中国海洋法学评论 - Xiamen University...中国海洋法学评论 2013 年卷第2 期总第18 期顾问委员会（按姓氏字母排序）陈宏远，中山大学，高雄

中国海洋法学评论China Oceans Law Review

2013 年卷第 2 期总第 18 期

（Volume 2013 Number 2）

（香港）中国评论文化有限公司出版

(Hong Kong) China Review Culture Limited

中国海洋法学评论2013 年卷第 2 期总第 18 期

顾问委员会（按姓氏字母排序）

陈宏远，中山大学，高雄季卫东，上海交通大学，上海

莫世健，澳门大学，澳门王曦，上海交通大学，上海

徐崇利，厦门大学，厦门叶子良，香港理工大学，香港

曾华群，厦门大学，厦门

编辑委员会

Erik Franckx，自由大学，比利时高之国，国家海洋局，北京

黄硕琳，上海海洋大学，上海吕文正，国家海洋局二所，杭州

Ted L. McDorman，维多利亚大学，加拿大 John N. Moore，维吉尼亚大学，美国

吴士存，中国南海研究院，海口张克宁，厦门大学，厦门

张新平，世新大学，台北周忠海，中国政法大学，北京

邹克渊，中央兰开夏大学，英国

编辑部

主编：傅崐成

经理：邓云成

执行副主编：赵菊芬

副主编：

高健军，中国政法大学，北京高圣惕，台湾海洋大学，基隆

何丽新，厦门大学，厦门李红云，北京大学，北京

魏丹，澳门大学，澳门薜雄志，厦门大学，厦门

张水锴，中山大学，高雄张新军，清华大学，北京

朱玲，香港理工大学，香港

资深编辑：

陈辉萍，厦门大学，厦门傅宗玲，格信律师事务所，美国

黄嘉美，台湾联合法律事务所，台北张相君，福州大学，福州

赵亚娟，华南理工大学，广州钟玉嘉，中山大学，高雄

编辑：常虹韩旭林蓁徐鹏

副编辑：江丹潘金梅任建科张维强

英文编辑：

Tom Friedenbach Arpita Goswami Joshua Whittingham

Sherra Wong 谢红月

CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEWVolume 2013 Number 2

ADVISORY COMMITTEE（In Alphabetical Order of Surnames）

CHEN Hongyuan, Sun Yat-sen University (Kaohsiung Taiwan)JI Weidong, Shanghai Jiao Tong UniversityMO Shijian, University of MacauWANG Xi, Shanghai Jiao Tong University XU Chongli, Xiamen UniversityT L YIP, The Hong Kong Polytechnic UniversityZENG Huaqun, Xiamen University

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

CHANG Shinping, Shih Hsin UniversityErik Franckx, Vrije Universiteit BrusselGAO Zhiguo, State Oceanic Administration, PRCHUANG Shuolin, Shanghai Marine UniversityLYU Wenzheng, State Oceanic Administration Second Institute, PRCTed L. McDorman, University of VictoriaJohn N. Moore, University of Virginia WU Shicun, South China National Institute for South China Sea StudiesZHANG Kening, Xiamen UniversityZHOU Zhonghai, China University of Political Science and LawZOU Keyuan, University of Central Lancashire

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-Chief: Kuen-chen FU Manager: DENG YunchengExecutive Deputy Chief Editor: ZHAO JufenDeputy Chief Editors: CHANG Shui-Kai, Sun Yat-sen University (Kaohsiung Taiwan)GAO Jianjun, China University of Political Science and LawMichael Sheng-ti GAU, Taiwan Ocean UniversityHE Lixin, Xiamen UniversityLI Hongyun, Peking UniversityWEI Dan, University of MacauXUE Xiongzhi, Xiamen UniversityZHANG Xinjun, Tsinghua UniversityZHU Ling, The Hong Kong Polytechnic UniversitySenior Editors: CHEN Huiping, Xiamen University CHUNG Yu-chia, Sun Yat-sen University (Kaohsiung Taiwan)Tzung-ling FU, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLPJamie Jia-mei HUANG, Huang & PartnersZHANG Xiangjun, Fuzhou UniversityZHAO Yajuan, South China University of TechnologyEditors: CHANG Hong HAN Xu LIN Zhen XU PengAssociate Editors:JIANG Dan PAN Jinmei REN Jianke ZHANG Weiqiang Editors (English):Tom Friedenbach Arpita Goswami Joshua Whittingham

Sherra Wong XIE Hongyue

卷首语

本期《中国海洋法学评论》开篇即重点关注了东海问题。

2012 年 9 月，日本单方面国有化钓鱼岛，拒绝承认“争端和搁置争端默契”的存在。学者李玉玲分析了在此问题上中日两国主权争端的关键点：日本在主张钓鱼岛为无主之地时，中国是否已拥有历史性主权；中国是否是在 1895 年《马关条约》中将群岛割让出去；日本签署接受《波茨坦公告》的投降书与《旧金山和约》中哪份文件更适用于解决该问题。据本文分析，在领土争端的国际法和国际判例法规定下，中国对钓鱼岛的主权主张更强有力。

韩国于 2012 年 12 月向大陆架界限委员会递交了其在东海的 200 海里以外大陆架外部界限的划界案，比其在 2009 年提交的“初步信息”的主张范围大大扩展。学者丘君、张海文推测，韩国划界案得到审议的可能性很小，但该划界案在客观上反映出中、韩在东海外大陆架问题上的合作立场，增强了中国关于东海大陆架自然延伸直至冲绳海槽的主张，同时也加大了未来解决东海大陆架划界问题的复杂性。

自日本外务省片面宣布日本 200 海里以外大陆架的申请获得了大陆架界限委员会的批准以来，关于其划界案涉冲之鸟礁区块的争论就一直备受国际社会关注。2012 年 5 月 15 日和 6 月 3 日在联合国网站上公布的委员会第 29 届会议主席声明和日本划界案建议摘要，并不认可日本依据冲之鸟礁主张的外大陆架。学者方银霞、唐勇、付洁对该建议摘要作了全文解读，以便大家全面了解日本的划界主张和委员会的审议结果。

同样作为对世界航运而言至关重要，或将产生重大作用的马六甲和新加坡海峡与北极，本期也收录了三篇探讨相关法律政策和制度的文章。

俄罗斯作为北极的区域内大国，其现有的大部分航行规则为在北极航行的船舶和船员规定了严格的要求，旨在确保航行安全并保护北极环境。俄罗斯学者 Dremliuga Roman 讨论了俄罗斯在北极的海洋法律、政策和航行规则的发展。

而美国学者 Joshua Owens 分析了北冰洋的法律地位，虽然其不符合半闭海的定义，但却与半闭海有类似的属性，存在特殊需求，因此主张（对闭海和半闭海制度）进行必要变更，并将变更之后的类似制度合理地适用

卷首语 1

于北冰洋。马六甲和新加坡海峡是世界上最重要海上通道中的两个，从概念上来

说，《联合国海洋法公约》的过境通行制度禁止对过境船舶征收任何形式的通行费，但这种制度也令毗邻这些繁忙航道的国家处境困难，尤其是在保护海峡海洋环境方面。马来西亚学者 Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli 探讨了若将马六甲和新加坡海峡指定为特别敏感海域，引入通行费征收制度的可行性和实用性问题，以及实施中可能引起的法律和政治影响。

最后，有关海商法和航海人才教育方面的问题，本期也有所收录。在过去的一个世纪里，国际航运界在国际层面上关于使用或滥用提单

下契约自由的相关法规管制发展过程，主要包含三个共存的公约，即《海牙规则》、《海牙维斯比规则》和《汉堡规则》，以及最近通过、但尚未生效的《鹿特丹规则》。学者陈梁的文章概述了这一发展情况，并简单介绍了中国法中的这一相关问题。

导致航海高级人才教育一直处于失衡与滞后的原因，既有缺乏有远见、有魄力的海事教育与人才培育政策的定位，也有市场兴衰和航运及造船科技的交互影响。台湾地区航运专家学者陈彦宏围绕“船多人少”与“船少人多”二个失衡状况下，船员、航运市场、培训体系三者间相生相变的状况，并试图思考中国大陆与中国台湾这二大国际航运实体未来航海高级人才教育的方向。

面对船舶业快速发展与资金来源有限性之间的矛盾，船舶融资途径迫切需要创新。夹层融资是介于股权与债权之间的“夹层”，兼具两者的性质特征，具有独特的灵活性及契合性。学者汪若男主要关注两种情况：建造中船舶可以融合适用夹层贷款模式，各方当事人以借贷关系和抵押担保关系维系利益；运营船舶可采取夹层贷款或优先股模式开展夹层融资。

此外，本刊已与 William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 公司签订合作协议，

HeinOnline 数据库将着手收录《中国海洋法学评论》全部论文，该数据库在美国乃至全球均享有盛名。此次收录将进一步扩大本刊的影响力，尤其是为海外学术界所熟知，这也是我们施行中英全文双语对照的初衷。迄今为止，本刊内容已经被收入在 Westlaw、万律、中国知网、北大法宝、台湾

华艺数位、维普、超星法源、HeinOnline 等数据库内，欢迎读者们多加利用。

编辑部谨识

中国海洋法学评论（2009 年卷第 2 期）2

EDITOR’S NOTE

The current Issue of China Oceans Law Review starts with three articles th-at focus on the East China Sea.

In September 2012, Japan unilaterally nationalized Diaoyu Dao and refus-ed to acknowledge the common understanding that a dispute, and an agreement to shelve the dispute, existed. Ivy Lee analyzes the critical points of contention with respect to China’s and Japan’s sovereignty claims: whether China had his-torical sovereignty at the time Japan claimed Diaoyu Dao to be terra nullius; whether China ceded the island group in the 1895 Maguan Treaty; and whether Japan’s signed Instrument of Surrender accepting the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration or the San Francisco Peace Treaty is better suited to resolve the dis-pute. This paper concludes that China has the stronger claim under the precepts of international law and case law governing territorial disputes.

In December 2012, the Republic of Korea (Korea) made a submission on the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the East China Sea to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Compared with its Preliminary Information delivered in 2009, the area of the extended continental shelf claimed in the 2012 Submission was markedly larger. QIU Jun and ZHANG Haiwen speculate that, although Korea’s Submission has little chance of being considered by the CLCS, it reflects Korea’s position of co-operating with China on the extended continental shelf issue in the East ChinaSea, and buttresses China’s claim that the East China Sea shelf extends natural-ly to the Okinawa Trough. However, the Submission also complicates the conti-nental shelf delimitation issue in the area.

Since Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs unilaterally announced that Ja-pan’s submission to delimit the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles was approved by the CLCS, the part of the submission involving the region based on Oki-no-Tori Shima has attracted attention in the internation-al community. But in fact, the Statement by the Chairperson of CLCS on the 29th session of meetings (published on the UN website on 15 May 2012) and the Summary of Recommendations of the CLCS in Regard to the Submission

EDITOR'S NOTE 3

Made by Japan (published on the UN website on 3 June 2012) did not agree with Japan’s claims of an outer continental shelf based on Oki-no-Tori Shima.FANG Yinxia, TANG Yong and FU Jie provide a comprehensive analysis of the CLCS’s Summary of Recommendations, so that the reader can gain a thorough understanding of Japan’s delimitation claims and the results of the CLCS’s deli-berations.

Cognizant of the vital roles being or to be played by the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the Arctic in international shipping, this Issue includes three papers exploring the related legal policies and regimes.

Russia is a large country in the Arctic region. A significant number of itsnavigation rules establish strict mandates for vessels and crews that pass through the Arctic. These rules aim to ensure navigation safety and protect the Arcticenvironment. Dremliuga Roman, from Russia, discusses the development of Ru-ssian maritime law, policy, and navigation rules in the Arctic.

Joshua Owens, from the United States, analyzes the legal status of the Arc-tic Ocean: while the Arctic Ocean may not fit the definition of a semi-enclosed sea, it nevertheless has properties that are similar to one. It also has its own par-ticular demands. Therefore, an analogous system (the system defining enclosed and semi-enclosed seas) could be applied mutatis mutandis in the Arctic Ocean in a reasonable manner.

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are two of the world’s most signifi-cant maritime chokepoints. Conceptually, the transit passage regime provided inthe UNCLOS prohibits the imposition of tolls in any form on ships in transit. This regime, however, creates a difficult situation for the States bordering these busy waterways, particularly in the area of marine environmental protection. Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, from Malaysia, discusses the question of the via-bility and practicability of the application of a toll-levying scheme if the Straitsof Malacca and Singapore were designated as Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas,and the potential legal and political implications arising from the implementa-tion of the scheme.

This Issue concludes with discussions on maritime law and the education of maritime professionals.

In the last century, the international shipping community has witnessed the development of international legislative control over the use or the abuse of the freedom of contract under bills of lading. This international legislative control is mainly embodied in three co-existing conventions: the Hague Rules, the Hag-

China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2013 No. 2)4

ue-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules, followed by the recently-passed, butstill unimplemented, Rotterdam Rules. CHEN Liang’s paper is a brief overviewof these developments, and also includes a snapshot of a related issue underChinese law.

The education of senior maritime professionals has been conducted in a backward and unbalanced manner year after year. This is due to the absence of afar-sighted maritime education and personnel training policy and the interac-tions between market fluctuations and shipping technology. Solomon Yang-Hong CHEN, a shipping expert from China Taiwan, focuses on the relationships among seafarers, the shipping market, and the existing training system under two types of unbalanced circumstances: “an excess supply of seafarer labor relative to the demand for ships”, and “a shortage in the supply of seafarer labor relative to the demand for ships”. He then reflects on the direction that China Mainland and China Taiwan, two major international shipping entities, should take in the training of future senior maritime professionals.

The conflict between the rapid development of the shipping industry and the limited sources of financing requires innovation in financing instruments. Mezzanine finance is a type of intermediate capital that has features of both equity and debt, making it uniquely flexible and compatible with many types of instruments. WANG Ruonan maintains that ship finance may be conducted in two ways: mezzanine loans may be used for ships under construction, where the interests of the parties are linked by a debtor–creditor relationship and a collateral relationship; and mezzanine loans or preferred equity may be adopted as methods of mezzanine finance for operational ships.

China Oceans Law Review has signed a cooperation agreement with Wil-liam S. Hein & Co., Inc. All of COLR’s articles will be included in the Hein-Online database, which enjoys an excellent reputation in the United States and the world. These efforts will expand the influence of this Journal, especially inacademia overseas. This was also our original motivation for publishing our articles in both Chinese and English. To date, COLR’s articles have been inclu-ded in several digital databases, such as Westlaw, Westlaw China, CNKI, Law-infochina.com, Airiti, Cqvip, Lawy.com.cn and HeinOnline. We hope the read-ers will find these resources useful.

COLR Editorial

EDITOR'S NOTE 5

目录

卷首语

论文国际法下钓鱼岛主权争端的评估 ……………………………………李玉玲（1）

国际法下钓鱼岛主权争端的评估（英文）…………………………李玉玲（31）

韩国东海部分划界案的特点和影响………………………丘君张海文（73）

韩国东海部分划界案的特点和影响（英文）…………… 丘君张海文（82）

日本划界案大陆架界限委员会建议摘要解读…方银霞唐勇付洁（96）

日本划界案大陆架界限委员会建议摘要

解读（英文）………………………………方银霞唐勇付洁（110）

北海航线航行的法律规制 …………………………… Dremliuga Roman（130）

北海航线航行的法律规制（英文）……………………Dremliuga Roman（139）

在用于国际航行的海峡实施成本回收机制的法律可行性：基于马六甲

和新加坡海峡的研究…………………Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli（153）

在用于国际航行的海峡实施成本回收机制的法律可行性：基于马六甲

和新加坡海峡的研究（英文）……… Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli（170）

闭海和半闭海制度

——北冰洋是半闭海吗？……………………………Joshua Owens（193）

闭海和半闭海制度

——北冰洋是半闭海吗？（英文）……………………Joshua Owens（204）

提单下的契约自由

——相关国际立法的发展和中国法中的一个

特殊问题…………………………………………………陈梁（219）

提单下的契约自由

——相关国际立法的发展和中国法中的一个

特殊问题（英文）……………………………………… 陈梁（225）

失衡滞后的航海高级人才教育……………………………………陈彦宏（234）

失衡滞后的航海高级人才教育（英文）……………………………陈彦宏（245）

船舶夹层融资活动中的法律关系 …………………………………汪若男（262）

船舶夹层融资活动中的法律关系（英文）…………………………汪若男（278）

目录 1

新发展与新文献IMO 为保护船东、经营人和船长免受几内亚湾区域内

海盗威胁的临时指南…………………………………………………（302）

国际海底管理局第 19 届会议决议与文件精选 …………………………（304）

关于修改《中华人民共和国船舶及其有关作业活动

污染海洋环境防治管理规定》的决定………………………………（306）

关于修改《中华人民共和国船舶油污损害

民事责任保险实施办法》的决定……………………………………（307）

关于修改《中华人民共和国国际海运条例实施细则》的决定 …………（308）

海洋生态损害评估技术指南（试行）…………………………………… （325）

海域评估技术指引 ………………………………………………………… （336）

附录《中国海洋法学评论》稿约 ………………………………………………（351）

短期访问学者招聘…………………………………………………………（353）


Table of Contents

Editor’s Note

ArticlesCompeting Claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands under International Law: A Critical Evaluation (Chinese)………………………………… Ivy Lee（1）Competing Claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands under International Law: A Critical Evaluation ………………………………………… Ivy Lee（31）Partial Submission Made by the Republic of Korea to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Review (Chinese) ……………………………………………QIU Jun ZHANG Haiwen（73）Partial Submission Made by the Republic of Korea to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Review ……………………………………………QIU Jun ZHANG Haiwen（82）Summary of Recommendations by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf with Regard to Japan’s Submission: A Commentary (Chinese)………FANG Yinxia TANG Yong FU Jie（96）Summary of Recommendations by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf with Regard to Japan’s Submission: A Commentary ……………… FANG Yinxia TANG Yong FU Jie（110）Legal Regulation of Navigation through the Northern Sea Route (Chinese) …………………………………………………… Dremliuga Roman（130）Legal Regulation of Navigation through the Northern Sea Route …………………………………………………… Dremliuga Roman（139）The Legal Feasibility of the Imposition of a Cost-recovery Mechanism in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Chinese) …Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli（153）The Legal Feasibility of the Imposition of a Cost-recovery Mechanism in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore …………… Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli（170）Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas: Does the Arctic Count? (Chinese) …………………………………………………………Joshua Owens（193）

Table of Contents 3

Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas: Does the Arctic Count? …………………………………………………………Joshua Owens（204）Bills of Lading’s Freedom of Contract: with Special Reference to the Development of the International Legislation and to a Special Issue under the Chinese Law (Chinese)………………………CHEN Liang（219）Bills of Lading’s Freedom of Contract: with Special Reference to the Development of the International Legislation and to a Special Issue under the Chinese Law …………………………………CHEN Liang（225）On the Unbalanced and Backward Education for Senior Maritime Professionals in China (Chinese)………………………Solomon Yang-Hong CHEN（234）On the Unbalanced and Backward Education for Senior Maritime Professionals in China…………………………………Solomon Yang-Hong CHEN（245）The Legal Relationships of Parties Involved in Mezzanine Finance in the Shipping Industry (Chinese) …………………… WANG Ruonan（262）The Legal Relationships of Parties Involved in Mezzanine Finance in the Shipping Industry ……………………………… WANG Ruonan（278）

Recent Developments and DocumentsInterim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for Protection against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Region …………………………（302）International Seabed Authority: Selected Decision and Documents of the Nineteenth Session…………………………………………………（304）Decision Concerning the Revision of Administrative Provisions of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Marine Environmental Pollution by Vessels and Their Operations……（306）Decision Concerning the Revision of Measures of the People's Republic of China for the Implementation of Civil Liability Insurance for Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage ……………………………（307）

Decision Concerning the Revision of Implementation Rules for the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on International Ocean Shipping…（308）Technical Guidelines for Marine Ecological Damages Assessment (Trial)… （325）Technical Guidelines for Assessment of Sea Area………………………… （336）

AppendixChina Oceans Law Review Call For Papers ……………………………… （352）Short-term Visiting Scholar Recruitment ………………………………… （354）


国际法下钓鱼岛主权争端的评估 1

国际法下钓鱼岛主权争端的评估

李玉玲 *

内容摘要：中国和日本对东海一群岛屿和露出水面的岩礁都宣称拥有主权，中国称之为钓鱼岛或钓鱼台，日本称之为尖阁诸岛。2012 年之前，两国达成默契，同意搁置主权问题，留待日后解决，因此几乎没有爆发过激烈的冲突。然而，2012 年 9 月，日本单方面国有化该岛链的 3 个岛屿，拒绝承认争端和搁置争端默契的存在。目前，日本制造强大舆论，声称基于国际法，中国对这些岛屿的主权主张很薄弱。随着这股舆论甚嚣尘上，尤其是在西方，无论争端最终是否会提交国际仲裁，评估中国和日本主权主张的相对实力变得非常重要。本文分析了两国主权争端的关键点，探讨两国谁更有权利拥有主权。关键点是：日本在主张钓鱼岛为无主之地时，中国是否已拥有历史性主权；中国是否是在 1895 年《马关条约》中将群岛割让出去；以及日本签署接受《波茨坦公告》的投降书与《旧金山和约》，哪份文件更适用于解决该主权争端问题。据本文分析，在领土争端的国际法和国际判例法规定下，中国对钓鱼岛的主权主张更强有力。日本有效控制的主张则有很大问题，而将中国的动机归责于对潜在油气资源储备的渴望也同样适用于日本。中国更重视该群岛的原因可能是：在美国“重返亚洲”政策和日本首相安倍晋三公然意图修改日本和平宪法的背景下，该群岛的战略地位能确保中国沿海防御和海上安全。

关键词：钓鱼岛钓鱼台领土争端主权主张

一、冲突的序幕：：钓鱼岛国有化

2012 年 9 月，日本从“琦玉县土地所有者手中购买”钓鱼岛中的 3 个岛屿并

将其国有化的举动，使中国和日本之间的主权争端再度燃起，并迅速升级。争端

*　李玉玲教授，美国洛杉矶加利福尼亚大学社会学博士，现在致力于为日本帝国军队在二战期间犯下的反人类罪行的受害者主持正义，同时也对当代中日关系很感兴趣。电子邮箱：[email protected]。感谢威廉·安德伍德博士对本文的审阅、评论和校订，感谢陈婉秋女士为本文提供了一些很难搜集的参考文献。

© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

中国海洋法学评论（2013 年卷第 2期）2

已经达到在公海或岛屿周围空域的任何事故均可能引发两国军事对抗的程度。而

这次双方似乎都没有缓解争端的意愿。

争端中的群岛由 5 个岛屿和 3 块露出水面的礁石组成，中国称之为钓鱼岛，

日本称之为尖阁诸岛。这些岛屿是否适合人类居住仍有争议。其中最大的岛屿中

文称之为钓鱼屿/岛或钓鱼台，日本称之为鱼钓岛，1 该岛陆地面积为 4.3 平方公

里，岛上淡水供应有限，除非有其他外来补给，否则很难建立永久性的住处。

中国声称对钓鱼岛拥有历史性主权。2 中国认为这些岛屿是在 1895 年的《马

关条约》中割让给日本的，因此，基于中国与盟军在第二次世界大战期间的各种协

议，以及日本于 1945 年签订的投降书中的条款，这些岛屿应该归还给中国。

然而，日本声称从 1884 年所谓古贺辰四郎的发现开始，经过 10 年调查研究，

发现该群岛是无主之地。日本内阁于 1895 年第一次中日战争中，即《马关条约》

签署约 3 个月前，并吞了其中 2 个岛。第二次世界大战后，根据 1951 年的《旧金

山和约》，美国接管了包括钓鱼岛在内的岛链所组成的区域，中华人民共和国和台

湾当局都不是该条约的签署方，中华人民共和国从一开始就公开抗议该条约的合

法性。

20 世纪 70 年代爆发了第一次争端，当时台湾当局是中国在联合国的代表，

其发现《归还冲绳协议》将钓鱼岛移交给日本时十分惊愕。美国在面临来自台湾

当局的压力，并希望与中华人民共和国建交的背景下妥协了，于 1971 年宣布，只

移交群岛的行政控制权给日本，而非主权。但同时，美国肯定了钓鱼岛处于《美日

安保条约》第 5 条军事保护之下，美国的这一立场延续至今。自 1972 年以来，日

本一直拥有该群岛的实际行政控制权。

1968 年，即 1972 年《归还冲绳协定》4 年前，在钓鱼岛周围的海底发现了大

概是世界上最大的潜在油气储备之一，日本称这一发现正是中国在沉默了数十年

之后又提出主权主张的原因。

钓鱼岛主权争端被注入了以美国为主导的强大舆论，指控中国是目前争端的

挑衅者，完全无视日本不顾中国的严正警告，企图国有化 3 个岛屿的事实。从中

国的角度来说，日本的言行违反了两国于 1972 年达成并在 1978 年重申的搁置争

议的默契。

因此，中国开始挑战日本对岛屿的实际控制权，派遣海监船和飞机到钓鱼岛

周围开展巡逻和执法任务，正如日本多年来的做法一样。日本严厉指责中国侵入

1　本文使用钓鱼岛这一名词来表示群岛或由5个小岛和3块露出水面的礁石构成的组群。当涉及单独岛屿时，则使用钓鱼屿或钓鱼台、以及鱼钓岛等名称。

2　笔者认为只有一个中国。中国台湾和中国大陆都是中国不可分割的组成部分。因此，本文在讨论两方（对外）对钓鱼岛的主张相同时，使用“中国”一词代表两者；当不同时期，例如在联合国的官方代表政府不同，或两方主张不同，需要单独提及时，则使用中国大陆或北京政府，以及中国台湾或台湾当局。


其领空及领海，但是很少有西方学者肯用心指出，领空及领海源于该区域毋庸置

疑的主权，有主权争端时，领空和领海的问题便不存在。

为了缓解紧张局势，西方学者认为双方应该提交国际法院解决争端。日本方

面提出异议，表示其实际控制这些岛屿，不应该是主动出击的一方。3 然而，很少

有人了解日本只接受国际法院基于“1958 年 9 月 15 日及之后发生无法用其他方

式和平解决的争端”的强制管辖。4 因为大部分支持中国主权的证据发生在 1958年之前，即使中国接受国际法院的强制管辖，这一争端也极不可能走上国际法院，

国际法院也很难作出判决。5

还有一些日本政客将中国不愿交由国际法庭解决争端归因于中国的主权主

张缺乏可靠的法律依据，6 这助长了中国在任何国际法裁决下都将失败的炒作。

鉴于这些占主导地位的西方和日本言论，本文将对中国与日本的主权争端提出批

判性评估。根据国际法，到底哪一个国家更有权利拥有主权？

二、钓鱼岛主权是历史性主权

还是源于占领无主之地的主权？

中国声称对钓鱼岛拥有历史性主权，直到在 1895 年第一次中日战争后的《马

3　Koichiro Genba, Japan–China Relations at a Cross-Road, New York Times, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/opinion/koichiro-genba-japan-china-relations-at-a-crossroads.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&ref=japan, 26 February 2013. 关于提交争端至国际法院的问题，玄叶光一郎的回答是：“这是一个经常被错误地指向日本的问题。日本才是根据国际法有效控制尖阁诸岛（钓鱼岛）的国家，而中国正寻求挑战现状，这个问题应该向中国提出。日本已经接受国际法院的强制管辖。既然中国正在国际论坛上开展各种活动兜售其主张，那么基于国际法寻求解决方案似乎对中国更有意义。为什么他们没有显示出接受国际法院强制管辖并向国际法院提交论据的迹象？”

4　 Japan resubmitted a declaration in 2007, at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=JP, 26 February 2013. This is the same as the one in the I.C.J. Yearbook 1988–1989, 1989, pp. 74~75, quoted in Hungdah Chiu, An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over T’iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto), Chinese (Taiwan) Year Book of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 15, 1996–1997, pp. 9~31.

5　当然，这两个国家可以向常设仲裁法庭或任何其他仲裁机构申请仲裁。但在仲裁庭组成之前，中国和日本都将签署一份同意把纠纷提交常设仲裁庭并遵守其裁定的协议。该份协议必须清楚说明争端范围、允许每一方在庭上委任相同数目的仲裁员等。常设仲裁庭的案件中不需要任何一方主动出击，未经对方同意另一方不能提起诉讼，两方都必须就争端的限定性因素达成一致。换句话说，另一方的任何保留或警告都必须接受。这样一份预仲裁协议是不可能（达成）的。

6　 Kenichiro Sasae (Japan’s Ambassador to the United States), New Envoy Vows to Push for TPP Talks, Downplays Isle Row with China, The Mainichi, at http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20121128p2g00m0dm072000c.html, 27 February 2013. 佐佐江贤一郎说“如果他们（中国）对其领土问题确实很有信心，我不知道为什么他们不去国际法院”，并补充道“我认为他们对自己的主张没有任何信心或依据”。


关条约》中将其割让给日本。日本则声称，经过反复调查发现该群岛是无主之地，

于是在 1895 年并吞该群岛。对这两种主张的评论如下。

（一）中国历史性主权的主张

“历史性主权”一词有时也被称为“历史上的主权”，出现在国际法院各种知

名的裁决中。7 在其他司法/仲裁案中，这一概念也可以与“古代的”主权和“原始

的”主权互换使用。8

从检验历史性主权的 3 个构成要件来看，获得历史性主权的过程类似于传统

的占领模式。9 首先，这种主权的确立必须有足够长的历史基础，“长期以来由普

遍认识所建立，以致这种认识本身就已足够证明历史性主权的存在”。10 布鲁姆认

为这种历史性权利赋予的主权“是漫长过程的产物，包括一系列的作为、不作为和

行动模式，从整体上通过累积效应使这种权利得以形成并巩固其在国际法上的有

效性”。11 其次，国家必须保持公开、连续、和平地行使领土主权。构成主权证据

的国家活动范围很广泛。至于最后一个构成要件，学术界提出了各种术语来体现

其本质，包括默许、明确承认和正面同意。12 国际法委员会使用“接纳”这一术语，

即其他国家接纳一国对某块领土享有有效和持续的主权。13 事实上，布鲁姆认为

他称之为“默许”的这一最后要件是形成历史性主权的法律基础，是“历史性权利

的重要支柱”。14 总结这些构成要件并将其应用到钓鱼岛争端中便可以发现，如果

7　 For example, in the Fishery Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 130; in ICJ’s verdict in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, I.C.J. Reports, 1953, p. 53.

8　 The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) between India and Pakistan, 19 February 1968, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XVII, p. 436; The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, Phase I: Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute, 9 October 1998, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXII, pp. 211~334; Case Concerning Sovereignty over PedraBranca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), I.C.J. Reports, Judgment of 23 May 2008, para. 290, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf, 3 August 2013.

9　 Artur Kozlowski, The Legal Construct of Historic Title to Territory in International Law – An Overview, Polish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 30, 2000, pp. 68~78.

10　 Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, Phase I: Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute, 9 October 1998, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXII, p. 239, para. 106.

11　 Yehuda Zvi Blum, Historic Rights, in R. Bernhardt ed., Encyclopedia of Public Internatio- nal Law, Vol. II, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1995, p. 711.12　 Yehuda Zvi Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965, pp. 53~55.13　 Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays: Study Prepared by the

Secretariat, A/CN.4/143, Yearbook of International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1962, paras. 109~110.

14　 Yehuda Zvi Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965, p. 131.


中国在其他国家的普遍接纳下，从远古时代到 1895 年一直对该群岛行使持续性

主权，那么中国对钓鱼岛已拥有历史性主权。

1. 中国对钓鱼岛的发现和命名

“钓鱼台”及“赤屿”等名称，最早出现在1221年南宋时期王象之的地理书《舆

地纪胜》中。15 这些名称原是中国著名的景点，王象之在书中记述了这些名称的起

源及相关的神话。中国人很有可能在同一时期就发现了钓鱼岛，虽然没有这些发

现的相关记录。16 1221 年王象之的书出版之后，到 1227 年该书很大一部分佚失，

当代日本学者菅沼云龙推测中国人在此 6 年间发现了这些岛屿，并按当时的惯例

由皇帝为这些岛屿命名，中国政府确认其为钓鱼台、赤屿等。这种推测似乎是可

信的，因为在 1801 年《舆地纪胜》被全部重新发现之前，这些岛屿就已经使用这

些名称了；17 这些名称出现在现存的明清两代官方记录、国防手册和书籍，以及琉

球文件和日本书籍中。

2. 明朝的证明文件：到琉球王国的针路

琉球 1372 年成为中国的附属国，中国使节被派遣到琉球完成册封新琉球国

王的使命。每次完成使命回国后，使节都要向皇帝提交行程的详细书面报告，这

些报告记录了钓鱼岛的名称。同时，作为官方文件，这些报告被储存在国家档案中。

在这一背景下，现存明朝官方记录中的各种钓鱼岛参考数据才重新浮出水面。

第一次册封的时间是 1373 年，最后一次是 1866 年，所有的 24 个册封使命

都是在明朝和清朝时期进行的。18 由于火灾销毁了前 11 次的册封记录，所以当

1534 年中国使节陈侃踏上册封之路时，不得不依靠从前的官员和随行的琉球人的

资料来拼凑“针路”，即采取的习惯航线。之所以称之为针路是因为中国使节从福

州港口前往琉球港口那霸的途中，每通过一个岛屿都需要重新设定罗盘，以便到

达下一个岛屿。其实，这条路线上的钓鱼岛和其他中国岛屿一直被当作导航的辅

助设备，“类似于”现代国家建造的“航标和灯塔”，而国际法院已经接受将建造

15　Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 42.

16　观察东海地图可以清楚地看到，在过去会发现这些岛屿并对其主张主权的国家最有可能的就是琉球和中国。根据历史学家、书籍和其官方记录，琉球一直声称琉球王国由36 个岛屿组成，不包括钓鱼岛。

17　 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 44. 该书第 44 页还写道，“从历史上来看，中国为任何景观或地点采用或使用新名称之前，该名称都必须得到政府的认可。最有可能的情况是，皇帝以自己的名义命名或重新命名地点或景观……因此，大概是南宋政府在东海发现了钓鱼岛的存在，并为其命名。”

18 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 46, 70.


航标和灯塔作为一种行使国家职能的表现。19 岛屿的这种功能并不局限于中国人，

琉球人在多次向中国纳贡的旅程中也使用岛屿作为路标。

在 1534 年的航程中，当船驶过钓鱼岛列岛时，陈侃准确依序地引用了这些

岛屿的名称。当他的船偏离针路时，随行的琉球人向他保证船并没有远离中国和

琉球的边界，也没有漂离太远以致到了日本的领土。20 因此，这次执行使命的官方

记录清楚地表明中国与琉球官员互相承认两国在东海的国际边界。此外，中国与

琉球的边界被描述为位于久米岛，而“赤尾、黄尾和钓鱼等岛屿并不属于琉球王国

的领土”，21 暗指这些岛屿属于中国。这一暗示在 1683 年汪楫的册封记录中得到

了确认，他指出钓鱼岛是“中外之界也”。22（参见以下清朝记录的部分）

因此，基于陈侃第 12 次册封的记录，中国在 16 世纪时就已明确建立了对钓

鱼岛的原始或历史性主权。至于从 13 世纪可能的发现和实际的命名，到对这些

岛屿主权的巩固，相关的原始文件可能已经永久丢失，但在国际法中如“无法收集

占领”小且无人居住岛屿的“必要证据”，23象征性的行动已足够确立“专属主权”。24

中国用著名景观的名称来命名钓鱼岛是最强的象征占领的行动，且“中国明清时

期册封附属国……意味着中国式‘主权’的象征行动”。25 该群岛在象征主权的仪

19　 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 50.

20　陈侃：《使琉球录》（1534 年），载于《使琉球录三种》，台北：台湾银行经济研究室1970 年重印版，第 13 页。转引自 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 48.

21　 Inoue Kiyoshi, Senkaku Retto: Chogyo Shoto No Shiteki Kaimei, Tokyo: Daisan Shokan, 1996, p. 29. 转引自 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japa-

nese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Ha- waii Press, 2000, p. 50. 由于没有其他领近钓鱼岛的国家可以声称钓鱼岛是其领土，所以很明显这语句是指中国和琉球的边界。22　 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations:

Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 75; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 48.

23　 Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 47.

24　 Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 50 中关于克利珀顿岛案；对于其他无人居住的领土，该等象征性的占有即代表初始 (但未得到巩固 )的主权权利。



式中得到显著描绘的事实，建立了中国对其“无法否认的主权权利”。26 虽然这些

在西方看来都不是典型的拥有主权的行动，但在领土争端的司法和仲裁决定中套

用西方看来获得古代（即历史性）主权的规则是“完全不合时宜”27 和“非常武断”

的。28 例如，在印度与巴基斯坦边界(喀奇盐沼)争端中，法院声明“主权特征，

即法律和习惯赋予的权利和义务，是固有的，并根据时间、地点、各种政治制度背

景，在不同的情况下显示出了相当大的变化。”29

此外，几个世纪以来，中国对这些岛屿的主权是日本学者甚至官员所知悉的，

并得到了琉球官员的承认（参见以下对《中山传信录》的讨论）。如同许多其他册

封一样，陈侃的册封也有琉球使节陪同。陈侃记录中确认钓鱼岛和指出琉球与中

国隐含边界的一段内容，也可在琉球民事管理员向象贤的公文中找到。30 几个世

纪以来该区域的主权都没有受到其他国家的挑战，31 由此可以说中国对这些岛屿

已经拥有历史性主权。

3. 明朝的证明文件：国防手册和地图

中国的主权主张并不局限于册封记录和其他国家的普遍接纳。中国对这些岛

屿的主权不仅是象征性的，在明朝的国防手册和地图中还可以找到中国对这些岛

屿持续行使主权的证据。

明朝之前，外敌侵袭的威胁主要来自于北方，因此修建长城抵御蛮夷的入侵。

明朝时期，由于倭寇（即日本海盗）有时会与中国海盗勾结，经常突袭中国沿海

地区，因此注意力便转移到海上。为了应对这些袭击，明朝设立了海事系统以保

卫沿海地区。在江苏总督胡宗宪的支持下，著名地理学家和军事学术家郑若曾在

1561 年出版了《筹海图编》，这本海域安全概略说明是明朝最知名的国防手册。

书中有 2 张从山东到广东的沿海地区边防地图都标示了钓鱼岛，即钓鱼屿、黄尾

屿、赤（尾）屿。明朝后续的国防出版物一直使用同样的地图，再次肯定了海军持


27　 The 1998 Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration, International Law Reports, Vol. 114, pp. 1, 116.28　 The Dubai/Sharjah Arbitration award (1981), International Law Reports, Vol. 91, pp. 543,

587.29　 Indo–Pakistan Western Boundary Case (Rann of Kutch) (1968), International Law Reports,

Vol. 50, p. 2.30　 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations:

Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 49.

31　因为钓鱼岛的位置靠近中国和昔日琉球的边界，“没有第三者有主权主张的余地”，且两国之间也“没有领土争端”。See Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 112.


续运用这些岛屿作为明朝的管辖界限。32

4. 明朝的证明文件：航海日志

有趣的是，现存最早提及钓鱼岛的地方并不在册封使节的记录中，而是在中

国一本名为《顺风相送》的航海日志中，这本日志可能早在 1403 年就已出版，作

者不详。书中各种明代航海路线中，包括了从福州到琉球的针路，并附有如何设

定罗盘以成功航行至琉球的建议。33《顺风相送》不仅提供了重要的航海信息，还

描绘了不同路线上各个港口的地理知识，以及出发的季节和时间。特别是从福州

到琉球的路线，钓鱼屿显然不仅是作为一个航海标记，还是主要的避难港，书中的

描述包含了这样的信息：“钓鱼台澳口好取柴水。开，打水十五托（即80 英寸）”。34

5. 清朝的证明文件

还有 8 次册封发生在清朝，最后一次是在 1866 年。值得注意的是汪楫在

1683 年的册封使命，新琉球国王派遣琉球代表团陪同汪楫，以防止在公海上发生

任何不必要的迷失。35 对此次航行驶过赤尾屿后的描述中，不仅提到了边界，而且

是中国和琉球使节都承认的中国和琉球的边界：

“薄暮过郊（或作沟）, 风涛大作……问郊之义何取，曰中外之界也。”36

这一段所说的（海)沟即冲绳海槽，那时俗称为黑水沟，因为海水在大陆架斜坡上

陡然进入东海的一段会突然从绿色变成墨黑色，给人一种恐惧感。穿过不可预知

的水流时有祈求海神帮助的惯例仪式，称为“过沟祭”或“海神祭”。37 中国和琉球

32　徐必达：《乾坤一统海防全图》（1605 年）；茅元仪：《武备志•海防二•福建沿海山沙图》（1621 年）。转引自 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 61~63; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 56. 日本质疑这些副本的重要性，显然是忽视了一点——这些都是持续行使国家职能的证据。国际法院认为间歇性并不是问题，但连续性是必要的（例如，帕尔马斯岛案）。

33 《顺风相送》（1403 ？年），华盛顿：国会图书馆 1975 年重印版，第 1 页；向达编：《两种海道针经》，北京：中华书局 1961 年版。根据《顺风相送》，最早记录航海日志是在11 世纪的周朝，可惜没有留存下来。

34 《顺风相送》（1403 ？年），华盛顿：国会图书馆 1975 年重印版，第 13 页。35　 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations:


36　 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 48.

37　 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 51~53. 有关这种仪式的描述早在明朝郭汝霖第 13 次的使命记录中就有记载。


都认为这条海槽是两国的明确界限和合法海上边界。38 因此，早在西方国际法和

主权概念出现之前，这种中国主导的世界秩序下的国界，就得到了附属国和邻国

的普遍承认和尊重。

清朝时期所记载的册封记录中，在国外最权威、最广为人知的当属徐葆光在

1719 年所作的《中山传信录》。该书内含有关琉球的详细描述、一张琉球 36 个岛

屿（不包括钓鱼岛）的地图和徐葆光的行程地图，其中就包括著名的针路。在该书

序言中，“徐葆光特别提到……他这本书是在（琉球国王）派遣的高级琉球官员的

帮助下完成和确认的，特别是著名的程顺则先生”，39 程顺则是琉球著名学者和地

理学家。因此，该书再次确认了中国和琉球官方承认其海上边界以及当时钓鱼岛

的地位。40

《中山传信录》传到日本后被翻译成日文，并成为江户时代后期日本了解琉

球知识的主要来源，甚至 19 世纪后期的日本官员都听说过这本书。1885 年冲绳

县县长和日本内政部长就并吞钓鱼岛中 3 个岛屿的可能性进行交流，两位均提及

该书。更确切地说，冲绳县县长表示了他的担忧，这些被推测为无主之地的岛屿

可能与《中山传信录》记录的是同一组岛群。然而，日本内政部长虽然承认这些岛

屿可能是相同的，但仍驳回了其参考价值，声称没有任何迹象显示这些岛屿属于

任何人或国家。41

将钓鱼岛纳入中国海上防御范围的做法一直持续到清朝。中国台湾于 1683年正式并入中国领土，此后这些岛屿与中国台湾关系更为密切。42 第一本幸存下

来记录这种联系的书是黄叔璥的《台海使槎录》，作者在 1722 年被派遣到台湾担

38　 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 53; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 48.


40　 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, pp. 46~47; Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 74~77.

41　 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, pp. 72~74.

42　中国台湾与无人居住的钓鱼岛自然是不可同日而语。台湾不是被中国以有名之地命名的方式所占领，台湾的发现可归因于葡萄牙，但是台湾当时已有土著人和来自中国大陆的移民居住。更重要的是，尽管台湾可能也出现在册封记录和其他文件中，但后来却被外国列强争夺和殖民。因此，中国并不认为台湾是正式的中国领土，直到 1683年将其并入。


任巡察御史之后完成了这份报告。虽然该书内容主要专注于台湾，作者仍在探讨

台湾武备情况的第 2 卷中提供了关于钓鱼岛的重要信息：钓鱼屿被列入台湾的巡

逻路线；其作为海军部署的可行性从以下声明得到印证，“（台湾）北有山名钓鱼台，

可泊大船十余”。43 在各种更为详细的涵盖福建省台湾府行政区域的地方志中，均

含有涉及钓鱼屿的描述。44 后来的很多年鉴，如陈寿祺 1871 年编写的《重纂福建

通志》第 86 卷，表明钓鱼屿属于中国台湾噶玛兰（今天的宜兰县）海军司令部。45

总之，基于明清时期的文件证明中国建立了对钓鱼岛的原始主权。而且，这

种主权在中国公开、持续、和平地行使对钓鱼岛的主权过程中得以完备，几个世纪

以来一直为其他国家所接纳。

（二）日本无主之地的主张

日本反对上述说明中国对这些岛屿拥有历史性主权的证据，坚称经过反复调

查，确定钓鱼岛是无主之地，并于第一次中日战争中将其并吞。但仔细审视 20 世

纪 50 年代解密的并吞过程文件便可发现，这些文件与日本的主张（即岛屿并“没

有受到清朝统治的痕迹”）46 直接抵触。此外，除了上述提及的冲绳县县长和日本

内政部长之间的交流外，这些解密文件反复明确提到“清朝”，从而传达出日本最

43 “Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan),” The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of Taiwan, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/official/Home/Detail/4ad52054-ebc7-452c-a6c1-d182b25c8001?arfid=2b7802ba-d5e8-4538-9ec2-4eb818179015&opno=0

27ffe58-09dd-4b7c-a554-99def06b00a1, 5 January 2013. 关于这一段的翻译，不同作者之间有些微不同。See Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 86; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 57.

44　 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 57. 作者邵汉义在其文章的第 57~58 页附注 68中讨论了这些地方志或地方录的官方性质，追溯到公元 780 年的唐朝，当时所有的区县都被要求每隔几年提交一份涵盖地方单位各个方面的报告，包括行政结构、地方事务、风俗、值得注意的人士和地点、地理等等。

45　 Chinese Government Official Web Portal, White Paper: Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China, at http://english.gov.cn/official/2012-09/25/content_2232763.htm, 5 January 2013; “Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan),” The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of Taiwan, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/TopicsArticleDetail/fd8c3459-b3ec-4ca6-9231-403f2920090a, 5 January 2013; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, pp. 58~59.

46　 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, answer to Q5, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 19 March 2013.


初怕引起中国怀疑的担忧。虽然日本内政部长希望在 1885 年并吞这些岛屿，但

日本外交部长的干预还是推迟了这一过程，直到适当时机出现，也就是 10 年后的

1894 年 11 月，此时日本已确信中国会在第一次中日战争中战败。解密文件还显

示，除了初步调查，1885 年至 1895 年间日本并没有对这些岛屿作进一步调查，

尽管现在日本外务省如此声称。47

并吞过程始于 1894 年 12 月，并导致内阁于 1895 年 1 月 14 日作出决定。

然而天皇诏书并没有批准内阁决定，根据明治宪法，诏书是实施并吞的必备条件，

“因此，1896 年 4 月 1 日日本内阁批准（在钓鱼岛上）建立国家地标的决定不能

被视为是国家颁布的正式或有效的法律”。48此外，来源于所谓反复“调查”的“信息”

显示，日本内阁仅并吞了 1885 年最初调查的 3个岛屿中的 2个，黄尾屿和钓鱼屿，

而赤尾屿直到 1921 年才被并吞。49

同一时期，日本并吞其他无主地岛屿时都尽力按照当时的国际标准，如对岛

屿进行深入调查、由诏书批准内阁决定、在官报上公布信息，50 但日本并吞钓鱼岛

却没有经过这些程序。所有上述因素都不利于日本在 1895 年断定钓鱼岛是无主

之地的主张。51

一些日本和美国学者意识到无主之地的主张可能站不住脚，便开始争辩如果

岛屿主权归属未知、不确定或存疑，日本也可以用“时效取得”获得主权。然而“学

术观点和国际法理学早已对时效取得有所保留，并在一定程度上将继续对此持有

异议”。52 此外，时效取得只适用于在某一国家有确定知情的情况下，默许另一国

47　 Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, New York Times, at http://kristoff.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-inconvenient-truth-behind-the-diaoyusenkaku-islands/, 8 February 2013.


49　 Steven Wei Su, The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 36, 2005, p. 60; 其他 5 块露出水面的礁石的状况请参见 Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1973, p. 246, note 3.


51　关于窃取钓鱼岛的更详细的讨论，请参见 Ivy Lee and Fang Ming, Deconstructing Japan’s Claim of Sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 53, No. 1, at http://japanfocus.org/site/view/3877, 8 August 2013.

52　 Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), I.C.J. Reports, Judgment of 23 May 2008, para. 15, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf, 3 August 2013.


家采用时效取得获取对有争议土地的主权。53 然而，日本有意隐瞒并吞钓鱼岛的

历程，阻碍中国“确定知情”的权力，1900 年才命名钓鱼岛为尖阁诸岛，54 20 世

纪50年代才将并吞钓鱼岛的相关文件解密。55下面还将进一步评估“有效控制”（和

“时效取得”类似的一种领土占领方式）的概念。

（三）历史性主权的巩固或无主之地的占领

对日本政府来说“中国大陆政府及台湾当局所谓的历史……依据……不足以

构成国际法上的有效论据来证明中国对尖阁诸岛(钓鱼岛)拥有领土主权的主

张”。56 尽管中国可能没有像西方国家一样行使国家职能，但日本用当今的标准来

看待中国的历史证据，完全无视有关证据的背景，使其无法正确看待国际法院在

西撒哈拉案中的意见。国际法院明确指出，特别是在没有国际法“要求国家结构

遵循任何特定模式”的情况下，“领土主张中显示国家主权的行动要考虑到该国的

国家结构”。57

而且，日本忽略了一个事实，即在 18 世纪之前，仅仅象征性的行动就可以拥

有无人居住岛屿的主权。此外，即使从时际法的角度来看，1895 年之前明清时期

文件证实的持续主权表现，也足以支持中国对有人居住(而不仅是无人居住)领

土的主权。支持中国历史性主权的证据还包括其他国家对中国主权的接纳，这些

接纳包括：20 世纪之前琉球和日本对这些岛屿使用中文名称；19 世纪 40 年代英

国皇家舰队三宝垄号船长爱德华·贝尔彻在他的旅行记录中使用钓鱼岛的中文名

称，例如花瓶山（即钓鱼屿）和黄尾屿；58 日本和其他西方国家出版的地图表明钓

53　布加迪法官在白礁岛一案的反对意见中表达了这一观点，指出“公布是时效取得的基本条件”。参见 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Dugard, para. 33, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14502.pdf, 3 August 2013.

54 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 93~94.


56　 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, answer to Q5, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 4 March 2013.

57　 Eric Heinze and M. Fitzmaurice eds., Landmark Cases in Public International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, p. 424.

58　 Edward Belcher, Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang during the Years, 1834-46, Vol. 1, London: Reeve, Benham, and Reeven, 1848. 转引自 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 89~90.


鱼岛是中国领土。59

过去，国际法院对审理历史争论并没有表现出太大的兴趣，60 特别是充满爱

国情感主义的争论。61 中国原始主权应该是没有争议的，正如东格陵兰案，存在争

议的是中国主权主张与日本无主之地主张。62 此外，中国的历史性主权主张是在

一连串国际协议的背景下作出的。这些协议有类似条约的性质，而依国际法院的

观点，条约是领土主张中最有说服力和合法性的。63

三、钓鱼岛是通过《马关条约》

割让或是被日本内阁并吞？

中国声称在 1895 年 4 月签订的《马关条约》中将钓鱼岛割让给日本，日本则

坚称该条约并没有明确提及岛群的名称。事实上，《马关条约》第 2 条款的相关部

分只是提到“（台湾）所有附属各岛屿”：

中国将管理下列地方之权，并将该地方所有堡垒、军器、工厂及一切属公物件，永远让与日本……

（2）（台湾）全岛及所有附属各岛屿……64

前文已经建立了中国原始主权的优先主张，剩下的问题就是，既然《马关条

59　例如，在日本，现存最早的肯定中国对钓鱼岛主权的日本文件是 1785 年日本著名地理学家林子平的地图，虽然日本辩护者对这幅基于中国《中山传信录》的地图不予理会，但这可能表明《中山传信录》的权威性和当时日本学者对这本书及其内容的普遍接受。其他外国的承认还包括 1790 年罗伯特·塞耶所作的《中华地图》和 1894 年兰德·麦克纳利公司出版的《世界地图集》。As indicated in Edward Belcher, Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang during the Years, 1834–46, Vol. 1, London: Reeve, Benham, and Reeven, 1848; also see Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 91.

60　例如，在 1953 年 The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case 国际法院报告第 56 页中，法院指出，“为了裁决本案，法院认为没有必要解决这些历史争论”。

61　 Andrew F. Burghardt, The Bases of Territorial Claims, Geographical Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, 1973, p. 230.

62　 Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 77.

63　 Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 53, 2004, pp. 1779~1812.

64　签署国同意如有任何有关条约目的和意义的争议，使用条约的英文版本作为正本。参见权赫秀：《<马关条约>的中日英文本异同考》，载于《二十一世纪》2004 年第 86 期，第 38~39 页。 Treaty of Maguan/Shimonoseki, at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimo-

noseki01.htm, 19 March 2013.


约》并没有具体列举每一岛屿或每一组岛屿，那钓鱼岛是否包括在这段相当模糊

的“所有附属各岛屿”的措辞中。该条款也没有附加地图划定台湾及其附属岛屿

的边界，65 而起草条约时有没有参考地图也不得而知，如有参考，也不清楚是参考

了哪幅地图。

（一）在条约“通常意义”的背景下探究主权争议

鉴于《维也纳条约法公约》中的规例来自国际习惯法并有国际习惯法的效力，

国际法院已经应用这些规例来解释《维也纳条约法公约》生效之前缔结的条约。66

《维也纳条约法公约》第 31 条指出，“条约用语应依按其上下文并参照条约之目

的及宗旨所具有之通常意义，善意解释之”。67 因此，确定“所有附属各岛屿”这一

模糊措辞的“通常意义”至关重要。韦氏词典对“附属”的定义是“属于或被连接

为合法的部分”，如果该岛链包括在《马关条约》第 2 款第 2 项中,那么钓鱼岛和

台湾之间应有某种合法的关系。中国指出钓鱼岛和台湾之间存在行政、历史、地

理和地质等关系。

1. 中国的主张：钓鱼岛和中国台湾之间的行政和历史关系

从法律的角度来看，最有说服力的可能是行政关系，即台湾 1683 年被纳入

清朝领土后，钓鱼岛已处于台湾行政管理之下的事实。历史上一项重要的证据就

是上面提到的 18 世纪 20 年代巡察御史黄叔璥的《台海使槎录》。这本书描述了

钓鱼屿在台湾海上巡逻路线中的位置，是“可泊大船十余”的地方。此外，如前所

述，陈寿祺在1871年编写的《重纂福建通志》第86卷区域海防和重要战略地点中，

特别指出钓鱼屿属于台湾府噶玛兰（今天的宜兰县）。

台湾后来成为晚清海上防御的关键。早在 1737 年，内阁学士兼礼部侍郎吴

金在奏折中就称台湾为“外洋门户，边海藩篱”。68 但台湾的战略重要性并没有得

到清朝的充分认识，直到日本 1874 年远征台湾。日本帝国派遣一支远征部队，试

图控制台湾，在中国引起了一系列政府反应，最终导致台湾从福建省分离出来，并

于 1885 年设立为省。法国在 1884 年中法战争期间封锁台湾，进一步促使中国不

65 《马关条约》附有辽东半岛和奉天省南部“附属岛屿”地图。但是，欧洲列强迫使日本交还奉天省南部及其附属岛屿。

66　有关《维也纳条约法公约》的追溯使用问题讨论，参见 Hazel Fox, Application of Article 31(3)(A) and (B) of the Vienna Convention and the Kasikili/Sedudu Case, in M. Fitzmaurice, Olufemi A. Elias and Panos Merkouris eds., Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Leiden: BRILL, 2010.

67　 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force 27 January 1980, article 31(1), at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a10.html, 9 August 2013.

68 《台案汇录丙集》，台湾文献丛刊第 176 种，台北：台湾银行 1963 年版，第 291~293 页。


得不派遣军队保卫海上边界。因此，海上防御成为清朝重点考虑的事务，而台湾

作为“七省门户”，“关系全局”。69 钓鱼岛自明朝以来就是海上防御不可或缺的一

部分，在台湾还是一个县的时候就受台湾管辖，当台湾崛起为中国海洋强省时自

然仍是台湾的附属岛屿。

2. 中国的主张：钓鱼岛和中国台湾之间的地理和地质关系

现今的科学知识也表明钓鱼岛在地理上是台湾的一部分。例如，钓鱼岛上的

爬行类物种与琉球群岛的其他岛屿不同，但和中国台湾及中国大陆东部相似；70

钓鱼屿上特有的鼹鼠在形态上与中国台湾的鼹鼠最为相似，但不同于其他地方的

鼹鼠。71此外，“这些岛屿（钓鱼岛）位于黑潮向北的路径，与台湾位于相同的季风带。

因此，气流和水流有利于从中国台湾北部航行到钓鱼台列岛，但不利于从琉球群

岛航行到钓鱼台列岛”。72

古地理学证据表明，在最近的冰河时期，钓鱼岛群和中国台湾的大多数岛屿

都与中国大陆东部边缘相连接，而琉球群岛从未与中国通过陆地相连接。73 因此，

中国台湾和钓鱼岛所位于的大陆架是“中国陆地领土的延伸”，74 该大陆架边缘最

明显的特征是冲绳海槽这一“具有显著隔断特征的重要地理单元”，75 地形变化突

69　摘自 1877 年收复新疆的湘军统帅左宗棠的奏折。See Katoaka Kazutada, Shincho Shinkyo Tochi Kenkyu (Study on Qing Dynasty’s Governance of Xinjiang), Kaga: Yuzankaku, 1991, p. 142.

70　 H. Ota, H. Sakaguchi, S. Ikehara and T. Hikida, The Herpetofauna of the Senkaku Group, Ryukyu Archipelago, Pacific Science, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993, p. 248.

71　 M. Motokawa, L-k Lin, H. C. Cheng and M. Harada, Taxonomic Status of the Senkaku Mole, Nesoscaptor uchidai, with Special Reference to Variation in Mogera insularis from Taiwan (Mammalis: Insectivora), Zoological Science, Vol. 18, 2001, pp. 733~740.

72　 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan),” The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of Taiwan, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/TopicsArticleDetail/fd8c3459-b3ec-4ca6-9231-403f2920090a, 8 February 2013. See also Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Report, The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Oil Under Troubled Waters?, CIA/BGI GE 71-9, May 1971, Point 11, p. 6, at http://cryptome.org/2013/07/guccifer-cia-senkaku.pdf#sthash.sadTucKD.dpuf, 8 October 2013.

73　 H. Ota, H. Sakaguchi, S. Ikehara and T. Hikida, The Herpetofauna of the Senkaku Group, Ryukyu Archipelago, Pacific Science, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993, p. 248.

74　 Executive Summary, Submission by the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea, 11 January 2013, p. 1, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/executive%20summary_EN.pdf, 24 February 2013.

75 Executive Summary, Submission by the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea, 11 January 2013, p. 1, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/executive%20summary_EN.pdf, 24 February 2013.


然，海水深度显著下降，最大水深超过 2300 米。76

以上科学数据支持了中国关于钓鱼岛是台湾附属岛屿的主张。国际法院在

1999 年卡西基里/塞杜杜岛案中认为，在解释德国与英国 1890 年条约中“主通

道”的通常意义时，“可以引用现今的科学知识阐明”。77 法院援引 1994 年阿根廷

/智利沙漠湖案的仲裁裁决来支持其使用现今科学信息的做法。78 在其他两个界

定国家相关海岸的案例中，国际法院进一步强调，一方面要“忠于实际地理情况”，79

另一方面要避免人为地“重塑实际自然情况”。80

3. 钓鱼岛和中国台湾在社会观念、社会认可和语言使用上的关联

在某个角度上，20 世纪的科学数据仅仅为理解 16 世纪以来已有的社会观念

提供了更好的自然基础。举例来说，如“黑水沟”，即冲绳海槽，证明了中国和琉

球默认用这些地理/地质特征来规整他们的社会生活和划定国界；正如 15 世纪文

献《顺风相送》中的记载，黑潮有助于前往琉球的册封使团在 5 月或 6 月出发，并

于 10 月返回，因为这些时节的风向和水流有利于这样的航行。总之，自然世界的

这些特征构建了册封使节古老的针路，并联接了钓鱼岛和中国台湾。

郑舜功深谙航海贸易，并对日本较为熟悉，因此被江苏总督派遣到日本，为

了收集倭寇路线的信息，他在日本逗留了很长一段时间，并在《日本一鉴》（1565年）一书中写道，钓鱼屿是“小东小屿也”，小东指的是台湾，即钓鱼屿是属于台

湾的小岛。81 当代专门研究钓鱼岛争端的中国学者吴天颖推测，这段叙述可能也

反映了当时日本国内的共识，82 而非现在日本人所说的是对中国主权主张的驳斥，

因为当时台湾还没有正式归属中国。郑舜功的叙述说明，自然界塑造了华人的经

历，也影响他们对社会各种现象之间相互联系的看法，形成了钓鱼岛属于中国的

概念。

1885 年，日本外相敦促在并吞钓鱼岛的过程中务必要谨慎行事，因为中国的

76　 Executive Summary, Submission by the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea, 11 January 2013, p. 3, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/executive%20summary_EN.pdf, 24 February 2013.

77　 Case Concerning Kasikili/Sendudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, I.C.J. Reports, 1999, p. 1060, para. 20.

78 Laguna del Desierto Case, International Law Reports, Vol. 113, p. 76, para 157.79　 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1985, p. 45,

para. 57.80　 North Sea Continental Shelf,Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 49, para. 91.81　郑舜功：《日本一鉴》，第 5 卷，1565 年；北京？，1909 年重印版，第 4 页；转引自

Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 65. 当时台湾被称为“小东”。

82　吴天颖：《甲午战前钓鱼列屿归属考——兼质日本奥原敏雄诸教授》，北京：社会科学文献出版社 1994 年版，第 77~81 页。


报纸充斥着有关日本在钓鱼岛可疑活动的报导，且 1885 年上海申报大标题为《台

岛警信》83 而非《钓鱼台警信》。此外，19 世纪中国台湾北部渔民在岛链周围发

现了丰富的渔场，并以此谋生。84 为躲避风暴，他们会登上钓鱼屿避难，19 世纪

40 年代英国皇家舰队三宝垄号船长爱德华·贝尔彻曾在此发现中国渔船的残骸。85

因此，钓鱼岛与中国台湾之间无数的联系并不局限于历史和行政方面，还有

地理/地质方面的因素，再转移到语言和社会观念上，即钓鱼岛是中国台湾一部

分的观念和认识，才是中国主张该岛链是通过《马关条约》割让出去的最具说服力

的论据。

4. 日本的主张：割让条款不包括钓鱼岛

从以上模糊措辞的“通常意义”来看，日本基于钓鱼岛未在《马关条约》86 中

明确提及而作出不存在割让的主张值得商榷。日本在条约签订大约 3 个月前钓鱼

岛就已经被并吞的论点也不成立，原因之一是岛屿并非无主之地，因此不能通过

并吞取得。

日本和其他国家的学者进一步指出，《马关条约》在另一条款中单独处理澎

湖列岛，意味着澎湖列岛并不被认为是中国台湾的附属岛屿。由于与澎湖列岛相

比，钓鱼岛离台湾更远，所以不可能被视为“附属”岛屿，因此不包括在被割让的

岛屿中。87 但澎湖列岛一直是台湾省的一部分；此外，与澎湖列岛相比，彭佳屿也

离台湾更远，却仍被视为是在《马关条约》中割让出去的。因此，距离并不是主要

的决定因素，国际法院的推理也对此不予考虑，有先例可援，国际法院将白礁判给

新加坡，而白礁距离马来西亚更近，甚至根据《联合国海洋法公约》可以说是在马


84　 Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No.2, 1973, pp. 221~266.

85　 Edward Belcher, Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang during the Years, 1834–46, Vol. 1, London: Reeve, Benham, and Reeven, 1848, pp. 315~320.

86　钓鱼岛在日本被称为“尖阁诸岛”，是黑岩恒在 1900 年的私人调查后杜撰出来的词，在此之前日本海军都采用中文和中英混合命名，令所有人困惑。See Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 89~96.

87　 Erdem Denk, Interpreting a Geographical Expression in a Nineteenth Century Cession Treaty and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 20 , No.1, pp. 100~101; Y. Matsui, International Law of Territorial Acquisition and the Dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, Japanese Annual of International Law, Vol. 40, 1997, note 2.


来西亚领海内。88

进言之，当时的澎湖列岛比钓鱼岛在战略上对日本有更重要的地位，因为日

本在第一次中日战争期间是从澎湖列岛成功袭击中国台湾。由于日本从 1874 年

远征台湾时就开始觊觎台湾，在《马关条约》中用十分明确的单独条款来割让澎湖

列岛，可能是日本要利用澎湖列岛的军事地位来保证继续占领中国台湾。

( 二）探究《马关条约》的宗旨和目的

根据《维也纳条约法公约》，考察条约的宗旨和目的有助于对条约的解释，因

此，接下来将探究《马关条约》的目的。毫无疑问，该条约的主要目的是领土和其

他利益的割让，作为战胜国从战败国获得的战利品。英国驻日本公使得知，1894年战争开始后的几个月，日本就开始起草和平条约的要求。89 该条约的条款主要

是反映日本觊觎中国已久的利益。使用模棱两可的措辞“所有附属各岛屿”可能

是为了起草者和签署国的方便。90

割让台湾是日本签署该条约的主要目的之一。考察日本领土扩张的轨迹，从

并吞琉球到对台湾的殖民统治，日本起草条约者最可能的想法是将位于这两个岛

群之间的钓鱼岛包含在内，作为割让的一部分。尽管日本明知这条岛链是当时福

州到琉球航线上的航标，却声称是福冈的古贺辰四郎在1884年发现这一群岛。“发

现”群岛之后，古贺向冲绳县申请租赁岛屿时被拒绝了，但他开启了秘密并吞群岛

的历程，这一历程始于日本内政部长 1885 年建议在岛上设置国家标记。因此，可

以肯定的是，占领这些岛屿的意图在战争之前早已存在。割让条款不过是让日本

合法化地并吞钓鱼岛，因为 1895 年 1 月的日本内阁决定从未经天皇批准。

（三）探究订约双方的后续行动

根据《维也纳条约法公约》，考察“订约后双方的后续行动”，可以更明确地

88　 Case Concerning Sovereignty over PedraBranca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), I.C.J. Reports, Judgment of 23 May 2008, para. 290, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf, 3 August 2013.


90　At http://www.mofa.gov.tw/official/Home/Detail/217bb223-b19c-4b8e-a510-ee54dfae7fec?arfid=2b7802ba-d5e8-4538-9ec2-4eb818179015&opno=027ffe58-09dd-4b7c-a554-99def06b00a1, 12 August 2013；台湾当局有不同的解释，认为模棱两可的措辞是故意的，便于日本窃取 / 并吞更多的岛屿。


解释条约语言。91 订约后中国在钓鱼岛问题上的沉默符合其对条约的理解，即在

第一次中日战争后已经将岛屿割让；中国忠实地遵守有约必守的准则，善意履行条

约义务。故一些报章即使对 1885 年日本在岛屿上进行的可疑活动曾经急切敲响

警钟，战争结束后就保持沉默，不再关注古贺对岛屿的开发，包括他从冲绳县带工

人到岛上收集信天翁羽毛和营运鲣鱼加工厂。

有趣的是，日本政府的后续行为也似乎证实了这些岛屿是被割让的观点。虽

然日本内阁作出并吞钓鱼岛的决定是在条约签署前几个月，但天皇从未批准。此

外，日本声称经过彻底调查确定钓鱼岛的 3 个岛屿是无主之地，但内阁决定只对

3 个岛屿中的 2 个进行并吞。古贺自 1885 年以来曾多次申请使用这些岛屿，但未

获批准，在日本正式占领中国台湾6天后，即1895年6月10日古贺再次提出申请。

在古贺传记中，古贺将日本对岛屿的占领归功于“帝国军队英勇的军事胜利”。92

内政部最终在1896年9月批准古贺的申请，允许他租赁4个岛屿：钓鱼屿、黄尾屿、

南小岛、北小岛，93 但日本内阁决定只正式“并吞”2 个岛屿：钓鱼屿、黄尾屿。

日本指出钓鱼岛一直由冲绳县管理，若是作为中国台湾的附属岛屿而被割

让，理应一直由台湾管辖。但自 1885 年并吞过程开始，两任不同的冲绳县县长为

规范海产品、渔业及相关业务，分别于1890年和1893年尝试申请管辖这些岛屿。94

尽管最后一封申请书要求加急响应，却一直被搁置到战后。战争结束之后，冲绳

县县长申请书就顺理成章被批准，把钓鱼岛划归冲绳管理。因此，1895 年后钓鱼

岛不由中国台湾管理与其是否被割让毫无关系。

总而言之，通过探究台湾“所有附属各岛屿”的通常意义，中国有足够理由声

称钓鱼岛是在《马关条约》中被割让出去的。当考察条约的宗旨和目的，以及双方

后续行动时，这种解释更为有力。

91　 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force 27 January,1980, Article 31(3)(b), at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a10.html, 12 August 2013.

92 Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, New York Times, at http://kristoff.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-inconvenient-truth-behind-the-diaoyusenkaku-islands/, 8 February 2013.

93　 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 30.1978 年，这些岛屿以 30 日元每 2.3 平方米的名义价格被卖给栗原家族。2012 年，日本购回和国有化其中 3 个岛屿。第 4个小岛久场岛目前仍为埼玉商人的亲属“所有”；日本国防部以一笔未公开的数额进行租用。See Jun Hongo, Tokyo’s Intention for Senkaku Islets, Japan Times, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/04/19/national/tokyos-intentions-for-senkaku-islets/#.UV8Q80oTSF8, 2 March 2013.



四、应通过《开罗宣言》、《波茨坦公告》

和二战投降条款，还是《旧金山和约》

解决钓鱼岛争端？

古贺在被允许租赁钓鱼岛后，投入了大笔资金开发这些岛屿。随着中日局势

越来越严峻，古贺在20 世纪30 年代关闭了岛上的设施，自此岛上一直无人居住。

第二次世界大战期间，美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福创造了“联合国”一词代表

盟军。1942 年元旦，四巨头（美国、英国、苏联和中国）一起签署了后来成为现代

联合国基础的《联合国家宣言》。这份宣言指出“各国政府保证与本宣言签署国政

府合作，并且不和敌国单独缔结停战协议或和约。”95

1943 年，罗斯福、丘吉尔和蒋介石在开罗举行会谈，会议期间各方同意，“日

本所并吞中国之领土，包括东北四省、台湾、澎湖列岛等，战后将归还中华民国”，96

由此产生的《开罗宣言》还指出，“其他日本以武力或贪欲所攫取之土地，亦务将

日本驱逐出境”。97

1945 年 7 月 26 日的《波茨坦公告》概述了日本的投降条款，肯定了《开罗宣

言》的条款，并确定日本领土界线“限于本州、北海道、九州、四国及吾人（盟军）

所决定其他小岛之内。”98 因此，“日本要回复到其 1894 年以前的国土，剥夺其在

二战前的日本帝国统治领土，包括朝鲜、台湾及最近征服的其他国家领土”，99 日

本后来在同一年签署的投降书中承诺接受《波茨坦公告》的投降条款。

因此，中国主张将《马关条约》和其他相关法律协议作整体考虑和解释时，钓

鱼岛应在二战之后归还中国。100 但日本坚称 1951 年的《旧金山和约》才是战后处

95　 United Nations Declaration, 1 January 1942, at http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/charter/history/declaration, 23 March 2013.

96　Cairo Declaration, Dec. 1, 1943, 3 U.S.T. 858; U.S. Department of State Archive, Information released online from 2000–2009, at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/107184.htm, 11 March 2013.

97　 United Nations Declaration, 1 January 1942, at http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/charter/history/declaration, 23 March 2013.

98　 Potsdam Declaration, 26 July 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1204, para. 8, at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html, 11 March 2013.

99　 Potsdam Declaration posted on the Princeton University site, at http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Potsdam_Declaration.html, 11 March 2013.

