

agent:

he Andean rural

countryside

nd

the

Quechua

or

Aymara

Indian'

peasant.

In

this

article,

we examine he

traditions

f

scholarly

epresentation

nd

the

construction

f

scientific

ruth

n

the workof

this

group

of

US

academic

specialists,

whom we shall refer to as

'Senderologists'.

irstwe look at the

scholarly

apparatus

pon

which

earlySenderologists

mounted heir

claims

that the PCP-SLconstitutesa 'mystery' r 'enigma'.We suggestthat this

image

of Senderohas

been

constructed

hrough

an

intentioned

pattern

of

bibliographic

lision

and

historical

alsification,

nd

through

he

mystifica-

tionof both

peasant

andThirdWorld

political

ationalities.

n

this

section

we

also

look at the

ways

in

which

the

'enigmatic'

tatus

of

Senderohas been

canonised

n the

iterature nd

usedto validate he

authority

f an

ntellectual

expertise

whichclaims o

decipher

he

mystery.

In the

following

wo

sections,

we look at how a series of related

assump-

tions

about

the natureof

peasantpolitical

culture,

ThirdWorld extremism'

and Maoist

dogma' hape

the

early

work

of

two US

Senderologists.

hese

assumptionsare based in received theoretical doctrine about: (1) the

processes

of

modernisation;

2)

the

essentialisedcultural

otherness'

of

peasants;

3)

the

parochial

nature

of

peasantpolitical

movements;

4)

the

irrationality

f

Thirdworld

politicalprocesses;

5)

the

uniformity

f

Maoist

thought;

and

(6)

the assimilation

of

Maoist

military

trategy

o

Western

historicist

llegories

bout he

struggle

etweenbarbarism nd

civilisation.

In

the

following

ectionswe examine he

hardening

f

the

peasant

model

n

later

texts

by

the same and other

authors.

We focus

in

particular

n

the

fit

between

senderological

models

and the

shifting

discursive

and

political

terrainof the

post

Cold War

era.

The

absorption

of

the

senderological

paradigm

nto thenew iteraturenterrorism ndnarcoterrorismeflectsnot

only

the

rising

dominance

f these new

fields

of

ideologicalproduction,

ut

the

easy

correspondence

between the

polarized

modernisationmodels

informingearly

senderology

and the 'new'

emphasis

on the

terroristic

irrationality

f

ThirdWorld

political

violence.

We conclude

with

some alternative

uggestions

or

how a more

productive

134


4/60

THE NEW

CHRONICLERSOF PERU

vision

of

Sendero

might

be

approached.

We

suggest

hat

an

understanding

f

the last decade

of

political

violence in

Peru

requires

detailed

historical

and

regional

analysis

of

local and

state

power,

class structuresand the con-

structionof ethnic and culturaldifference. n particular, nyaccountof the

origins,

importance

and

future

of the PCP 'Sendero

Luminoso' must

necessarily

ake

nto

account

he

broad-based

rass-roots

ocial

movements,

popular

political

organisations

and

Leftist

parties

not

affiliated

with

or

supportive

of the PCP-SL's

actions.

By focusingnarrowly

n the PCP-SLas

the

sole

oppositional political

actor in

Peru,

US

Senderology

has both

privileged

and

exaggerated-and

therefore

endorsed-Sendero's claims to

represent

he Peruvian

peasant

and

working

lasses.

SCHOLARLY

METHODAND

FACTUAL

ENIGMA

I

believe that

if

you're

teachin'

history,

ill

it with

straight

up

facts

not

mystery-KRS

ONE3

The

authors

of

the earliest

work n

English

on SenderoLuminoso

are David

Scott Palmer and

Cynthia

McClintock.

Because the work of

these two

political

cientists

has,

n

manyways,

shaped

he

field of US

Senderology,

we

begin

our

discussion with a close

look at their

published

materials

and

scholarly

method.

In

this section we

will

be

particularly

nterested

in

examining

he

techniques

of

bibliographic eferencing

nd

citation

hrough

whichbothauthors ituate heirpublishedwork on Senderowithrespectto

the

broader ield

of

knowledge

aboutPeru

n

general

and SenderoLuminoso

in

particular.

As

the

groundwork

f

academic

method,

citation

and

biblio-

graphic referencing

provide

useful

entry points

for

understanding

how

'scholarly' uthority

as been

assembled

n

US

senderological

iscourse,

and

why

the

'mysterious'

r

'enigmatic'

scriptionplaced

on

Sendero

Luminoso

in

these

two

scholars'

arly

work

has come

to

be so

crucial

o the

enterprise

f

US

Senderology.

Cynthia

McClintock,

n associate

professor

n

the

Department

f

Political

Science at

George

WashingtonUniversity,

began

her work on Peru with

research in the early 1970s on the agricultural conomy and the co-

operatives

set

up

by

Peru's

military

government.4

Her work on

Sendero

draws

on economic

statistics,

on

survey questionnaires

conducted

on

agricultural

o-operatives

during

her

earlier

research,

nterviews

with Lima

intellectuals,

and 'informal

interviews

with

peasant

leaders

(not

from

Ayacucho)

during

various

periods

n

the

early

1980s'.5

David Scott

Palmer,

professor

of

Political

Science and

International

Relationsat Boston

University,

lso

began

his academic

areerwith

workon

the 1970s Peruvian

military overnment.

At the time

of his

original

Sendero

publications,

however,

Palmer

was Associate Dean

for

Programmes

and

Chairman f LatinAmericanandCaribbeanStudiesat theForeignService

Institute

of the

US

Department

f

State.His

analyses

of

Senderoare

based

n

part

on

the

time he

spent

n

Ayacucho

as a

Peace

Corp

volunteer

rom

1962

to 1964.6

During

these

years,

which

predate

Sendero's

consolidationas a

political

party,

Palmer

claims

o

have

met

many

ndividuals

who

were

aterto

become

senderistas,

ncluding

Abimael

Guzman.7

135


5/60

BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH

Palmer

returned o

Ayacucho

10

years

later

to

carry

out

dissertation

researchon

the

effects

of

militarygovernmentpolicy

on

agricultural

o-

operatives

and

peasant

communities.8 e

returned

gainduring

he

period

1977-1979, as a visiting ecturer or the US Information erviceand the

State

Department's

chool of Area

Studies.

n

1980 he

published

a

critical

evaluation nd

study

of

military

eformism ntitledPeru: he

Authoritarian

Tradition

9

Both Palmer's nd

McClintock's

arly

workdraws

heavily

on the

modern-

isation

breakdownmodels

of

the US

political

scientists,

James

Davies and

Samuel

Huntington.10

hese

theoreticians

hifted he

emphasis

n

modern-

isation

heory

rom

economics

o

politics.

In

particular,hey predicted

hat

the

popular

desiresand mobilisations timulated

y

modernisation

n

Third

World

countries,

would lead

inevitably

o

disruption

of

orderlypolitical

process

n

thoseareas

where

culturally

r

sociallymarginal opulations-for

example,peasants-had

not

yet

made the

transition

rom

'traditional'

o

'moder'.

