De Aeternitate Mundi

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De aeternitate mundiDE AETERNITATE MUNDI

byThomas Aquinas

On the Eternity of the World[1]English translation 1991, 1997 by Robert T. Miller[2]

From http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/aquinas-eternity.htmlreformated by Joseph Kenny, O.P.

Supposito, secundum fidemCatholicam, quod mundusdurationis initium habuit, dubitatiomota est, utrum potuerit semperfuisse. Cuius dubitationis ut veritasexplicetur, prius distinguendum estin quo cum adversariis convenimus,et quid est illud in quo ab eisdifferimus. Si enim intelligatur quodaliquid praeter Deum potuit semper

fuisse, quasi possit esse aliquidtamen ab eo non factum: errorabominabilis est non solum in fide,sed etiam apud philosophos, quiconfitentur et probant omne quodest quocumque modo, esse nonposse nisi sit causatum ab eo quimaxime et verissime esse habet. Siautem intelligatur aliquid semperfuisse, et tamen causatum fuisse aDeo secundum totum id quod in eo

est, videndum est utrum hoc possitstare.

Let us assume, in accordance with theCatholic faith, that the world had abeginning in time. The question stillarises whether the world could havealways existed, and to explain the truthof this matter, we should firstdistinguish where we agree with ouropponents from where we disagreewith them. If someone holds thatsomething besides God could have

always existed, in the sense that therecould be something always existing andyet not made by God, then we differwith him: such an abominable error iscontrary not only to the faith but also tothe teachings of the philosophers, whoconfess and prove that everything thatin any way exists cannot exist unless itbe caused by him who supremely andmost truly has existence. However,someone may hold that there has

always existed something that,nevertheless, had been wholly causedby God, and thus we ought todetermine whether this position istenable.

Si autem dicatur hoc esseimpossibile, vel hoc dicetur quiaDeus non potuit facere aliquid quodsemper fuerit, aut quia non potuit

fieri, etsi Deus posset facere. Inprima autem parte omnes

If it be impossible that somethingcaused by God has always existed, itwill be so either because God could notmake something that has always

existed or because such a thing couldnot be made, regardless of God's ability
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consentiunt: in hoc scilicet quodDeus potuit facere aliquid quodsemper fuerit, considerandopotentiam ipsius infinitam. Restat

igitur videre, utrum sit possibilealiquid fieri quod semper fuerit.

to make it. As to the first, all partiesagree that, in view of his infinite power,God could have made something thathas always existed.[4]It remains to be

seen, therefore, whether somethingthat has always existed can be made.

Si autem dicatur quod hoc nonpotest fieri, hoc non potest intelliginisi duobus modis, vel duas causasveritatis habere: vel propterremotionem potentiae passivae, velpropter repugnantiam intellectuum.Primo modo posset dici, antequamAngelus sit factus, non potest

Angelus fieri, quia non praeexistit adeius esse aliqua potentia passiva,cum non sit factus ex materiapraeiacente; tamen Deus poteratfacere Angelum, poterat etiamfacere ut Angelus fieret, quia fecit,et factus est. Sic ergo intelligendo,simpliciter concedendum estsecundum fidem quod non potestcreatum semper esse: quia hocponere esset ponere potentiampassivam semper fuisse: quodhaereticum est. Tamen ex hoc nonsequitur quod Deus non possitfacere ut fiat aliquid semper ens.

If such a thing cannot be made, theimpossibility will arise for one of tworeasons: either because of an absenceof a passive potentiality or because ofsome contradiction between the ideasinvolved.[5]In regard to the first, noticethat before an angel is made, we maysay, in a certain manner of speaking,

that the angel cannot be made,[6]sinceno passive potentiality precedes itsbeing, for an angel is not made frompre-existing matter. Nevertheless, Godwas able to make the angel, and hewas able to cause the angel to bemade, for God made it, and it wasmade. Therefore, if we understand"being made" or "being caused" asimplying the pre-existence of a passivepotentiality, then it should to beconceded, according to faith, thatsomething caused cannot always exist,for it would then follow that a passivepotentiality has always existed, and thisis heretical. But since a passivepotentiality need not precede in timewhatever God may make, it does notfollow that God could not have madesomething that has always existed.