100 中国大陆和中国台湾都提出了相同的主张。中国台湾还额外指出，根据 1952 年《中日和平条约》第 4 条，日本同意废除 1941 年前与中国缔结的所有条约。从笔者的角度来看，这些岛屿归还给中国台湾还是中国大陆并不重要，台湾和大陆属于同一国，最终会统一为一个不可分割的中国。


置其占领和并吞领土的最终仲裁书。101

由于《旧金山和约》第 2 条没有具体列出日本必须放弃钓鱼岛，日本争辩该

条约确认了日本对该群岛的主权。102 此外，虽然《旧金山和约》第 3 条并没有通过

联合国信托统治制度将钓鱼岛明确置于美国管辖之下，但美国琉球民政管理局于

1953 年 12 月 25 日发布的第 27 号声明却将其包括在内。103 日本继续辩称，中国

对“尖阁诸岛（钓鱼岛）处于美国施政之下”的事实从未提出过任何异议，“由此

可以明确地看出，中国没有将尖阁诸岛(钓鱼岛)视为（中国）台湾的一部分”。104

日本的推理是错误的，因为中国大陆和中国台湾都不是《旧金山和约》的签

署方。既然《旧金山和约》没有列明对钓鱼岛的处置，那么期望北京或台北对该群

岛的处理提出具体反对就是不合理的。最后，尽管美国琉球民政管理局在随后第

27 号声明中将钓鱼岛包括在南西诸岛的界限内，但南西诸岛的界限是基于日本无

条件投降后，在 1945 年 9 月呈交给麦克阿瑟将军的一份 1939 年日本地图。105

事实上，中华人民共和国国务院总理周恩来确实反对过，他指出根据 1942年《联合国家宣言》，《旧金山和约》没有效力。周恩来说：“中国保留向日本提出

索赔的权利，并且拒绝承认该条约。”106

由于台湾当局当时依赖美国的外交承认和经济军事援助，因此对《旧金山和

约》保持沉默。虽然台湾当局可能在 1952 年的《中日和平条约》中承认了《旧金

101 日本国内有反对声音，最近的是矢吹教授，参见他“钓鱼岛和南沙群岛、西沙群岛问题是日本帝国战后和解尚未完成这一事实的象征”的陈述。Yabuki Susumu, China-Japan Territorial Conflicts and the US–Japan–China Relations in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, The Asia–Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 9, No. 2, 2013.

102 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 19 March 2013.

103 United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) Number 27, (Washington, 1953) reprinted in Kikan Okinawa [Okinawa Quarterly] 56, 108.

104 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 23 November 2013.

105 菅沼云龙在其 2013 年 10 月 3 日的博客中解释，( 美国 ) 国家文件与记录管理局内的一份机密备忘录揭露了美国是怎样确定南西诸岛边界的，“‘南西诸岛’一词是根据一份 1939年包含尖阁诸岛（钓鱼岛）在内的日本地图定义的，但尖阁诸岛（钓鱼岛）并没有在《旧金山和约》中明确提及”。菅沼继续说道“换句话说，东京政府提供的信息是美国确定南西诸岛边界的基本来源。这对日本人来说是非常‘聪明的’……”下载于 http://chinajapanusrelations.blogspot.com/，2013 年 10 月 3 日。

106　 From Documents on New Zealand External Relations [DNZER], Vol. III, 1095 (1985), quoted in John Price, A Just Peace? The San Francisco Peace Treaty in Perspective, Japan Policy Research Institute, Working Paper No. 78, June 2001.


山和约》的第 2 条，但台北可能没有考虑到条款可能涉及钓鱼岛主权问题。107 从

1943 年 11 月开罗会议期间罗斯福与蒋介石的私人晚宴上就可以看出，美国对钓

鱼岛的战后安排也并不明确。罗斯福问蒋介石，中国战后是否想要琉球，108 蒋介

石回答他接受与美国共同管辖。109 因谈话是在收复领土的背景下进行，美国归还

一切日本并吞中国之领土的意图更明显。

虽然《旧金山和约》对日本很宽容，但该条约反映了美国的地缘政治和战略

利益，很少关注解决亚洲敌对势力的领土争端问题。尽管日本的声明指出，“上述

事实（即《旧金山和约》第 2 条和第 3 条）明确地显示出尖阁诸岛(钓鱼岛)作为

我国(即日本)领土的地位”，110但这些条款并没有确定岛屿主权的含义。事实上，

美国国会在 1971 年《归还冲绳协议》听证会上清楚表明了这一点。

与日本的企图相反，美国从那时起就一直对钓鱼岛主权问题保持中立，并宣

布在《归还冲绳协议》中只是转移了钓鱼岛的行政控制权。111 然而，美国又向日本

保证钓鱼岛受 1960 年《美日安保条约》第 5 条的保护，该条款责成美国在日本管

理下的领土受到攻击时援助日本。112 至于日本主张的对这些岛屿保留的“残存的

主权”，113 美国官员在 1971 年国会听证会上解释，“残存的主权”指的是美国归

107　当台湾当局在 1953 年 11 月意识到这个问题时已经太晚了，台北对美国决定“返还”日本奄美群岛提出抗议。然而，美国并没有理会台北的抗议，美国在 1953 年12 月将奄美群岛作为“圣诞礼物”返还给日本。台湾当局的反对意见详见 “The Memorandum of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US Ambassador in Taipei,” November, 1953 and China, Legislative Yuan, Li-fa-yuan Kung-pao [The Records of the Legislative Yuan], 12th Session, No. 8 (15 January 1954), pp. 88~89, as noted in Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1973, p. 252.

108　 See Chinese Summary Record [translation] of Roosevelt–Chiang Dinner Meeting [23 November 1943], FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 324.

109　 See Chinese Summary Record [translation] of Roosevelt–Chiang Dinner Meeting [23 November 1943], FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 324.

110　 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 23 November 2013.

111　 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearing, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 27–29 October 1971, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 89~90.

112　 The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States, 11 U.S.T. 1632. 1960 年 1 月 19 日签署，同年 6 月 23 日生效，俗称《美日安保条约》。

113　 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, answer to Q15, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 11 March 2013.“正如旧金山和约会上美国代表杜勒斯的发言以及 1957 年 6 月 21 日日本总理大臣岸信介和美国总统艾森豪威尔的联合新闻公报所明确显示的，美国承认我国（日本）对南西诸岛拥有残存的（或潜在的）主权。”


还日本所有其按照《旧金山和约》第 3 条所管辖领土的意图和政策。114

综上所述，中国对于钓鱼岛应该在二战后归还的主张更强有力。中国援引的

战时国际宣言/公告，即《开罗宣言》和《波茨坦公告》，如同条约，“不仅仅是预

期未来行为的声明”，115 建立有约束力的关系的意图更是显而易见。116 因此，这些

宣言/公告有合同的性质，从法律上建立了各方承认的权利和义务预期，117 特别

是《开罗宣言》通过《波茨坦公告》得到重申，而后者成为投降书条款，日本因为

接受投降书而成为《波茨坦公告》的缔约国。美国从未承认《旧金山和约》对于解

决岛屿争议的重要性；美国的立场一直是“条约(即《旧金山和约》)本身并不一

定是主权问题的最终决定因素”。118

五、日本可以基于有效控制

取得钓鱼岛主权吗？

美国将钓鱼岛（连同冲绳和其他岛屿）归于自己管辖之后，似乎已经忘记这

些岛屿是中国的，之前属中国台湾管辖。119 冷战开始时，美国企图拉拢日本进入

其“旧金山体系”，使得“日本从战败国转变成军事盟友”，120 美国似乎也接受战

前日本政府在《马关条约》签署后不久将钓鱼岛归于冲绳县的行政安排。自 1972年《归还冲绳协议》开始，该群岛便一直受日本的实际行政控制。

114　 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearing, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 27–29 October 1971, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1971); also New York Times, 23 April 1972, p. 17, col. 1.

115 Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 4th ed., New York: Aspen Publi- shers, 2003, p. 9, note 14.116　国际协议最重要的共同因素就是建立有约束力的关系；正是这一因素使协议具有法

律约束力。See Kelvin Widdows, What is An International Agreement in International Law?, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 20, 1979, pp. 117~149.

117　 Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 4th ed., New York: Aspen Publi- shers, 2003, p. 9, note 14.118　 Seokwoo Lee, Territorial Disputes in East Asia, the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951,

and the Legacy of US Security Interest in East Asia, based on Telegram regarding Senkaku Islands (14 September 1970) US NARA/Doc. No.: Pol 32-6 Senkaku Is and XR Pol 33 China Sea (4 September 1970) in Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee eds., Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2011, p. 58, note 51.

119　根据台湾当局的说法，因为日本使用尖阁诸岛表示该群岛，台湾和盟军并不知道其所指的就是钓鱼岛。因此，这些岛屿是被《旧金山和约》第 3 条错误地划归在美国的托管之下的。除了麦克阿瑟将军收到并片面使用的日本地图之外，笔者认为这可能是产生困惑的另一个原因。

120　 Iriye Akira, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction, Upper Saddle River: Prenti- ce Hall, 1974, p. 182.


因此，日本指出，除 1945 年至 1972 年间日本没有“直接”控制外，从 1895年起对这些岛屿行使的“有效控制”进一步证明日本对钓鱼岛拥有主权。121 向国

际法院证明领土主权的合法性一般可分为几类，“有效控制”在司法裁决中具有高

度决定性作用。122 例如，法院在敏基埃岛和艾克利荷斯岛案中表明，如果其他国

家对此没有任何抗议，“再多的历史或书面证据也比不上对争议领土的实际长期、

和平占领或国家权力的行使”。123

然而，国际法院也在布基纳法索/马里案中认为，“‘主权’包含证明权利存

在的任何证据和这种权利的实际来源”，124 有效控制本质上是一种证明权利存在

的证据。1895 年至 1945 年期间，日本行使国家权力的合法来源是中国在《马关

条约》中的主权割让。暂且不论目前中国关于这些岛屿应在二战后返还的争论，

问题仍然是从 1945 年至今，日本是否具有“这种主权的实际来源”以行使有效控

制。

要回答这个问题，首先必须探究行政与有效控制所包括的活动。根据国际法，

这两者有很大的重叠。125 因此，有效控制可以说是包括行政行为和一系列其他活

动，而行政功能的行使也包括部分的有效控制活动，这样重叠的结果使得行政和

有效控制可能在表面上是可以互换的。但两者在钓鱼岛争端上性质不同，日本所

谓的有效控制不等同于在过去司法和仲裁庭领土争端中有决定性作用的有效控

制。

日本承认其战后“直至一九七二年五月十五日含尖阁诸岛（钓鱼岛）在内的

冲绳施政权归还日本以前的这段时间，日本没能对尖阁诸岛(钓鱼岛)进行直接

统治(即直接控制)”。126 因此日本所谓的“直接”和“有效”控制来源于其行政控

制权。然而，从 1972 年至今，日本并没有建立和维持自身的行政控制权。根据美

国官方声明，行政控制权是移交给日本的。因此，行政控制现状的维持与其说是

121　 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, answer to Q3, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 19 March 2013.

122　 Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 53, 2004, pp. 1779~1812.

123　 William B. Heflin, Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and China, Oceans Apart, Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 18, 2000, pp. 16~17.

124　 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 412.

125　例如，在利吉丹岛和西巴丹岛主权案中，印度尼西亚和马来西亚基于许多因素（如历史、条约法等等）对利吉丹岛和西巴丹岛提出了主权主张。See Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, I.C.J. Reports, 2002, pp. 625, 630. 国际法院判决马来西亚的“立法、行政或准司法行为 /动”，即有效控制的实例，已足够使其获得主权。See Press Release, ICJ/605, International Court Finds that Sovereignty over Islands of Ligitan and Sipadan belongs to Malaysia, 17 December 2002, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/ICJ605.doc.htm, 13 December 2012.

126 　Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, answer to Q3, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 19 March 2013.


日本单方的努力，不如说是美国因 1960 年《美日安保条约》第 5 条对日本的坚定

支持。在这起岛屿争端中，三方冲突的性质显而易见，每当争端升级，日本就会呼

吁美国重申其对（美日）联盟的承诺。

从这个意义上说，日本声称的所谓“有效控制”很难说是国际仲裁和判决通

常理解与一直使用的“有效控制”。没有其他争端存在类似的情况，即由世界上唯

一的超级大国移交并依靠其力量维持的行政控制所实现的所谓“有效控制”。如

提交岛屿争端至国际法院进行仲裁，很难评估法院会如何对这种异常情况作出判

决。

从最坏的角度来看，日本获得的对钓鱼岛的行政控制权可能会被视为其领土

扩张主义和帝国主义的产物，也就是由更强的国家支持一个国家攫取另一个国家

的土地。从最好的角度来看，可以说日本对岛屿行使的是“受限制的”127行政控制，

而不是有效控制。因为在1971年当中国意识到美国将终止其对钓鱼岛的托管时，

就抗议美国向日本移交行政控制权。随后在 1972 年，日本首相田中角荣和中华

人民共和国国务院总理周恩来在中日邦交正常化会谈期间达成默契，同意“搁置”

争议。1978 年，中华人民共和国国务院副总理邓小平在会见日本首相福田赳夫后，

再次谈到搁置争议，指出“我们这一代人没有足够智慧在这个问题上找到共同语

言，我们的下一代肯定会更聪明，他们会找到所有人都能接受的办法。”128 这种默

契使得两国在 2012 年 9 月前都采取了“积极的争端管理”。129

例如，两国政府都试图限制激进主义分子登陆钓鱼岛。日本努力克制在岛上

发展和设置军事设施。130 尽管美国媒体和政客一再指责北京政府在岛屿争端上动

员中国舆论反对日本，但实际上多年以来，中国已正式或非正式地试图尽量减少

国内媒体对冲突的报导。此外，“中国政府在这个问题上也一直限制抗议日本活

127　 Paul O’Shea, Sovereignty and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Territorial Dispute, p. 4, at http://www.hhs.se/EIJS/Research/Documents/240.pdf, 15 August 2013.

128　邓小平关于钓鱼岛争端的讲话。转引自 Chi-Kin Lo, China’s Policy towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, London: Routledge, 1989, pp. 171~172; see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 June 1979 for a similar quote.

129　 Taylor Fravel, Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute, in Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi eds., Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan–US Relation, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 151; At http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.stabiltiy.senkakus.pdf, 15 August 2013.

130　 Taylor Fravel, Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute, in Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi eds., Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan–US Relation, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2010, pp. 153~155, at http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.stabiltiy.senkakus.pdf, 15 August 2013.


动的数量、范围和持续时间。”131

在采取积极的争端管理期间，尽管两国之间偶尔会爆发冲突，但稳定似乎占

了上风。然而现在日本通过国有化岛屿，不仅否认存在领土争端，而且也否认曾

经达成搁置争端的默契，132 这预示着稳定现状的结束，并将迎来中日冲突不稳定

的新时期。

因此，日本不但没有行使有效控制这种权利的“实际来源”，而且日本行使的

所谓有效控制绝不是和平的行为；相反，两国之间争端的相对平静是由默契协议所

维持的。日本至今表现出的“受限制的”行政控制，也不能说是日本的“有效”控制，

这种行政控制很可能会无法达成国际法院授予领土主权的标准。

六、争端源于钓鱼岛的潜在石油资源

或是钓鱼岛的战略地位？

日本指责中国在发现钓鱼岛周围海底有潜在油气储备后才提出主权主张，133

但发现潜在石油的时间是在中国台湾首次意识到美国将终止其对岛屿的托管并将

岛屿移交给日本的前后。因此，中国真的是觊觎海底资源，还是中国争取钓鱼岛

主权和潜在石油的发现在同一时期发生仅是一种巧合？

石油可能是中国的动机之一，但上文已经讨论过中国台湾在 20 世纪 70 年代

前保持沉默的另一原因：1943 年罗斯福与蒋介石谈话时，美国对钓鱼岛未来的安

131　 Taylor Fravel, Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute, in Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi eds., Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan–US Relation, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 154, at http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.stabiltiy.senkakus.pdf, 15 August 2013.

132　 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, answer to Q14, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 19 March 2013. 西方和日本记者的报告证实了这种默契的存在，正如《日本时报》的叙述表明，“在 2009 年

的大选中被民主党赶下台的自民党政府，一直尊重据称 20 世纪 70 年代东京与北京达成的这种默契协定”。See Ayako Mie, No Quick Senkakus Fix, but Return to Status Quo Likely: Domestic Issues Preventing Quick Resolution of Row, Japan Times Online, 12 October 2012, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121012f1.html#sthash.LcnYxzYU.dpuf, 20 March 2013. 此外，矢吹晋教授控告日本外务省将周恩来—田中角荣谈话和田中对在亚洲—太平洋战争中日本的侵略所表示的谢罪在日本外务省网站删除。See Stephen Harner, Interview with Professor Yabuki on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis and US–China–Japan Relations, Forbes, 3 October 2012, at http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2012/10/03/interview-with-professor-yabuki-on-the-senkakudiaoyu-crisis-and-u-s-china-japan-relations/, 13 December 2012.

133　 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 19 March 2013.


排并不明确有利于日本。战后，台湾当局没有理由反对其盟友美国托管岛屿，直

到美国在未经协商的情况下决定将钓鱼岛的行政控制权移交给日本。而中国大陆

一直抗议《旧金山和约》，指出该条约违背 1942 年《联合国家宣言》的精神和内容。

归责中国在钓鱼岛主权争端背后的动机，即渴望潜在的油气资源，同样也适

用于日本，毕竟日本在此之前也始终保持沉默。其实在发现石油之前，两国都“对

这些岛屿的存在感到困惑”，134 也似乎忘记钓鱼岛主权问题。135

此外，日本可能比中国更需要国内石油的供给。尽管美国中央情报局扭曲事

实，倾向支持日本对钓鱼岛拥有主权，但美国中央情报局在 1971 年发表（于 2007年解密）的一份报告中称，“虽然所有相关势力（中国大陆、中国台湾、日本）都渴

望拥有对这些潜在巨大资源的权利，但石油对所涉国家的重要性差别很大……从

石油供应的角度来看，日本最重视这一点，因为日本国内几乎完全缺乏重要原油

资源……”136

然而，这些岛屿对巩固国家对潜在海床下财富的权利或对海洋划界有多大的

贡献仍不确定。根据《联合国海洋法公约》第 121 条，“岛屿”和任何陆地领土一

样，除了可以拥有领海，还可以有毗连区、专属经济区和大陆架，而不能维持人类

居住和经济生活的“岩礁”则不行。钓鱼岛应该被认定为岛屿、岩礁，抑或介乎二

者之间仍存在疑问，甚至为符合第 121 条所定义的岛屿所做的预备工作数据，也

对其可能的分类几乎无法提供线索。137

判例法表明，岛屿在海洋划界中的价值是由其“一般地理环境下的大小、重

134　 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 124. 该书作者在该书第 124~129 页中列举了无数例子说明这种“困惑”；这种困惑还在两国的地图和教科书中有所体现，这些资料都没有将钓鱼岛作为日本或中国的领土。事实上，该书作者将这一时期称为“多年的困惑”。在割让岛屿和发现石油之间，中国经历了一系列由革命和内战导致的政府变动所带来的破坏。所以，在作者看来，困惑是完全可以理解的。日本困惑的原因参见 Prof. Yabuki, China–Japan Territorial Conflicts and the US–Japan–China Relations in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, The Asia–Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 9, No. 2, 2013, note 135.

135　 Prof. Yabuki, China–Japan Territorial Conflicts and the US–Japan–China Relations in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, The Asia–Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 9, No. 2, 2013. “战败国日本忘记了无人居住的尖阁诸岛（钓鱼岛）”，直到潜在油气储备的发现。

136 　Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Report, The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Oil Under Troubled Waters?, CIA/BGI GE 71-9, May 1971, Point 47, p. 20, at http://cryptome.org/2013/07/guccifer-cia-senkaku.pdf#sthash.sadTucKD.dpuf, 8 October 2013.

137　 See Steven Wei Su, The Tiaoyu Islands and Their Possible Effect on the Maritime Boundary Delimitation between China and Japan, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, 2004, pp. 393~397.


要性和类似考虑”所决定的。138 小且孤立的岛屿如果不是被完全忽略也可能仅有

有限的作用。139 日本在冲之鸟礁附近主张 16.3 万平方英里的海域，虽然冲之鸟礁

在涨潮时最高处距离海面不到 20 英尺，但日本在其周围建造围墙以保持较低的

海平面，这表明在东海大陆架主张中，与中国相比，日本为这些岛屿附加了更多价

值。140 日本对中国的指责可能是其自身动机的投射。

此外，中国在 1990 年和 2006 年分别提出共同开发钓鱼岛周围区域资源，均

被日本拒绝。该提议直到2010年还被提及，但东京政府认为没有共同开发的理由，

因为“中国对尖阁诸岛(钓鱼岛)的主张缺乏国际法和历史依据”。141 然而，在两

国海洋边界争端中，中国和日本于 2008 年达成了共同开发春晓/白桦气藏的协

议，尽管自 2008 年以来一直没有太大的进展。142 很显然，中国的立场并非单方面

独占钓鱼岛周围海底的油气储备。

尽管如此，目前的紧张局势已经上升到一个新层面。日本已经否定搁置争端

的默契，中国必须作出回应。中国在这个问题上的回旋余地有限，如果在钓鱼岛

主权争端上退让，中国人民会认为日本再次侵略中国领土。在遭遇日本和其他列

强瓜分一个世纪之后，中华人民共和国的合法性在很大程度上取决于维护国家领

土完整的能力。

更重要的是，这些岛屿不仅地处重要海道，而且可以用于在该海域的力量部

署。143 对美国和日本而言，控制这些岛屿便可以安装雷达或声呐以监视中国发展

中的导弹潜艇舰队，这对美国重返亚洲的地缘政治政策和日本一般防御策略而言

是一个关键优势；对中国而言，控制这些岛屿将打开美国盟友的“第一岛链”，让

138　 Eritrea/Yemen Case, Phase II Maritime Delimitation, Award, 17 December 1999, para. 117, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160, 15 August 2013; Tunisia/Lybia Case, Judgment, I.C.J Reports, 1982, p. 18, para. 79, and Qatar v. Bahrain Case, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2001, p. 39, para. 248. 上述案例均证实了这些标准。

139　 Steven Wei Su, The Tiaoyu Islands and Their Possible Effect on the Maritime Boundary Delimitation between China and Japan, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, 2004, pp. 404~408.

140　 M. Carr, China and the Law of the Sea Convention, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, Vol. 9, 1983, p. 44.

141 　Tokyo Nixed Joint Senkaku Exploitation, Japan Times Online, 22 October 2010, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20101022a1.html, 13 December 2012.

142　 For details of this agreement on joint development, see Disputed Claims in the East China Sea: An Interview with James Manicom by Chris Acheson, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 25 July 2011, at http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=159, 16 August 2013.

143　 Taylor Fravel, Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute, in Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi eds., Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relation, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 158, at http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.stabiltiy.senkakus.pdf, 15 August 2013.


中国潜艇继续静默地进入太平洋，144 并保证没有敌人可以利用这些岛屿作为“雷

达和导弹平台”145 向中国发动攻击。

明朝经历了倭寇的频繁掠夺，于是将注意力从只保护北方陆地领土转移到建

立沿海的海上防御。因此，钓鱼屿、黄尾屿和赤尾屿被纳入其海岸防御，如《筹海

图编》中福建防御地图七、八所示。钓鱼岛的战略重要性从明朝时期一直持续到

清朝，在 1874 年日本远征（中国台湾）和 1883 至 1885 年中法战争之后，清朝在

1885 年将海上防御作为优先事项予以考虑。

20 世纪 60 年代中国与苏联关系破裂后，中国认为其主要安全威胁之一是苏

联从北方陆地入侵，然而，这样的攻击后来被认为是不可能的。随着 20 世纪 80年代现代海战的发展，中国再次将注意力转向沿海防御。146 这种政策变化因美国

近期（2011 年）宣布重返亚洲而进一步加强。尽管奥巴马政府坚持“美国向亚太

地区再平衡是响应整个地区领导和公众强烈需求的信号”，147 但中国认为美国正

试图包围中国，阻止中国作为地区大国崛起。148 此外，日本在 2012 年单方面决定

国有化钓鱼岛中 3 个岛屿的事实不仅加深了中国对日本的不信任，也引起中国的

担忧：日本可能太渴望成为美国围堵中国的战略合作伙伴。

与日本指控中国对海底油气储备的渴望相比，中国现在更“重视这些岛屿在

‘第一岛链’中的位置”。149 在采取积极的争端管理期间，这些岛屿没有处在任何

特定国家的控制之下。但日本国有化岛屿并否定搁置争议默契的存在后，中国察

觉到前所未有的潜在威胁。因此，中国认为必须重新获得对岛屿的控制，以确保

进入太平洋的通道，同时在敌人进攻时保护自身安全。因此，钓鱼岛已重新回到

其在明清两代对中国海防和安全的战略地位。

七、结论

144　 Robert Wade, The Island Dispute between China and Japan: the Other Side of the Story, at http://triplecrisis.com/the-island-dispute-between-china-and-japan-the-other-side-of-the-story/, 17 March 2013. 第一岛链是指东亚大陆海岸之外主要群岛的第一链，包括菲律宾、韩国、日本等，都是美国盟友。

145　 Robert Wade, The Island Dispute between China and Japan: the Other Side of the Story, at http://triplecrisis.com/the-island-dispute-between-china-and-japan-the-other-side-of-the-story/, 17 March 2013.

146　 People’s Liberation Navy – Offshore Defense, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm, 18 March 2013.

147　 Remarks by Tom Donilon to the Asia Society, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/130311_Donilon%20Asia%20Society.pdf, 18 March 2013.

148　 Li Jie, US in Position to Strangle China’s Maritime Life Lines, Global Times, at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/725455.shtml, 17 March 2013.

149　 Robert Wade, The Island Dispute between China and Japan: the Other Side of the Story, at http://triplecrisis.com/the-island-dispute-between-china-and-japan-the-other-side-of-the-story/, 17 March 2013.


与日本相比，中国对钓鱼岛的主权主张在国际法中具有更坚实的基础。明清

两代的证据表明，中国在 1895 年之前已经建立和巩固对这些岛屿的原始或历史

性主权。日本虚伪地认定这些岛屿是无主之地，违反应以善意应用和遵守国际法

的基本原则。中国指出，其在《马关条约》中割让了这些岛屿，因此在 1895 年到

1945 年间保持沉默，这一论点令人信服。1972 至 2012 年底，稳定在争端中占了

上风，因为两国于 1972 年达成了搁置争议的默契，并于 1978 年予以重申，但日

本现在否定这项默契。

基于《开罗宣言》、《波茨坦公告》等国际协议和日本签署的投降书，中国有

充分理由宣称钓鱼岛应在二战后归还。而《旧金山和约》并未涉及对这些岛屿的

处置，美国对岛屿的主权地位也保持中立；战后日本不可能保留钓鱼岛的残存的主

权，因为日本以往从未取得钓鱼岛的合法主权。虽然国际法院在许多裁决中都已

经表明有效控制起决定性作用，但仔细审查日本所谓的“有效控制”，会发现其只

不过是移交的行政控制权，由美国转交和极力支撑，因此与其他裁决案例中的有

效控制概念不同。最后，日本指责中国的动机可能是反映日本自身对领土和资源

的渴求。

2012 年日本对钓鱼岛的国有化，可能已经超过中国事先设定用来避免对抗的

底线，并可能已经“改变了问题的性质”。150 以往，学者预测如果不通过战争，中

国想重新控制钓鱼岛将十分困难。151 然而，日本否定领土争端和搁置争议的默契，

警示中国必须进行海上和空中常规巡逻，正如日本从 20 世纪 70 年代以来所做的

一样，以支撑中国的主权主张。尽管中国的常规巡逻被讽为侵入日本海域和空域，

且不断受到装备更好的日本“自卫”部队的挑战，加上一旦在这些岛屿周围与日本

发生军事冲突，就会有美国介入的潜在威胁，但这些学者的预测未必准确，因为客

观来说，中国现在正逐步恢复其从 19 世纪末 20 世纪初以来失去的对钓鱼岛的控

制。

（衷心感谢刘君业先生在百忙中为本译文审阅和校订，从各角度提供宝贵意见，使本文原意明确，亦感谢陈婉秋女士和廖泽云先生的复核审阅。）

（中译：赵菊芬）

150　 Shelve What Controversy? Develop What Resources? With Whom?, China Times, editorial (Taipei, China Taiwan), translated by Bevin Chu, at http://datelinetaipei.blogspot.tw/2012/11/shelve-what-controversy-develop-what_1488.html, 13 December 2012.

151　 Paul O’Shea, Sovereignty and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Territorial Dispute, p. 4, at http://www.hhs.se/EIJS/Research/Documents/240.pdf, 15 August 2013; basically that is the underlying tenor of Fravel’s article as well.

Competing Claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands under International Law: A Critical Evaluation 31

Competing Claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands under International Law:

A Critical Evaluation

Ivy Lee*

Abstract: Both China and Japan lay claim in the East China Sea to a group of islands and rocky outcroppings called Diaoyu Dao or Diaoyutai in China and Senkaku Islands in Japan. Prior to 2012, the conflict was kept mostly at bay through an informal agreement between the countries to shelve the issue of sovereignty until a later date. However in September 2012, Japan unilaterally nationalized three islands of the island chain, refusing to acknowledge that a dispute and an agreement to shelve the dispute exist. The current controversy is infused with a strong Japan-driven narrative of China having a flimsy claim to the islands under international law. With this narrative taking hold, especially in the West, it is important to assess the relative strength of China’s claim against Japan’s, regardless of whether the dispute would eventually be submitted to international arbitration. This paper explores the question of which of these countries has the better right to title through analyzing critical points of contention with respect to these countries’ sovereignty claims. These are: whether China had possessed a historic title at the time Japan claimed Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands to be terra nullius, whether China ceded the island group in the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895, and which document, i.e., Japan’s signed Instrument of Surrender accepting the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration or the San Francisco Peace Treaty, is relevant to the resolution of the dispute. Evidence suggests China to have the stronger claim under precepts of international law and international case law governing territorial disputes. Japan’s

* Ivy Lee, PhD in Sociology from the University of California, Los Angeles, now focusing her efforts on obtaining justice for the victims of crimes against humanity the Japanese Imperial Forces committed during WWII. Lee is also interested in contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. Email: [email protected]. The author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the help of Dr. William Underwood who read, critiqued and line-edited the article and Ms. Cindy Chan who obtained a number of difficult-to-access references for this paper.



assertion of having effective control is highly debatable while the imputation of China’s motive to its thirst for the potential reserves of hydrocarbon resources could be applied to Japan equally. China, on the other hand, may value the island group more for its strategic location to ensure China’s coastal defense and maritime security, in the context of the U.S. Pivot to Asia and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s avowed intention to re-write Japan’s pacifist constitution.

Key Words: Diaoyu Dao; Diaoyutai; Senkakus; Competing claims; Territorial dispute; Sovereignty

I. Setting the Stage for Conflict: Nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands

The dispute over the Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus flared up again between China and Japan in September 2012 over the latter’s nationalization of three of these islands through “purchase from a Saitama owner.” Escalation soon followed. The dispute is at a level where an accident on the high seas or in the air surrounding the islands could spark a military confrontation between the two countries. And this time, it looks like the will to de-escalate may not be there on either side.

The island group in question, called Diaoyu Dao in China and Senkakus in Japan,1 consists of five islands and three rocky outcroppings. Whether these islands are capable of sustaining human habitation remains in doubt. The largest of the island group called Diaoyu Yu/island or Diaoyutai by the Chinese and Uotsuri-jima by the Japanese2 has a land mass of 4.3 km2 and a limited fresh water supply, but without other supplies from the outside, an insular group can hardly establish a permanent abode there.

1 Diaoyu Islands or Diaoyu Dao are used throughout this article when discussing China’s clai- m/evidence. The term Senkaku Islands or Senkakus is used when discussing Japan’s claim/

evidence. Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands or Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus are used when referring to the competing claims from both sides. The same practice will be followed in referring to the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty.

2 Both Diaoyu Dao/Islands and Senkakus are used in this paper as a group noun denoting the archipelago or the group of five islets and three outcroppings. When individual islands are referred to, then such names as Diaoyu Yu/island or Diaoyutai and Uotsuri-jima are used.


China claims a historic title to Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus.3 It maintains that the islands were ceded to Japan through the Treaty of Maguan/Shimonoseki in 1895, and accordingly, they should have been returned based on various agreements China made with the Allies during World War II (WWII) and by the terms of the surrender document Japan signed in 1945.

Japan, however, claims the island group was found to be terra nullius after a ten-year investigation that began with its so-called discovery by Koga Tatsushiro in 1884. Japan’s Cabinet incorporated two of the islands in 1895 in the midst of the first Sino-Japanese war, approximately three months before the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty was signed. After WWII, a geographical area consisting of is-land chains, including the Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus, was put under the administration of the United States (US) pursuant to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT). Neither the People’s Republic of China (PRC) nor the Taiwan administration was a signatory of this treaty, with the PRC publicly protesting the treaty’s illegality from the very start.

The dispute first erupted in the 1970s when the Taiwan administration, which was then China’s representative to the United Nations (UN), found to its dismay that the Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus was to be handed over to Japan in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. Under pressure from the Taiwan administration, and in its desire to establish relations with the PRC, the US compromised. It declared in 1971 it was turning over only administrative control of the island group to Japan – and not sovereignty rights. Concurrently the US affirmed the Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus to be under the extended deterrence of article 5 of the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty, a position the US maintains to date. Since 1972 the island group has been under the de facto administrative control of Japan.

In 1968, four years before the 1972 reversion, a potential reserve of hydrocar-bon presumably equal to the greatest in the world was discovered in the seabed around Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus. Japan asserts this discovery to be the reason for China’s claim after decades of silence.

The current dispute is infused with a strong, US-driven narrative of China

3 The author is of the view that there is only one China and that China Taiwan and China Mainland are integral parts of this one China. Therefore, in this article the author uses “China” to refer to both China Mainland and China Taiwan when both are in agreement with regard to their claims over Diaoyu Dao. When a distinct reference is called for, as at different periods when the official representative government at the UN differs or when their claims are different, then China Mainland or Beijing and China Taiwan or Taipei are used.


being the provocateur, completely ignoring the fact that it was Japan who nationa-lized three islands in the face of China’s stern warning not to do so. From the Chi-nese perspective, Japan violates both in deeds and words the tacit agreement the two countries reached in 1972 and reaffirmed in 1978 to shelve the contentious issue.

In response China begins to challenge Japan’s de facto control of the islands, dispatching marine surveillance ships and airplanes into the Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus surroundings on a patrol and law enforcement mission as Japan has done for years. Japan roundly accuses China of intrusion into its territorial space. But few Anglophone observers and commentators know or bother to point out that the very concept of territorial space in sea and air is derived from the notion of unquestioned sovereignty to a given region; territorial space cannot be said to exist when there are unresolved competing claims.

In an effort to lower the tension, Western observers suggest the parties should submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a resolution. Japan demurs, indicating that with its de facto control of the islands, it should not be the one to make the first move.4 Few, however, realize that Japan’s acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction is based on “all disputes arising on and after 15 September 1958 with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date and being not settled by other means of peaceful settlement.”5 Given Japan’s reservations when the bulk of evidentiary materials to support China’s claim is pre-1958, an ICJ adjudication is highly unlikely even if China were to accept ICJ’s com-

4 Koichiro Genba, Japan–China Relations at a Cross-Road, New York Times, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/opinion/koichiro-genba-japan-china-relations-at-a-crossroads.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&ref=japan, 26 February 2013. Regarding submitting the dispute to ICJ, Koichiro Genba answered “[t]his is a question that is often wrongly directed toward Japan. It is Japan that has valid control over the Senkaku Islands under international law, and it is China that is seeking to challenge the status quo. The question should be posed to China. Japan has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory. Since China is undertaking various campaigns to promote their assertions in international forums, it seems to make sense for China to seek a solution based on international law. Why don’t they show any signs of accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory and taking their arguments to the ICJ?”

5 Japan resubmitted a declaration in 2007, at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=JP, 26 February 2013. This is the same as the one in the I.C.J. Yearbook 1988–1989, 1989, pp. 74~75, quoted in Hungdah Chiu, An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over T’iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto), Chinese (Taiwan) Year Book of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 15, 1996–1997, pp. 9~31.


pulsory jurisdiction.6

Still other Japanese politicians attribute China’s reluctance to settle the disputeby an international court to the shaky legal basis of its claim,7 fueling the specula-tion that China would most certainly lose in any adjudication under international law. In view of this dominant Western and Japanese narrative, this paper proposes to critically evaluate China’s claim against Japan’s. Which of these countries has the better right to title under international law?

II. A Historic Title or a Title by Occupation of Terra Nullius?

China claims a historic title to Diaoyu Dao until it was ceded to Japan in 1895 in the Treaty of Maguan after the first Sino-Japanese War. Japan claims that, after repeated surveys of the islands in which they were found to be terra nullius, it incorporated them in 1895. An evaluation of these two claims follows.

A. China’s Claim to a Historic Title

The term “historic title,” sometimes referred to as “historical title,” appears in various well-known rulings of the International Court of Justice.8 In other judicial/arbitral cases, the concept is also used interchangeably with the term of “ancient”

6 Of course both countries can request arbitration with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) or any other arbitral bodies. But before the arbitral tribunal can be constituted, both Japan and China would have to sign an agreement to bring the case to PCA and to abide by its decision. Then the agreement has to spell out scope of the dispute; each party is allowed to appoint same number of arbitrators to sit on the tribunal, etc. Neither party needs to make the first move in a PCA case. China cannot bring suit without Japan’s agreement; neither could Japan without China’s agreement. Both have to agree on the parameters of the dispute. In other words, any caveats would have to be accepted by the other party. Such a pre-arbitration agreement is unlikely.

7 Kenichiro Sasae (Japan’s Ambassador to the United States), New Envoy Vows to Push for TPP Talks, Downplays Isle Row with China, The Mainichi, at http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20121128p2g00m0dm072000c.html, 27 February 2013. Kenichiro Sasae said “[i]f they (China) are really confident about their territorial problem, I don’t know why they are not going to the ICJ.” “I think they don’t have any confidence or basis for their claims,” he added.

8 For example, in the Fishery Case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 130; in ICJ’s verdict in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, I.C.J. Reports, 1953, p. 53.


or “original” title.9

The acquisition of a historic title is not a process that is much distinct from the customary mode of occupation as an examination of its three constituent elements shows.10 First, there must be a sufficient lapse of time such that the title created “has so long been established by common repute that this common knowledge is itself a sufficient.”11 Historic rights accorded the title, Blum observes, “are the product of a lengthy process comprising a long series of acts, omissions and patterns of behavior which, in their entirety, and through their cumulative effect, bring such rights into being and consolidate them into rights valid in international law.”12 Second, the state must maintain an open, continuous and peaceful exercise of sovereignty over the territory. The range and scope of activities undertaken by a state constituting evidence of its sovereign authority is very wide. As to the last element, various ter-ms have been proposed to capture its essence such as acquiescence, explicit recogn-ition, and positive consent.13 The International Law Commission employs the term of “tolerance,” namely, toleration by other states of the effective and continued so-vereignty of a state over a given territory.14 In fact, Blum considers this last element, which he calls acquiescence, to be the legal basis for the formation of a historic title, “the very pillar of historic rights.”15 Summarizing these elements and applying them to the case in point, a historic title then is considered to have emerged and sustain-ed, if China had exercised continuous sovereignty over the islands from time imme-morial to 1895 under the general toleration of other states.

9 The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) between India and Pakistan, 19 February 1968, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XVII, p. 436; The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, Phase I: Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute, 9 October 1998, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXII, pp. 211~334; Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), I.C.J. Reports, Judgment of 23 May 2008, para. 290, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf, 3 August 2013.

10 Artur Kozlowski, The Legal Construct of Historic Title to Territory in International Law – An Overview, Polish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 30, 2000, pp. 68~78.

11 Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, Phase I: Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute, 1998, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXII, p. 239, para. 106.

12 Yehuda Zvi Blum, Historic Rights, in R. Bernhardt ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. II, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1995, p. 711.

13 Yehuda Zvi Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965, pp. 53~55.

14 Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays: Study Prepared by the Secretariat, A/CN.4/143, Yearbook of International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1962, paras. 109~110.

15 Yehuda Zvi Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965, p. 131.


1. China’s Discovery and Naming of the Diaoyu DaoThe name “Diaoyutai” and other names such as “Chi Yu” first appeared during

the Southern Song dynasty in the 1221 geography book Yudi Jisheng by Wang Xiangzhi.16 Wang wrote about the provenance of and the myths associated with these names, which were originally given to famous landscape sites in China. It is quite likely that around the same time period, the Chinese discovered the islands, but no record of the discovery has been located to date.17 Suganuma conjectures that with the discovery, the emperor named these islands and the government recognized them as Diaoyutai, Chi Yu and so on, as was the custom then, during the six-year period from the publication of Wang’s book in 1221 until the disappearance of a large portion of it in 1227. Such conjecture seems plausible because the islands were already known by these names before the book Yudi Jisheng was rediscovered in toto in 1801;18 their names appear in extant official Ming and Qing records, defense manuals and books, Ryukyu documents and Japanese books.

2. Supporting Documents from the Ming Dynasty: The Compass Route to Ryukyu Kingdom

The official records containing the names of these islands in the Diaoyu Dao are the investiture mission reports. When Ryukyu became a tributary state of China in 1372, Chinese envoys were sent on cefeng missions to Ryukyu for the investiture of new Ryukyu kings. Upon each mission’s return to China, the envoy submitted a detailed written report to the emperor about his journey and these reports were stored as official documents in the imperial archive. It is in this context that various references to the Diaoyu Islands resurfaced in existent official records of the Ming dynasty.

The first investiture mission took place in 1373 and the last in 1866; in all, 24

16 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 42.

17 A look at the map of the East China Sea clearly shows there to be two probable candidates in the past to the discovery and claim to ownership of these islands, Ryukyu or China. Ryukyu according to historians, books and its official records had always claimed its kingdom to be comprised of 36 islands, excluding those of Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus.

18 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 44. Also on p. 44, “[h]istorically, before the Chinese adopted or used a new name of any landscape or location, the new name would have to be recognized by the government. The most likely case is that the emperor would name the location or rename a landscape in his honor…The Southern Song government, ergo, probably was responsible for recognizing the existence of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and naming these islands.”


cefeng missions were undertaken during the Ming and Qing dynasties.19 Fire in the imperial archive destroyed the records of the first 11 missions, so that when Chen Kan, the Chinese envoy, embarked on his mission in 1534, he had to rely on the directions gathered from previous officials and the accompanying Ryukyuans to inform him of the “compass route.” The compass route, which was the customary passage taken, was so called because it required the envoys, starting out from the seaport of Fuzhou, to reset their compass when they passed by each island so as to reach the next one, en route to the Ryukyu seaport of Naha. In essence Diaoyu and other Chinese islands on this route were used as navigational aids, “similar to modern-day beacons and lighthouses” built by states which the ICJ has accepted as an exercise of state function.20 Such usage of the islands was not confined to the Chinese; the Ryukyuans also used the islands as guides in the many more tributary missions they made to China.

During his 1534 voyage, Chen cited the Diaoyu Islands by names in their exact order as the ship sailed past them. When his ship drifted away from the compass route, the Ryukyuans who accompanied him reassured him that he was not far from the boundary between China and Ryukyu – and that he had not drifted so far as to come into the territory of Japan.21 Thus the official record of this mission clearly indicated a mutual recognition between Chinese and Ryukyuan officials of the international boundaries in the East China Sea. Further, the boundary between China and Ryukyu was described as being located “up to Kume Island,” while “Chiwei, Huangwei, and the Diaoyu Islands d[id] not belong to the territory of

19 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 46, 70.


21 Chen Kan, Shi Liuqiu (Rykyu) Lu [The Record of the Mission to the Liuqiu (Ryukyu) Kingdom], in Shi Liuqiu (Ryukyu) Lu Sanzhong, Taipei: Taiwan Yinhang, 1970, p. 13 (in Chinese), as quoted in Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 48.


the Liuqiu (Ryukyu) Kingdom,” 22 but rather implicitly to China. This implication was made explicit in Wang Ji’s 1683 mission record in which he stated it was “the boundary between China and foreign country.” 23 (See section on Qing Records below.)

Thus by the 16th century, China had clearly established an original or historic title to the islands based on the existent record of Chen’s 12th investiture mission. Documentation on the exact historical evolution from the probable discovery and actual naming in the 13th century to the consolidation of title to the islands may be lost forever. However, with regard to small and uninhabited islands “where the requisite evidence of occupation could not be collected,” 24 the performance of a symbolic act may be sufficient to establish an “exclusive title.” 25 Which act of possession could be more potently symbolic than the fact that the islands were named by Chinese with names of famous landscapes in China? Moreover, “Chinese cefeng missions to tributary states… signify symbolic acts of Chinese-fashion ‘sovereignty’ during both the Ming and Qing times.” 26 The fact that the islands figured so prominently in a symbolic sovereignty ceremony created “rights of sovereignty” that “cannot be denied.” 27 Although these may not be Western-style symbolic acts of possession, judicial and arbitral decisions in settling territory dis-putes repeatedly return to this notion that to apply Western rules to the acquisition

22 Inoue Kiyoshi, Senkaku Retto: Chogyo Shoto No Shiteki Kaimei, Tokyo: Daisan Shokan, 1996, p. 29, as quoted in Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 50. Since there was no other state bordering these islands which could have claimed them as part of their territory, it was obvious the boundary was between China and Ryukyu.

23 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 75; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 48.

24 Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 47.

25 Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 50, on Clipperton Island case; with respect to other inhabited territories, such symbolic possession would produce an inchoate title.




of an ancient title is nothing short of “sheer anachronism”28 and “highly artificial.”29 For example, in Rann of Kutch, the Court states “the rights and duties which by law and custom are inherent in and characteristic of sovereignty present considerable variations in different circumstances, according to time and place, and in the context of the various political systems.”30

Further, for centuries China’s title to these islands was acknowledged by Ryukyuan officialdom and known among Japanese scholars and even officials (See discussion of Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu below). Chen’s mission was accompanied by Ryukyuan envoys, as were many other missions. A passage in Chen’s record that identified the Diaoyu Islands and pointed to the implied boundary between Ryukyu and China was also found in the document written by a Ryukyu civil administrator, Sho Shoken.31 Absent challenges for centuries by other states in the region,32 China could be said to have attained a historic title to these islands.

3. Supporting Documents from the Ming Dynasty: Defense Manuals and Maps

Support for China’s claim is not confined to the cefeng records and general tolerance exhibited by other states. A non-symbolic indication of China’s title to these islands and its continuous display of state functions can be found in various defense manuals and maps of the Ming dynasty.

Prior to the Ming dynasty, the threat of foreign attacks came primarily from the north; thus the building of the Great Wall to fence off invasions by the barba-rians. During the Ming dynasty, attention shifted to the seas as Japanese pirates, called wokou, frequently raided China’s coastal areas, sometimes in collusion with Chinese pirates. In response to these raids, the Ming dynasty set up a maritime system to defend the coastal regions. Under the auspices of Hu Zongxian, the

28 The 1998 Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration, International Law Reports, Vol. 114, pp. 1, 116.29 The Dubai/Sharjah Arbitration Award (1981), International Law Reports, Vol. 91, pp. 543,

587.30 Indo–Pakistan Western Boundary Case (Rann of Kutch) (1968), International Law Reports,

Vol. 50, p. 2.31 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations:


32 As Diaoyu Dao is located close to the boundary between China and erstwhile Ryukyu, “there was no room for a third party to claim ownership,” and “there were no territorial disputes” between the two countries. See Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 112.


governor-general of Jiangsu region, Zheng Ruozeng, a noted geographer and master of military arts, published the Chouhai Tubian in 1561, an illustrated compendium on maritime security and the most well-known of the Ming defense manuals. In it, the Diaoyu Islands, i.e. Diaoyu Yu, Huangwei Yu and Chi (Chiwei) Yu, were shown in two separate maps illustrating the perimeter defense of the coastal region from Shandong to Guangdong. The reproduction of the maps in subsequent Ming defense publications merely reaffirmed the islands’ continuing role in a naval system for enforcing the Ming dynasty’s jurisdictional boundary.33

4. Supporting Documents from the Ming Dynasty: A Navigational Logbook

Interestingly enough, the earliest extant reference to the Diaoyu Dao is not found in the cefeng mission records but in a Chinese navigational logbook entitled Shunfeng Xiangsong (Fair Winds for Escort) which was published probably as early as 1403 by an unknown author or authors. Included in the various routes of Ming navigation is the Fuzhou–Ryukyu compass route, with suggestions of how to set and reset the compass for a successful voyage to Ryukyu.34 Shunfeng Xiangsong provided not only critical navigational information but also geographical knowle-dge by its portrayals of the ports on the different routes, along with the season and time of departure. Specifically with regard to the Fuzhou–Ryukyu route, the Diaoyu island was apparently not only used as a navigational marker but also as a major port of refuge, for its description included this information: “berths with a depth of 15 tuo (80 inches) on Diaoyutai are good for refueling wood and drinking water.”35

5. Supporting Documents from the Qing Dynasty

33 Xu Bida, Qiankun Yitonghai FangQuanTu, 1605; Mao Yuanyi, Wubei Zhihaifang Erfu Jianyanhai Shansha Tu, 1621, as cited in Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 61~63; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 56. Japan questions the importance of these copies, clearly missing the point that they are evidence of a continuous display of state functions. Intermittency has not been a problem with ICJ but continuity has proven essential (in, for example, the Island of Palmas case).

34 Shunfeng Xiangsong, 1403?, reprint Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1975, p. 1 (in Chinese); also republished in Xiang Da ed., Liangzhong Haidao Zhenjing (Two Logbooks), Bejing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1961 (in Chinese). According to Shunfeng Xiangsong, navigational logbooks were written as early as the Zhou dynasty in the 11th century; unfortunately none of those survived.

35 Shunfeng Xiangsong, 1403?, reprint Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1975, p. 13. (in Chinese)


Eight more of these cefeng missions took place during the Qing dynasty, the last one in 1866. Of note is the 1683 mission, in which Wang Ji was accompanied by a Ryukyuan delegation sent by the new Ryukyu King to forestall any needless wanderings on the high seas.36 In Wang’s description of this voyage after passing the Chiwei island, not only was the boundary noted but was now clearly identified as that between China and Ryukyu, recognized by both the Chinese and Ryukyu envoys:

“At dusk as the boat passed the outskirts (or trough), heavy winds and strong tides rose up. (A ritual of crossing the trough took place.) Upon [my] inquiring about what the outskirts meant, I (Wang) was told that it was the boundary between Chinese and foreign land.”37

The trough in this passage is the Okinawa Trough, commonly known at the time as the heishuigou. It created a sense of fear, as the water changes suddenly from a green to an ink black color where the continental shelf slopes precipitously into the East China Sea. Crossing its unpredictable currents led to a customary ritual to pray for the sea god’s help called guogouji or haishenji.38 The trough was recognized by both countries as the exact delimitation and legitimate maritime boundary between Ryukyu and China.39 Thus long before the appearance of Western concepts of international law and sovereignty, this Pax Sinica that China created had interna-tional boundaries, customarily recognized and respected by tributary and neighbo-ring states.

Of the mission records written during the Qing era, the most authoritative


37 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 48.

38 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 51~53. A description of this ritual can be found in records as far back as the 13th mission of Guo Rulin during the Ming dynasty.

39 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 53; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 48.


and widely known beyond China is the Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu, written by Xu Baoguang in 1719. Xu’s work contained detailed descriptions of Ryukyu, a map of its 36 islands (which excludes the Diaoyu Islands), and maps of his journey, including the famed compass route. In its preface, “Xu specifically mentioned ... his work was completed and validated with the assistance of high-ranking Ryukyuan officials sent by the (Ryukyu King), in particular, the distinguished Tei Junsoku,”40 the famed Ryukyuan scholar and geographer. Accordingly, this Lu again reaffirmed Chinese and Ryukyuan official recognition of their maritime boundary – and therefore the status of the Diaoyu Islands at the time.41

After Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu found its way to Japan, it was translated into Japanese and became the main source of knowledge about Ryukyu in Japan during the late Edo era. Even Japanese officials in the late 19th century knew of this text. For in the exchanges of the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate and the Home Minister in 1885 regarding the possibility of annexing three of the Diaoyu Islands, both referred to the Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu. More specifically, the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate voiced his concern over the fact that the islands that were presumably terra nullius might be the same as the ones that were recorded in the Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu. However, the Home Minister, while acknowledging the islands might be the same, dismissed the significance of their reference to aver the islands showed no signs of belonging to anyone.42

The practice of incorporating the islands into the maritime defense of China also continued through the Qing dynasty, although during this period the islands were more closely tied to China Taiwan after Taiwan’s official incorporation into


41 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, pp. 46~47; Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 74~77.

42 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, pp. 72~74.


Chinese territory in 1683.43 The first surviving record in which this connection was made is Huang Shujing’s book Taihaishi Chalu (A Tour of Duty in the Taiwan Straits). Huang completed the report after he was dispatched to China Taiwan in 1722 as a provincial censor. Focusing primarily on China Taiwan, Huang still managed to provide valuable information on the Diaoyu Dao in Volume 2, which discussed Taiwan’s military preparation. The Diaoyu island was included in Taiwan’s patrol routes; its viability for naval deployment was evidenced by the statement that “in the seas north of Taiwan is an island Diaoyutai where ten or more large ships may be anchored.”44 This description of the island was repeated, in some cases in greater detail, in various local annals covering the administrative area of the Taiwan prefecture of Fujian province.45 Later annals such as, among others, Volume 86 of the Recompiled General Annals of Fujian, compiled by Chen Shouqi in 1871, showed that the Diaoyu island was placed under the naval command of the administrative unit of Gemalan/Kavalan (known as Yilan County today), China

43 China Taiwan is naturally treated quite differently from the uninhabited Diaoyu Dao. Taiwan was not taken possession of by China in an act of naming it after a famous place in China. Its discovery may have been attributed to the Portuguese but Taiwan was already inhabited at the time by indigenous people and immigrants from China Mainland. More importantly although Taiwan might also have appeared in mission records etc., it was later fought over and colonized by foreign powers. Therefore China did not consider Taiwan to have been official Chinese territory until it was incorporated in 1683.

44 “ Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan)”, The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of Taiwan, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/official/Home/Detail/4ad52054-ebc7- 452c-a6c1-d182b25c8001?arfid=2b7802ba-d5e8-4538-9ec2-4eb818179015&opno=027ffe5 8-09dd-4b7c-a554-99def06b00a1, 5 January 2013. The translation of this passage differs

slightly from author to author. See Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 86; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 57.

45 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 57. Shaw discussed the official nature of these local annals or gazetteers in note 68 at pp. 57~58, tracing their official nature back to the Tang dynasty in 780 A.D., during which all sub-prefectures were required to submit one every few years covering various aspects of the local unit including administrative structure, local affairs, customs and noteworthy personages and sites, geography, and so on.


Taiwan.46

In sum, China’s evidence based on Ming and Qing documents demonstrates an original title was created. Further, this title was perfected by China’s open, continuous and peaceful exercise of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Dao which was tolerated by other states for centuries.

B. Japan’s Claim of Terra Nullius

Against the above-discussed evidence of China’s historic possession of these islands, Japan maintains, after repeated surveys, it determined the Senkakus to be terra nullius and incorporated it in the midst of the first Sino-Japanese War. But a closer look at the documents of the incorporation process, declassified in the 1950s, shows these to contradict directly Japan’s assertion that the islands “showed no trace of having been under the control of Qing dynasty of China.”47 For, in addition to the exchanges of the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate and the Japanese Home Minister mentioned above, these declassified documents repeatedly and specifically mention “Qing China” thereby conveying Japan’s initial concern about arousing China’s suspicion. Although the Home Minister was eager to have the islands annexed in 1885, the Foreign Minister intervened to have the process delayed until the arrival of the appropriate moment. That moment came 10 years later in November 1894, with Japan’s assurance of China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war. Despite the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) current claim, the declassified documents also reveal that, apart from the initial survey, no further investigation of the islands was done between 1885 and 1895.48

The process to incorporate, initiated in December of 1894, resulted in the

46 Chinese Government Official Web Portal, White Paper: Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China, at http://english.gov.cn/official/2012-09/25/content_2232763.htm, 5 January 2013; “Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)”, The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of Taiwan, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/TopicsArticleDetail/fd8c3459-b3ec-4ca6-9231-403f2920090a, 5 January 2013; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, pp. 58~59.

47 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, answer to Q5, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 19 March 2013.

48 Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, New York Times, at http://kristoff.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-inconvenient-truth-behind-the-diaoyusenkaku-islands/, 8 February 2013.


Cabinet’s Decision of January 14, 1895. However the Cabinet Decision was not ratified by an Imperial Edict, a requirement under the Meiji Constitution for the incorporation to take effect. “Consequently, the decision of the Japanese cabinet to give permission to build a national landmark (on the Diaoyu Islands) on April 1, 1896, cannot be considered a formal or valid law enacted by the state.”49 In addition, with the “information” derived from the so-called “surveys,” the Cabinet annexed only two of the three islands it initially investigated in 1885, Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-jima; the Taisho-jima islet was not annexed until 1921.50

In its incorporation of other islands that it regarded as terra nullius at about the same time, Japan made every effort to follow the prevailing international standards such as conducting thorough surveys of the islands, ratifying the cabinet decision by Imperial Edict, and publicizing the information in Kanpo (Official Gazette).51 This and all the above-mentioned factors militate against the claim that Japan determined the Senkakus to be terra nullius in 1895.52

Recognizing the claim of terra nullius may not stand, some Japanese and American scholars contend that Japan could have gained sovereignty under the modality of prescription; that is to say, Japan could have acquired title to the Senka-kus when it presumed its ownership was unknown, uncertain or questionable. How-ever, “scholarly opinion and international jurisprudence have long had reservations and to some extent continue to do so about prescription.”53 Besides, acquiescence to prescription should only be assumed in cases where the acquiescing state has


50 Steven Wei Su, The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 36, 2005, p. 60; see the status of the other five outcroppings at Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1973, p. 246, note 3.


52 For a more detailed discussion of the secretive incorporation of Diaoyu Dao, see Ivy Lee and Fang Ming, Deconstructing Japan’s Claim of Sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 53, No. 1, at http://japanfocus.org/site/view/3877, 8 August 2013.

53 Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), I.C.J. Reports, Judgment of 23 May 2008, para. 15, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf, 3 August 2013.


constructive knowledge of the prescriptive state’s claim.54 Japan, however, took great care to deny China that constructive knowledge, keeping the incorporation of the islands secret until the documents were declassified in the 1950s,55 while the islands were not named Senkakus until 1900.56 A more thorough evaluation of a variant of this contention will be presented in the later section on “Effective Control.”

C. Historic Title Consolidated and Maintained vs. Occupation of Terra Nullius

To the Japanese government, “[n]one of the arguments that the Chinese govern-ment or Taiwanese authorities have presented as historical … grounds is valid evi-dence under international law to support the Chinese assertion of its territorial so-vereignty over the Senkaku Islands.” 57 Although China might not have exercised state functions as Western states have done, in applying present-day standards to China’s historical evidence and in completely ignoring their evidentiary context, Japan fails to appreciate the ICJ’s opinion in the Western Sahara Case. In it, the ICJ specifically states that “where sovereignty over territory is claimed, the particular structure of a State may be a relevant element in appreciating the reality or otherwise of a display of State activity adduced as evidence of that sovereignty,” especially when no international law “requires the structure of a State to follow any particular pattern.” 58

Furthermore, Japan ignores the fact that prior to the 18th century, a mere sym-bolic act might have conferred an exclusive title to uninhabited islands. Besides, even if intertemporal law for the maintenance of title in inhabited territory is taken

54 Judge Dugard expressed this view in his dissenting opinion on the Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh case stating “[p]ublicity is an essential requirement for prescription” in Dissenting Opinion of Judge Dugard, para. 33, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14502.pdf, 3 August 2013.


56 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 93~94.

57 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, answer to Q5, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 4 March 2013.

58 Eric Heinze and M. Fitzmaurice eds., Landmark Cases in Public International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, p. 424.


into account, China’s continuous display of sovereignty before 1895 as evidenced in the Ming and Qing documents, would suffice to support its claim. Additional evidence to cement China’s claim to a historic title can be found in the toleration of Chinese sovereignty by other states. Examples of this include the Ryukyuan and Japanese use of the Chinese names for these islands before the 20th century, the use of Hoa-pin-san (Diaoyu island) and Tia-usu (Huangwei island) by Captain Edward Belcher in his 1840s voyage on the H.M.S. Samarang,59 and maps published by Japan and other Western countries indicating the islands were Chinese territory.60

In the past the ICJ has not shown much interest in adjudicating historical controversies,61 especially when such claims are charged with questions of national identity and emotionalism.62 China’s claim of an original title, however, should be non-controversial, for like the Eastern Greenland case it is a claim of title versus one of terra nullius by Japan.63 In addition the claim is made in the context of a chain of claims that rests eventually on formal international agreements. These agreements have properties similar to treaties, while treaties are the most persuasive and juridically justifiable of all territorial claims in the ICJ’s view.64

59 Edward Belcher, Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang during the Years, 1834-46, Vol. 1, London: Reeve, Benham, and Reeven, 1848 as cited in Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 89-90.

60 In Japan, for example, the oldest existent Japanese document affirming China’s title to the Diaoyu Dao was a map by Hayashi Shihei, a noted Japanese geographer, in 1785. Although his map was dismissed by Japanese apologists as being based on China’s Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu, the mere possibility demonstrates the authoritativeness and the widespread acceptance of the book and its contents among Japanese scholars at the time. Other foreign acknowledgments consist of maps such as that in The Empire of China with Its Principal Divisions by Robert Sayer in 1790, and Atlas of the World by Rand McNally & Co. in 1894, as indicated in Edward Belcher, Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang during the Years, 1834–46, Vol. 1, London: Reeve, Benham, and Reeven, 1848; also see Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 91.

61 For example in The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, I.C.J. Reports, 1953, p. 56, the Court states “[f]or the purpose of deciding the present case it is, in the opinion of the Court, not

necessary to solve these historical controversies.”62 Andrew F. Burghardt, The Bases of Territorial Claims, Geographical Review, Vol. 63, No. 2,

1973, p. 230.63 Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 77.64 Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, Duke Law

Journal, Vol. 53, 2004, pp. 1779~1812.


III. Cession through the Treaty of Maguan/Shimonoseki, or Non-Cession but Cabinet Incorporation?

China claims to have ceded the Diaoyu Dao to Japan through the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty, signed in April 1895. Japan maintains otherwise as the Treaty did not expressly name the island group. Indeed the pertinent portion of article 2 of the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty only mentions “all islands appertaining or belonging to (Taiwan)”:

China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon:

(b) The island of Formosa (Taiwan), together with all islands appertain-ing or belonging to the said island of Formosa (Taiwan).65

As the foregoing section of this paper has established China’s superior claim to an original title, the question remains as to whether Diaoyu Dao was included in the rather ambiguous phrase, “islands appertaining or belonging to,” that evidently refers to a set of islands without specifying each. A map did not accompany article 2(b) of the treaty to delimit the boundaries of Taiwan and its appertaining islands,66 and it is not known what maps, if any, the treaty drafters consulted.

A. Exploring Competing Claims in the Context of the “Ordinary Meaning” of the Treaty

The ICJ has applied the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties(VCLT) to interpret treaties concluded before the VCLT came into being, conside-

65 The signatories agreed to use the English version of this treaty as the authentic text should any controversies arise regarding the intent and meaning of the treaty; see Quan Hexiu, An Examination of the Similarities and Differences in Wording of the Chinese, Japanese and English Version of the Treaty of Maguan, The 21st Century, No. 86, 2004, pp. 38~39 (in Chinese). Treaty of Maguan/Shimonoseki, at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm, 19 March 2013.

66 A map of the Liaotung Peninsula and “appertaining islands” of southern Fengtien was attached to the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty; however, Japan was forced by the European powers to retrocede that portion of Fengtien together with its appertaining islands.


ring them to be derived from and to have the force of customary international law.67 Article 31 of the VCLT states that a treaty “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”68 Accordingly, ascertaining the “ordinary meaning” of the vague phrase “islands appertaining or belonging to” is critical. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “to appertain” as “to belong or be connected as a rightful part or attribute.” Were the island chain included in article 2(b) of the treaty, then the phrase clearly points to some sort of rightful connection or relationship between Diaoyu Dao and Taiwan. China points to, among others, an administrative and historical, as well as a geographical and geological relationship between these two.

1. China’s Claim: An Administrative and Historical Relationship

From a legal standpoint, the most persuasive may be an administrative relation-ship, namely, the fact that Diaoyu Dao had been placed historically under the ad-ministration of Taiwan after the latter’s 1683 incorporation into the territory of the Qing dynasty. A significant piece of supportive evidence is the above-noted imperial censor Huang Shujing’s Taihaishi Chalu (A Tour of Duty in the Taiwan Straits) in the 1720s, which described Diaoyu island’s position in Taiwan’s maritime patrol routes as the location where ten or more large ships could be anchored. Further, as previously mentioned, Chen Shouqi’s 1871 Recompiled General Annals of Fujian specifically listed the island under Gemalan (now Yilan County), Taiwan Prefecture, in Volume 86 on Coastal Defense and Strategically Important Places in all Districts.

Taiwan in turn emerged as the key to the late Qing dynasty’s maritime defense.As early as 1737, the Grand Secretary and Minister of Rites, Wu Jin, wrote in hismemorial (as communication to the emperor is called) that Taiwan was “the gate-

67 For a discussion of the problems associated with what might be considered a retroactive application of the VCLT, see Hazel Fox, Application of Article 31(3)(A) and (B) of the Vienna Convention and the Kasikili/Sedudu Case, in M. Fitzmaurice, Olufemi A. Elias and Panos Merkouris eds., Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Leiden: BRILL, 2010.

68 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force 27 January 1980, article 31(1), at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a10.html, 9 August 2013.


way to the outer seas and the hedgerow of the bordering oceans.”69 But Taiwan’s strategic importance was not fully recognized until Japan’s Taiwan Expedition in 1874. Imperial Japan’s dispatch of an expeditionary force to attempt to take control of Taiwan set in motion a series of governmental responses that led to the eventual separation of Taiwan from the Fujian province and its establishment as a province in 1885. The French blockade of the island during the Sino-French war in 1884 ad-ded further impetus as China had to send its army to defend its maritime frontier. Hence maritime defense became a priority etched in Qing dynasty’s consciousness, while Taiwan, being “the gateway to the seven coastal provinces,” was considered “crucial to the whole national defense.”70 Diaoyu Dao, which was part and parcel of maritime defense since the Ming dynasty and administered by Taiwan when the latter was a prefecture, naturally remained an appertaining island at Taiwan’s emergence as a Chinese maritime province.

2. China’s Claim: A Geographical and Geological Relationship

Present-day scientific knowledge also reveals that Diaoyu Dao is geographi-cally a part of Taiwan. For example, the herpetofauna of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is found to be distinct from that of other parts of the Ryukyu archipelago, but is similar to that of China Taiwan and eastern continental China.71 A mole endemic to the Diaoyu island is discovered to be morphologically most similar to the mole found in China Taiwan, rather than to other species of moles found elsewhere.72 Further “[t]hese islands are situated in the northbound path of the Kuroshio Current, and share the same monsoon zone with [China] Taiwan. Thus, the air and water currents are favorable for sail from northern [China] Taiwan to Diaoyutai Islands, and not favorable for sail from the Ryukyu Islands to the

69 Taian Huilu Bingji (Collected Materials on Taiwan, Vol. 3), Taiwan 176, Taipei: Taiwan Yinghang, 1963, pp. 291~293. (in Chinese)

70 From the 1877 memorial submitted by Zuo Zongtang, head of the Hunan Army in the Xinjiang Campaigns, in Katoaka Kazutada, Shincho Shinkyo Tochi Kenkyu (Study on Qing Dynasty’s Governance of Xinjiang), Kaga: Yuzankaku, 1991, p. 142.

71 H. Ota, H. Sakaguchi, S. Ikehara and T. Hikida, The Herpetofauna of the Senkaku Group, Ryukyu Archipelago, Pacific Science, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993, p. 248.

72 M. Motokawa, L-k Lin, H. C. Cheng and M. Harada, Taxonomic Status of the Senkaku Mol- e, Nesoscaptor uchidai, with Special Reference to Variation in Mogera insularis from Taiwan

(Mammalis: Insectivora), Zoological Science, Vol. 18, 2001, pp. 733~740.


Diaoyutai Islands.”73

Paleogeographical evidence indicates that most islands of the Diaoyu group and China Taiwan were connected to the eastern margin of the continent during themost recent glacial period, while the Ryukyu archipelago was never connected bydry land with China.74 Thus, the continental shelf on which China Taiwan and Diao-yu Dao sit is a “prolongation of China’s land territory.”75 The edge of this continen-tal shelf is marked by the Okinawa Trough, “an important geomorphological unitwith prominent cutoff characteristics,”76 formed by a sudden topographical change involving a significant drop in sea depth reaching a maximum of over 2,300 me-ters.77

The above scientific information bolsters China’s claim that Diaoyu Dao appertains to China Taiwan. The ICJ has opined in the 1999 Kasikili/Sendudu case that “[i]n order to illuminate the meaning of words, there is nothing that prevents the Court from taking into account the present-day scientific state of knowledge,” in interpreting the ordinary meaning of the “main channel” in the 1890 treaty between Germany and Great Britain.78 The Court cited the 1994 Arbitral Award of the Laguna del Desierto Case to support its use of current information derived from science.79 In two other cases that deal with defining the states’ relevant coasts, the Court further emphasized the need to “be faithful to the actual geographical

73 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)”, The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of Taiwan, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/TopicsArticleDetail/fd8c3459-b3ec-4ca6-9231-403f2920090a, 8 February 2013. See also Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Report, The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Oil Under Troubled Waters?, CIA/BGI GE 71-9, May 1971, Point 11, p. 6, at http://cryptome.org/2013/07/guccifer-cia-senkaku.pdf#sthash.sadTucKD.dpuf, 8 October 2013.

74 H. Ota, H. Sakaguchi, S. Ikehara and T. Hikida, The Herpetofauna of the Senkaku Group, Ryukyu Archipelago, Pacific Science, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993, p. 248.




78 Case Concerning Kasikili/Sendudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, I.C.J. Reports, 1999, p. 1060, para. 20.

79 Laguna del Desierto Case, International Law Reports, Vol. 113, p. 76, para 157.


situation”80 in one, and to avoid “completely refashioning nature”81 in the other.3. Social Construct, Societal Recognition and

Linguistic Usage LinkageTo a certain extent, this 20th-century information merely provides a much

better understanding of the physical bases for social constructs that existed since the 16th-century. For instance, constructs such as “heishuigou”, i.e., the OkinawaTrough, attest to the fact that Chinese and Ryukyuans implicitly recognized these geographic/geological features and used them to order their social world and delimit their “guojiaojie”, i.e., their national boundary. The Kuroshio Current un-derlay the cefeng missions’ departure time in May or June to Ryukyu and their return in October when the winds and currents were favorable for such voyages as noted in the 15th century book, Shunfeng Xiangsong (Fair Winds for Escort). Together, these characteristics of the natural world structured the centuries-old compass route of the imperial envoys, which linked the various Diaoyu Islands with China Taiwan.

Zheng Shungong, who was well versed in maritime trade and familiar with Japan, was sent by a governor-general of the Jiangsu region to Japan for a lengthy stay in order to gather information on the wokou route. He wrote in his 1565 RibenYijian (A Mirror of Japan) that Diaoyu island was a “xiaodong xiaoyu ye”, i.e., a small island that is a part of Taiwan.82 Rather than being a refutation of China’s claim per some Japanese’s assertion, as at the time Taiwan had not yet been official-ly annexed by China, Zheng’s statement merely shows how a conceptualization derived from the physical world shaped the Chinese experience and their view of the connectedness of various parts of their social world. Wu Tianying, a Chinese scholar specializing on the Diaoyu Dao issue, speculates this statement might also have reflected the common understanding in Japan in those days.83

When in 1885 the Japanese foreign minister urged caution in proceeding

80 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1985, p. 45, para. 57.

81 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 49, para. 91. 82 Zheng Shungong, Riben Yijian, Vol. 5, 1565; reprint Beijing? (1909), p. 4; quoted in Unryu

Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 65. Taiwan at the time was also named “xiaodong.”

83 Wu Tianying, A Textual Research on the Ownership of the Diaoyu Islands to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Also a Query to Professor Toshio Okuhara and Others, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1994, pp. 77~81. (in Chinese)


with the incorporation of the Diaoyu Islands because Chinese newspapers were abuzz with reports of suspicious Japanese activities there, a headline of the 1885 Shanghai-based Shen Bao newspaper reads, “An Alarming Report Concerning the Island of Taiwan”84 and not “An Alarming Report Concerning the Island of Diaoyutai.” Moreover, 19th-century fishermen of northern China Taiwan found their rich fishing grounds and livelihood around the island chain.85 When necessary they sought shelter from the storm on the Diaoyu island, leaving remains of their wreckages that were discovered in the 1840s by Captain Edward Belcher on his tour of the area in the H. M. S. Samarang.86

Thus the myriad linkages between Diaoyu Dao and China Taiwan were not confined to the historical and administrative aspects; nor would the account be complete by adding the geographic/geological factors. It is the devolution of these elements to the linguistic and societal connection, that is, the social construct and perception of the Diaoyu Islands as being a part of China Taiwan that speaks most eloquently for China’s claim that the island chain was ceded through the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty.