Huntington,

n

particular,

aw the

gap

between tradition

and

modernity-which

he

mapped

conveniently

nto that

supposedlyprevailing

between the

countryside

and the

city-as

the

primary

ource of

political

instability

n

ThirdWorldcountries. Becausehe

considered

Third

World,

and

particularly

atin

American,

ocieties

o be

constitutionallyncapable

f

reproducing

European

and US models of economicand

politicaldevelop-

ment,

Huntington,

whose influenceboth Palmerand McClintockacknow-

ledge,wenton toargue hatpolitical cientists houldabandon he Parsonian

assumptions

f both scientific

objectivity

nd

neutrality,

nd

engage

nstead

in

political ngineering.12

e

personally pplied

his

doctrine

as a member f

the National

Security

Council,

and as a

leading

architect

f

the

urbanisation

andforcedresettlement

rogrammes

n

Vietnam.'3

His

arguments

n

favour

of suchdrastic

ounterinsurgency

easureswere

bolstered,

n the one

hand,

by

his

belief

(or 'theory')

hatwhatThirdWorld

countries eededwas

a

large

dose

of authoritarian

institutionalisation',

nd,

on

the

other,

by

his

predic-

tion

that

both

modernity

and

political

nstitutionalisation ould

only

be

achievedonce

the

gap

between

city

and

countryside

ad

been

forcibly

limi-

nated.

This

ideologically

nformed onstruction

f the

opposition

betweenrural

and

urban,

raditional nd

modern,

constitutes

ne of the

principal egacies

of

Huntington's ounterinsurgency

heory

o

the

Senderologists'

nalyses

of

Peruvian

insurgency'

n

the 1980s. Like

Huntington,

he

Senderologists,

s

we

will

see,

attempt

o

explain

he

peasantry's

ole

in

Sendero's

insurgency'

by mythologising

heir

presumably

mbivalent

osition

n

what

Huntington

has

spatialised

and

engendered)

as

'the no-man's and of

change'

where

neither

tradition'

or

'modernity'

revails.14 hey

also

uncritically

ssume

his

hypotheses egarding

he

necessarily

fundamentalist'haracter

f Third

World 'rural

movements',

he 'tribal'characteristics f Latin American

political

cultures,

and

the

casual relation between universitiesand

the

'destabilising

ehaviour'

f

an

educatedThirdWorld

ntelligentsia.15

Another

subjectprivileged

y politicaldevelopment

heory

was the

Third

World

military,

who

Huntington

nd

other

heorists onsidered o be the last

hope

for

orderly

modernisation.'6

he reformist

military egime

which

ruled

136


6/60

THE NEW

CHRONICLERSOF

PERU

Peru

from 1968 to 1975 underGeneralJuanVelascoAlvarado

provided

an

opportune

case

study

with which to

test

these

theories.

Both

Palmer

and

McClintock

began

their

careers,

as

we have

seen,

with

studies

of

Velasco's

militarygovernment.Theirlateranalysesof Sendero buildupon the same

dichotomised and

highly

authoritarianmodels of

political

modernisation

that

shaped

early

nterest

n

studyingmilitary

eform.

For

example,

Palmer's

emphasis

on

what he

sees as the

inevitability

of

Sendero's

(pre-modern)

political

fundamentalism s

clearly

informed

by

Huntington's

ominous

prediction

that,

when the

military

fails to

successfully

modernise and

institutionalise

opularpolitical

demands,

the

broadening

of

participation

ransforms he

society

into a

mass

praetorian ystem.

In

such

a

system

the

opportunity

o

create

political

institutionspasses from the military, he apostlesof order,to ... the

apostles

of

revolution.17

In

McClintock's

ase,

the

influenceof thisbrand

of

political

modernisation

(and

counterinsurgency)

heory

s seen most

clearly

n

her

approach

o

the

'politics'

of both

peasants

and Sendero Luminoso.For

McClintock,

as for

other

politicaldevelopment

heorists,

politics

are not

ways

of

doingthings

or

organisingpeople.

Rather,

politics

and

political

actions are taken

to

be

expressions

of

collective

mentalities

or

modes

of

feeling

that

necessarily

reflectsocietalvaluesand

beliefs.

This

epiphenomenal

pproach

o

explain-

ingpoliticalactivity gnoressuchquestionsas interestsandpowerin favour

of

whatMichael

Shafer

has

calleda

'de-odorised

politics'

purged

of

'the

cigar

smoke and stink

of

fear

that

accompany

the

vulgar

understanding

of

politics'.18

s we will

see,

it

is

by

virtueof

this

epiphenomenal

definitionof

'politics'that McClintock s

able,

on

the

one

hand,

to

ignore

the

role

of

competing

Peruvian

Leftist

political

and

peasant

organisations,

nd,

on

the

other,

to

extrapolategeneralities

about

'peasant

perceptions'

of

crisis

or

'peasant

attitudes'

owards

he

government

nto

proof

of

generalised

peasant

'political support'

for

Sendero

Luminoso. As we

will

suggest

later,

such

essentialising quations

between

peasant

values and

extremist

politics

have

ominous mplicationsor thetypesof counterinsurgencyoctrinenowbeing

applied

n

the Peruvian

highlands.

Such

equations

are

rendered even more

dubious

by

the

empirical

base

upon

which

both

these

authors validate

their

conclusions about

peasant

attitudes and

beliefs.

Although

both

rely

to

some

extent

on

the

textual

authority

onferred

by

the

fact that

they

once

lived

in

or visited

Peru,

their

specific

statements

bout

what

peasants

hink

rely

at

best on

survey

question-

naires

and,

at

worst,

on

impressionistic

bservations

and racist

assumptions

abouthow

'traditional

ndians'

easonand

think.

The bulk of

both

their

analyses,

however,

depends

on

neither

surveys

nor

observations,

but on

secondary

sources

and,

most

importantly,

on each

other.

McClintock's

influential 1984

World

Politics

article,

which all

subsequent

US

Senderology

ites,

refers

o Palmer's

1983

manuscript

s the

principal

ource

for the

PCP-SL's

politicalhistory.19

almer's1985

article n

turncites

McClintock's1983

publications.20

This

pattern

of

reciprocal

itation

s used to

create he

impression

hat

ittle

137


7/60

BULLETIN

OF

LATINAMERICAN

RESEARCH

is

knownabout

Sendero

beyond

he work

of

these

wo

US

political

cientists.

This

image

of a

mysterious

errorist

group

s

reinforced

by

a

bibliography

which

systematically

lides

or

silences

both the

substantive

ontentand the

politicallysituatednatureof their Peruviansources.For information n

human

rights

abuses,

or

example,

Palmerrelies

not on the

easily

accessible

reports

of

organisations

uch

as

Americas

Watch

or

Amnesty

nternational,

buton

journalism

n

the

centre-right

eruvian

weekly,

Caretas,

nd

on Mario

Vargas

Llosa's

widely

discreditedand

avowedlypro-government

over-up

of

the

Uchuraccay

massacre.21McClintock

also cites

Vargas

Llosa's

Uchuraccay

article

in the

New York Times

Magazine

and-even

more

surprising-the

right-wing

mercenarymagazine

Soldier

of

Fortune,

for

estimates

of

Sendero's

trength

and

organisational

tructure.22

eithershe

nor Palmer

mentions

hat reliableand

sophisticated nalyses

of

Sendero's

ideology,goals

and

party

organisation

wereavailable t thetime.23

When Peruvian

social

scientific

publications

are cited

in

Palmer's

and

McClintock's

exts,

they

are

selectively

referenced

as sources

of

empirical

information,

ather

han

for the

analyses,

heories

or

political

perspectives

offered

by

their authors.