Secundo modo dicitur propterrepugnantiam intellectuum aliquidnon posse fieri, sicut quod nonpotest fieri ut affirmatio et negatiosint simul vera; quamvis Deus hocpossit facere, ut quidam dicunt.Quidam vero dicunt, quod nec Deushoc posset facere, quia hoc nihilest. Tamen manifestum est quodnon potest facere ut hoc fiat, quiapositio qua ponitur esse, destruit seipsam. Si tamen ponatur quod Deus

In regard to the second, someone mayhold that something that has alwaysexisted cannot be made because sucha thing is self-contradictory, just as anaffirmation and a denial cannot bemade simultaneously true. Still, somepeople say that God can even makeself-contradictories things, while otherssay God cannot make such things, forsuch things are actually nothing.Clearly, God cannot make such thingscome to be, for the assumption that
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huiusmodi potest facere ut fiant,positio non est haeretica, quamvis,ut credo, sit falsa; sicut quodpraeteritum non fuerit, includit in se

contradictionem. Unde Augustinusin libro contra Faustum: quisquis itadicit: si omnipotens est Deus, faciatut ea quae facta sunt, facta nonfuerint: non videt hoc se dicere: siomnipotens est Deus, faciat ut eaquae vera sunt, eo ipso quo verasunt, falsa sint. Et tamen quidammagni pie dixerunt Deum possefacere de praeterito quod non fueritpraeteritum; nec fuit reputatum

haereticum.

such a thing exists immediately refutesitself. Nevertheless, if we allow thatGod can make such things come to be,the position is not heretical, though I

believe it is false, just as the propositionthat the past did not occur is false,about which Augustine says(XXVI Contra Faustumcap. 5),"Anyone who says, 'If God isomnipotent, let him make what hashappened not to have happened,' doesnot realize that he is saying, 'If God isomnipotent, let him make true thingsfalse insofar as they are true.'" [PL 42,481.] Nevertheless, certain great men

have piously maintained that God canmake past events not to havehappened, and this was not reputed tobe heretical.

Videndum est ergo utrum in hisduobus repugnantia sit intellectuum,quod aliquid sit creatum a Deo, ettamen semper fuerit. Et quidquid dehoc verum sit, non erit haereticumdicere quod hoc potest fieri a Deo utaliquid creatum a Deo semper fuerit.Tamen credo quod, si essetrepugnantia intellectuum, essetfalsum. Si autem non estrepugnantia intellectuum, non solumnon est falsum, sed etiamimpossibile: aliter esset erroneum,si aliter dicatur. Cum enim adomnipotentiam Dei pertineat utomnem intellectum et virtutem

excedat, expresse omnipotentiaeDei derogat qui dicit aliquid posseintelligi in creaturis quod a Deo fierinon possit. Nec est instantia depeccatis, quae inquantumhuiusmodi nihil sunt. In hoc ergotota consistit quaestio, utrum essecreatum a Deo secundum totamsubstantiam, et non haberedurationis principium, repugnent adinvicem, vel non.

We thus ought to determine whetherthere is any contradiction betweenthese two ideas, namely, to be made byGod and to have always existed. And,whatever may be the truth of thismatter, it will not be heretical to say thatGod can make something created byhim to have always existed, though Ibelieve that if there were acontradiction involved in asserting this,the assertion would be false. However,if there is no contradiction involved,then it is neither false nor impossiblethat God could have made somethingthat has always existed, and it will bean error to say otherwise. For, if there

is no contradiction, we ought to admitthat God could have made somethingthat has always existed, for it would beclearly derogatory to the divineomnipotence, which exceeds everythought and power, to say that wecreatures can conceive of somethingthat God is unable to make. (Nor aresins an instance to the contrary, for,considered in themselves, they arenothing.) In this, therefore, the entire

question consists: whether to be wholly


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created by God and not to have abeginning in time are contradictoryterms.