4. Japan’s Claim of Non-CessionFrom an exploration of the “ordinary meaning” of the ambiguous phrase

above, Japan’s claim of non-cession based on the fact that the Senkakus was not explicitly mentioned in the Shimonoseki Treaty87 is questionable. Japan’s contention that the islands were already annexed approximately three months before the Treaty was signed does not stand either as, among other reasons, the islands were not terra nullius, and therefore not subject to acquisition by incorporation.

Japanese and other scholars have further pointed out that the separate treatment of Penghu (Pescadores) in another provision of the Shimonoseki Treaty means

84 Shaw’s translation of the Chinese newspaper. See Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 76.

85 Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1973, pp. 221~266.

86 Edward Belcher, Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang during the Years, 1834–46, Vol. 1, London: Reeve, Benham, and Reeven, 1848, pp. 315~320.

87 The term “Senkakus” is used here for convenience sake. Kuroiwa Hisashi coined the term after his private survey in 1900. Before that the Japanese navy for instance adopted Chinese and also incorporated English (British) nomenclature, confusing themselves and everyone else. See Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 89~96.


Penghu was not considered to be an island “appertaining” to China Taiwan. Since the Senkakus is much farther from China Taiwan than Penghu, it could not possibly be regarded as an “appertaining” island and was therefore not included in those islands that were ceded.88 But Penghu, then as now, was part of Taiwan province; in addition, Pengjia Yu which is further away than Penghu, was still acknowledged to be ceded in the Shimonoseki Treaty. Thus distance was not a major determining factor nor is it in the ICJ’s reasoning since the Court awarded to Singapore Pedra Branca, which is closer to and arguably on the territorial sea of Malaysia based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).89

It should be noted that Penghu at the time was strategically much more impor-tant than the Senkakus, for Japan mounted its successful attack on China Taiwan from Penghu during the first Sino-Japanese war. As Japan had its eyes on China Taiwan ever since its 1874 Expedition to Taiwan, it might have demanded in no uncertain terms Penghu’s cession in a separate provision of the Shimonoseki Treaty to guarantee its continued occupation of China Taiwan.

B. Exploring the Object and the Purpose of the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty

Per VCLT, an examination of the object and the purpose of the treaty may add to treaty interpretation; accordingly an exploration of the purpose of the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty follows. Unquestionably, the treaty’s main purpose was terri-torial and other concessions extracted as spoils of the war by the victor from the van-quished. The British minister to Japan learned that Japan began drafting its demands to be included in the peace settlement a few months after the war started in 1894.90 The employment of the ambiguous expression was probably for the convenience

88 Erdem Denk, Interpreting a Geographical Expression in a Nineteenth Century Cession Trea- ty and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, International Journal of Marine and Coastal

Law, Vol. 20 , No.1, pp. 100~101; Y. Matsui, International Law of Territorial Acquisition and the Dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, Japanese Annual of International Law, Vol. 40, 1997, note 2.

89 Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), I.C.J. Reports, Judgment of 23 May 2008, para. 290, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf, 3 August 2013.



of the drafters and signatories.91 The terms of the treaty can be expected to reflect mostly what Japan coveted from China.

The cession of Taiwan was one of Japan’s main objects in this treaty. An inspection of the trajectory of Japan’s territorial expansion, from the annexation of Ryukyu to the colonization of Taiwan, shows the inclusion of the Senkakus, situated in between those two island groups, as part of the concession was most likely on the minds of the Japanese drafters. Despite the fact that the island chain was known to Japan as being navigational aids on the route from Fuzhou to Ryukyu in those days, the 1884 so-called discovery of the islands, was accredited in Japan to Koga Tatsushiro from Fukuoka. When Koga applied to Okinawa Prefecture for a lease of the islands after the “discovery,” he was turned down, but he set in motion a secretive process to incorporate the islands beginning with the Home Minister’s proposal to place national markers on the islands in 1885. Therefore the intent was certainly there to take possession of these islands prior to the war. The cession treaty only legitimated Japan’s incorporation of Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus, an incorporation that the Cabinet could not effect because the January 1895 Cabinet Decision was never ratified by the emperor.

C. Exploring the Subsequent Conduct of Parties to the Treaty

According to the VCLT, “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty” may be taken into account to arrive at a more definitive interpretation of treaty language.92 China’s silence with regard to Diaoyu Dao accords with its understanding that it had ceded the islands after the first Sino-Japanese War; it was punctilious in observing the maxim of pacta sunt servanda, i.e., fulfilling its treaty obligations in good faith, without protest. The silence extended to those newspapers which were so eager to sound the alarm bells regarding suspicious Japanese activities on the islands in 1885; after the war they no longer took note of Koga’s development of the islands, or of his bringing over workers from Okinawa

91 At http://www.mofa.gov.tw/official/Home/Detail/217bb223-b19c-4b8e-a510-ee54dfae7fec?arfid=2b7802ba-d5e8-4538-9ec2-4eb818179015&opno=027ffe58-09dd-4b7c-a554-99def06b00a1, 12 August 2013; China Taiwan has a different explanation and believes the ambiguity was deliberately planted so as to facilitate claims of more islands later.

92 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into f- orce 27 January 27, 1980, Article 31(3)(b), at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a- 10.html, 12 August 2013.


to gather albatross feathers and to operate a bonito processing plant.Interestingly enough, subsequent behavior of the Japanese government also

appears to substantiate the point that the islands were ceded. Although the Cabinet Decision to incorporate Senkakus took place a few months before the signing of the treaty, it was never ratified by the emperor. Additionally, the decision named and incorporated only two of the three Senkaku islets that Japan professes to have tho-roughly surveyed to arrive at the terra nullius determination. Koga, who had repea-tedly applied for use of the islands since 1885, filed yet another application on June 10, 1895, six days after Japan officially occupied China Taiwan. In a biographyabout him, Koga attributed Japan’s possession of the islands to “the gallant military victory of our Imperial forces.”93 When the Ministry of Home Affairs finally appro-ved his application in September of 1896, Koga was granted a lease to four islands: Uotsuri-jima, Kuba-shima, Minami-kojima and Kita-kojima,94 while only two of them were “incorporated” according to the Cabinet Decision.

Japan points to the fact the Senkaku Islands have always been administered by Okinawa Prefecture; if ceded as appertaining islands of China Taiwan, they should have been kept under the jurisdiction of Taiwan. But once the process to have them incorporated began in 1885, two different Okinawa Prefectural governors had applied to have the islands put under their jurisdiction, one in 1890 and another in 1893, for the purpose of regulating marine products, fishing and related business attempts.95 Although the last petition asked for an urgent response, it was put aside until after the war, at which point the request proceeded along the line of least resistance already established before the war, and the islands were placed under

93 Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, New York Times, at http://kristoff.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-inconvenient-truth-behind-the-diaoyusenkaku-islands/, 8 February 2013.

94 Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., “R.O.C.” and Japan, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Vol. 1999, No. 3, 1999, p. 30. The corresponding Chinese names of these islets are Diaoyu Yu, Huangwei Yu, Nanxiao Dao and Beixiao Dao. In 1978, the islands were sold for a nominal price of 30 yen per 2.3 square meters to the Kurihara family. In 2012 Japan purchased and nationalized three of these islands. Kuba-shima, the fourth islet, is currently under the “ownership” of a relative of the Saitama businessman; it is being rented by Japanese Department of Defense for an undisclosed sum. See Jun Hongo, Tokyo’s Intention for Senkaku Islets, Japan Times, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/04/19/national/tokyos-intentions-for-senkaku-islets/#.UV8Q80oTSF8, 2 March 2013.



the administration of Okinawa Prefecture. Thus the fact that Senkakus was not administered by China Taiwan after 1895 has nothing to do with whether it was ceded or not.

In sum China appears to have a solid case in arguing that the Diaoyu Islands were ceded in the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty through an exploration of the ordin-ary meaning of the phrase “islands appertaining or belonging to” China Taiwan. This interpretation is additionally strengthened when the object and purpose, and the subsequent conduct of the parties to the treaty are taken into account.

IV. Resolution through the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, and the WWII Surrender Terms, or the San Francisco Peace Treaty?

Koga invested large sums of his own money to develop the islands after he was granted a lease to the Senkakus. With growing China–Japan tensions, he closed his business on the islands in the 1930s. The islands have remained uninhabited ever since.

During World War II, US President Franklin Roosevelt coined the term “UnitedNations” to represent the Allies. On New Year’s Day 1942, the Big Four (the US,Britain, Soviet Russia and China) came together to sign a United Nations Declara-tion that later became the basis of the modern United Nations (UN). This document states “[e]ach Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.”96

In 1943 Roosevelt conferred in Cairo with Winston Churchill of U.K. and Chiang Kai-shek of China; during the meeting all parties agreed “that territories taken from China by Japan, including Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores, would be returned to the control of the Republic of China after the conflict end-ed.”97 The resulting Cairo Declaration additionally states that “Japan will also be ex-pelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.”98

96 United Nations Declaration, 1 January 1942, at http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/charter/history /declaration, 23 March 2013. 97 Cairo Declaration, Dec. 1, 1943, 3 U.S.T. 858; U.S. Department of State Archive, Informa- tion released online from 2000–2009, at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/1071- 84.htm, 11 March 2013.98 United Nations Declaration, 1 January 1942, at http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/charter/history /declaration, 23 March 2013.


The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, outlined the terms of surrender forJapan, including an affirmation of the terms of the Cairo Declaration, plus a territor-ial delimitation of Japan to “the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as (the Allies) determine.”99 Thus “Japan was to be reduced to her pre-1894 territory and stripped of her pre-WWII empire including Korea and Taiwan, as well as all her recent conquests.”100 The actual instrument of surrender that Japan later signed in the same year pledges to accept the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration.

Thus China claims that when the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty is considered and interpreted as an integrated whole with these other relevant legal agreements, then Diaoyu Dao should have been returned to China after World War II.101 Japan maintains, on the other hand, that the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) should be the final arbiter on postwar disposition of its conquered and annexed territories.102

Since the SFPT did not specifically name Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus in its list of territories Japan must renounce under article II, Japan contends that the treaty affirms its title to the islands.103 Further, although the SFPT did not specifically include the islands under article III of the territories to be placed under the adminis-tration of the US via the UN trusteeship, the proclamation of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) No. 27, issued on December 25, 1953, did.104 Japan goes on to say the fact that China has expressed no objections

99 Potsdam Declaration, 26 July 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1204, para. 8, at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html, 11 March 2013.

100 Potsdam Declaration posted on the Princeton University site, at http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Potsdam_Declaration.html, 11 March 2013.

101 Both China Mainland and China Taiwan put forth the same claim. China Taiwan makes an additional point that in the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952, per article 4 Japan agreed to rescind all treaties signed with China before 1941. From the author’s point of view, it does not matter whether the islands are returned to China Taiwan or to China Mainland. China Taiwan and China Mainland are parts of the same country and eventually will be reunited into one indivisible China.

102 There are dissenting voices within Japan, the most recent of which is Prof. Yabuki’s. See his statement, “The issues of the Senkaku Islands and the Nansha Islands and Xisha Islands are symbolic of the fact that imperial Japan’s postwar settlement is not yet completed ,” in China-Japan Territorial Conflicts and the US–Japan–China Relations in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, The Asia–Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 9, No. 2, 2013.


104 United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) Number 27, (Washington, 1953) reprinted in Kikan Okinawa [Okinawa Quarterly] 56, 108.


to “the status of the Islands being under the administration of the United States … clearly indicates that China did not consider the Senkaku Islands as part of [China] Taiwan.”105

Japan’s reasoning is flawed because neither China Mainland nor China Taiwan was a signatory to that treaty. Moreover, while the SFPT was silent on the status of Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus, it is unreasonable to expect either Beijing or Taipei to raise a specific objection as to the island group’s disposal. Finally, although USCAR No. 27 subsequently included the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands within the boundaries of Nansei Shoto, the information about the latter was based on none other than a 1939 Japanese map Japan provided General Douglas MacArthur in September of 1945 immediately after its unconditional surrender.106

PRC Premier Zhou Enlai did in fact object, pointing to the treaty’s invalidity based on the United Nations Declaration of 1942. “China,” Zhou stated, “reserves [the] right to demand reparations from Japan and would refuse to recognize the treaty.” 107

The Taiwan administration kept silent about its rejection of the SFPT, being dependent at the time on the US for diplomatic recognition and economic and military assistance. While it might have recognized the article II of the SFPT later in the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, Taipei did not consider the treaty to


106 Unryu Suganuma explains in his October 3, 2013 blog, at http://chinajapanusrelations.blogspot.com/, 8 October 2013, that a confidential memo in the National Archive and Records Administration exposes how the US arrived at the boundaries of Nansei Shoto: “The term ‘Nansei Shotō’ was defined on the basis of a 1939 Japanese map to include the Sankaku [Senkaku] Islands, which were not specifically referred to in the (Peace) Treaty.” Suganuma then continues: “In other words, the information provided by Tokyo was the fundamental source for the U.S. determining the boundary of the Nansei Shoto. This is extremely ‘smart’ for the Japanese…”

107 From Documents on New Zealand External Relations [DNZER], Vol. III, 1095 (1985), quoted in John Price, A Just Peace? The San Francisco Peace Treaty in Perspective, Japan Policy Research Institute, Working Paper No. 78, June 2001.


have any bearing on the question of sovereignty.108 The postwar disposition of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands was not evident either, in view of the November 1943 conversation Roosevelt had with Chiang during a private dinner at Cairo. At the time Roosevelt asked Chiang whether China would want Ryukyu after the war;109 Chiang replied that he would accept joint administration with the US.110 As the conversation was conducted in the context of territorial restoration after the war, the US president’s intention to restore to China territories that Japan had gained through aggression after the war was much more unmistakable.

Although the terms of the SFPT were generous to Japan, the treaty was drafted to reflect the geopolitical and strategic interests of the US, with little attention devoted to the problem of settling territorial disputes of rival claimants in Asia. Despite Japan’s statement that “[t]he facts outlined herein (i.e., articles II and III in the SFPT) clearly indicate the status of the Senkaku Islands being part of the territory of Japan,” 111 these articles have no implication for the sovereignty of the islands. Indeed, the US made this point very clear in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearing in the US Congress in 1971.

Contrary to Japan’s desires, the US then and since has maintained neutrality with regard to the sovereignty issue and declares that it transferred administrative rights only in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.112 However, the US assures Japan that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are protected by article 5 of the 1960 US–Japan

108 When Taiwan administration realized too late this mistake in November 1953, Taipei raised objections to the American decision to “return” the Amami islands to Japan. However, over Taipei’s objections the US returned these islands as a “Christmas present” in December 1953. China Taiwan’s objections were recorded in “The Memorandum of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US Ambassador in Taipei,” November, 1953 and China, Legislative Yuan, Li-fa-yuan Kung-pao [The Records of the Legislative Yuan], 12th Session, No. 8 (15 January 1954), pp. 88~89, as noted in Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1973, p. 252.

109 See Chinese Summary Record [translation] of Roosevelt–Chiang Dinner Meeting [23 November 1943], FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 324.

110 See Chinese Summary Record [translation] of Roosevelt–Chiang Dinner Meeting [23 November 1943], FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 324.


112 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Okinawa Reversion Treaty Heari- ng, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 27–29 October 1971, (Washington, D.C.: US Goverment

Printing Office, 1971), pp. 89~90.


Mutual Security Treaty, which obligates the US to come to Japan’s aid if territories under Japanese administration are attacked.113 As to the “residual sovereignty” Japan claims to have retained over the islands,114 US officials explained at the 1971 Congressional Hearing that the term referred to the US intention and policy of returning to Japan all territories it administered pursuant to article III of the SFPT.115

To sum up, China is in a much stronger position in claiming that the Diaoyu Dao should have been returned after WWII. The wartime international agreements, i.e., Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, China cites, like treaties, are “something more than statements of expected future conduct.”116 The intent to create binding relations is evident.117 Thus the agreements are contractual in nature, creating legally recognizable expectations in terms of rights and obligations on all parties,118 especially when the Cairo Declaration was re-affirmed through the Potsdam Declaration, while the latter became the instrument of surrender to which Japan became a party by its acceptance. As to the SFPT, the US never recognizes the importance Japan attributes to it with respect to the disposition of the islands; the US position has always been that “the treaty alone is not necessarily the final

113 The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States, 11 U.S.T. 1632. It was signed on 19 January 1960, and entered into force on June 23 of the same year, commonly known as the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty.

114 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, answer to Q15, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 11 March 2013. “As is clearly expressed in a statement issued by Secretary of State Dulles at the San Francisco Peace Conference and in the Joint Communique of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi and U.S. President Eisenhower issued on June 21, 1957, the U.S. Government did recognize Japan’s ‘residual sovereignty’ over the Nansei Shoto Islands.”

115 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearing, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 27–29 October 1971, (Washington: US Govt. Print. Office, 1971); also New York Times, 23 April 1972, p. 17, col. 1.

116 Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 4th ed., New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003, p. 9, note 14.

117 The most important element common to international agreements is the intent to create binding relations; it is this element that makes the agreements legally binding. See Kelvin Widdows, What is An International Agreement in International Law?, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 20, 1979, pp. 117~149.

118 Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 4th ed., New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003, p. 9, note 14.


determinant of the sovereignty issue.”119

V. Could Japan Have Acquired Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands on the Basis of Effective Control?

In putting Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus under its administration along with Okinawa and other islands, the US had seemingly forgotten that the islands were China’s, previously administered by China Taiwan.120 Instead, at the start of the Cold War, in attempting to draw Japan into its “San Francisco System” which changed “Japan from a conquered and occupied country to a military ally,”121 the US appeared to have accepted the administrative arrangements of the pre-war Japanese government under which the Senkakus was attached to Okinawa Prefecture shortly after the Shimonoseki Treaty was signed. Since the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1972, the island group has been under the de facto administrative control of Japan.

Therefore, except for the 1945–1972 period during which it did not have “direct” control, Japan points to the “valid, (i.e., effective) control” it has exercised over the island group since 1895 as additional evidence it has sovereignty over the Senkakus.122 Justifications for territorial claims before the ICJ can generally be grouped into categories, with “effective control” being highly determinative in judicial decisions.123 The Minquiers and Echrehos Case, for instance, shows that “[n]o amount of historical or documentary evidence will trump the actual long-term, peaceful occupation or the exercise of state authority over a territory in

119 Seokwoo Lee, Territorial Disputes in East Asia, the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, and the Legacy of US Security Interest in East Asia, based on Telegram regarding Senkaku Islands (14 September 1970) US NARA/Doc. No.: Pol 32-6 Senkaku Is and XR Pol 33 China Sea (4 September 1970) in Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee eds., Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2011, p. 58, note 51.

120 According to China Taiwan, because Japan used Senkakus to refer to the islands, both China Taiwan and the Allies were unaware it was one and the same island group as Diaoyu Dao. Thus the islands were mistakenly placed under US trusteeship per article III of the SFPT. The author believes this may be another reason for the confusion in addition to the one-sided Japanese map General MacArthur was given and used.

121 Iriye Akira, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1974, p. 182.


123 Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 53, 2004, pp. 1779~1812.


controversy,”124 absent any protest from other states.However, as the ICJ also notes “in the Burkina Faso/Mali case, the word ‘title’

or sovereignty comprehends both any evidence which may establish the existence of a right and the actual source of that right.”125 Effective control is evidentiary in nature. From 1895 to 1945, the source of that right to exercise state authority might have stemmed legitimately from China’s cession of title in the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty. Putting aside for the moment China’s contention that the islands should have been returned after WWII, the question remains as to whether Japan has the “actual source of that right” from 1945 to date to exercise effective control.

In order to answer this question, the activities which comprise administrative versus effective control must first be explored. Under international law these overl-ap considerably.126 Thus, effective control may be said to include administrative acts and a range of other activities, while the exercise of administrative functions comprises part of effective control. As a result of this overlap, administrative and effective control may appear on the surface to be interchangeable. But the two are qualitatively different in the Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus dispute and cannot be equated with the type of effective control judicial and arbitral courts have found to be determinative in past territorial disputes.

Japan admits it “could not exercise direct control over the Islands until the administrative rights were reverted to Japan in 1972.”127 Therefore its “direct” or “valid/effective” control is derived from its administrative control. Japan, however, did not establish and maintain administrative control from 1972 to the present on its own. Per US official statements, the administrative rights were transferred to

124 William B. Heflin, Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and China, Oceans Apart, Asian- Pacific Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 18, 2000, pp. 16~17.125 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2003, p. 412.126 For example, in the case of Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, Indonesia

and Malaysia presented competing claims to the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan based on a number of factors such as history, treaty law and so on. See Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, I.C.J. Reports, 2002, pp. 625, 630. The International Court of Justice found Malaysia’s “legislative, administrative or quasi-judicial acts,” namely, instances of effective control, sufficient to award it the title. See Press Release, ICJ/605, International Court Finds that Sovereignty over Islands of Ligitan and Sipadan belongs to Malaysia, 17 December 2002, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/ICJ605.doc.htm, 13 December 2012.



it. The status quo of administrative control is maintained thereon not by Japan’s efforts alone so much as by the US standing firmly behind Japan with article 5 of the 1960 US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The trilateral nature of the conflict is obvious, for whenever the dispute escalates Japan calls on the US to reaffirm the latter’s commitment to the alliance.

In this sense, the so-called “valid/effective control” Japan claims to exercise can hardly be said to fall under the purview of “effective control” as the term is generally understood and has been previously used in international arbitrations and adjudications. In no other dispute is there a similar instance of this so-called “valid/effective control” enabled by an administrative control which is transferred and then backed by the strength of the world’s only superpower. The anomaly of this case makes it difficult to assess how it would be adjudicated were it to be submitted to the ICJ.

At worst, the administrative control Japan acquires over the Senkakus may be viewed as a product of its territorial expansionism and imperialism, that is, a seizure of land by a state upheld by a stronger state. At best, Japan may be said to exercise “circumscribed”128 administrative, rather than effective control, over the islands. Its right to exercise this administrative control, however, was disputed by China in 1971 as soon as China realized the islands were to be turned over to Japan. Then in 1972 both countries reached a tacit agreement to “shelve” the dispute during normalization talks between Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, and PRC Premier Zhou Enlai. In 1978, PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, after meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, again talked about shelving the issue, commenting that “[o]ur generation is not wise enough to find a common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will find a solution acceptable for all.”129 As a result of this tacit agreement, both

128 Paul O’Shea, Sovereignty and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Territorial Dispute, p. 4, at http://www.hhs.se/EIJS/Research/Documents/240.pdf, 15 August 2013.

129 Deng Xiaoping speech on the Diaoyu Dao conflict, quoted in Chi-Kin Lo, China’s Policy towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, London: Routledge, 1989, pp. 171~172; see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 June 1979 for a similar quote.


countries had engaged in “active dispute management” prior to September 2012.130

For instance, both governments attempted to limit activists’ access to the islands. Japan had refrained from developing and putting military installations on the islands.131 Although the American media and politicians repeatedly blamed Beijing for mobilizing Chinese opinion against Japan on the island dispute, in actuality for many years China had officially or unofficially tried to minimize media coverage of the conflict. Further, “the Chinese government ha[d] restricted the number, scope and duration of protests against Japan over this issue.”132

During this period of active dispute management, stability seemingly prevaileddespite occasional eruptions of confrontation between the two countries. Now, how-ever, with the nationalization of the islands, Japan not only denies that a territo-rial dispute exists but that an agreement has ever been reached to shelve the issue,133 signaling the end of the status quo and ushering in a new period of instability and conflict with China.

130 Taylor Fravel, Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute, in Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi eds., Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan–US Relation, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 151, at http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.stabiltiy.senkakus.pdf, 15 August 2013.

131 Taylor Fravel, Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute, in Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi eds., Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan–US Relation, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2010, pp. 153~155, at http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.stabiltiy.senkakus.pdf, 15 August 2013.

132 Taylor Fravel, Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute, in Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi eds., Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China–Japan–US Relation, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 154, at http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.stabiltiy.senkakus.pdf, 15 August 2013.

133 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, answer to Q14, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 19 March 2013. The tacit agreement existed according to among others, Westerner and Japanese journalists, as this statement from Japan Times shows, “[p]revious governments under the LDP, which was ousted from power by the DPJ in the 2009 general election, had respected (this) tacit agreement Tokyo allegedly reached with Beijing in the 1970s,” in Ayako Mie, No quick Senkakus fix, but return to status quo likely: domestic issues preventing quick resolution of row, Japan Times Online, 12 October 2012, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121012f1.html#sthash.LcnYxzYU.dpuf, 20 March 2013. In addition, Professor Yabuki Susumu charged that Japan MOFA excised the minutes of the Zhou–Tanaka exchange from the MOFA website along with Tanaka’s solemn apology for Japanese aggression in the Asia-Pacific War, in Stephen Harner, Interview with Professor Yabuki on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis and US–China–Japan Relations, Forbes, 3 October 2012, at http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2012/10/03/interview-with-professor-yabuki-on-the-senkakudiaoyu-crisis-and-u-s-china-japan-relations/, 13 December 2012.


Accordingly, Japan not only does not have the “actual source of that right” to exercise effective control, its exercise of the so-called effective control is by no means peaceful; instead the relative calm with respect to the dispute was sustained by an implicit agreement between the two states. Nor can Japan be said to have exercised “effective” control, for whatever “circumscribed” administrative control it has exhibited to date would probably fail the bar the courts have set for awarding title to territories in the past.

VI. Access to Petroleum Resources, or Strategic Location of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands?

Japan accuses China of not making a sovereignty claim until the discovery of potential reserves of hydrocarbon in the seabed around Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus.134 But the discovery of oil happened around the time when China Taiwan first learned that the US would terminate its trusteeship of the islands and turn them over to Japan. Therefore, does China really covet the seabed resources or is it simply a matter of coincidence that the claim and discovery occurred within the same time period?

Oil may be one of the motivations for China’s claim. Another cause for China Taiwan’s silence until the 1970s was discussed in the previous section: the future disposition of the islands by the US in favor of Japan was not obvious in the context of the 1943 Roosevelt/Chiang conversation. After the war, China Taiwan would have no reason to object to their trusteeship under the US, its ally, until it became clear that the US, without consultation, decided to transfer administrative control of these islands to Japan. As to China Mainland, it had protested the SFPT all along, including that treaty’s violation in spirit and letter of the 1942 United Nations Declaration.

The imputation of China’s motive behind its claim, i.e., thirst for the potential reserves of hydrocarbon resources, could be applied to Japan as well. Japan, after all, had also remained silent until then. In fact before the discovery of oil, both



countries “were confused about the existence of (these islands)”135 and both seemed to have forgotten about the issue of their sovereignty.136

Moreover, Japan may need a significant source of domestic oil supply morethan China. Although concluding from tortuous reasoning that Japan has a strong claim, the Central Intelligence Agency nevertheless finds in a 1971 report, declassi-fied in 2007, that “[w]hile all concerned powers are eager to establish their rights tothese potentially large resources, the importance of petroleum to the nations invol-ved varies greatly … Japan is in the most critical position from the standpoint of oil supply. This is due to the almost total lack of significant domestic crude oil resources (in Japan)…” 137

Yet the extent to which these islands would contribute to a state’s claim of po-tential riches under the seabed and to their maritime delimitation is uncertain. Under article 121 of UNCLOS, an “island” generates, in addition to its territorial sea, a con-tiguous zone, an economic exclusive zone and a continental shelf, as any land territory would, whereas a “rock” which cannot sustain human habitation and economic life, does not. Whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands qualify as islands, rocks or something in-between remains in doubt, for even the travaux préparatoires for article 121 give little clue as to its possible classification.138

Case law indicates the value of an island in maritime delimitation would be de-termined by its “size, importance and like considerations in the general geographi-

135 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 124. He gave numerous examples of this “confusion” in pp.124~129; the confusion extends to maps, textbooks, etc. in both countries, which should have but did not include the islands as territory of either Japan or China. In fact Suganuma calls the period “Years of Confusion.” Between cession of the islands and the discovery of oil, China went through a series of disruptions brought on by changes in government due to revolutionary and civil wars. So from the author’s point of view, the confusion is entirely understandable. Causes for Japan’s confusion is well stated by Prof. Yabuki, China–Japan Territorial Conflicts and the US–Japan–China Relations in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, The Asia– Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 9, No. 2, 2013, note 135.

136 Prof. Yabuki noted in China–Japan Territorial Conflicts and the US–Japan–China Relations in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, The Asia–Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 9, No. 2, 2013, that “Japan, a defeated nation, forgot about the uninhabited Senkaku islands,” until the reversion and discovery of hydrocarbon reserves.

137 Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Report, The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Oil Under Troubled Waters?, CIA/BGI GE 71-9, May 1971, Point 47, p. 20, at http://cryptome.org/2013/07/guccifer-cia-senkaku.pdf#sthash.sadTucKD.dpuf, 8 October 2013.

138 See Steven Wei Su, The Tiaoyu Islands and Their Possible Effect on the Maritime Bounda- ry Delimitation between China and Japan, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 3,

2004, pp. 393~397.


cal context.” 139 Small and isolated islands would probably have limited effect if th-ey were not ignored altogether.140 But Japan’s claim of a 163,000-mile2 maritimezone around the Okinotorishima rocks, peaking less than 20 feet above high tide, with Japanese-built walls around them to keep the sea level low, demonstrates Japan would attach more value to these islands than China would with respect to Japan’s resulting ability to lay claim to the continental shelf of the East China Sea.141 Japan’s imputation may simply be a projection of its own motives onto China.

Besides, in 1990 and again in 2006 China offered, and Japan turned down, joint resource development of the region surrounding the Diaoyu Dao/Senkakus. The offer was renewed as late as 2010, but Tokyo saw no reason for joint develop-ment as “China’s claims on the Senkakus lack grounds under international law and history.” 142 However, in the two countries’ maritime boundary dispute, China andJapan did reach an agreement in 2008 to jointly develop the gas deposit in the Chun-xiao/Shirakaba field, although not much progress has been made since 2008.143 Clearly then, China’s position is not all about making a unilateral claim to the oil and gas reserves in the seabed around Diaoyu Dao.

Nonetheless, the current flare-up has taken on a new dimension. Now that Japan has repudiated the implicit agreement to shelve the dispute, China must respond. China has limited room to maneuver on this issue for it has to answer to what its domestic constituency regards as another instance of Japan’s territorial aggression. The PRC’s very legitimacy rests in large part on the ability to preserve the nation’s territorial integrity after a century of dismemberment by Japan and other foreign powers.

139 Eritrea/Yemen Case, Phase II Maritime Delimitation, Award, 17 December 1999, para. 117, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160, 15 August 2013; cases such as Tunisia/Lybia Case, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1982, p. 18, para. 79, and Qatar v. Bahrain Case, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2001, p. 39, para. 248, also affirmed these criteria.

140 Steven Wei Su, The Tiaoyu Islands and Their Possible Effect on the Maritime Boundary Delimitation between China and Japan, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, 2004, pp. 404~408.

141 M. Carr, China and the Law of the Sea Convention, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, Vol. 9, 1983, p. 44.

142 Tokyo Nixed Joint Senkaku Exploitation, Japan Times Online, 22 October 2010, at http://w- ww.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20101022a1.html, 13 December 2012.143 For details of this agreement on joint development, see Disputed Claims in the East China

Sea: An Interview with James Manicom by Chris Acheson, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 25 July 2011, at http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=159, 16 August 2013.


More importantly, the islands not only sit along important sea lanes but they could also be used “to project power” over the seas in that region.144 For the US and Japan, control of these islands may mean the installation of radar or sonar to monitor the movement of China’s developing ballistic submarine fleet, a crucial advantage to the US’ Pivot to Asia geopolitical policy and to Japan’s general defense strategy. For China, control would provide an opening in the “first island chain” of US allies to permit continuing unobserved Chinese submarine access to the Pacific Ocean;145 it would also ensure no enemy could use the islands as “a platform for radar and missiles” 146 in launching an attack on China.

It may be recalled that the Ming dynasty, which experienced frequent depreda-tions of the wokou, switched its attention from guarding its land territory to the north only, to establishing a maritime defense along its coast. Consequently, Diao-yu, Huangwei and Chiwei islands were incorporated into its seacoast defense as shown in the seventh and eighth Fujian defense maps in Chouhai Tubian. The strategic importance of Diaoyu Dao, sustained through the Ming period, was carried into the Qing dynasty which made maritime defense its priority in 1885 following the 1874 Japan Expedition and the Sino-French war of 1883–1885.

In modern times, immediately after the PRC’s split with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, China considered one of its main security threats to be a Soviet land invasion from the north. However, such an attack was later deemed improbable and with the advances in modern naval warfare in the 1980s, China once again turned its attention to coastal defense.147 This change in policy is further reinforced by the recent US announcement of its Pivot to Asia in 2011. In spite of the Obama administration’s insistence that “U.S. rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is also a

144 Taylor Fravel, Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute, in Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi eds., Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relation, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 158, at http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.stabiltiy.senkakus.pdf, 15 August 2013.

145 Robert Wade, The Island Dispute between China and Japan: the Other Side of the Story, at http://triplecrisis.com/the-island-dispute-between-china-and-japan-the-other-side-of-the-story/, 17 March 2013. The first island chain refers to the first chain of major archipelagos out from the East Asian continental mainland coast including the Philippines, Korea, Japan, etc., all allies of the US.

146 Robert Wade, The Island Dispute between China and Japan: the Other Side of the Story, at http://triplecrisis.com/the-island-dispute-between-china-and-japan-the-other-side-of-the-story/, 17 March 2013.

147 People’s Liberation Navy – Offshore Defense, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm, 18 March 2013.


response to the strong demand signal from leaders and publics across the region,”148 China believes that the US is attempting China’s encirclement to deter its rise as a regional power.149 Moreover, Japan’s unilateral decision to nationalize three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012 not only deepens China’s mistrust, but also plays into China’s fear that Japan may be too eager to be a partner in the US strategy to contain China.

Therefore, in contrast to Japanese allegation of China’s thirst for the hydrocar-bon reserves under the seabed, China now “values the islands for their location in the ‘first island chain.’”150 During the period of active dispute management, the islands were not under any particular country’s control. But after Japan nationalized the islands and denied the existence of the implicit agreement, China perceives a potential threat that had not existed previously. As a result China feels it must regain control of the islands to ensure its continuing unobserved access to the oceans and its safety from enemy attack. Thus the Diaoyu islands have come full circle to re-assume the strategic position they held in the Ming and Qing dynasties for the coastal defense and security of China.

VII. Conclusion

China’s claim to sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, compared to Japan’s, is much more solidly grounded in international law. Evidence from the Ming and Qing dynasties demonstrates China had established and consolidated an original or historic title to the islands before 1895. Japan’s assertion that the islands were terra nullius is disingenuous, if not in violation of the cardinal principle of good faith in applying and observing international law. China credibly contends it ceded the islands in the Maguan/Shimonoseki Treaty and therefore its silence from 1895 to 1945. Between 1972 to late 2012, stability in the dispute prevailed, founded on an implicit agreement reached in 1972 and reaffirmed in 1978 by both countries to shelve the issue to a later day, despite Japan’s current denial of this agreement.

148 Remarks by Tom Donilon to the Asia Society, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/130311_Donilon%20Asia%20Society.pdf, 18 March 2013.

149 Li Jie, US in Position to Strangle China’s Maritime Life Lines, Global Times, at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/725455.shtml, 17 March 2013.

150 Robert Wade, The Island Dispute between China and Japan: the Other Side of the Story, at http://triplecrisis.com/the-island-dispute-between-china-and-japan-the-other-side-of-the-story/, 17 March 2013.


Based on international agreements and the surrender instrument Japan signed, China has good reasons to maintain the islands should have been returned after WWII. The SFPT, on the other hand, has no implication for the disposition of the islands; the US remains neutral as to their sovereignty status, while Japan would have retained residual sovereignty when the island group reverted to its administration only if it had acquired legitimate title before reversion. Although the ICJ has shown effective control to be determinative in a number of its rulings, a close scrutiny of Japan’s so-called “valid control” reveals it to be no more than transferred administrative control, sustained with the efforts of a third party, the US, thus bearing scant resemblance to the concept of effective possession/control in other adjudicated cases. Finally, Japan’s imputation of motive to China may merely be a reflection of its own thirst for territory and resources.

With its nationalization of the islands in 2012, Japan may have crossed the line China drew in the sand to avoid confrontation. By so doing Japan may have qualitatively “transformed the nature of the issue.”151 Scholars in the past have observed how difficult it would be for China to regain control of the islands short of war.152 Yet Japan’s denial of a territorial dispute and its repudiation of the implicit agreement to shelve the issue alerted China to the necessity of conducting regular patrols of the disputed territory by sea and air, much as Japan had done since the 1970s, to sustain its claim. Despite being tarred as an aggressor who is intruding into Japanese sea and air space, and under constant challenge by Japan’s better armed “self-defense” forces and the unspoken threat of US involvement if a military confrontation with Japan ensues over these islands, China may yet manage to defy the prognostication of these scholars. To an impartial observer, China is now making gradual progress to reclaiming control of the islands it has lost since the turn of the 20th-century.

151 Shelve What Controversy? Develop What Resources? With Whom?, China Times, editorial (Taipei, China Taiwan), translated by Bevin Chu, at http://datelinetaipei.blogspot.tw/2012/11/shelve-what-controversy-develop-what_1488.html, 13 December 2012.

152 Paul O’Shea, Sovereignty and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Territorial Dispute, p. 4, at http://www.hhs.se/EIJS/Research/Documents/240.pdf, 15 August 2013; basically that is the underlying tenor of Fravel’s article as well.

韩国东海部分划界案的特点和影响 73

韩国东海部分划界案的特点和影响

丘君 * 张海文 **

内容摘要：韩国于 2012 年 12 月向大陆架界限委员会（以下简称“委员会”）递交了部分划界案，提出了其在东海的 200 海里以外大陆架外部界限。韩国确定大陆架外部界限定点的方法独特，在适用《联合国海洋法公约》第 76 条规定的基础上，以距离日本领海不少于 5 海里为原则，选择了 85 个外部界限定点。韩国此次主张的外大陆架范围比其在 2009 年向委员会提交的“初步信息”的主张范围大大扩展，并与中国提交的东海部分划界案的范围几乎完全重叠。日本已就韩国划界案提出反对照会，并以存在海洋划界争端为由要求委员会不予审议。根据委员会过去的实践推测，韩国划界案得到审议的可能性很小，但该划界案的提交在客观上反映出中、韩在东海外大陆架问题上的合作立场，也进一步增强了中国关于东海大陆架自然延伸至冲绳海槽的主张。与此同时，韩国大陆架主张的南扩也加大了未来解决东海大陆架划界问题的复杂性。

关键词：东海 200 海里以外大陆架划界案大陆架界限委员会

沿海国大陆架包括其领海以外依其陆地领土的全部自然延伸。《联合国海洋

法公约》（以下简称“《公约》”）第 76 条规定了确定大陆架范围的两项标准：一是

自然延伸标准，沿海国大陆架扩展到大陆边外缘，大陆边外缘如果超过从领海基

线量起 200 海里，可以主张 200 海里以外的大陆架；二是距离标准，沿海国大陆架

自然延伸不足 200 海里的，可以主张到 200 海里的大陆架。实践中，各沿海国均

从有益于本国利益的角度选用上述标准，意图实现大陆架权利的最大化。

东海陆架地形平坦，最大宽度超过500千米，是亚洲东部最宽阔的陆架之一。

东海周边中、日、韩三国采用不同的标准，提出各自的大陆架主张范围。中国采用

自然延伸标准，主张东海大陆架向东自然延伸至冲绳海槽，并于 2012 年 12 月 14

*　丘君，国家海洋局海洋发展战略研究所，博士，副研究员。电子邮箱：[email protected]。本文得到海洋公益性行业科研专项经费项目“外大陆架划界与国际海底资源关系评估辅助决策系统研制和示范应用（项目编号：201205003）”的资助。

** 张海文，国家海洋局海洋发展战略研究所，博士，研究员。© THE AUTHORS AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW


日提交了东海部分海域 200 海里以外大陆架划界案，明确了这一主张。1 日本主张

以距离标准划定东海大陆架，其大陆架主张范围已越过冲绳海槽，并向西延伸。

韩国采用大陆架自然延伸标准，主张其大陆架向东和向南延伸至冲绳海槽。2012年 12 月 26 日，韩国递交了其在东海的 200 海里以外大陆架部分划界案(以下简

称“韩国划界案”)。2 韩国主张的 200 海里以外大陆架全部进入日本的主张范围，

并与中国的主张范围大面积重叠。

图 1 东海外大陆架划界形势图

1 《中华人民共和国东海部分海域二百海里以外大陆架划界案执行摘要》，下载于 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/executive%20summary_CH.pdf，2013 年 6 月 3 日。

2　 Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Pursuant to Article 76 Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Executive Summary, Republic of Korea, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/kor65_12/executive_summary.pdf, 3 June 2013.


一、韩国划界案的特点

韩国主张的大陆架外部界限是 85 个外部界限点的直线连线（图 1），从济州

岛 200 海里线开始，大致沿琉球群岛西侧，自东北向西南方向延伸，直至接近济

州岛 350 海里线处，总长约 453 千米。对比其他国家递交的划界案，韩国划界案

特点鲜明，表现在以下三方面。

（一）确定外部界限点的方法独特

1．确定大陆架外部界限的一般规则

《公约》第 76 条为确定大陆架外部界限规定了复杂的规则，这些规则可归纳

为：大陆架外部界限不能同时超过两条“公式线”，也不能同时超过两条“制约线”。

两条“公式线”是指：（1）沉积岩厚度为从该点至大陆坡脚最短距离的百分之一的

定点的连线；（2）离大陆坡脚的距离为 60 海里的各定点的连线。两条“制约线”

是指：（1）领海基线外推 350 海里线；（2）2500 米等深线外推 100 海里线。3

上述“公式线”和“制约线”只限定了沿海国有权扩展的大陆架的最大范围，

并没有限定沿海国在该最大范围内如何确定大陆架的外部界限。换言之，沿海国

可以在上述任意一条“制约线”范围之内（包括线上）和任意一条“公式线”范围

以内（包括线上），选择任意定点，作为大陆架外部界限的定点。已有的划界案中，

绝大多数沿海国都依据利益最大化的原则，尽量选择位于公式线或制约线上的点

作为定点。但也有例外，比如，墨西哥主张的在墨西哥湾的大陆架外部界限是其

与美国协议商定的美、墨两国间的大陆架边界。该边界既没有到达墨西哥的公式

线，也没有到达其制约线。还有一些划界案为了避免其外大陆架进入邻国 200 海

里范围，而用邻国 200 海里线作为其外大陆架延伸的终止。

2．韩国确定大陆架外部界限的方法

韩国划界案执行摘要说明了其选定大陆架外部界限定点的原则，但没有具体

说明各外部界限点的由来或属性。韩国选用 6 个坡度变化最大点作为东海大陆坡

脚，4 其外部界限点“源自”大陆坡脚的 60 海里外部包络线，但为避免侵入日本领

3　《大陆架界限委员会科学和技术准则》（CLCS/11）第 2.1.4 段至第 2.1.9 段。4　 Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Pursuant to

Article 76 Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Executive Summary, Republic of Korea, para. 5.3.


海，对外部界限点做了调整。5

韩国在确定其外大陆架外部界限点时重点考虑了两方面的因素：一是《公约》

第 76 条第 4 款第 (a)(ii) 项的规定，二是日本领海外部界限的位置。基于这两方

面的因素，可把韩国外部界限点的确定方法分为两种。第一种方法是依据第 76条第 4 款第 (a)(ii) 项的规定，即“以离大陆坡脚的距离不超过 60 海里的各定点为

准划定界线”，在离大陆坡脚恰好 60 海里的弧线上（大陆坡脚的 60 海里外部包

络线上）选择外部界限点。韩国用这种方法确定的外部界限点有 9 个，具体包括

KOR-10 至 KOR-17 以及 KOR-85。第二种方法是在离大陆坡脚的距离不足 60海里的区域内，选择一批距离日本领海外部界限 5 海里的点。这些点共有 76 个，

包括KOR-01 至KOR-09 和KOR-18 至KOR-84。“5海里”的方法既不是《公约》

的规定，也不是《大陆架界限委员会科学和技术准则》的规定，只是韩国自主选择

的一个方法。根据确定大陆架外部界限的一般规则，只要满足离大陆坡脚的距离

不超过 60 海里，且不超过制约线，沿海国可以任意选择它们认为合适的点作为其

大陆架外部界限点。

（二）比初步信息主张的范围显著扩展

2009 年 5 月，韩国向大陆架界限委员会（以下简称“委员会”）递交了其关于

东海外大陆架的初步信息，6 该初步信息标示了当时韩国主张的一部分东海外大

陆架的范围，即位于济州岛 200 海里范围以外，且在 1974 年建立的日、韩共同开

发区之内的区域（图 1）。与初步信息相比，韩国划界案所主张的外大陆架范围显著扩展。首先是向南

扩展，初步信息主张的外大陆架最南端点超出济州岛 200 海里线大约 78 海里，而

划界案主张的外大陆架最南端超出济州岛 200 海里线大约 143 海里，接近济州岛

350 海里线。换言之，划界案主张的区域比初步信息的主张向南延伸了大约 65 海

里。其次是向东扩展，临近日本领海。初步信息主张的外大陆架外部界限离日本

领海最近距离约为 18 海里，而划界案的主张离日本领海最近只有 5 海里。

（三）与中国主张的外大陆架相互重叠

5　Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Pursuant to Article 76 Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Executive Summary, Republic of Korea, para. 5.4.

6　Preliminary Information regarding the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf, Republic of Ko- rea, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/kor_2009prelim- inaryinformation.pdf, 4 June 2013.


中、韩两国均主张东海的大陆架向东延伸，且韩国主张的外大陆架向东延伸

距离比中国的主张更远。韩国的所有外部界限点都在中国的外部界限点以东，两

条外部界限之间的最远距离超过 24 海里。

二、韩国划界案的影响

（一）反映出中韩在外大陆架问题上的合作立场

自 2009 年 2 月开始，中、韩两国一致反对日本在其划界案中利用冲之鸟礁主

张专属经济区和外大陆架。两国均多次发表照会，反对委员会就日本划界案冲之

鸟礁部分采取行动。7 该立场被委员会所采纳，并最终写入委员会对日本划界案的

审议建议中。虽未明示，但中、韩两国在冲之鸟礁问题上的一致行动无疑向外界

展示出两国的合作姿态。2009 年 5 月 11 日，中、韩两国同时递交了关于东海外

大陆架的初步信息，两国主张的范围虽大体重叠，但互不反对，向外展示了两国在

东海大陆架问题上的合作立场。

此次，韩国明确表示在划界案编制过程中曾与中国协商，8 并且在中国提交划

界案后不久即提交其划界案。截至目前，中、韩两国尚未对对方的划界案提出反

对照会。考虑到韩国指出“在划界案编制过程中曾与中国协商”，推测两国今后也

应不会就对方的划界案公开提出反对意见。两国在外大陆架问题上的合作立场将

得到进一步加强。

（二）增强了中国关于东海大陆架自然延伸的主张

中国主张东海大陆架向东自然延伸到冲绳海槽，中国的划界案在冲绳海槽西

侧陆坡基部选择了 12 个大陆坡脚；韩国主张东海大陆架自然延伸，在冲绳海槽西

侧陆坡基部选择了 6 个大陆坡脚。这说明中、韩两国关于东海大陆边外缘的认识

是一致的，印证了中国主张东海外大陆架自然延伸在科学证据方面的合理性。

中国在大陆坡脚 60 海里包络线内选择了 10 个冲绳海槽局部最大水深点作

为大陆架外部界限定点，韩国则在大陆坡脚 60 海里包络线内选择了 85 个距离日

7　2009 年 2 月 6 日，中华人民共和国照会 (CML/2/2009)，下载于 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_c.pdf，2013 年 6 月 4 日；2009年 2 月 27 日，韩国政府照会（MUN/046/09），下载于 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/kor_27feb09.pdf，2013 年 6 月 4 日。



本领海不少于 5 海里的点作为其大陆架外部界限定点。两国主张的区域几乎完全

重叠，这也进一步印证了中国所确定的外大陆架区域在技术上的合理性。

中、日在东海大陆架划界问题上分歧很大：中国主张依据大陆架自然延伸原

则公平划定中、日东海大陆架边界，日本则主张以中间线方法划定大陆架。韩国

划界案呼应了中国关于东海大陆架自然延伸的主张，是对中国观点的有力支撑。

（三）加大了解决东海大陆架划界问题的复杂性

韩国此前的东海大陆架主张从未超过日、韩共同开发区的范围（图 1）。但在

这次提交的划界案中，其大陆架主张大幅度向南、向东推进，显示出韩国大陆架主

张的重大变化。这种变化将加大解决东海大陆架划界问题的难度。

按韩国此前的主张，东海的大陆架划界问题可以分为东北和东南两大区域：

日、韩共同开发区所在的东北部区域由中、日、韩三国协商解决，日、韩共同开发

区以南的东南部海域则由中、日双方谈判解决。韩国新的外大陆架主张则意味着

其将插手东南部海域的大陆架划界，这将给本就难解的东海大陆架划界问题增加

复杂因素。

需要强调的是，韩国提交的划界案仅是其单方面的大陆架主张，并不能据此

加重其以后在大陆架划界谈判中的筹码。一方面，《公约》第 76 条第 10 款明确

规定，沿海国提交划界案和委员会审议划界案都不妨害海岸相向或相邻国家间大

陆架界限的划定。另一方面，韩国也在其划界案中明确表示其划界案以及委员会

关于该划界案的任何行动均不妨害邻国在大陆架划界问题上的立场，9 也不妨害

海岸相邻或相向国之间划定大陆架边界。10

（四）涉及到钓鱼岛海域

韩国主张的外大陆架外部界限不但进入了琉球群岛的 200 海里范围，也进入

了钓鱼岛附属岛屿赤尾屿的 200 海里范围。KOR-85 是唯一进入赤尾屿 200 海里

范围的外部界限点，它离上一点 KOR-84 的距离达 37.29 海里，离济州岛 350 海

里线尚有数海里。从整体看，KOR-85 是一个孤立的点，韩国选择 KOR-85 的直

接目的就是让其外部界限点进入赤尾屿的 200 海里范围，其深层目的需进一步分

9　 Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Pursuant to Article 76 Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Executive Summary, Republic of Korea, para. 4.4.



析。

首先，韩国是否借此否认赤尾屿满足《公约》第 121 条所规定的构成“岛屿”

的条件？韩国主张的所有外部界限点都已经进入琉球群岛的 200 海里范围，而事

实上琉球群岛中的大部分岛屿都完全符合《公约》第 121 条所规定的构成“岛屿”

的条件，具备拥有 200 海里专属经济区的权利，这一点无可争辩。因此，不能从

韩国使 KOR-85 进入了赤尾屿的 200 海里范围这一点直接推断韩国认为赤尾屿

不满足《公约》第 121 条所规定的构成“岛屿”的条件。

其次，韩国是否借此回应中国将最北端点定在济州岛 200 海里以内？中国的

外大陆架外部界限点（FP1）确已进入济州岛 200 海里范围，但是，由于韩国并没

有在划界案中表明对钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿主权归属的立场，因此，也无法就此推

断韩国使 KOR-85 进入了赤尾屿 200 海里范围的目的是回击中国将最北端点定

在济州岛 200 海里以内。

排除上述可能性后，推测韩国此举的动机可能源自两方面。第一，防止外界

解读韩国在赤尾屿主权归属问题上的立场，避免过度刺激日本。外部界限点进入

赤尾屿 200 海里可以解释为韩国对赤尾屿和对琉球群岛的立场是一致的，这可模

糊韩国在赤尾屿主权归属问题上的立场。相反，如果韩国的大陆架主张大面积进

入琉球群岛 200 海里范围的同时，却没有进入赤尾屿 200 海里，那么外界可能解

读为：韩国认可中国对赤尾屿的主权，为体现对“盟友”中国的支持，韩国的外大

陆架主张未“侵入”中国赤尾屿 200 海里。韩国显然不希望因此卷入中、日间钓

鱼群岛主权问题的争论。第二，韩国试图为将来的东海大陆架划界谈判埋下伏笔。

从韩国的角度，无论将来赤尾屿归属哪国，韩国均可主张赤尾屿不具有 200 海里

权利，这对韩国是有利的。

三、委员会审议韩国划界案的前景分析

根据《大陆架界限委员会议事规则》（以下简称“《议事规则》”），委员会将在

公布韩国划界案执行摘要之日起至少 3 个月后初步审查韩国划界案。11 除划界案

涉及的科学技术问题外，委员会将重点审查该划界案是否涉及尚未解决的陆地领

土争议或者其他海洋争端。针对存在争端的不同情况，委员会对划界案的处理有

四种可能模式：（1）决定“该划界案按照收件顺序排列成为下一个应审议的划界案

时”，将设立小组委员会审议；（2）仅对不存在争端的部分区域设立小组委员会进

行审议；（3）暂不审议，直到相关争端得到解决，或者各方均同意委员会审议时，

11 《大陆架界限委员会议事规则》（CLCS/40/Rev.1）之附件三《审议提交大陆架界限委员会的划界案的工作方式》第 2.2 部分。


再讨论是否设立小组委员会进行审议，委员会针对存在争端的划界案较多采用这

种处理方式；（4）直接做出不予审议的决定，这主要是针对存在严重陆地领土主权

争端的划界案，或依南极大陆主张外大陆架的划界案，12 例如，委员会决定对阿根

廷划界案涉及马尔维纳斯群岛和南极的部分不予审议。13

韩国主张的外大陆架外部界限点全部进入了日本的 200 海里范围，并且临近

日本的领海。2013 年 1 月 11 日，日本针对韩国的划界案递交了反对照会。14 日

本照会指出，日、韩两国海岸相向，距离不足 400 海里，两国在东海的大陆架划界

应由两国根据《公约》第 83 条协商解决，韩国不能单方面划定大陆架外部界限。

并且，日本引用了《议事规则》附件一第 5 段第 a 项，以涉及海洋划界争端为由要

求委员会对韩国划界案不予审议。

2013 年 1 月 23 日，韩国对日本的反对照也提出了反应照会。15 韩国在其反

应照会中指出，其划界案符合《公约》规定，也符合《大陆架界限委员会科学和技

术准则》，并要求委员会予以审议。韩国提出了三方面的理由：（1）《公约》并未规

定海岸相向不足400 海里的海域不能划定200 海里以外大陆架外部界限，《公约》

关于确立大陆架权利有两个标准，即第 76 条第 4款规定的地学标准和距离标准，

这两项标准并无优先次序，日本不能用距离标准去否认韩国主张的地学标准；（2）日韩两国尚未完成相关海域的大陆架划界，但这并不妨害委员会审议划界案，相

反，委员会的审议将有助于澄清该区海底的自然状况以及大陆架延伸的情况，有

利于推动两国达成最终的大陆架划界协定，这也符合《公约》第 83 条的相关精神；

（3）韩国在准备划界案的过程中曾主动提出与日本就相关问题进行商议，日本未

曾表示相关海域存在争议，也未回应韩国的提议，日本在韩国提交划界案后方才

提出反对意见，令韩国惊讶。

韩国照会提出的三点理由虽有一定道理，但是，韩国的回应也恰恰证明了在

相关海域存在尚未解决的海域划界争端。从委员会过去的做法推断，委员会很有

可能对韩国划界案做出暂不审议的决定。

需要指出的是，无论委员会审议与否，韩国均能通过提交划界案申明其大陆

架自然延伸超过其领海基线 200 海里的立场，并宣示其新的大陆架主张范围。从

已有实践看，不少国家明知道其划界案将因涉及争端而得不到审议，但是仍然提

交，其目的就是重申其大陆架权利主张。例如，俄罗斯提交的划界案在鄂霍次克

12　丘君、张海文：《200 海里以外大陆架外部界限划界新动态》，载于刘楠来、李兆杰、凌岩主编：《中国国际法年刊 2011》，北京：世界知识出版社 2012 年版，第 505~506 页。

13 《大陆架界限委员会第 30 届会议主席的说明》（CLCS/76），第 56~57 段。14　 2013 年 1 月 11 日，日本政府照会 (SC/13/019)，下载于 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/

clcs_new/submissions_files/kor65_12/jpn_re_kor_11_01_2013.pdf，2013 年 6 月 4 日。15　 2013 年 1 月 23 日，韩国政府照会（MUN/022/13），下载于 http://www.un.org/Depts/

los/clcs_new/submissions_files/kor65_12/kor_re_jpn_23_01_2013.pdf，2013 年 6 月 4 日。


海部分涉及俄、日北方四岛争端，16 缅甸提交的划界案涉及与印度、孟加拉等国的

划界争端。17 再如，澳大利亚明知涉及南极领土的划界案不会得到委员会的审议，

仍将涉及南极的外大陆架作为一个区块，只不过，与此同时又主动要求委员会可

不审议其划界案中涉及南极区域的部分。18

四、结论

韩国提交的 200 海里以外大陆架部分划界案是一份明知不会得到委员会审议

而仍然提交的划界案，其主要目的并不在于确定大陆架的外部界限，而是以提交

划界案的方式，宣示韩国在东海的新大陆架主张范围。

韩国主张的外大陆架外部界限点全部位于日本的 200 海里范围内，最近点距

离日本领海只有 5 海里，引发了日本的强烈反对。韩国的主张也与中国的主张大

面积重叠，一方面反映出其与中国在外大陆架问题上的合作立场，支持了中国关

于东海大陆架自然延伸至冲绳海槽的主张，另一方面也加大了未来解决东海大陆

架划界问题的复杂性，应进一步跟踪研究。

16　 Receipt of the Submission Made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_English.pdf, 4 June 2013.

17　 Continental Shelf Submission of Union of Myanmar, Executive Summary, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mmr08/mmr_es.pdf, 4 June 2013.

18　 Continental Shelf Submission of Union of Australia, Executive Summary, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/aus04/Documents/aus_doc_es_web_delivery.pdf, 4 June 2013.


Partial Submission Made by the Republic of Korea to the Commission on the

Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Review

QIU Jun* ZHANG Haiwen**

Abstract: In December 2012, the Republic of Korea (hereinafter “Korea”) made a partial submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that identified the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the East China Sea. Based on article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 85 points situated not less than 5 nautical miles from the territorial sea of Japan, have been selected as the fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf. Compared with its Preliminary Information delivered in 2009, the scope of the extended continental shelf indicated in the Submission expands remarkably, and seriously overlaps with China’s claim of extended continental shelf. Japan has addressed a note verbale, in which the CLCS was requested not to consider and qualify the Submission made by Korea under the pretext of existence of delimitation disputes. Although judging from the previous practice of the CLCS, Korea’s Submission has little chance of being considered by the CLCS, the Submission strengthens cooperation on continental shelf affairs between China and Korea, as well as China’s claim that its continental shelf in the East China Sea extends naturally to the Okinawa Trough. However the southern expansion of Korea’s continental claim has complicated the delimitation of the continental shelf in that area.

* QIU Jun, PhD, Associate Researcher, China Institute for Marine Affairs, State Oceanic Administration, China. E-mail: [email protected]. This article is funded by the Ocean Public Welfare Scientific Research Special Appropriation Project “Development and Demonstration Application of a Decision Support System for the Assessment of the Relationship between Extended Continental Shelf Delimitation and International Seabed Resources” (Project No.: 201205003).

** ZHANG Haiwen, PhD, Researcher, China Institute for Marine Affairs, State Oceanic Administration, China.

© THE AUTHORS AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

Partial Submission Made by the Republic of Korea to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Review 83

Key Words: East China Sea; Outer continental shelf; Submission; Commissio-n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory. Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines two criteria for determining the scope of the continental shelf: (1) the criterion of natural prolongation, which refers to the extension of the continental shelf of a coas-tal State to the outer edge of the continental margin. If the outer edge of the conti-nental margin is beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) from the baselines measuring the maritime zone, the coastal State may claim a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. (2)criterion of distance, which means that the continental shelf of a coastal State may extend to a distance of 200 nm from the baselines where the natural prolongation of the continental shelf does not extend to that distance. In practice all coastal States apply the above criteria in a way that maximizes their continental shelf rights.

The East China Sea shelf is over 500 km wide at its greatest point, making it one of the broadest continental shelves in East Asia. China, Japan and Korea surround the East China Sea and each country has applied different criteria to raise their respective claim for continental shelf. China applies the criterion of natural prolongation, and claims that its continental shelf in the East China Sea extends naturally to the Okinawa Trough, which is clarified in China’s 14 December 2012 submission concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the East China Sea.1 Japan claims that the continental shelf in the East China Sea should be delimited according to the distance criterion. Japan argues that its continental shelf extends westward crossing the Okinawa Trough. Korea holds the criterion of natural prolongation, claiming that its continental shelf extends east and south toward the Okinawa Trough. On 26 December 2012, Korea made its partial submission on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the East China Sea (hereinafter “Korea’s Submission”).2 The entire continental shelf beyond

1　Submission by the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea, Executive Summary, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/executive%20summary_EN.pdf, 3 June 2013.

2　Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Pursuant to Article 76 Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Executive Summary, Republic of Korea, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/kor65_12/executive_summary.pdf, 3 June 2013.


200 nm claimed by Korea is within the scope of Japan’s claim, and a large part overlaps with the scope claimed by China.

Fig. 1 Map of the Delimitation Situation Concerning the Extended Continental Shelf in the East China Sea

I. The Characteristics of Korea’s Submission

The outer limits of the continental shelf argued by Korea in this Partial Submi-ssion are defined by a line composed of 85 fixed points (Fig. 1). The 453 km line starts at the 200 nm line of Jeju Island then roughly extends from the northeast to the southwest along the western side of the Ryukyu Islands, and ends at a point


near the 350 nm line from Jeju Island. Korea’s Submission is distinct from the submissions made by other countries in the following three aspects:

A. Korea’s Unique Method for Delineating the Fixed Points of the Outer Limit Line

1. General Rules for Delineating the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf

Article 76 of UNCLOS outlines the complicated rules for delineating the outer limits of the continental shelf. Essentially, the outer limits of the continental shelf cannot exceed two “formulae lines” at the same time, nor exceed two “constraint lines” at the same time. “Formulae lines” are (1) a line delineated by reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continen-tal slope; and (2) a line delineated by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nm from the foot of the slope. “Constraint lines” are (1) a line delineated by reference to fixed points at a distance of 350 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured; and (2) a line delineated by reference to fixed points at a distance of 100 nm from the 2500 metre isobath.3

“Formulae” and “constraint” lines only define the maximum extent of the continental shelf that a coastal State is entitled to claim. These definitions do not explain how a coastal State may delineate the limits of the continental shelf within the maximum scope. In other words, a coastal State may select fixed points to deli-neate the outer limits of the continental shelf within the scope of either of the “con-straint lines” (including points on the lines) and within the scope of either of the “formulae lines” (including points on the lines). In most submissions to the CLCS coastal States follow the principle of maximum interest and select fixed points on the formulae lines or constraint lines, although exceptions do exist. For example, the outer limits of Mexico’s continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico were decided after an agreement with the United States. This border does not reach Mexico’s for-mulae or constraint lines. To prevent the extended continental shelf from entering the 200 nm zones of bordering countries, some submissions take the 200 nm lines of the bordering countries as the outer limits of their extended continental shelf.

3　Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS/11), paras. 2.1.4~2.1.9.


2. Korea’s Method for Delineating the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf

The Executive Summary of Korea’s Submission describes the principle applie-d in selecting the fixed points of the outer limits of the continental shelf, but does not specify the sources or the attributes of each fixed point. Korea has selected six points of maximum gradient change at the base of the continental slope in its partial submission.4 The fixed points “stem” from the outer envelopes of 60 nm from the foot of the continental slope, but the points have been adjusted in order to avoid intruding into Japan’s territorial sea.5

In determining the fixed points for defining the outer limits of the continental shelf, Korea focused on considering the following two factors: (1) the provisions of article 76(4)(a)(ii) of UNCLOS, and (2) the location of the outer limits of Japan’s territorial sea. Based on these two factors, Korea’s methods for delineating the fixed points of the outer limits can be classified into two types: (1) the first method is to follow the provision in article 76(4)(a)(ii), namely “a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nm from the foot of the continental slope,” to select the fixed points of the outer limits on the arc line exactly 60 nm from the foot of the continental shelf (the outer envelopes of 60 nm from the foot of the continental shelf). Korea used this method to determine nine fixed points, including points KOR-10 to KOR-17, and point KOR-85. (2) The second method is to select points situated 5 nm from the outer limits of Japan’s territorial sea, yet no more than 60 nm from the foot of the continental shelf. There are 76 such points, including points KOR-1 to KOR-09, and points KOR-18 to KOR-84. The “five-nautical-mile” method is neither prescribed in UNCLOS nor in the Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. It is a method determined independently by Korea. According to the general rules governing the outer limits of the continental shelf, so long as the limits are no more than 60 nm from the foot of the continental shelf, and do not exceed the constraint lines, a coastal State may select any points it finds appropriate as the fixed points for defining the outer limits of its continental shelf.




B. Korea’s Expanding Claims

In May 2009, Korea submitted to the CLCS its Preliminary Information con-cerning the extended continental shelf in the East China Sea,6 which indicated the scope of part of Korea’s extended continental shelf in the East China Sea, that is, the area beyond 200 nm from Jeju Island and within the Japanese–Korean Joint Development Zone established in 1974 (Fig. 1).

Compared with the Preliminary Information, the scope of the extended conti-nental shelf claimed in Korea’s Submission has obviously expanded. Korea’s claimshave expanded both to the south and east of their original position. First, the sou-thernmost point of the extended continental shelf claimed in Korea’s Preliminary Information was 78 nm beyond the 200 nm line of Jeju Island, while that in the Submission exceeds the 200 nm line of Jeju Island by over 143 nm and is close to the 350 nm line of such island. In other words, the area claimed in the Submission is 65 nm farther than the claim in the Preliminary Information. Second, Korea’s claim expands closer to Japan’s territorial sea. The outer limits of the extended continental shelf claimed in the Preliminary Information were about 18 nm from Japan’s territorial sea at the closest point, while the claim in the Submission is only 5 nm from Japan’s territorial sea at the closest point.

C. Overlapping with China’s Extended Continental Shelf Claims

Both China and Korea claim that their respective continental shelves in the East China Sea trend eastward, although Korea’s claims extend farther east than China’s. All the outer limit points claimed by Korea are to the east of China’s outer limit points, with the longest distance between the two outer limit lines exceeding 24 nm.

6　Preliminary Information regarding the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf, Republic of Ko- rea, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/kor_2009prelimi- naryinformation.pdf, 4 June 2013.


II. The Impact of Korea’s Submission

A. Reflecting the Cooperative Position of China and Korea on the Extended Continental Shelf Issue

Since February 2009, both China and Korea have opposed Japan’s use of the Okinotorishima Rocks to claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and an extended continental shelf in submissions to the CLCS. Both countries have delivered seve-ral note verbales in opposition to any action taken by the CLCS concerning the Oki-notorishima Rocks in Japan’s submission.7 This opposition has been accepted by the CLCS and written into the CLCS recommendations on Japan’s submission. Despite the absence of any express statement, the concerted actions taken by Chinaand Korea on the issue of the Okinotorishima Rocks undoubtedly present to the international community the cooperative attitude of the two countries. On 11 May2009, China and Korea submitted preliminary information on the extended conti-nental shelf in the East China Sea at the same time. Though the scopes claimed by the two countries overlap, they do not oppose each other. This shows their coopera-tive position on the issue of the East China Sea shelf.

For its December 2012 Partial Submission, Korea clearly stated that it had con-sulted with China in the course of preparing the Submission.8 Korea’s Submission was made shortly after China made its submission and neither China nor Korea has delivered any note verbale opposing each other’s submission up to now. Korea has consulted with China throughout the preparation of its submission as noted in the Executive Summary of Korea’s Submission. The two countries would not openly raise opposition to each other’s submission because of this active consultation. The cooperative position of the two countries concerning the extended continental shelf issue will be further reinforced.

7　China’s note dated 6 February 2009 (CML/2/2009), at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.pdf, 4 June 2013; Korea’s note dated 27 February 2009 (MUN/046/09), at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/kor_27feb09.pdf, 4 June 2013.



B. Strengthening China’s Claim about the Natural Prolongation of the East China Sea Shelf

China claims that the East China Sea shelf extends naturally east toward the Okinawa Trough, and in China’s Submission 12 feet of continental slope (FOS) have been selected at the western slope of the Okinawa Trough. Korea also argues for the natural prolongation of the East China Sea shelf, and has selected 6 FOS at the western slope of the Okinawa Trough. These practices illustrate that China and Korea share an understanding on the East China Sea’s continental margin and also prove that China’s claim of the natural prolongation of the extended continental shelf in the East China Sea is based on reasonable scientific evidence.

China has selected 10 local maximum water depth points in the Okinawa Trough within the outer envelopes of 60 nm from the foot of the continental slope, while Korea has selected 85 points situated no less than 5 nm from Japan’s territorial sea. All of these points are within the outer envelope of 60 nm from the foot of the continental slope. The areas claimed by the two countries almost completely overlap, which further proves that the extended continental shelf area determined by China is technically reasonable.

There is substantial conflict between China and Japan on the East China Seashelf delimitation. China holds that the Sino-Japanese East China Sea shelf bounda-ry should be fairly delimited in line with the principle of natural prolongation of continental shelf; while Japan argues for a delimitation of the continental shelf through the median line method. Korea’s Submission is in line with China’s natural prolongation claim concerning the East China Sea shelf, and thus is a powerful support to China’s view.

C. Increasing the Complexity of the East China Sea Shelf Delimitation Issue

Korea’s earlier claims on the East China Sea shelf never exceeded the scope of the Japanese–Korean Joint Development Zone (Fig. 1). Korea’s Submission has a major change in respect of Korea’s continental shelf claims. In the Submission, Korea’s continental shelf is pushed both further south and east than it ever was before. Such a dramatic change will increase the difficulty of solving East China Sea shelf delimitation issues.

According to Korea’s earlier claims, the continental shelf delimitation in the


East China Sea may be divided into two major areas: the northeastern part and thesoutheastern part. The northeastern area includes the Japanese–Korean Joint Deve-lopment Zone while the southeastern area is located south to the Joint Development Zone. Disputes in the northeastern area should be resolved through trilateral negotiations among China, Japan and Korea. Disputes over the southeastern areashould be resolved through bilateral negotiations between China and Japan. Korea’snew extended continental shelf claim means that it will get involved in the continen-tal shelf delimitation in the southeastern area, which will make the already challen-ging continental shelf delimitation issue in the East China Sea even more complex.

It should be noted that Korea’s Submission is only a unilateral continental shelf claim, and cannot be used as a basis to add credence to Korea’s future nego-tiations on continental shelf delimitation. On one hand, it is expressly provided in ar-ticle 76(10) of UNCLOS that coastal States’ submissions and the CLCS’s conside-ration of submissions are without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. On the other hand, Korea has also stated that the submission and any actions of the CLCS in regards to that submission shall not prejudice the position of its neighboring States on the question of delimitation.9 Nor shall it prejudice the position of its neighbors on the delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts in the East China Sea.10

D. Involving the Diaoyu Island Area

The outer limits of the extended continental shelf claimed by Korea are not only within 200 nm from the Ryukyu Islands, but also within 200 nm of an affiliated island of Diaoyu Island, Chiwei Island. KOR-85 is the only outer limit point within 200 nm of Chiwei Island, which is 37.29 nm away from the last point KOR-84, and several nm from the 350 nm line of Jeju Island. Overall, KOR-85 is an isolated point. By selecting KOR-85, Korea extends its outer limit points into the area within 200 nm from Chiwei Island, and its underlying purpose should be




further analyzed.First, does Korea intend to deny on these grounds that Chiwei Island meets

the conditions for an “island” provided for in article 121 of UNCLOS? All the outer limit points claimed by Korea are within 200 nm of the Ryukyu Islands. Most islands in this chain fully satisfy the conditions for “island” provided for in article 121 of UNCLOS and are indisputably entitled to a 200 nm EEZ. Therefore, from the fact that Korea has placed KOR-85 within 200 nm of Chiwei Island, it cannot be inferred that Korea does not regard Chiwei Island as an “island” as defined in UNCLOS.

Second, does Korea intend to react to China’s establishment of the northern-most point within 200 nm of Jeju Island? An outer limit point of the extended conti-nental shelf of China (FP1) is indeed within 200 nm of Jeju Island. But it cannot be inferred that Korea’s purpose of placing KOR-85 within 200 nm of Chiwei Island is to react to China’s placement of the northernmost point within 200 nm of Jeju Island, as Korea does not state its position on Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands in its submission.

Barring the above possibilities, it can be inferred that there might be two motives behind Korea’s action. The first is to prevent the outside world from interpreting Korea’s position on the sovereignty question of Chiwei Island, so as to avoid provoking Japan. The placement of an outer limit point within 200 nm of Chiwei Island can be interpreted as Korea holding a consistent position towards Chiwei Island and the Ryukyu Islands, which blurs Korea’s position on the sovereignty question of Chiwei Island. On the contrary, if Korea’s claim does not encompass any area within 200 nm of Chiwei Island while a large area of the continental shelf it claims is within 200 nm of the Ryukyu Islands, outsiders may interpret this as Korea recognizing China’s sovereignty over Chiwei Island. As a show of support for its ally “China”, Korea’s claims do not “intrude” into the EEZ of China’s Chiwei Island. Korea does not wish to get entangled in the disputes between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. Second, Korea attempts to seed future negotiations on the delimitation of the East China Sea shelf. From Korea’s perspective, no matter which country Chiwei Island belongs to, Korea can claim that the islet is not entitled to a 200 nm EEZ, which will be to Korea’s advantage.