The

only

Peruvian

ocial

scientists

whom Palmer

cites

are referenced

as sources

of

statistical

nformation

r as

support

or

highly

generalised

bservations

boutthe

lack of

state-sponsored

evelop-

ment

n

Ayacucho.

The contents

of otherPeruvian

works

are

falsely

repre-

sentedas

references or

Palmer's

otally

allacious

ssertions

bout

Sendero's

'messianism'nd primitiveommunism'(seep. 158).Althoughhefootnotes

such

important

cholarship

s

Hector

Bejar's

book on

the

1965

guerrilla,

RauilGonzalez's

hronologies

nd

analyses

f

Sendero's ctivities

nd

politi-

cal-military trategies

n

the Peruvian

ournal

Quehacer,

nd

French

anthro-

pologist

Henri Favre's

mportant

analysis

of

Sendero's

class

and ethnic

origins,

n no case

does

he

attempt

o

incorporate

he facts

or

insights

con-

tained

in these

analyses

nto his own

portrait

of the PCP-SL.24

imilarly,

although

McClintock ites

work

by

the

British

political

cientist

ColinHard-

ing

and

the Peruvian

ociologist

Raiil

Gonzalez,

he

gives

no indication f

the

content

of

either

Harding's

r

Gonzilez's

analyses,

othof which

ocus

expli-

citlyandevensomewhat mphaticallyn SenderoLuminosonot as a 'peas-

ant

rebellion'

but

rather

as a

secular,

urban-based

political-military

organisation.25

Finally,

although

oth

Palmerand

McClintock

cknowledge

he

existence

of

position

papers

and

political

documents

written

by

the

PCP-SL,

not

once

do

they

either

analyse

or

refer

o the

actual

contentsof these

primary

ource

documents

on

party

ideology,

military strategy

and

political goals.26

Similarly, lthough

oth

authors

laim o

be

writing

bouta

'dogmatic

Maoist

party',

neither

refers

to

Mao's

own

writings

nor

attempts

o

distinguish

betweenthe

many

varieties

of

international

nd Peruvian

Maoism.

Rather

than

ooking

more

closely

at such

primary

ourcematerials r at studiesof

Peruvian

Maoism,

hey

nstead

rely

on

categorical

tatements

bout Maoist

dogma'

nd

on

secondary

nd/or

ournalistic

ccounts.27

Similarobfuscations

re

used to

support

both authors'

ategorical

tate-

ments

regarding

he differences

etweenSendero

and

other

Peruvian

Leftist

groups,

he

indecipherability

f the

peasantry

ndthe

undocumented

ature

138


8/60

THENEW

CHRONICLERS

OF

PERU

of

Ayacuchano

social

reality.

For

example,

McClintock's

analysis

of

the

Peruvian

uerrillas

n the

1960s andthe Peruvian

peasant

movement-out

of

whichshe claimsSendero

emerges

and

of

which she

claims

t

forms a

part-

relies on general secondarysources and edited volumesby US political

scientists.

She

does not cite

any

of the

available

analyses

of the

Peruvian

guerrilla;

nor

does she

use

any

of

the

multitude

of

available

political

and

statisticaldocuments

put

together

by

the

independentopposition

peasant

organisation,

he

Confederaci6n

Campesina

del

Peru

(CCP).28

hese docu-

ments

contain

explicit

statements

regarding

the

CCP's

political

and

ideological

rejection

of

Sendero's tactics

and document the

adversarial

marginality

f

Sendero

to the

popular

peasant

social movement

in

Peru.

Finally, missing

from both her

and Palmer's

analyses

are

substantive

references

to

any

of the

theses,

field

reports,

statistical

studies,peasant

community

surveys,

or intellectualand

politicaljournals

produced

at the

University

of

Huamanga

nd

elsewhere

n

Peru,

during

he

1960s,

1970s and

early

1980s.29

McCLINTOCK'S EASANT

REBELLION

No tenemos

retaguardia

l

comienzo

o

la

tendremos

pequeha,

debil,

frdgily

variable-Abimael

Guzmain

(1980)30

When

the

subject

is a

political

and

militaryorganisation

as

important

as

SenderoLuminoso,such misrepresentationsf sourcesas those outlined

above

have

important

consequences

which

go beyond

the

domain of

scholarlyaccuracy

and

ethics.

For

example,

McClintock's ailure o

consult

or

to

cite

major,

readily

available

documents

in

which

the

CCP,

CNA

(National

Agrarian

Confederation)

nd other

regional

and national

peasant

organisations

enounce

Sendero's uthoritarian

nd

terrorist

olitics,

relates

directly

o

her

claims o mountan

authoritative

heory

of

Sendero's ole

and

centrality

n

the Peruvian

peasant

movement. t is this

stated ntentionof

the

author

which

transformsher

bibliographic

omissions'

nto overt

political

statements

about what

she believes

to be the

origins

and

direction of

Peruvianpeasant politics, and, equally important,her opinions about

Peruvian

peasants',

cholars'

and

politicians'

ability

to

speak

for their

own

political

and

social

reality.

McClintock's

objective

of

representing

Sendero as a

rural

peasant

rebellion

shapes

not

only

her

bibliographic

hoices,

but

also the manner

and

order

in

which

she

presents

the

facts about

Sendero.

McClintock's

irst

publishedanalyses

of

Sendero

appear

n

September

1983.31We will

focus

here,

however,

on

hermore

ambitious

rticle

published

n

1984 in

the

journal

World

Politics,

because it

is

this article

which

is most

frequently

cited

by

subsequent

Senderologists

and which

has,

therefore,

most

influenced the

field of US

Senderology.32

n this

article,

McClintock

proposes

to 'examine

the

origins

of

a

major

rural

revolutionary

movement,

Sendero

Luminoso',

o

evaluate he

nature

of

its

'considerable

peasant

support

n

Peru's

southern

highlands',

nd 'to

shed new

light

on ...

the

prevailing

heories

of

peasant

revolution'

(McClintock,

1984:

49).

In

the

following

analysis

of the

World

Politics

article,

we

suggest

hat

the

139


9/60

BULLETINOF LATIN

AMERICANRESEARCH

author ails o

examine

arefully

what

might

be meant

by

the term

support'

n

the Peruvian ase and that she instead

assumes

he de

facto

existenceof

a

generalised

nd

historically

on-specific

peasantsupport

network.33n the

political developmentmodel which she employs,this de facto support

network

s

assumedas

necessary

or

Sendero

o have

emerged

at all

since

politics

are taken

to be an

epiphenomenal

manifestation

f

societal

values

and

'mentalities'

(see

p.