Quod autem non repugnent adinvicem, sic ostenditur. Si enimrepugnant, hoc non est nisi propteralterum duorum, vel propterutrumque: aut quia oportet ut causaagens praecedat duratione; aut quiaoportet quod non esse praecedatduratione; propter hoc quod diciturcreatum a Deo ex nihilo fieri.

That they are not contradictory can beshown as follows. If they arecontradictory, this is for one or both ofthese two reasons: either because theagent cause must precede the effect intime, or because non-being mustprecede the effect in time, for we saythat what God creates comes to be outof nothing.

Primo ostendam, quod non estnecesse ut causa agens, scilicetDeus, praecedat duratione suumcausatum, si ipse voluisset. Primosic. Nulla causa producens suumeffectum subito, necessariopraecedit duratione suum effectum.Sed Deus est causa producenseffectum suum non per motum, sedsubito. Ergo non est necessariumquod duratione praecedat effectum

suum. Prima per inductionem patetin omnibus mutationibus subitis,sicut est illuminatio et huiusmodi.Nihilominus tamen potest probariper rationem sic.

First, we should show that it is notnecessary that an agent cause, in thiscase God, precede in time that whichhe causes, if he should so will. This canbe shown in several ways. First, nocause instantaneously producing itseffect necessarily precedes the effect intime. God, however, is a cause thatproduces effects not through motion butinstantaneously. Therefore, it is notnecessary that he precede his effects in

time. The first premise is provedinductively from all instantaneouschanges, as, for example, withillumination and other such things. Butthe premise may be proved by reasonas well.

In quocumque instanti ponitur resesse, potest poni principium actioniseius, ut patet in omnibusgenerabilibus, quia in illo instanti inquo incipit ignis esse, calefacit. Sedin operatione subita, simul, immoidem est principium et finis eius,sicut in omnibus indivisibilibus. Ergoin quocumque instanti ponitur agensproducens effectum suum subito,potest poni terminus actionis suae.Sed terminus actionis simul est cumipso facto. Ergo non repugnatintellectui si ponatur causa

producens effectum suum subitonon praecedere duratione causatum

For, at whatever instant a thing exists,at that instant it can begin to act, as isclear in the case of all things that cometo be by generation: in the very instantat which there is fire, the fire heats. Butin an instantaneous action, thebeginning and the end of the action aresimultaneous, indeed identical, as isclear in the case of all indivisible things.Hence, at whatever moment an agentinstantaneously producing an effectexists, the end of its action can exist aswell. The end of the action, however, issimultaneous with the thing made.

Therefore, there is no contradiction ifwe suppose that a cause


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suum. Repugnat autem in causisproducentibus per motum effectussuos, quia oportet quod principiummotus praecedat finem eius. Et quia

homines sunt assueti considerarehuiusmodi factiones quae sunt permotus, ideo non facile capiunt quodcausa agens duratione effectumsuum non praecedat. Et inde estquod multorum inexperti ad paucarespicientes facile enuntiant.

instantaneously producing an effectdoes not precede its effect in time. Acontradiction does obtain if the causeinvolved is one that produces its effects

through motion, for the beginning of themotion precedes in time the end of themotion. Since people are accustomedto considering the type of cause thatproduces effects through motion, theydo not easily grasp that an agent causemay fail to precede its effect in time,and so, having limited experience, theyeasily make a false generalization.

Nec potest huic rationi obviare quod

Deus est causa agens pervoluntatem: quia etiam voluntas nonest necessarium quod praecedatduratione effectum suum; necagens per voluntatem, nisi per hocquod agit ex deliberatione; quodabsit ut in Deo ponamus. Praeterea.

Nor can the conclusion be avoided by

saying that God is an agent cause thatacts voluntarily, for neither the will northe voluntary agent need precede itseffect in time, unless the agent causeacts from deliberation, which we take tobe absent in God.