III. Prospects of the CLCS’s Consideration on Korea’s Submission

According to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of theContinental Shelf (hereinafter “Rules of Procedure”), following the publication of the Korea’s Submission’s executive summary the CLCS has at least 3 months to conduct an initial examination.11 Besides the scientific and technical issues involved in the Submission, the CLCS will focus on considering whether the Submission concerns unresolved land or maritime disputes. In light of the different circumstances of existing disputes, the CLCS may adopt one of the following four modes of treatment: (1) establish a subcommission to consider the submission when it is the turn of that submission to be considered in the order that the submissions are received; (2) establish a subcommission to consider the part of the submission free from disputes; (3) not consider the submission for the moment, or discuss whether a subcommission should be set up to consider the submission until the related disputes are resolved, or with prior consent given by all States that are parties to the disputes, which is the method often adopted by the CLCS for submissions involving disputes; and (4) refuse to consider the submission. This method is mainly applied towards submissions involving serious land territorial disputes, or submissions concerning claims for an extended continental shelf in the Antarctica.12 For example, the CLCS has decided not to consider the part of Argentina’s Submission concerning the Malvinas Islands and Antarctica.13

All the outer limit points of the extended continental shelf claimed by Korea are within the 200 nm zone of Japan, and close to Japan’s territorial sea. On 11 January 2013, Japan delivered a note verbale opposing Korea’s Submission.14

11　 Section 2.2 of Annex III (Modus operandi for the consideration of a submission made to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS/40/Rev.1).

12　 Qiu Jun and Zhang Haiwen, Recent Developments of Delimitation of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles, in Liu Nanlai, Li Zhaojie and Ling Yan eds., Yearbook of Chinee International Law 2011, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2012, pp. 505~506. (in Chinese)

13　 Progress of Work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf – Statement by the Chairperson – Thirtieth Session (CLCS/76), paras. 56~57.

14　 Japan’s Communication Dated 11 January 2013 (SC/13/019), at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/kor65_12/jpn_re_kor_11_01_2013.pdf .4 June 2013.


Japan pointed out in its note that because the distance between the opposite coasts of Japan and Korea in the East China Sea with regard to the submission is less than 400 nm, the delimitation of the continental shelf in this area shall be effected by an agreement between the concerned States in accordance with article 83 of UNCLOS, and Korea cannot unilaterally establish the outer limits of the continental shelf in this area. Also, Japan invoked paragraph 5(a) of Annex I of the Rules of Procedure to request the CLCS not to consider and qualify Korea’s Submission.

On 23 January 2013, Korea delivered a note verbale in response to Japan’s opposing note.15 Korea pointed out in its reply note that its submission met the pro-visions in UNCLOS as well as relevant provisions of the Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the CLCS and requested the CLCS to consider its submission. Korea presented the following reasons: (1) nothing in UNCLOS supports the suggestion that the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in an area where the distance between States with opposite coasts is less than 400 nm cannot be accomplished under the provisions of UNCLOS. UNCLOS establishes two distinct bases of entitlement in the continental shelf: a. Distance from the coast; and b. The geomorphological criterion stated in article 76(4). Neither basis enjoys priority over the other under UNCLOS. Japan, therefore, cannot use its entitlement based on the distance criterion to negate Korea’s entitlements based on geomorphological considerations; (2) the fact that the maritime boundary in the area between Korea and Japan is yet to be agreed upon is no impediment to the consideration of Korea’s Submission. On the contrary, actions by the CLCS on Korea’s Submission would likely facilitate the boundary agreement process by clarifying the nature of the underlying seabed, and the extent and outer limits of the continental shelf in the area. This would be fully consistent with the objectives of article 83 of UNCLOS; (3) in the course of preparing its submission Korea has made efforts in good faith to explain the aforementioned points to Japan. Japan has never indicated the existence of a dispute, and has refused to engage in consultations on the matter with Korea. Korea is therefore surprised by Japan’s objection raised after Korea made its submission.

Though the three reasons presented in Korea’s note are reasonable to some extent, Korea’s response also proves the existence of unresolved maritime boundarydelimitation disputes in the relevant sea area. Judging from its previous practices,

15 Korea’s Communication Dated 23 January 2013 (MUN/022/13), at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/kor65_12/kor_re_jpn_23_01_2013.pdf, 4 June 2013.


the CLCS is very likely to decide not to consider Korea’s Submission for the moment.

Regardless of whether its Submission will be considered by the CLCS or not, Korea can argue that its continental shelf extends naturally beyond its territorial sea baseline 200 nm, and declare the scope of its new continental shelf claim by making a submission. Judging from past practices, many countries have made submissions to the CLCS despite being well aware that their submissions would not be considered because of ongoing disputes. The submission is seen as a way of reiterating continental shelf claims, regardless of whether or not it will be considered by the CLCS. For example, a submission made by Russia involves the Russian–Japanese disputes on the Kuril Islands,16 and a submission made by Myanmar involves its delimitation disputes with India and Bangladesh.17 Another example is Australia, which includes the continental shelf of Antarctica as part of its extended continental shelf notwithstanding its awareness that a submission involving Antarctic territory would not be considered by the CLCS. But in its submission, Australia also requested the CLCS not to take any action for the time being with regard to the part in its submission that is related to continental shelf appurtenant to Antarctica.18

IV. Conclusion

The submission made by Korea on the limits of its extended continental shelfbeyond 200 nm is a submission made notwithstanding its awareness that the submi-ssion will not be considered by the CLCS. Korea’s Submission is not designed to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf; instead it is a declaration of the extent of Korea’s new continental shelf in the East China Sea.

All the fixed points of the outer limits of the extended continental shelf claimed by Korea are within 200 nm from Japan, with the closest point at only 5 nm from Japan’s territorial sea. This has provoked strong opposition from Japan.

16　 Receipt of the Submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_English.pdf, 4 June 2013.

17　 Continental Shelf Submission of Union of Myanmar, Executive Summary, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mmr08/mmr_es.pdf, 4 June 2013.

18　 Continental Shelf Submission of Union of Australia, Executive Summary, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/aus04/Documents/aus_doc_es_web_delivery.pdf, 4 June 2013.


Korea’s claim also overlaps with China’s claim, which, on one hand, reflects its cooperative position with China on the extended continental shelf issue and supports China’s claim that the East China Sea shelf extends naturally to the Okinawa Trough. On the other hand, it makes the continental shelf delimitation issue in the East China Sea more complicated. Further follow-up studies should be conducted on this problem.

Translator: CHEN XiaoshuangEditor (English): Joshua Whittingham


日本划界案大陆架界限委员会

建议摘要解读

方银霞 * 唐勇 ** 付洁 ***

内容摘要：自日本外务省 2012 年 4 月 28 日宣布，日本 200 海里以外大陆架的申请获得了大陆架界限委员会（以下简称“委员会”）的批准以来，关于其划界案涉冲之鸟礁区块的争论就一直吵得沸沸扬扬，备受国际社会关注。随着委员会分别于 2012 年 5 月 15 日和 6 月 3 日在联合国网站上公布了委员会第 29 届会议主席声明和日本划界案建议摘要，日本划界案审议结果已经是明明白白，那就是委员会根本不认可日本依据冲之鸟礁主张的外大陆架。日本除了借助冲之鸟礁外，在其他主张区还混淆概念，滥用《联合国海洋法公约》相关规定，以获取本国利益最大化，但并未得到委员会认可。本文对委员会建议摘要作全文解读，以便大家全面了解日本的划界主张和委员会的审议结果。

关键词：《联合国海洋法公约》日本划界案大陆架界限委员会委员会建议摘要

一、引言

《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称“《公约》”）第 76 条规定，沿海国陆地领土

向海洋的自然延伸如果超过其领海基线 200 海里，可以主张 200 海里以外的大陆

架（以下简称“外大陆架”）。对外大陆架提出权利要求的沿海国，须根据《公约》

所规定的一系列科学技术标准编制关于划定其外大陆架外部界限的信息资料（以

下简称“划界案”），提交给大陆架界限委员会（以下简称“委员会”）。委员会对

沿海国所划定的外大陆架外部界限是否具有充分的科学技术和法律依据进行审

*　方银霞，国家海洋局第二海洋研究所专属经济区与大陆架研究中心，研究员，主要从

事大陆边缘演化及大陆架划界研究，电子邮箱：[email protected]。本文获海洋公益性行业科研专项经费资助（编号：201205003）。

**　唐勇，国家海洋局第二海洋研究所专属经济区与大陆架研究中心，研究员。*** 付洁，国家海洋局第二海洋研究所专属经济区与大陆架研究中心，博士研究生。© THE AUTHORS AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

日本划界案大陆架界限委员会建议摘要解读 97

议，然后以“建议”的方式对沿海国划界案作出认可或否定的决定。根据《公约》

规定，沿海国在委员会建议基础上建立的大陆架外部界限才是最终和固定的。自

2002 年俄罗斯向委员会提交第一份划界案以来，截至 2012 年 10 月提交的正式

划界案已达 61 个。目前委员会已完成其中 18 个划界案的审议工作，并给出了委

员会建议，其中就包括日本的划界案。

日本于 1983 年 7 月签署《公约》，同年 10 月海上保安厅就展开了大规模的

大陆架调查行动，经过 25 年多的调查研究工作，最终于 2008 年 11 月提交了其

划界案，提出的外大陆架面积达 74.7 万平方公里，几乎是日本陆地面积的 2倍（其

陆地面积约为 37.8 万平方公里）。更重要的是，这些大陆架海域不仅蕴藏着丰富

的石油、天然气和矿物资源，而且还涵盖中国向东和东南深入太平洋、美国向西进

入东亚以及俄罗斯南下的必经通道，获得这些海域大陆架的主权权利不仅可以同

时影响几个大国，亦可拓宽自身的防御范围。正是基于此，日本国家战略研究所

所长阿部正寿把这次大陆架扩展计划看作是“日本建国以来的最大机会”。

日本划界案包括日本主要岛屿以南和东南的 7 个海区（图 1），分别为九州—

帕劳洋脊南部区（KPR 区）、南硫磺岛区（MIT 区）、南鸟岛区（MTS 区）、茂木

洋脊区（MGS 区）、小笠原海台区（OGP 区）、冲大东洋脊南部区（ODR 区）和

四国海盆区（SKB 区）。1

1　Japan’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Executive Summary, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/jpn_execsummary.pdf, 1 May 2013.


图 1 日本划界案主张的外大陆架范围 2

二、日本划界案审议过程

2008 年 11 月 12 日，日本向委员会提交了关于划定其大陆架外部界限的划

界案。委员会是根据《公约》成立的机构，负责对沿海国所划定的外大陆架外部界

限是否具有充分的科学技术和法律依据进行审议，然后以“建议”的方式对沿海国

提交的外大陆架主张做出认可、部分认可或否定的决定。根据《公约》规定，沿海

国在委员会建议基础上建立的大陆架外部界限才是最终和固定的。委员会由 21名委员组成，这些委员都是地质学、地球物理学或水道测量学方面的专家。从委

员会的组成结构我们不难看出，委员会对划界案的审议主要是一个科学和技术的

过程，不处理法律争端。但是，我们也应该看到，虽然《公约》中的很多术语来源

于科学，但是一旦成为条约的一部分，对其适用和解释就应该遵守条约解释的国

际法规则，况且《公约》关于大陆架诸多术语的解释和地质地理学意义上的概念并

2　Japan’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Executive Summary, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/jpn_execsummary.pdf, 1 May 2013.


不完全一致，这本身就是一个复杂的法律问题，是注定无法脱离于法律的。

由于日本划界案的 KPR 区以冲之鸟礁为基点主张了面积约 25.5 万平方公

里的外大陆架，此外，日本主张的 SKB 区和 MIT 区的外部界限也与冲之鸟礁的

200 海里线相关，主张面积分别约 17.7 万和 4.6 万平方公里。日本以冲之鸟礁为

基点主张外大陆架，其前提必须是冲之鸟礁拥有主张 200 海里专属经济区和大陆

架的权利基础。根据《公约》第 121 条第 3 款的规定，不能维持人类居住或维持

其自身经济生活的岩礁不应有专属经济区和大陆架。冲之鸟礁是位于西太平洋九

州－帕劳洋脊上两块孤零零的礁石，有学者形象比喻其高潮时露出海面的总面积

不足大尺寸的双人床。很显然，冲之鸟礁不具有主张 200 海里专属经济区和大陆

架的权利基础，更不可能拥有 200 海里以外的大陆架。因此，日本提出划界案后，

中国和韩国先后向委员会递交外交照会，3 4 对日本关于冲之鸟礁的专属经济区和

外大陆架主张提出质疑，并要求委员会不对日本划界案涉及冲之鸟礁的部分采取

行动。

2009 年 8 月举行的委员会第 24 届会议上，委员会决定成立小组委员会着手

审议日本划界案并提出建议，但考虑到中韩两国照会的关切，委员会同时决定，不

对小组委员会撰写的涉及中韩两国照会中提及地区部分的建议采取行动，直至委

员会决定这样做。5 也就是说，除非委员会另有决定，否则将不讨论、不通过小组

委员会撰写的与冲之鸟礁相关区块的建议草案。日本划界案小组委员会经过长达

2 年多的审议，形成的建议草案在 2011 年 8 月举行的委员会第 28 届会议上提交

委员会审议。

由于KPR区完全以冲之鸟礁为基点，冲之鸟礁法律地位问题无法回避，因此，

2012 年 4 月召开的委员会第 29 届会议在讨论 KPR 区之前，首先就对“应否对建

议草案中与九州—帕劳洋脊南部区有关的内容采取行动”这一问题举行表决。由

于委员会内部意见不一，该表决在进行过程中演变成了两次表决。第一次表决是

要确定“应否对建议草案中与九州—帕劳洋脊南部区有关的内容采取行动”这一

问题属于实质性问题还是程序性问题，第二次表决则是在第一次表决的结果，即

该问题确为实质性问题的基础上，进行的正式表决。

3　The notes verbales to the CLCS from China, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissi- ons_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.pdf, 25 February 2009.4　The notes verbales to the CLCS from the Republic of Korea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/

clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/kor_27feb09.pdf, 25 February 2009.5　Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the

Progress of Work in the Commission, Twenty-fourth session, at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/536/21/PDF/N0953621.pdf?OpenElement, 1 May 2013.


“大陆架界限委员会第 29 届会议主席的说明”（以下简称“主席声明”）6 第

19 段提及“有人提出此事为实质性还是程序性的问题。对此，主席裁定此为实质

性问题，需要三分之二的多数票决定之。这一裁定引起争议，随后以 8票对 7票、

1 票弃权的简单多数得以维持。”也就是说，第一次表决结果确定该问题为实质性

问题，因此必须获得参加表决成员的三分之二多数同意才能通过。但随后举行的

第二次“对关于建议草案中与九州—帕劳洋脊南部区有关的内容采取行动的提案

进行表决”，没有得到三分之二多数票的支持。表决结果是，参加会议的 16 位委

员中，有 5 人支持，8 人反对，另有 3 人弃权。这一表决结果表明多数委员都不支

持委员会对 KPR 区采取行动。7

经过委员会第 28 和 29 两届会议的讨论，委员会最终完成了对日本划界案的

全部审议工作并做出建议，于 2012 年 6 月 3 日在联合国网站上公布了委员会建

议摘要。8

三、委员会建议摘要全文解读

根据建议摘要，日本主张的 7 个区块中，对完全以冲之鸟礁为基点主张的

KPR 区，委员会决定不采取行动；对位于深海海盆的 MGS 区和 MTS 区，委员会

认为延伸大陆架不超过 200 海里；而 MIT、OGP、ODR、SKB 四个区块被委员会

部分核可，被核可的总面积约29.2万平方公里，约占日本主张总面积的39%（图2）。划界案中与冲之鸟礁有关的 MIT 和 SKB 区也完全脱离与冲之鸟礁的关系，其中

MIT 区由于陆坡脚（FOS）的重新选取，其外部界限与冲之鸟礁的 200 海里线无

关；至于 SKB 区，委员会的修改图件中也有意去除了其南部冲之鸟礁 200 海里线，

只标明开天窗部分，此举再次体现了委员会对冲之鸟礁岛屿地位不持立场的态度。9

下面将分区块逐一进行介绍：

6　Progress of Work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairperson, Twenty-ninth session, at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/326/32/PDF/N1232632.pdf?OpenElement, 1 May 2013.

7　丘君：《得道多助，失道寡助——“大陆架界限委员会第 29 届会议主席的说明”解读》，载于《中国海洋报》2012 年 7 月 18 日第 4 版。

8　Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 2013.

9　丘君：《谎言不能掩盖事实——日本划界案“建议摘要”解读》，载于《中国海洋报》2012 年 7 月 11 日第 4 版。


图 2 日本划界案中委员会建议认可的外大陆架范围

（一）九州—帕劳洋脊南部区（KPR 区）

日本认为KPR区的大陆架是以冲之鸟礁为代表的陆块领土的水下自然延伸，

并向南一直延伸至帕劳 200 海里线。由于 KPR 区是完全依据冲之鸟礁为基点主

张的外大陆架，而冲之鸟礁本身的法律地位就受到国际社会的严重质疑，且委员

会本身不具备判断冲之鸟礁是岛还是礁的职权。因此，委员会在建议里明确表明

了立场，即在中国、韩国、日本照会中提及的关于冲之鸟礁法律地位的问题得到解

决之前，委员会无法就建议草案中关于KPR 区块的内容采取行动。该决定表明，

委员会没有认可冲之鸟礁是岛屿，更没有认可日本以冲之鸟礁为基点主张的专属

经济区和外大陆架。

（二）南硫磺岛区（MIT 区）

MIT 区地处伊豆—小笠原岛弧和马里亚纳岛弧连接处。其东部马里亚纳海

岭外弧和西部帕里西维拉海盆之间的内弧区域内，分布有几个北东—南西向的与

海底突起和海山链有关的雁式洋脊，包括大寒海山和南硫磺岛隆起。


日本认为 MIT 区为七岛—硫磺岛海岭上的南硫磺岛陆地领土的水下延伸，

包括南硫磺岛隆起和西马里亚纳海岭西部陆坡。日本在该区提交了 3 个关键的陆

坡脚点，2 个与南硫磺岛隆起有关，1 个与西马里亚纳海岭的内弧陆坡有关。

小组委员会认为该区的陆坡基部确实位于由西马里亚纳海岭火山碎屑沉积建

造的沉积扇向海一侧，认可了 FOS-113 的位置，该点位于大寒海山链向海坡度变

化明显之处（坡度从 1.3°降至 0.2°）。10

被日本认为是最大雁式洋脊之一的南硫磺岛隆起，是西马里亚纳海岭弧后扩

张发育而成，它由两部分组成，分别是其西南端的大正海山内陆坡突起，和向西与

位于帕里西维拉裂谷东北的洋脊拼合在一起的外部区域。日本认为南硫磺岛隆起

是在帕里西维拉海盆弧后海底扩张过程中沿转换断层发育形成的。11

小组委员会指出，南硫磺岛隆起的两部分相对于海底高度不一样。包括大正

海山的隆起内坡明显高出邻近海底，而其外坡水深变化较大，12 特别是在隆起之

间的鞍状区水深较大，只高出邻近海底 200 米，13 从地形上看是不连续的，而且平

均坡度也逐渐变小。此外，小组委员会指出在隆起外坡东南分布有几个孤立的高

出海底 200~300 米的海丘，以及数量众多的、复杂的、细长状突起，这些海丘向西

北延伸构成东帕里西维拉海盆的海底。14 尽管这些海丘高出周围海底 1000 米，但

水深均达 3900~4200 米。因此，小组委员会认为这些海丘的地形特征正是弧后扩

张的典型特征，因而它们更可能是帕里西维拉海盆洋壳的一部分。

因此，小组委员会认为像 MIT 区这样具有复杂地质特征、水深变化大、与邻

近海域差异大的非传统大陆边缘，仅从地形上不足以判断是大正海山的水下自然

延伸。而且小组委员会认为目前的地质和地球物理数据不仅不支持这种延伸，反

而从南硫磺岛隆起向海到大正海山的地壳逐步减薄，并出现典型弧后扩张洋壳现

10　Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, p. 8, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 2013.

11　 Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, pp. 5~6, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 2013.

12　 Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, p. 6, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 2013.




象，有力地说明了南硫磺岛隆起外坡是深海盆的一部分，而非岛弧陆坡的一部分。15

综上所述，小组委员会认为，MIT 区的陆坡基部应该位于大正海山向海一

侧的鞍状区，16 因此不认可与硫磺岛隆起有关的 2 个陆坡脚（FOS-030 和 FOS-046）。17 小组委员会建议应根据陆坡基部的位置重新确定陆坡脚，其位置应比原

来的更靠近陆地。18日本根据建议提交了2个新的陆坡脚，获得小组委员会的认可。19

MIT 区的外部界限基于上述 3 个陆坡脚采用了距离公式线划定，20 委员会核

可的面积为0.9万平方公里，只有原来4.6万平方公里的20%。由于陆坡脚的调整，

据此划定的大陆架外部界限向西未延伸至冲之鸟礁的 200 海里线位置，因此 MIT区外大陆架与冲之鸟礁无关（图 2）。

（三）南鸟岛区（MTS 区）

MTS 区位于水深 5700~6200 米的西北太平洋深海平原。海盆内分布有大量

北西—南东向的海山和海丘，北边有马尔库斯—威克海山，南边有麦哲伦海山。

南鸟岛位于该区的中东部，是该区唯一的陆地领土，它是马尔库斯—威克海山的

一部分。该区西南的拓洋第 5 海山是该区最大的平顶海山，其他平顶海山如拓洋

第 4 海山、咸临海山和东咸临海山都位于该海山的北西侧。这些平顶海山均位于

水下 1000~1300 米深处，并高于周围深海平原 4000 米。

日本在该区提交了 13 个关键陆坡脚，均未得到小组委员会的认可，因为这

13 个陆坡脚都是基于海山群确定的，而这些水下海山之间的凹陷区是深海盆的一

部分。

综上所示，小组委员会一致认为，南鸟岛的水下延伸未扩展至周围海山，其








陆坡基部和陆坡脚均位于锥状海山的基部，其外扩 60 海里包络线均未超出其 200海里线，因此该区无外大陆架（图2），与英国阿森松岛划界案委员会建议原则一致。

（四）茂木洋脊区（MGS 区）

MGS 区位于菲律宾海和西北太平洋之间，该区分为两部分，分别为西边

的伊豆—小笠原岛弧和东边的西北太平洋海盆。东部的西北太平洋海盆水深

5000~6200 米，是晚侏罗—早白垩期间洋中脊的海底扩张作用形成的深洋底，其

主体为深海平原，零星分布有白垩纪板内火山作用形成的海山和海丘，茂木洋脊

位于海沟处，西侧延伸至伊豆—小笠原岛弧陆坡，高出海沟底约 800 米。

日本认为，MGS 区是七岛 — 硫磺岛海岭上的陆地领土（如八丈岛）的水下

自然延伸。日本在该区提交了 1 个关键陆坡脚（FOS-009）。日本根据地形和测深证据，以及地质与地球物理佐证资料，指出茂木洋脊的

鞍状区各点均高出海沟 800 米，鞍状区已经与伊豆—小笠原西侧外弧陆坡的下部

相连，茂木洋脊是陆坡的一部分。

小组委员会注意到，海沟东侧的太平洋深海盆、海沟东侧陆坡和海沟海底以

及零星的深海海丘、洋脊、断裂带和海山等都是深海海底的典型特征。小组委员

会认为鞍状区深度大大超过茂木洋脊东部斜坡带基部，无足够数据证明茂木洋脊

和伊豆—小笠原岛弧在地形上是连续的。因此，该区的任何陆坡脚都应落在伊豆

—小笠原海沟内，而不是落在属于深海底一部分的茂木洋脊周围，相应的其外扩

60 海里包络线均未超出其 200 海里线，表明该区无外大陆架（图 2）。

（五）小笠原海台区（OGP 区）

OGP 区包括南北向的伊豆—小笠原岛弧东翼和东西向的小笠原海台和上田

洋脊。日本认为，该区是西侧小笠原海岭上的小笠原群岛和七岛—硫磺岛海岭上

的南硫磺岛陆地领土的自然延伸。

日本认为，OGP 区是一个复杂的、由多个海山组成的复合型海底高地形，

分为西部的海台区、东部的洋脊区和东南部的海山区。西部的小笠原海台区，水

深在 3000 米至不足 2000 米之间，由南和东两个大海山和一个西小海山组成，

它目前正与伊豆—小笠原岛弧碰撞，堵塞在俯冲海沟，该处正是马里亚纳海沟和

伊豆—小笠原海沟连接处。21 东部的迈克尔逊洋脊区，水深与西侧海台区类似，



从西到东的平顶海山有矢部、半沢和片山海山等。22 日本认为海台区和洋脊区在

2500~3500 米水深范围内的地形上是连续的。东南部是个相对独立的海山群区。

小笠原海台被日本人认为是《公约》第 76 条中的海底高地，海台区西侧与伊

豆—小笠原岛弧发生增生形成横跨海沟的桥梁，东侧则进入太平洋深海海底。小

笠原海台水深 3300 米，比相邻海沟的最深处高出 6000 米，比东部的深海平原高

出 2500 米。小组委员会基于地形特征，认可日本沿与伊豆—小笠原岛弧相关的

海沟内侧基部以及海台和洋脊区周围确定的陆坡脚。

但是，委员会不同意宝盖草海山群的陆坡脚。因小组委员会认为，这些海山

没有出露成岛，还是典型深海海底的一部分，在太平洋广泛发育。这个认识跟小

组委员会对 MIT 区的建议是一样的。

日本在 OGP 区提交了 15 个关键陆坡脚，7 个与小笠原海台有关，7 个与宝

盖草海山群有关，1 个与上田洋脊有关。基于上述事实，与宝盖草海山群和上田

洋脊有关的 8 个陆坡脚均无效。小组委员会认可了小笠原海台的 5 个陆坡脚，其

余 2 个（FOS-069 和 FOS-203）小组委员会认为应选在更靠近陆地的地方。日本

为此重新提交了 7 个新的陆坡脚点，并为小组委员会所认可。

关于 OGP 区的限制线，日本划界案采用了距离和深度两种公式线。因为利

用深度限制线，就必须审议 OGP 区是否是大陆边缘自然组成部分的海底高地。

日本提供了大量佐证数据说明该海台区被低角度逆冲断层所切断，使得海台区地

壳与太平洋板块洋壳被分隔开，部分海台已经增生至伊豆—小笠原岛弧。此外，

该区穿过海沟的鞍状区明显高于海沟向海侧海底，满足《大陆架界限委员会科学

和技术准则》第 7.3.1 段的规定，因此委员会认可海台区已经增生至岛弧，并将继

续增生，是第 76 条所定义的海底高地，适用 2500 米等深线外推 100 海里的深度

限制线。而东部洋脊区是远离俯冲区和岛弧，在大洋环境下形成的，与深海海底

特征一致，因此它不是海底高地，而是海底洋脊，只适用 350 海里的距离限制线。

OGP 区的外部界限就是基于上述 7 个陆坡脚，采用距离公式线划定的，由于

陆坡脚的调整和距离限制线的约束，委员会核可的面积减少为 12.2 万平方公里，

是原来 20 万平方公里的 53%（图 2）。

（六）冲大东洋脊南部区（ODR 区）

ODR 区位于菲律宾海的西北，分为两部分，分别为北部的冲大东海岭和冲大

东隆起，以及南部的菲律宾海盆。该区陆地领土为冲大东海岭上的冲大东岛。



日本在该区提交了 4 个关键陆坡脚，均位于冲大东隆起沿南冲绳断崖向南延

伸的一个深部的相对隆起区内，该区域构成冲大东隆起的最南端。

在冲大东隆起南段和冲大东隆起主体之间向陆有个较深的鞍状区，该区比日

本定义的陆坡基部高 200 米。小组委员会认为，鞍状区海底起伏属于周围海底正

常地形起伏范围内，而且鞍状区是陆坡坡度变化最大之处，其平均坡度从冲大东

隆起主体的 0.4°变为鞍状区和日本确定的最外陆坡脚之间沿南冲绳断崖的不到

0.1°。因此，尽管沿鞍状区有 200 米隆起，显示微弱的形态连续性，小组委员会仍

认为仅凭地形数据不能认为冲大东隆起南段是日本陆地领土的水下自然延伸，还

需要地球物理和地质佐证资料来证明地质的连续性。

日本补充提交了相关佐证数据，但小组委员会认为其提供的重力数据和磁异

常数据都无法清楚地判断冲大东隆起南段的构造特征；而地球化学证据也显示冲

大东断崖是不连续的，采自冲大东隆起和断崖北段的 DSDP 294/295 样品显示出

典型的洋岛玄武岩特征，而冲大东隆起南段和冲大东断崖本身的样品则表现出富

集的大洋中脊玄武岩特征。因此，小组委员会认为，日本提供的重磁场和地质佐

证数据未反映该区冲大东隆起主体部分和冲大东隆起南段之间的地质连续性，反

而支持相反的观点，即两者是不连续的。

日本在此区内重新确定了 4 个陆坡脚并获委员会同意。ODR 区的外部界限

就是基于上述 4 个陆坡脚采用了距离公式线划定的，由于陆坡脚的调整，委员会

核可的面积只为 0.37 万平方公里，是原来 3.8 万平方公里的 10%（图 2）。

（七）四国海盆区（SKB 区）

SKB 区位于菲律宾海北部，四国海盆西接九州—帕劳洋脊北部，北接南海海

槽，东接伊豆—小笠原和马里亚纳岛弧，南接帕里西维拉海盆。

日本划界案认为该区的大陆边缘由东、西两部分组成。东区为伊豆—小笠原

岛弧的水下自然延伸，其陆地领土为七岛—硫磺岛海岭上的鸟岛；西区为大东海岭

和九州—帕劳洋脊的水下自然延伸，其陆地领土为大东海岭上的北大东岛和南大

东岛、冲大东海岭上的冲大东岛和九州—帕劳洋脊上的冲之鸟礁。

1. 西侧外部界限

日本在 SKB 区西侧提交了 6 个关键陆坡脚，均位于九州—帕劳洋脊东翼。

小组委员会认可了除 FOS-136 外的其他 5 个陆坡脚。FOS-136 位于该区南

部一个很小、几乎与九州—帕劳洋脊垂直、从陆坡伸入四国海盆突出部分的向海

末端。小组委员会指出这个突出部分在地形上和规模上都更像是深海海底的一部

分而非陆坡的一部分。

基于日本新提供的地球化学数据和该区的构造模式资料，小组委员会基本同

意其陆坡基部和 FOS-136 的确定。


2.东侧外部界限

日本 SKB 区东侧大陆边缘主要由伊豆—小笠原岛弧北部的西侧大陆边缘组

成。南伊豆台地是该陆缘的主要组成部分，并与纪南断崖西部相连。基于日本提

交的地质、地球化学和地球物理数据，小组委员会同意日本提出的南伊豆台地是

伊豆—小笠原岛弧的岛弧地壳和四国海盆弧后扩张地壳之间的过渡带，纪南海山

链是四国海盆弧后扩张最后阶段形成的海山链。

日本认为该区的陆坡基部大致位于纪南断崖的基部，但是有两个区域除外。

一个是在地形上与南伊豆台地连续的纪南海山链区，日本认为其陆坡基部沿

着海山群的西翼分布。地形连续性主要体现在沿纪南断崖分布的两个特征地形单

元，南部是高出纪南断崖基部400 米的狭窄脊状隆起，北部的地形单元更显宽缓，

只高出纪南断崖基部 200 米左右。但小组委员会发现纪南断崖西部的海底表现为

沿北北西向线性的弧后扩张地形特征，分布有无数的北西向不连续的、小的洋脊

和海底突起及其突起间的局部凹陷，其地形特征被认为与弧后扩张相关，而与邻

近的南伊豆台地的平缓海底完全不同。小组委员会还发现上述提及的两个地形单

元，更像是纪南断崖西部崎岖海底的一部分，而不是弧后扩张区和台地区之间的

地形连续，因此，小组委员会不认可纪南海山西翼的陆坡脚。

另一个是西部的南伊豆台地区。

日本指出，四国海盆的张开和弧后扩张始于磁异常条带 7，但是盆地东部条

带 7 和 6B 好像被弧后扩张作用之后的伊豆—小笠原岛弧向西生长的岩浆活动所

改造。小组委员会同意日本的观点，接受以这种方式改造过的初始弧后扩张地壳

是伊豆—小笠原岛弧地壳一部分的观点。

小组委员会认为北纬 28°~30.5° 之间的纪南断崖是伊豆—小笠原岛弧在该区

的陆坡基部区域，而陆坡脚应该位于那些断崖外缘明显高于邻近深海海底、且整

个台地平均高度明显高于（至少 300 米）邻近崎岖深海海底的区域。

日本根据小组委员会的建议，对 SKB 区的陆坡脚做了修改，在该区重新提交

了 7 个陆坡脚点并基本为小组委员会认可。SKB 区的外部界限就是基于西侧的 6个陆坡脚和东侧的 7 个陆坡脚采用了距离公式线划定的。但委员会认为外部界限

的直线连线应基于同一条公式线，也就是说，直线连线不能将西部陆缘的定点和

东部陆缘的定点连接起来，这样在该区 200 海里线以外还存有一块面积约 1.8 万

平方公里的空白。扣除这 1.8 万平方公里，委员会核可的该区块面积约为 15.8 万

平方公里，是原来 17.7 万平方公里的 90%（图 2）。特别需要指出的是，从委员会建议可以看出，SKB 区块大陆架外部界限是基

于四国海盆东西两侧大陆边缘向海延伸的，与南部的冲之鸟礁毫无关系。而且委

员会为体现对冲之鸟礁的法律地位不持立场的态度，在该区的外大陆架范围示意

图中（图 3），还有意去除了 SKB 区块南部的冲之鸟礁 200 海里线，显然委员会

核可的 SKB 区外大陆架主张与冲之鸟礁没有任何关系。


图 3 获委员会核可的 SKB 区外大陆架范围 23

四、日本划界案建议的启示和重要意义

沿海国外大陆架划界是沿海国和国际海底区域之间的利益划分，如何确保这

两种利益的平衡，《公约》第 300 条“诚意和滥用权利”有明确规定，要求缔约国

应诚意履行根据《公约》承担的义务并应以不致构成滥用权利的方式，行使《公约》

所承认的权利、管辖权和自由。一方面，沿海国应正当行使《公约》权利而不滥用

权利；另一方面，沿海国扩展外大陆架不应侵蚀国际海底区域，不能片面运用《公

约》的部分条款，过度主张外大陆架。

日本划界案显然弃《公约》的“诚意和滥用权利”规定于不顾，滥用《公约》

相关规定，追求本国利益的最大化，这不仅体现在基于冲之鸟礁主张的外大陆架

上，还体现在对深海海底各类洋脊的权利认定上，如把位于深海海盆和深海平原

上的南硫磺岛隆起、南鸟岛、茂木洋脊、上田洋脊、迈克尔逊洋脊区、宝盖草海山群、

23　 Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 2013.


冲大东隆起南段、纪南海山、南伊豆台地等一系列洋脊均看作是日本陆地领土的

水下自然延伸和大陆边缘自然组成部分的海底高地，据此主张大面积的外大陆架。

委员会在日本划界案审议过程中，坚持《公约》基本原则，基于大量艰苦细致的工

作，完成了委员会建议。

日本划界案委员会建议中指出，在中国、韩国、日本照会中提及的关于冲之

鸟礁法律地位的问题得到解决之前，委员会无法就建议草案中关于 KPR 区块的

内容采取行动。从目前看，无论是《公约》相关规定，学术界主流观点，还是相关

国际实践，都不支持冲之鸟礁是具有专属经济区和大陆架权利的岛屿。因此，委

员会的决定基本上打消了日本指礁为岛，利用外大陆架问题强化其冲之鸟礁专属

经济区和大陆架主张的企图。在南硫磺岛隆起、南鸟岛、茂木洋脊、上田洋脊、迈

克尔逊洋脊区、宝盖草海山群、冲大东隆起南段、纪南海山、南伊豆台地等一系列

洋脊的地质属性认定、陆坡基部的确定和陆坡脚的审核上也严格把关，维护了《公

约》制度的严肃性和海洋正义，维护了全人类的国际海底区域利益，定将对世界海

洋划界格局产生深远的影响。


Summary of Recommendations by the Commission on the Limits of the

Continental Shelf with Regard to Japan’s Submission: A Commentary

FANG Yinxia* TANG Yong** FU Jie***

Abstract: Since Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on April 28, 2012 that Japan’s submission to delimit the outer limits of its continental shelf be-yond 200 nautical miles was approved by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), the part of the submission involving the region based on Oki-no-Tori Shima has been arousing controversy in the international community. Since the May 15, 2012 publication of the Statement by the Chairperson on the “Progress of Work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf” from the 29th session of meetings and the June 3, 2012 publication of the Summary ofRecommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Re-gard to the Submission Made by Japan (hereinafter “Summary of Recommenda-tions”) on the United Nations’ website, the result of the deliberations on Japan’s submission has been clear: the CLCS did not agree at all with Japan’s claims of anouter continental shelf based on Oki-no-Tori Shima. In addition to its attempt to claim an outer continental shelf based on Oki-no-Tori Shima, Japan also tried to maximize its interests in other regions by confusing the issues and abusing the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. These

* FANG Yinxia, research fellow, Research Center on Exclusive Economic Zones and Continen- tal Shelves at the Second National Institute of Oceanography, State Oceanic Administration,

her research focusing on the evolution of continental margins and delimitations of continental shelves. Email: [email protected]. This article is funded by the Ocean Public Welfare Scientific Research Special Appropriation Project (No: 201205003).

** TANG Yong, research fellow, Research Center on Exclusive Economic Zones and Continen- tal Shelves at the Second National Institute of Oceanography, State Oceanic Administration.*** FU Jie, Ph.D. candidate, Research Center on Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental

Shelves at the Second National Institute of Oceanography, State Oceanic Administration.© THE AUTHORS AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

Summary of Recommendations by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf with Regard to Japan’s Submission: A Commentary 111

attempts were also rejected by the CLCS. This paper gives a comprehensive analy-sis of the CLCS’s Summary of Recommendations, so that the reader can gain a tho-rough understanding of Japan’s delimitation claims and the results of the CLCS’s consideration.

Key Words: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; Japan’s sub-mission; Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; Sumarry of Recom-mendations

I. Introduction

According to the requirements of article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal States have the right to claim a continen-tal shelf beyond 200 nautical miles if the natural prolongation of its land territory extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines of its territorial sea (hereinaf-ter “extended continental shelf”). A coastal State that wants to claim rights to an ex-tended continental shelf must make its submission with supporting scientific and technical data gathered and organized according to a series of standards included in the UNCLOS to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The CLCS will review the submission for complete scientific, technical, and legal bases, and will approve or reject the submission in the form of recommendations. According to the UNCLOS, the limits of the continental shelf established by a coastal State are final and binding only if they are established on the basis of these recommendations. Between 2002, when Russia made the first submission to the CLCS, and October 2012, the CLCS had received 61 submissions. To date, the CLCS has finished the review of and released recommendations on 18 of them, including that of Japan.

Japan signed the UNCLOS in July 1983. In October of the same year, the Ja-pan Coast Guard immediately launched a large-scale continental shelf survey. After more than 25 years of survey and research, Japan finally made its submission onNovember 12, 2008. The area it claimed as its extended continental shelf was 747,000 square kilometers, almost twice the land area of Japan (its land area is approximately 378,000 square kilometers). More importantly, these sea areas are not only rich in oil, gas, and mineral resources, but also important channels for China’s passage to the east and southeast into the Pacific, for the United States westward toward East Asia, and for Russia going southward. Securing sovereign right over a continental shelf of these sea areas would not only increase Japan’s


influence on several powerful countries at once, but also enlarge its area of defense. Based on these considerations, Masatoshi Abe, the director of Japan’s Council on National Strategy and Policy, called the continental shelf expansion project “the biggest opportunity since the founding of Japan.”

Japan’s submission included 7 regions located to the south and the southeast of its main islands (Fig. 1). They were: the Southern Kyushu–Palau Ridge Region (KPR), the Minami-Io To Island Region (MIT), the Minami-Tori Shima Island Region (MTS), the Mogi Seamount Region (MGS), the Ogasawara Plateau Region (OGP), the Southern Oki-Daito Ridge Region (ODR) and the Shikoku Basin Region (SKB).1

Fig. 1 Areas of the Extended Continental Shelf Claimed by Japan in Its Submission2

1 Japan’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Executive Summary, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/jpn_execsummary.pdf, 1 May 2013.

2 Japan’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Executive Summary, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/jpn_execsummary.pdf, 1 May 2013.


II. The Process of Reviewing Japan’s Submission

Japan made its submission to the CLCS on November 12, 2008. The CLCS, established by the UNCLOS, is the agency responsible for reviewing submissions made by coastal States on the limits of their extended continental shelves as to whether they include sufficient scientific, technical, and legal bases. After the review, the CLCS renders a decision of approval, partial approval, or rejection, in the form of recommendations. According to the UNCLOS, the outer limits of the continental shelf established by a coastal State are only final and binding if they are based on these recommendations. The CLCS consists of 21 members, who are all experts in geology, geophysics, or hydrography. It is clear from the composition of the CLCS that the consideration of submissions is mainly a scientific and technical process, and does not deal with legal disputes. However, it is also clear that although many terms in the UNCLOS come from science, their applicability and definitions should be consistent with the principles of international law once they have become part of the treaty. Moreover, the definitions of the various terms about the continental shelf in the UNCLOS are not entirely consistent with the corresponding geological and geographical concepts. This in itself is a complex legal issue, and cannot be considered separately from law.

The KPR region claimed in the Japan’s submission used Oki-no-Tori Shima as its base point. This part of the proposed extended continental shelf measured 255,000 square kilometers. In addition, the outer limits of the SKB region and the MIT region claimed by Japan also concerned the 200-nautical-mile line of Oki-no-Tori Shima; these areas measured respectively 177,000 and 46,000 square kilometers. The prerequisite for Japan’s claim of an extended continental shelf based on Oki-no-Tori Shima was that Oki-no-Tori Shima must have a basis for claiming rights to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf. However, according to the requirements of article 121(3) of UNCLOS, “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” Oki-no-Tori Shima is com-posed of two tiny isolated rocks located on the Kyushu–Palau Ridge in the WesternPacific. At high tide, the area of the rocks above the sea surface has been comparedby experts to a bed that is hardly enough for two people. Obviously, Oki-no-Tori Shima has no basis on which to claim rights to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive eco-nomic zone or a continental shelf, much less rights to an extended continental shelf


beyond 200 nautical miles. For this reason, after Japan made its submission, Chinaand the Republic of Korea submitted notes verbales to the CLCS in succes-sion.3 4 Both countries questioned Japan’s claims to the exclusive economic zone and extended continental shelf as they were based on Oki-no-Tori Shima, and requested the CLCS not to take any action regarding the part of the submission relating to Oki-no-Tori Shima.

During the twenty-fourth session of meetings held in August 2009, the CLCS decided to establish a subcommission to examine Japan’s submission and make re-commendations on it. But in consideration of the notes verbales expressing concern from China and the Republic of Korea, the CLCS decided at the same time that it would not take action on the recommendations prepared by the subcommission with regards to the area referred to in the notes verbales until the CLCS later decided to do so.5 In other words, in the absence of a separate decision by the CLCS, the CLCS would not discuss or adopt the subcommission’s draft recommendations with regards to the area based on Oki-no-Tori Shima. After considering Japan’s sub-mission for more than two years, the subcommission presented its draft recommen-dations to the CLCS during the twenty-eighth session of meetings in August 2011.

Since the KPR region was completely based on Oki-no-Tori Shima, its legal status was an unavoidable issue. Therefore, before the discussion on the KPR regi-on began during the twenty-ninth session of meetings in April 2012, the CLCS held a vote on whether it should take action on the portion of the recommendations rela-ting to the KPR region. Due to the different views within the CLCS, the one round of voting turned into two. The first round decided whether the above-described question was a matter of substance or of procedure. Based on the first round’s deci-sion that this was a substantive matter, the second round was a formal vote on the question of whether the CLCS should take action on the draft recommendations relating to the KPR region.

In Progress of Work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,

3 The note verbale to the CLCS from China, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submiss- ions_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.pdf, 25 February 2009.4 The note verbale to the CLCS from the Republic of Korea, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/

clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/kor_27feb09.pdf, 25 February 2009.5 Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the

Progress of Work in the Commission, Twenty-fourth session, at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/536/21/PDF/N0953621.pdf?OpenElement, 1 May 2013.


Statement by the Chairperson (hereinafter “Chairperson Statement”)6, paragraph 19 stated: “Responding to a question as to whether this was a matter of substance or of procedure, the Chairperson ruled that it was one of substance, requiring a two-thirds majority. That ruling was contested and subsequently upheld by a simple majority of 8 votes in favor, 7 against and 1 abstention.” In other words, the first round of voting determined that the question was a matter of substance, and therefore a two-thirds majority was required among those participating in the second round of voting for it to pass. However, in the second round of voting regarding the proposal to take action on the part of the draft recommendations relating to the KPR region, the proposal did not receive a two-thirds majority. Among the 16 members who participated in the meeting, the result of the vote was 5 in favor, 8 against, and 3 abstentions. This result shows the majority of the members did not support taking action on the portion of the draft recommendations relating to the KPR region.7

After discussions during the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth sessions of meetings, the CLCS finally finished considering Japan’s submission and made its recommendations. The Summary of Recommendations was published on the United Nations website on June 3, 2012.8

III. Analysis of the Full Text of the Summary of Recommendations

According to the Summary of Recommendations, among the 7 regions claim-ed by Japan, (1) the CLCS would not take action on the KPR region, whose claim was completely based on Oki-no-Tori Shima; (2) the continental shelf of the MGSand MTS regions, located in deep sea basins, shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles; (3) parts of the claimed areas of the MIT, OGP, ODR and SKB regions were adopted by the CLCS, and the total area adopted was about 292,000 square kilometers, about 39% of the original claimed area (Fig. 2). The MIT and SKB

6 Progress of Work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairperson, Twenty-ninth session, at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/326/32/PDF/N1232632.pdf?OpenElement, 1 May 2013.

7 Qiu Jun, More Moral More Support and No Moral No Support: Interpretation of the Progress of Work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Twenty-ninth Session, Statement by the Chairperson, China Ocean News, 18 July 2012, p. 4. (in Chinese)

8 Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 2013.


regions, which were related to Oki-no-Tori Shima in the submission, were entirely severed from Oki-no-Tori Shima. The relationship between the outer limit of the MIT region and the 200-nautical-mile line of Oki-no-Tori Shima was severed by the reselection of the foot of the continental slope (FOS). As for the SKB region, the CLCS’s modified map deliberately omitted the 200-nautical-mile line of Oki-no-Tori Shima in the south, marking only the area left unenclosed. This decision shows that the CLCS did not take a position as to whether Oki-no-Tori Shima could claim the status of an island.9 The recommendations with regards to the 7 regions are discussed in the following sections respectively.

Fig. 2 Areas of Extended Continental Shelf Claimed by Japan in Its Submission as Adopted by the CLCS

9 Qiu Jun, Lies Cannot Cover up the Facts: Interpretation of the Sumarry of Recommendations to Japan’s Submission, China Ocean News, 11 July 2012, p. 4. (in Chinese)


A. The Southern Kyushu–Palau Ridge Region (KPR)

Japan had considered the KPR region’s continental shelf to be the natural prolongation of Japan’s land mass, such as Oki-no-Tori Shima, which extended southward to the 200-nautical-mile line of Palau. The KPR region was completely based on Oki-no-Tori Shima, but the legal status of Oki-no-Tori Shima was serious-ly questioned by the international community. Besides, the CLCS itself did not ha-ve the authority to decide whether Oki-no-Tori Shima was an island or a rock. There-fore, the CLCS stated its position clearly in the Summary of Recommendations: the CLCS would not be in a position to take action on the draft recommendations on the KPR region until the matters referenced in the notes verbales of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan were resolved. The decision indicates that the CLCS has not agreed that Oki-no-Tori Shima is an island, and further has not approved Japan’s claims to the exclusive economic zone and the extended continental shelf based on Oki-no-Tori Shima.

B. The Minami-Io To Island Region (MIT)

The MIT region was located at the junction of the Izu–Ogasawara and Mariana Arcs. In the inner-arc area between the Mariana Ridge outer arcs to the east and the Parece Vela Basin to the west, there were several en-echelon ridges in the northeast–southwest direction associated with submarine projections and seamount chains, including the Daikan Seamount Chain and the Minami-Io To Spur.

Japan had considered the MIT region to be the submerged prolongation of the land mass of Minami-Io To Island on the Shichito-Io To Ridge, including the Minami-Io To Spur and the western slope of the West Mariana Ridge. Japan had submitted 3 key FOS points in the MIT region, two associated with the Minami-Io To Spur, and one associated with the inner arc slope of the West Mariana Ridge.

The Subcommission agreed with the base of the continental slope in the MIT region to be in fact located along the seaward edge of a slope fan system built by volcaniclastic sediments from the West Mariana Ridge. FOS-113, which was also agreed with by the Subcommission, was at a point on the Daikan Seamount Chain


where the average seaward gradient changes significantly from 1.3° to about 0.2°.10

The Minami-Io To Spur, which was considered by Japan to be one of the largest en-echelon ridges, developed as an extension of the back-arc side of the West Mariana Ridge. It was composed of two parts: an inner slope “spur” that included the Taisho Seamount at its south–western end, and an outer part that merged to the west with the Ridge Hill located to the northeast of the Parece Vela Rift. According to Japan the Minami-Io To Spur developed along a transform fault that formed during back-arc, seafloor spreading that opened the Parece Vela Basin.11

The Subcommission noted: “[T]he two parts of the Minami-Io To Spur differ-[ed] in terms of their topographic elevation relative to the surrounding seafloor. Theinner-slope part of the spur, including the Taisho Seamount, [wa]s distinctly elevat-ed above the adjacent seafloor. The outer part of the spur ha[d] a more variable re-lative elevation with respect to the adjacent seafloor,”12 especially in the saddle area between the spurs. These saddle areas lay as little as 200 meters above the adjacent seafloor.13 There was no clear topographic continuity, and the average slope also gradually became less steep. In addition, the Subcommittee noted “the existence of several isolated seafloor highs that stand[ed] about 200~300 meters above the smooth seafloor to the southeast of the outer part of the Minami-Io To Spur, as well as numerous, complex, elongate northeast-trending highs to the northwest of the ridge forming the seafloor of the eastern Parece Vela Basin.”14 Although these highs rose over 1000 meters above the seafloor, they all reached depths of 3900 to 4200 meters. Therefore, according to the Subcommission, the topographical features of these spurs were typical of back-arc spreading and therefore more likely to be part

10 Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, p. 8, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 2013.

11 Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, pp. 5~6, at http://www.

un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 20112 Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in

Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, p. 6, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 2013.




of the oceanic crust of the Parece Vela Basin.The Subcommission concluded that in the areas such as the Minami-Io To

Island region, with complex geological features, large changes in water depths, and unconventional continental margins distinct from the adjacent sea areas, the claim that the the MIT region was a submerged prolongation of the Taisho Seamount could not be justified on morphology alone. Further, the Subcommission believed that “there was … no compelling geological or geophysical evidence to support such prolongation. On the contrary, the thinning of the crust and the presence of the typical back arc spreading fabric of the basement of the Minami-Io To Spur seaward of the Taisho Seamount strongly indicate[d] that the outer part of the spur [wa]s part of the deep ocean floor rather than the continental slope of the island arc.”15

In summary, the Subcommission considered the base of the slope zone to be inthe saddle area at the seaward end of the Taisho Seamount,16 and therefore disagre-ed with the FOS points associated with the Minami-Io To Spur (FOS-030 and FOS-046).17 The Subcommission recommended that Japan reselect new FOS points in more landward positions than FOS-030 and FOS-046 in accordance with the base of slope zone location.18 Based on the recommendations, Japan submitted two new FOS points, which were accepted by the Subcommission.19

The outer limits of the MIT region were based on fixed points on arcs construct-ed at a distance of not more than 60-nautical-mile from above-described 3 FOS points.20 The area approved by the CLCS was about 9,000 square kilometers,

15 Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, pp. 6~7, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 2013.







or only about 20% of the original 46,000 square kilometers claimed. Due to the reselection of the FOS points, the outer limits of the MIT region did not extend westward to the 200-nautical-mile line of Oki-no-Tori Shima, and the region was entirely disassociated from Oki-no-Tori Shima (Fig. 2).

C. The Minami-Tori Shima Island Region (MTS)

The MTS region lay in the abyssal plain in the northwestern Pacific, which was between 5700 and 6200 meters deep. In the basin, there were numerous seamounts and knolls in the northwest–southeast direction, including the Marcus–Wake Seamounts in the north and the Magellan Seamounts in the south. Minami-Tori Shima Island, located in the mid-eastern part of the region, was part of the Marcus–Wake Seamount system and the only land mass in the region. The Takuyo-Daigo Seamount lay to the southwest of Minami-Tori Shima Island and was one of the largest guyots in the region. Other guyots such as the Takuyo-Daiyon, Kanrin, and Higashi-Kanrin Seamounts were located northwest of the Takuyo-Daigo. These guyots all stood at a depth of 1000 to 1300 meters, and they rose more than 4000 meters above the surrounding abyssal plain.

Japan had submitted 13 critical FOS points in the MTS region. They were all rejected by the Subcommission because the 13 FOS points were based on seamounts, and the depressions between the seamounts were parts of the deep ocean basin.

Based on the above, the Subcommission unanimously concluded that the submerged prolongation of Minami-Tori Shima Island did not extend to the surrounding seamounts. The Island’s base of the slope zone and FOS points were located at the base of its pinnacle-shaped edifice, and the 60-nautical-mile formula line delineated from these FOS envelopes did not extend beyond the 200-nautical-mile line of the Island. Therefore, the MTS region had no extended continental shelf (Fig. 2). The principle was consistent with the CLCS’s recommendations with regards to the Ascension Island region in the United Kingdom’s submission.

D. The Mogi Seamount Region (MGS)

The MGS region was located between the Philippine Sea and the northwest Pacific Ocean. The region was divided into two parts: the Izu–Ogasawara Arc in the west and the Northwest Pacific Basin in the east. The Northwest Pacific Basin in the east had a depth between 5000 and 6200 meters and was a deep ocean floor


formed by seafloor spreading at mid-oceanic ridges in the Late Jurassic to the Early Cretaceous periods. The majority of the basin was an abyssal plain, dotted with seamounts and knolls that were formed by intraplate volcanism in the Cretaceous period. The Mogi Seamount was located at the trench, and in the west extended up to the Izu–Ogasawara Arc slope and maintained an elevation of about 800 meters above the trench floor.

Japan had considered the MGS Region to be the natural submerged prolonga-tion of its land mass extending from its land territories on the Shichito-Io To Ridge, such as Hachijo Shima Island. Japan had submitted one critical FOS point in this region (FOS-009).

Based on the topographical and bathymetric evidence and the geological and geophysical data, Japan had concluded that all points in the saddle areas of the Mogi Seamount were 800 meters above the trench floor and were connected to the lower part of the Izu–Ogasawara outer-arc slope on its western edge. Therefore, the Mogi Seamount was part of the continental slope.

However, the Subcommission noted that the Pacific Ocean Basin and abyssal plains to the east of the trench, the eastern trench slope and the deep floor of the tr-ench itself, as well as the scattered abyssal hills, ridges, fracture zones, seamounts etc. were all characteristics of the deep ocean floor. The Subcommission considered the saddle area to be substantially deeper than the base of the slope zone to the eastof the Mogi Seamount, and there was insufficient evidence to prove the morpholo-gical continuity between the Mogi Seamount and the Izu–Ogasawara Arc. Therefore, any FOS points in this region should be within the Izu–Ogasawara Trench and not around the Mogi Seamount, which was part of the deep ocean floor. The corresponding 60-nautical-mile formula line delineated from the FOS envelope would not extend beyond the 200-nautical-mile line. In other words, the MGS region had no extended continental shelf (Fig. 2).

E. The Ogasawara Plateau Region (OGP)

The OGP region included the south–north trending eastern flank of the Izu–Ogasawara Arc, the east–west trending Ogasawara composite high, and the Uyeda Ridge. Japan had considered this region to be the natural prolongation of the Minami-Io To Island land territory on the Shichito-Io To Ridge and the Ogasawara Gunto Islands on the Ogasawara Ridge.

According to Japan’s submission, the OGP region was a complex, composite


seafloor high composed of several seamounts, and divided into the western plateau part, the eastern ridge part, and the southeastern seamounts part. The Ogasawara plateau part in the west had depths ranging between 3000 meters and less than 2000 meters, and was composed of two large seamounts in the south and east and a small seamount in the west. It was “currently colliding with the Izu–Ogasawara Arc and clogging up the subduction trench in the area where the Mariana Trench join[ed] the Izu–Ogasawara Trench.”21 The Michelson Ridge in the east lay “at similar depths to the western plateau part and host[ed] large, flat topped seamounts, which from west to east [were] the Yabe, Hanzawa and Katayama seamounts” as well as other seamounts.22 Japan had considered that, at a common depth of 2500~3500 meters, the western plateau part and the eastern ridge part were morphologically continuous. The southeastern part was a relatively isolated group of seamounts.

Japan had considered the Ogasawara Plateau to be a submarine elevation within the meaning of article 76 of UNCLOS. The western portion of the plateau part had merged with the Izu–Ogasawara Arc and formed a massive bridge across the trench, and extended onto the deep ocean floor of the Pacific Ocean to the east. The Ogasawara plateau lay at about 3300 meters in depth, which was more than 6000 meters above the deepest parts of the adjacent trenches and more than 2500 meters above the abyssal plain to the east. The Subcommission, based on morphology, approved the FOS points established along the base of the inner trench wall associated with the Izu–Ogasawara Arc and around the plateau and the ridge part .

However, the CLCS rejected the FOS points of the Hotokenoza Seamount Gr-oup because, in the view of the Subcommission, these seamounts were not surmoun-ted by islands. This was a normal part of the typical deep ocean floor, particularly in the Pacific Ocean. This consideration was consistent with the recommendations presented by Subcommission with regards to the MIT region.

Japan had submitted 15 critical FOS points in the OGP region, 7 of which were associated with the Ogasawara Plateau, 7 were associated with the Hotokenoza Seamounts Group, and 1 was associated with the Uyeda Ridge. For the reasons

21 Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Japan on 12 November 2008, pp. 13~14, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, 1 May 2013.



presented above, the 8 FOS points associated with the Hotokenoza Seamounts Group and the Uyeda Ridge were void. The Subcommission approved 5 of the FOS points associated with the Ogasawara Plateau; the Subcommission believed that the other 2 FOS points (FOS-069 and FOS-203) should be located at points closer to land. Following the recommendations, Japan resubmitted 7 new FOS points all of which were approved by the Subcommmission.

For the constraint lines of the OGP Region, Japan had used both the distance and the depth formula lines. The application of the depth constraint would force the question of whether the OGP Region was a submarine elevation that could be considered as a natural part of the continental margin. Japan had provided a large amount of supporting data to show that the Plateau was cut off by low-angle thrust faults and therefore the crust of the plateau part was separated from the oceanic crust of the Pacific plate, and that part of the plateau had been accreted to the Izu–Ogasawara Arc. Moreover, the saddle area across the trench was substantially elevated above the seafloor seaward of the trench, which satisfied the criteria in paragraph 7.3.1 of the Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the CLCS. The CLCS agreed that the plateau part had been accreted to the arc and continued to do so. Therefore, the Ogasawara Plateau was a submarine elevation within the meaning of article 76, suitable for the application of the depth constraint constructed at 100-nautical-mile from the 2500 meter isobaths. However, the eastern ridge part was originally formed in the oceanic environment far from the subduction zone and the associated island arc, and shared the characteristics of the deep ocean floor. It should not be considered a submarine elevation but a submarine ridge, and therefore was only suitable for the application of 350-nautical-mile distance constraint.

The outer limits of the OGP region were delimited based on fixed points on arcs constructed at a distance of not more than 60-nautical-mile from above-described 7 FOS points. Due to the reselection of FOS points and the limits of the depth constraint, the area approved by the CLCS was reduced to 122,000 square kilometers, or about 53% of the 200,000 square kilometers originally claimed (Fig. 2).

F. The Southern Oki-Daito Ridge Region (ODR)

The ODR region, located in the northwestern part of the Philippine Sea, was divided into two parts: the Oki-Daito Ridge and the Oki-Daito Rise in the north,


and the Philippine Basin in the south. The land territory in this region was the Oki-Daito Shima Island on the Oki-Daito Ridge.

Japan had submitted 4 critical FOS points in respect of this region. These points were all located in a deep-seated, relatively elevated area extending south-ward from the Oki-Daito Rise along the Minami-Okinawa Escarpment. This area constituted the southernmost tip of the Oki-Daito Rise.

There was a low-lying saddle area between the landward end of the feature termed the southern tip of the Oki-Daito Rise and the main body of the Oki-Daito Rise, which had an elevation of 200 meters above the base of the slope zone defined by Japan. The Subcommission determined that the changes in elevation in the saddle area lay within the average general range of the surrounding seafloor. Further, the saddle area was the point of maximum change in the gradient of the slope. Its average gradient changed from 0.4° in the main body of the Oki-Daito Rise to less than 0.1° along the Minami-Okinawa Escarpment between the saddle and the outermost FOS point as defined by Japan. Despite the weak morphological continuity shown by the 200-meter elevation across the saddle area, the Subcommission considered the morphological data to be insufficient evidence to consider the southern tip of the Oki-Daito Rise to be a natural submerged prolongation of Japan’s land territory. The geological continuity had to be further substantiated by supplemental geophysical and geological data.

After Japan submitted the relevant supplemental data, the Subcommission still believed that the data provided with regards to the gravitational and magnetic anomalies could not clearly identify the structural features of the southern tip of the Oki-Daito Rise. Geochemical evidence also showed that the Oki-Daito Escarpment was discontinuous. The samples from the Oki-Daito Rise and the DSDP 294/295 north of the escarpment exhibited typical OIB-like signatures, while the samples from the southern tip of the Oki-Daito Rise and the Oki-Daito Escarpment itself exhibited typical E-MORB signatures. Therefore, the Subcommission determined that the supplemental gravitational and magnetic field and geological data provided by Japan could not support the existence of geological continuity between the main body of the Oki-Daito Rise and the southern tip of the Oki-Daito Rise. Rather, the data appeared to indicate the opposite: the two were discontinuous.

Japan reselected 4 new FOS points in this region, which were accepted by the CLCS. The outer limits of the ODR region were based on fixed points on arcs constructed at a distance of not more than 60-nautical-mile from the above-described 4 FOS points. Due to the reselection of FOS points, the area approved


by the CLCS was only 3,700 square kilometers, about 10% of the 38,000 square kilometers originally claimed (Fig. 2).

G. The Shikoku Basin Region (SKB)

The SKB region was located in the northern Philippine Sea. The Shikoku Basin was bounded in the west by the northern part of the Kyushu–Palau Ridge, in the north by the Nankai Trough, in the east by the Izu–Ogasawara and Mariana Arcs, and in the south by the Parece Vela Basin.

The continental margins in the SKB region were described as constituting two parts, the eastern and the western, in Japan’s submission. The eastern region was the natural submerged prolongation of the Izu–Ogasawara Arc, with Tori-Shima Island on the Shichito-Io To Ridge as its land territory. The western region was the natural submerged prolongation of the Daito Ridge and the Kyushu–Palau Ridge, with Kita-Daito Shima and Minami-Daito Shima Islands on the Daito Ridge, Oki-Daito Shima Island on the Oki-Daito Ridge, and Oki-no-Tori Shima Island on the Kyushu–Palau Ridge as its land territories.

1. The Western Outer LimitsJapan had submitted 6 critical FOS points in the western SKB region, all

located in the eastern flank of the Kyushu–Palau Ridge. The Subcommission agreed with the 5 FOS points other than FOS-136. FOS-

136 was located at the seaward end of a minor, spur-like feature in the southern part of the region which protruded into the Shikoku Basin from a slope, and which was almost perpendicular to the Kyushu–Palau Ridge. The Subcommission pointed out that this spur-like feature had a morphology and size that made it appear more likely to be a part of the deep ocean floor, rather than the slope.

Based on the geochemical data and the tectonic model of the region that Japan later provided, the Subcommission basically agreed with the determination of the base of the slope zone and FOS-136.

2. The Eastern Outer LimitsThe eastern continental margin of the SKB region was formed by the western

margin of the north Izu–Ogasawara Arc. The Minami-Izu Terrace was the major structural element of this margin, and was bounded to the west by the Kinan Escarpment. Based on the geological, geochemical, and geophysical data submitted by Japan, the Subcommission agreed that the Minami-Izu Terrace included the transition zone between the island arc crust of the Izu–Ogasawara Arc and the


back-arc spreading crust of the Shikoku Basin, and that the Kinan Seamount Chain was formed during the final stages of the seafloor spreading in the Shikoku Basin.

Japan had stated that the base of the slope zone along this margin was, in general, located along the base of the Kinan Escarpment, except for two areas.

One area was the Kinan Seamount Chain region, which Japan had considered to be geomorphologically continuous with the Minami-Izu Terrace; therefore, its base of the slope zone was along the western flanks of the seamounts. The proposed morphological continuity consisted of two features across the Kinan Escarpment. In the south, the feature consisted of a narrow, ridge-like structure rising about 400 meters above the seafloor at the base of the Kinan Escarpment. In the north, the feature was even broader and rose only 200 meters above the seafloor. However, the Subcommission found that the seafloor to the west of the Kinan Escarpment displayed NNW-trending lineaments that were featured of back-arc spreading fabric, numerous NW-trending discontinuous small ridges and highs, and intervening local depressions. This roughness pattern was in clear contrast to the smooth surface of the adjacent Minami-Izu Terrace, and was taken to be associated with the back arc spreading crust. The Subcommission further found that the two features referred to above seemed more likely to be part of the general roughness pattern of the seafloor west of the Kinan Escarpment and not morphological bridging points between the terrace area and the back arc spreading area. Therefore, the Subcommission rejected the FOS points located on the western flanks of the Kinan Seamounts.

The other area was the Minami-Izu Terrace area in the west. Japan had pointed out that the opening and back arc ocean spreading in the

Shikoku Basin was symmetrical starting at anomaly 7. However, on the eastern side of the basin, anomalies 7 and 6B seemed to be masked by later magmatic activity related to the westward growth of the Izu–Ogasawara Arc following the end of back-arc spreading. The Subcommission agreed with Japan’s assertion and accepted that the original back arc spreading crust had been modified in this way to become a part of the Izu–Ogasawara Arc crust.

The Subcommission considered the base of the slope zone in the area of the Izu–Ogasawara Arc to be located between approximately 28º~30.5º N in the Kinan Escarpment, and the FOS points to be located in the areas whose margins were noticeably elevated above the adjacent deep ocean floor and where the terraces were on average noticeably elevated (more than 300 meters) above the adjacent rugged deep ocean floor.


Based on the Subcommission’s recommendations, Japan reselected 7 new FOS points in the region that were in substance accepted by the Subcommission. The outer limits of the SKB region were based on fixed points on arcs constructed at a distance of not more than 60 nautical miles from the 6 FOS points in the west and 7 FOS points in the east. However, the CLCS recommended that the straight lines establishing the outer limits should connect fixed formula points on the same formula line; in other words, the straight lines should not connect fixed points on the eastern formula lines with formula points on the western formula line. Therefore, the approved area did not include the blank “window” beyond the 200-nautical-mile line which was measured about 18,000 square kilometers. Taking away this blank window, the approved area was 158,000 square kilometers, about 90% of the 177,000 square kilometers originally claimed (Fig. 3).

In particular, it can be observed from the CLCS’s recommendations that the outer limits of the continental shelf in the SKB region were based on the eastern and western margins of the Shikoku Basin and had nothing to do with Oki-no-Tori Shima in the south. Furthermore, to show that the CLCS took no position on the legal status of Oki-no-Tori Shima, the Oki-no-Tori Shima 200-nautical-mile line in the southern part of the SKB region was deliberately omitted on the CLCS’s map (Fig. 3). Evidently, the extended continental shelf of the SKB region, as approved by the CLCS, had no relationship with Oki-no-Tori Shima.


Fig. 3 The Extended Continental Shelf in the SKB Region as Approved by the CLCS23

IV. The Significance and Implications of the Summary of Recommendations to Japan’s Submission

The delimitation of the coastal States’ continental shelves is a division of inter-ests among the coastal States and the international seafloor. To balance these two i-nterests, article 300 of UNCLOS, “[g]ood faith and abuse of rights,” clearly provides that the States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under the UNCLOS and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in the UNCLOS in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right. On one level, coastal States should exercise their rights appropriately and avoid abusing them. On another level, when claiming their extended continental

23 Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission, made by Japan on 12 November 2008, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/ com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf, June 11, 2012.


shelves, coastal States should not encroach upon international seafloor or use certain provisions of the UNCLOS out of context to make excessive claims.

To maximize its interests, Japan had apparently disregarded the “Good faithand abuse of rights” requirements in the UNCLOS and abused the relevant provisions. Such attempts were reflected not only in the claim for an extended continental shelf based on Oki-no-Tori Shima, but also in the identification of the legal status of the various types of ocean ridges in the deep ocean floor. These included the Minami-Io To Spur, Minami-Tori Shima Island, the Mogi Ridge, the Uyeda Ridge, the Michelson Ridge, the Hotokenoza Seamount group, the southern tip of the Oki-Daito Rise, the Kinan Seamount, and the Minami-Izu Terrace, all located in deep sea basins and abyssal plains. Japan had considered all these the natural submerged prolongations of its land territory and submarine elevations in the naturally-formed portions on the edge of the continental margins. In the process of considering Japan’s submission, the CLCS upheld the basic principles of the UNCLOS and prepared its recommendations after a copious amount of arduous and meticulous work.

In its recommendations, the CLCS noted that it would not be in a position totake action on the contents concerning the KPR region in the draft recommenda-tions until the matters referred to in the notes verbales of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan had been resolved. At present, neither the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS, nor the mainstream views in academia, nor the actual practice in theinternational community supports Oki-no-Tori Shima’s status as an island entitled to an exclusive economic zone or a continental shelf. The CLCS’s decisions basica-lly dispelled Japan’s attempts to call a rock an island and to claim an exclusive economic zone and extended continental shelf based on Oki-no-Tori Shima. More-over, the CLCS adhered strictly to its standards in identifying the geological features, the base of the slope zones, and the FOS points in the series of ocean ridges that included the Minami-Io To Spur, Minami-Tori Shima Island, the Mogi Ridge, the Uyeda Ridge, the Michelson Ridge, the Hotokenoza Seamount group, the southern tip of the Oki-Daito Rise, the Kinan Seamount, and the Minami-Izu Terrace. The CLCS has protected the legitimacy and justice of the UNCLOS’s regime and maintained humanity’s common interest in the international seafloor. Its decision will certainly exert a profound influence on world maritime delimitation trends in the future.