137).

This

a

priori

assumption

s

necessary

for

McClintock

o mould Sendero's

extremist

political-military

rganisation

into

a

suitable case

with

which

to intervene

n

'various

heoreticalcon-

troversies

n

the

scholarship

on

peasant

revolution'

(ibid.,

p.

48).

These

controversies

re:

(1)

the

importance

f

subsistence rises

n

the

determina-

tionof

peasant

ebellion;

2)

'the

ype

of

agrarian

tructuremost

conducive

o

[peasant]evolutionary ctivity';3)

the

way

in

which

government grarian

policies shape peasant political perceptions;

and

(4)

'geopolitics'

ibid.,

p.

49).

These

questions

arise

out of

the

literature n

comparative easant

revolutions

by

Barrington

Moore,

Eric

Wolf,

James

Scott,

Theda

Skocpol

and

Jeffery

Paige.34

ather

han

considering

he

specific

political

tructuring

and

raison

d'tre

of the

PCP-SL

as

a

political-militaryorganisation,

McClintock

xplicitly

tructures er

questions

o

address

his literature

n

comparative

easant

and

agrarian

ebellions

nd revolutions.

he PCP-SL's

relevance

o this

iterature,

nd

therefore

ts statusas

a

'peasant

ebellion',

s

thereby

presented

as

an a

priori

assumption

ather han as a historical

or

sociologicalproblemwhichmustbefirstproven,and then addressed.

McClintock

egins

her

1984 articlewitha schematic ccount

of

the

origins

of

the

PCP-SL.Shefirst ells

the reader hat he

University

f

Huamanga

was

'the

professional

ome

of

various

xtremely

adical

roups

until

1978'

(ibid.,

pp.

50-51)

and

thatthere

was considerableactionalism.

he next

mentions

that the

PCP-SLwas

'founded

n

1968

[sic]

by

Abimael

Guzman',

who

she

describes

imply

as

a

'philosophy

rofessor'

rom

Arequipa.

She

then abels

Sendero's

ideology

and

political position

as

'Gang-of-Four

Maoist',

'classically

Maoist',

'unusually

ectarian'

and as

'stridently

riticalof the

currentSoviet

and Chinese

governments,

s well as of

[the

PeruvianLeftist

coalition]IzquierdaUnida'(ibid.,p.

51).35

She claimstheyare 'extremely

taciturn

bout

[their]

trategies

nd

programs'

ndthendismisses

he

content

of

their

published

documents

as

'very

slim' and

'dealingprimarily

with

guerrilla

warfare'

(ibid.,

p.

51).

She

gives

no

summary

f

the

actual

ontent

of

these

documents;

nor

does she

explain

why

documents

primarily

about

guerrilla

warfare hould

be

considered rrelevant

o

analysis

of

what

she

herself

describes as

a

'guerrilla

movement'.

Instead,

she dismisses the

question

by typologising

endero's

ideology'

s

'classically

Maoist',

phrase

which he assumes

ncorrectly

o mean hat

revolution

s

to be achieved

by

a

prolongedpopular

war

that

will

first

gather upport

n

the

countryside

nd

then

inally

encircle hecities'

(ibid.,

p.

51,

emphasis

urs).

McClintock

concludes

her overview

of Sendero's

party

history by

insinuating

cultural

r

ideological

ontinuity

etweenAndean

peasants

nd

Sendero's

Maoism.

Sendero',

he claims

at the

close

of

her

paragraph

bout

the

party's

rigins,

has

ncorporated

ymbols

rom

he Incan

nsurrectionary

tradition

nto

its

posture'

(ibid.,

p.

51).

She

opens

the next

paragraph

y

140


10/60

THE NEW

CHRONICLERS

OF

PERU

stating imply

hat The

movement

grew

gradually'.

his

'growth',

he

claims,

occurred at

meetings

held

in

the

home of

the

'charismatic

Guzman'

and

through

an

obscure

process

in

which

'students rom

peasant

families

...

actually ived for long periods n Indiancommunities .. learned he Indian

language

..

married nto the

communities-and

preached

politics'

(ibid.,

p.

50).

McClintock's our

short

paragraphs

n

Sendero's

party history'

are not

only

riddledwith

error,

hey

are

intentionally

tructured o

insinuatea set

of

theoretical

assumptions

around which

McClintock will

structure the

remainder f her

article.These

suppositions

re:

(1)

the notion

that he

PCP-

SL

spontaneously

merged

out of a

factionalistradicalism

ndemic to the

University

of

Huamanga;

2)

the notion

that

peasant

social

movements

require organic

cultural

(or ethnic)

links

between their

leaders,

their

repertoire

of

motivating ymbols,

and their

followers;

(3)

the notion

that

peasant

political

culture

is irrational

and

pre-modern

(or

even

pre-

Columbian)

ecauseof

its isolation rom

national

political

discourse;

4)

the

assumption

hat

peasantpolitical

culture s

regionally

uniform;

and

(5)

the

idea that

Sendero's

Maoist

doctrine

preaches

an

'encircling'

f the

citiesanda

consequent polarisation

of

Peru's urban

and rural

populations.

Let us

examine

he factual

bases of

these

suppositions

one-by-one.

First,

the PCP

'Sendero

Luminoso'

was not

one of

'various

extremely

radical

groups'

at

the

University

of

Huamanga,

much

less the creation

of a

philosophyprofessor. twas and s apoliticalpartyandmilitary rganisation

which is known

and

identified

by

its

contested and far from

hegemonic

position

within

the Peruvian

eft.

In

1964,

the Peruvian

Communist

Party

split

nto the Partido

Comunista

Peruano-'Unidad'

(PCP-U)

and the

Partido

Comunista del

Peru 'Bandera

Roja'

(PCP-BR).

This

split

reflected the

division

n

the

international

ommunistmovementbetween

he Soviet

Union

and China.

At that time

Abimael

Guzmain

was a

militantof

the

Peruvian

Communist

Party

and

sided with

the

pro-Chinese

PCP-BR.

One

year

later,

the

youth

branchof

Bandera

Roja

split

for

internal

political

differences nto

the Partido

Comunista

del Peru

'Patria

Roja'

(PC

del

P-PR).

Guzman

remainedas theleaderof PCP-BR'sSpecialWorkCommission nchargeof

military

ffairs

(Comision

de

Trabajo

Especial).

At the

height

of

the

Cultural

Revolution,

Guzman

ravelled o

Chinato

attenda

cadre school.

Upon

his

return o

Ayacucho,

he led

a faction

within

the PCP-BR

('Fracci6n

Roja').

This

faction

was

committedto

armed

insurrection.

n

1969

the

political

positionsput

forward

by

Guzman's

action

were defeated

n

the

congress

of

the

peasant

ederation

ontrolled

by

PCP-BR,

he

Federacion

Departmental

de

Campesinosy

Comunidadesde

Ancash

(FEDCCA),

as well

as

in

the

University

of

Huamanga

tudent

front,

the

Frente

Estudiantil

Revolucion-

ario

(FER).