Causa producens totam reisubstantiam non minus potest in

producendo totam substantiam,quam causa producens formam inproductione formae; immo multomagis: quia non producit educendode potentia materiae, sicut est in eoqui producit formam. Sed aliquodagens quod producit solum formam,potest in hoc quod forma ab eoproducta sit quandocumque ipsumest, ut patet in sole illuminante. Ergomulto fortius Deus, qui producit

totam rei substantiam, potest facereut causatum suum sitquandocumque ipse est.

Further, a cause that produces thewhole substance of a thing does not, in

producing a whole substance, act in aless perfect way than does a cause thatproduces just a form in producing theform. On the contrary, it acts in a muchmore perfect way, since it does not actby educing from the potentiality ofmatter, as do causes that merelyproduce forms. However, some causesthat produce just forms are such that,whenever the cause exists, the formproduced by it exists as well, as is clear

in the case of illumination by the sun.Therefore, much more can God, whoproduces the whole substance ofthings, make something caused by himexist whenever he himself exists.

Praeterea. Si aliqua causa sit quaposita in aliquo instanti non possitponi effectus eius ab ea procedensin eodem instanti, hoc non est nisi

quia causae deest aliquid decomplemento: causa enim completa

Further, if, granted a cause, its effectdoes not immediately exist as well, thiscan only be because somethingcomplementary to that cause is lacking:

the complete cause and the thingcaused are simultaneous. God,


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et causatum sunt simul. Sed Deonunquam defuit aliquid decomplemento. Ergo causatum eiuspotest poni semper eo posito; et ita

non est necessarium quodduratione praecedat.

however, never lacks any kind ofcomplementary cause in order toproduce an effect. Therefore, at anyinstant at which God exists, so too can

his effects, and thus God need notprecede his effects in time.

Praeterea. Voluntas volentis nihildiminuit de virtute eius, et praecipuein Deo. Sed omnes solventes adrationes Aristotelis, quibus probaturres semper fuisse a Deo per hocquod idem semper facit idem, dicuntquod hoc sequeretur si non essetagens per voluntatem. Ergo et si

ponatur agens per voluntatem,nihilominus sequitur quod potestfacere ut causatum ab eo nunquamnon sit. Et ita patet quod nonrepugnat intellectui, quod dicituragens non praecedere effectumsuum duratione; quia in illis quaerepugnant intellectui, Deus nonpotest facere ut illud sit.

Further, the will of the voluntary agentin no way diminishes his power, andthis is especially true with God. But allthose who try to answer the argumentsof Aristotle (who held that somethingcaused by God had always existed,since like always makes like)[7]saythat the conclusion would follow if God

were not a voluntary agent. Therefore,allowing that God is a voluntary agent,it still follows that he can makesomething that he has made never failto exist. Thus, although God cannotmake contradictories true, we haveshown that there is no contradiction insaying that an agent cause does notprecede its effect in time.

Nunc restat videre an repugnetintellectui aliquod factum nunquamnon fuisse, propter quodnecessarium sit non esse eiusduratione praecedere, propter hocquod dicitur ex nihilo factum esse.Sed quod hoc in nullo repugnet,ostenditur per dictum Anselmi inMonologio, 8 cap., exponentisquomodo creatura dicatur facta exnihilo. Tertia, inquit, interpretatio,

qua dicitur aliquid esse factum denihilo, est cum intelligimus essequidem factum, sed non essealiquid unde sit factum. Per similemsignificationem dici videtur, cumhomo contristatus sine causa,dicitur contristatus de nihilo.Secundum igitur hunc sensum, siintelligatur quod supra conclusumest, quia praeter summamessentiam cuncta quae sunt abeadem, ex nihilo facta sunt, idest

It remains to be seen, then, whetherthere is a contradiction in saying thatsomething made has always existed,on the grounds that it may benecessary that its non-being precede itin time, for we say that it is made out ofnothing. But that there is nocontradiction here is shown by Anselmin his explanation of what it means tosay that a creature is made out ofnothing. He says (Monologioncap. 8),