Editor (English): Sherra Wong


北海航线航行的法律规制

Dremliuga Roman *

内容摘要：北极中属于俄罗斯联邦的部分不久就会成为国际航行最重要的区域之一。俄罗斯现有的大部分航行规则向在北极航行的船舶和船员提出了严格的要求，这些规则旨在确保航行安全并保护北极环境。本文讨论了俄罗斯在北极的海洋法律、政策和航行规则的发展。

关键词：北海航线北极航行法律规制

北海航线不仅对俄罗斯联邦（以下简称“俄联邦”），而且对整个国际社会都

是一个重要议题。经北海航线从北太平洋到北欧相较于其他海上航线，在经济上

更为有利。例如，经北海航线从海参崴到圣彼得堡的航线长度将近1.4 万公里（7560海里），但若经苏伊士运河，航线长度将超过 2.3 万公里（12420 海里）；而且与苏

伊士运河相比，北海航线无需过境费（虽然有引航费），海盗威胁最小，且无需排队。

正如大多数俄罗斯法案讨论的，北海航线指的是俄联邦历史上在北极建立的

大洋航线，途经维尔基特斯基、绍卡利斯基、德米特里·拉普捷夫和桑尼科夫海峡。

在北海航线享有航行权利的依据是俄联邦的联邦法、签订的国际协定和北海航线

相关航行条例。1

一、历史特点

俄罗斯人在北冰洋航行方面有着悠久的传统。早在 16 世纪中叶，海岸居民 2

和先驱者就利用西伯利亚地区河流的支流开始沿北冰洋海岸航行，并穿越北冰洋。

1648年，一群由商人F·波波夫和哥萨克酋长S·迭日涅夫率领的海员，乘坐“科奇”3

* Dremliuga Roman，俄罗斯海参崴远东联邦大学法学院高级讲师。电子邮箱：[email protected]。感谢 William Price 对本文编辑工作的帮助。

© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW1　1998 年《俄罗斯联邦内水、领海及毗连区法》第 14 条。2　海岸居民，白海和巴伦支海沿岸的居民。海岸居民在北极开发中扮演主要角色。3　科奇，俄罗斯海岸居民的帆船，可以抵抗冰压。

北海航线航行的法律规制 131

绕过楚科奇半岛，到达太平洋。4

1686 至 1688 年，由 I·托尔斯特赫夫领导的商人探险队从西向东绕过泰梅尔

半岛。虽然很不幸的是这只探险队失踪了，但是表明这一探险成果的证据已被发

现。1712 年，先驱者 M·沃根和 Y·佩尔米亚科夫首次发现了大利亚霍夫岛，并

开启了整个新西伯利亚群岛的发现和开发进程。

1725 年，当俄罗斯沙皇彼得大帝 53 岁临近死亡之时，发起了一项新事业，

这项事业划定了北太平洋的现有边界，并描绘了其土地和人民。随后的 140 年中，

俄罗斯派出超过 225 艘船只进入北太平洋，开始是建立其在北美的殖民地，后来

是为其殖民地服务。虽然没有发现新通道，但俄罗斯的这些探索给欧洲人带来了

有关新地域和新民族的知识。从 1790 年到 1840 年，俄罗斯水手成功绘制了西伯

利亚临北极和太平洋的海岸航线图，该图范围超出了北美的巴罗角。俄罗斯人的

航行包括了重要的科学研究、新技术的测试，发现了生活在“新世界”的民族，并

为欧洲博物馆鉴定了成千上万的植物、动物和矿产。5

北极探索的后续期开始于海军上将 S·马卡罗夫命令建设俄罗斯第一艘重型

破冰船——“叶尔马克”号，6 用于鄂毕河和叶尼塞河的定期航行；另外，“叶尔马

克”号也被认为可以到达北极高纬度地区。该艘破冰船于 1899 年完成，并参加了

许多北极探险，首次使得在北冰洋的定期航行成为可能。“叶尔马克”号悬挂商业

旗帜这一点非常重要，因为这清楚地表明北海航线的首要目的和用途是作为贸易

航线。

十月革命后的苏联政府强调北极探索。1921 年，列宁签署了一项建立流动海

洋研究所的法令，涵盖北冰洋、北西伯利亚河流的河口，以及北极地区的岛屿和

海岸。根据 1921 年 10 月 3 日颁布的该法令第 1 条，“为对国家至关重要的北部

海域和海岸进行详细和系统的研究，必须在人民启蒙委员部之下建立流动海洋研

究所，包括生物、水文、气象、地质矿物学部门。”在流动海洋研究所的委托下，19个极地无线电气象站在 1923 年至 1933 年间建立起来。

1937 年，首个流动站建设完成，使得在固定和漂浮冰上探索北冰洋成为可能，

俄罗斯在首次成功后又继续创建了许多流动研究站，这些研究站是在北极开发上

迈出的重要一步。

北极作出的最值得肯定的贡献是在第二次世界大战期间。北海航线是苏联盟

友（主要是美国）运输货物到俄罗斯西部的唯一海道。法西斯势力试图破坏俄罗

斯破冰船舰队，甚至制定特别计划企图完全消灭俄罗斯北极海军力量。尽管敌人

肆意攻击，破冰船还是在经历了浴血奋战之后幸存下来，并帮助打败法西斯德国。

4　Nikitin N. I., Semen Dejnev, Voprosy Istorii, No. 4, 2001, pp. 135~144.5　Russia’s Great Voyages, at http://www.calacademy.org/exhibits/science_under_sail/sailing.

html, 4 March 2013.6 “叶尔马克”号是俄罗斯非常著名的西伯利亚先驱者和征服者。


历史证据表明，俄罗斯人在过去几个世纪广泛探索和开发了北极地区，从海

岸原住民的航海开始，到现今蓬勃发展的商业贸易。毫无疑问，俄罗斯为北极探

索和生存做出了重大贡献；现在，随着北极的航行价值和巨大的油气资源储备得到

广泛认可，其他国家才开始主张各自在俄联邦北极地区的权利。

二、法律规制的起源

北海航线连接了相距约 3 千海里的欧洲和远东港口，是俄罗斯在北极的重要

航道。北极航行每年只有 3 至 4 个月的时间，北极港口通常在七到十月份期间可

以进入。北海航线的实际路线因航行需要和冰情影响每年都有变化，甚至在单个

航行季节也会改变。

尽管使用北海航线具有优势，但直到最近也只有相对较少的船只航经该通道。

因北海航线航行量低，在此之前没有必要改变有关其航行的法律法规。2010 年，

过境通行量只有 4艘船舶（11 万吨），2011 年也只有 34 艘船舶（82 万吨），但是，

2012 年的预期运输吨位为 250 万吨。

此外，北海航线主要位于俄联邦的专属经济区、领海，甚至内水以内，这意味

着北海航线主要处于俄罗斯主权或特殊管辖区域内。即使是位于俄联邦专属经济

区之外的部分，因为必须引航也需要获得俄罗斯的过境许可。换言之，没有船舶

可以在绕过俄罗斯管辖领土的情况下经过北海航线。另外，正如《指导船舶通过

北海航线的破冰船和引航员条例》（以下简称“《指导条例》”）中提到的，北海航线

的海上航道多位于有复杂冰情和航行条件的特别生态脆弱区，因此需要作特别考

虑。

俄罗斯已经制定了许多有关北海航线的官方法案，这些法案的法律制度主要

是建立在国内法的基础上。但这与《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称“《公约》”）并

不矛盾，因为根据《公约》第 234 条，“沿海国有权制定和执行非歧视性的法律和

规章，以防止、减少和控制船只在专属经济区范围内冰封区域对海洋的污染，这种

区域内的特别严寒气候和一年中大部分时候冰封的情形对航行造成障碍或特别危

险，而且海洋环境污染可能对生态平衡造成重大的损害或无可挽救的扰乱。这种

法律和规章应适当顾及航行和以现有最可靠的科学证据为基础对海洋环境的保护

和保全。”7

在俄罗斯，规范商业航运的基本法案是《俄罗斯联邦商船航运法典》（以下简

7　At http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A-31363-English.pdf, 5 March 2013.


称“《航运法典》”），8 其中包括“船舶”的法律定义、规范船舶注册的法律原则、海

上保险规范等。然而，只有第 5 条“商船航运领域的公共管理”提到了北海航线，

其第 4 款规定了北海航线的航行和水道测量支持由联邦商船领域的执行机构提

供。应当指出的是，根据本法案，其他海域的航行和水道测量支持由联邦国防执

行机构提供。

控制北海航线航行适用的主要法案是于 1990 年 9 月 14 日由商业海运部长

批准并于 1991 年 7 月 13 日在《航海通告》第 29 期官方发布的《北海航线海上航

道航行条例》（以下简称“《航行条例》”），9 其有效性在 1998 年 6 月 18 日交通部

第 73 号命令中得到重申（参见第 73 号命令第 2 条）。根据《航行条例》第 2 条，

“在不歧视所有国家船舶的基础上，本条例应以确保安全航行和预防、减少、控制

来自船舶的海洋环境污染为目的，规范北海航线的航行。因为北极地区特别恶劣

的气候条件和一年大部分时间冰情的存在给航行带来了障碍或增加了危险，而海

洋或苏联北部海岸的污染可能对生态平衡造成极大损害或无可挽救的扰乱，并损

害极北地区人民的利益和福祉。”

批准《航行条例》的时间是在 20 多年前的苏联时期，但当时就已经有了关于

所有国家通过北海航线的非歧视性航行规定，这一点非常重要。《航行条例》确立

了航行规则（第 7 条）、通过航线时请求指导的规则（第 3 条）、船舶及其指挥人

员的要求等。该法案一些条款的措辞非常笼统，需要借助其他法案进行解释。例

如，第 3 条规定，“意图在北海航线航行的船舶应当满足特殊要求，其船长或代替

船长的人应当有丰富的在冰中操作船舶的经验。”但是，该法案并没有明确“满足

特殊要求”的含义，若要理解其含义，必须适用《北海航线航行船舶的设计、装备

和物资要求》（以下简称“《要求》”）中的定义。

《航行条例》对北海航线定义如下：北海航线是苏联的国家运输航线，位于毗

连苏联北部海岸的内水、领海（领水）或专属经济区内，包括需要在冰中引航的海

道。其西端点是新地群岛海峡的西入口，经度从梅斯热拉尼亚以北开始，东至北

纬 66º西经 168°58'37" 的白令海峡（第 1.2 条）。这一定义不同于其他法案的定

义，例如，该定义没有反映出 1998 年《俄罗斯联邦内水、领海及毗连区法》（以下

简称“《内水、领海及毗连区法》”）第 14 条中有关该航线长期历史用途和国内性质

的规定。显然，与其他法律法案的此种冲突会引起适用《航行条列》的困难。

根据《航行条例》，俄罗斯北海航线管理局有权在一定条件下对任何通过北

8　可以在网络上找到该法案一些非官方的英文版本，例如，下载于 http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/HNS/rmc.pdf，2013 年 3 月 5 日。

9　Federal agency of river and marine transport, Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route, at http://www.morflot.ru/files/docslist/20111103135113-REGULATION_FOR_NAVIGATION_ON_ТНЕ_SEAWАYS_OF_ТНЕ_NORTHERN_SEA_ROUTE.doc, 5 March 2013.


海航线的船舶进行检查。第 6.1 条规定，“如果有不利的冰情、航行、水文、天气

和其他危及船舶的情况，或如果有污染海洋环境或苏联北部海岸的威胁，管理局

代表可以对在北海航线航行的船舶进行检查。”这一规定赋予北海航线管理局只

有在恶劣条件危及船舶和存在污染威胁时，才可以进行检查的权利。这完全符合

现代国际法中关于航行自由可以受限于海洋环境和海上安全的规定。此外，如果

存在海洋污染威胁，检查的特权还可以移交给其他国家机构。

《航行条例》第 6.3 条列举了检查的种类：北海航线管理局的检查可以包括确

保船舶符合特殊要求的文件审查、货运单据审查，在特定情况下，还可以直接检查

船舶的情况，细查其装备、设施、技术导航辅助设备、准备情况及能否满足有关预

防海洋污染的要求。

根据《航行条例》，每艘通过北海航线的船舶都应（向俄罗斯北海航线管理局）

提交通知和引导请求，此外，拟通过北海航线的船舶应该满足特殊要求。为确定

引导船舶通过北海航线的可能性，该船应向北海航线管理局提交一份通知，写明

如下事项：

1. 船舶名称、国际海事组织编码、船旗、船籍港、船主（全名和地址）；

2. 总/净吨位；

2.1 满载排水量；

3.主要尺寸（长、宽、设计草图），主引擎的输出量、推进器（结构、材料）、速度、

建造年份；

4. 冰级和船级社，最后一次检查日期；

4.1 船头结构（冰刀或球鼻船首）；

5. 预期通过北海航线的时间；

6. 有涵盖环境污染损坏民事责任的保险凭单或其他经济担保；

7. 航行目的（商业航行、旅游、科学研究等）；

8. 不符合《要求》的清单。10

《要求》规定了经北海航线航行的船舶所需要的规格，11 该法案规定，“现有

的《要求》考虑到了沿北海航线航行时特别困难和危险的条件，目的是确保航行安

全、防止污染海洋环境和俄罗斯北部特别脆弱的海岸地区，法律禁止在这些地区

处理任何剂量的石油产品和其他有害物质及含有总量超过既定标准的此种物质的

混合物。”这一规定表明了俄罗斯的立场：所有北极法案的制定都是为了防止污染、

10　 Federal agency of river and marine transport, Commemorative Booklet, at http://www.morflot.ru/files/docslist/20120706113906-2.doc, 6 March 2013.

11　 Federal agency of river and marine transport, Requirements for thе Design, Equipment and Supplies of Vessels Navigating thе Northern Sea Route, at http://www.morflot.ru/files/docslist/20111107100554-REQUIREМENTS_FOR_ТНЕ_DESIGN_EQUIPМENT_AND_SUPPLIES_OF%20VESSELS_NAVIGAТING.doc, 6 March 2013.


维持一个安全的环境和避免船舶碰撞。因此，每艘船舶在通过北海航线时都必须

遵守这些特别规则。

《要求》的适用对象包括所有沿北海航线航行的（注册）总吨位为 300 吨及

以上的船舶（第 1.1 条），如果一艘船舶的吨位不足 300 吨，其应向北海航线管理

局寻求特殊决议。《要求》不能单独适用；“除了现有的《要求》，沿北海航线航行

的船舶还必须满足《俄罗斯联邦注册规则》，该项规则的适用对象包含以下抗冰级

别的船舶：Arc4 (LU4)、Arc5 (LU5) 或 Arc6 (LU6)”（第 1.2 条）。因此，为了符

合《要求》，船舶还必须考虑其他相关法案。

除了规定拟通过北海航线船舶的必要规格，《要求》还规定了必要的船舶检

查，列举了检查场所和其他有关国家调控要求的规定。最后一个条款“船上船员”，

详细阐述了船员和船长的资格标准，该条款的目的也是为预防海洋环境污染、避

免碰撞。例如，第 9.5 条规定，“必须预先警告船上船员禁止在北海航线排放污染

物和垃圾，以及根据俄联邦法律，污染任何海洋和冰层所招致的责任。”

另一个与北海航线有关的重要法规是《指导条例》。12 可以看到，《指导条例》

包括了对“指导”的法律定义，根据该法案，“指导船舶通过北海航线是指，该船

舶在通过北海航线的整个航行过程中，一直受到西部和东部海洋营运总部（以下

简称“营运总部”）的控制。营运总部负责协调北海航线航道上的船舶交通流量和

破冰船服务，向船舶提供冰区引航员（如果船上没有）、必要的破冰支持，以及系

统地通知船舶冰情和水文气象条件，以便快速、安全地通过北海航线。根据冰情、

水文气象和航行的具体情况，营运总部在北海航线区域建立和提供以下类型的船

舶指导……”（第 1.4 条）。《指导条例》规定了请求指导和发送通知的程序，指导

的组织（第 2 条），以及船舶船长、破冰船船长和国家引航员在指导船舶通过北海

航线过程中的义务和责任（第 3 条）。

根据《指导条例》，破冰船船长、船主和租船人不对指导穿越冰区和相关调遣

过程中或因此给船舶造成的损害或其他损失负责（第 3.1 条）。但如果船舶船长

在破冰船或冰区引航员指导下，因其自身的错误行为致使破冰船或其他船舶遭受

损失，船舶船主将对该损害负责（第 3.6 条）。该条是基于《航运法典》第 17 章的

规定所制定的，尽管该章的名称是“船舶碰撞的损害赔偿”，“但这些规定也应适

用于由一艘船舶的作为或不作为、或者不遵守航行规则造成另一艘船舶、船上人

员、货物或其他财产的损害，即使事实上并没有发生船舶之间的碰撞”（《航运法典》

第 310 条）。总之，即使是引航员（不仅是在北极）导致船舶碰撞或遭到损害，也

只有被指导船舶的船主需要对损害或其他损失承担责任（《航运法典》第 314 条）。

12　Federal agency of river and marine transport, Regulations for Icebreaker and Pilot Guiding of Vessels through the Northern Sea Route, at http://www.morflot.ru/files/docslist/20110928151938-REGULATIONS_FOR_ICEBREAKER.doc, 7 March 2013.


很明显，尽管俄罗斯法院会直接适用上述各项法案，但都需要依赖俄罗斯颁

布的其他法律和签署的国际公约。这些法案的执行力度弱，且如果其中的规定与

联邦法律相冲突，将不会适用。很大程度上，与航运相关的主要法律并不会涉及

北海航线，而且《航行条例》存在一个很大的缺陷，即它是 20 多年前颁布的，不

能反映现代通行北海航线的需求。

三、法律的实施

由于北海航线的船舶流量比较小，并没有许多关于北方航行法案适用的实例。

但是为理解上述法案的含义，分析执法的实践非常重要。

关于《航行条例》，俄联邦的联邦仲裁法院一再证实，《航行条例》是北海航

线航行适用的主要法案。根据东西伯利亚地区联邦仲裁法院 2000 年 5 月 25 日第

1-871-96-C1-Ф02-880/00-С2 号决议，《航行条例》建立了北海航线的航行规则，

决议证实了《航行条例》的许多规定都是可以适用的。

应当指出的是，所有航行和水文气象服务的提供都依赖于《航行条例》，其独

立于适用于破冰船和引航员指导的合同规定（西西伯利亚地区联邦冲裁法院 2012年 3 月 15 日第 А75-1740/2011 号案件裁决）。

《航行条例》未就无营运总部指导的经北海航线的航运作出规定（西西伯利

亚地区联邦冲裁法院 2010 年 11 月 8 日第 А70-14602/2009 号案件裁决），而营

运总部可以单方面用一种指导替换另一种（第八上诉联邦仲裁法院 2010 年 6 月

24 日第 А70-14602/2009 号案件裁决）。法院最新的判决表明，即使船舶适合无

协助的航行，也应该遵守《航行条例》和《指导条例》。

应当注意的是，第八上诉联邦仲裁法院 2010 年 6 月 24 日第 А70-14602/2009 号案件的裁决证实了指导并不总意味着在破冰船的护送或使用引航

的情况下航行，该裁决提出没有破冰船护送并不一定意味着缺乏指导。因此，俄

罗斯法院的执法规定是，每艘船舶只有在遵守《航行条例》并由营运总部指导时才

能通过北海航线。这种指导的主要规定在《航行条例》和《指导条例》中都有描述。

四、北海航线航行法律规制的发展

俄联邦如今已有很多规定北海航线海洋政策及其前景的法案。第一个描述所

有俄罗斯海洋政策的文件是《俄罗斯联邦至2020年期间海洋战略》（以下简称“《海

洋战略》”），其法律根据是俄联邦宪法、俄联邦法律及其他联邦法案、《公约》、以

及其他有关海事活动和资源与海洋不同区域使用的国际协定（参见“总则”部分）。

此外，应当指出的是，俄罗斯海洋政策原则的第一条是遵守俄联邦通过的一般公


认国际法规则和国际协定。

《海洋战略》将北极定义为海洋政策的主要方向之一。根据这项法案，在北

极的国家海洋政策优先考虑的是为俄罗斯舰队在北极海域、北海航线和北大西洋

的活动创造有利条件。在北极应该完成的长期任务也在《海洋战略》中列举出来，

其中一些与北海航线的法律规制有关。

这些任务如下所示：

1. 捍卫俄联邦在北极的利益；

2. 创造条件，包括为该地区人员使用海军力量以确保维护俄联邦在北极地区

方向的主权、主权权利和国际权利创造条件；

3. 基于与主要海上强国签订的双边和多边协定，在协定地域和区域限制外国

海军活动；

4. 确保俄联邦在北海航线的国家利益，集中管制运输系统、破冰服务和为相

关承运人，包括国外承运人提供平等权利；

5. 与北极沿岸国一起划定北冰洋海域及海底边界时，维护俄联邦的利益；

6. 俄联邦联邦中心和其他组成领土共同努力、整合资源，发展北极航运和河

口口岸，实现北方运输，开发提供经济活动的信息系统。

显然，俄联邦希望将北海航线改造成符合其国家目标的国际海上航线。这可

以简单地理解为：俄罗斯负责其北极海域的环境和海上安全。因为对承运人责任

的限制和对船员、船舶的要求，现代海洋法规则在北极并不适合。在北冰洋发生

一起事故可能会造成不可逆转的损害，并威胁北极环境和生活在北方的俄罗斯人

民的经济福利。

另一项关于北极的法案是《2020 年前及更远的未来俄罗斯联邦在北极的国家

政策原则》（以下简称“《原则》”）。13 俄罗斯政府于 2008 年 9 月通过这项新的北

极战略。该法案描述了北极地区的特征及其与俄罗斯政策的联系。这些特征包括：

1. 北冰洋恶劣的环境和气候条件，包括该区域的永久冰盖层和浮冰；

2. 该地区工业和经济发展受制，人口密度低；

3. 远离主要的工业中心，资源高度密集，本地经济活动等都依赖从俄罗斯其

他地区调配的燃料、食物和生活必需品；

4. 决定地球生物平衡和气候的生态系统稳定性低，依赖于人为影响。

俄罗斯所有北极政策都是根据该地区的区域特征而制定的，该地区发展方向

的首要决定因素是恶劣的环境和气候条件、较低的生态系统稳定性，其次才是出

于防御和经济考量。《原则》也定义了俄罗斯北极政策进程的主要目标和战略重点

（第三部分），列举了执行俄联邦北极国家政策的基本任务和安排（第四部分），

其中包括北冰洋海域划界、支持在斯匹茨卑尔根群岛的互惠互利（第 7 条），以及

13　At http://www.rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html, 8 March 2013. (in Russian)


准备俄联邦划定俄罗斯北极地区地理边界（包括该地南部边界以及区域内的定居

点列表）的法律文本制定（第 9 条）。

此外，应当指出的是，1998 年《内水、领海及毗连区法》、《航运法典》和其

他一些法案中有关北海航线航行的修订正在酝酿中，14 国家杜马已于 2012 年 7月3 日通过了类似的一些修订。

预计《内水、领海及毗连区法》第 14 条将在下一版中表述为“在北海航线水

域——俄联邦历史上在北极形成的国家运输交通路线——的航行，应符合国际法

公认原则和条例、俄联邦订立的国际协定、本联邦法案、以及基于上述各项制定的

其他联邦法律法规。”

《航运法典》将新增第5.1条，题为“北海航线水域的航行”，这一点非常重要。

有人认为，这一条将包括对北海航线新的法律定义、俄罗斯北海航线管理局的义

务和权利、未来《航行条例》的内容。这将大力提高北海航线航行法律规制的透明

度。

因此，北海航线航行的法律支持是俄罗斯北极政策的主要方向。俄联邦当局

在提高北方航运的法律管制方面有明确的预期，这一预期考虑到了所有俄罗斯承

担的国际义务，非歧视性地允许外国船舶进入北极地区，但这些船舶必须遵守有

助于保护北极环境和防止碰撞的规则。

五、结论

北海航线有成为世界主要海上航线的巨大潜力，但这种潜力目前受到不透明

的法律规制的阻碍。一些法律规制的来源已经过时，需要修订和更新。俄罗斯当

局明白这一点，正准备对北海航线航行的法律管制进行实质性改善。这些变化将

带来深远影响。

（中译：邓云成所在单位：厦门大学）

14　 At http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(Spravka)?OpenAgent&RN=608695-5&02, 18 September 2013. (in Russian)

Legal Regulation of Navigation through the Northern Sea Route 139

Legal Regulation of Navigation through the Northern Sea Route

Dremliuga Roman*

Abstract: The portion of the Arctic belonging to the Russian Federation will soon become one of the most significant areas of international navigation. A significant number of Russian navigation rules already in place establish severe claims for vessels and crews taking part in Arctic shipping. These rules primarily aim to provide safety of navigation and to protect the Arctic environment. This article discusses Russian maritime law and policy as well as the development of navigation rules in the Arctic.

Key Words: Northern Sea Route; Arctic navigation; Legal regulation

The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a significant issue not only for the Russian Federation but for the entire international community. Use of the NSR offers an economically preferable alternative to other sea routes for traveling between the the northern Pacific Ocean and northern Europe. For example, a journey from the Vladivostok to Saint Petersburg via the NSR runs approximately 14,000 km (7,560 nm); traveling through the Suez Canal by contrast amounts to more than 23,000 km (12,420 nm). Also in contrast to the Suez Canal, the NSR requires no transit fee (though there is a pilotage fee), enjoys a minimal threat of piracy, and is free of queues.

The NSR as discussed in most Russian acts refers to the historically-establish-ed shipping lane of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. It runs along through the Vilkitski, Shokalsky, Dmitri Laptev, and Sannikov straits. Right of navigation in the NSR is enjoyed according to federal statutes of the Russian Federation, internation-al agreements with the Russian Federation, and the regulations for navigation on

* Dremliuga Roman, Senior lecturer of the Law School of the Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). E-mail: [email protected]. Many thanks to William Price who helped with the editing of the article.



these waterways of the NSR.1

I. Historical Aspects

Russians have a lengthy tradition of Arctic Ocean navigation. Coast-dwellers2 and pioneers using tributaries of the Siberian rivers began navigation along the Arctic coasts and through the Artic Ocean in the mid-16th century. In 1648, a group of seafarers led by tradesman F. Popov and Cossack chieftain S. Dejnev using “coches”3 got round the Chukchi Peninsula and reached the Pacific Ocean.4

In 1686–1688, a merchant expedition under the direction of I. Tolstouhov got round the Taimyr Peninsula from west to east. While his expedition unfortunately met an untimely end, evidence of the expedition’s achievements has since been discovered. In 1712, pioneers M. Vageen and Y. Permyakov first discovered Big Lyahovsky Island and went on to initiate the opening and development of all New Siberian Islands.

In 1725, Peter the Great, Tsar of All the Russians, at the age of 53, not long before his death, launched an enterprise which gave the North Pacific its present borders and described its land and peoples. Over the course of 140 years, Russia sent more than 225 ships into the North Pacific, first to establish, and then to serve, its colony in North America. Although no passage was found, these Russian explorations provided knowledge of new places and peoples to Europeans. From 1790 to 1840, Russian mariners succeeded in charting the Arctic and Pacific shores of Siberia, eventually reaching beyond Point Barrow in North America. Their voyages included important scientific studies, testing of new technologies, revelations about the dynamic peoples of the “New World” and thousands of plants, animals, and mineral identifications for European museums.5

The subsequent period of Arctic exploration began when Admiral S. Makarov ordered the construction of Russia’s first heavy icebreaker, Ermak,6 which was used

1 The Law on Internal Sea Waters, the Territorial Seas and Adjacent Zone of the Russian Federation, 1998, Article 14.

2 Coast-dwellers – inhabitants of White Sea and Barents Sea coast. Coast-dwellers play a leading part in Arctic development.

3 Coch – sailing vessel of Russian coast-dwellers that can resist ice pressure.4 Nikitin N. I., Semen Dejnev, Voprosy Istorii, No. 4, 2001, pp. 135~144.5 Russia’s Great Voyages, at http://www.calacademy.org/exhibits/science_under_sail/sailing.

html, 4 March 2013.6 Ermak is very famous Russian pioneer and conqueror of the Siberia.


in regular service on the Ob and Yenisei rivers. It was also assumed that the Ermak could reach high latitudes in the Arctic. The icebreaker was completed in 1899 and took part in many Arctic expeditions, allowing for the first time the regular use of the Arctic Ocean for shipping. It is extremely significant that the Ermak flew a commercial flag: the Ermak clearly demonstrated that the NSR was intended to be used first as a trade route.

Soviet rule after the October Revolution placed a strong emphasis on the exploration of the Arctic. In 1921, Lenin signed a decree creating a floating marine research institute which operated in the Arctic Ocean, the mouths of North-Siberian rivers, and the islands and coasts of the Arctic. In accordance with article 1 of the Decree in 3 October 1921, “[f]or detailed and systematic research of north seas and coasts that have utmost importance to the state it must establish under the People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment the floating marine research institute including biological, hydrological, meteorological, geological-mineralogical departments.” Following the commission of the floating research institute, nineteen Polar radio-meteorology stations were constructed during the decade following 1923.

In 1937 the first floating station was completed, making it possible to explore the Arctic Ocean from stationary and drifting ice. Russia continued to create floating research stations to follow its initial success; these stations proved an important step forward in the use of the Arctic.

The most assertive Arctic efforts occurred during World War II. The NSR ser-ved as the only sea route for delivering cargo from Soviet allies (in the first place from the USA) to western Russia. The Fascist forces tried to destroy the Russian icebreaker fleet and even developed special plans for a complete extermination of Russia’s Arctic naval capabilities. Despite the utmost efforts of the enemy and a number of bloody battles, the icebreakers survived and helped to defeat fascist Germany.

Historical evidence demonstrates that the Arctic has been extensively explored and exploited by the Russian people over the course of centuries. It began first with the first coast-dwellers’ seafaring and continues today with a booming merchant trade. Russia has undoubtedly made a substantial contribution to the exploration and survival of the Arctic; it seems that only now, with a rapidly growing appreciation of the Arctic’s navigational value and extensive oil and gas resources, that other countries get interested in claiming rights to the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.


II. Sources of Regulation

The NSR is a significant shipping lane for Russia in the Arctic, as it connects European and Far-Eastern ports which are some three thousand nautical miles apart. Navigation in the Arctic is possible only three or four months of the year, with the Arctic ports typically accessible between July and October. The actual route of the NSR changes yearly according to navigational needs and regional ice conditions, and has been known to change within a single sailing season.

Despite the advantages of using the NSR, until recently relatively few vessels transited the passage. Given its low use, previously, there was no need to change rules and laws regarding navigation through the NSR. In 2010, transit traffic amounted to just 4 vessels (110,000 tons); in 2011 still only 34 vessels (820,000 tons). The expected transit tonnage for 2012 is 2,500,000 tons.

Moreover, the NSR primarily exists within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), territorial waters, and even internal waters of the Russian Federation. This means that the NSR lies primarily within the areas under Russian sovereignty or special Russian jurisdiction. Even the sections of the NSR which lie beyond the EEZ of the Russian Federation require Russian permission for transit because of pilotage obligations. In other words, no vessel may transit the NSR without traveling through the territory under Russian jurisdiction. In addition, the seaways of the NSR pass through a number of particularly ecologically vulnerable areas with difficult ice and navigational conditions, as mentioned in the Regulations for Icebreaker and Pilot Guiding of Vessels through the Northern Sea Route, and as such require special consideration.

Russia has adopted many official acts regarding the NSR, the legal regime of which is based primarily on domestic law. This situation does not contradict the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) because, according to article 234 of UNCLOS, “[c]oastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection


and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.” 7

The basic statutory act regulating merchant shipping in Russia is the Merchant Shipping Code of the Russian Federation,8 which contains a legal definition of “vessel,” principles of law regulating registry of ships, marine insurance norms, etc.; however only article 5 “[p]ublic administration of merchant shipping area” makes mention of the NSR. Sub-section 4 explains that navigational and hydrographical support of the NSR is provided by the federal executive body of merchant marine sphere. It should be noted that navigational and hydrographical support of other areas according this act comes through the federal executive body of defense.

The main act applicable to the control of NSR navigation is the Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route approved by the Minister of the Merchant Marine on 14 September 1990 and officially published on 13 July 1991 in the Notices to Mariners No. 29.9 Its validity was reaffirmed by Order No. 73 of Ministry of Transport on 18 June 1998 (See article 2 of Order No. 73). According to article 2 of the Regulations, “[t]he Regulations shall, оn the basis of non-discrimination for vessels of all States, regulate navigation through the Northern Sea Route for purposes оf ensuring safe navigation and preventing, reducing and keeping under control marine environment pollution from vessels. Since the specifically severe climatic conditions that exist in the Arctic regions and the presence of ice during the larger part of the year bring about obstacles, оr increased danger, to navigation while pollution of sea, or the northern coast of the USSR might cause great harm to the ecological balance or upset it irreparably, as well as inflict damage оn the interests and well-being of the peoples of the Extreme North.”

It is extremely significant that the Regulations, despite being approved during Soviet times more than twenty years ago, already contain provisions about non-discriminative navigation for all States through the NSR. The Regulations establish

7 At http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A-31363-English.pdf, 5 March 2013.

8 You can find some unofficial English versions of this act in the Internet. For example, at http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/HNS/rmc.pdf, 5 March 2013.

9 Federal agency of river and marine transport, Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route, at http://www.morflot.ru/files/docslist/20111103135113-REGULATION_FOR_NAVIGATION_ON_ТНЕ_SEAWАYS_OF_ТНЕ_NORTHERN_SEA_ROUTE.doc, 5 March 2013.


the order оf navigation (article 7), rules for requesting guidance through the route (article 3), requirements for vessels and their commanding personnel, etc. Some clauses of this act have a very general wording and require interpretational assistance from other acts. For example, article 3 reads as follows “[a] vessel intending tо navigate the Northern Sea Route shall satisfy special requirements and, her Master, or а person replacing him, shall be experienced in operating а vessel in ice.” The act does not define the meaning of “satisfy special requirements.” To find this meaning, one must apply definitions from the Requirements for the Design, Equipment and Supplies of Vessels Navigating the Northern Sea Route.

The Regulations have their own definition of the NSR: the national transporta-tion route of the USSR, which is situated within the inland waters, territorial sea (territorial waters), or exclusive economic zone adjoining the USSR northern coast, and includes seaways suitable for guiding ships in ice. The extreme points of which in the west аre the western entrances tо the Novaya Zemlya straits and the meridian running from Mys Zhelaniya northward, and in the east, in the Bering Strait, bу the parallel 66° N and the meridian 168°58'37" W (article 1.2). This definition differs from the others. For example, it does not reflect the long historical usage and domestic nature of regulation of this route as in article 14 of the Law on the Internal Sea Waters, the Territorial Seas and Adjacent Zone of the Russian Federation, 1998. It is obvious that such conflict with other legal acts creates difficulties in applying the Regulations.

Under the Regulations, the Russian Administration of the Northern Sea Route has authority to inspect any vessels transiting through the NSR under certain circum-stances. Article 6.1 reads “[i]n cases of unfavourable ice, navigational, hydrograph-ic, weather, and other conditions endangering а vessel, or if there is а threat of po-lluting marine environment, or the USSR northern coast, а representative of the Ad-ministration mау carry out an inspection of а vessel while she navigates the North-ern Sea Route.” This provision gives the right of inspection to the Administration of the Northern Sea Route only when bad conditions endangering a vessel prevail and when there exists a threat of pollution. It completely corresponds with modern international law under which freedom of navigation can be restricted by marine environment and marine safety provisions. Also, if the threat of marine pollution exists, privileges of inspection can be handed over to other state bodies.

Enumeration of the kinds of inspection can be found in article 6.3 of the Regulations. Administration of the Northern Sea Route inspections mау include examination of documents certifying compliance with special requirements, of


cargo documents and, depending on circumstances, direct examination of а vessel’s condition, its equipment, facilities, technical navigational aids, preparedness and ability tо fulfill requirements concerning prevention of marine pollution.

According to the Regulations, every vessel should submit notification and а request for guidance through the NSR. Additionally, a vessel intending to navigate through the NSR shall satisfy special requirements. For decisions concerning the po-ssibility of leading a ship through the NSR, the ship should submit to the Northern Sea Route Administration a notification, which should indicate the following:

1. Name of ship, IMO number, flag, port of registry, shipowner (full name and full address).

2. Gross/net tonnage reg.t.2.1. Full displacement of the ship.3. Main dimensions (length, breadth, draft), output of main engines, propeller

(construction, material), speed, year of build.4. Ice class and classification society, date of the last examination.4.1. Construction of bow (ice knife or bulb-bow).5. Expected time of sailing through the NSR.6. Presence of certificate of insurance or other financial security in respect of

civil liability for environmental pollution damage.7. Purpose of voyage (commercial voyage, tourism, scientific research, etc.).8. List of deviations from the Requirements for the Design, Equipment and

Supplies of Vessels Navigating the Northern Sea Route.10

Required specifications of vessels transiting through the NSR are described in the Requirements for thе Design, Equipment and Supplies of Vessels Navigating thе Northern Sea Route.11 This act reads that “[t]he present Requirements take into account the especially difficult and dangerous conditions of navigation along the Northern Sea Route and are intended tо ensure safety of navigation and tо prevent pollution of the marine environment and northern coast of Russia which is especially vulnerable area, where it is prohibited to dispose of any amount of oil products and other harmful substances and their mixtures containing such

10 Federal agency of river and marine transport, Commemorative Booklet, at http://www.morflot.ru/files/docslist/20120706113906-2.doc, 6 March 2013.

11 Federal agency of river and marine transport, Requirements for thе Design, Equipment and Supplies of Vessels Navigating thе Northern Sea Route, at http://www.morflot.ru/files/docslist/20111107100554-REQUIREМENTS_FOR_ТНЕ_DESIGN_EQUIPМENT_AND_SUPPLIES_OF%20VESSELS_NAVIGAТING.doc, 6 March 2013.


substances in amounts that exceed the established standards, in accordance with the legislation.” It shows the Russian position that all Arctic acts are enacted to prevent pollution, maintain a safe environment and avoid collisions of vessels, and therefore every vessel should observe extra rules when passing through the NSR.

The Requirements cover all vessels with a gross tonnage of 300 t (registered) or greater that travel along the NSR (article 1.1). If a vessel has a tonnage less than 300, it should seek a special decision of the Administration of the Northern Sea Route. This act is not applicable by itself; “besides the present Requirements vessels that travel along the NSR must also satisfy the applicable Rules of the Russian Federation Registry for vessels containing the following literal designations of ice resistance categories as part of the symbol of their class: Arc4 (LU4), Arc5 (LU5) or Arc6 (LU6)” (article 1.2). Thus, to comply with the Requirements, ships must also take into account other relevant acts.

The Requirements are not limited to specifications for vessels intending to pass through the NSR. The act also contains a description of the required inspection of vessels, enumeration of inspection places and other provisions linked with state control requirements. The last article, titled “Crew of vessel,” expounds crew and master qualifying standards. The goals of this provision are also to prevent pollution of the marine environment and to avoid collisions. For example, article 9.5 reads that “[t]he crew of the vessel must be forewarned concerning prohibitions against discharging polluting substances and rubbish on the NSR, as well аs responsibility for any pollution of the sea and ice cover in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation.”

The next significant statute associated with the NSR is the Regulations for Icebreaker and Pilot Guiding of Vessels through the Northern Sea Route.12 It should be observed that the Regulations for Icebreakers and Pilot Guiding contain the legal definition of guiding. Under this act “[g]uiding of а vessel through the Northern Sea Route means that this vessel during the entire period of her navigation through the NSR is constantly controlled by the West and East Marine Operations Headquarters, which while coordinating vessel traffic flows and icebreaker service оn the seaways of the NSR, provide vessels with ice pilot (if not taken aboard before) and necessary icebreaking support, as well as systematically inform

12 Federal agency of river and marine transport, Regulations for Icebreaker and Pilot Guiding of Vessels through the Northern Sea Route, at http://www.morflot.ru/files/docslist/20110928151938-REGULATIONS_FOR_ICEBREAKER.doc, 7 March 2013.


vessels about ice and hydrometeorological conditions in order to provide for fast and secure transit through the Northern Sea Route. Depending on concrete ice, hydrometeorological and navigational conditions, Marine Operations Headquartersestablish and provide the following types of guiding of vessels in the area of the NSR…” (article 1.4). The Regulations describe requests fоr guiding and notification procedures, organization оf guiding (article 2), and the duties and responsibilities оf the vessel master, icebreaker master and state ice pilot during vessel guidance through the NSR (article 3).

According to the Regulations for Icebreaker and Pilot Guiding, the icebreaker master, owner and charterer are not liable for damage and other losses that mау be inflicted on а vessel during, and as а consequence of, guiding through ice and related maneuvers (article 3.1). But if the master of а vessel being under icebreaker or ice pilot guidance incurs losses to the icebreaker, or any other vessel by his incorrect actions, the owner of the vessel will be held responsible for said damage (article 3.6). This is based on provisions of the Merchant Shipping Code of the Russian Federation (Chapter XVII). Although the chapter name is “Compensation for damages caused by collision of vessels,” “regulations shall also apply in caseswhere damages were caused by one vessel to another vessel, or persons on board thereof, as well as to cargo or other property either by the execution or non-execu-tion of a maneuver or by the non-observance of navigation rules, even if no colli-sion between vessels had actually taken place” (article 310 of the Merchant Ship-ping Code of the Russian Federation). In any case, even if a pilot (not limited toArctic pilots) causes a collision or damage to a vessel(s), only the owner of the gui-ded vessel will be liable for damage and other losses (article 314 of the Merchant Shipping Code of the Russian Federation).

It is quite clear that the acts described above rely on other laws enacted by Russia as well as signed international conventions, though they are applied by Russian courts directly. Legal enforcement of them is minimal and provisions of these acts cannot be applied if there is a conflict with federal laws. For the most part, the main laws related to shipping do not concern the NSR. Moreover, a large shortcoming of the Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Routes is that it was enacted more than twenty years ago and does not reflect modern necessities of navigation through the NSR.


III. Law Enforcement

Due to light traffic through the NSR, there are not many cases of the applica-tion of acts associated with northern navigation. But it is very important to analyze the practice of law enforcement in order to understand the meaning of the acts described above.

With regard to the Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route, the Federal Arbitration Courts of the Russian Federation have repeatedly confirmed that these Regulations are the main acts applied to NSR navigation. According to resolution 25.05.2000 No. 1-871-96-С1-Ф02-880/00-С2 of the Federal Arbitration Court of East Siberia district, the Regulations establish rules to NSR navigation and the resolution confirms many provisions of the Regulations as applicable.

It should be noted that all navigation and hydrometeorological services provid-ed rely on the Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route independently from provisions of contract applicable to icebreakers and pilot guiding (resolution of Federal Arbitration Court of West Siberia district 15 March 2012 Case No. А75-1740/2011).

The Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route do not provide for shipping through the NSR without guidance by the Marine Operations Headquarters (resolution of Federal Arbitration Court of West Siberia district 8 November 2010 Case No. А70-14602/2009), which can unilaterally substitute one kind of guidance for another (resolution of 8th Appeal Federal Arbitration Court 24 June 2010 Case No. А70-14602/2009). The latest findings of the court are that even vessels suitable to unassisted sailing should follow the Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route and the Regulations for Icebreaker and Pilot Guiding of Vessels through the Northern Sea Route.

It should be noted that guiding does not always mean navigation escorted by icebreaker or the use of pilotage; the resolution of the 8th Appeal Federal Arbitra-tion Court 24 June 2010 Case No. А70-14602/2009 confirms this. It sets forth that a lack of icebreaker escort does not necessarily mean a lack of guiding. Thus, law enforcement by Russian courts provides that every ship should navigate throughthe NSR only while in compliance with the Regulations for Navigation on the Sea-ways of the Northern Sea Route, and should be guided by the Marine Operations Headquarters. The main provisions of this guiding are described by the Regulations


and the Regulations for Icebreaker and Pilot Guiding of Vessels through the Northern Sea Route.

IV. Development of Legal Regulation of Navigation through the NSR

The Russian Federation today has many acts defining maritime policy and its future prospects in connection with the NSR. The first document which describes all Russian marine policy is the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation forthe Period up to 2020. It is legally based on the Constitution of the Russian Ferde-ration, federal laws and other federal acts of the Russian Federation, UNCLOS and other international agreements in the sphere of maritime activity and the use of resources and different areas of the ocean (See “General Provisions”). Also it should be noted that the first listed principles of Russian maritime policy is the observance of generally-accepted rules of international law and international agreements adopted by the Russian Federation.

The Maritime Doctrine defines the Arctic as one of the main directions for maritime policy. According to this act, the national maritime policy priority in the Arctic is the creation of beneficial conditions for Russian fleet activities in the Arctic seas, the NSR and the North Atlantic. Long-term tasks that should be completed in the Arctic are also enumerated in the Doctrine and some of them are associated with the legal regulation of the NSR.

These tasks are as follows:1. defend the interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic; 2. establish conditions, including those with the faculty of the region for

the use of naval capabilities to ensure the protection of sovereignty, as well as sovereign and international rights of the Russian Federation in the Arctic regional direction;

3. restrict foreign naval activities in the agreed areas and zones based on bilateral and multilateral agreements with the leading maritime powers;

4. ensure the national interests of the Russian Federation in relation to the Northern Sea Route, centralized control of the transport system, icebreaking services and the provision of equal rights to interested carriers, including foreign carriers;

5. observe the interests of the Russian Federation in the delimitation of mari-time areas and the bottom of the Arctic Ocean with Arctic coastal States;


6. combine the efforts and resources of the federal center and constituent territories of the Russian Federation to develop Arctic shipping and mouth-of-river ports, and realize Northern delivery as well to develop information systems providing economic activity.

It is obvious that the Russian Federation wants to transform the NSR into an international sea route in compliance with its national aims. This has a simple explanation: Russia is responsible for the Arctic environment and marine safety in its seas. Modern rules of maritime law, with their restriction of carrier’s liability and requirements for crew and vessel, are not suitable in the Arctic. An accident in the Arctic Ocean could cause irreversible damage and threaten the Arctic environment as well as the economic well-being of Russian peoples living in the north.

Another act concerning the Arctic is “the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in Arctic Regions till 2020 and beyond.” 13 The Russian government adopted this new Arctic strategy in September 2008. It describes characteristics of the Arctic region and their relationship to Russian policy. These characteristics include:

1. extreme environmental and climatic conditions including permanent ice cover and drift ice in the Arctic seas.

2. circumscribed nature of industrial and economic development and low population density.

3. remoteness from main industrial centers, high resource-intensiveness and economic and other dependence on deliveries of fuel, food and essential goods from other regions of Russia.

4. low stability of ecological systems determining biological balance and climate of the Earth, and their dependence on human impact.

Russian policy in the Arctic is established in accordance with regional charac-teristics; directions for development are driven first by the extreme environmental and climatic conditions and limited ecological stability of the region and only secondarily by defensive and economic considerations. The Fundamentals also define the main goals and strategic priorities of Russian policy course in the Arctic (Section III) and enumerate basic tasks and arrangements to carry out public policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic (Section IV). Among them are the delimitation of maritime space in the Arctic Ocean, the support of a mutually beneficial presence at the Spitsbergen archipelago (article 7), and preparation

13 At http://www.rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html, 8 March 2013. (in Russian)


for the enactment of legal texts of the Russian Federation to specify geographic borders of the Russian Arctic zone including the southern border and also a list of settlements within the zone (article 9).

Also, it should be noted that some amendments relating NSR navigation to the Law on Internal Seas, the Territorial Seas and Adjacent Zone of the Russian Federation, 1998, the Merchant Shipping Code of Russia and some other acts, have been planned.14 Some of such changes were adopted by the State Duma on 3 July 2012.

It is expected that article 14 of the Law on Internal Seas, the Territorial Seas and Adjacent Zone of the Russian Federation in its next edition will be: “Navigation on the waterways of the Northern Sea Route, the historical national unified transport line of communication of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, shall be carried out in accordance with universally recognized principles and regulations of the international law, international agreements concluded by the Russian Federation, this federal act, other federal laws and acts based on the above-listed.”

It is very significant that a new article 5.1, titled “Navigation through the North Sea Route water area,” will be added to the Merchant Shipping Code of the Russian Federation. It is believed that a new legal definition of the NSR, obligations and rights of the Russian Administration of the Northern Sea Route, and the content of future Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route will be included in this article, which will be a big step towards transparency of legal regulation of NSR navigation.

Thus, legal support of NSR navigation is the main direction of Russian policy in the Arctic. Authorities of the Russian Federation have a clear prospect in the sphere of improving the legal control of northern shipping. This prospect takes into account all of Russia’s international obligations and supposes to provide non-discriminatory admission of foreign vessels in the Arctic which abide by the rules and laws intended to help to secure the Arctic environment and prevent collisions.

V. Conclusion

The NSR has great potential to become one of the main sea routes in the world, but this potential is currently hindered by opaque legal regulation. Some

14 At http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(Spravka)?OpenAgent&RN=608695-5&02, 18 September 2013. (in Russian)


sources of legal regulation have become obsolete and require revision and renovation. Russian authorities understand this and are preparing substantial improvements to legal control of NSR navigation. These will be influential changes indeed.

Editor (English): Tom Friedenbach

在用于国际航行的海峡实施成本回收机制的法律可行性：基于马六甲和新加坡海峡的研究 153

在用于国际航行的海峡实施

成本回收机制的法律可行性：

基于马六甲和新加坡海峡的研究

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli*

内容摘要：马六甲和新加坡海峡是世界上两个重要的海上通道，每年有总计约 7.4 万艘船舶的航行交通量。1982 年《联合国海洋法公约》第三部分规定，所有船旗国的船舶和飞机，在通过用于国际航行的海峡时，都享有不受阻碍的过境通行权。从概念上来说，通过引入过境通行制度，《联合国海洋法公约》已经禁止对过境船舶征收任何形式的通行费。给予所有船旗国船舶这一权利，令毗邻这些繁忙航道的国家处境困难，尤其是在保护海峡海洋环境免受来自船舶的污染方面。澳大利亚已于 2005 年成功指定托雷斯海峡为“特别敏感海域”，并以强制引航作为可适用的相关保护措施，这有助于托雷斯海峡海上事故风险的最小化。假定将马六甲和新加坡海峡也指定为特别敏感海域，鉴于其繁忙的过境交通性质，通过引入“成本回收机制”（以通行费征收制度的形式），或许能实现最适宜的相关保护措施的实施。收取通行费而筹集的基金可以用于维护和更新沿整个马六甲和新加坡海峡设置的助航设备，提高航行安全，从而降低可能对海峡海洋环境造成威胁的海上事故的风险。本文旨在探讨在马六甲和新加坡海峡引入这种通行费征收制度的可行性和实用性问题，以及实施中可能引起的法律和政治影响。

关键词：马六甲海峡新加坡海峡成本回收机制用于国际航行的海峡

一、引言

马六甲和新加坡海峡是连接世界两大洋的狭窄航道。马六甲海峡的入口位于

*　 Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli，马来西亚回教科学大学回教法法律学院高级讲师，马来西亚丁加奴大学海洋与环境学院助理研究员。电子邮箱：[email protected]。



苏门答腊岛最北端的乌戎巴卡与泰国普吉岛的莱姆佛兰之间；1 在通向安达曼海的

地方很宽阔，大约有200海里宽；2分隔马来半岛大陆与印度尼西亚的苏门答腊岛；

与新加坡海峡的交界处是往南逐渐变窄的漏斗形航道，连接印度洋与南（中国）海

和太平洋。

二、马六甲和新加坡海峡：重要的经济航道

马六甲和新加坡海峡沿岸最早的港口是出现于公元 3 世纪的郎卡素卡。3 公

元 7 世纪，斯里加亚崛起，“控制了马六甲海峡”，郎卡素卡臣服于斯里加亚。斯

里加亚积极参与到日益发展的世界经济中，进行了大量的樟脑、丁香、檀香木和肉

豆蔻等商品贸易，得到了繁荣发展。4 13 世纪，马六甲海峡的控制权转移给了满

者伯夷王国，并最终于 15 世纪转移给马六甲苏丹王朝。1511 年，葡萄牙人洗劫

马六甲港，开始了马六甲海峡地区的欧洲殖民时代。葡萄牙人对马六甲港的占领

并不意味着已经完全控制了马六甲海峡，他们必须与其他在马六甲海峡已有相当

大影响力的地区王国（如亚齐和柔佛）相竞争。在葡萄牙人统治之后，马来西亚、

印度尼西亚和新加坡于 20 世纪中期获得独立之前，这一地区还受到过荷兰人、英

国人和日本人的殖民。5现在，马六甲海峡的主要沿岸国是印度尼西亚和马来西亚，

新加坡海峡的沿岸国是马来西亚、印度尼西亚和新加坡。因为该地区悠久的贸易、

文化交流和殖民史，联合国教科文组织已在 2008 年将马六甲海峡沿岸的两个港

口城市（槟榔屿和马六甲）认定为联合国教科文组织世界文化遗产。6

马六甲和新加坡海峡也是沿岸国（尤其是马来西亚和印度尼西亚）的重要渔

场。马来西亚渔业部门报道称，毗邻马六甲和新加坡海峡的马来西亚各州的鱼品

1　Executive Summary, in Mohd Ibrahim Mohamed and Hairil Anuar Husin eds., Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia's Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008.

2　Amelia Emran, The Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Wollongong: The University of Wollongong, 2007, p. 9.

3　William A. Southworth, Langkasuka, in Keat Gin Ooi ed., Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, From Angkor Wat to East Timor, California: ABC-CLIO, 2004, pp. 764~765.

4　Bertie Reginald Pearn, An Introduction to the History of South-East Asia, 2nd ed., Kuala Lumpur: Longmans of Malaysia Ltd., 1965, p. 24.

5　Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Balancing Shipping and the Protection of the Marine Environment of Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Wollongong: The University of Wollongong, 2012, pp. 16~22.



上市量已经从 2005 年的 692985 吨增加到 2009 年的 729559 吨。7 同样地，马六

甲和新加坡海峡也对印度尼西亚的渔业发挥了重要作用，每年提供约 27.7 万吨的

渔获量。8

马六甲和新加坡海峡位于珊瑚三角区，有丰富的海洋生物多样性，如珊瑚礁、

泥滩、湿地和红树林，是许多野生动物的自然栖息地。位于马来半岛西南端的丹

绒比艾、蒲莱河和龟咯岛已经被指定为国际重要湿地，这表明马六甲和新加坡海

峡的沿岸环境在湿地保护方面非常重要。9兰卡威岛位于马六甲海峡北部入口处，

是马来西亚很受欢迎的假日胜地。基于其生态的重要性，兰卡威岛于 2007 年 6月被联合国教科文组织评为世界地质公园。10

尽管马六甲和新加坡海峡在渔业和生物多样性保护上有重要地位，国际社会

仍然认为这两个海峡是重要的航运通道，一直将其称为地球上两个重要的石油运

输通道。11 随着中国、日本、韩国和东南亚国家新兴经济体的发展，马六甲和新加

坡海峡作为连接中东石油生产商和东亚消费者的油轮通道，将继续发挥越来越重

要的作用。12

马六甲和新加坡海峡的航运量每年都在持续增长。2010 年，大约有 7.4 万艘

各种类型的船舶通过马六甲和新加坡海峡，如表 1 所示：

表 1 马六甲和新加坡海峡 2005—2010 年过境船舶

（来源：马来西亚海洋研究所）

船舶类型 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010巨型油轮 /深吃水船舶

3788 3851 3753 4040 4221 4329

7　 Fisheries Department of Malaysia, Landings of Marine Fish by State and Fishing Gear Group, Putrajaya: Fisheries Department of Malaysia, 2009.

8　 A. Nontji, Managing the Marine Environment of the Straits of Malacca, paper presented at the Building a Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004, p. 152.

9　 The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, The Annotated Ramsar List: Malaysia, at http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-pubs-annolist-annotated-ramsar-16529/main/ramsar/1-30-168%5E16529_4000_0__, 11 September 2010.


11　 Paul Y. Cheng, Mansi Singhal, Saurabh Bharat, Cheng Khoo and Lucy Haskins, Global Oil Choke Points, Global Equity Research, 18 January 2008, pp. 10~11, at http://www.deepgreencrystals.com/images/GlobalOilChokePoints.pdf, 2 September 2013.

12　 Chia Lin Sien, Alternative Routes for Oil Tankers: A Financial, Technical and Economic Analysis, in Hamzah Ahmad ed., The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety, Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1998, pp. 103~104.


（续表）

船舶类型 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010油轮 14759 14784 14391 15894 16398 16250

液化天然气运输船 /液化石油气运输船

3099 3297 3413 3726 3330 3581

货轮 6340 6477 8467 8794 8560 8444集装箱船 20818 22615 23736 26359 22310 24805散装货船 7394 8129 9684 10256 11186 11639其他 6423 6496 6734 7312 5354 5085总计 62621 65649 70178 76381 71359 74133

从 1982 年的 4 万艘船舶量 13 到 2007 年的约 7万艘，预计到 2020 年，运输量

将会继续增加到 14 万艘。14 据报道，马六甲和新加坡海峡的交通流量以年均 9%的比率在增长。15 这种持续增长的现象将直接或间接地令沿岸国不得不承受有些

昂贵的助航设备维护成本，如表 2 所示：

表 2 助航设备操作和维护方案（10 年预算评估）

（来源：三方技术专家小组）16

第 1 年—第 10 年成本（美元）

印度尼西亚

维护 8538871.00操作 6512500.00更换 16986842.00总计 32038213.00

13　 G. Naidu, The Straits of Malacca in the Malaysian Economy, in Hamzah Ahmad ed., The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety, Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1997, pp. 33~60.

14 　Vijay Sakhuja, Malacca: Who’s to Pay for Smooth Sailing?, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IE16Ae01.html, 14 January 2009.

15　 Muhammad Razif bin Ahmad, The Financial Cost of Risk Management in the Straits of Malacca, in Hamzah Ahmad ed., The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety, Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1997.

16　这一数据来自 2010 年由三方技术专家小组组织的在日惹召开的马六甲和新加坡海峡航行安全和环境保护合作机制第 3 次合作论坛上所发表的论文《Report of 4th Aids to Navigation by Malaysia: Update on the Aids to Navigation Fund under the Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore》。


（续表）

马来西亚

维护 9890374.00操作 4094523.00更换 8800888.00总计 22785785.00

总计（马来西亚+ 印度尼西亚）

54823998.00

表 2 显示助航设备的年均维护成本（2010—2020 年期间）大约是 550 万美元。鉴

于马六甲和新加坡海峡频繁的航运交通，对沿岸国而言，关键是为海峡配备足够

的助航设备以使海上事故风险最小化，从而保护这些航道的敏感海洋环境免受无

端污染。

三、马六甲和新加坡海峡的航行制度

《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称“《公约》”）第三部分阐述了用于国际航行

的海峡的法律地位，该部分规定也适用于马六甲和新加坡海峡。过境通行制度规

定，所有船舶和飞机在通过用于国际航行的海峡时继续不停和迅速过境，沿岸国

不得拒绝、妨碍或损害。17 用于国际航行的海峡的沿岸国应将其所知的海峡内或

海峡上空对航行或飞越有危险的任何情况妥为公布。18 与沿海国有权因必要的安

全原因暂停外国船舶通过的无害通过制度不同，19 用于国际航行的海峡的沿岸国

没有这种权利。20《公约》第十二部分第 233 条进一步限制了这些海峡沿岸国的

执行权，当外国船舶通过用于国际航行的海峡时，只有当这种通过会对海峡的海

17 《联合国海洋法公约》第 37 条解释到，过境通行制度适用于连接公海或专属经济区的一个部分和公海或专属经济区的另一部分的海峡。《联合国海洋法公约》第 38 条第 1款规定，“在第 37 条所指的海峡中，所有船舶和飞机均享有过境通行的权利，过境通行不应受阻碍……”；Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Navigational Regimes through Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, MIMA Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012.

18 　Robert Beckman, Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for Considerati- on, paper presented at the MIMA Conference on Building a Comprehensive Security

Environment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004.19 1982 年《联合国海洋法公约》第 25 条第 3 款。20　 Robert Beckman, Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for Considerati- on, paper presented at the MIMA Conference on Building a Comprehensive Security

Environment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004.


洋环境造成重大损害时，外国船舶才能被暂停通过。21 然而，《公约》第 43 条却又

鼓励海峡沿岸国和海峡使用国在维护和保护海峡海洋环境方面进行合作。

四、马六甲和新加坡海峡的合作机制

目前，海峡沿岸国和使用国间确实存在一项正在进行的合作机制方案，以管

理海峡内的航行安全问题，并控制来自船舶的污染。22 然而，合作进展相当缓慢，

赶不上每年马六甲和新加坡海峡过境船舶增加的数量。这种情况事出有因，2009年的助航设备基金预算是 800 万美元，但只设法筹集到 500 万美元，其中 250 万

美元来自日本财团。23 2010 年筹集到的总额甚至更少，只有 300 万美元，由马六

甲和新加坡海峡沿岸各国政府以及其他利益相关者捐助，如表 3 和表 4 所示。24

表 3 助航设备基金捐款（2009—2011 年）

（来源：马来西亚海洋研究所和马来半岛海运部）

年份 2008 2009 2010 2011捐款金额（美元） 1451000 5007532 3228235 2934500

表 4 捐款金额与航标设备设施维护年均成本对比

（来源：马来西亚海洋研究所和三方技术专家小组）25

年份捐款金额（美元）年均成本（美元）

2008 1451000.00 1354000.002009 5007532.00 5500000.00

21 《联合国海洋法公约》第 233 条允许海峡沿岸国对对海峡海洋环境造成重大损害或有造成重大损害威胁的船舶采取适当执行措施。

22　 Joshua Ho, The Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Ensuring Safe and Efficient Shipping, RSIS Commentaries, 2009, at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS119200-

9.pdf, 22 August 2010.23 　Sam Bateman, Regime Building in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: Two Steps Forward,

One Step Back, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 45~51.

24 　Muhammad Razif Ahmad, An Overview of the Cooperative Mechanism between Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (No. CF 4/2/1), Marine Department of Malaysia, 2011.

25　这一数据来自 2010 年由三方技术专家小组组织的在日惹召开的马六甲和新加坡海峡航行安全和环境保护合作机制第 3 次合作论坛上所发表的论文《Report of 4th Aids to Navigation by Malaysia: Update on the Aids to Navigation Fund under the Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore》。


（续表）

年份捐款金额（美元）年均成本（美元）2010 3228235.00 5500000.002011 2934500.00 5500000.00

这一常常被提出的问题引发了一项提议，即向国际海洋法法庭控告海峡使用

者违反《公约》第 300 条 26 关于诚意和滥用权利的规定。27

尽管由使用者向助航设备基金提供的财政捐助逐渐减少，但自2009年以来，

在合作机制管理的项目协调委员会的协调下，已经有更多的海峡使用国表现出与

沿岸国共同分担负责的兴趣，并通过分享海洋技术来提供协助，以确保马六甲和

新加坡海峡的航运更安全。28

鉴于马六甲和新加坡海峡未来的航运交通会不断增加，加上迅速上涨的助航

设备维护成本，29 合作机制方案可能不足以促进马六甲和新加坡海峡国际航运的

可持续利用。30 此外，随着更多的船舶往来于海峡，对马六甲和新加坡海峡沿岸国

而言，航运安全问题和海洋环境问题将变得更为尖锐。31 如果这种情况继续下去，

未来将很难保护并促进马六甲和新加坡海峡水域环境的可持续发展。

五、航运对马六甲和新加坡海峡海洋环境的影响

漏油和废弃物排放是现代航运活动所特有的，包括操作排放和意外排放。由

26 《联合国海洋法公约》第 300 条规定，“缔约国应诚意履行根据本公约承担的义务并应以不致构成滥用权利的方法，行使本公约所承认的权利、管辖权和自由”。

27　Mohd Nizam Basiron, Special Focus: Symposium on the Enhancement of Safety of Navigation and the Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, MIMA Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 23~25.

28　 Muhammad Razif bin Ahmad and Mohd Fairoz bin Rozali, The Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: The Way Forward, paper presented at the Sixth MIMA Conference on the Straits of Malacca: Charting the Future, Kuala Lumpur, 2009.

29　 2009 年，马来半岛海运部报道称，维护、修理或新建助航设备的成本是 1061066.00 美元。2010 年，花费增加至 4085315.00 美元。参见 Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: 6th Aids to Navigation Fund Committee Meeting, 2011.

30　 Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Protecting Vital Sea Lines of Communication: A Study of the Proposed Designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area, Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 57, 2012, pp. 79~94.

31　 B. Hamzah, Straits of Malacca: Burden Sharing, Transit Passage & Sovereignty of Coastal State, paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, 2008.


于马六甲和新加坡海峡繁忙的航运活动（2010 年的船舶过境量总计约 7.4 万艘），

因此，在海峡水域出现意外漏油事故等的海上风险很高。32 据报道，2000 至 2010年，分道通航制区域共发生 39 起事故，是这 10 年间马六甲和新加坡海峡内最拥

堵的路线。33 这些事故如表 5 归类所示：

表 5 马六甲和新加坡海峡意外事故分类（2000—2010）

（来源：马来西亚海运部）

事故类型百分比

碰撞 59沉船 9搁浅 10火灾 22总计 100

漏油事故给海洋环境带来了不利影响。34 每年大量的航运活动被认为是造成

马六甲海峡珊瑚礁生长缓慢，创区域最低记录的原因；35 航运交通及其引发的湍

流造成了持续性的水土流失，使马来西亚马六甲海峡沿岸的红树林生态系统也受

到威胁，一个很好的例子就是柔佛西南端（马六甲海峡与新加坡海峡交汇处，航运

交通繁忙）沿岸红树林植被的水土流失。36

此外，船舶也排放其他类型的污染物，如海洋垃圾、污水、有毒有害物质、噪

声排放和空气污染等，这些都是年复一年持续破坏和恶化海峡海洋环境的污染物。

当国际环境法的原则刚开始出现时，各国就开始协商过境通行制度的规定了。

自从《公约》被议定以来，当中保护和保全海洋环境的框架就已经被现代保护原则

和规范（诸如预警原则、生物多样性保护、可持续利用和污染者付费原则等）明显

32　Wally Mandryk, Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit: Strategic Importance of Trade & Shipping in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, paper presented at the Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2008.

33　 Ahmad Nordin Ibrahim, Overview on Traffic and Incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, paper presented at the 4th Cooperation Forum of the Cooperation Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Melaka, 2011.

34 Mohd Nizam Basiron, Sea-Based Sources of Marine Pollution, in Mohd Ibrahim Hj. Mohamed and Hairil Anuar Husin eds., Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008, pp. 120~125.

35　 Amelia Emran, The Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Wollongong: The University of Wollongong, 2007.

36　 Mohd Nizam Basiron and Tan Kim Hooi, The Environmental Impact of Increased Vessel Traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, MIMA Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 15~22.


放大。那么，过境通行权还是不受限制的吗？贝特曼认为：

随着沿海国日趋引进对航行有影响的海洋环境保护措施，今后，过境通行权会受到越来越多的限制。37

在国家实践层面，澳大利亚在托雷斯海峡特别敏感海域引入了强制引航制度，作

为相关保护措施，为用于国际航行的海峡的管理开辟了新的发展方向。38 这一国家

实践可能是一个先兆，即对所有在用于国际航行的海峡过境的船舶和飞机而言，

过境通行是一种不受限制的航行权利的假定，因考虑到沿岸国和使用国共同的环

境责任而被修正。

六、拟议的马六甲和新加坡海峡特别敏感海域

国际海事组织是负责指定特别敏感海域的唯一国际机构。特别敏感海域是指

因公认的生态、社会经济或科学重要性，且易受国际海事活动损害，需要由国际海

事组织采取行动进行特别保护的海域。39 只有国际海事组织的成员国才能向国际

海事组织申请特别敏感海域的指定，以及相关保护措施的采用和修改。40 相关保护

措施是特别敏感海域制度的主要部分，规定了特别敏感海域的保护方式及程度，

以应对国际航运活动造成的环境威胁。41 当两个或两个以上政府在该特别区域有

共同利益时，应当制定一项协调提案。《特别敏感海域的识别与指定修订指南》（第

A.982(24) 号决议）规定：

特别敏感海域指定的申请应包含相关保护措施或旨在防止、减少、消除威胁或已识别漏洞的措施提案。特别敏感海域的相关保护措施受限于将要或

37 　Sam Bateman, The Compulsory Pilotage Regime in the Torres Strait – A “Melting Pot” of Operational, Legal and Political Considerations, in Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman and Susan J. Rolston eds., The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 261~286.

38　托雷斯海峡是大洋洲地区相当重要的一个航道，每年来往的船舶大约有 3000 艘。Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2011, p. 512.

39　 Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, at http://www.imo.org/environment/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1357, 24 August 2009.

40　 International Maritime Organization, Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designa- tion of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, A 24/Res 982, 6 February 2006.41　 Markus J. Kachel, Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas: The IMO’s Role in Protecting Vulnera- ble Marine Areas, Hamburg: Springer, 2008.


已经由国际海事组织批准和采用的行动，例如，避航区之类的船舶定线制。

有观点认为，马六甲海峡也许是特别敏感海域的合理候选区域。贝克曼指出：

作为一个整体，马六甲海峡很可能不符合特别敏感海域的指定（标准），但是，该海峡中一块特别明确界定的区域却是需要特别保护的。42

范·戴克指出：

因为人类和经济对马六甲海峡的依赖，其也许是被国际海事组织指定为特别敏感海域的合理候选区域。43

本文第二节已经阐明了马六甲和新加坡海峡对沿岸的马来西亚、印度尼西亚

和新加坡在生态和社会经济上的重要性，沿岸的一些地区已被认定为联合国教科

文组织世界文化遗产、地质公园以及国际重要湿地。本文的第五节也已经提到马

六甲和新加坡海峡海洋环境易受海峡内繁忙航运活动的影响。根据特别敏感海域

的指定标准，马六甲和新加坡海峡都有被指定为特别敏感海域的可能，因其拥有

重要的生态、社会经济或科学价值，且容易受到航运活动和有害物质排放等国际

海洋活动的损害。44 昂鲁主张：

根据社会、文化和经济标准，( 马六甲和新加坡 ) 海峡可以被看作是人类和经济尤为依赖的区域。（马六甲和新加坡）海峡对马来西亚的经济价值已不单是作为运输通道的功能，近海捕鱼、旅游和红树林收割等其他经济活

42　 Robert Beckman, Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for Consideratio- n, paper presented at the MIMA Conference on Building a Comprehensive Security

Environment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004.43　 Jon M. Van Dyke, Transit Passage through International Straits, in Aldo Chircop, Ted L.

McDorman and Susan J. Rolston eds., The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 177~232.

44　马六甲和新加坡海峡拥有社会经济价值，因为捕鱼和海洋旅游等经济活动对马来西亚、新加坡和印度尼西亚沿岸人口的生计有重要意义。参见 Tan Kim Hooi, Natural Resources Exploitation and Utilisation, in Mohd Ibrahim Hj. Mohamed and Hairil Anuar Husin eds., Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008, p. 72; Siti Nazatul Izura Bt. Mohd Ishak and Tan Kim Hooi, Fisheries in the Straits of Malacca, in Mohd Ibrahim Hj. Mohamed and Hairil Anuar Husin eds., Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008.


动，都对马来西亚和印度尼西亚的经济有重要贡献。45

假定马六甲和新加坡海峡都被指定为特别敏感海域，那么很重要的一点是确定针

对航海者的最适相关保护措施。强制引航制度可能并不完全可行。马六甲和新加

坡海峡的交通量是托雷斯海峡的近 25 倍，46 因而难以为通过马六甲和新加坡海峡

的航海者提供足够的引航员。47 因此，引入以通行费征收为形式的成本回收机制

或许对这两个重要航道而言是一种可行的相关保护措施。

（一）拟议的马六甲和新加坡海峡成本回收机制

在马六甲和新加坡海峡征收通行费的想法可以追溯到 1972 年。48 在当时的

背景下，海峡使用国被视为“搭便车者”，因此，马来西亚建议建立一家马来西亚

—印度尼西亚公司负责向往来于海峡的船舶征收通行费；但另一方面，新加坡和海

峡使用国并不赞成这一想法。继 1992 年海上事故急剧增加之后，这一想法再次

被提出，以降低在马六甲和新加坡海峡的碰撞风险。49

对通过马六甲和新加坡海峡的船舶征收通行费会导致与《公约》规定相抵触

的问题。《公约》第 26 条第 1 款规定，沿海国不得向仅仅是通过领海的外国船舶

征收费用。沿海国只能就“特定服务”征收费用。“特定服务”通常是指引航、拖

曳和护航服务，因为这些服务涉及确保过境船舶顺利航行。50 无论交通多么繁忙，

海峡沿岸国对维护海峡内航行设施的安全都负有主要责任。作为拥有全球最繁忙

海上要道美誉的海峡——多佛海峡的沿岸国之一，英国曾向国际海事组织提交了

45　 Nihan Unlu, Current Legal Developments: Straits of Malacca, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2006, pp. 546~547.

46　 Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Balancing Shipping and the Protection of the Marine Environment of Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Wollongong: The University of Wollongong, 2012, pp. 269~271.

47　 Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2011, pp. 519~520.

48　 Joon Num Mak, Unilateralism and Regionalism: Working Together and Alone in the Malacca Straits, in Graham Gerard Ong-Webb ed., Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006, pp. 146~151.

49　 Tommy H. Purwaka, Control of Marine Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Modalities for International Co-operation, Singapore Journal of International & Comparat-

ive Laws, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 1998, pp. 457~458.50　 Jon M. Van Dyke, Transit Passage through International Straits, in Aldo Chircop, Ted L.