In

these

circumstances,

aving

decided to

privilege

clandestine

organisation

nd armed

struggle,

Guzman'sFracci6n

Roja

consolidated n

1970 to

become the

PCP

'Sendero

Luminoso'.

At the

time

McClintockwrote

her

early

articles,

he

general

outlinesof

this

party

genealogy

was

public

knowledge

n

Peruvian

political

and

intellectual

circles,

and was

published

in

numerous

Peruvian

party

newspapers,

magazines

and

pamphlets.36

n

fact,

the

name Sendero

Luminoso'

omes off

141


11/60

BULLETINOF

LATINAMERICAN

RESEARCH

the masthead f

a

newspaper

ublishedby

the factionof

Ayacucho's

Frente

EstudiantilRevolucionario

(FER)

controlled

by

Guzman's

Fracci6n

Roja'.

It

is,

perhaps,

nderstandablehat

McClintock id not

know

or

didnot

tell

her readers he completedetailsof thiscomplexpartyhistory. t is equally

comprehensible

hat she wouldnot have had

ready

access

to,

or

wouldnot

choose

to

cite,

all of

the

early

documents

and

polemicssurrounding

en-

dero's

early

party

history.

What s not

acceptable,

however,

s to

present

a

politically

motivated rmed

plinter roup

of

the

Peruvian

Communist

arty

as

an

isolated

or

spontaneously enerated

movement'

hich

prang p

in the

radical incubatorof the

University

of

Huamanga

or in the

home of a

charismatic

hilosophyprofessor.

We

can

begin

o

understand

why

McClintock

might

havechosen o

repre-

sent Sendero

n

such

a

fashion

by examining

second

theoretical

premise

embedded

n

her account

of

Sendero:

he

concept

of

a

political

or

social

'movement'.

n her

1984

text

she

employs

he

term

peasant

movement'

nter-

changeably

with

he terms

peasant

evolt'and

peasant

ebellion' o

describe

Sendero

Luminoso

(pp.

48-50,

passim).

Moreover,

lthough

he claims hat

SenderoLuminoso s

'not

Peru's irstradical

peasant

movement'

(p. 77),

she

gives

no

examples

of whatshe considers o

have

been the

circumstances,

e-

mandsor nature

of

previous

peasant

movements

n

Peru,

nor

does

she men-

tion

the

existence of a broad

peasant

movement

contemporary

with

and

opposed

o

Sendero.

nstead,

Sendero's

peasant

movement's defined

negat-

ivelyby oppositionto the 'guerrillamovement'whichprecededit in the

1960s.

According

o

McClintock,

his

earlier

guerrilla

movementdiffered

from Sendero's

peasant

revolt'

on

several counts. Unlike

Sendero,

she

claims,

Peru's

evolutionary

ctivists

of

the

early

1960s were

..

of middle-

to

upper-class

rigins

and

rom he

cities'

(pp. 77-78).

They

werenot 'able o

gain

the

peasants'

rust or to

organise

effectivemovements'

(p. 78).

They

were,

she

continues,

almost

otally

unsuccessful

n

recruiting ighlands

sic)

peasants

o their

cause.

They

did

not

prepare

or a

struggle.

Nor

did

they

establisha

political

base...

In

particular,heyoverlooked

he

differences etween

the Cuban ierramaestra nd

the

Peruvian

ighlands

p. 78).

Moreover,

she

continues,

they

were

'roving, undisguised,unprotected

guerrilla

ands'

who,

when

hey

moved nto

the

lowland

areas,

were

quickly

detected,

as their

physical ppearance

was

radically

ifferent

rom

hatof the

jungle

peoples'

p. 78).

As

an

example

of

the alienatedurban

revolutionary

leader,

he cites the case of

Hugo

Blanco.

In

point

of

fact,

Hugo

Blanco,

who

speaks

luent

Quechua,

s a

university-

trained

agronomist

rom

the

rural

agricultural

istrict

apital

of

Huanoquite

in

the

Cusqueiioprovince

of Paruro.

n

the

early

1960s he moved to the

lowland

Cusqueiiovalley

of La Convenci6nwhere he became a share-

cropper

(aparcero)

working

along

with the

other

peasant

sharecroppers

and

tenant farmers

o build the

Federaci6nProvincialde

Campesinos

de La

Convencion Lares.He later

became

he

secretary eneral

f this

ederation,

and

it

was

in this

capacity

hat he led

the

peasants'

ive-year

struggle

o

recover heir

and.It

was

only

at the end of this

five-year

period

hat

Blanco

142


12/60

THE NEW CHRONICLERSOF PERU

and the

peasant

organisation

he headed

created

an

armed self-defence

committee

(Comite

de

Auto Defensa

Campesina).

As McClintockherself

acknowledgesp. 78)

Blanco,

who

was a

Trotskyist

militant,

was

ideologic-

ally

opposed

to

launching

guerrilla

warfarewithout

having

first built

up

a

social base

and

revolutionary

arty.

t is

precisely

because

of his ruralback-

ground,

luency

n

Quechua

and

experience

working

with

the

peasant

edera-

tion

in

La Convencion

hat

Blanco

became,

andhas

remained,

very

popular

political igure

among

peasants

n the

southernPeruvian

highlands

f

Cusco,

Apurfmac

nd

Ayacucho.

Clearly

McClintock-who cites no literaturewhatsoever

o

support

her

description

of

Blanco-chose

the

wrong example

o

prove

her

thesis

about

the alienatedstatus

and non-rural

origins

of the

1960s

guerrilla

eaders.37

Had she chosenanyof a numberof otherguerrillaeaders rom thisperiod,

however,

he

would have been

equallywrong.38

here s an extensive

biblio-

graphy

on the 1960s Peruvian

guerrilla

which containsthis information.39

Nevertheless,

she neither cites this

literature,

presents

historical

evidence

aboutthe 1960s

guerrilla,

or

considers

he fact thatSendero's

own

evalua-

tion of the 1960s

guerrilla

ocuses

on

totally

different

spects

of

ideology

and

military

strategy.40

nstead,

McClintock

presents

a

superficial

and

totally

undocumented

eading

of

the

1960s

guerrilla xperience

n

order o

support

her

hypothesis

hat the 1960s movementdiffered

qualitatively

rom that of

Sendero

because ts

leadersdid not share

organic

ultural nd

classties to

the

peasantryorwhomthey fought.

What

then is the

positive

evidence

she

presents

to

prove

that

Sendero-

whose

principal

deologue

and

military

eader

is a

middle-class,

Spanish-

speaking,

Kantian

philosopher

rom

Arequipa-does

have a more

organic

relationship

to

the

peasantry?

Here we come to McClintock's third

supposition-the

necessarily

unmediated or

organic

nature of

peasant

political

culture.

As

we have

seen,

in

her

introduction o Sendero's

political

history,

she insinuates hat the PCP-SL shares an

ideological

or

'symbolic'

universe

with

the

peasantry,

nd that

they

invoke

this universe

hrough

he

use of 'Incan

[sic]

nsurrectionary ymbols'.