"The third sense in which we can saythat something is made out of nothingis this: we understand that something ismade, but that there is not somethingfrom which it is made. In a similar way,we say that someone who is sadwithout reason is sad about nothing.We can thus say that all things, exceptthe Supreme Being, are made by himout of nothing in the sense that they arenot made out of anything, and noabsurdity results." On this
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non ex aliquo; nihil inconvenienssequetur. Unde patet quodsecundum hanc expositionem nonponitur aliquis ordo eius quod

factum est ad nihil, quasi oportueritillud quod factum est, nihil fuisse, etpostmodum aliquid esse.

understanding of the phrase "out ofnothing," therefore, no temporal priorityof non-being to being is posited, asthere would be if there were first

nothing and then later something.

Praeterea, supponatur quod ordo adnihil in praepositione importatusremaneat affirmatus, ut sit sensus:creatura facta est ex nihilo, idestfacta est post nihil: haec dictio postordinem importat absolute. Sedordo multiplex est: scilicet durationis

et naturae. Si igitur ex communi etuniversali non sequitur proprium etparticulare, non esset necessariumut propter hoc quod creatura dicituresse post nihil, prius duratione fueritnihil, et postea fuerit aliquid: sedsufficit, si prius natura sit nihil quamens; prius enim naturaliter inestunicuique quod convenit sibi in se,quam quod ex alio habetur. Esseautem non habet creatura nisi abalio; sibi autem relicta in seconsiderata nihil est: unde priusnaturaliter est sibi nihilum quamesse. Nec oportet quod propter hocsit simul nihil et ens, quia durationenon praecedit: non enim ponitur, sicreatura semper fuit, ut in aliquotempore nihil sit: sed ponitur quodnatura eius talis esset quod essetnihil, si sibi relinqueretur; ut si

dicamus aerem semper illuminatumfuisse a sole, oportebit dicere, quodaer factus est lucidus a sole. Et quiaomne quod fit, ex incontingenti fit,idest ex eo quod non contingit simulesse cum eo quod dicitur fieri;oportebit dicere quod sit factuslucidus ex non lucido, vel extenebroso; non ita quod umquamfuerit non lucidus vel tenebrosus,sed quia esset talis, si eum sibi sol

relinqueret. Et hoc expressius patet

Further, let us even suppose that thepreposition "out of" imports someaffirmative order of non-being to being,as if the proposition that the creature ismade out of nothing meant that thecreature is made after nothing. Thenthis expression "after" certainly implies

order, but order is of two kinds: order oftime and order of nature. If, therefore,the proper and the particular does notfollow from the common and theuniversal, it will not necessarily followthat, because the creature is madeafter nothing, non-being is temporallyprior to the being of the creature.Rather, it suffices that non-being beprior to being by nature. Now, whatevernaturally pertains to something in itselfis prior to what that thing only receivesfrom another. A creature does not havebeing, however, except from another,for, considered in itself, every creatureis nothing, and thus, with respect to thecreature, non-being is prior to being bynature. Nor does it follow from thecreature's always having existed that itsbeing and non-being are eversimultaneous, as if the creature always

existed but at some time nothingexisted, for the priority is not one oftime. Rather, the argument merelyrequires that the nature of the creatureis such that, if the creature were left toitself, it would be nothing. For example,if we should say that the air has alwaysbeen illuminated by the sun, it would beright to say that the air has always beenmade lucid by the sun. Thus, sinceanything that comes to be such-and-

such comes to be such-and-such from


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in stellis et orbibus quae semperilluminantur a sole.

being not such-and-such, we say thatthe air is made lucid from being non-lucid, or opaque, not because the airwas once non-lucid or opaque, but

because the air would be opaque if thesun did not illuminate it. This is clearlythe case with the stars and thosecelestial bodies that are alwaysilluminated by the sun.