一份参考文件，题为“制定向使用者征收海上基础设施成本费的原则”，51 这是基

于不断增加的助航设备和设施成本将最终成为沿海国的负担的事实而提出的。为

营造更公平的环境，英国建议国际海事组织制定一些公平原则来管理非歧视性收

费体系的建立。52 这将是一种非盈利的制度，通过向船舶收费获得资金来回收成

本、资本投入和整修（投入）。这一制度旨在减轻沿海国负担，尤其是在像多佛海峡、

马六甲和新加坡海峡这样繁忙的航道中维护助航设备以及其他设施的负担。由于

这一提议夹杂着复杂的法律问题，（国际海事组织）并没有针对英国的提议采取进

一步的措施。53

吸引更多的当事方参与共同管理马六甲和新加坡海峡的呼声时有出现，然

而，所获得的支持却让人非常失望，尤其是私营投资领域的企业和其他利益相关

者。54 潜在的捐赠国与沿岸国间就项目集资存在不同意见，且船东已经对捐赠助

航设备基金存在疑虑。尽管在马六甲和新加坡海峡沿岸港口停泊的船舶会支付入

港费，当中部分费用已经用于维护海峡的助航设备，但半数以上的过境船舶并不

会在这些当地港口停泊，因而被认为是搭便车者，使用主要由沿岸国提供和资助

的现有助航设备设施。55 因此，为了确保马六甲和新加坡海峡使用国和利益相关

者更有效地合作与参与，沿岸国可能会提出征收通行费这一潜在的相关保护措施。

如果马六甲和新加坡海峡的沿岸国能够向海峡过境船舶征收通行费，那所得收益

可以用来改进并建造更多海峡内助航设备设施和基础设施。这不会与《公约》相

抵触，因为所提议的费用征收会在指定特别敏感海域的框架下进行，而《公约》本

身并没有完全反对这样做。56

通行费征收制度以前在丹麦海峡（由 3 条航道组成，与卡特加特海峡和斯卡

51　 David H. Anderson, Funding and Managing International Partnerships for the Malacca and Singapore Straits, Consonant with Article 43 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 1999, pp. 454~455.

52　 Jon M. Van Dyke, Transit Passage through International Straits, in Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman and Susan J. Rolston eds., The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 177~232.

53　Satya N. Nandan, The Management of Straits Used for International Navigation: International Cooperation in Malacca and Singapore Straits, in Myron H. Nordquist and John Norton Moore eds., Current Maritime Issues and the International Maritime Organization, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 27~28.

54　 Sam Bateman, Regime Building in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 47~48.

55　 Joshua H. Ho, Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: The Co-operative Mechanism, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 233~247.

56 《联合国海洋法公约》第 192 条规定“各国有保护和保全海洋环境的义务”。


格拉克海峡一同连接了北海和波罗的海）也实施过。57 过去，曾向通过这些海峡的

船舶征收通行费或海峡费；在没有支付过境费的情况下，外国贸易船舶不能通过丹

麦海峡。由于航道交通繁忙，丹麦从通行费征收中获得了可观的收益，以致通行

费一度成为丹麦三分之一财富的来源。过境费直接在赫尔辛格（丹麦海峡中最狭

窄的地方）征收，通行费数额由船舶所载货物决定。58 经过丹麦海峡所增加的贸易

成本在欧洲海洋国家之间造成了不安，这些国家认为通行费负担沉重，反对通行

费的征收并一致认为必须废除这种制度。因此，1857年3月14日，奥地利、比利时、

法国、英国、汉诺威、汉萨城、梅克伦堡、荷兰、奥尔登堡、普鲁士、俄国、瑞典—

挪威和丹麦在哥本哈根签订了《海峡费补偿条约》。丹麦给予这些国家的船舶过

境权，相应地也得到了一笔来自签约国的补偿金，具体金额相当于年收入资本化

现值。59

丹麦也与英国就这一问题缔结过另一个条约。《丹麦和英国完成海峡费补

偿之安排的公约》（《哥本哈根公约》）第 2 条规定，英国向丹麦（丹麦国王）支付

1125206 英镑，而作为回报，第 3 条赋予英国船舶通过丹麦海峡的航行自由。60 同

一年，丹麦与美国达成一项协议，允许美国船舶永久自由地通过丹麦海峡。1857年 4 月 11 日，丹麦与美国在华盛顿签署《废止海峡费公约》（《华盛顿公约》），其

中第 1 条赋予美国船舶顺利通过丹麦海峡的自由；61 第 2 条约定丹麦将维护海峡

内的助航设施，不得向美国船舶收取通行费；作为对此的回报，美国政府同意向丹

麦支付一笔巨款（详见第 3 条），即一次性支付总额为 3.93 亿美元的补偿金。62

从 1857 年开始，海峡费的支付终止了。丹麦先前的实践表明，向航行船舶征

收通行费的制度并不完全是史无前例的，尽管自其被废止以来已经超过了 150 年，

57　 Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Regime of Passage of Ships through the Danish Straits, NILOS Papers Online.

58　Yasuhiko Kagami, International Support for Navigational Aids: Lesson Learned from International Practices, paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008.

59　 Treaty for the Redemption of Sound Dues between Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Hanover, the Hanse Towns, Mecklenburg–Schwerin, the Netherlands, Oldensburg, Prussia, Russia, Sweeden–Norway and Denmark, 1969, in Clive Parry ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (1648–1918), Vol. 116, New York: Oceana Publications, 1969.

60　 Convention between Denmark and Great Britain to Complete the Arrangements for the Redemption of the Sound Dues Signed at Copenhagen, 14 March 1857, in Clive Parry ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (1648–1918), Vol. 116, New York: Oceana Publications, 1969.

61　 Convention for the Discontinuance of the Sound Dues between Denmark and the United States signed at Washington, 11 April 1857, in Clive Parry ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (1648–1918), Vol. 116, New York: Oceana Publications, 1969.

62　 Gunnar Alexandersson, International Straits of the World, in Gerard J. Mangone ed., The Baltic Straits, Vol. 6, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982, pp. 73~75.


且尚未在其他任何地方再次施行。当时的海上强国愿意向丹麦支付巨额补偿金来

换取自由航行，这代表其承认沿海国具有征收通行费的权利。然而通常认为，对《公

约》相关规定的广泛接纳推翻了早期对这一权利的认可。

（二）潜在的法律和政治影响

正如上述第三节所解释的，过境通行制度规定所有船舶在通过用于国际航行

的海峡（连接公海或专属经济区的一个部分和公海或专属经济区的另一部分）时

拥有不受阻碍的航行权。基于这一事实，可以预料，在马六甲和新加坡海峡拟议

引入以通行费征收为形式的成本回收机制可能会面临困难。首先，通行费的征收

与《公约》第 38 条第 1 款和第 44 条所规定的行使不受阻碍的过境通行相抵触。63

像美国这样的海运大家很可能会反对这一提议，因为美国政府一直强烈反对在马

六甲和新加坡海峡征收类似的通行费。64“2006 年关于马六甲和新加坡海峡的吉

隆坡会议：加强安全、保安和环境保护”（吉隆坡会议）期间，美国连同航运业一起

在会上重申适用《公约》第 38 条来确保货物、原材料和能源运输保持畅通，并且

他们准备反对在马六甲和新加坡海峡征收强制通行费的任何尝试。65一年后，“2007年关于马六甲和新加坡海峡的新加坡会议：加强安全、保安和环境保护”（新加坡

会议）期间，美国对可能借助合作机制征收强制通行费的情况表示担忧，并对实施

通行费的想法未被摆上合作机制议事日程感到高兴。

其次，除非设计出某种电子预付费方式，否则通行费的支付会使得通过马六

甲和新加坡海峡的船舶大排长队，导致船舶航行的不当延误，最终给许多依靠航

运来进行贸易活动的公司造成经济损失。66 沿岸国也可能因此对这些船舶及其船

员、货物进口商、甚至可能是货物的消费者所遭受的经济损失负有赔偿责任。再次，

就政治影响而言，通行费的征收可能会遭到许多海洋国家和那些依靠全球进出口

的国家的反对，因为这将为在别处征收通行费创造一种不良先例。最后，确定通

行费的标准很困难，尤其是是否应该基于船舶大小、所载货物或船舶污染海洋的

63 《联合国海洋法公约》第 38 条第 1 款规定，“在第 37 条所指的海峡中，所有船舶和飞机均享有过境通行的权利，过境通行不应受阻碍……”。这一条得到《联合国海洋法公约》第 44 条的支持，其规定“海峡沿岸国不应妨碍过境通行……”。

64　 Nazery Khalid, Burden Sharing, Security and Equity in the Straits of Malacca, at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Nazery-Khalid/2277, 23 August 2010.

65　 Joshua H. Ho, Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: The Cooperative Mechanism, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 238~242.

66　Mary George ed., Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Malaysia: LexisNexis, 2008, pp. 156~160.


可能性来收费。67

沿岸国可能会反驳，通行费的征收并没有与通过海峡的过境通行权相违背。

通行费的征收会为航行带来方便，因为安装最先进的助航设施使得海峡内的国际

海上交通更为安全。通行费的征收不会给沿岸国产生额外和过多的收入，因为这

些钱将用于资助海峡的维护。此外，通行费征收机制并不会创造一种被其他沿岸

国所效仿的不良先例，因为每个海峡都有不同的特点，这种通行费只能在负担较

重航行交通量（达到了对海洋环境的完整性很不利，以致必须采取严厉措施的程

度）的海峡内征收。

为了确定不损害、不妨碍顺利航行，也不会不合理地影响航运成本的最可行

程序，通行费的支付方式和标准可以由沿岸国、使用者、国际海事组织和其他利益

相关者共同讨论与商议。一种可能的方式是把这些款项纳入国际海事组织海峡信

托基金或在 2006 年吉隆坡会议上引入的助航设备基金，同时设立一个由沿岸国、

国际海事组织和使用者组成的特别委员会来管理该基金。该基金并不包括由马六

甲海峡委员会设立的循环基金，因为其是沿岸国与日本间的单独合作。通过该基

金的国际化管理来确保落实问责制、增强透明度和廉洁性是更可行和更令人满意

的；由于马来西亚、印度尼西亚和新加坡都是对海峡拥有主权的沿岸国，由这些国

家来主持委员会也是合适的。

目前，估计每年通过马六甲和新加坡海峡的船舶载重吨超过 40 亿。68 如果每

艘过境船舶每载重吨贡献出一美分给基金，那将给基金带来约 4000 万美元。69 据

日本财团主席笹川洋平所说，按此标准缴纳的金额微不足道，甚至不会影响运费

率。70因此，可以提议该方案要求使用者按每载重吨一美分直接向基金支付通行费。

这是一种非歧视性制度：使用越多，支付越多。事实上，这种类型的合作是得到《公

约》本身支持的，《公约》第 194 条规定：

67　 Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Balancing the Tensions between Shipping and Marine Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Have the Straits Reached an Environmental Tipping Point, The International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability, Vol. 7, 2011, pp. 39~50.

68　Wally Mandryk, Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit: Strategic Importance of Trade & Shipping in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, paper presented at the Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2008.

69　 Mohd Nizam Basiron, Special Focus: Symposium on the Enhancement of Safety of Navigation and the Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, MIMA Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 33~35.

70　 B. Hamzah, Straits of Malacca: Burden Sharing, Transit Passage & Sovereignty of Coastal State, paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008, pp. 77~78.


各国应该在适当情形下个别或联合地采取一切符合本公约的必要措施，防止、减少和控制海洋环境污染……

《公约》第 197 条支持全球性或区域性合作，其规定：

各国在为保护和保全海洋环境而拟定和制定国际规则……时，应在全球性的基础上或在区域性的基础上，直接或通过主管国际组织进行合作……

“应该”这个词在第 194 和第 197 条的使用表明，只要与《公约》相一致，《公约》

并不禁止国家间为保护和保全海洋环境而开展任何层面（全球性或区域性）的合

作方案。这包括在拟议的马六甲和新加坡海峡特别敏感海域施行的相关保护措施

——通行费制度，并可能有助于造就一个更为有效的合作责任分担机制，沿岸国、

使用者和国际海事组织现在仍在为此努力。

七、结语

《公约》第三部分的过境通行制度给予所有通过用于国际航行的海峡的船舶

一种非常自由的航行方式，沿岸国不得妨害和限制这种权利。此外，这些国家享

有非常有限的执行权来对可能污染或有污染其领峡海洋环境威胁的违规船舶采取

行动。认识到这一局限，澳大利亚已经建议国际海事组织指定托雷斯海峡为特别

敏感海域，并以强制引航作为一种相关保护措施，这一指定已获批准。自 2006 年

以来，托雷斯海峡的强制引航已得到实施。尽管受到来自新加坡和美国，尤其是

美国的批评，但强制引航的施行已经对完善托雷斯海峡敏感生态系统的保护和保

全有所帮助。与托雷斯海峡一样，马六甲和新加坡海峡也受到《公约》条款的约束，

沿岸的马来西亚、印度尼西亚和新加坡不得阻碍和损害所有通过马六甲和新加坡

海峡船舶的过境通行。

由于每年大量船舶航行于此，沿岸的马来西亚和印度尼西亚以及新加坡一直

对航运给马六甲海峡带来的不利影响表示担忧。如果这些沿岸国考虑效仿澳大利

亚，建议国际海事组织指定马六甲海峡为特别敏感海域，且鉴于马六甲和新加坡

海峡每年必须承受繁重的交通，那么在海峡征收通行费的方案可能是一种优于强

制引航的相关保护措施。但是，这无疑将遭到使用国的指责，国际海事组织很可

能也会予以批评。

从目前的情况看，很难对往来于马六甲和新加坡海峡的船舶实施通行费征收

制度，尤其是这两个海峡被誉为两个重要的海上通道，而《公约》也禁止对仅仅是

通过领海的船舶征收通行费。由于航运成本将不可避免地增加，通行费的征收制


度很可能会损害全球经济。此外，许多人也会认为，沿岸国与使用者所展开的合

作机制已经得到了很好的发展，这些合作机制被很多当事者认为是平衡马六甲和

新加坡海峡航运与海洋环境保护的最好方式。但是，基于表 2、3 和 4 所示数据，

从筹集的金额看，基金所得到的支持显然还不尽如人意，不足以有效维护沿海峡

安装的助航设备。

在这个问题上，使用国应该站在沿岸国角度思考。毗邻马六甲和新加坡海峡

的其中两个沿岸国（即马来西亚和印度尼西亚）都是发展中国家，他们不应该承担

维护海峡助航设备和其他海峡海洋环境的全部成本，71 马来西亚和印度尼西亚也

没有从中获益。因此，这些沿岸国为了其他国家（大部分都是马六甲和新加坡海

峡的使用者）的利益，在海峡维护上花费巨大。

相应地，如果使用国不同意实施通行费征收方案的提议，那他们应该积极帮

助减轻沿岸国每年为促进所有船舶安全航行所不得不承受的负担。更为安全的航

行将减少海上事故的发生，因而保护海峡的海洋环境免受漏油或化学品泄漏的不

利影响。基于当前的航运形势，目前还难以在马六甲和新加坡海峡实施通行费征

收方案。但是，每年航运交通的稳定增长无疑将给海峡敏感的海洋环境带来压力，

在这种情况下，未来几年在马六甲和新加坡海峡水域内实施通行费征收方案也并

非完全不可能。

（中译：宋东工作单位：重庆人文科技学院）

71　例如，截至 2008 年，马来西亚就已经花费超过 2 亿令吉用于确保在马六甲和新加坡海峡的航行安全，这对一个发展中国家而言是一笔相当大的金额。参见 Teh Eng Hock, Malaysia Seeks to Limit Maritime Traffic in Straits of Malacca, at http://www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx?sec=nation&file=%2f2008%2f10%2f22%2fnation%2f2335917, 6 September 2013.


The Legal Feasibility of the Imposition of a Cost-recovery Mechanism in

Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and

Singapore

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli*

Abstract: The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are two of the world’s mostsignificant maritime chokepoints with navigational traffic amounting to approxima-tely 74,000 vessels annually. Part III of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prescribes that vessels and aircraft of all flags may exercise the right of unimpeded transit passage when navigating through straits used for international navigation. Conceptually, through the introduction of the transit passage regime, the UNCLOS has prohibited any form of toll imposition on transiting ships. The conferment of this right to ships of all flags has created a difficult situation for the States bordering these busy waterways, particularly in protecting the marine environment of such straits from vessel-source pollution. Au-stralia has been successful in designating the Torres Strait as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) in 2005, with compulsory pilotage as the applicable Associated Protective Measure (APM), thus, minimising the risks of maritime casualties in the said waterway. Assuming that the PSSA designation is also extended to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the implementation of the most potentially suitable APM would probably materialise through the introduction of a “cost recovery mechanism” which could be in the form of toll-levying scheme, given the nature of the Straits which are busy with transiting traffic. The funds collected from toll co-

* Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Senior Lecturer of Syariah & Law, Universiti Sains Islam Mal- aysia, Associate Fellow, Institute of Oceanography and Environment, Universiti Malaysia

Terengganu. E-mail: [email protected].© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

The Legal Feasibility of the Imposition of a Cost-recovery Mechanism in Straits Used for International Navigation:

A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore 171

llection could be used to maintain and upgrade the aids to navigation installed along the Straits, which, in turn, would enhance the safety of navigation, hence reducing the risks of maritime accidents that may pose threats to the marine environment of the Straits. This paper aims to discuss the question of the viability and practicability of the application of this toll-levying scheme if such is introduced in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the potential legal and political implications arising out of such an implementation.

Key Words: Strait of Malacca; Strait of Singapore; Cost-recovery mechanism; Straits used for international navigation

I. Introduction

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are narrow waterways that connect two of the world’s largest oceans. The entrance to the Strait of Malacca is located between Ujung Baka, the northernmost tip of Sumatra and Lem Voalan in Phuket Island in Thailand.1 The Strait of Malacca is quite wide at its opening to the Andaman Sea, which is about 200 nautical miles in breadth.2 The Strait of Malacca separates mainland Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, forming a funnel-shaped waterway as it narrows down to the south before joining the Strait of Singapore, linking the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and subsequently to the Pacific Ocean.

II. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Important Economic Waterways

The earliest port that existed along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was Langkasuka, which emerged sometime in the third century AD.3 In the seventh century AD, Langkasuka submitted to Srivijaya that rose into power and became the “Master of the Strait of Malacca”. Srivijaya participated actively in a growing

1 Executive Summary, in Mohd Ibrahim Mohamed and Hairil Anuar Husin eds., Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008.

2 Amelia Emran, The Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Wollongong: The University of Wollongong, 2007, p. 9.

3 William A. Southworth, Langkasuka, in Keat Gin Ooi ed., Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, From Angkor Wat to East Timor, California: ABC-CLIO, 2004, pp. 764~765.


world economy and prospered well in engaging extensive commerce in camphor, cloves, sandalwood and nutmegs.4 The power over the Strait of Malacca was then shifted to Majapahit in the thirteenth century AD and ultimately to the Sultanate of Malacca in the fifteenth century AD. The era of European colonisation began in the Strait of Malacca region when the Portuguese sacked the port of Malacca in 1511. The taking of the port by the Portuguese did not mean that the Portuguese had an absolute control over the Strait of Malacca. The Portuguese had to compete with other regional kingdoms which had had considerable influence over the Strait such as the Sultanate of Aceh and Johor. Subsequent to the Portuguese era, this region was colonised by the Dutch, the British and the Japanese, before Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore attained independence in the mid-twentieth century.5 At present, the Strait of Malacca is bordered considerably by Indonesia and Malaysia while the Strait of Singapore is bordered by the littoral States of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The rich history of trade, cultural exchanges and colonisation has prompted the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to acknowledge two port cities along the Strait of Malacca, namely Penang and Malacca as UNESCO World Heritage Sites in 2008.6

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are also important fishing grounds for the littoral States, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. The Department of Fisheries of Malaysia reported that the fish landings in the Malaysian states bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have increased from 692,985 tonnes in 2005 to 729,559 tonnes in 2009.7 Likewise, the Straits play important roles for Indonesia’s fishing industry, producing about approximately 277,000 tonnes of fish catch each year.8

4 Bertie Reginald Pearn, An Introduction to the History of South-East Asia, 2nd ed., Kuala Lumpur: Longmans of Malaysia Ltd., 1965, p. 24.

5 Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Balancing Shipping and the Protection of the Marine Environment of Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Wollongong: The University of Wollongong, 2012, pp. 16~22.


7 Fisheries Department of Malaysia, Landings of Marine Fish by State and Fishing Gear Gro- up, Putrajaya: Fisheries Department of Malaysia, 2009.8 A. Nontji, Managing the Marine Environment of the Straits of Malacca, paper presented

at the Building a Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004, p. 152.



Located within the coral triangle, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are rich in the concentration of marine biodiversity such as coral reefs, mudflats, wetlands and mangrove forests which are natural habitats for many wild species. The designation of Tanjung Piai, Sungai Pulai and Pulau Kukup, all located at the southwestern end of the Malay Peninsula, as RAMSAR sites shows that the coastal environment along the Straits is important in wetlands conservation.9 Pulau Langkawi is a popular Malaysian holiday getaway which is located at the northern entrance to the Strait of Malacca. Due to its ecological importance, Pulau Langkawi was awarded a World GEOPARK status by UNESCO in June 2007.10

Despite being important for the fisheries industries as well as for biodiversityconservation, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are considered by the interna-tional community as important shipping passages, and have been consistently described as two of the most important oil transportation choke points on the planet.11 With the emerging economies of China, Japan, South Korea and that of Southeast Asian nations, both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore will continue to increase in their significance as tanker pipelines, connecting the oil producers in the Middle East with their East Asian consumers.12

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore have witnessed continued increases in the number of navigational traffic each year. In 2010, approximately 74,000 vessels of all types transited the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as shown in the following Table 1:

9 The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, The Annotated Ramsar List: Malaysia, at http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-pubs-annolist-annotated-ramsar-16529/main/ramsar/1-30-168%5E16529_4000_0__, 11 September 2010.


11 Paul Y. Cheng, Mansi Singhal, Saurabh Bharat, Cheng Khoo and Lucy Haskins, Global Oil Choke Points, Global Equity Research, 18 January 2008, pp. 10~11, at http://www.deepgreencrystals.com/images/GlobalOilChokePoints.pdf, 2 September 2013.

12 Chia Lin Sien, Alternative Routes for Oil Tankers: A Financial, Technical and Economic Analysis, in Hamzah Ahmad ed., The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety, Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1998, pp. 103~104.


Table 1 Transiting Vessels in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, 2005–2010

(Source: Maritime Institute of Malaysia [MIMA])Type 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

VLCC/Deep Draft CR 3,788 3,851 3,753 4,040 4,221 4,329

Oil Tanker Vessel 14,759 14,784 14,391 15,894 16,398 16,250LNG/LPG Carrier 3,099 3,297 3,413 3,726 3,330 3,581

Cargo Vessel 63,40 6,477 8,467 8,794 8,560 8,444Container Vessel 20,818 22,615 23,736 26,359 22,310 24,805

Bulk Carrier 7,394 8,129 9,684 10,256 11,186 11,639Others 6,423 6,496 6,734 7,312 5,354 5,085Total 62,621 65,649 70,178 76,381 71,359 74,133

From 40,000 ship movements in 1982 13 to almost 70,000 in 2007, it is predict-ed that traffic will continue to increase up to 140,000 ship movements by the year 2020.14 Traffic in the Straits is reported to grow at an average rate of 9 per cent annually.15 This ongoing phenomenon will directly or indirectly burden the littoral States that have to bear the cost of maintaining aids to navigation that are somewhat costly as shown in Table 2:

13 G. Naidu, The Straits of Malacca in the Malaysian Economy, in Hamzah Ahmad ed., The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety, Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1997, pp. 33~60.

14 Vijay Sakhuja, Malacca: Who’s to Pay for Smooth Sailing?, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IE16Ae01.html, 14 January 2009.

15 Muhammad Razif bin Ahmad, The Financial Cost of Risk Management in the Straits of Malacca, in Hamzah Ahmad ed., The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety, Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1997.



Table 2 Programme on the Operations and Maintenance of Aids to Navigation –10 Years Budget Estimation(Source: Tripartite Technical Experts Group [TTEG])16

Cost Year 1- Year 10 (USD)

IndonesiaMaintenance 8,538,871.00

Operation 6,512,500.00Replacement 16,986,842.00

TOTAL 32,038,213.00

MalaysiaMaintenance 9,890,374.00

Operation 4,094,523.00Replacement 8,800,888.00

TOTAL 22,785,785.00

TOTAL (MALAYSIA + INDONESIA) 54,823,998.00

Table 2 shows that the average annual maintenance cost for the aids to navigation (for the period of 2010–2020) is about USD 5.5 million. Given the high navigation-al traffic plying the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, it is crucial for the littoral Sta-tes to equip the Straits with sufficient aids to navigation facilities to minimise the risks of maritime accidents so as to protect the sensitive marine environment of the-se waterways from unwarranted pollution.

III. Navigational Regime through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

16 This data is derived from the “Report of 4th Aids to Navigation by Malaysia: Update on the Aids to Navigation Fund under the Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore” presented at the 3rd Co-operation Forum under the Co-operative Mechanism on the Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, held in Yogyakarta in 2010 organised by the Tripartite Technical Experts Group.


expounds on the legal status of straits used for international navigation and is applicable to both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The regime of transit passage provides for continuous and expeditious passage of all vessels and aircraft through straits used for international navigation that cannot be denied, hampered or impaired by the bordering States.17 States that border straits used for international navigation must give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within or over the straits of which they have prior knowledge.18 Unlike the regime of innocent passage where the coastal States have the right to temporarily suspend the passage of foreign vessels for reasons essential for the security of the coastal State,19 the States bordering straits used for international navigation do not have this right.20 Article 233 of Part XII of the UNCLOS further limits the enforcement powers of these States as the passage of foreign vessels through these straits could be suspended only if the passage causes major damage to the marine environment of the straits.21 The UNCLOS in its article 43 does however encourage both, the States bordering the straits and the user States to co-operate in maintaining and preserving the marine environment of the straits.

IV. Co-operative Mechanism in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

It is true that currently, there is an ongoing co-operative mechanism scheme between the littoral States and the user States in managing the issues on safety of

17 Article 37 of UNCLOS explains that the transit passage regime applies in straits that link one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. Artice 38(1) of UNCLOS reads “in straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded…”; Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Navigational Regimes through Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, MIMA Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012.

18 Robert Beckman, Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for Consideratio- n, paper presented at the MIMA Conference on Building a Comprehensive Security Enviro- nment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004.19 UNCLOS, Art. 25(3), 1982.20 Robert Beckman, Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for Consideratio- n, paper presented at the MIMA Conference on Building a Comprehensive Security Enviro- nment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004.21 Article 233 of the UNCLOS allows States bordering straits to take appropriate enforcement

measures against ships that has caused or threatening to cause major damage to the marine environment of the Straits.



navigation and the control of vessel-source pollution in the Straits.22 Nevertheless, these developments have been moving rather slowly and have not kept pace with the increasing number of ships that transit the Straits of Malacca and Singapore each year. This is justified by the fact that the 2009 budget for the fund was USD 8 million, but it has managed to rise only by USD 5 million, with USD 2.5 million coming from the Nippon Foundation.23 In 2010, the amount raised was even lesser, only about USD 3 million, which was contributed by various governments and other stakeholders of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as shown in Tables 3 and 4.24

Table 3 Contributions Made to the Aids to Navigation Fund, 2009–2011(Source: MIMA & Marine Department of Peninsular Malaysia)

Year 2008 2009 2010 2011Contribution (USD) 1,451,000 5,007,532 3,228,235 2,934,500

Table 4 Contributions Vis-à-vis Annual Cost of Maintenance of Aids to Navigation Facilities

(Source: MIMA & TTEG)25

Year Contribution (USD) Annual Average Cost (USD)2008 1,451,000.00 1,354,000.002009 5,007,532.00 5,500,000.002010 3,228,235.00 5,500,000.002011 2,934,500.00 5,500,000.00

22 Joshua Ho, The Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Ensuring Safe and Efficient Shipping, RSIS Commentaries, 2009, at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS119200-

9.pdf, 22 August 2010.23 Sam Bateman, Regime Building in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: Two Steps Forward,

One Step Back, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 45~51.

24 Muhammad Razif Ahmad, An Overview of the Cooperative Mechanism between Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (No. CF 4/2/1), Marine Department of Malaysia, 2011.

25 This data is derived from the “Report of 4th Aids to Navigation by Malaysia: Update on the Aids to Navigation Fund under the Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore” presented at the 3rd Co-operation Forum under the Co-operative Mechanism on the Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, held in Yogyakarta in 2010 organised by the Tripartite Technical Experts Group.


This issue has been consistently raised, resulting in a proposal to lodge a complaint at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea against the users for violating article 300 of the UNCLOS26 on good faith and abuse of rights.27

Despite the decreasing amount of financial contribution made by the users to the fund, more user States, since 2009, have shown interest to share the burden with the littoral States and assistance is generally rendered through sharing maritime technology to ensure safer shipping in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore under the Project Co-ordination Committee administered by the Co-operative Mechanism.28

Given that the Straits are projected to accommodate constant increase of shipping traffic in the future, coupled with the escalating costs of maintenance of aids to navigation in the Straits,29 the co-operative mechanism scheme may not be entirely sufficient to promote sustainable use of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore for international shipping activities.30 Besides, with more vessels plying the Straits, the question of safety and environmental concerns will become more acute for the States bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.31 If this situation continues, it may be difficult in the future to protect and promote environmental sustainability in the waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

26 Article 300 of UNCLOS states that “State Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the right, jurisdiction and freedoms

recognised in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.”27 Mohd Nizam Basiron, Special Focus: Symposium on the Enhancement of Safety of

Navigation and the Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, MIMA Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 23~25.

28 Muhammad Razif bin Ahmad and Mohd Fairoz bin Rozali, The Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: The Way Forward, paper presented at the Sixth MIMA Conference on the Straits of Malacca: Charting the Future, Kuala Lumpur, 2009.

29 In 2009, the Marine Department of Peninsular Malaysia reported that the cost for maintenance, repair or newbuilding to aids to navigation was at USD 1,061,066.00. In 2010, the expenditures increased up to USD 4,085,315.00. See Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: 6th Aids to Navigation Fund Committee Meeting, 2011.

30 Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Protecting Vital Sea Lines of Communication: A Study of the Proposed Designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area, Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 57, 2012, pp. 79~94.

31 B. Hamzah, Straits of Malacca: Burden Sharing, Transit Passage & Sovereignty of Coastal State, paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, 2008.



V. The Impacts of Shipping on the Marine Environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Oil spills and waste discharge are typical of modern shipping activities, either through operational or accidental discharges. With the high volume of shipping movements in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore amounting to approximately 74,000 transits in 2010, there is always a high risk of the occurrence of maritime casualties involving accidental oil spills.32 There were about thirty-nine accidents reported in the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) area, which is the most congested stretch within the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in the 10-year period from 2000 to 2010.33 These accidents can be categorised as shown in Table 5:

Table 5 Casualty Breakdown in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (2000—2010)

(Source: Marine Department of Malaysia)Type of Casualty Percentage

Collision 59Sinking 9

Grounding 10Fire 22

Total 100

Oil spill incidents entail adverse impacts on the marine environment.34 The volume of shipping activities taking place each year in the Straits is thought to be the cause of low coral reef development in the Strait of Malacca, and is being

32 Wally Mandryk, Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit: Strategic Importance of Trade & Shippi- ng in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, paper presented at the Symposium on Safety

and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2008.

33 Ahmad Nordin Ibrahim, Overview on Traffic and Incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, paper presented at the 4th Cooperation Forum of the Cooperation Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Melaka, 2011.

34 Mohd Nizam Basiron, Sea-based Sources of Marine Pollution, in Mohd Ibrahim Hj. Mohamed and Hairil Anuar Husin eds., Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008, pp. 120~125.


recorded as amongst the lowest in this region.35 The well-being of the mangrove ecosystem along the Malaysian coast bordering the Strait of Malacca is also threatened due to constant soil erosion caused by the ship traffic and the turbulence engendered. One good example of this is the soil erosion in mangrove vegetation along the coast of the south–western tip of Johor, which is an area of high numberof ship transits, where the Strait of Malacca converges with the Strait of Singa-pore.36

In addition, ships also discharge other types of pollutants such as debris, sewage, hazardous and noxious substances, noise emissions and air pollution. These are a few among the polluting substances that damage and deteriorate the marine environment of the Straits on a continuous basis year in, year out.

The provisions of the regime of transit passage were negotiated when princi-ples of international environmental law were emerging. The framework for protection and preservation of the marine environment in the UNCLOS has been considerably amplified by modern conservation principles and norms such as the precautionary principle, conservation of biodiversity, sustainable use and the polluter pays principle since the UNCLOS was negotiated. Therefore, does the right of transit passage remain unqualified? Bateman asserts:

The right of transit passage may be increasingly qualified in the future by the growing trend among coastal States to introduce measures for the protection of the marine environment which impact upon navigation.37

Australia has pioneered a new development in State practice in the governance of straits used for international navigation through its introduction of a compulsory pilotage regime as an Associated Protective Measure (APM) for the Torres Strait

35 Amelia Emran, The Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Wollongong: The University of Wollongong, 2007.

36 Mohd Nizam Basiron and Tan Kim Hooi, The Environmental Impact of Increased Vessel Traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, MIMA Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 15~22.

37 Sam Bateman, The Compulsory Pilotage Regime in the Torres Strait – A “Melting Pot” of Operational, Legal and Political Considerations, in Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman and Susan J. Rolston eds., The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 261~286.



Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA).38 This State practice may be an early sign that the assumption that transit passage is an unqualified navigational right for all vessels and aircraft exercising transit in straits used for international navigation has been modified to take into account the environmental responsibilities of both the littoral States and the user States.

VI. The Proposed Straits of Malacca and Singapore PSSA

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the only international body responsible for PSSA designation. A PSSA is an area that needs special protection through action by the IMO because of its significance for recognised ecological, socio-economic or scientific reasons and which may be vulnerable to damage by international maritime activities.39 An application to the IMO for designation of a PSSA and the adoption of APMs or any amendment(s) to them may be submitted only by a Member Government of the IMO.40 APMs are essential parts of a PSSAin which the APMs define the means by and the extent to which a PSSA is protect-ed against environmental threats posed by international shipping activities.41 A coor-dinated proposal should be formulated when two or more governments have a co-mmon interest in that particular area. Resolution A.982(24) or its full name, Revis-ed Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of PSSAs, states that:

An application for PSSA designation should contain a proposal for an APM or measures aimed at preventing, reducing or eliminating the threat or identified vulnerability. APMs for PSSAs are limited to actions that are to be, or have been, approved and adopted by IMO, for example, a routeing system such as an area to be avoided.

38 The Torres Strait is a waterway of considerable importance in the Oceania region and accommodates around 3000 vessel movements each year. Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2011, p. 512.

39 Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, at http://www.imo.org/environment/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1357, 24 August 2009.

40 International Maritime Organization, Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designa- tion of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, A 24/Res 982, 6 February 2006.41 Markus J. Kachel, Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas: The IMO’s Role in Protecting Vulnera- ble Marine Areas, Hamburg: Springer, 2008.


Views have been expressed that the Strait of Malacca may be a logical candidate to be designated as a PSSA. Beckman argued that:

It is very likely that Malacca Strait as a whole would not qualify for designation as a PSSA, but only a particular clearly defined area of the strait which is in special need of protection.42

Van Dyke stipulated:

The Malacca Strait might be a logical candidate to be designated by the IMO as a PSSA because of the human and economic dependency on this Strait.43

Section II of this article has explained the ecological and socio-economic importance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore for the littoral States of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. This is justified by the fact that some areas along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have been recognised as UNESCO World Heritage Sites, UNESCO Geopark as well as RAMSAR Sites. Section V has also mentioned that the marine environment of the Straits is vulnerable to the active shipping activities taking place through the Straits. Based on the criteria which need to be fulfilled for a PSSA designation, it would not be impossible for both straits to qualify as PSSAs as they both have significant ecological or socio-economic or scientific value which may be vulnerable to damage by international maritime activities such as shipping movements and discharges of harmful substances.44 Unlu asserted:

42 Robert Beckman, Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for Consideratio- n, paper presented at the MIMA Conference on Building a Comprehensive Security Enviro- nment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004.43 Jon M. Van Dyke, Transit Passage through International Straits, in Aldo Chircop, Ted L.


44 The Straits of Malacca and Singapore possess socio-economic importance, as they are significant in generating the sources of livelihood for coastal populations of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia through economic activities such as fishing and marine tourism. See Tan Kim Hooi, Natural Resources Exploitation and Utilisation, in Mohd Ibrahim Hj. Mohamed and Hairil Anuar Husin eds., Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008, p. 72; Siti Nazatul Izura Bt. Mohd Ishak and Tan Kim Hooi, Fisheries in the Straits of Malacca, in Mohd Ibrahim Hj. Mohamed and Hairil Anuar Husin eds., Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective, Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008.



According to social, cultural and economic criteria, the Straits could be accepted as an area that is of particular importance to human and economic dependency. The economic importance of the Straits to Malaysia extends beyond its function as a transport channel. The other economic activities, such as offshore fishing, tourism and mangrove harvesting, make an important contribution to the Malaysian and Indonesian economies.45

Assuming that both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are to be designated as PSSAs, it is therefore important to ascertain the most suitable APM to be imposed on mariners. The imposition of compulsory pilotage may not be entirely feasible as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore accommodate approximately a traffic volume of 25 times higher than that of the Torres Strait.46 Difficulties may arise in providing sufficient pilots for mariners transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.47 Therefore, the introduction of a cost-recovery mechanism in the form of toll-levying scheme is probably a feasible APM to be imposed in these crucial waterways.

A. The Proposed Cost-Recovery Mechanism in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

The idea of toll imposition in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore goes back in 1972.48 The user States, in this context, were viewed as “free riders”, and thus, Malaysia suggested that a Malaysia–Indonesia corporation be set up to levy tolls on ships plying the Straits. Singapore and the user States, on the other hand, were not in favour of the idea. After the dramatic increase of marine casualties in 1992, this

45 Nihan Unlu, Current Legal Developments: Straits of Malacca, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2006, pp. 546~547.


47 Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2011, pp. 519~520.

48 Joon Num Mak, Unilateralism and Regionalism: Working Together and Alone in the Malac- ca Straits, in Graham Gerard Ong-Webb ed., Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the

Malacca Straits, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006, pp. 146~151.


idea was again mooted to reduce the risks of collisions in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.49

Levying toll on vessels transiting the Straits raises questions of inconsistency with the UNCLOS provisions. Article 26(1) of UNCLOS prescribes that coastal States should not levy foreign ships that are merely passing through their territorial Sea. The coastal State can only levy them for “specific services”. It has been generally accepted that “specific services” refers to pilotage, towing and escorting services, because these services relate to ensuring the success of transiting vessels’ voyage.50 States bordering straits are primarily responsible for maintaining safety of navigation facilities in the straits no matter how busy the traffic is. As one of the States bordering the Dover Strait, a strait possessing a reputation as the busiest global chokepoint, the United Kingdom (UK) submitted an information paper to the IMO entitled “Developing Principles for Charging Users the Cost of Maritime Infrastructure.”51 This was based on the fact that the increasing cost of navigational aids and facilities would eventually be a burden on the coastal State. In order to foster a more equitable situation, the UK suggested that the IMO should develop some fair principles to govern the establishment of a non-discriminatory charging system.52 This would be a non-profitable regime where ships are charged to gain funds for recovery of costs, capital investment and improvements. This regime was designed to reduce the burden on coastal States, especially in busy waterways like the Dover Strait and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, of maintaining the aids to navigation and other such facilities. Due to the complex legal issues associated with this proposition, no further action was taken on the UK’s proposal.53

49 Tommy H. Purwaka, Control of Marine Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Modalities for International Co-operation, Singapore Journal of International & Comparati-

ve Law, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 1998, pp. 457~458.50 Jon M. Van Dyke, Transit Passage through International Straits, in Aldo Chircop, Ted L.

McDorman and Susan. J. Rolston eds., The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 177~232.

51 David H. Anderson, Funding and Managing International Partnerships for the Malacca and Singapore Straits, Consonant with Article 43 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law,Vol. 3, Issue 2,1999, pp. 454~455.

52 Jon M. Van Dyke, Transit Passage through International Straits, in Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman and Susan. J. Rolston eds., The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 177~232.

53 Satya N. Nandan, The Management of Straits Used for International Navigation: International Cooperation in Malacca and Singapore Straits, in Myron H. Nordquist and John Norton Moore eds., Current Maritime Issues and the International Maritime Organization, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 27~28.



There have also been periodic calls to attract more parties to participate in co-managing the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, however the support given, especially by private sector companies and other stakeholders, has been very disappointing.54 Differences have arisen between prospective donor States and the littoral States over project funding, and shipowners have shown hesitation to contribute to the Aids to Navigation Fund. Although ships calling at the ports along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore pay port dues, part of which has been used to maintain aids to navigation in the Straits, yet more than half of the transiting ships do not call at these local ports, and hence are considered free riders, taking advantage of the existing aids to navigation facilities primarily provided and funded by the littoral States.55 Therefore, to ensure more effective co-operation and participation from user States and stakeholders in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, toll-levying could be a potential APM proposed by the littoral States. If the littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were able to impose tolls on ships transiting the Straits, the revenue collected could be used to improve and to establish more aids to navigation facilities and infrastructure along the length of the Straits. This would not be inconsistent with the UNCLOS as the proposed imposition of toll would be undertaken under the umbrella of the PSSA designation, and the UNCLOS is not entirely against this.56

A toll-levying regime was previously practised in the Danish Straits, which comprises of three channels connecting the North and Baltic Seas through the Kattegat and Skagerrak.57 In the past, toll payments or Sound Dues were imposed upon ships that navigated these Straits. No foreign trading ships could pass through the Danish Straits without paying the transit dues. Due to the busy nature of the waterways, Denmark gained substantial revenue from the toll collection, so much so that at one time, it contributed a third of Denmark’s wealth. Transit dues were collected directly at Helsingør, the narrowest point of the Straits and the amount

54 Sam Bateman, Regime Building in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 47~48.

55 Joshua H. Ho, Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: The Cooperative Mechanism, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 233~247.

56 Article 192 of UNCLOS reads “States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marin- e environment.”57 Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Regime of Passage of Ships through the Danish Straits, NILOS

Papers Online.


of toll incurred was based on the cargo that these vessels were carrying.58 The increased trade cost through the Danish Straits brought uneasiness among European maritime States which felt burdened with the toll imposed upon them. These States opposed the toll and opined that it should be abolished altogether. As a result, the Treaty for the Redemption of the Sound Dues between Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Hanover, the Hanse Towns, Mecklenburg–Schwerin, the Netherlands, Oldenburg, Prussia, Russia, Sweden–Norway and Denmark was signed on 14 March 1857 at Copenhagen. In exchange for transit right for vessels of these States, Denmark received an indemnity corresponding to an annual income capitalised to the current value from the signatory States.59

Denmark also entered in another treaty with Great Britain on the same matter. Article 2 of the Convention between Denmark and Great Britain to Complete the Arrangements for the Redemption of the Sound Dues (Copenhagen Convention) requires Great Britain to pay Denmark a sum of £1,125,206 to the King of Den-mark, and in return, article 3 of the Copenhagen Convention confers freedom of navigation for British ships to pass the Danish Straits.60 In the same year, Denmark made an agreement with the United States of America (U.S.) allowing U.S. ships to pass freely in perpetuity through the Danish Straits. Article 1 of the Convention for the Discontinuance of the Sound Dues (Washington Convention) between Denmark and the U.S. signed at Washington, 11 April 1857 confers freedom upon American ships to sail through Danish Straits.61 As agreed in article 2 of the Washington Convention, Denmark would maintain aids to navigation in the Straits without having to charge toll upon American ships. In return for this, the American government agreed to pay Denmark a hefty amount of money, as enumerated in

58 Yasuhiko Kagami, International Support for Navigational Aids: Lesson Learned from International Practices, paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008.

59 Treaty for the Redemption of Sound Dues between Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Hanover, the Hanse Towns, Mecklenburg–Schwerin, the Netherlands, Oldensburg, Prussia, Russia, Sweeden–Norway and Denmark, in Clive Parry ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (1648–1918), Vol. 116, New York: Oceana Publications, 1969.

60 Convention between Denmark and Great Britain to Complete the Arrangements for the Redemption of the Sound Dues Signed at Copenhagen, 14 March 1857, in Clive Parry ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (1648–1918), Vol. 116, New York: Oceana Publications, 1969.

61 Convention for the Discontinuance of the Sound Dues between Denmark and the United States signed at Washington, 11 April 1857, in Clive Parry ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (1648–1918), Vol. 116, New York: Oceana Publications, 1969.



article 3 of the Washington Convention, a lump sum payment of compensation amounting to USD 393 million.62

Beginning in 1857, the payment of Sound Dues was discontinued. This previ-ous practice by Denmark shows that the toll regime imposed upon navigating vessels is not something which is entirely unprecedented although it is now over 150 years since it was discontinued and it has not been replicated in any other part of the world. The willingness of the maritime powers at that time to pay hefty compensation to Denmark in return for free navigation represented an acknowledgement of the rights of a coastal State to impose a toll; however, wide acceptance of relevant provisions of the UNCLOS would generally be considered as overriding that earlier acknowledgement.

B. Potential Legal and Political Implications

As explained earlier in Section III, the transit passage regime provides unim-peded right to all vessels for navigating through straits used for international navigation that link one part of the high seas or EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ. Based on this fact, it is anticipated that the proposed introduction of a cost-recovery mechanism in the form of toll collection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may face difficulties. Firstly, toll-levying is inconsistent with the exercise of unimpeded transit passage as provided for in articles 38(1) and 44 of UNCLOS.63 Maritime nations like the U.S. are likely to oppose this proposal as the U.S. government has always been vigorous in airing its opposition to toll-type charges in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.64 During “The 2006 Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection” or the Kuala Lumpur Meeting, the U.S., along with the shipping industry at the meeting reiterated the application of article 38 of UNCLOS to ensure that the shipping of goods, raw material and energy remained unimpeded

62 Gunnar Alexandersson, International Straits of the World, in Gerard J. Mangone ed., The Baltic Straits, Vol. 6, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982, pp. 73~75.

63 Article 38(1) of UNCLOS reads “in straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded…”. This article is supported by article 44 of the UNCLOS which stipulates that “States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage…”.

64 Nazery Khalid, Burden Sharing, Security and Equity in the Straits of Malacca, at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Nazery-Khalid/2277, 23 August 2010.


and that they were ready to oppose any attempt for the imposition of compulsory toll charges in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.65 A year later, during “The 2007 Singapore Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection” or the Singapore Meeting, the U.S. expressed concerns on the possible imposition of compulsory tolls via the Co-operative Mechanism and was glad that the idea of toll implementation was not deliberated in the Co-operative Mechanism’s agenda.

Secondly, unless some pre-paid electronic form of payment is devised, toll payments may create long queues for ships to pass through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, causing undue delays in the voyage of vessels which will result in financial losses to many companies that rely on shipping for their trading activities.66 As a result, the littoral States may be liable to pay compensation for the financial losses suffered by such ships and their crew, the cargo importers and perhaps even the consumers of the goods. Thirdly, in terms of political implications, this toll imposition is likely to be challenged by many maritime States and those dependent on global imports and exports as it would create an undesirable precedent for the imposition of toll elsewhere. Fourthly, it would be difficult to devise the criteria for determining the toll fee, in particular, whether it should be based on the size of the ship, the cargo it is carrying or the potential of the vessel to pollute the seas.67

The littoral States may counter-argue that the imposition of tolls is not contrary to the right of transit passage through the Straits. Toll collection would facilitate shipping, as navigation through the Straits would be safer for international maritime traffic with installation of state of the art aids to navigation. Toll-collection wouldnot generate extra and excessive income for the littoral States as the money would be used to fund the maintenance of the Straits. In addition a toll-levying mechanism would not create an undesirable precedent for other littoral States to follow because each strait has different characteristics. Such a toll would only be imposed in a

65 Joshua H. Ho, Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: The Cooperative Mechanism, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 238~242.

66 Mary George ed., Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Malaysia: LexisNexis, 2008, pp. 156~160.

67 Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, Balancing the Tensions between Shipping and Marine Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Have the Straits Reached an Environmental Tipping Point, The International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability, Vol. 7, 2011, pp. 39~50.



strait that is heavily burdened with high navigational traffic which has reached a level so detrimental to the integrity of its marine environment that drastic measures have to be taken.

The method of toll-payment and determination of toll fees could be discussedand deliberated between the littoral States, the users, the IMO and other stakehold-ers in order to determine the most viable procedures so that these would neither impair nor hamper smooth navigation and unreasonably affect shipping costs. A possible way forward is to integrate such payments into the IMO Straits Trust Fund or the Aids to Navigation Fund introduced in the Kuala Lumpur Meeting in 2006 and to establish a special Committee comprising the littoral States, the IMO and the users to manage such a Fund. This would not involve the Revolving Fund established by the Malacca Strait Council (MSC) as this is a separate co-operation between the littoral States and Japan. It is more feasible and acceptable that such a Fund to be internationally managed to ensure accountability, transparency and corruption-free. As Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are littoral States that possess sovereignty over the Straits, it would also be appropriate that the Committee be chaired by these States.

Presently, it is estimated that more than 4.0 billion Dead Weight Tonne (DWT) of ships transit the Straits annually.68 If every transiting ship contributed only one cent per DWT to the Fund, it would generate approximately USD 40 million to the Fund.69 According to Yohei Sasakawa, the President of the Nippon Foundation, such a monetary amount to be contributed is trivial, so much so that it would not even impact freight rates.70 Therefore, it could be proposed that under this scheme, the payment of the toll is made directly to the Fund with the users required to pay one cent per DWT to the Fund. This would be a non-discriminatory regime; the more usage, the more payment would be imposed. In fact, this kind of co-operation is supported by the UNCLOS itself. Article 194 of UNCLOS states:

68 Wally Mandryk, Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit: Strategic Importance of Trade & Shippi- ng in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, paper presented at the Symposium on Safety

and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2008.

69 Mohd Nizam Basiron, Special Focus: Symposium on the Enhancement of Safety of Navigation and the Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, MIMA Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 33~35.

70 B. Hamzah, Straits of Malacca: Burden Sharing, Transit Passage & Sovereignty of Coastal State, paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008, pp. 77~78.


States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment…

Article 197 of UNCLOS supports cooperation on a global or regional basis by stating that:

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules… for the protection and preservation of the marine environment…

The usage of the word “shall” in both articles 194 and 197 shows that the UNCLOS does not proscribe the formation of a co-operation scheme, on any level, be it global or regional, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment between States as long as it has consistency with the UNCLOS. This may include the suggested toll regime as an APM for the proposed Straits of Malacca and Singapore PSSA which would likely help realise the vision towards creating a more effective co-operative burden sharing mechanism that the littoral States, the users and the IMO are still working on now.

VII. Conclusion

The transit passage regime in Part III of UNCLOS has provided a very liberal form of navigation for all vessels to sail through straits used for international navigation. This right cannot not be impeded or hampered by the States bordering the straits. Moreover, these States possess very limited enforcement powers to take action against recalcitrant ships that may pollute or threaten to pollute the marine environment of their territorial straits. Recognising this impediment, Australia has proposed to the IMO the designation of the Torres Strait as a PSSA with compulsory pilotage as an APM, and this designation was approved. Compulsory pilotage has been implemented in the Torres Strait since 2006. Despite receiving some criticism from Singapore and the U.S. in particular, the imposition of compulsory pilotage has assisted in improving the protection and preservation of the sensitive ecosystem of the Torres Strait. Like the Torres Strait, the Straits of



Malacca and Singapore are also bound by the provisions of the UNCLOS. The littoral States of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are prohibited from hampering or impairing the transit passage of all vessels through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Being heavily navigated by ships every year, the littoral States of Malaysia and Indonesia along with Singapore have always raised their concerns about the adverse impacts of shipping on the Strait of Malacca. Should these littoral States consider following in Australia’s footsteps, and propose the designation of the Strait of Malacca as a PSSA to the IMO, and, given the heavy traffic that the Straits have to accommodate each year, the toll-levying scheme might be a better APM over the compulsory pilotage, to be imposed in the Straits. Nevertheless, this would undoubtedly be followed by criticism from user States and most probably from the IMO itself.

Looking at the current situation, it would be quite difficult to impose toll-levying regime on ships plying the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, particularly as these Straits possess reputations as two of the most important chokepoints and that the UNCLOS itself prohibits the imposition of toll on ships merely exercising passage through the territorial sea. This toll-levying regime is likely to injure the global economy as shipping costs would inevitably rise. Furthermore, many would also argue that the cooperative mechanisms already engaged between the littoral States and the users have been developing quite well. These cooperation mechanisms are seen by many parties as the best way to balance shipping and protection of the marine environment of both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. However, based on data shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4, it is clear that the support given to the Fund has not been really encouraging with the amount raised and not been sufficient to maintain aids to navigation installed along the Straits.

On this matter, the user States should put themselves in the littoral States’ shoes. Two of the littoral States bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia are developing countries and they should not bear the entire burden of maintaining aids to navigation equipment and other costs to sustain the marine environment of the Straits.71 Malaysia and Indonesia are not

71 For example, as of 2008, Malaysia has spent more than RM 200 million to ensure safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, a considerable amount to be borne by a developing country. See Teh Eng Hock, Malaysia Seeks to Limit Maritime Traffic in Straits of Malacca, at http://www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx?sec=nation&file=%2f2008%2f10%2f22%2fnation%2f2335917, 6 September 2013.


positively benefitting from this. These littoral States are therefore expending a great deal in maintaining the Straits for the benefit of other countries most of which are users of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Accordingly it would seem that if the user States do not agree with proposals to impose a toll-levying scheme, they should actively assist in lessening the burden that the littoral States have to bear each year to facilitate safe shipping for all vessels. Safer shipping would reduce maritime casualties, hence protecting the marine environment of the Straits from the adverse effect of oil or chemical spills. Based on the current shipping trends, the imposition of toll-levying scheme in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore at the moment is far from becoming a reality; however, the steady increase of annual shipping traffic will inevitably pressure the sensitive marine environment of the Straits. In these circumstances the imposition of toll-levying scheme may not be entirely impossible in the waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in future years.

Editor (English): Arpita Goswami

闭海和半闭海制度——北冰洋是半闭海吗？ 193

闭海和半闭海制度——北冰洋是半闭海吗？

Joshua Owens *

内容摘要：北冰洋环境独特且脆弱，本文主要研究是否可将该水域视为半闭海，以便按照 1982 年《联合国海洋法公约》执行用以加强该区域环境保护的特殊治理方法。在分析闭海和半闭海制度有关条款的历史背景，并详细讨论在几个著名闭海和半闭海达成的合作体系后，本研究得出以下结论：虽然北冰洋并不符合半闭海的定义，但却与半闭海有类似的性质。无论如何，北冰洋存在特殊需求，因此本文主张（对闭海和半闭海制度）进行必要变更，并将变更之后的类似制度合理地适用于北冰洋。此种制度可以作为一个平台，以加强这片脆弱且快速变化海域的环境保护。为了便于过渡，建议此项工作通过北极理事会或与其合作完成。

关键词：闭海和半闭海北冰洋《联合国海洋法公约》第 122 条和 123 条

一、引言

名称有什么关系？有些人可能会说名称并不重要，还不如关注事物实际的本

质。但不幸的是，在解决法律问题时，这种做法是站不住脚的。相反，政府、私人

企业、非政府组织、国际律师和个人都必须找到某个共同的立足点，以便秩序能够

得以维持。这个共同点就是法律，而法律的基础就在于不会随时变化而又必须保

持灵活的“概念”。

本文重点论述以《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称“《公约》”）为中心建立的世

界海洋治理法律框架中所规定的闭海和半闭海定义、背景和历史。首先，将检视

从《公约》谈判（1973 年直到 1982 年公约定稿）中摘录的相关文件；然后，讨论各

国在实践中执行闭海和半闭海制度的方式；接下来，探讨各国将如何管理北极，这

其中谈到了各国在不同制度下的潜在差异，这实际上又回到了法律定义的层面。

毫无疑问，对初露头角的北极区未来的管理会由《公约》所规定的基础性概念来引

*　 Joshua Owens，印第安纳大学。电子邮箱：[email protected]。© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW


导，但是，协调北极沿岸国和非极地国家，建立一种令所有人合意或至少是可以接

受的北极管理形式，这当中所作的必要努力势必会在法律问题上引起不少的冲突

和误解。出于这个原因，本文的目标是至少解决其中一个问题，阐明闭海和半闭

海制度，并说明未来有关北极管理的国际谈判中是否应考虑闭海和半闭海制度。

二、关于闭海和半闭海的《公约》谈判

《公约》第 122 条和 123 条向国际法主体介绍了闭海和半闭海的概念，这两

条规定：

122. 为本公约的目的，“闭海和半闭海”是指两个或两个以上国家所环绕并由一个狭窄的出口连接到另一个海或洋，或全部或主要由两个或两个以上沿海国的领海和专属经济区构成的海湾、海盆或海域。

123. 闭海或半闭海沿岸国在行使和履行本公约所规定的权利和义务时，应互相合作。为此目的，这些国家应该尽力直接或通过适当区域组织：

（a）协调海洋生物资源的管理、养护、勘探和开发；（b）协调行使和履行其在保护和保全海洋环境方面的权利和义务；（c）协调其科学研究政策，并在适当情形下在该地区进行联合的科学

研究方案；（d）在适当情形下，邀请其他有关国家或国际组织与其合作以推行本

条的规定。

毋庸置疑，努力促成《公约》包纳闭海和半闭海概念的是那些在这一问题上

有利害关系的国家，比如土耳其、阿尔及利亚、伊朗和伊拉克，所有这些国家都毗

邻符合《公约》定义的闭海和半闭海：土耳其毗邻黑海和地中海，阿尔及利亚毗邻

地中海，伊朗毗邻里海和波斯湾，伊拉克在波斯湾有 58 千米的狭长海岸线。迄今

为止，在这些国家中，土耳其是唯一的非《公约》缔约国。我们只要稍微浏览一下

这些国家在《公约》谈判初期提交的文件，便可以更好地了解第 122 条和 123 条

的由来、相关利益问题，以及管理闭海和半闭海的基础性工作。

土耳其首先提出了共同解决闭海和半闭海划界问题的想法：“半闭海地区有

特殊的地理特征，领海宽度应由该地区各沿岸国共同决定”。1 8 天之后，阿尔及

利亚表明了自身立场，一方面肯定了商业航经国际海峡的非歧视性权利，但须满

足以下条件：途径者（1）遵守防止碰撞的国际规范；（2）采取所有必要措施防止对

1　Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.8, 15 July 1974.


沿岸国造成损害；（3）允许任何因其通过（海峡）而遭到损害的沿岸国提出赔偿；

以及（4）海峡沿岸国不得阻止或妨碍船舶通过该海峡。2 另一方面，阿尔及利亚为

军舰非商业航行的无害通过保留了足够的自由，但是将其条款的适用范围限制在

连接公海两个部分的海峡内，由此推定，排除了一端是领海甚至是毗连区的海峡。3

1974 年 8 月 13 日，土耳其重申了闭海和半闭海管理中的基本原则——衡平

原则：

本公约所列（关于领海和经济区的）一般性规则，应当以一种衡平的方式在闭海和半闭海中应用。

闭海和半闭海沿岸国之间可以进行磋商，以决定适合该区域和该条款目的的实施方式和方法。4

除了衡平原则，这份文件还强调建立一个灵活的管理制度，通过调整该制度，

使其充分、合乎理想地适用于任何选择采用这种制度的区域。

尽管伊拉克的海岸线相对较短，但该国提出了好几个关于闭海和半闭海的建

议。与阿尔及利亚类似，伊拉克将闭海和半闭海制度的适用限制在“连接公海的

两个部分并通常用于国际航行的海峡”。5 该份文件还肯定了所有国家船舶自由航

行的权利，无论是在半闭海还是在公海；建议半闭海沿岸国在适当顾及国际组织和

标准的前提下，对资源开发、管理，以及环境保护进行共同管理；保证在半闭海内

的航行自由；以及保护“之前被视为公海一部分”6 的新生领海的航行自由。伊拉

克关于闭海和半闭海的定义 7 与后来《公约》所采用的定义有一些相似之处：

“构成公海一部分的半闭海”一词是指被两个或两个以上国家所环绕的内海，可以为相向或相邻国家提供一个公海通道，通过一个狭窄的出口与公海的其他部分相连接。

显然，可以发现这一定义与《公约》第 122 条对闭海和半闭海的定义之间有

一些重要差异：“构成公海一部分”这一表述并没有出现在《公约》第 122 条中，

但该条款包括了更多的地理名词（海盆和海湾）；而且，伊拉克的定义中没有提及

一个海要被领海和专属经济区多大程度地覆盖才能被视为闭海或半闭海。由于伊

2　Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.20, 23 July 1974.3　Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.20, 23 July 1974.4　Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.56, 13 August 1974.5　Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.71 and Add. l and 2, 21 August 1974.6　Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.71 and Add. l and 2, 21 August 1974.7　这里，笔者并没有在严格意义上使用闭海和半闭海这一术语，因为伊拉克的定义明确所

指的只是“构成公海一部分的半闭海”。


拉克的文件是在谈判早期提交的，未能提及专属经济区也在意料之中，因为当时

专属经济区的概念还没有得到令人满意的阐释。此外，并不明确伊拉克为什么会

在定义中选择“可以”这个模棱两可的词。但无论如何，《公约》中的定义似乎更

有弹性，因为它没有规定闭海和半闭海只限于那些连接公海两个区域的海峡（事

实上，它避免提及“海峡”一词，转而使用“狭窄出口”这一更一般性的描述，大概

是为了防止与《公约》第三部分规定的“用于国际航行的海峡”这一内容相混淆）；

此外，《公约》中的定义标准更容易达到，它起到了与选言述句一样的作用：或者

仅由一个狭窄出口连接到另一个海，或者全部或主要由领海和专属经济区组成的

海域、海盆或海湾。对关键形容词“狭窄”和“主要”的解释，取决于法院和法庭

在审理关于闭海和半闭海问题的案件时所作的自由裁量。

伊朗与伊拉克在同一天提交了本国的草案条款，对闭海和半闭海的概念区分

如下：

（a）“闭海”一词指的是由两个或两个以上国家所环绕并由一个狭窄的出口连接到公海的面积很小的内海；

（b）“半闭海”一词指的是沿主要海洋盆地边缘，并由两个或两个以上国家的陆地领土所包围的海盆。8

伊朗的草案也重申了一项原则：对任何闭海和半闭海制度进行调整，以符合

当下环境的特定需求和条件，同时考虑相关沿岸国的特殊利益。关于沿岸国的合

作，伊朗建议如下：

沿岸国有责任保全和保护闭海或半闭海的海洋环境，并对其资源进行管理。9

在实践中，伊朗建议通过采用“旨在更好地保护（闭海或半闭海）环境免受污

染的区域性规则和标准”，和协调“根据区域性安排对闭海或半闭海的可再生资源

进行管理和开发利用的相关活动”，来履行这一责任。10 另外，在海洋科学研究上，

伊朗持以下立场：

在闭海或半闭海的科学研究，只有经相关沿岸国的同意后方能进行。

8　 Document A/C01,F.62/C.2/L.72, 21 August 1974.9　 Document A/C01,F.62/C.2/L.72, 21 August 1974.10 Document A/C01,F.62/C.2/L.72, 21 August 1974.


可想而知，这种海洋科学研究的管理体制取决于沿岸国的合作意愿，并可能

导致冲突或政治僵局。尽管如此，从各国关于闭海和半闭海制度的建议中可以发

现一个统一的主题：自由航行。无论是本质上还是理论上，《公约》为闭海和半闭

海规定的法律框架都不应阻碍任何国家在闭海和半闭海中自由航行或剥夺其在闭

海和半闭海自由航行的权利，但实际上在第 123 条所列的事项中还是赋予了沿岸

国某些优先特权。可现在的问题是，这样的一种利益平衡是否建立了一个公平、

衡平、可持续的体系？或者《公约》提出的闭海和半闭海管理制度是否可能导致争

端？带着这些问题，下文将对已经付诸实践的闭海和半闭海制度框架进行检验和

讨论。

三、《公约》之后的国家实践

最著名的闭海或半闭海的水体是地中海、北海、波罗的海、黑海、加勒比海，

以及波斯湾、阿曼湾、墨西哥湾和泰国湾。11 出于本文的目的，以下会对其中几个

进行粗略的考察，作为与地球上最北的水体（通常被称为北冰洋）进行对比的基础。

首先将考察各个半闭海的地理属性，然后考量当前所有的政府间合作治理活动。

只要快速浏览一下地图，我们就能确信面积为 264 万平方公里的加勒比海 12

是半闭海：

根据 1982 年《公约》中明确表达的定义，并考虑到其周长的 75% 都被大陆或岛屿从公海分离出来的事实，加勒比海是一个很好的半闭海例子。13

75% 这个统计数值是某种精确的标准吗？不见得。正好相反，上述引证似乎

暗示着闭海和半闭海的概念必然包含一定程度的主观性。也就是说，对地图上一

个给定的海的地理特征进行考察，判断其为闭海或半闭海还是公海，具有主观经

验性；在判断一个海是公海而不是半闭海这点上，并没有一个能够很容易用语言或

11　 Extracted from a more extensive list within Major Issues in the Management of Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas, with Particular Reference to the Caribbean Sea, LC/CAR/L.24, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (November 2004), p. 1, at http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/20811/L0024.pdf, 11 September 2013.




公式表达清楚的界线。经过再三考虑，闭海和半闭海的严格定义可能实际上无法

充分适应地球上诸多海洋复杂多样的情况。除了涉及“从公海分离出来的周长比

例”这一模糊标准，即如果加勒比海从公海分离出来的周长不是四分之三，而只有

三分之二或二分之一，它还算是半闭海吗？这个例子也引发了一个问题，即如何

解释第 122 条闭海和半闭海定义中一个特别模糊的语法使用。要知道，加勒比海

有无数的海峡与大西洋相连，能够有效地视其为一个由“两个或两个以上国家所

环绕并由一个狭窄的出口连接到另一个海或洋的海”吗？在严格的解释下，不定

冠词“一个”的使用指的是单独的、唯一的出口；而在宽松的解释下，则允许有多

个出口，就如同“杀人犯总有一个动机”表示有多个可能的动机。然而，正如加勒

比海的例子，根据《公约》中闭海和半闭海定义的替代性标准，即全部或主要由领

海或专属经济区构成，这个问题则并没有实际意义。但是，这又引发了另一个问

题：一个海必须要多大程度上处于国家主权范围内，才能被视为“主要”由领海和

专属经济区所构成——五分之四，四分之三，或甚至是三分之二？同样，这些问

题是《公约》等重要基础性条约不会回答的。更确切地说，在需要的情况下，这样

的问题应当由国家实践或司法手段加以解决。

和世界上其他海洋一样，加勒比海有许多以增强政府间管理或多边管理为宗

旨的组织，如加勒比国家联盟、在联合国支持下建立的拉丁美洲和加勒比海经济

委员会、可与欧盟相比的超国家组织——加勒比共同体，以及东加勒比海国家组

织。值得注意的是，除了拉丁美洲和加勒比海经济委员会之外，美国并没有加入

这些组织，尽管其拥有包括波多黎各自由联邦和美属维尔京群岛在内的加勒比海

属地。这些组织的显著特征是由东加勒比海国家组织铸造共同货币——东加勒比

海元，以及由加勒比共同体签发统一护照，该护照类似于授予公民在欧盟境内更

多旅行自由的欧盟护照。尽管这些组织大多数似乎都致力于经济一体化以及经济

增长，但还是有一些以环境为导向的框架可适用于加勒比海。加勒比海环境规划

署的行动计划于 1981 年通过，14 包括美国在内的 28 个国家协助建立的加勒比海

行动计划的主要目标是：发展可持续性旅游业，建立有效的污染预防和响应机制，

以及改进渔业和林业管理。15




面积约 300 万平方公里的地中海估计是公认的最大半闭海。16 与加勒比海不

同，它只有一个与公海相连的天然出口：直布罗陀海峡。尽管苏伊士运河是人工运

河，但它是否也可被视为一个出口已无关紧要。假设沿岸各国都主张专属经济区

（许多地中海国家主张专属经济区的程序还没有完全实施，并不是因为缺乏国家

动机，而是希望通过充分的协调，避免将来产生重叠或相冲突的主张），地中海的

水面也将“全部或主要”由沿岸国的领海或专属经济区组成，并且邻接陆地的周长

比例也达到 99% 左右。17

由于其战略上的重要性，在地中海进行合作治理自然是众望所归，但鉴于地

中海沿岸各国显著不同的政治体制，合作治理不可避免地具有挑战性：传统上开放

的西方经济体，如西班牙、法国和意大利，与阿尔及利亚、利比亚等国家的独裁体

制截然相反。因此，在这样的一个五花八门的混合体中达成共识是个不小的壮举。

2008 年，地中海联盟成立，这是根据 1995 年《巴塞罗那宣言》提出的原则（即经

济合作、加强安全措施、发展法治和民主原则）建立的国家间组织，简言之，数个

欧洲和地中海国家联合起来，旨在“使地中海海盆成为一个对话、交流和合作的平

台，以保证该区域的和平、稳定与繁荣。”18 这个论坛使得原本不愿意维持外交关

系的国家实现了多层次的参与，比如以色列和巴勒斯坦、摩洛哥和阿尔及利亚。

此外，地中海联盟还授予土耳其成员国资格（因为欧盟拒绝授予土耳其成员国资

格，这相当于土耳其参与欧盟事务的替代途径）。为了防止欧盟内部的政治纠纷

和派系斗争，欧盟所有成员国，无论是否毗邻地中海，都被自动授予地中海联盟的

成员国资格。该机构对地中海进行全面管理，其涵盖的议题范围广泛，包括交通、

高等教育、移民、污染清除和淡水采集、健康、海事安全、能源开采和新能源开发、

农业、环境、旅游、城市发展和信息交换等，19 这个新生组织的长期影响力还有待

观察。1976 年的《保护地中海免受污染的巴塞罗那公约》是政府间保护地中海环

境的一份基础性文件，它“为保护地中海免受污染而进行的区域合作建立了一个


17　 Document A/C01,F.62/C.2/L.72, 21 August 1974.18　 Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Bulletin of the

European Union, November, No. 11.19　 Final Statement of the Marseille Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign

Affairs, 2008, pp. 20~21, at http://ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/1103_minist- erielle_Euromed/Final_Statement_Mediterranean_Union_EN.pdf, 12 September 2013.


整体法律框架。”20 该公约共有 22 个缔约国，但缔约国并没有一致批准之后起草

的议定书。21

在波罗的海，沿岸国也充分认识到需要进行合作，以便在该区域实施有效、

可持续性的治理。波罗的海的面积只有 37 万平方公里，22 相较于上文提到的海来

说较小，但它的重要地位不容忽视。包括加里宁格勒（俄罗斯）、格丹斯克（波兰）、

吕贝克（德国）、里加（拉脱维亚）、塔林（爱沙尼亚）、赫尔辛基（芬兰）和斯德哥

尔摩（瑞典）在内的各国主要港口都毗邻波罗的海。和地中海一样，除了在丹麦和

瑞典之间有连接北海的相对狭窄的海峡之外，其周围几乎完全被陆地包围。

被授权管理波罗的海的主要国际组织是具有 12 个成员国的波罗的海国家理

事会，另外还有 10 个国家享有该理事会的观察员身份。和地中海联盟相似，波罗

的海国家理事会负责管理波罗的海很多方面的事务，比如环境、经济发展、能源、

教育和文化等。23 波罗的海国家理事会是管理波罗的海的主要政府间组织，但同

时也存在其他机构，包括波罗的海委员会，其致力于建设“可持续发展的社会，旨

在促进波罗的海沿岸地区和岛屿（包括非欧盟国家地区）之间的民主、交流、合作

和团结。”24

四、北冰洋是半闭海吗？

既然我们对当今闭海和半闭海管理方式的应用，以及这种制度的范围和结构

有了一个基本的了解，那么接下来让我们审视一下北极区：（1）是否符合闭海和

半闭海的定义；（2）如果符合，是否可能建立《公约》所规定的闭海和半闭海管理

制度；（3）当前的发展情况及其所显示的北极治理前景。

首先让我们思考一下《公约》第 122 条和 123 条的性质。仔细阅读后我们会

20　 Mazen Adi, The Application of the Law of the Sea and the Convention on the Mediterranean Sea, New York: Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, 2009, p. 38, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/adi_0809_syria.pdf, 12 September 2013.

21　 See Signatures and Ratifications of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean and its Protocols as at 13 May 2011, United Nations Environment Program, Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) for the Barcelona Convention, at http://195.97.36.231/dbases/webdocs/BCP/StatusOfSignaturesAndRatifications.doc, 12 September 2013.

22　 Major Issues in the Management of Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas, with Particular Refer- ence to the Caribbean Sea, LC/CAR/L.24, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin

America and the Caribbean (November 2004), p. 1, at http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/20811/L0024.pdf, 11 September 2013.

23　可以查询该组织的网站，下载于 http://cbss.org，2013 年 9 月 12 日。24　 Baltic Sea Commission’s website, at http://www.balticseacommission.info/about.html, 12

September 2013.