She does not

give

her readers

examples

of these

symbols.

Nor does she ventureto

explain

why

peasants

might

be

spurred

to insurrection

by

some

vague

set

of

pre-Columbian

symbols

with little or no

specificrelationship

o

their

daily

ives.Insteadshe

simply

footnotes the PCP-SL

document,

'Develop

Guerrilla Warfare'

(hereafter

referred to as

'Desarrollemos'),

hereby implying

that such

symbols

are contained

n

thatdocument

(p.

51,

fn

9).

This, however,

is not the case.

'Desarrollemos' s Sendero's irst

major

public

assessmentof the successanddirection

of

its

military ampaign.

n

this

document,

hey

claim

responsibility

or over 2900 armedactions

between

1980 and 1982. Theylistthelocationand natureof theseactions-well over

half of which

were

in

urban ocations-in

detail

and

clearly

state that these

actions are

part

of

the initial

stage

of a

long-termmilitary

trategy

o over-

throw

he 'old order'.

They

assess

the

response

of the

government

nd other

'reactionary

orces'

n

Peruvian

ociety

to their nitial

stage.They

offer

their

interpretation

f

the

political

ituation,

he economiccrisisand the Belaiinde

government.

Nowhere

does the document

contain the

slightest

allusion to

143


13/60

BULLETINOF

LATINAMERICANRESEARCH

'Incan

nsurrectionaryymbols'.

Nowhere does

it-or

any

other Sendero

party

document-privilege

ethnic,

racial or

cultural actors

as

elements

shaping

he historical

ision,

politicalphilosophy

nd

military trategy

f the

PCP-SenderoLuminoso.41

In

fact,

n

those

documentswherePCP-SL

pokespersons

nd

eaders

do

mention 'Andean culture'

hey

disparage

uch

'folklore'

as 'nacionalismo

mdgico-quejumbroso'

'magical-whining

ationalism')

and

as archaic

survivals

whichmust

be

eliminated

n

the construction f thePCP-SL'sNew

Democracy'.42

n

response

to an

interviewer's

ueryregarding

he

'funda-

mentalist endencies'

f SenderoLuminoso

nd

he rolethat

he

partyassigns

to

religion

n

Peruvian

ociety,

LuisArce

Borjaresponded

hat

thePC

does

not

propose

to

go

back to

an

Inca

regime

or

to

any

other

rrationalities....

[R]eligion ndthe PC are two opponents'.ForArce, as for otherSendero

spokespersons,

he

'magic

of

stars,

of

animals,

of

the

Sun and the soul'

constitute a

cultural elief

n

magic

which]

ontinues

o

have nfluenceover

the most

backward

nhabitants

f

Peru....

[T]his Andean]

ultural

radition

has

absolutely othing

o do

with

the warandthe

revolutionarytruggle'.43

Even a

summary

eview

of the

historical

iterature n

peasantpolitical

and

socialmovements

n

the PeruvianAndes wouldshow

that

the 'insurrection-

ary'

raditions

nd

symbols

whichMcClintockwishes

o attributeo

Sendero,

form

part

of a much

more

complex

political

culture

of

resistance/rebellion

forged

n

response

o and as

part

of

the broader

class,

ethnicand nationalist

discourses ndexperiences f colonialandrepublican eru.44 hiscultures

the

product

of

over

fourcenturies

f

exchange

f ideasbetween

he Andean

and

the

European

worlds.The

single

most

important

ounding

basis

of

this

hybridpolitical

culture

upon

which

Sendero

builds is

an

insurrectionary

tradition

of rebellionand bloodshed nherited

rom the

bourgeois

revolu-

tionary

and nationalist raditions f the

Frenchrevolution.45 nother s the

Christian,

nd later

socialistand

anarchist,

radition

of

messianic

utopian

thought.46

McClintock's

unsupported

assumption

that Sendero's

symbols

must

necessarily

be

'Incan'

n

nature,

negates

the PCP-SL's

place

within

this

European-and

now international-traditionof

revolutionary

utopian

discourse.

t

also,

however,

reflects

her

ignorance

aboutthe

ways

in which

both

political

discourse

and

political

symbols

are

constructed,

used and

interpeted

n

twentieth-century

eru. 'Inca'

ymbols

n

Peru

are

no

longer

simple

tokens

of a natural

Indian'

culture,

but are rather

mediated

by

Peruvians'

nd

Peruvian

easants'

xperiences

withthe

indigenista

hetoric

and

conography mployed

by nearly very

wentieth-centuryolitical

party

and

eader.

The condor

rom he

pre-Inca

tate

centred

n

Chavin

de Huantar

is

included

n APRA's

party

emblem.

PresidentBelauinde

onned

ponchos

andother ndigenous ostumesonhistravels hroughheprovinces

of Peru.

The

slogan

of

General

Juan

Velasco Alvarado

was

the

Quechua

phrase,

'kausachum

ampesinuruna'

'long

live

the

peasants'),

and the hat of the

eighteenth-century

ndian

rebel

leader

Tupac

Amaru was

the

pervasive

symbol

of the

agrarian

eform

whichMcClintock

erself

tudied.

The names

of the

1960s

guerrilla

ronts

werePachacutec

(Central

ierra),

Tupac

Amaru

(front

n

La

Convenci6n),

llariq

Chaska

(command

ase

in

La

Convencion)

144


14/60

THE NEW

CHRONICLERS

OF

PERU

and Manco Inca

(northern

ierra).

Limeiio

activist

ntellectuals

requently

choose such

quechuizedpseudonyms

as SilvestreCondorunaand

Americo

Pumaruna.The

US

DEA

and Peruvian

military

anti-drugoperation

was

called

'Operacion

Condor'and the US-trained

special

counter-insurgency

forces

in

Peru

are

called 'Sinchis'and

'LlapanAtiqs'.47

ndeed,

given

the

prominence

and

importance

of

Andean,

Indian,

Quechua

and

Inca

symbols

in

Peruviannationalist

discourse,

t

is

singularlynoteworthy

hat Sendero

uses

none

of the usual

repertoire

of 'Incan

ymbols',

hatAbimael

Guzman

has chosen the

names

of

Spanish

conquistadores

or

his noms de

guerre

(Alvaro

and

Gonzalo),

and

that Guzmanreads

excerpts

from the texts of

Shakespeare (Macbeth,

Julius

Caesar)

and

Washington

Irving

in

his

'charismatic'

ncitements

o

armed

struggle.48

As

a

provincial,

Peruvian

political-militaryorganisation,

he

PCP-SL

undoubtedly

forms a

part

of

and

builds

upon

aspects

of

both Peruvian

national

political

culture-including

its 'Incan

symbols'-and

the subset

of

thatculturewhichwe

might

hinkof

as Andean

peasantpolitical

culture.This

commonality

s

determined

by

the fact that these

Andean 'traditions' nd

peasant political

cultureshave been

shaped by

the same

set

of

forces

that

have

shaped

the

thinking

of

PCP-SL militantsand

leaders. These 'forces'

include the broader

political

traditionsand

discourses

of

Marxistand

non-

Marxist

political parties,

NGOs and

international

development

projects,

progressive

church

organisations,

peasant

federations,

mining

unions,

indigenistculturalmovements and regionalistmovements.Peasantsare

moved to act

politically-and

to lend

political

support'-by

their

reasoned

reflection

on their

prior

historical and

personal

experiences

with

such

organisations

nd

by

their

understandings

f what

economic and

political

benefitssuch

organisations

s SenderoLuminosohave to

offer them.