Sic ergo patet quod in hoc quoddicitur, aliquid esse factum etnunquam non fuisse, non estintellectus aliqua repugnantia. Sienim esset aliqua, mirum est

quomodo Augustinus eam non vidit:quia hoc esset efficacissima via adimprobandum aeternitatem mundi,cum tamen ipse multis rationibusimpugnet aeternitatem mundi inundecimo et duodecimo de Civ. Dei,hanc etiam viam omninopraetermittit? Quinimmo videturinnuere quod non sit ibi repugnantiaintellectuum: unde dicit decimo deCiv. Dei, 31 cap., de Platonicisloquens: id quomodo intelligant,invenerunt non esse hoc, scilicettemporis, sed substitutionis initium.Sic enim, inquiunt, si pes exaeternitate semper fuisset inpulvere, semper ei subessetvestigium, quod tamen vestigium acalcante factum nemo dubitaret; necalterum altero prius esset, quamvisalterum ab altero factum esset: sic,

inquiunt, et mundus et dii in illocreati semper fuerunt, semperexistente qui fecit; et tamen factisunt. Nec unquam dicit hoc nonposse intelligi: sed alio modoprocedit contra eos. Item dicitundecimo Lib., 4 cap.: qui autem aDeo quidem mundum factumfatentur, non tamen eum temporissed suae creationis initium habere,ut modo quodam vix intelligibili

semper sit factus; dicunt quidem

Thus it is clear that there is nocontradiction in saying that somethingmade by God has always existed.Indeed, if there were somecontradiction, it would be amazing that

Augustine failed to see it, for exposingsuch a contradiction would be a mosteffective way of proving that the worldis not eternal, and although Augustineoffers many arguments against theeternity of the world in XI and XII DeCivitate Dei, he never argues that hisopponents' view is contradictory. Onthe contrary, Augustine seems to hintthat there is no contradiction involved.Thus, speaking of the Platonists, hesays (X De Civitate Deicap. 31), "Theysomehow contemplate a beginning incausation rather than a beginning intime. Imagine, they say, a foot that hasbeen in dust since eternity: a footprinthas always been beneath it, andnobody would doubt that the footprintwas made by the pressure of the foot.Though neither is prior in time to theother, yet one is made by the other.

Likewise, they say, the world and thegods in it have always existed, just ashe who made them always existed; yetnevertheless, they were made." [PL 41,311] Nor does Augustine ever say thatthis cannot be understood; rather, heproceeds against the Platonists in atotally different way. He says (XI DeCivitate Deicap. 4), "Those, however,who admit that the world was made byGod but nevertheless want to hold that

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aliquid et cetera. Causa autemquare est vix intelligibile, tacta est inprima ratione.

but not in time, so that, in somescarcely intelligible way, it has alwaysbeen made by God, think that they aredefending God against a charge of

casual rashness." [PL 41, 319][8]Theirposition is difficult to understand,however, only for the reason givenabove in the first argument.

Mirum est etiam quomodonobilissimi philosophorum hancrepugnantiam non viderunt. Dicitenim Augustinus in eodem Lib. cap.5, contra illos loquens de quibus inpraecedenti auctoritate facta est

mentio: cum his agimus qui etDeum corporum et omniumnaturarum quae non sunt quod ipse,creatorem nobiscum sentiunt; dequibus postea subdit: istiphilosophos ceteros nobilitate etauctoritate vicerunt. Et hoc etiampatet diligenter consideranti dictumeorum qui posuerunt mundumsemper fuisse, quia nihilominusponunt eum a Deo factum, nihil dehac repugnantia intellectuumpercipientes. Ergo illi qui tamsubtiliter eam percipiunt, soli sunthomines, et cum illis oritur sapientia.