了解，这两个条款的目标不是禁止而是鼓励某种行为，即对闭海和半闭海实行更

好的区域治理。根据《公约》相关条款，闭海和半闭海沿岸国并没有觉得自己负有

沉重义务，必须就闭海和半闭海治理开展区域性合作，因为《公约》并没有规定遵

守该条款的激励措施或者违反该条款的惩罚机制，事实上，第 123 条仅仅主张闭

海和半闭海沿岸国“在行使和履行本公约所规定的权利和义务时，应互相合作”。

而如果一个国家认定最符合其利益的做法是不合作，那么延迟或者躲避合作看来

也并不会招致严重后果。

由此看来，我们或许应把闭海和半闭海条款看成主要是劝导性的，任何根据

这些条款建立的制度在本质上都是国家之间自愿达成的；此外，这些条款的目标显

然是加强对闭海和半闭海的保护，而不是授予沿岸国过多的权力（这些权力转而

可能会产生某些竞争或政治优势，虽然不可否认这是一个可能的伴随结果）。如

前所述，在《公约》的谈判过程中，各国均明确表示在行使有关闭海和半闭海区域

治理的权利时，不会侵犯航行自由。既然如此，我们可以认为，任何闭海和半闭海

制度的指导原则都会在不损害自由航行、海洋科学研究或者其他传统海事自由的

前提下进行有效管理。因此，任何国家反对建立这样一个看起来有益的体系，都

会被认为是无根据甚至是荒谬的。然而，在被许多人看作是大洋的北极区，这样

一个体系合适吗？根据阿迪的说法：

第 122 条定义闭海和半闭海的措辞，可能会使许多水体因此被界定为闭海或半闭海。然而，该条款并没有明确界定封闭的程度以及面积，因此，相对较大的海域（比如地中海）也可被包括在内。25

考虑到北极区水域大概是地中海表面面积的 3 倍，如果将《公约》规定的闭

海和半闭海定义应用到北冰洋，是否有肆意扩大此定义之嫌？北极地区是一个特

例，如果重新将其归类为一个半闭“海”，因其面积巨大必定会找不到先例。另一

方面，作为大洋，它目前是世界上最小的：由于它在海和洋这两个范畴的极端点之

间，有必要明确判定其为海还是洋吗？毋庸置疑，无论闭海和半闭海的定义是否

适用，北极区都要遵守《公约》的规定。因此，对北极地区的治理唯一可能的变更（或

者添加）措施就是：为了更有效的治理，建立一个闭海和半闭海制度，这也是根据

其独特和原始的环境所采取的谨慎措施。26 非北极国家很难得知如何最好地管理

25　 Mazen Adi, The Application of the Law of the Sea and the Convention on the Mediterranean Sea, New York: Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, 2009, p. 31, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/adi_0809_syria.pdf, 12 September 2013.

26 《联合国海洋法公约》在第 234 条也授予了冰封区域的沿岸国某些权利，尽管只是在专属经济区内。


与其自身环境如此相异的地域；若是将北极留给区域内国家进行管理，便会产生一

个更有效的制度，为全世界维持更高的安全和航行标准，并且确保减少环境破坏。

换言之，在北极区建立闭海和半闭海制度只会带来实际好处。有哪个国家能够对

这样的推论提出合理的反对意见吗？如果有，或许也仅仅是出于抑制北极国家国

力的提升与削弱其影响范围的简单动机。北极航运、旅游、资源开发和其他商业

活动，肯定会产生不计其数的收入。如果北极国家在实际上寡占北极，非北极国

家自然会反对。除此之外，只要北极区符合《公约》规定的闭海和半闭海定义，若

要坚称其不能同时被视为是洋和海，就很难进行合乎逻辑的论证。如果将北冰洋

称作“半闭海”冒犯了地理学家和其他专家学者的情感，也可以考虑将该制度进行

必要变更后再适用于这个脆弱的极地水体。相关条款并没有表明，基于闭海和半

闭海制度的体系不宜适用于一个与传统公认的闭海和半闭海拥有类似属性的较大

海域。

但真是这样的吗？事实上，北冰洋由两个或两个以上国家所环绕，仅仅通过

狭窄的出口（比如白令海峡、丹麦海峡、纳斯海峡和戴维斯海峡，尽管其中有些海

峡相对于直布罗陀海峡或马尔摩—哥本哈根海峡来说是很宽阔的，但与北极区的

面积成比例来看，它们还是明显狭窄的）与其他的海或洋相连。然而就领海和专

属经济区而论，北极区是“全部或主要”由它们组成吗？一张由英国杜伦大学制作

的地图标示出了北极区的各种边界。27 乍一看，这张北极圈的地图显示北冰洋大

约四分之三的水面由美国、加拿大、挪威、丹麦、冰岛和俄罗斯的专属经济区所覆

盖。四分之三足以符合《公约》中“主要”由领海和专属经济区覆盖这一定义吗？

这又将我们带到了最后一个问题：《公约》固然授予闭海和半闭海一些特权和义务，

但当前有关北极治理的现状又如何呢？

实际上，大部分北极区管理权已经落在少数几个北极沿岸国家手中了。1996年，北极理事会通过《渥太华宣言》成立，其宗旨是：（1）在北极原住居民和其他

北极居民的参与下，在一些共同的北极问题上，尤其是北极地区的可持续发展和

环境保护问题上，提供一种促进北极国家之间合作、协调与互动的方法；（2）监督

和协调根据北极环境保护战略的北极监督与评估计划所建立的项目，北极动植物

保护，北极海洋环境保护，做好应急防治、准备和响应；（3）采纳有借鉴作用的条款，

监督和协调可持续发展计划；（4）传播信息、鼓励教育，以及促进在北极相关问题

上的利益。28 这些目标与地中海、波罗的海和加勒比海的政府间管理机构的目标

非常相似。北极理事会于 2011 年达成了第一份具有法律约束力的条约——《北

极搜救协议》。我们可以推测，由于北极冰层融化导致的商业和航行可能，将会产

27　下载于 http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/arctic.pdf，2013 年 9 月 13 日。28　 1996 Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, at http://arctic-council.

org/filearchive/Declaration%20on%20the%20Establishment%20of%20the%20Arctic%20Council-1.pdf, 13 September 2013.


生更多的条约。

五、结论

回顾了闭海和半闭海的历史（包括《公约》谈判期间这个概念的发端和此后

各国对该制度的执行情况）之后，有些情况已经非常明了：（1）闭海和半闭海制度

本质上是劝导性的；（2）闭海和半闭海的定义具有很大的延展性；（3）考虑到理

论上，建立闭海和半闭海或与其类似的制度只是为了改善区域治理，并不会减损

传统的海事自由，因此，要反对这种尝试几乎是站不住脚的，即使讨论的区域并非

明显属于《公约》第 122 条定义的闭海和半闭海。这种情况也适用于北极区，尽

管大多数人认为北冰洋是大洋，从而与其仅仅是个“海”的想法格格不入。

由于北冰洋面积广阔，其可能超出了《公约》所公认的半闭海定义。尽管如此，

为了建立有效的区域管理来更好地管理其资源，促进贸易和繁荣，保护环境、居民

和过境者，在北冰洋适用加以必要变更后的类闭海和半闭海制度，似乎是实际可

行的。然而，无论该立场能否在学术领域得到支持，这样的一个政府间论坛事实

上早已存在，即拥有 8 个成员国的北极理事会。鉴于北极区迅速变化的生态状况，

该组织或许很快就会发现其在国际舞台上的形象和地位正随着北极冰层的融化而

急剧提升。

（中译：郭玉兰）


Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas: Does the Arctic Count?

Joshua Owens*

Abstract: The Arctic Ocean is a unique and delicate environment. The present contribution explores the question of whether this body of water may be considered a semi-enclosed sea for the purpose of implementing special governance techniques to enhance environmental protection in the area, as provided for in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The history behind the articles addressing this regime is assayed and the cooperative systems found in several notable enclosed and semi-enclosed seas are discussed in detail. The research concludes that while the Arctic Ocean may not fit the definition of a semi-enclosed sea, it nevertheless shares similar properties. Regardless, the special needs of the Arctic Ocean remain, and therefore it is submitted that an analogous system could legitimately be applied mutatis mutandis in the Arctic Ocean. Such a regime would serve as a platform for enhancing environmental protection in the vulnerable and rapidly changing maritime area. For ease of transition, it is recommended that such work be accomplished through or in cooperation with the Arctic Council.

Key Words: Enclosed and semi-enclosed seas; Arctic Ocean; UNCLOS articl-es 122 & 123

I. Introduction

What’s in a name? Some might suggest that a name is of little importance and would prefer to focus their sights on the actual essence of a thing. When it comes toresolving legal issues, unfortunately, such an approach is untenable. Instead, go-vernments, private companies, NGOs, international lawyers and individuals must all find some common ground to stand on so that order may be maintained. This com-

* Joshua Owens, Indiana University. Email: [email protected].© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas: Does the Arctic Count? 205

mon ground is law, and its foundation rests on concepts which are at once immutab-le and yet must remain flexible.

The focus of the present article is on the definition, background and history of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas (ESEs), as set forth in the legal framework of the world oceans governance, built around the centerpiece of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Below will examine the relevant documents excerpted from the UNCLOS negotiations, which ran from 1973 till the convention was finalized in 1982. Afterward, attention will be paid to the ways in which States have implemented the ESEs regime in practice. Then the question will be raised on how States are poised to manage the Arctic, making mention of the potential differences under discrete regimes, which in fact all trace back to legal definitions. The future administration of the budding Arctic will no doubt be guided by the foundational concepts promulgated within UNCLOS, but the necessary efforts of reconciling coastal Arctic States and non-circumpolar ones to create a form of Arctic administration pleasing, or at the very least acceptable, to all will certainly bring about no few conflicts and misunderstandings over legal issues. For this reason, the present essay aims to dispense with at least one of those issues, shedding light on the ESEs regime and whether or not it should be taken into account in future international negotiations on Arctic administration.

II. UNCLOS Negotiations on ESEs

UNCLOS articles 122 and 123 introduced to the body of international law the concept of ESEs. They read:

122. For the purposes of this Convention, “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.

123. States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-operate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization:

(a) to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea;


(b) to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment;

(c) to co-ordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area;

(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations to co-operate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article.

Unsurprisingly, the countries that pushed for inclusion of the ESEs concept in the UNCLOS were countries with a stake in the matter, such as Turkey, Algeria, Iran and Iraq. All of these countries border on seas that meet the UNCLOS definition of ESEs. Turkey borders the Black and Mediterranean Seas; Algeria also borders the Mediterranean; Iran borders the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf; lastly, Iraq has a 58-km sliver of coastline on the Persian Sea. Of these, to date Turkey is the only non-Party to the UNCLOS. By taking a glimpse at the documents submitted by these countries during the initial stages of negotiating the UNCLOS, we may better understand how articles 122 and 123 came to be, the interests States brought to the table, and the groundwork that was laid for ESEs management.

Turkey first submitted the idea of jointly approaching the issue of ESEs border delimitation with the following suggestion: “In areas of semi-enclosed seas, having special geographical characteristics, the breadth of the territorial seas shall be determined jointly by the States of that area.”1 Eight days later, Algeria submitted its own stance, affirming on one hand, the non-discriminatory right to commercial passage through international straits, provided the conditions are met that passers-through (1) comply with international regulations on preventing collisions; (2) take all measures necessary to prevent damage to coastal States; (3) allow any coastal State that has sustained damage as a result of passage to claim compensation; and (4) that States bordering the straits shall not hamper or interrupt passage through the Strait.2 Algeria left ample freedom for the innocent passage of warships on non-commercial voyages but qualified the scope of its articles, restricting their application to those straits which connect two portions of the high seas, thus presumably excluding straits that lie between one or more sections of territorial or

1 Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.8, 15 July 1974.2 Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.20, 23 July 1974.


even contiguous seas.3

On 13 August 1974, Turkey reaffirmed the basic principles of equity in ESEs management:

The general rules [relating to territorial sea and economic zone] set out in…this Convention shall be applied, in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, in a manner consistent with equity.

States bordering enclosed and semi-enclosed seas may hold consultati-ons among themselves with a view to determining the manner and method of application, appropriate for their region, for the purposes of this article.4

Along with equity, this document emphasized a flexible administrative system that could be adjusted to adequately and ideally fit any region which chose to adopt it.

Notwithstanding Iraq’s relatively miniscule coastline, it had several suggestio-ns to make regarding ESEs. It, similar to Algeria, limited the applicability of the ESEs regime to “straits which connect two parts of the high seas and which are customarily used for international navigation.”5 The same document affirmed the right of all nations’ ships to navigate freely, whether in semi-enclosed or open seas; recommended the joint administration among riparian States bordering semi-enclosed seas of resource exploitation, management, environmental preservation, with due regard given to international organizations and standards; guaranteed that freedom of navigation should be maintained in semi-enclosed seas; and protected freedom of navigation in areas where newly-drawn territorial seas were superjacent to waters “previously considered as part of the high seas”.6 Iraq’s definition of ESEs7 shows some similarities to the one later adopted by UNCLOS:

The term “semi-enclosed sea which constitutes part of the high seas” means an inland sea which is surrounded by two or more States, which may provide a corridor of the high seas between opposite and adjacent States and which is

3 Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.20, 23 July 1974.4 Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.56, 13 August 2974.5 Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.71 and Add. l and 2, 21 August 1974.6 Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.71 and Add. l and 2, 21 August 1974.7 Here I use the term ESEs loosely, since Iraq’s definition makes explicit reference only to the

term “semi-enclosed sea which constitutes part of the high seas”.


connected with other parts of the high seas by a narrow outlet.

Notably, some important differences between this definition and UNCLOS’s article 122 definition of ESEs are detectable: the clause “which constitutes part of the high seas” was dropped in UNCLOS, though article 122 included more geographical terms (basin and gulf); also, Iraq’s definition made no mention of the degree to which a sea should be covered by territorial sea or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in order to be considered an enclosed sea or semi-enclosed sea. Since Iraq’s document was submitted very early on in the negotiations, a lack of reference to EEZs is to be expected, however, because the concept of EEZs had not yet been satisfactorily refined. Why Iraq chose to include the ambiguous word “may” is unclear. At any rate, the UNCLOS definition appears to be far more flexible, since it does not stipulate any restriction to only those straits that connect two areas of the high seas (and in fact it avoids any reference whatsoever to the term “straits”, opting instead for the more generic descriptor “narrow outlet”, presumably to prevent confusion with another section on Straits Used for International Navigation, found in Part III of UNCLOS); furthermore, the criteria are easier to fulfill under the UNCLOS definition, which functions as an “either…or” statement: either the sea, basin, or gulf is connected to the sea only by a narrow outlet or its area consists entirely or primarily of territorial seas and EEZs. The interpretation of the crucial adjectives “narrow” and “primarily” are at the discretion of courts and tribunals hearing cases on the matter, should they arise.

On the same day as Iraq, Iran also submitted its own draft articles. It distingui-shed between the concepts of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas in the following way:

(a) The term “enclosed sea” shall refer to a small body of inland waters surrounded by two or more States which is connected to the open seas by a narrow outlet;

(b) The term “semi-enclosed sea” shall refer to a sea basin located along the margins of the main ocean basins and enclosed by the land territories of two or more States.8

Iran’s draft also reiterated the principle of attuning any ESEs regime to match

8 Document A/C01,F.62/C.2/L.72, 21 August 1974.


the specific needs and conditions of the environment at issue, while taking into account the particular interests of the coastal States concerned. As to coastal State cooperation, Iran suggested the following:

[The] preservation and protection of the marine environment of an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea and the management of its resources shall be the responsibility of the coastal States. 9

In practical terms, Iran recommended that this be achieved through the adoption of “regional rules and standards aimed at the better protection of their environment against marine pollution” and coordination of “activities in relation to the management and exploitation of the renewable resources of the enclosed or semi-enclosed sea under regional arrangements”.10 Further, Iran took the following stance on marine scientific research (MSR):

Scientific research in an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea shall be conducted only with the consent of the coastal State concerned.

As can be imagined, such a regime governing MSR hinges on a coastal State’s willingness to cooperate, potentially leading to conflicts or political stalemates. Even so, one major unifying theme found within the recommendations of States regarding the ESEs regime is that of free navigation. In essence and theory, the legal framework that UNCLOS provides for ESEs should not curtail or prevent the free navigation of any State in ESEs, and yet certain preferential privileges are in fact granted to riparian States concerning the items listed in article 123. The question at hand, though, is whether such a balance of interests constitutes a fair, equitable and sustainable system. Or could the ESEs management regime presented in UNCLOS potentially lead to disputes? With those questions in mind, the frameworks of ESEs regimes that have already been put into practice will be examined and discussed below.

III. Post-UNCLOS State Practice

9 Document A/C01,F.62/C.2/L.72, 21 August 1974.10 Document A/C01,F.62/C.2/L.72, 21 August 1974.


The best known of the bodies of water considered to be ESEs are the Mediter-ranean, North, Baltic, Black and Caribbean Seas, as well as the Persian Gulf and theGulfs of Oman, Mexico, and Thailand.11 For the purposes of this essay, cursory ex-aminations of a few of these will be conducted as a basis for comparison with the Earth’s northernmost body of water commonly referred to as the Arctic Ocean. First, attention will be paid to the geographical attributes of the various seas; then account will be taken of any current intergovernmental cooperative administration efforts.

A quick glance at a map will confirm, the 2.64 million km² Caribbean Sea12 is semi-enclosed:

On the basis of the definition articulated in the 1982 Convention and taking into account the fact that 75% of its circumference is separated from the open ocean by either continental or insular land masses, the Caribbean Sea provides an excellent example of a semi-enclosed sea.13

Does this statistic, 75%, set some sort of precise standard? Not likely: on the contrary, the previous quote appears to hint that the concept of ESEs necessarily includes a certain degree of subjectivity. That is, the subjective experience of examining the geographical characteristics of a given sea on a map and perceiving it as either enclosed/semi-enclosed or open; there is no clearly discernible boundary between the two – the point at which one pronounces a sea as open instead of semi-enclosed – that can be readily expressed with words or formulas. On reflection, it is possible that a rigid definition of ESEs would in fact fail to adequately accommo-date a set of circumstances as diverse as the world’s seas. In addition to touching up-on the hazy criterion of the “percentage of circumference separated from the open

11 Extracted from a more extensive list within Major Issues in the Management of Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas, with Particular Reference to the Caribbean Sea, LC/CAR/L.24, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (November 2004), p. 1, at http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/20811/L0024.pdf, 11 September 2013.




ocean” – would the Caribbean be semi-enclosed if not three-fourths but only two-thirds were separated from the ocean, or one-half? – this example also raises the question of how to interpret a peculiarly vague grammatical usage within article 122’s definition of ESEs. Bearing in mind that the Caribbean has countless straits that communicate to the Atlantic, could it be validly be considered a “sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet”? The usage of the indefinite article “a” could point, following a strict interpretation, to one single, sole outlet; on the other hand, a liberal reading would permit a plurality of outlets, in the same way the statement “killers always have a motive” indicates a plurality of possible motives. The question, however, is moot in light of the alternate criterion of the UNCLOS definition of ESEs that the sea be entirely or primarily covered by States’ territorial seas or EEZs, as is the case in the Caribbean. This entails yet another issue, though: how much of the sea must be under State sovereignty to qualify as being “primarily” covered by territorial seas and EEZs – four-fifths, three-fourths, or even two-thirds? Again, these are questions that a major foundational treaty like UNCLOS does not answer; rather, such issues shall be resolved by State practice or judicial means, should circumstances require it.

As in other world seas, many organizations have arisen with the aim of enhan-cing intergovernmental, or multilateral, administration of the Caribbean, such as the Association of Caribbean States (ACS); the Economic Commission for Latin Ame-rica and the Caribbean (ECLAC), established under the auspices of the United Nations; Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a supranational collective compara-ble to the European Union; and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OEC-CS). Notably, the United States does not enjoy membership in these organs (except for ECLAC), despite its Caribbean possessions that include the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. Some striking characteristics of these organizations are the common currency minted by the OECS, the East Caribbean Dollar, and the common passport issued by CARICOM, analogous to EU passports that grant citizens increased travel freedoms within EU borders. Though for the most part these organizations appear to focus on economic integration and growth, there are some environmentally-oriented frameworks available for use in the Caribbean. The Action Plan for the Caribbean Environment Programme (CEP)


was adopted in 1981.14 Some principal objectives of the Caribbean Action Plan (CAP) – which 28 States, including the US, helped establish – are development of sustainable tourism, effective pollution prevention and response schemes, and improved fisheries and forestry management.15

The Mediterranean Sea is perhaps the largest of commonly-held semi-enclosed seas, at some 3 million km2.16 Unlike the Caribbean, it has only a single natural outlet that communicates to the high seas: the Strait of Gibraltar. The question of whether the Suez Canal may also be considered an outlet despite being manmade is beside the point; assuming the littoral States claim EEZs – a procedure that has not been fully realized by many Mediterranean States not for lack of national motivation but rather for the desire to coordinate fully to avoid making overlapping or conflicting claims in the future – the surface of the Mediterranean too will consist “entirely or primarily” of riparian States’ territorial seas or EEZs, and the proportion of this sea’s circumference that bounds land comes to about 99%.17

Cooperative governance in the Mediterranean, naturally desirable due to its strategic importance, inevitably proves challenging in light of the dramatically varying governments of the riparian Mediterranean States: traditionally open, Western economies like Spain, France and Italy lie opposite to authoritarian regimes like Algeria and Libya. Therefore achieving consensus among such a motley assortment is no small feat. The year 2008 marked the founding of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), an inter-State organization built around the principles set forth by the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, namely economic cooperation and enhanced security measures, in addition to the development of rule of law and democracy in the region – in short, the coalition of several European and Mediterranean States aimed to “[turn] the Mediterranean Basin into an area of




17 Document A/C01,F.62/C.2/L.72, 21 August 1974.


dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”.18 This forum allows for multi-dimensional participation of States otherwise reluctant to maintain diplomatic relations, such as Israel–Palestine and Morocco–Algeria. Furthermore, it grants Turkey a membership (an alternative to participation in the EU, to which it has been denied membership). In order to prevent political dissension and factions in the EU, all EU members are automatically granted membership to the UfM, whether or not they border the Mediterranean Sea. This organ takes a comprehensive approach toward Mediterranean administration, with its reach encompassing a wide gamut of issues, including transportation, higher education, migration, de-contamination and fresh water acquisition, health, maritime safety,energy exploitation and alternative energy development, agriculture, the environ-ment, tourism, urban development and information exchange, among others.19 The long-term impact of this nascent organization remains to be observed. The 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution stands as a foundational document for intergovernmental protection of the Mediterranean environment. It “established an overall legal framework of regional cooperation for the protection of the Mediterranean against pollution.”20 Twenty-two States are parties to this convention, though protocols drafted later on have not been ratified across the board by Contracting Parties.21

Another sea that has awakened ample willingness among riparian States to cooperate to enact effective and sustainable governance is the Baltic Sea. With a

18 Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Bulletin of the Euro- pean Union, November, No. 11.19 Final Statement of the Marseille Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign

Affairs, 2008, pp. 20~21, at http://ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/1103_ministerielle_Euromed/Final_Statement_Mediterranean_Union_EN.pdf, 12 September 2013.

20 Mazen Adi, The Application of the Law of the Sea and the Convention on the Mediterranean Sea, New York: Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, 2009, p. 38, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/adi_0809_syria.pdf, 12 September 2013.

21 See Signatures and Ratifications of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean and its Protocols as at 13 May 2011, United Nations Environment Programme, Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) for the Barcelona Convention, at http://195.97.36.231/dbases/webdocs/BCP/StatusOfSignaturesAndRatifications.doc, 12 September 2013.


surface area of only 370,000 km²,22 the Baltic is comparatively smaller than the seas previously mentioned, yet it is important. Major ports from various nations abut the sea, including Kaliningrad (Russia), Gdansk (Poland), Lübeck (Germany), Riga (Latvia), Tallinn (Estonia), Helsinki (Finland) and Stockholm (Sweden). Like the Mediterranean, its circumference is bounded almost entirely by land, save for the relatively narrow straits between Denmark and Sweden which communicate to the North Sea.

The primary international organization authorized to govern the Baltic is 12-Member State Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). Ten other nations enjoy observer status to the Council. Similar to the Union for the Mediterranean, the CBSS sees to many aspects of Baltic administration, such as the environment, economic development, energy, education and culture, etc.23 This is the primary intergovernmental assembly for the governance of the Baltic, but other institutions also exist, including the Baltic Sea Commission, which works for “sustainable society, aiming at promoting democracy, exchanges, co-operation and solidarity between the coastal zones and islands of the Baltic Sea including the Regions of the non-European Union Countries.”24

IV. A Semi-enclosed Sea in the Arctic?

Now that we have a rudimentary understanding of the present day applications of ESEs administrative methods as well as the scope and structure of such regimes, let us examine whether the Arctic (1) meets the definition of ESEs and (2) is therefore open to an ESEs governance regime as set forth by UNCLOS. We will also consider (3) the current developments in the Arctic and the indications they provide regarding the future of Arctic governance.

Let us first ponder the nature of UNCLOS articles 122 and 123. A close reading leads one to understand that the objective of the articles is not to prohibit, but rather encourage a certain behavior, namely bettering regional governance of

22 Major Issues in the Management of Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas, with Particular Refere- nce to the Caribbean Sea, LC/CAR/L.24, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin

America and the Caribbean (November 2004), p. 1, at http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/20811/L0024.pdf, 11 September 2013.

23 As may be observed from the organization’s website, at http://cbss.org, 12 September 2013.24 Baltic Sea Commission’s website, at http://www.balticseacommission.info/about.html, 12

September 2013.


ESEs. Nations bordering ESEs do not find themselves under a heavy obligation to cooperate for regional ESEs governance under the relevant UNCLOS articles: the UNCLOS stops short of offering either an incentive to comply with or punishment for violating the articles, and in fact article 123 only goes so far to assert that riparian States of ESEs “should co-operate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention.” The consequences of delaying or avoiding cooperation seem far from dire, should a State decide its interests were best served by non-cooperation.

In this light, we may view the ESEs articles as chiefly hortatory, and any regimes created as a result of them essentially voluntary; furthermore, the objective of the articles is clearly to enhance protections of ESEs, certainly not to grant excessive powers to riparian States, which could in turn produce some sort of competitive or political advantage (though this is admittedly a possible collateral outcome). During UNCLOS negotiations, as discussed earlier, States made it clear that no navigational freedoms were to be infringed upon in the exercise of rights pertaining to the regional governance of ESEs. That being the case, one may conclude that the guiding principle of any ESEs regime will be effective administration without hampering free navigation, MSR or other traditionally-enjoyed maritime freedoms. Thus the objections from any State as to the desirability of installing such a seemingly beneficial system could be labeled as unfounded or even absurd. Would such a system be appropriate, however, in the Arctic, a region considered by many to be an ocean? According to Adi:

The definition of an enclosed and semi-enclosed sea as codified in Article 122 is so worded that many bodies of water may in consequence be defined as either enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. However, it did not give a clear definition of the degree of enclosure and size, which permits relatively large seas to be included, such as the Mediterranean.25

Bearing in mind that the Arctic waters encompass some three times the surfacearea of the Mediterranean, would it somehow stretch the definition of ESEs provi-ded by UNCLOS to apply it to the Arctic Ocean? The Arctic presents a special case,

25 Mazen Adi, The Application of the Law of the Sea and the Convention on the Mediterranean Sea, New York: Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, 2009, p. 31, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/adi_0809_syria.pdf, 12 September 2013.


because if it were to be reclassified as a “sea” that is semi-enclosed, then it would certainly be unprecedented in its enormous size. On the other hand, as an ocean it is the world’s smallest by far: since it straddles the fence between the two extremes of the sea–ocean spectrum, is it necessary to pronounce it definitively as one or the other? Indisputably, whether or not the ESEs definition applies, the Arctic is still subject to the provisions of UNCLOS. Therefore, the only potential alterations (or additions) to Arctic governance would be that of installing an ESEs regime for more effective governance, a prudent measure in light of its unique and pristine environment.26 Non-Arctic nations would be hard-pressed to know how best to administrate a territory so alien to their own; leaving it to the Arctic powers to govern it would, hypothetically, yield a more effective regime, maintain higher safety and navigational standards for all the world to enjoy, and ensure lower environmental harm. In other words, there are only practical gains to be had from installing an ESEs regime in the Arctic: Could any nation pose a defensible objection to such reasoning? Perhaps, if only for the simple motive of curtailing any advancement of Arctic nations’ power and sphere of influence. Arctic shipping, tourism, resource exploitation and other commercial endeavors are a sure reservoir for untold amounts of revenue. If Arctic nations mount a de facto oligopoly over it, then it would be natural for non-Arctic nations to stand in opposition. Apart from that, one can conceive of few coherent arguments for insisting that the Arctic cannot be considered both an ocean and a sea, so long as it meets the definition of ESEs provided for in UNCLOS. In the event referring to the Arctic Ocean as a semi-enclosed sea offends the sensibilities of geographers and other academics, then the possibility may also be considered of applying the regime mutatis mutandis to this vulnerable polar body of water. Nothing in the relevant articles suggests that a system based on the ESEs regime be unsuitable for application to a larger sea area that shares similar properties to traditionally-accepted enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.

But does it? The Arctic Ocean is in fact surrounded by two or more States, is connected to other areas of the sea or ocean only by narrow outlets (such as the Bering, Denmark, Nares and Davis Straits, though some of these straits are wide in comparison with the Strait of Gibraltar or Malmo–Copenhagen Strait, proportional to the Arctic’s size they are still manifestly narrow). But as to territorial seas and

26 UNCLOS at article 234 also grants certain rights to coastal States of ice-covered areas, though only within the EEZ.


EEZs, does the Arctic consist “entirely or primarily” of them? One map, produced by Durham University, depicts the various boundaries present in the Arctic.27 To the casual eye, this cartograph of the Arctic Circle shows the water surface to be covered by some three-quarters by the EEZs of USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Russia. Would three-fourths be enough to meet the UNCLOS definition of being “primarily” covered by territorial sea and EEZ? This brings us to our last question: notwithstanding privileges or duties concerning ESEs granted by the UNCLOS, what is the current state of affairs concerning Arctic governance?

In practice, the lion’s share of administrative authority in the Arctic already lies in the hands of the few nations with Arctic shores. The formation of the Arctic Council took place in 1996 via the Ottawa Declaration, with aims to “(1) provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arcticinhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable developme-nt and environmental protection in the Arctic; (2) oversee and coordinate the programmes established under the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) on the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); and Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); (3) adopt terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development program; (4) disseminate information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues.”28 These objectives are quite similar to the institutions spear-heading intergovernmental administration of the Mediterranean, Baltic and Carib-bean Seas. The Council concluded its first legally binding treaty in 2011, the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement. It may be surmised that many more will follow, due in large part to the commercial and navigational possibilities arising as a result of the Arctic ice melt.

V. Conclusion

After taking a look at the history of ESEs, including the incipience of this

27 At http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/arctic.pdf, 13 September 2013.28 1996 Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, at http://arctic-council.

org/filearchive/Declaration%20on%20the%20Establishment%20of%20the%20Arctic%20Council-1.pdf, 13 September 2013.


concept during UNCLOS negotiations and resultant State implementation of the regime, a few things in particular have become apparent: (1) the ESEs regime is hortatory in nature; (2) the definition of ESEs is considerably malleable; and (3) there is little foundation to oppose attempts to install ESE or ESE-like regimes – taking into account that they, in theory, only improve regional governance and do not detract from traditional maritime freedoms – even if the areas in question are not expressly covered under the definitions set forth by UNCLOS article 122. This would apply to the Arctic, which is considered by most as an ocean and thus irreconcilable to the idea of being a mere “sea”.

Due to its vastness, the Arctic Ocean may exceed the generally accepted definition of a semi-enclosed sea under UNCLOS. Even so, for the purpose of establishing effective regional governance to better manage its resources, foster trade and prosperity, and protect the environment, inhabitants and passers-through, it nevertheless seems practical and feasible to apply ESE-like regime mutatis mutandis within the Arctic Ocean. However, whether or not this position finds credence in the academic sphere, the fact remains that such an intergovernmental forum has already come into existence in the form of the Arctic Council, an 8-member organization that, considering the rapidly changing ecological state of the Arctic, may soon find its profile and prominence on the international scene increasing dramatically, commensurate with the melting of polar ice.

提单下的契约自由——相关国际立法的发展和中国法中的一个特殊问题 219

提单下的契约自由——相关国际立法的发展和中国法中的一个特殊问题

陈梁 *

内容摘要：在过去的一个世纪里，国际航运界在国际层面上关于使用或滥用提单下契约自由的相关法规管制得到了发展。这些国际法规管制主要包含三个共存的公约，即《海牙规则》、《海牙维斯比规则》和《汉堡规则》，以及最近通过、但尚未生效的《鹿特丹规则》。本文概述了这一发展历程，并简单介绍了国内法中的一个特别相关问题。

关键词：契约自由提单国际公约

提单作为通常由承运人在其提供的船上收到承运货物后向托运人签发的文

件，早已完成了从单纯的货物收据到成熟的物权凭证和运输合同证明的过渡。其

中，作为运输合同证明的功能，在上个世纪已经引起了国际立法界的高度关注。

与提单的其他两个功能（货物收据和物权凭证）相比，其合同证明的功能一直是

国际立法的焦点，并主要包含在《海牙规则》、《海牙维斯比规则》和《汉堡规则》

中，虽然联合国国际贸易法委员会最近在统一国际海上货物运输法律方面努力的

结果——《鹿特丹规则》——已经有点偏离这方面的传统，转而侧重其他两个功能，

特别是提单物权凭证功能的可转让性，以及提单转移其获授权利的功能。出现这

个焦点的原因在很大程度上可以解释为当代航运技术发展水平在确保海上船舶安

全方面的衍生作用。

*　陈梁，复旦大学法学教授，小耘律师事务所执业律师和顾问，中国海事仲裁委员会仲裁员。电子邮箱：[email protected]。本文是 2012 年 6 月 18—20 日在香港城市大学召开的“运输、贸易和服务研究协会国际研讨会”上发表论文的修订版本。本文的写作参考了以下资料：P. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979; Chen Liang, Legal Aspects of Bills of Lading Exception Clauses and Their Impact upon Marine Cargo Insurance, Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 2005; UNCTAD Secretariat, Carrier Liability and Freedom of Contract under the Uncitral Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [by Sea], UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2004/2, 24 November 2004.



海上航行在大约一个多世纪以前是一种巨大的冒险，航运业也是如此，那时

的航运业显然比现代的更危险，所以在当时，投资航运业需要很大的勇气。由于

金融投资稀缺，可用于货物（多为国际贸易货物）运输的船舶非常少，因此，承运

人相对于货主有非常强大的议价地位。而提单格式合同的提供者通常都是承运

人，他们往往通过充分利用当时可得的自由，充分利用如此强劲的议价地位尽可

能多地推卸对货主的责任。所以，在当时的许多提单中，可以发现冗长的例外条款，

几乎排除了承运人对货物在航行过程中发生损坏或灭失的任何责任，这在现代是

典型的不公平合同条款。这种实质上滥用契约自由的做法，肯定会给货主带来许

多困难，并因此对国际贸易产生不利影响。到上世纪初，国际商业圈不希望这种

情况再进一步发展，于是采取行动对这种滥用行为实施立法管制。如此努力的结

果便是《海牙规则》的诞生，该规则率先在国际层面上规范了作为海上货物运输合

同证明的提单。

但是，《海牙规则》是如何实施管制的？下面做一个简单介绍。

这一率先规范提单作为合同证明的国际公约主要是规定了一些频繁使用的提

单标准格式条款，并成功确立了承运人的最低责任基础，而这种最低责任是不能

通过合同予以减少或排除的。这些施加于承运人的最低限度义务主要包括：照料

货物、谨慎处理以提供适航船舶和不偏离航程。这 3 项义务主要受限于以下 3 种

免责条款：第一，第 4 条第 2 款包含的完全免责条款；第二，主要由第 4 条第 5 款

包含的责任限制条款；第三，第 3 条第 6 款包含的诉讼时效限制条款。此外，第 4条第 6 款有关危险货物运输的规定，也可被归为上述免责条款的第一种，作为对

承运人上述三项明示义务的进一步限制。另一方面，第 3 条第 8 款大体充当了主

要的控制条款，在特定情况下，该条款的规定可以使任何旨在减少或推卸上述《海

牙规则》所规定的最低限度责任的提单条款无效。因此，仅仅根据第 3条第 8款，

就可以说在一定程度上已经控制了契约自由的滥用。然而，如果当事人同意，他

们同样可以根据第 3 条第 8 款，基于最低限度责任，增加承运人的责任。所以，仅

此就可以说，根据《海牙规则》，在有限的范围内仍可实行契约自由。即便如此，

第一个国际公约——《海牙规则》——的效果仍可说是偏向或有利于船东的。主

要的原因是，上述 3 种免责条款在很大程度上为一些臭名昭著的“免责风险”提供

了庇护，如在航行和管理船舶中，承运人的雇佣人员或第三方过失的免责。《海牙

规则》中这些免责条款的存在，使得承运人不必费力在事先准备的提单标准格式

中体现他们，因为无论如何，他们将默示成为受《海牙规则》管辖的合同的一部分。

所以，在这个意义上，承运人享受契约自由的权利在很大程度上仍然被保存了下

来，换言之，在《海牙规则》诞生之前的时期里使用或者滥用契约自由的产物之一，

实际上已被《海牙规则》承认和保留。这就是为什么从国际贸易的利益考虑（如果

不仅仅是考虑货方利益），《海牙规则》有进一步修改（如果不是重大变革）的需要，

以下将对此进行讨论。


无法说 1968 年完成的《海牙维斯比规则》使得天平进一步向货主倾斜，即使

其增加了货物损害赔偿限额（这是为了消除两个时代之间通货膨胀的影响），这主

要是因为《海牙维斯比规则》的框架与《海牙规则》的框架并没有太大区别。事实

上，《海牙维斯比规则》的第 4 条第 2 款附则通过部分吸收“喜马拉雅条款”，使

得货主无法选择以侵权而不是违约为诉因来起诉承运人的雇佣人员。使“喜马拉

雅条款”的理念法定化，至少在一定程度上是公开支持契约自由原则的，因为“喜

马拉雅条款”是契约自由的产物，虽然在当时备受尊重的合同相对性原则面前，它

实际上并不那么合法。然而，第 4 条第 2 款附则所体现的这一法定“喜马拉雅条

款”，从受益人名单上剔除了独立的第三方（其本是传统的“喜马拉雅条款”下的

受益人，可以享受免责条款向承运人提供的好处），这一事实显然是契约自由在这

个领域的另一个障碍。本着同样的精神，第 4 条第 2 款附则也使货主不必在违约、

侵权或托管等其他诉因之间选择以规避第 4 条第 2 款的免责条款，这是因为无论

原告选择基于何种诉因提出索赔，第 4 条第 2 款附则都会使《海牙维斯比规则》中

的免责条款对承运人有效。这种排除因不同诉因而引起相同责任的规定，可被视

为支持缔约原意（契约自由原则的基础）的又一例子。由于《海牙维斯比规则》增

加或修改的条款对于契约自由原则来说喜忧参半，《海牙维斯比规则》下的契约自

由原则的命运与《海牙规则》中的仍然几乎相同。

当《汉堡规则》于 1978 年完成时，天平已进一步大幅向货主倾斜，以（受免

责条款限制的）承运人强制性最低责任为基础制定的规则框架已经发生了巨大改

变，这体现在其将基本责任和免责条款合并成一则单一条款。并且根据这一条款，

《海牙规则》或《海牙维斯比规则》第 4 条第 2 款规定的承运人对其雇佣人员或聘

请的第三方在航行和管理船舶中的过失的免责条款已被删除。因此，在《汉堡规则》

下，承运人的最低强制责任大幅增加，这当然是进一步限制了承运人一方的契约

自由。与此相一致的是，航行的责任期间从“钩至钩”延长到“仓至仓”，并增加了（只

有在承运人和托运人之间有效的）保函的补充规定。此外，《汉堡规则》明确规范

了航程中发生迟延的风险，这是此类国际公约中的第一次。《汉堡规则》采用的这

些新规定都进一步限制了契约自由，另外，某些情况下，将舱面货物和活动物纳入

《汉堡规则》所规范的货物范围，也缩小了契约自由的运作范围。然而，把承运人

雇用的独立第三方增为《汉堡规则》中法定“喜马拉雅条款”的受益者之一，可以

被视为进一步认可了契约自由的产物——传统的喜马拉雅合约条款。诉讼时效从

《海牙规则》和《海牙维斯比规则》规定的 1年时间增加到《汉堡规则》中的 2年，

这可以说是进一步限制了承运人方面的（契约）自由，因为承运人希望尽可能将诉

讼时效缩至最短。尽管如此，同样用来禁止减少和免除承运人最低责任的控制条

款也可以在《汉堡规则》的第23条中找到，虽然像《海牙规则》或《海牙维斯比规则》

一样，《汉堡规则》的第 23 条也允许船货双方通过协议在承运人法定最低责任的

基础上增加其他责任，但第 23 条总体上显然还是限制了契约自由。与《海牙维斯


比规则》一样，《汉堡规则》也借机提高赔偿限额以弥补多年来由通货膨胀造成的

价值损失，但这一事实不能说是给契约自由提供了更多的操作空间，因为提高赔

偿限额所带来的效果基本与通货膨胀相抵消。总之，可以这样说，公约规范范围

的扩大和一些有利于承运人的重要“免责风险”的删除，体现了《汉堡规则》中的

契约自由大幅下降。尽管如此，《汉堡规则》的成员国数量还是稳步增长，但许多

海上强国拒绝签署该公约的事实在很大程度上削弱了《汉堡规则》的实际效果。

《海牙规则》、《海牙维斯比规则》和《汉堡规则》三个公约并存的情况，显然

对该领域的国际统一产生了消极影响。此外，在这些公约中还有许多不尽如人意

的地方，需要改革和完善。因此，一个旨在取代以上三个公约的新公约已起草多年，

这项草案最终在 2008 年 12 月 11 日的联合国大会上表决通过，即《鹿特丹规则》。

该公约需要多长时间才会生效仍是未知数，直到最近笔者通过联合国国际贸易法

委员会网站 1 获悉，仅有 24 个国家已经签署，且只有西班牙一国已经批准该公约，

而《鹿特丹规则》第 94 条第 1 款设定的生效条件是获得 20 个国家的批准。2 尽管

如此，该公约仍值得在此做一个简短的描述。

虽然《鹿特丹规则》会在多大程度上影响航运实践仍有待其最终生效后、在

实际运用中加以检验，但以下明显影响契约自由的变化是显而易见的。首先，航

程的责任期间从“仓至仓”进一步延长至“门至门”，因此减少了契约自由的运作

空间。尽管根据第 12 条第 3 款，为确定承运人的责任期间，合同当事人可以自由

约定接收和交付货物的时间和地点，但这种自由还受到该条款下两个特殊限制规

定的制约。其次，托运人的责任在《鹿特丹规则》下有了更多的规定。实际上《鹿

特丹规则》在国际公约层面是第一次制定了托运人的强制最低责任，这显然进一

步限制了该领域的契约自由。这样一个新规定产生的原因可能是基于这样的事

实，即起草《鹿特丹规则》时，现代的很多托运人实际上是大公司，不再如过去一

样处于弱势地位。第三，电子单据也受到了《鹿特丹规则》的严格规范，使契约自

由在这个相对较新的领域中发挥重要作用的机会被剥夺或限制了。第四，批量合

同是一种包括不止一次装运的服务合同，而不是承运人的公开运价表、服务表及

第 80 条第 3 款中提到的其他文件，批量合同也是第一次被引入这种公约。但批

量合同不同于以提单（纸质或电子的）为凭证、针对每次装运所订立的普通运输合

同：根据《鹿特丹规则》第 80 条的规定，批量合同不强制适用最低责任。换言之，

这些最低限度的责任可以通过合同予以排除或修改，但这种对最低限度责任的背

离只有在符合第 80 条规定的各种条件时才有效。这些条件包括：这种背离应该在

合同中明确声明，而不是以提及的方式从另一文件并入；托运人应该有选择订立

1　下载于 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam_status.h- tml，2012 年 6 月 9 日。2　根据第 94 条第 1 款，公约只有“于第 20 份批准书、接受书、核准书或者加入书交存之

日起一年期满后的下一个月第一日”才能生效。


不背离公约一般条款的普通合同的自由，而不应被标准格式合同所约束。具体而

言，第 80 条第 4 款并不允许有涉及承运人适航义务的背离条文，也不允许有涉及

托运人不装载危险货物和提供某些信息、指示、文件义务的背离条文。最后，关

于批量合同，正如第 80 条第 6 款所规定的，为了享受背离最低限度责任的利益，

受益人（承运人或托运人）应当负有证明背离公约的各项条件已得到满足的举证

责任。如以上条件未得到满足，该公约中的最低限度责任可以自动适用于批量合

同。此外，《鹿特丹规则》引入了一些新的术语或概念，如“控制方”、“合同履约

方”或“海运履约方”，这也预示着新公约规范范围的扩大，尽管有关控制方的一

些规范仍为当事人保留了契约自由，如第 54 和第 56 条的规定。同样地，环境因

素也在这种海上运输公约史中第一次被提到，这体现在第 15 条关于危险货物的

定义和第 17 条第 3 款第 n 项列举的关于承运人的一项除外危险中。即使是共同

海损，这一除了在关系到危险货物运输的规定中有涉及外，根据之前的公约（例如

《汉堡规则》第 24 条），一直被保留给《约克—安特卫普规则》来规范的内容，也

在第 16 条中作了简要规范。这些新的规范范围显然是意识到航运业日益复杂化

的结果，也符合最近的环保运动。另一方面，一些存在于旧公约中的旧机制也被

《鹿特丹规则》保留或稍加修改。所以，与《汉堡规则》一样，《鹿特丹规则》也没

有制定承运人雇佣人员在航行和管理船舶中的过失责任制度；而且承运人的适航

义务已经扩展到航程开始之后，这实际上与《汉堡规则》有相似的效果，尽管根据

《汉堡规则》，适航义务包含在与承运人责任有关的一般性规定中，且“适航性”

这个词已经完全消失。此外，规定最低责任义务的条款，如《鹿特丹规则》的第 79条，以及在更有限的意义上的第 59 条第 1 款、第 75 条第 5 款、第 80 条第 4 款和

第 63 条，这些可以在之前三个重要公约中找到的条款都被保留了下来，尽管现在

这些规定最低责任义务的条款也适用于新建立的托运人的最低责任制度，但如上

文所述，这些条款不强制适用于批量合同。此外，保障最低责任的第 79 条不能适

用于船上载运的活动物，因为第 81 条规定，针对活动物的运输最低责任可以被降

低，除非产生这种责任的货损被证明是由于承运人或《鹿特丹规则》第 18 条述及

的其他由承运人负责其作为或者不作为的当事人所故意造成的，不过这个规范与

《汉堡规则》中同一事项相比，似乎有点扩大了契约自由的操作范围。其他方面，

如《鹿特丹规则》第 21 条和第 25 条第 1 款第 c 项规定的，有关舱面货物的载运

与一般货物的交付时间事宜当事人可自由约定。这表示，在舱面货物或活动物运

输方面，以及货物交付时间方面，与《海牙规则》和《海牙维斯比规则》相比，无疑

《鹿特丹规则》准许更少的契约自由。

在结束讨论前，还需花笔墨简要讨论一下根据中国大陆的法律，契约自由原

则在一个特定问题中是如何表现的。众所周知，《中华人民共和国海商法》（以下

简称“《海商法》”）第四章是现有三个相关国际公约的综合，然而，中国法律与这

些国际公约仍有许多差异。除众多其他差异外，可以体现中国法律与现存的三个


国际公约和《鹿特丹规则》相比进一步限制了契约自由原则的主要差异之一是，根

据《海商法》第 257 条，海上货物运输合同的当事人不能通过协议或声明延长诉

讼时效。应该指出的是，《海商法》第 44 条和第 45 条实质上包含了《海牙维斯比

规则》第 3 条第 8 款的精神，任何合同条款都不能有效地删除或修改《海商法》第

四章规定的承运人的最低责任，不过，由提单证明的海上货物运输合同中的诉讼

时效规定放在了第十三章的第 257 条，而没有如其他免责条款那样放在第四章，

因此被排除在上述第 44 条和第 45 条的适用范围之外。这样的立法（应该是刻意

为之，而不是由意外或过失导致）实际上是与以下的中国法律原则相一致：诉讼时

效应该是法定的，不可通过合同进行修改。这样的原则已经由中华人民共和国最

高人民法院在 2008 年 8 月 11 日发布的《关于审理民事案件适用诉讼时效制度若

干问题的规定》3（2008 年 9 月 1 日开始生效）第 2 条关于一般诉讼时效的规定

中得到了强化。

总之，海上货物运输国际立法的历史发展证明规范的范围在不断扩大，这尤

其体现在承运人强制性最低责任的扩大，以及《鹿特丹规则》中最新实施的托运人

最低强制责任规定。鉴于上述情况，可以认为，海运业中契约自由的操作范围已

进一步缩小。最重要的是，提单下契约自由的缩紧趋势很可能会继续，且从这层

意义上来说，未来几年天平将不会重新倒向对承运人有利。碰巧的是，这种情况

符合当前商业金融世界的趋势，也即，近期的全球金融危机过去之后，至少可以说，

对金融部门过度监管的指控在不久的将来将不会有多大市场。

（中译：赵菊芬）

3　中华人民共和国最高人民法院发布，法释 [2008]11 号，下载于 http://www.civillaw.com.cn/jszx/lawcentre/default.asp，2010 年 10 月 19 日。

Bills of Lading’s Freedom of Contract: with Special Reference to the Development of the International Legislation

and to a Special Issue under the Chinese Law 225

Bills of Lading’s Freedom of Contract: with Special Reference to the Development

of the International Legislation and to a Special Issue under the Chinese Law

CHEN Liang*

Abstract: In the last century, the international shipping circle has witnessed the development of legislative control, at the international level, of the use or abuse of freedom of contract under bills of lading. Such international legislative control is mainly contained in three co-existing conventions, i.e., the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules, followed recently by the Rotterdam Rules which are still not yet in force. This paper is a brief account of such a development, together with a snapshot of a particularly relevant issue under Chinese law.

Key Words: Freedom of contract; Bills of lading; International conventions

As a document normally issued by the carrier to the shipper after his receiving of the goods for carriage on board of his provided ship, the bill of lading has for a long time accomplished the transition from the mere receipt of goods to the full-blown documentary of title as well as an evidence of the contract of carriage. It is the last function, that is, as an evidence of the contract of carriage that has caught

* CHEN Liang, Professor of Law (Fudan University), a practicing lawyer and consultant with the Richard Wang & Co., China, and an arbitrator associated with the China Maritime Arbitration Commission. Email: [email protected]. This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the International Conference of the Association of Transport, Trade and Service Studies, 18–20 June 2012, at the City University of Hong Kong. This paper has been written by reference to the following works: P. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979; Chen Liang, Legal Aspects of Bills of Lading Exception Clauses and Their Impact upon Marine Cargo Insurance, Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 2005; UNCTAD Secretariat, Carrier Liability and Freedom of Contract under the Uncitral Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [by Sea], UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2004/2, 24 November 2004.



the intensive attention of the international legislation in the last century. Compared with the other two functions of the bill of lading, that is, the receipt of goods and documentary of title, the function of the bill of lading as an evidence of contract has been the focus of the international legislation, mainly contained in the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules as well as the Hamburg Rules, though the Rotterdam Rules, the result of the UNCITRAL’s recent efforts in unifying the laws of international carriage of goods by sea, have deviated a bit from the tradition in this respect to devote more spaces to the other two functions, especially that of the documentary of title in terms of the negotiability of the bills of lading and the bills of lading’s function of transferring their conferred rights. The reasons for this focus could be largely explained as a side effect of the development level of shipping technology, in terms of ensuring the safety of the ships at sea, of the time.

About more than one century ago, navigation at sea was very much a risky adventure, so was the shipping business which was obviously more dangerous than that at the modern time. So at that time, to invest into the shipping business would take a real courage. Because of the scarcity of the financial investment, very few ships were available for enforcing the transportation and delivery of the goods largely resulting from the international trade. As a result, the carrier was in a very strong bargaining position in relation to the cargo interests. As normally the provider of the standard form of contract of bills of lading, the carrier often took full advantage of such strong bargaining position by using to the full of the freedom available to him at the time to contract out as much of his liability towards the cargo interests as possible. So in many of the bills of lading at that time, one can often find the lengthy exception clauses which virtually exclude any liability of the carrier for the cargo damages or losses occurring during the voyage, a typical unfair contract term at modern times. This practice of the virtual abuse of freedom of contract would certainly cause many hardships to the cargo interests, thus adversely affecting international trade. In the early 20th century, the international business circle no longer wished to let this develop further but to take action to impose legislative control on such an abuse. Such efforts resulted in the birth of the Hague Rules, the earliest one of this kind at international level for regulating the contract of carriage of goods by sea as evidenced by the bill of lading.

But how do the Hague Rules manage to exercise such a control? The follow-ing is a brief account.

This first international convention regulating the contract evidenced by the bill of lading is mainly based on some well-used standard forms of bills of lading, and



succeeded in establishing a minimum liability basis for the carrier which can not be reduced or excluded contractually. The minimum obligations imposed on the carrier mainly include care of goods, exercise of due diligence in providing a seaworthy ship and not to deviate in the prosecution of the voyage. These three obligations should then be mainly qualified by the following three kinds of exception clauses: first, the total exclusion of liability clause as embodied in Art. 4(2), second, the limitation of liability clause as mainly embodied in Art. 4(5), and third, the limitation of action clause as embodied in Art. 3(6). Besides, the provision related to the carriage of dangerous goods as provided for under Art. 4(6) could also be treated as belonging to the first kind of qualification that further limits the carrier’s above mentioned three kinds of express obligations. On the other hand, Art. 3(8) mainly serves as a main controlling provision in the sense that it by its own wording would strike down any bill of lading clause aiming at reducing or contracting out the above mentioned minimum liability as provided for under the Hague Rules. So in the light of Art. 3(8) alone, one can say that the abuse of freedom of contract has been controlled to some extent. However, if the parties so agree, they can increase, also by reason of the same Art. 3(8), the liability of the carrier from the basis of the minimum liability. So in the light of only this, one may say that freedom of contract can still be practiced under the Hague Rules in some limited scope. That said, still the outcome of this first international convention – the Hague Rules – can be said to be tilted towards or in a bit favor of the shipowners. The reason for this is mainly that the three kinds of exception clauses as mentioned above have largely provided shelter for some infamous excepted perils such as the negligence of the employees of the carrier or that of a third party in the navigation and management of the ship. In the presence of these exception clauses under the Hague Rules, the carrier need not take the trouble to embody them into his pre-prepared standard form of the bill of lading as they would be implied into the contract governed by the Hague Rules as part of such a contract anyway. So in this sense, the carrier’s right of enjoying freedom of contract is still largely preserved or in other words, one of the products of the use or abuse of freedom of contract in the pre-Hague Rules period has in fact been acknowledged and retained under the Hague Rules. That is why there were further needs for evolution, if not revolution, to the interests of the international trade, if not to the interests of the cargo only, of the Hague Rules which will be discussed in the following.

The Hague-Visby Rules, completed in 1968, can not be said to tilt the balance further towards the cargo interests even with the increase in the limitation amounts


for cargo damages, a change that was an adjustment in response to inflation be-tween the time of the Hague Rules and of the completion of the Hague-Visby Rules. The reason for this is mainly because that the framework under the Hague-Visby Rules is not much different from that under the Hague Rules. In fact, by incorporating partly the Himalaya clause into the Hague-Visby Rules through Art. IV bis, paragraph 2, the cargo interests have been virtually prevented by such a provision from choosing to sue the employees of the carrier in tort. To make the idea under the Himalaya clause statutory, partly at least, is an open endorsement of the doctrine of freedom of contract in the sense that the Himalaya clause is a product of freedom of contract though it is in fact not so legitimate in front of the well respected doctrine of privity of contract in those days. However, the fact that such a statutory Himalaya clause as embodied under Art. IV bis, paragraph 2 excludes from the list of beneficiaries the independent third party, who is otherwise a beneficiary under the conventional Himalaya clause and can enjoy the benefits of the exception clauses available to the carrier, is obviously another obstacle to the freedom of contract in this area. In a similar vein, Art. IV bis, paragraph 2 also makes it unnecessary for the cargo interests to make a choice of cause of action between default and tort or something else such as bailment in order to evade the exception clauses embodied in Art. 4(2). That is because it makes the exception clauses embodied under the Hague-Visby Rules available to the carrier no matter on what cause of action the cargo plaintiff would choose to base his claim. Such a provision to exclude the self-same liability at different levels of cause of action could be regarded as a blessing to the contractual intention which is the foundation of the freedom of contract doctrine. With the mixed blessings added by the Hague-Visby Rules, the fortune of the freedom of contract remains almost the same under the Hague-Visby Rules as under the Hague Rules.

When the Hamburg Rules were completed in 1978, the pendulum swung drastically further towards the cargo interests, that is, the framework of setting out the mandatory minimum liability of the carrier to be limited by the exception clauses were changed dramatically into that of blending the basic liability and exception clauses into one single provision. Under such a provision, the exception for the carrier’s liability for the negligence of his employees and some of his engaged third parties in the navigation and management of the ship which could be found under Art. 4(2) of the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules disappeared. So under the Hamburg Rules the carrier’s minimum compulsory liabilities increased drastically, which is certainly an increased restriction on freedom of contract on



the part of the carrier. Consistent with this is the prolongation of the compulsory duration of the voyages from tackle-to-tackle to warehouse-to-warehouse under the convention, plus the added regulation of the document called the letter of indemnity which is made only valid between the carrier and the shipper under the Hamburg Rules. Besides, the peril of delay in the prosecution of the voyage has been regulated expressly for the first time under this kind of international convention as under the Hamburg Rules. All these new provisions introduced by the Hamburg Rules are further restrictions on freedom of contract. That said, to have brought the deck cargo as well as live animals within the coverage of the Hamburg Rules under certain circumstances also has shrunken the scope of the operation of freedom of contract. However, to add third parties engaged by the carrier as another beneficiary of the statutory Himalaya clause under the Hamburg Rules could be regarded as adding credit to the product of freedom of the contract – the conventional contractual Himalaya clause. The increase of the compulsory time limit for action from one year under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules to two years under the Hamburg Rules could be said to restrict the freedom further on the part of the carrier who would very much hope to reduce such time limit to as short as possible a length. Nonetheless, the same controlling provision to the effect of prohibiting the reducing and contracting out of the minimum liability of the carrier can also be found under Art. 23 of the Hamburg Rules, which is an obvious restriction on freedom of contract, though similarly under the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules, the increasing of the carrier’s liability from such statutory minimum liability by agreement is allowed. Similarly under the Hague-Visby Rules, the fact that the Hamburg Rules also took the chance to increase the limitation amount to compensate for the loss of value resulting from the inflation over the years cannot be said to allow more scope for the operation of freedom of contract, as its effect has been mainly set off by the inflation. In all, it could be said that the enlargement of the scope of the regulation and the deletion of some important excepted perils in favor of the carrier evidence a drastic fall of freedom of contract under the Hamburg Rules. That notwithstanding, the members to the Hamburg Rules still have increased steadily, but many maritime powers refuse to endorse the Rules, which has reduced largely their practical effect.

The co-existence of the three conventions, namely the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, obviously adversely affects the mission of international uniformity in this area. Additionally, there are many unsatisfactory areas in the conventions which need to be reformed and updated. Thus a new convention


intended to replace the above three had been under drafting for some years and such a drafting had finally come to a conclusion on 11 December 2008 when the General Assembly of the United Nations voted through the convention now called the Rotterdam Rules. Though how long would it take effect is still unknown, as up to recently this author found from the website of the UNCITRAL1 that only twenty-four States had signed the convention, with Spain being the only one to have ratified it – far less than the required 20 for entry into force as provided by Art. 94(1) of the Rotterdam Rules.2 Nevertheless, it is still worth giving it a brief account in the context of the paper here.

Although how generally the Rotterdam Rules would affect the shipping prac-tice is still to be seen during its exposure to the reality after its eventual coming intoforce, the following obvious changes affecting the contractual freedom can be observed. First, the warehouse-to-warehouse duration of the voyage has been prolonged further to the door-to-door one, thus reducing the space for the operation of freedom of contract. That is in spite of the fact that under Art. 12(3), contractual parties are allowed the freedom to agree on the time and location of the receipt and delivery of the goods for determining the carriers’ period of responsibility, though such freedom is provided for under the same provision to be subject to two specific limits. Second, much more scope is given to the regulation of the shippers’ liability and in fact the Rotterdam Rules have for the first time in this area set out the compulsory minimum liability for the shippers, which obviously further restrict freedom of contract in this area. The reason for such a new area of regulation may be the fact that at modern times many shippers are in fact big companies and are no longer in a weak position as in the old days when the Hague Rules were drafted. Third, electronic documents also receive intensive regulation under this Rotterdam Rules so that freedom of contract has been denied of the chance of or limited to a smaller scope of playing an important role on this relatively new front. Fourth, the volume contract, a kind of service contract covering more than one shipment rather than a carrier’s public schedule of prices and services and other documents. as so mentioned in Art. 80(3), was introduced for the first time into this kind of convention. But unlike the general contract of carriage as evidenced by a bill of

1 At http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam_status.html, 9 June 2012.2 According to this Art. 94(1), the convention will come into force only “on the first day of

the month following the expiration of one year after the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession”.



lading for each shipment, paper or electronic, the volume contract is exempted from the mandatory application of the minimum liability as provided for under Art. 80 of the Rotterdam Rules. In other words, although the minimum liability as found under this new convention could be applied to the volume contract by default, they nevertheless can be contracted out or contractually modified. However, such derogation from the convention is only valid if it meets various conditions as set out in Art. 80. Among such conditions, it is provided that such derogation should be made known through a prominent statement in the contract rather than through an incorporation clause by reference to another document, and the shipper should have the freedom to choose an ordinary contract which are not allowed to be derogated from the general terms of the convention, rather than being bound by a contract of adhesion. More specifically, under a volume contract, no such derogation is allowed in respect of seaworthiness obligation on the part of the carrier, and on the other hand, no such derogation is allowed in respect of the obligation of not loading dangerous goods and the obligation of providing certain information, instruction and documents on the part of the shippers. Lastly in respect of volume contract, as so provided in Art. 80(6), in order to enjoy the benefits of the derogation, the beneficiary, carriers or shippers, should bear the burden of proof that those conditions set for the validity of the derogation have been fulfilled. Besides, that some new terms and concepts such “controlling parties”, “contract performing parties” or “maritime performing parties” have been introduced in this new convention also signals the widening of the scope of the regulation of this new convention despite the fact that some areas in the regulation of the controlling parties are still reserved for the freedom of contract of the parties as so provided under Arts. 54 and 56. The same is true of the fact that an element of environment has found its way into this kind of convention of maritime transportation for the first time in history, as shown in Art. 15 and Art. 17(3)(n) in respect of the definition of dangerous goods and one excepted peril in favour of the carrier for instance. Even the general average sacrifice, which had long been reserved for the York–Antwerp Rules under the previous conventions (for instance as so provided in Art. 24 of the Hamburg Rules) except in relation to the carriage of the dangerous goods, is briefly regulated in Art. 16. These new scopes of regulations are obviously a result from the increased awareness of the growing complication of the shipping business and in line with the recent environmental-friendly movement. On the other hand, some old mechanisms as existing in the older convention or conventions are generally retained or slightly modified. So the negligence of the


employees of the carrier in the navigation and management of the ship is also absent in the liability regime under the Rotterdam Rules as under the Hamburg Rules; and the seaworthiness obligation on the part of the carrier has been extended beyond the beginning of the voyage, which is actually similar in effect to that under the Hamburg Rules, though under the Hamburg Rules the seaworthiness obligation is taken care of by the general provision related to the carriers’ liability and the word seaworthiness has disappeared altogether. Besides, the provision making the minimum liability compulsory as could be found in Art. 79 as well as, in a more limited sense, in Art. 59(1), Art. 75(5), Art. 80(4) and in Art. 63 of the Rotterdam Rules, which can be found in the previous three key conventions, has been retained, though it now applies also to the newly founded minimum liability of the shippers but not to the volume contract compulsorily as mentioned above. Moreover, the minimum liability as safeguarded by Art. 79 cannot be applied to the live animals as carried on board, as such minimum liability can be reduced in relation to the carriage of such live animals as provided for in Art. 81, unless such reduction is proved to be motivated by the willful misconduct of the carrier or any other parties for whose acts or omissions the carrier is liable as Art. 18 of the Rotterdam Rules so expressly provides for. This, though, seems to enlarge a bit the scope for the operation of freedom of contract compared with that for the same matter under the Hamburg Rules. In other respects, the time for delivery and the carriage of goods on deck are reserved for the agreement and freedom of contracting to the parties as so provided in Art. 21 and Art. 25(1)(c) of the Rotterdam Rules. That said, it is certain that the Rotterdam Rules provide less freedom of contract in respect of carriage of deck cargo or of live animals and, to a less extent, the time for delivery of goods than that under either the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules.

Before the conclusion, a few words are added here for discussing briefly how the freedom of contract doctrine fares under the law of China Mainland with respect to one particular issue. Chapter 4 of the Maritime Code of China is well-known as a mixture of the three existing international conventions concerned. However, there are still many differences between the Chinese law and those international conven-tions. Apart from many other differences, one of the major differences indicating the further falling down of the doctrine of freedom of contract under the Chinese law compared with the existing three international conventions as well as the Rotterdam Rules is that the parties to the contract of carriage of goods by sea cannot by agreement or declaration prolong the time limit for action as that provided for under Art. 257 of the Maritime Code of China. It should be noted that Arts. 44 and



45 of the Maritime Code of China virtually incorporate the spirit of Art. 3(8) of the Hague-Visby Rules that no contractual provisions can effectively delete or modify the minimum liability of the carrier as provided for under Chapter 4 of the Maritime Code of China, yet the provision about the time limit for action under the contract of carriage of goods by sea as evidenced by the bill of lading is set out in Art. 257 under Chapter 13, thus excluding it from the scope of the application of the above mentioned Arts. 44 and 45. Such a legislation, which should be intentional rather than by accident or negligence, is in fact an endorsement of the doctrine under the Chinese law that the time limit for action should be statutory and thus should not be subject to the modification of the contract. Such a doctrine has been reinforced by Art. 2 of the “Regulation of Some of the Problems Concerned with the Time Limit for Action in Relation to Civil Cases” issued by the Supreme Court of China on 11 August 2008 3 (which came into operation from 1 September 2008) in relation to the time limit for action generally.

To conclude, the historical development of the international legislation in relation to the carriage of goods by sea witnesses an ever widening of the scope of regulation and particularly an enlargement of the mandatory minimum liability of the carrier, as well as a newly imposed minimum mandatory liability on the shippers under the Rotterdam Rules. In the light of the above, it could be said that the scope of the operation of freedom of contract has been reduced further. Above all, it seems likely that the trend that freedom of contract is falling will continue under the bills of lading and the pendulum will not swing back to the interests of the carrier in this sense for years to come. This, accidentally, is in line with the trend in the current business and finance world. That is, in the wake of recent world-wide financial crisis, the accusation of over-regulation in the financial sector would not have much market in the near future to say the least.

Editors (English): Tom Friedenbach and Sherra Wong

3 See Legal Explanation (2008) No.11, as issued by the Supreme Court of China, at http://ww- w.civillaw.com.cn/jszx/lawcentre/default.asp, 19 October 2010.


失衡滞后的航海高级人才教育

陈彦宏 *

内容摘要：历经数十年被热烈讨论的航海高级人才教育问题，数十年后，仍不失本色地继续被热烈讨论着。究其本末，还是在于缺乏有远见、有魄力的海事教育与人才培育政策定位，以及市场兴衰和航运及造船科技的交互影响。因此航海高级人才教育也不得不在失衡与滞后的情况下举步维艰地度过。本文主要围绕在“船多人少”与“船少人多”二个失衡状况下，船员、航运市场、培训体系三者间的拉锯与推衍、相生相变的情况，并从大陆与台湾二方面，试图思考这二大国际航运实体未来航海高级人才教育应走的方向。

关键词：海事教育与培训船员短缺航海人员训练《国际海员培训、发证和值班标准公约》

一、船员市场的基本问题

市场供需机制很大程度上主导着船员市场的变化。在航运低迷时期，很多船

员闲赋在家，海事院校的学生连实习分配都有困难。相反，在全球航运景气时期，

却又造成船员严重短缺的现象。无论何者，船员市场的变化，从二次大战后迄今，

似乎未曾稳定过。这其中最显著的例子莫过于 2008 年后期全球金融危机时期的

状况。

金融危机爆发前夕，全球沉醉于经济与产业的蓬勃发展，船员的供不应求造就

了很多供给面的强势作为。以中国大陆为例，甚至设立了百余所海员教育培训机

构；1 金融风暴引燃之后的航运业衰退，使船员的供应由不足瞬时反转为过剩，也

* 陈彦宏，海事仲裁员，上海交通大学凯原法学院 CMT- 国际海事研究中心访问学者，台湾海事安全与保安研究会秘书长，高雄海洋科技大学航运技术系副教授暨海事安全研究中心主任，英国威尔士大学海洋事务与国际运输学博士。电子邮箱：[email protected]。本文内容部分取材自作者以澳大利亚海运学院国家港埠与航运中心副主任身份应邀于 2008 年 6 月 21—22 日在中国深圳举办的“首届国际海员高级经理人峰会暨国际海员劳务洽谈会”的专题演讲内容。

© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW1　依据中华人民共和国海事局《2010 年船员管理年报》统计数据显示，全国航海院校共

69 个，船员培训机构共 59 个。

失衡滞后的航海高级人才教育 235

让“弹性”低的供给面迄今仍无法调适，事实上也可能是不知道该如何调适。

原因很简单，从船员培育的角度来看，一般而言，从招收新生开始，国际航线

操作级高级船员的培养，至少需要 4 至 6 年，管理级则可能需要 7 至 9 年或更长

时间；相对地，从造船的角度来看，一艘新船的建造仅需时 8 至 9 个月；而从市场

机能的角度来看，瞬息万变的国际贸易与经济活动所牵动的航运市场的变化，可

能是随时激发的，也可能是循环往复的。

在这种条件基础之下，就经济学的供需理论、弹性理论、市场均衡理论而言，

船员市场与航运市场的活动本来就无法达成和谐；再从市场预测机制理论，以及植

树造林式的人才培养观念来看，海事人才培养机构在满足航运市场需求方面，具

有极大的难度。

二、船员流动性分析

在宏观条件下，经济周期以及世界贸易的变化，频繁地打破船员的供需平衡；

在微观层次，船员的流动为本来已经很复杂的船员市场增添了新的变量。船员的

流动可以分为以下几个层面：

1.第一个层面是船员在航运业内部的流动。这种流动可以是在不同船舶之

间的流动，也可以是船上与岸上工作岗位之间的流动。尤其是在景气时期，船员

经常在不同的船公司之间流动，以寻求最好的待遇。

2.第二个层面是从海事院校毕业的学生加入航运业，或业内人士回海事院校

深造。

3.第三个层面则是跨行业的人才流动。在这一层面上，船员彻底结束航海生

涯到别的行业寻求工作机会或干脆退休。

在上述三个层面中，海事院校的毕业生可以增加船员的供应，而企业内部及

企业之间的流动则不影响航运业内船员的总体数量。然而，单向的跨行业流动及

船员退休则会极大地影响航运业内船员的供应。其中，一个重要的流失源头存在

于海事教育和培训过程当中，由于各种各样的原因，很多海上专业的学生转向其

他更流行的专业，更多的海事学生在毕业时选择陆上的职业，那些最终上船的有


很多在几年内也选择离开。2 3

流失的原因多种多样，包括家庭因素、经济因素、社会变迁，以及很多行业的

重新组合。很显然，这些因素很难仅从航运企业自身，甚至从航运业的整体角度

来解决。然而，个体企业的参与、航运业的支持，以及全社会的关注，会在很大程

度上减少这种流失。

固然，从畅通船员晋升体系与渠道的角度而言，适度的外部流失是健康的；但

是外部需求的大量增加，会造成船员结构体系的失衡。以中国过去航运与港埠的

快速扩张与发展过程为例，岸上对具有相关航海轮机背景知识人才的需求非常迫

切，也就提早收割了在线的高级船员。从好的方向想，是畅通晋升渠道；但从另一

个方向想，这一时期高级船员的平均素养，可能就没有前一时期高级船员一般的

扎实与精炼。

上述讨论还不包括在航运市场国际化特征下，船东出于支出、服务质量、能

力，以及国籍偏好等不同因素的考虑，开始雇用特定国籍船员，由此产生经济学理

论的“替代”、“弹性”、“偏好”等情形所加速的船员市场的国际板块位移与变化。

波罗的海国际海事委员会/国际航运联合会之船员供需人力调查报告数据显

示(表 1、表 2)，4 当国际高级船员市场短缺之际，补足缺口的主要是来自经济相对

落后的东欧与中欧国家的高级船员，但是当乙级船员过剩之时，市场上所减少的却

是来自远东地区的海员。中国虽然在船员数量上有所增长，但主要还是受雇于中

2　目前中国远洋船员的主要力量并不是来自国内重点航海院校 4 年制的本科毕业生。从近几年航海院校毕业生的双选会情况来看，50% 以上的航海院校本科生不愿意上船工作。即使选择了船员职业的也打算在未来几年退出船员行业，真正能将船员作为终生职业的不足 20%。航海职业的稳定性受到严重冲击，国家的航海教育资源遭到严重浪费，很难提高中国船员资源的数量。有的航海院校自称是航海家的摇篮，那也只是过去。随着中国经济的发展，人民生活水平的提高，再加上独生子女政策的现实，这一问题更加严峻。我们应该认真研究中国的航海教育，如何控制招收 4 年制的本科水上专业学生，大力发展航海专科教育，合理选择航海院校的生源，让有限的中国航海教育资源发挥最大的效用。参见顾剑文：《我国船员资源与船员市场发展状况》，载于《水路运输文摘》2005 年 10 期，第 28 页。

3　正如中国船东协会海员工作委员会 2010 年工作报告所说：“合格海员短缺不仅困扰世界航运业，也是中国船队面临的难题，我国海员特别是高级船员由于种种原因弃船登陆，流失率居高不下，加剧了船员紧缺的局面。”下面以两个案例来描述海船高级海员的流失情况。案例一：某现有 3200 名高级船员的大型航运企业，1999—2008 年间高级船员流失量不断攀升，2005 年起流失量与招聘量比值超过 0.5。案例二：某船员外派服务机构自 1996 年起招聘的毕业生约 1800 人。服务年限 3—5 年，流失率约25%；服务年限 6—8 年，流失率约 40%；服务年限 9 年起，流失率超过 50%。而且本科生的流失率略大于专科生。参见翁跃宗：《建设“船员强国”下的海船高级船员资源分析》，载于《中国航海》2011 年第 2 期，第 79~80 页。

4　 BIMCO/ISF Manpower 2010 Update – The Worldwide Demand for and Supply of Seafare- rs, Main Report, University of Warwick: Institute for Employment Research.