They

are

not

spurred

to action

by vague

(or,

in

this

case,

non-existent)

Incan

symbols

or

by

charismatic

niversityprofessors.

In

earlier work,

McClintock

describes

peasant

participation

in

government-managed

o-operatives

and

gives

credence to

the extent and

importance

of

organisedpeasant political

activity

n

the

form

of

national

strikes,peasantfederationsandorganisingby the CCPand CNA.49 n her

1984

article,

by

comparison,

McClintock

systematically

excludes all

reference o the existenceof

such

peasantpoliticalexperience,

as

well as all

reference to

popular

opposition politics

in

Ayacucho

not

associated

with

Sendero Luminoso. She claims

that Sendero has

privileged

ties to the

peasantry

because

they

sent

party

members

o work

n

the

countryside

n

the

1970s

(p.

51).

Yet she fails to

mention that this was

common

practice

for

many

eftist

parties

n

Peru

throughout

he

1970s.

Of

these,

the PCP-SLwas

probably

the

group

with

the

least

presence

in

the

countryside

outside of

Ayacucho.50Moreover, udgingby

the

topics

of

its

fliers and

publications

during

the

early

1970s,

even

in

Ayacucho,

it

was the

party

with the least

active nterest

n

agrarian

ssues and the

peasant

cause.5'

Diverging

harply

rom

her own

past

work

on

the

co-operatives

ormed

by

the

Velasco

government,

McClintockfurther

simplifies

the

political

and

ethnic

setting

n which

Sendero

emergedby

claiming

hat

the

Velasco

regime

failed

to

establishnew

political

nstitutions

n

the

countryside'

p.

79),

and

145


15/60

BULLETINOFLATINAMERICANRESEARCH

that no

significant

ew encroachment n the

lives

of the

highlands

easantry

were

apparentduring

he

1970s

(p. 76).52

Repeatedly hroughout

he text

(p.

49,

passim)

she statesthat

Ayacucho-and

therefore

ts

peasants-were

isolated from the capitalistmarket and had very little experiencewith

national

ociety.

She even

goes

so far as to claim hat

Ayacucho

s the

only

one of the

five

southern

[Peruvian]

highlandsdepartments

hat is

in-

accessible,

without

a mainroad rom

he coast'

(p.

76).53

In

fact,

Ayacucho

s

the

department

with the

highestmigration

ate to Limaand

migrants

here

maintain

active

ties with their

relatives

n

Ayacucho's

isolated'

peasant

communities.54

Moreover,

the

road to

Cusco

and

Apurimac

rom

Lima

passes

throughAyacucho

and

Ayacucho

has

an

airport

with

flights

from

LimaandCusco

entering

everal imes

weekly.

Why

does

McClintock ind t

necessary

o

falsify

Peruvian

eography

nd

history

in

this manner?

Why

does she

systematically

lide

the

history

of

political

and social movements

in

the Peruvian

highlands

n

order to

represent

Sendero

as a 'rural

peasant

movement'?

The answersto these

questions

lie,

in

part,

in

the fourth

supposition

nforming

McClintock's

analysis.

This

supposition,

which s drawn

directly

rom

James

Scott'smuch

disputed

model

of

peasant

rebellion,

posits

that he PCP-SL's

olitically

nd

partisan

motivated rmed

truggle riginates

n,

and s an

organic

xpression

of,

the

economicneeds of 'the

peasantry'.

McClintock

begins

her

analysis

of

the 'subsistence' auses of

Sendero

Luminoso'speasant ebellion' yconvincingly ertifying,withstatistics,he

severeeconomic

crisis

afflicting

eruand

especially

hePeruvian

ierra n

the

late 1970s and

early

1980s. She also

correctly

documents nd

describes he

failures

f

Velasco's

agrarian

eform

programme.

er

problems

rise,

on the

one

hand,

in

her

assumptions

that the economic crisis

necessarily

corresponded

o a 'subsistence

risis',and,

on

the

other,

n the

ways

n

which

she

attempts

to

translate

he

alleged

economic and

biological

crisis into

peasant upport

or Sendero.

An

example

of thissomewhat onvoluted

nterpretive rocess

s heruse

of

surveys

o measure

peasantpolitical

support

or

Sendero.As a measureof

'thepeasants'ubjective xperience f economiccrisisshe citestheresultsof

a

surveyquestion

she

asked

in

1980 to 25

peasants

n

'Varya', peasant

community

ssociated

witha

government

ormed

co-operative

nterprise

r

SAIS

(Sociedad

Agricola

de Inter6s

Social)

n

Huancavelica. he resultsof

this

survey,

he

reports,

were hat 84

per

cent

of

25

respondents

aid

n

1980

that

he

community's rogress

had

been bad'

(ibid.).

She then

umps

o

1984

at whichtime

Varya

was

'alleged

o

be a

pro-Senderistaommunity'

ibid.).

The

only

proof

she offers

of

the

Varya

peasants' upport

or Sendero

s

the

fact that the

village

had

been

occupied by

the Peruvianarmed

forces.55

Acceptingarmyallegations

f

the

village's

terrorist'

inks,

McClintock hen

contrasts he

'possible

pro-Senderistaympathies'

nd

pessimistic

ttitudes

of

Varya

with

the 'more

positive

views

and

non-Senderistanclinations' f a

coastal

co-operative

and

a

'prosperous

central

highlands

peasant

com-

munity'

where she asked the same

questions

(ibid.).

These

peasants,

she

claims,

were better

off

after the

agrarian

eform

and,

as a

result,

wereno

longer

concerned

with

subsistence,

ut with

secondary-school

ducation

or

146


16/60

THE

NEW

CHRONICLERS

OF

PERU

their children'

(p. 66).

Her conclusions are that

peasants

with

subsistence

crises and 'bad' economic conditions

are

prone

to look to Sendero as

a

solutionto their

problems.

Of

these

poor peasants,

hose

in

Ayacucho

were

the

poorest

andmoreisolated.

They

weretherefore,

presumably,

hose most

apt

to turn o

the PCP-SL

(pp.

59-62).

In

this

'analysis'

McClintock

has

carefully

crafted her

depiction

of

the

political

space

withinwhich

Sendero

operates.