How remarkable it would be that eventhe most noble of philosophers failed tosee a contradiction in the idea thatsomething made by God has alwaysexisted. Speaking against thePlatonists, Augustine says (XI De

Civitate Deicap. 5), "Here we arecontending with those who agree withus that God is the Creator of all bodiesand all natures except himself," [PL 41,320] and then, again about thePlatonists, he adds (XI De CivitateDeicap. 5), "These philosopherssurpassed the rest in nobility andauthority." [PL 41, 321] Augustine saidthis even after diligently consideringtheir position that the world has alwaysexisted, for they nevertheless thoughtthat it was made by God, and they sawno contradiction between these twoideas. Therefore, those who so subtlyperceive the contradiction are solitarymen, and with these does wisdomarise.[9]

Sed quia quaedam auctoritatesvidentur pro eis facere, ideo

ostendendum est quod praestanteis debile fulcimentum. Dicit enimDamascenus I Lib. 8 cap.: nonaptum natum est quod ex non entead esse deducitur coaeternum esseei quod sine principio est et semperest. Item Hugo de sancto Victore inprincipio Lib. sui de sacramentisdicit: ineffabilis omnipotentiae virtusnon potuit aliud praeter se haberecoaeternum, quo faciendo iuvaretur.

Still, since certain authorities seem toargue on the side of such men, we

ought to show that they basethemselves on a weak foundation.Damascene says (I De FideOrthodoxacap. 8), "What is made outof nothing is by nature not such that it iscoeternal to what has no causalprinciple and always exists." [PG 94,814B] Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor says(De SacramentisI-1 cap. 1), "Theineffable omnipotent power could nothave anything coeternal beyond itselfthat would help it in making." [PL 176,
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187B]

Sed harum auctoritatum et similiumintellectus patet per hoc quod dicit

Boetius in ult. de consolatione: nonrecte quidam, cum audiunt visumPlatoni mundum hunc nec habuisseinitium temporis, nec habiturumesse defectum, hoc modo conditoriconditum mundum fieri coaeternumputant. Aliud enim est perinterminabilem vitam duci, quodmundo Plato tribuit; aliudinterminabilis vitae totam paritercomplexam esse praesentiam, quod

divinae mentis esse propriummanifestum est. Unde patet quodetiam non sequitur quod quidamobiiciunt, scilicet quod creaturaaequaretur Deo in duratione; etquod per hunc modum dicatur, quodnullo modo potest esse aliquidcoaeternum Deo, quia scilicet nihilpotest esse immutabile nisi solusDeus, patet per hoc quod dicitAugustinus, in libro XII de Civ. Dei,cap. 15: tempus, quoniammutabilitate transcurrit, aeternitatiimmutabili non potest essecoaeternum. Ac per hoc etiam siimmortalitas Angelorum non transitin tempore, nec praeterita est quasiiam non sit, nec futura quasinondum sit; tamen eorum motus,quibus tempora peraguntur, exfuturo in praeteritum transeunt. Et

ideo creatori, in cuius motudicendum non est vel fuisse quodiam non sit, vel futurum esse quodnondum sit, coaeterni esse nonpossunt. Similiter etiam dicit octavosuper Gen.: quia omninoincommutabilis est illa naturaTrinitatis, ob hoc ita aeterna est ut eialiquid coaeternum esse non possit.Consimilia verba dicit in undecimoconfessionum.

But the position of these and similarauthorities is made clear by Boethius,

who says (V De Consolationeprosa 6),"When some people hear that Platothought this world neither had abeginning in time nor will ever have anend, they mistakenly conclude that thecreated world is coeternal with theCreator. However, to be led through theendless life Plato attributes to the worldis one thing; to embrace simultaneouslythe whole presence of endless life isquite another, and it is this latter that is

proper to the divine mind." [PL 63,859B] Thus it does not follow, as somepeople object, that a creature, even if ithad always existed, would be equal toGod in duration. For, if "eternal" beunderstood in this sense, nothing can inany way be coeternal with God, fornothing but God is immutable. AsAugustine says (XII De Civitate Deicap.15),[10]"Time, since it passes away byits mutability, cannot be coeternal withimmutable eternity. Thus, even if theimmortality of the angels does not passaway in time (it is neither past, as if itdid not exist now; nor is it future, as if itdid not yet exist), nevertheless, theangels' motions, by which moments oftime are carried along from the futureinto the past, pass away. Therefore,angels cannot be coeternal with theCreator, in whose motion there is

nothing which has been that is not now,nor anything which will later be that isnot already." [PL 41, 364-365] Likewise,Augustine says (VIII Super Genesis adLitteramcap. 23), "Since the nature ofthe Trinity is wholly unchangeable, it iseternal in such a way that nothing canbe coeternal with it," [PL 34, 389] andhe uses words to the same effect inXI Confessionumas well.[11]
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Addunt etiam pro se rationes quasetiam philosophi tetigerunt et eassolverunt; inter quas illa est difficiliorquae est de infinitate animarum:

quia si mundus semper fuit,necesse est modo infinitas animasesse. Sed haec ratio non est adpropositum, quia Deus mundumfacere potuit sine hominibus etanimabus, vel tunc homines facerequando fecit, etiam si totummundum fecisset ab aeterno; et sicnon remanerent post corporaanimae infinitae. Et praeterea nonest adhuc demonstratum, quod

Deus non possit facere ut sintinfinita actu.

Those who try to prove that the worldcould not have always existed evenadduce arguments that thephilosophers have considered and

solved. Chief among these is theargument from the infinity of souls: ifthe world had always existed, thesepeople argue, there would necessarilybe an infinite number of souls. But thisargument is not to the point, for Godcould have made the world withoutmaking men or creatures with souls, orhe could have made men when in facthe did make them, even if he had madethe rest of the world from eternity. In

either case, an infinite number of soulswould not remain after the bodies hadpassed away. Furthermore, it has notyet been demonstrated that God cannotcause an infinite number of things toexist simultaneously.

Aliae etiam rationes sunt a quarumresponsione supersedeo adpraesens, tum quia eis alibiresponsum est, tum quia quaedamearum sunt adeo debiles quod suadebilitate contrariae parti videnturprobabilitatem afferre.

There are other arguments adduced aswell, but I refrain from answering themat present, either because they havebeen suitably answered elsewhere, orbecause they are so weak that theirvery weakness lends probability to theopposing view.

NOTES:

[1]This translation follows the Leonine Edition of Aquinas's works, vol. 43 Sancti Thomae DeAquino Opera Omnia85-89 (Rome 1976).

[2]All persons are licensed to reproduce this translation and the footnotes hereto for personal oreducational purposes, provided that the notice of copyright above and this notice are included intheir respective entireties in all copies. This license includes reproduction by a commercial entityengaged in the business of providing copying services if such reproduction is made at thebehest of a person who would otherwise be licensed under the preceding sentence toreproduce this translation for personal or educational purposes.

[3]Aquinas means that the impossibility may be thought to arise either on the part of God, as ifhe were unable to make such a thing for lack of power, or on the part of the thing, as if such athing could not be made because it lacks a pre-existing passive potentiality or because it is self-contradictory.
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[4]That is, on the condition that such a thing can be made. In other words, all sides agree thatthe impossibility of something having always existed, if such there be, does not arise from somelack of power in God.

[5]That is, between "always having existed" and "having been made."

[6]In the sense that there was nothing existing before the angel that would become the angel,as the brass to be made into a statue exists before the statue and becomes the statue.

[7]See II De Generatione et Corruptionecap. 10, 336a 27-28.

[8]PL 41, 319. In the Leonine Edition, Aquinas does not quote the predicate of the independentclause; it does appear in the Parma Edition, and I have chosen to supply it.

[9]Said ironically, the sentence is quite out of character for Aquinas, who courteouslyconducted the bitterest disputations. Here he is probably alluding to the Vulgate text of Job12:2, in which Job says, "You are solitary men, and with you wisdom shall die." The differencebetween "arises" (oritur) and "shall die" (morietur) is small.

[10]So in Aquinas. The chapter divisions in De Civitate Deiare, at this point, somewhat unclear,and, as the editors of the Leonine Edition suggest, the quoted text is probably from cap. 16. Inany event, the quoted material appears at PL 41, 364-365.

[11]See XI Confessionumcap. 30. PL 32, 826.
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