The fact that

'peasants

were

perceiving

a crisis'

(p. 62)

relies on McClintock's omission

of crucial

information

regarding

he

quite

different

political

and

regional

contexts-

and therefore

the

quite

different

peasantries-existing

in

a Huancavelica

SAIS

formed

during

a

government-sponsored

grarian

eform

and

in

the

impoverished

and

(by

her own

characterisation)

solated

provinces

of

the

department Ayacucho)which,in McClintock'sown words,was 'the least

benefited

agrarian

one'

(1984:

66)

in

Peru's

1969

agrarian

eform.56

These

radically

different

experiences

with the

agrarian

reform,

among

other

things,

make

the

political

and economic factors

informing

a

Varya

peasant'sunderstanding

f what such

(inherentlyvague)

words as

'bad',

'crisis'

and

'progress'

mean

quite

distinct rom

the

interpretations laced

on

suchwords

by,

for

example,

an

Ayacuchano

or

Apurimeiiopeasant.

ndeed,

in

McClintock's1982 article

on

agrarian olitics

n

Peru,

she cites the same

survey

n

a

very

different

way.

In

this earlier

publication,

he tells us that

'84

per

cent of the

Varyarespondents

aid

that,

since the

inauguration

f

the

SAIS,Varya'sprogresshad been"bad".'57learly,ntheoriginal urvey, he

peasants

were not asked about 'crisis'

n

general,

but rather about their

perceptions

of a

poorly managed,government-owned

AIS and its

corrupt

government-appointed

dministrators.

y

the late

1970s,

the

peasants

hem-

selves had

proposed

to

reorganise

reestructurar)

he

SAIS

under

their own

political

and

managerial

initiative.58Similar

manipulations

occur

in

McClintock's

failure either to mention Velasco's

sweeping

educational

reformsas

a context

affecting

he 'better-off

co-operativepeasants'

nterest

in

educationover

subsistence,

or to mention he fact thatthe

largestpopular

socialmovement

n

defence

of

free educationoccurred

n

Ayacucho

n

1969.

Deprived nthiswayof the social andpoliticalcontext nwhichsurveyswere

conducted,

such statements

by peasantsclearlyprovide

no

evidence

what-

soever

of a

causal

ink

between

a

worsening

conomic

situationand

peasant

support

or

Sendero.59

We do

not

wish

to

deny

the factthatSenderodid and

does

havethe

support

of certain ectorsof the Andean

peasantry

n

Peru.This s

particularly

rue

of

Ayacucho,

where Sendero's

community

of

political sympathisers

and

militantss

greatly xpandedby

networks f

kinship,

compadrazgo

nd

paisa-

naje,

as

well as

by

the

undeniably

authoritarian nd

violent

persuasion

methods

through

which

they

'influence'both

voting

behaviour and

gain

'support'.60

he nature of the

'support'

offered to Sendero

by differently

situated ctors

within

hesenetworks

s, however,

neitheruniformnor

consist-

ently political'.

This s

even more trueof the

'support'

nd

sympathy'

ffered

to Sendero

by peasants

n

different

provinces

of

Ayacucho

and

in

different

regions

of Peru.

These

peasants'perceptions

of

Sendero's

military

nd

politi-

cal

agenda

areconditioned

by

the

quitespecific

ocaland

regional xperiences

147


17/60

BULLETIN

OFLATIN

AMERICAN

RESEARCH

with,

and

knowledges

f,

the

Peruvian

tate,

national

politicalparties

and

the

capitalist

economy.

McClintock's

nalysissystematically losses

both the

complexity

f these

regionally pecific

Andean

peasantpolitical

ultures,

nd

theimportant enerational ifferencesbetweenSendero's outhful uppor-

ters

and the

peasantry'

s

a whole.61

By

eliding

he

non-peasant

that

s,

'non-organic')

rigins

and

background

of

many

of

Sendero's

militants nd

eaders,

by deleting

he

historical

ontext

in

which

peasant

political

decision-making

ccurs,

by omitting

rucial

actual

information n

the

political

geneaology

of

both

the PCP-SL

and

its

leader,

Abimael

Guzmain,

and

by

ignoring

the coercive

impact

of Sendero's

authoritarian

ilitarydeology,

McClintock onstructs

n

image

of

Sendero

Luminoso

s

an

organically

ural

peasant

movementwhich

peaks

or the

felt

economic

or 'subsistence'

needs of the Peruvian

peasantry.

Sendero's

primary

peasant

base',

she

concludes,

are 'rural mallholders

who

are

not

particularly

ctive

n

the

market'

(1984:

82).

The tenuous

historical ocumentation

or

this

assumption

boutSendero's

exclusively

uralbase and

strategy

s denied

by

the

sequence

and

patterning

of

Sendero's

military

ctions

and

by

the texts

of

PCP-SL

party

documents.

McClintock's

omission

of this factual

information

on PCP-SL's

military

campaign

elates

to

her

fifth,

and

for our

purposes

inal,

supposition:

he

'encircling' trategy

of

'classic Maoism'.

Building upon

Mao

Zedong's

military

heories,

he PCP-SL eeks

to

develop

armed

truggle

n

two inter-

related theatresof operations: he countrysideand the city.62However,

whereas

Mao,

who elaboratedhis theories

around he

particular

ocial

and

political

conditions

of

China,

privileged

rural

actions and saw the

urban

insurrection

s

a final

step

in

the

overthrowof

the old

regime,

Guzman,

whose

party

seeks

to attain

power

in

the

quite

different

context of

Peru,

conceives

of

military

ctions

n

the

city

and the

countryside

s

parallel

and

simultaneous

renas

of

military

manoeuvre.63

n

Guzman's

wn

words,

Es

una

especificacion

e

la

guerra

popular

en el Perui acerdel

campo

el teatro

principal

de

las

acciones

y

de

las

ciudades

complemento

necesario'64

According

to this vision

of

complementary

heatres

of

operations,

the

peasantry anonlybe an effectivepoliticalactor n alliancewiththeurban

proletariat

ndcan

only

act

under

he

eadership

f the

revoutionary arty

as

the

ideological

and

politicalvanguard

f the

proletariat:

The Communist

Party

of

Peru,

a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

arty

of

a

new

type, oyal

o its

principles

nd

programme,

onscious

of its

historic

mission as

the

organised

vanguard

of

the

Peruvian

proletariat,

has

assumed

ts

responsibility

o launch

he armed

struggle

o

fight

for the

seizure

of

power

by

the

working

lass

and

the

people,

and s

developing

guerrilla

warfare,

earning

rom advancesand

setbacks,

anning

more

widely heliving lamesof armed onflictandrooting hemmoredeeply

among

he

poor

peasants,principally,

nd

will

lead

in

building

evolu-

tionary

base

areas hatwill

finally

give

concrete

ormto the

triumphant

roadof

people's

war.65

This

strategy

of

guerrilla

warfare s based

on Mao

Zedong's heory

of the

cadre

party

as

'theconductor

of all

revolutionary

lasses

and

all revolution-

148


18/60

THE

NEW

CHRONICLERSOF

PERU

arygroups'.66

he

implications

f this Maoist

principle

or

the PCP-SL

s,

in

Guzman's

words,

that

el

partido

iene

caracter emasas

pero

no es de

masas.

... Nuestro

partido

esun

partido

de

militantes,

e

dirigentes,

na

maquina

de

guerra

7

This

concept

of

the

cadre

party,

whi

Documents

D Poole nuevas cronicas del peru.pdf