国掌控或与中国相关的航运船队，真正外雇到国际船队的船员还是相对少见。5 6

表 1 2000—2010 全球主要区域船员供给量（单位：千人）2000 年 2005 年 2010 年 2000—2010 年的变化率

高级船员

OECD 国家 147 133 184 25.2%东 /中欧 62 95 127 104.8%非洲 /南美 35 38 50 42.9%

远东 128 132 183 41.9%印度 /中东 32 68 80 150.0%

总计 404 466 624 54.5%

乙级船员

OECD 国家 191 174 143 -25.1%东 /中欧 107 115 109 1.9%

非洲 /南美 89 115 109 22.5%远东 332 226 275 -17.2%

印度 /中东 104 96 108 3.9%总计 823 721 747 -9.2%

表 2 船员供给的历史发展

1990 年 1995 年 2000 年 2005 年 2010 年

中国 9905 29009 34197 42704 51511全球 403000 409000 404000 466000 624000

占全球百分比 2.46% 7.09% 8.46% 9.16% 8.25%

这个被国际普遍采用的人力调查资料虽然在最源头的调查方法上仍存在争

议，但不争的具体意义则是证明了高素质船员在质量和结构上已经出现短缺，亦

即特种船舶、高技术船舶和超大型与特大型船舶高级船员的短缺，虽然这部分高

5　 Manning – Annual Report 2012, Drewry Maritime Research, 8 May 2012.6　国际上船员劳务外派的主要输出国有：菲律宾(28.1%)、俄罗斯(6.8%)、东欧(16.6%)、

中国 (6.2%)、印度 (5%)。纵观国际船员市场形势，菲律宾占据整个国际海员市场的霸主地位，每年向国际市场提供约 20 万名船员，其中 15 万名服务于欧洲船东的船上，另 5 万名服务于日本为主的亚洲船东的船上。菲律宾船员培训设施落后、高级船员短缺、文化水平低下。欧洲的发达国家已无船员资源，东欧由于前苏联解体，经济滑坡，使得船员资源上升，许多人愿意跑船，但他们占据的主要是大西洋航线。印度是个人口大国，有先天的英语条件，发展势头较快。目前世界上主要的液货船使用的大多是印度船员。目前国际船员劳务市场需求上升，竞争激烈。中国船员工资逐年提高，但与国际市场相比还有一定差距，中国每年输出船员仅为 2 万名左右，而且 80% 为亚洲地区外派船员，真正打入欧美市场的不多。参见郑磊：《浅议马尼拉公约下我国海船船员的发展对策》，载于《第四届广东海事高级论坛论文集》，广东：广东省科学技术协会科技交流部 2012 年版，第 525~528 页。


级船员需求数量不多，但在业内影响很大。7

三、供需失衡的衍生问题

失衡的船员市场所产生的后果可以从“人多船少”、“船多人少”两个方面来

讨论。

一个“人多船少”的船员市场给船东更多的选择余地。不利的因素是船员在

这种情况下很难找到适当的工作岗位，会有被遗弃的感觉。那些未来的船员很难

找到实习的机会，更别提找到合适的工作。这种情况会对航运业未来吸引年轻人

入行造成很大的负面影响。“船多人少”的市场则会刺激对海事教育和培训的投入，

但会使很多的航运企业因过高的船员薪资、低下的船员质量而遭受损失。

“人多船少”的市场机制演进趋势如下：

1. 首先，最直接的优势是来自船方部份。船方可以在这个市场机制中遴选到

优秀的船员，也可以在船员薪资上相对俭省很多开销。

2.其次，在这种市场中，冲击船员的主要是生计与升迁二个层面。生计方面，

船员只要可以上得了船，自然就不会太轻言下船，如此一来，船员轮换周期加长，

更增加了无船可上的情况；升迁方面，在供过于求的市场中，在同一职位的时间拉

长，升迁周期随之增长，甚或必须以高阶低用的方式寻求职位以保生计。

3. 其三，在培训机构方面，为了迎合市场的高质量需求，所有培训考试门槛

在这个机制中都会以控制质量为名而不自觉地增高。

在上述三者的交互影响之下，直接的后果就是，很多具备专业能力的优秀船

员会放弃船员职务，寻求其他的出路；另一方面，能力相对较低的船员，在这个机

制中将被自然淘汰；至于更深远的影响，则是高竞争、低升迁、预期所得低落的职

场，直接降低了人们选择船员作为职业的意愿。也因此，这种没有足够新鲜血液

加入的情况，埋下了日后船员短缺的因子。

“船多人少”的市场机制演进趋势如下：

1. 船方方面，在面临有船无人的情况下，只有以薪资或升迁等更优越的条件

吸引船员加入。另外，部分船方则以降低原有的船员素质与需求标准，寻求过去

不愿接受的下一级船员的加入。除此之外，船方在这个阶段如果启动如聘用外国

7　波罗的海国际海事委员会 / 国际航运联合会发布的研究报告与预测数据有下列三项明显误差，只能用于参考。其一，应从数学原理上正确了解上述机构调查研究全球海上人力资源 ( 高级船员 ) 供求关系所采用的问卷调查方法的局限性和统计预测方法及其数学模型的精确性；其二，应从客观事实上正确评估上述机构所发布的全球高级船员短缺数据的可信度；其三，应从动机上正确认识上述机构一直发布全球高级船员短缺数据的原因。参见吴兆麟：《高级船员短缺的本质与我国的应对举措》，载于《世界海运》2011 年第 11 期，第 2~3 页。


籍船员等其他船员供应渠道，也是一个解决问题的方式。

2. 船员方面，不仅在工作权方面有充分的选择机会，较优越的薪资或工作条

件，以及更多的升迁机会，在这个市场中还可以获得更多的实践。

3. 培训机构方面，除了在招生办学上取得的优势，最值得忧心的影响是：为了

急于满足市场的需求，培训的质与量以及考试与发证制度很可能在这段时期失去

原有的水平。8 9

在这个市场机制中，船员的遴选与淘汰机制都相对较弱，高级船员服务年限

过短，新手急于晋升，船员平均素质下滑，加上企业间不择手段地挖墙角，使得明

显不适任的船员冲击着船舶的运行服务质量、冲击着海运安全的这道防线，无形

中提高了海事安全的风险系数。10 另外，从因果的角度分析，在“船多人少”时期，

扩大招生与培训船员的结果，其实也是埋下未来船员过剩的一项因子。11 船方在

这个阶段聘用其他供应渠道船员的策略，也会加剧未来供需变化时出现的新问题。

四、人才供需的战略思考

高等航海教育已经不再是过去传统的知识与技术教育，而是强调有国际竞争

能力的高级航运人才应具备“一种精神”､“两种素质”､“四个意识”和“五项能

8　中国目前的船员培训中心很多，但有质量的船员培训中心并不多，他们大多从事船员履约的培训，而真正能提高中国船员素质的船员培训中心几乎没有。参见顾剑文：《我国船员资源与船员市场发展状况》，载于《水路运输文摘》2005 年 10 期，第 28~29 页。

9　由于我国航海教育和培训所需的专业师资队伍及海上实践教学和学生实习的教学资源( 教学训练船和上船实习机会 ) 严重缺乏，有些实际上不具备设立航海类专业条件的院校也开始招生。目前我国航海教育和船员培训规模的急剧扩大与我国航海教育和船员培训质量提高不大形成了明显的反差。设立航海类专业条件的实际放宽，船员培训机构办学条件的实际降低，虽然对扩大我国航海教育和船员培训规模有利，但很难解决我国高级船员短缺与全球高级船员短缺的问题。参见吴兆麟：《高级船员短缺的本质与我国的应对举措》，载于《世界海运》2011 年第 11 期，第 1~4 页。

10　现实情况是无论海员外派机构还是船员本身 , 法制观念均有待加强。有章不循、无证经营、收费标准混乱的现象屡禁不止。高价吆喝、拉郎配式地招聘船员，致使船员受薪资或升职等吸引，吃东家做西家，质量与诚信严重缺失。这种状况破坏了船员正常任职与合理流动的有序状态，船东对此颇有微词……一个缺乏管理和监控的劳务市场，失去的是船东的信任，损害的是船员的利益。参见郝明丽：《我国海员劳务外派市场存在问题及对策研究》，载于《航海》2012 年第 3 期，第 66~69 页。

11　中国 2006—2010 年航海院校招生规模由 22785 人成长至 53996 人，中国供给的远洋高级船员数量预测值由 2011 年的 73643 人上升到 2015 年的 134339 人。这种供求比严重失衡的现象，将使大量船员无法上船工作。参见李宁、廉清云：《我国远洋高级船员供求关系预测分析与对策》，载于《航海技术》2012 年第 2 期，第 73~75 页。


力”，12 或者说航海教育培养的高质量人才应具备以下素质：13

1. 熟知航海专业知识、国际公约和相关法律法规，并具备知识更新能力；

2. 知识面广泛，具备经济、管理、人文等方面的综合知识，尤其是掌握国际航

运立法，有处理国际海运事务的能力；

3. 具有较高外语水平，尤其是较强的听说能力，能参与国际海员劳务市场的

竞争；

4. 具备海洋运输安全意识和环保意识；

5. 具有敬业精神、团队精神，有职业道德，具备服从意识；

6. 具备实务操作能力和独立解决问题的能力。

然而，上述的期待，事实上也间接说明了在供给与需求层面之外，现阶段的

中国高级船员培育上所出现的问题。14

从政策推动的措施来看，为应对船员发展存在的船员数量严重不足、船员综

合素质不高、船员队伍结构不甚合理、高级船员紧缺、普通船员富余、船员流动性

进一步加剧、高素质船员流失严重、船员培养机制严重缺失等多项深层次的矛盾，

12　 (1)“一种精神”是指敬业精神。具有坚定正确的政治方向，这是对航运人才的基本要求。要热爱祖国，热爱企业，有高度的事业心和对工作的责任心，有严格的组织纪律性，能吃苦耐劳，有为发展中国航运事业献身的精神。(2)“两种素质”即身体素质和心理素质。有健康的身体和良好的心理素质：能经受海上严酷的自然条件和长期单调的生活所带来的困难，善于协调人际关系；在陆岸工作的，要能面对激烈竞争，学会自我调节，适应社会环境。(3)“四个意识”即经济意识、法律法规意识、环境意识和服从意识。传统的航海教育注重知识传授和技能训练，但经济意识、法律法规意识、环境意识强化得不够。经济意识要求航海类人才要懂得经营，知道如何盈利；法律法规意识要求航海类人才不但要懂得国际国内各项专业法律法规，更要严格遵守各项专业法律法规；环境意识要求航海类人才在自己的专业岗位上，最大限度地防止污染、保护海洋环境。(4)“五项能力”即管理领导能力、外语应用能力、工作能力、应变能力和创新能力。有较高的英语水平，能用英语顺利地完成本职工作和参加对外交流活动。在现代企业经营活动中，科学有效的管理会带来巨大的效益，在现代航海教育中，培养领导协调能力要成为教学内容的一部分。同时要具有较强的创新能力，这是新时期对航运人才的普遍要求。参见林洪贵：《浅谈远洋航海人才的培养》，载于《现代商贸工业》2007 年第 3 期，第 75~76 页。

13　王祖温：《全球高级船员供需状况与中国高等航海教育的发展》，下载于 http://www.sol.com.cn/xinxiupdown_winland/zhishu/editor/uploadfile/dalianhaishi.pdf，2012 年 11 月2 日。

14　有专家在我国海员劳务外派市场现状及问题分析中指出了现有远洋海员规模过小、高级船员培训扩容能力不足、船员培训考核机制不合理、劳务市场监督力度不大、外派海员自身素质不高等 5 大缺失。其中第 5 点具体包括学习意识有待加强、英语交流能力有待加强、忽视船员外派的文化差异和工作能力、工作热情不高和服从意识不够等4 项素质欠缺。参见郝明丽：《我国海员劳务外派市场存在问题及对策研究》，载于《航海》2012 年第 3 期，第 66~69 页。


交通部在 2008 年推出了《加快船员发展的十大措施》，15 通过淡化学历要求、强

化资历要求和淡化理论考试、强化实操考试的“两淡化，两强化”手段，试图解决

船员发展存在的突出问题，提高船员素质，促进船员队伍的科学发展。然而，这些

相应的措施，与培育出期待中有素养的高级航海人员似乎永远存在着一定的鸿沟。

事实上，综观过去五十年国际船员供应市场的演进，可以看到，船员的供需

与航运市场的发展、各国的社会经济发展、各国的国民所得，以及各国的海运政策

与劳务输出政策都息息相关，更与各国的海事教育发证考试体系有关。

仅以海事教育发证考试体系为例，一般而言，来自公务体系的海事教育发证

考试部门，往往是反应最慢也稍微带有官僚气息的部门。这些部门的行事风范常

常使得航海高级人才的问题雪上加霜。其主要症结来自教育体系招生制度的不灵

活，往往招收到“以取得学历为目标”而非“以航海事业为志向”的学生。这类情

形特别以台湾、韩国、日本、大陆为首的东方社会为最。其结果自然就是教育资源

的浪费，也使得愿意“以航海事业为志向”的学子被排除在考试制度之外。

其次是为维护海事教育发证考试的专业、中立与超然，并避免有官商勾结、

图利他人之嫌，公务体系一向不太容易和市场机制配合，更遑论思考及预测航运

市场的兴衰与市场的供需变化。当然，或许也可以解释为，航运市场的兴衰机制

很难预测，不如不预测等等。

固然，航海教育是航运发展的重要基石之一，厚植航海高级人才资源，对一

个国家的航运业肯定有莫大的帮助，但也并非绝对如此。

以联合国贸易与发展会议的《2011 年海运评估》资料为基础，16 以 1000 总吨

以上船舶数量占全球 27.82%、载重吨占全球 41.10% 的三个航运大国（希腊、日

本、德国）为例（表 3），这些国家当然有其赫赫的海洋文化与历史背景，但引领风

骚迄今，这些国家也没有维持高数量的航海高级人才培育体系。17 反观菲律宾、东

欧等几个著名的船员供应国家，也没有因其高人一等的船员数量而得以证明其航

15　一、推行船员电子政务；二、建立船员适任综合考评机制，以船员综合素质确认船员适任；三、建立高级船员任职见习机制，提高高级船员适任能力；四、加强船员适任能力评估，提高船员实际操作能力；五、取消航海院校在校学生先实操评估后理论考试的限制；六、规范函授培养模式，为普通船员晋升建立渠道；七、开展师资培训，满足船员教育和培训需要，提高培训质量；八、将三副、三管轮晋升二副、二管轮的海上资历要求从 12 个月延长至 18 个月；九、船员适任考试成绩 3 年有效，取消补考次数限制；十、调整高级船员学历要求，改善船员队伍结构。参见交海发 [2008]141 号《加快船员队伍发展十大措施》，2008 年 3 月 27 日。

16　中国大陆船舶数量占全球 9.40%，载重吨占 8.63%；香港船舶数量占全球 1.83%，载重吨占 2.97%；台湾船舶数量占全球 1.70%，载重吨占 2.63%。See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2011, at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/rmt2011_en.pdf, 31 October 2012.

17　希腊、德国、挪威、丹麦、意大利、英国等欧洲国家合计拥有 1000 总吨以上船舶的数量占全球 29.82%，载重吨占全球 33.55%，但其总高级船员数仅占全球 9%。See Drewry Maritime Research, Manning – Annual Report 2012, 8 May 2012.


运事业的蓬勃发展。这个问题的症结在于航海高级人才的定义：航海高级人才是

公司未来发展的重要人才、知识与技能资源及工作伙伴，抑或仅是接受公司指令

定时定点开船的技术人员？

表 3 各主要国家或地区拥有船队统计

国家 /地区

(全球排名 )

1000 总吨以上船舶艘数载重吨

国轮外籍轮总数国轮外籍轮总数

希腊 (1) 758 2455 3213 64659201 137728951 202388152日本 (2) 724 3071 3795 18942573 178287143 197229716德国 (3) 442 3356 3798 17149221 97623425 114772646

中国大陆 (4) 2044 1607 3651 46207468 61762042 107969510韩国 (5) 736 453 1189 18135391 29317780 47453171美国 (6) 971 1001 1972 24363609 22011225 46374915挪威 (7) 818 1166 1984 14850693 28127239 42977932

中国香港 (8) 399 313 712 24102438 13080401 37182839丹麦 (9) 383 592 975 13998073 21113253 35111326

中国台湾(10) 97 565 662 4096790 28863160 32959950意大利 (13) 616 220 836 16556782 6774107 2330889英国 (14) 363 412 778 8927892 13395899 22323791全球总数 17391 21456 38847 399254553 852394905 1251649458

( 来源：United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2011, at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/rmt2011_en.pdf, 31 October 2012.)

不过这个论点的基础，却不能作为拥有 13 亿人口的大陆可以不用积极投入

航海人才教育的借口。这个论点的基础，亦不能作为台湾这个仰赖海运维生、素

以航运事业闻名的地方的推托之词。

大陆方面，注册船员数达 155 万人，居世界第一位，但真正从事海上运输的

只有 51 万人，持有远洋商船证书的海员 15.6 万人，持有甲类证书的远洋船员 6.2万人。船长和轮机长各不足 5 千人，这其中还包括陆上管理层级的船长和轮机长，

所以真正从事远洋航业的船长和轮机长也就 8 千人左右。18 因此，以目前的航运

18　郑磊：《浅议马尼拉公约下我国海船船员的发展对策》，载于《第四届广东海事高级论坛论文集》，广东：广东省科学技术协会科技交流部 2012 年版，第 525~528 页。


企业需求观之，现阶段的大陆航海高级人才供应，已然不足以稳定供应内需。19 这

不但是商业的考虑，也是国家安全的警讯。再从目前大陆的平均国民所得分析，

在省份与城乡高度差异的社会结构中，拥有较高收入的高级航海人员的职业选

择，对人均所得相对较低的人民有极大的吸引力。另外，对于 2016 年预估的 59万人的国际高级船员市场，大陆所设定的市场占有率的多寡，不但是经济性指标，

更是大陆高级海员能力素质的指标。20

台湾方面，这个拥有雄厚航运实力的小岛，可能要思考的是：首先，如果没有

航海高级人才的培育，是否仍能维持目前的航运实力；其次，在国际经济与政治的

交相影响与压迫下，台湾的航运市场是否仍能维持抑或是即将反转直下；再者，航

海高级人才与台湾航运市场间，在过去几十年不正常的交相影响下，船员数量从 3万人滑落至 6 千人，台湾的下一个航运人才培育策略又将是什么？

19　依据联合国贸易与发展会议的《2011 年海运评估》数据显示，中国大陆拥有的 1000总吨以上国轮与外轮共计 3651 艘，占全球 9.398%；《2010 年海运评估》数据显示有3633 艘，占全球 9.458%。但依据波罗的海国际海事委员会 / 国际航运联合会 2010 的调查数据显示，中国大陆高级船员数仅占全球 8.25%。此数据一则说明中国大陆的高级船员数似乎已不足以供应其自身拥有的船队所需，二则说明大陆高级船员似乎已没有多余的能量供应其他国家船队所需的人力。

20　据德鲁里海事研究的研究报告，六大类船舶数量 2011 年底是 22581 艘，预估到 2016年将增长至 24393 艘，复合年均增长率 1.6%( 注表 1)，预估增加高级船员需求 31000人 (注表 2)。See Drewry Maritime Research, Manning – Annual Report 2012, 8 May 20-

12.注表 1 预计到 2016 年船队数量变化

2000 年船队数 (1)

2011 年船队数 (2)

2000—2011 年的复合年增长率

2016 年船队数

预计 2011—2016 年的复合年增长率

油轮 2884 3130 0.7% 3402 1.7%化学品运输船 1618 4045 8.7% 4302 1.2%液化石油气船 873 1140 2.5% 1201 1.0%液化天然气船 127 358 9.9% 425 3.5%干散货船 5540 8818 4.3% 10185 2.9%集装箱船 2500 5090 6.7% 4878 -0.8%

总计 13542 22581 4.8% 24393 1.6%(1) 截至 2000 年 1 月 1 日 , (2) 截至 2011 年 12 月

（来源：Drewry Maritime Research, Manning – Annual Report 2012, 8 May 2012.）注表 2 预计高级船员需求 / 供应（单位：千人）

1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 2016高级船员需求 448 427 420 476 560 591高级船员供应 403 409 404 566 544 575

表面盈余（缺口） -45 -18 -16 -10 -16 -16

（来源：BIMCO/Drewry Maritime Research/PAL）


五、结语

不论是“船多人少”抑或是“船少人多”下的航运市场态势，航海高级人才在

航运市场上永远都只是标准的“供给”与“需求”问题的相生相衍。但是围绕供需

问题的航运市场波动背后的，却是不折不扣的严肃的航海教育体制与培训机制的

问题，也是个发证考试机制的问题。然而，更根本的议题，则是在这些机制下所产

出的航海高级人才的素质问题。一个忽高忽低、质量不一，而且是一个一直无法

真正进入国际航运人才市场的我国航海高级人才的精神、素质、意识、能力等等方

方面面的软硬问题。

有着相同历史渊源的大陆与台湾，在数百年的闭关锁国后，海洋文化早已蒙

尘甚或消失；造船与航海科技的龙头宝座亦早已拱手让人。

虽说，这个民族在六百年前曾经主导全球航海大业；虽说，即便是六百年后的

今日，这个民族，也仍具备纵横全球航海大业的某些条件。但要实践“船员强国”

的目标，21还有待仔细评估失衡滞后的航海高级人才教育的真正问题，重新定位“航

海高级人才”的角色。

21　要实现“船员强国”的目标，必须在三方面有充分表现：一、成为船员劳务输出大国；二、具有可满足现代化船舶、特种船舶、超大型船舶需求的高质量船员；三、在国际船员舞台上具有强有力的话语权。参见翁跃宗：《建设“船员强国”下的海船高级船员资源分析》，载于《中国航海》2011 年第 2 期，第 78 页。

On the Unbalanced and Backward Education for Senior Maritime Professionals in China 245

On the Unbalanced and Backward Education for

Senior Maritime Professionals in China

Solomon Yang-Hong CHEN*

Abstract: The question of education for senior maritime professionals conti-nues to be a hot topic of discussion because the education of senior maritime profe-ssionals has been conducted in a backward and unbalanced manner year after year. This is due to the absence of a far-sighted maritime education and personnel training policy, in addition to the interactions between market fluctuations and ship-ping technology. This article focuses on the relationship among seafarers, the ship-ping market and the existing training system under two unbalanced circumstances: “excess seafarer labor supply relative to demand for ships” and “shortage of seafarer labor supply relative to demand for ships”. The article then reflects on the direction that the two major international shipping entities, Chinese Mainland and Taiwan, should take for the training of future senior maritime professionals.

Key Words: Maritime education & training; Seafarer; Shortage; Seafarer trai-ning; STCW

I. Basic Problems of the Seafarer Market

Changes in the seafarer market are largely dominated by market demand and

* Solomon Yang-Hong CHEN, Maritime Arbitrator, Visiting Scholar of the CMT International Center for Maritime Studies, KoGuan Law School of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Secretary-General of the Taiwan Association of Maritime Safety and Security, Associate Professor of the Department of Shipping Technology and Director of the Center for Maritime Safety Studies of the Kaohsiung Marine University, and PhD in Marine Affairs and International Transportation of the University of Wales, UK. E-mail: [email protected]. Part of this article is from a presentation made at the First International Seafarer Senior Manager Summit and International Seafarer Labor Symposium held in Shenzhen China on June 21–22, 2008, to which the author was invited in the capacity of Associate Director of the National Center for Ports and Shipping of the Australian Maritime College.



supply forces. During times of economic slowdown in the shipping industry, many seafarers are unable to work in the industry and it is even difficult for students in maritime education institutions to find internships. While a global shipping boom causes serious shortages of seafarers. Since the Second World War the seafarer market has never been stablized; the most remarkable example is none other than the 2008 global financial crisis.

On the eve of the financial crisis, the world was enjoying economic and indus-trial growth, leading to a shortage of seafarer labor, which in turn caused a vigorous development of seafarer labor supply. For example, there were over a hundred seaf-arer education and training agencies in China Mainland by 2010.1 The decline of the shipping industry triggered by the financial crisis has immediately turned the seafarer labor shortage into seafarer labor surplus. Due to the poor “flexibility” of the labor supply, it cannot cope or adjust with the new situation till now.

The reasons for this are very simple. Generally speaking, it takes four to six years of training for a newly recruited student to become an operating officer for international shipping routes, while it may take seven to nine or more years to train a managing officer. On the other hand, it takes only eight to nine months to build a new ship from scratch. When it comes to market functions, the shipping market is affected by ever-changing international trade patterns and economic activities, and changes may be triggered at any time, or may be cyclic.

Under such conditions, as far as the demand and supply theory, elasticity theo-ry and market equilibrium theory in economics are concerned, it is impossible to r-each equilibrium between the activities of the seafarer market and those of the ship-ping market. In addition, judging from market forecasting theory and the forest-bu-ilding personnel training concept, it is extremely difficult for maritime personnel training agencies to meet the needs of the shipping market.

II. Seafarer Employment Mobility Analysis

Under the macro conditions, the economic cycle and changes in world trade frequently break the balance between demand and supply of the seafarer labor market. On the micro level, seafarer mobility adds new variables to the already

1 According to the statistical data of The Annual Bulletin on Seafarer Management 2010 issued by the Maritime Safety Administration of the People’s Republic of China, at the time there were 69 maritime institutes and 59 seafarer training agencies in China.


complicated seafarer labor market. Seafarer labor mobility may be described on the following levels:

1. The first level is the mobility of seafarers within the shipping industry. This can be between different ships or between onboard posts and shore-side posts. During periods of high economic growth, seafarers often move between different shipping companies to seek optimal levels of pay.

2. The second level is graduates from maritime training institutions joining the shipping industry, or personnel in the industry returning to maritime institutes for further education and training.

3. The third level is cross-industry personnel mobility. On this level, seafarers end their seafaring career to seek work opportunities in other industries or simply retire.

Of the above three levels, graduates from maritime institutions increase the supply of seafarers while mobility inside or between companies does not affect the overall number of seafarers employed by the shipping industry. Unidirectional cross-industry mobility and retirement substantially affect the supply of seafarers within the shipping industry. An important reason for attrition is that during maritime education and training, many students majoring in maritime affairs transfer to other more popular majors for various reasons. Students specializing in maritime affairs often choose onshore occupations upon graduation, and furthermore many of those choosing to work on board ships opt to leave within a


few years.2 3

There are many reasons for the attrition of such personnel, including family factors, economic factors, social transformations, and industry restructuring. Obvi-ously such problems cannot be solved by shipping companies themselves, or even by the shipping industry as a whole. However, with the participation of individual companies, the support and attention of both the shipping industry and society, this attrition can be reduced by a large extent.

Moderate external attrition is necessary for smoothening of the promotion system, but a substantial increase in external demand will lead to the loss of balance in the seafarer labor supply structure. For example, with the rapid expansion and development of shipping and ports in China, there was a very urgent demand for personnel with relevant marine engine knowledge, and the officers in training were employed before they finished training. Taken optimistically, this was good for opening the channel for promotion. Viewed from another angle, however, the

2 Most Chinese seafarers are not graduates of 4-year undergraduate programs from key domestic maritime colleges. Judging from the situation at job fairs for graduates from maritime colleges in recent years, over 50% of graduates are unwilling to work on board ships. Even those who choose to work as seafarers intend to retire from the seafaring career in the coming years, while less than 20% plan on taking seafaring as their life long career. The stability of the seafaring occupation is under heavy threat, and the country’s education system for seafarers is inefficient and hardly able to increase the quantity of China’s seafarers. Some maritime colleges claim to be cradles of seafarers, but that too was only in the past. Following China’s economic development, improvement of people’s living standard and the reality of the one-child policy in China, this problem is even more severe. We should carefully study China’s seafaring education system and create a solution that controls recruitment of 4-year undergraduate students in maritime specialties. The system should also vigorously develop junior college maritime education, and have a fair admission system to bring out the best of the limited maritime education resources in China. See Gu Jianwen, Seafarer Resources and Development of Seafarer Market in China, Water Transportation Digest, No. 10, 2005, p. 28. (in Chinese)

3 As stated in the 2010 Work Report from the Seafarer’s Working Committee of China Shipo- wners’ Association, “the shortage of qualified seafarers is a difficulty not only troubling the

global shipping industry, but also confronting Chinese fleets. Seafarers in China, especially officers, leave ships for shore-side work for various reasons. The high attrition rate has aggravated the shortage of seafarers.” The attrition of officers in ocean-going ships may be illustrated with two cases. Case I: In a large shipping company with 3,200 seafarers, the attrition of officers has arisen from 1999 to 2008, with an over 0.5 attrition to recruitment ratio since 2005. Case II: A seafarer dispatch service agency recruited approximately 1,800 graduates in 1996. The attrition rate of those with 3–5 service years was roughly 25%, the attrition rate of those with 6–8 service years was about 40% and the attrition rate of those with 9 or more service years exceeded 50%. In addition, the attrition rate of graduates from 4-year undergraduate programs was slightly higher than that of junior college graduates. See Weng Yuezong, Analysis of Ship Officer Resources under the Goal of Building a Strong Seafarer Country, Navigation of China, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2011, pp. 79~80. (in Chinese)


average competence of officers in this period might not be as solid and refined as that of officers in the previous period.

The above discussions do not cover the movements and changes of the interna-tional seafarer market accelerated by the situations described by the economic theo-ries of “replacement”, “elasticity” and “preference,” which arise from shipowners’ employment of seafarers of specific nationalities due to considerations for expendit-ure, service quality, ability or preferred nationality.

According to the data in the Baltic and International Maritime Council/Interna-tional Shipping Federation (BIMCO/ISF) Worldwide Demand for and Supply of Seafarers, Main Report (Tables 1 and 2),4 when the international officer market is in short of supply, those filling the gap are mainly from less developed Eastern Euro-pean and Central European countries. However, when the market is oversupplied, those cut from the market are seafarers from the Far Eastern region. Despite their growth in number, Chinese seafarers are mainly employed by shipping fleets controlled by or relevant to China, and few of them are employed by international fleets.5 6

4 BIMCO/ISF Manpower 2010 Update – The Worldwide Demand for and Supply of Seafarers, Main Report, University of Warwick: Institute for Employment Research

5 Manning – Annual Report 2012, Drewry Maritime Research, 8 May 2012.6 The major seafarer labor exporting countries and regions in the world are: the Philippines

(28.1%), Russia (6.8%), Eastern Europe (16.6%), China (6.2%) and India (5%). The Philippines dominates the international seafarer market, supplying about 200,000 seafarers to the international market each year, among which 150,000 serve ships of European shipowners, and 50,000 serve ships of Asian shipowners mainly from Japan. The seafarer training facilities in the Philippines are backward, the number of officers provided is insufficient, and the educational level of seafarers is low. There are no seafarer resources in developed countries in Europe. Due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the economies of Eastern Europe have suffered a downturn, and as a result the number of seafarers has risen, as many people are willing to work on board ships. But they mainly occupy Atlantic shipping routes. India is a country with a large population, an advantage in the English language, in addition to a rapidly developing supply of seafarers. Most major liquid cargo ships in the world use Indian seafarers. Demand for international seafarer labor is rising, with intense competition. The wages of Chinese seafarers rise year by year, but are still lower than the international market average. China exports about 20,000 seafarers each year, of whom 80% work for ships in Asia, and few of whom enter the European and American markets. See Zheng Lei, A Tentative Discussion on the Measures for Developing Seafarers in China under the Manila Amendments to the STCW Convention, Proceedings of the Fourth Guangdong Maritime Advanced Forum, Guangdong: Guangdong Provincial Association for Science and Technology, 2012, pp. 525~528. (in Chinese)


Table 1 Supply of Seafarers in Main Regions of the World from 2000 to 2010 (Unit: 1,000 People)

2000 2005 2010 Rate of change from 2000 to 2010

Officers

OECD countries 147 133 184 25.2%Eastern/Central

Europe 62 95 127 104.8%

Africa/South America 35 38 50 42.9%

Far East 128 132 183 41.9%India/Middle East 32 68 80 150.0%

Total 404 466 624 54.5%

Ratings

OECD countries 191 174 143 -25.1%Eastern/Central

Europe 107 115 109 1.9%

Africa/South America 89 115 109 22.5%

Far East 332 226 275 -17.2%India/Middle East 104 96 108 3.9%

Total 823 721 747 -9.2%

Table 2 Historical Development of Seafarer Supply1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

China 9,905 29,009 34,197 42,704 51,511World 403,000 409,000 404,000 466,000 624,000

Percentage in global supply 2.46% 7.09% 8.46% 9.16% 8.25%

Despite some controversies over the survey methodology, the practical signifi-cance of the survey data is that it proves that there is a shortage of highly competent seafarers in terms of quality and structure, that is, the shortage of officers for special ships, high-tech ships, and super-sized and extra-large ships, who have great


impact on the industry though the demand is not large.7

III. Problems Resulting from the Supply and Demand Imbalance

The consequences of the unbalanced seafarer market can be analyzed from two viewpoints: “excess seafarer labor supply relative to demand for ships” and “shortage of seafarer labor supply relative to demand for ships.”

A seafarer market of seafarer labor surplus leaves shipowners more choices. The consequence for seafarers is that they struggle to find appropriate positions in such a situation, and will feel abandoned. In addition, students studying to become seafarers struggle to find internship opportunities, to say nothing of a suitable entry-level job. This situation prevents the shipping industry from becoming an attractive industry for young people. A market of seafarer labor shortage will stimulate the investment in maritime education and training, but many shipping companies will suffer losses due to higher wages and lower quality employees.

The evolution of a market mechanism in which “seafarer labor supply outnumbers demand for ships” is as follows:

1. First, the most direct advantage is in regards to shipowners. As shipowners can select excellent seafarers in this market mechanism and may reduce expenditure due to lower spending on seafarer wages.

2. Second, the main impact on seafarers in such a market is their employment and promotion opportunities. In terms of employment, seafarers who have the opportunity to work on board ships will be reluctant to leave their jobs, which will prolong the rotation cycle of seafarers and aggravate the situation of few ships to work with; in terms of promotion opportunities, in a market where supply exceeds demand, the time of work at one position is prolonged, which in turn extends the

7 Since there are three obvious errors in research report released by the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and the International Shipping Federation (ISF), the data can only be used as reference. First, we should understand the limitation of the questionnaire

survey method adopted by the BIMCO/ISF for surveying the supply and demand of worldwide shipping manpower (officers) and the accuracy of the statistical forecast method as well as its mathematical model. Second, we should assess the validity of the worldwide officer shortage data released in the research report in light of objective facts. Third, we should understand the motivation for the constant release of worldwide shortage data of officers by the BIMCO/ISF. See Wu Zhaolin, Nature of the Shortage of Officers and China’s Coping Measures, World Shipping, Vol. 34, No. 11, 2011, pp. 2~3. (in Chinese)


promotion cycle, and thus seafarers may have to seek a job they are overqualified for in order to make a living.

3. Third, training agencies which cater to market demands for high-quality staff, will raise all training test thresholds in the name of quality control.

The direct result of the above three aspects is that many excellent and qualified seafarers will leave their seafaring positions to seek jobs in other industries. On the other hand, seafarers with relatively low levels of competence will be eliminated by this mechanism. The more far-reaching impact of this phenomenon is a job market with intense competition for few positions, little opportunity for promotion, and low expected income. This situation makes seafaring a less attractive industry to individuals considering seafaring as their career. As a result, the lack of newcomers foreshadows the future shortage of seafarers.

The evolution of the market mechanism in which “demand for ships outnum-bers supply of seafarers” is as follows:

1. For shipowners faced with few seafarers looking for work aboard ships, they have no choice but to attract seafarers by offering better working conditions, higher wages or more promotion opportunities. Moreover, some shipowners, by lowering their original seafarer competence standards will seek to employ lower-ranking seafarers which they might have been unwilling to accept in the past. In ad-dition, the shipowners, at that time, may solve the problem by choosing other seafa-rer supply channels, including engaging foreign seafarers.

2. For seafarers, they will not only have more job choices, better wages, improved working conditions, and greater opportunities for promotion, but will also gain more job experience in such a market.

3. For training agencies, besides the advantages gained in student recruitment and training, the impact that causes the most concern is that in order to meet market demand, the quality and quantity of training as well as the examination and


certification system may have their original standards lowered during this period.8 9

Under such a market mechanism, the seafarer selection and elimination mecha-nism is relatively weak, the service time of officers is too short, and new seafarers are anxious for promotion, which leads to the backsliding of average competence. In addition, some companies unscrupulously poach seafarers from other companies, which can lead to the employment of incompetent seafarers. As a result, ship operation and service quality are impacted, as are maritime safety standards, which raise the risk of maritime accidents.10 From a cause and effect perspective, the effect of expanded student recruitment and seafarer training in the period when “demand of ships outnumbers supply of seafarers” is in fact a cause for the future surplus of seafarers.11 Shipowners’ strategy for employing seafarers from other supply channels during such a period will also aggravate the new problems arising

8 There are many seafarers training centers in China, of which few are of good quality. Most of the centers simply provide training on seafarers’ performance of contracts, while almost none of them truly improve the competencies of Chinese seafarers. See Gu Jianwen, Seafarer Resources and Development of Seafarer Market in China, Water Transportation Digest, No. 10, 2005, pp. 28~29. (in Chinese)

9 Due to the serious shortage of professional teachers, practical teaching resources and resources for student internships (vessels for teaching and training in addition to onboard internship opportunities), some colleges which lack the necessary conditions for setting up maritime specialties have also started to recruit students. These conditions are required for maritime education and training in China. An obvious contrast has been developed between the rapid expansion of maritime education and seafarer training and the lack of real improvement in maritime education and seafarer training in China. The relaxing of standards for setting up maritime specialties and the lowering of operating conditions for seafarer training agencies, though favorable for expanding China’s maritime education and seafarer training, can hardly resolve the shortage of officers in China and across the world. See Wu Zhaolin, Nature of Shortage of Officers and China’s Coping Measures, World Shipping, Vol. 34, No. 11, 2011, pp. 1~4. (in Chinese)

10 The reality is that the legal knowledge of both seafarer dispatch agencies and seafarers have yet to be strengthened. Problems such as: failure to follow regulations, operation without proper licenses and unfair tuition charges, despite repeated attempts to prevent them, are common. Seafarers are recruited through the promise of high wages or arbitrary arrangements. As a result, seafarers lack competence and credibility, tempted by higher pay or position. This situation has destroyed the order of seafarers’ normal employment and mobility, and is also criticized by shipowners… A labor market lacking proper management and regulation loses credibility with shipowners and damages seafarers’ interests. See Hao Mingli, A Study on Problems in China’s Seafarer Labor Dispatch Market and Countermeasures, Navigation, No. 3, 2012, pp. 66~69. (in Chinese)

11 The number of students recruited by maritime institutes in China grew from 22,785 to 53,996 from 2006 to 2010, and it is estimated that the number of ocean-going officers

supplied by China will increase from 73,643 in 2011 to 134,339 in 2015. The serious imbalance between supply and demand will prevent many seafarers from working on board ships. See Li Ning and Lian Qingyun, Supply of China’s Ocean-going Officers: Forecast and Countermeasures, Marine Technology, No. 2, 2012, pp. 73~75. (in Chinese)


from future changes of supply and demand.

IV. A Strategic Reflection on the Supply and Demand of Qualified Professionals

Professional maritime education no longer focuses on traditional knowledge and technology education, but instead stresses that advanced maritime professionals with international competitiveness should have “one kind of spirit”, “two kinds of competence”, “four kinds of awareness”, and “five skills”.12 In other words, high-quality professionals that are trained through maritime education should have the following core competencies:13

1. They should be versed in professional maritime knowledge, international conventions, relevant laws and regulations, and able to keep updating their knowle-

12 (1) “One kind of spirit” means professional dedication. Having a resolute and correct political direction is a basic requirement for maritime professionals. They should love the nation and love the company where they work. They should be responsible and dedicated to their work. They must strictly abide by a sense of organizational discipline. They should be hard-working and have the spirit to be dedicated to the development of China’s shipping business. (2) “Two kinds of competence” means physical competence and psychological competence. Seafarers should be healthy both physically and psychologically. They need to be able to endure the inclement natural conditions and difficulties resulting from a life spent at sea. They should be good at managing interpersonal relationships. Those working in coastal areas should be able to confront intense competition and adjust to the social environment. (3) “Four kinds of awareness” refers to economic awareness, legal awareness, environmental awareness and awareness of obedience. Traditional maritime education focused on teaching knowledge and skills, but it lacked adequate training on economic awareness, legal awareness and environmental awareness. Economic awareness requires that maritime professionals should know how to operate and make a profit. Legal awareness requires that maritime professionals should not only know various international and domestic laws and regulations relevant to their specialty, but also strictly obey such laws and regulations. Environmental awareness requires that maritime professionals do their best to prevent pollution and protect the marine environment on their respective posts. (4) “Five skills” means management and leadership skills, foreign language skills, work skills, adaptability to changes and innovation skills. They should be able to use English to smoothly complete their work and participate in foreign exchange activities. In modern enterprise operation activities, scientific and effective management will bring huge benefits. Thus, in modern maritime education, training of leadership and coordination skills should become a part of the curriculum. Also, seafarers should be innovative, which is a general requirement for modern seafarers. See Lin Honggui, Training of Ocean-going Maritime Professionals: A Preliminary Discussion, Modern Business Trade Industry, No. 3, 2007, pp. 75~76. (in Chinese)

13 Wang Zuwen, Worldwide Supply and Demand of Officers and Development of Higher Maritime Education in China, at http://www.sol.com.cn/xinxiupdown_winland/zhishu/editor/uploadfile/dalianhaishi.pdf, 2 November 2012. (in Chinese)


dge base;2. They should master an extensive range of knowledge, including comprehen-

sive knowledge in economics, management and humanities, especially a mastery of international maritime legislation, and be able to deal with international maritime affairs;

3. They should have a good command of foreign languages, especially listen-ing and speaking ability in order to compete in the international seafarer labor market;

4. They should be aware of relevant marine transportation safety and environ-mental protection issues;

5. They should abide by a code of professional ethics, value team spirit, and be aware of the importance of obeying orders; and

6. They should have practical operations skills and be able to solve problems independently.

However, the above expectations are an indirect illustration of the problems in the current education and training of officers in China beyond the level of supply and demand.14

In light of policy measures to cope with diverse problems in seafarer develop-ment such as a serious lack of seafarers, low competence of seafarers, unreasonable seafarer team structure, scarcity of officers, abundance of ratings, further aggrava-tion of seafarer mobility, serious attrition of high-quality seafarers, and serious lackof seafarer professional training mechanism, the Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of China launched Ten Measures for Accelerating the Develop-

14 An expert has pointed out five problems in a study on the current situation and problems of China’s seafarer labor dispatch market: 1) the present number of ocean-going seafarers is too small, 2) existing officer training is unable to adequately expand, 3) the seafarer examination system is irrational, 4) efforts in monitoring the labor market are inadequate, and 5) seafarers working abroad do not have high competence. The fifth point includes the lack of four abilities on the part of seafarers: their inadequate learning awareness, their poor English communication skills, the neglect of dispatch seafarers’ culture difference and work ability, their lack of passion for work and their inadequate awareness of obedience. See Hao Mingli, A Study on Problems in China’s Seafarer Labor Dispatch Market and Countermeasures, Navigation, No. 3, 2012, pp. 66~69. (in Chinese)


ment of Seafarers in 2008.15 These measures, by moderating requirements on degrees, strengthening requirements on experience, moderating theoretical examinations and strengthening operational tests, attempt to solve outstanding problems in the development of seafarers, improve seafarers’ competence, and promote the scientific development of the seafarer team. However, it seems that a gap always exists between these relative measures and the training of officers with expected competence.

In fact, a retrospective view of the evolution of the international seafarer labor supply market over the past fifty years will demonstrate that the supply and demand of seafarers is not only closely related to the development of the shipping market, economic and social development of various countries, income of nationals of various countries, as well as the maritime transportation policies and labor export policies of various countries, but also related to the maritime education certification system of various countries.

A prime example of this is the maritime education certification system. The maritime education certification test department, as a part of the public service system, is often a department with the slowest response due to its bureaucratic style. The work style of such departments often aggravates the problems of advanced maritime professionals. The root of the problem is the inflexibility of the education system’s student recruitment method, which often recruits students who “aim to get a degree” instead of those who “aspire to follow a seafaring career”. This situation is more often found in East Asian societies, primarily South Korea, Japan and Chinese Mainland and Taiwan. The natural result is a waste of educational resources, and the exclusion of students “aspiring to follow a seafaring career” from the test system.

15 I. Implement seafarer E-government; II. Establish comprehensive seafarer competence assessment programs to determine seafarer competence by their abilities; III. Establish an officer internship program to improve their competence; IV. Strengthen seafarer competence assessment and improve their practical operation ability; V. Eliminate the restriction on students at maritime institutes that they should be subject to operational evaluation before a theoretical examination; VI. Regulate the correspondence training model in order to establish a channel for a promotion of ratings; VII. Train teachers to meet the needs of seafarer education and improve training quality; VIII. Prolong the qualification requirements for the promotion of third officers and fourth engineers to second officers and third engineers from 12 to 18 months; IX. Ensure that seafarer competence exam scores are valid for three years and eliminate the restriction on the number of make-up exams; X. Adjust the educational requirements on officers and improve team structure. See Jiao Hai Fa [2008] No. 141, Ten Measures for Accelerating the Development of Seafarers, 27 March 2008.


Also, to maintain the maritime education certification test’s professional, neu-tral and detached nature, and to prevent collusion between officials and business-men, the public service system has always not been able to coordinate with the market mechanism. To say nothing of coordination in regards to the reflection and forecasting of the ups and downs of the shipping market as well as changes in market supply and demand. Of course, it is very difficult to forecast the ups and downs of the shipping market, and thus it might be better not to forecast.

Maritime education is one of the cornerstones of shipping development, and cultivating advanced seafarer labor will improve the shipping industry of a country, although this is not always the case.

For example, the three major shipping countries, Greece, Japan and Germany have a different approach to seafarer education. Based on data from the Review of Maritime Transport 2011 issued by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Table 3),16 the three major shipping countries’ ships of 1,000 gross tonnage (GT) and above account for 27.82% of the world’s total and whose deadweight tonnage account for 41.10% of the world’s total. These countries have prominent maritime culture and historical background related to the shipping industry, but they do not maintain a large training system for advanced maritime professionals to maintain their leadership in the modern shipping industry.17 In comparison, famous seafarer supply countries such as the Philippines and several Eastern European countries are not able to secure the high development of their shipping business even with their larger number of seafarers. The crux of the problem is in the definition of advanced maritime professionals: are they important personnel, knowledge and skill resources, working partners for the future development of a company, or are they just technical personnel operating ships for a fixed time at the command of a company?

16 China Mainland’s number of vessels accounts for 9.40% of the world total, and deadweight tonnage 8.63%；China Hong Kong’s number of vessels accounts for 1.83% of the world total, and deadweight tonnage 2.97%; Taiwan’s number of vessels accounts for 1.70% of the world total, and deadweight tonnage 2.63%. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2011, at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/rmt2011_en.pdf, 31 October 2012.

17 The total number of vessels over 1000 GT owned by European countries such as Greece, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom accounts for 29.82% of the world total, and deadweight tonage 33.55%, but the total number of officers they have accounts for only 9% of the world total. See Drewry Maritime Research, Manning – Annual Report 2012, 8 May 2012.


Table 3 Fleets Owned by Major Countries or Regions

Country/region (global ranking)

Number of ships above 1000 GT DWT

Domestic vessels

Foreign vessels Total Domestic

vesselsForeign vessels Total

Greece (1) 758 2,455 3,213 64,659,201 137,728,951 202,388,152Japan (2) 7,24 3,071 3,795 18,942,573 178,287,143 197,229,716

Germany (3) 442 3,356 3,798 17,149,221 97,623,425 114,772,646China Mainland

(4) 2044 1,607 3,651 46,207,468 61,762,042 107,969,510

South Korea (5) 736 453 1,189 18,135,391 29,317,780 47,453,171United States

(6) 971 1,001 1,972 24,363,609 22,011,225 46,374,915

Norway (7) 818 1,166 1,984 14,850,693 28,127,239 42,977,932China Hong

Kong (8) 399 313 712 24,102,438 13,080,401 37,182,839

Denmark (9) 383 592 975 13,998,073 21,113,253 35,111,326China Taiwan

(10) 97 565 662 4,096,790 28,863,160 32,959,950

Italy (13) 616 220 836 16,556,782 6,774,107 2,330,889United

Kingdom (14) 363 412 778 8,927,892 13,395,899 22,323,791

World’s total 17,391 21,456 38,847 399,254,553 852,394,905 1,251,649,458(Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Mariti-me Transport 2011, at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/rmt2011_en.pdf, 31 October 2012.)

But the basis for this view cannot be taken as an excuse for the failure of China Mainland with a population of 1.3 billion to make active input in education of maritime professionals, nor can it be used as a pretext for China Taiwan, a region famous for its maritime business and dependent on maritime transportation.

China Mainland has 1.55 million registered seafarers, ranking first in the world, but only 510,000 of them really engage in maritime transportation, including 156,000 seafarers with an ocean-going merchantman certificate, and 62,000 ocean-going seamen with officer certificate. There are less than 5,000 shipmasters and chief engineers respectively, including management level onshore shipmasters and chief engineers. The total number of shipmasters and chief engineers truly engaging


in ocean-going shipping is only about 8,000. 18 Therefore, in light of the current demand of shipping companies, the supply of senior maritime professionals in China Mainland is inadequate to meet China Mainland’s domestic demand.19 This is not only a commercial concern, but a warning signal for national security. An analysis of the current average income of citizens may uncover that with its wide gaps between different provinces and urban and rural areas, choosing to become a senior maritime professional can be very attractive to people with lower income because of the relatively high salary. Besides, of the expected 590,000 strong 2016 international officer market, the shares that China Mainland is set to occupy will not only be an economic index but an indicator of the competence of China

18 Zheng Lei, A Tentative Discussion on the Measures for Developing Seafarers in China under the Manila Amendments to the STCW Convention, Proceedings of the Fourth Guangdong Maritime Advanced Forum, Guangdong: Guangdong Provincial Association for Science and Technology, 2012, pp. 525~528. (in Chinese)

19 According to the data in Review of Maritime Transport 2011 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the total number of vessels with 1,000 GT and above (including national and foreign flags) in China Mainland was 3,651, accounting for 9.398% of the world’s total; and the data in Review of Maritime Transport 2010 shows the percentage was 9.458%. However, according to the data of the 2010 BIMCO/ISF survey, China Mainland’s officers only accounted for 8.25% of the world’s total. This data illustrates that it seems that the number of officers cannot meet the demand of the fleets owned by China Mainland and there are no surplus officers from China Mainland to supply to the fleets of other countries.


Mainland’s officers.20

For Taiwan, with its strong shipping capacity, there are also several unique questions that may have to be considered. First, will Taiwan be able to maintain its current shipping capacity without the education and training of senior maritime professionals? Second, will Taiwan’s shipping market continue to grow at the current rate or will it sharply decline under the pressure of international economy and politics? Third, considering that the number of seafarers in Taiwan has dropped from 30,000 to 6,000 over the past few decades because of the abnormal interactions between senior maritime professionals and Taiwan’s shipping market, what will Taiwan’s next strategy for training maritime professionals be?

V. Conclusion

Whether in a market in which “supply of seafarers outnumbers demand for

20 According to a report from Drewry Maritime Research, the number of six kinds of vessels was 22,581 by the end of 2011, and is predicted to increase to 24,393 by 2016, with a compound annual growth rate of 1.6% (Table 1 below). The demand for officers is predicted to increase by 31,000 (Table 2 below). See Drewry Maritime Research, Manning – Annual Report 2012, 8 May 2012.

Table 1 Projected Fleet Changes to 2016Number of vessels in 2000 (1)

Number of vessels in 2011 (2)

Compound annual growth rate from

2000 to 2011

Number of vessels in 2016

Projected compound annual growth rate from 2011 to 2016

Oil tanker 2,884 3,130 0.7% 3,402 1.7%Chemical

tanker 1,618 4,045 8.7% 4,302 1.2%

LPG carrier 873 1,140 2.5% 1,201 1.0%

LNG carrier 127 358 9.9% 425 3.5%

Dry bulk 5,540 8,818 4.3% 10,185 2.9%Container 2,500 5,090 6.7% 4,878 -0.8%

Total 13,542 22,581 4.8% 24,393 1.6%(1) By 1 January 2000, (2) By December 2011

（Source: Drewry Maritime Research, Manning – Annual Report 2012, May 8, 2012.）Table 2 Projected Officer Demand/Supply (unit: 1,000 People)

1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 2016Officer demand 448 427 420 476 560 591Officer supply 403 409 404 566 544 575

Surface surplus (deficit) -45 -18 -16 -10 -16 -16 （Source: BIMCO/Drewry Maritime Research/PAL）


ships”, or one in which “demand for ships outnumbers supply of seafarers”, the number of senior maritime professionals is always a consequence of the interaction between supply and demand. Underlying the fluctuating shipping market is the serious problem of an inadequate maritime education and training system, as well as an inefficient certification system. However, the more fundamental issue is the competence of senior maritime professionals produced under these systems. The spirit, qualification, awareness and abilities of Chinese senior maritime professionals continue to be a problem. Individuals produced by a system whose competence fluctuates and quality varies, will be unable to truly enter the professional international maritime market.

Chinese Mainland and Taiwan, which share a historical origin, have already surrendered leadership of global shipbuilding and maritime science and technology because of several hundred years of closed-door policies under which maritime culture was neglected.

This nation led the global shipping industry six hundred years ago and even today this nation is still equipped with the conditions for leading the global shipping industry. Yet to realize the goal of becoming a “strong seafarer country”,21 the real problem of unbalanced education for senior maritime professionals is yet to be carefully assessed, and the role of “senior maritime professionals” needs to be re-positioned.


21 To realize the goal of becoming a “strong seafarer country”, the following three objectives must be achieved: 1. become a major country of seafarer labor export; 2. have high-quality seafarers able to meet the demands of modern, special and super-sized vessels; 3. have a strong voice on the international seafarer stage. See Weng Yuezong, Analysis of Ship Officer Resources under the Goal of Building a Strong Seafarer Country, Navigation of China, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2011, p. 78. (in Chinese)


船舶夹层融资活动中的法律关系

汪若男 *

内容摘要：面对船舶业快速发展与资金来源有限性之间的矛盾，船舶融资途径迫切需要创新。夹层融资是介于股权与债权之间的“夹层”，兼具两者的性质特征，具有独特的灵活性及契合性。尽管我国现行的法律法规并无相关的专门规定，但现有的法律规范基本能够支持船舶夹层融资的开展。本文针对建造中船舶和营运船舶提出两种夹层融资模式：建造中船舶可以融合适用夹层贷款模式，各方当事人以借贷关系和抵押担保关系维系利益；船舶运营本身有着很大的不确定性，投资风险随之变化，可以采取夹层贷款或优先股模式开展夹层融资。为了更好地运行船舶夹层融资，各参与人之间的法律关系须予以明确，主要涉及权利抵押的定性、关系人的利益冲突和“优先股”的界定等问题。

关键词：夹层融资船舶融资法律关系

2009 年，国务院明确提出推进上海建设国际航运中心的目标；1 上海市也积

极响应，出台加快国际航运中心建设“十二五”规划。2 2013 年上海紧锣密鼓积

* 汪若男，上海交通大学凯原法学院。电子邮箱：[email protected]。题目来源：中国国际经济交流中心课题《上海国际航运中心建设》，课题组组长赵劲松教授。

© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW1 《国务院关于推进上海加快发展现代服务业和先进制造业建设国际金融中心和国际航运

中心的意见》（国发 [2009]19 号）。国际航运中心建设的总体目标是：到 2020 年，基本建成航运资源高度集聚、航运服务功能健全、航运市场环境优良、现代物流服务高效，具有全球航运资源配置能力的国际航运中心；基本形成以上海为中心、以江浙为两翼，以长江流域为腹地，与国内其他港口合理分工、紧密协作的国际航运枢纽港；基本形成规模化、集约化、快捷高效、结构优化的现代化港口集疏运体系，以及国际航空枢纽港，实现多种运输方式一体化发展；基本形成服务优质、功能完备的现代航运服务体系，营造便捷、高效、安全、法治的口岸环境和现代国际航运服务环境，增强国际航运资源整合能力，提高综合竞争力和服务能力。

2 《市政府印发上海市加快国际航运中心建设“十二五”规划》（沪府发 [2012]48 号）。总体目标是：重点提升和优化航运优势产业，建立较为完整的航运服务体系，形成有利于国际航运中心建设的政策环境，鼓励各类市场主体充分发挥作用，提高基于现代信息技术的现代物流服务效能，加强与江浙主要港口的互动协作，建成辐射长三角地区和长江流域的结构合理的集疏运体系。到 2015 年底，基本实现货物、船舶、企业、资金、人才、信息、技术等航运要素与资源全面集聚，初步具备全球航运资源配置能力，形成上海国际航运中心核心功能，为 2020 年具备全球航运资源配置能力打下框架基础。

船舶夹层融资活动中的法律关系 263

极推动浦东综合配套改革，试点建立自由贸易园区；3 并且为建设国际航运中心软

实力，波罗的海国际航运公会上海中心已经于 2013 年 2 月正式落户浦东。4 建设

与本国经济规模、发展现状相适应的船舶航运业，对我们国家而言，是经济改革开

放发展的内在需求，也是中国面向世界发展不可或缺的战略组成部分。

船舶业属于技术与资本都高度密集的产业。5 船舶融资具有投入高、技术性

强、回报期长等特点。船舶融资市场上存在多种融资途径，各有利弊。6 在全球整

体航运融资供需缺口持续扩大 7的大环境影响下，国内船舶融资在增长速度与幅度

方面都有所减缓，但航运金融市场依然保持增长势头。我国船舶融资市场目前面

临的最主要问题就是如何通过制度创新构建更加适合当前经济环境的船舶融资新

模式，以满足日益增长的航运企业融资需求：船舶融资方式迫切需要开辟新路径。

一、夹层融资适用于船舶融资中的现实可能性

3　《浦东：剑指“太平洋战略”》，下载于 http://www.shport.gov.cn/kadt/gjhy/201302/t20130- 219_6757.html，2013 年 4 月 1 日。4　《首个国际航运组织入驻上海，增强航运中心软实力》，下载于 http://www.shport.gov.c- n/kadt/gjhy/201302/t20130226_6814.html，2013 年 4 月 1 日。5　杨良宜著：《船舶融资与抵押》，大连：大连海事大学出版社 2003 年版，第 45 页。6　商业银行贷款是最为普通与常见的船舶融资方式。就我国而言，可以肯定的是，商业

银行拥有巨大的资金流。但在实际操作过程中，在船价、运价、波罗的海干散货指数纷纷走低，金融机构，尤其是商业银行很难评估手中抵押物能否覆盖贷款，同时也无法判断船东未来是否有能力偿还贷款，在这种情况下，银行会向造船业投放多少贷款，目前仍是一个问题。参见《船舶融资的亚洲机遇》，下载于 http://www.cnforex.com/comment/html/2012/8/23/73a7d420c14dce4c55763f47a47237ce.html，2013 年 3 月 7 日。融资租赁是租赁公司常用的融资方式，其本意在于在同一个交易中经由借物这一方式同时达到融物与融资两方面的效果。在融资租赁交易过程中，出租人仍然是租赁物的所有权人，然而承租人却长期占有、使用租赁物，“占有”和“所有”的长时间分离很容易产生交易时信息的不对称，自然而然就会影响各方当事人参与的积极性，无形中增添了开展融资租赁的阻力。参见高圣平、王思源：《论融资租赁交易的法律构造》，载于《法律科学（西北政法大学学报）》2013 年第 1 期，第 160~170 页。债券融资和股权融资是国内许多大型航运企业常用的融资手段。虽然首次公开募股融资能力强劲，但上市后，企业必然要公开披露诸多信息，同时还要经受舆论媒体的追踪监督等等。大量披露财务、股东状况及运营规划等信息，方便了公众了解企业动态，但同时不可避免地也方便了竞争对手知晓公司发展计划。在股权方面，不可否认，大量的外来社会资本进入企业，壮大了企业的资本实力，但也不难发现，资本有抑制性，外来资本的进入必然在某些方面牵制了内部股权力量，原有的管理目标或既定策略遭受考验，是否能一如既往地保证决策和执行的效率还有待进一步考证。

7　相关数据显示，2010 年远东地区以及澳大利亚两个区域船舶融资数额为 664 亿美元，2012 年上涨幅度超过 40%，增长到 930 亿美元，并且预计未来两年内仍会保持这一上升势头。参见《2012–2013 中国航运金融市场发展报告》，下载于 http://news.sol.com.cn/html/2013-02-25/A2C888E9A0ADCDADB.shtml，2013 年 3 月 18 日。2012 年 7 月，国外媒体发表相关报道，全球航运业存在融资缺口高达 650 亿美元，到 2013 年该缺口将扩大至 1010 亿美元。参见《2013 年全球航运业融资缺口将达 1010 亿美元》，下载于 http://info.10000link.com/newsdetail.aspx?doc=610260313，2013 年 3 月 7 日。


夹层融资是一种融资方式的统称，并不是一个严格意义上的法律概念，其性

质融合了债权融资和股权融资两者的特征，8 融资方式非常灵活。学者谢剑平将

“Mezzanine Finance”翻译为“双重特性融资”，9 夹层融资好比在股权与债权中

增加了一个“夹层”，风险与回报均介于债务融资和股本融资之间。

夹层资本最主要的投资利润来自于获得目标企业股权的溢价收益，这也就决

定了夹层资本在筛选目标企业时一定要进行充分地评估和比较。在夹层融资的过

程中，为确保投资的安全，夹层资本不仅会对土地、房产等不动产之类的硬件进行

评估，而且也会对企业的人力资源、品牌价值、商业名誉等软实力进行评价，同时

也可能会对企业的管理者以及股东的个人情况一并进行综合考察。充分的、全方

位的评估有利于夹层投资者更深入地了解企业的综合状况，给投资者选择不同企

业提供的不同债权和股权融资比例方案做参考依据，融资过程也很灵活。在债权

融资的基础上结合转股选择权，这样的方法对于借款企业来说，可以解决或缓解

企业在低谷时期的还款压力，在融资结构中给借款人保留比较大的资产余值，也

在退出机制方面提供了一定的便利。

将夹层融资纳入为船舶融资的途径之一，与船舶融资的特点和夹层融资的特

征密不可分。

首先，船舶具有明显的商品属性。从传统意义上讲，船舶是航运的工具，船

舶所有者提供运输服务。类似但不同于房产的是，船舶虽属于可移动的财产，但

因其价值巨大，在法律上被视为不动产。船舶投资回报率高，可以达到 7% 左右，

比房地产高出 4%~5%，10 船舶投资具有高度的财富积累效应，可投资性强。

其次，船舶融资具有长期性的特征，鉴于此，航运企业应着重考虑资金成本

和财务风险。11 长期性银行贷款或发行长期债券，能够为航运企业提供长期的运

营资金，同时也提高了企业的负债率，产生财务风险隐患。因此，选择融资方式，

不能仅仅只考虑到某一方面的可行性，而应当在明确资本结构合理性的基础上，

8　在英文中，“Mezzanine”是指“底楼与二楼之间的夹层楼面”。夹层这一概念最早在华尔街被用于指代投资级债券与垃圾债券之间的债券等级。随着市场的发展，夹层融资演化成为一种介于股权和普通债务之间的融资方式。参见傅璇：《夹层融资：股权与债务之间资本通道》，载于《国际融资》2004 年第 12 期，第 56~59 页；《夹层融资：缓冲债务抵押渠道不足之下的融资方案》，下载于 http://shiju.tax861.gov.cn/bjds/wenzi/wenzi.asp?more_id=127112，2013 年 3 月 10 日。《路透金融词典》对此的解释是，夹层融资是指一种性质介于债务与股票之间的资本融资方式，其收益率高于优先级债务，但长期收益率低于股票，下载于 http://glossary.reuters.com.cn/wiki/index.php/，2013 年 3 月 17 日。

9　谢剑平著：《现代投资银行》，台北：智胜文化事业有限公司 2001 年版，第 2~4 页。10 船舶投资平均回报率比房地产高出 4%~5%。参见涂媛婷：《金融危机下船舶融资现状

及发展船舶开放式基金》，载于《江西金融职工大学学报》2010 年第 3 期，第 19~21 页。11　长期性银行贷款或发行长期债券，能够为航运企业提供长期的运营资金，资金成本也

相对较低，但同时提高了企业的负债率，增加了财务风险。而发行股票虽然财务风险相对较小，但资金成本却较高。


综合衡量财务风险及其与资金成本的关系，追求负债融资和权益融资总体上的平

衡。我国的航运企业想要获得最佳的资本结构，就必须要选择正确的融资方式。

优化公司资本结构需要充分权衡债权与股权以及内部融资与外部融资的比例，这

一点恰恰反映了夹层融资兼具股权与债权性质的特点。

第三，与传统融资方式相比，夹层融资的方式就是充分运用各种社会资本，

使部分股权和部分债权得以灵活地参与到实体经济中，发挥企业资源优势，提升

企业金融能力，从而促使企业产生更多的资本效益。当企业在某一产业领域已经

占有一定的市场和稳健的效益，并证明自己有意愿和能力在这个产业领域进一步

做大做强时，上市和夹层融资都是不错的融资方式。然而，上市要求高、需要经过

繁琐的长期准备，无疑增添了融资的成本，很多企业望尘莫及。在上市之前，如果

企业自身实力不够，可采取夹层融资的方式进行融资。

因此，融资方式的选择，不能仅考虑到某一方面的可行性，而应当在明确资

本结构合理性的基础上，综合衡量财务风险和资金成本的关系，在总体上追求负

债融资和权益融资的平衡。我国航运企业要达到资本结构最佳，就要正确选择融

资方式。融资结构的优化表现为内、外部融资比例的协调，股权和债权有效的组合。

二、营运船舶夹层融资的法律结构及法律问题

根据资金使用目的的区别，船舶融资通常可以分成两类，即新造船融资和营

运船舶融资。当然，不同的船舶融资需求不同，相应的法律框架也不尽相似。加

之，夹层融资本身是一种交易结构形式，其融资方式非常灵活，因此交易双方选用

不同的交易模式必然导致双方不同的权利义务关系。同时，船舶标的价值巨大，

与其他设备的生产过程也不尽相同，造船厂不会并且也不能生产船舶待销，而是

在接收到定单的情况下才着手建造船舶。船舶的价值也是随建造进程的变化而变

化的。在现有法律法规的基础上，针对不同阶段的具体情形，适时构建不同的法

律框架，才能更好地开展融资活动，规避风险。

（一）营运船舶夹层贷款模式法律运行框架


图 1 夹层贷款模式

由上图所示，夹层贷款人提供夹层贷款，夹层借款人是单纯为运作夹层融资

专门成立的符合法定借款人资质的实体。夹层贷款人利用此新设实体对该船舶运

营项目进行控股。夹层借款人将其持有的抵押借款人的股权质押给夹层贷款人以

此作为夹层债的担保，12 也可以用获得的分红来偿还夹层债。夹层借款人向船舶

所有人提供抵押贷款，此时船舶为抵押担保物。抵押借款人直接拥有船舶所有权，

并以船舶作为向抵押贷款人贷款的抵押。抵押借款人和抵押贷款人之间也有两重

关系，借贷关系和抵押担保关系。抵押贷款人和夹层贷款人需要在利益关系上互

相协调。为协调利益关系，抵押贷款人和夹层贷款人会签订一份协议，即债权人

协议。

夹层模式中，夹层借款人与夹层贷款人之间，以及抵押借款人和抵押贷款人

之间都存在借贷与抵押担保的双重关系，13 投资者可以获得现金收益和资本升值

双重收益。一旦船舶在营运过程中遭遇不测灭失，抵押权丧失时，依然可以通过

借贷关系进行权益追偿。在发动夹层贷款上，抵押借款人与抵押贷款人具有共同

的利益。因而在具体操作时，为化解抵押贷款人与夹层贷款人之间的纠纷，解决

12　 Andrew A. Lance Partner, Structural Protections in Inter-creditor Agreements for Mezzanine Loans, Briefings in Real Estate Finance,Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2004, pp. 21~36.

13　 Patrick Lawler, What Private Equity Firms Want in a Lender, Commercial Lending Review, Vol. 22, Issue 1, 2007, p. 9.


利益矛盾，14 双方通常会协商起草一份债权人协议。此时，当事人就抵押船舶有

关的相互权利义务关系做出约定，只要不违反国家法律法规，约定是有效力的。

（二）船舶夹层贷款模式的标的——股权之定性问题

传统抵押贷款中，借款人直接拥有船舶；与之不同的是，在船舶夹层融资中，

夹层借款人不直接拥有船舶或运作企业，仅持股分红，而船厂或船公司直接拥有

船舶所有权。夹层借款人将其持有的船厂或船公司的股份，抵押给夹层贷款人，

用以作为夹层贷款的担保。那么以股权为标的进行抵押，这一融资方式能否合法

合规地操作呢？

1. 关于股权的定性问题

夹层融资借款人的担保物标的是股东权利，那么该怎样为这一标的定性呢？

存在多种有关股权性质的学说，比较著名的学说有所有权说、债权说、社员权说等

三大主流观点。这些学说各有其合理性，同时也各有其不能自圆其说之处。

股份公司中，股东出资换取相应股权，从本质上来看，这是将财产支配权通

过入股这一行为转化为收益权。股权特有的客体——股份，其特征决定了股权是

一种新型的权利，不能在传统的物权、债权、知识产权等权利类型中为它找到适当

的位置。在法律规定的法人制度框架内，个人通过出资成为公司法人的股份所有

人，即股东；同时，个人的出资行为经过特定的法律手续，变成了两个彼此独立的

法律客体，即公司财产与股东个人财产。两者对应的法律主体亦不相同，并且，这

一变化直接导致此时股东股权的实现手段发生了变化，也就是说，股东不能直接

处分其在公司中所拥有的财产，只能通过法律概念上的法人，即公司这一中转桥

梁来实现。公司盈利，股东资本升值，也同样不能直接支出或转入，只能凭借股东

大会或董事会等法定机构以法定程序享有相应的支配权。

公司财产是股东出资的总额，基于资本不变的原则，在未经法定程序变更之

前，公司财产保持相对固定不变的状态。在这个过程中，无论股东的出资情况发

生了怎样的变化，转让、抽回、折价等等，都不会影响到已经由法律确定的公司总

资产。股东持有股权，因而给股权带来了一些人身方面的属性或特征，但这并不

是也不能掩盖股权的财产权属性，股权是股东因持有相应公司财产份额而获取的

管理、支配权利。换句话说，为设立或发展公司，股东用自己的财产出资换取了相

应份额的股份，此时股权实际上就是这份出资资产的所有权或使用权所对应的公

司权利份额。

2. 营运船舶夹层融资中股权的定性

14　沈达明编著：《国际金融法上的次级债权》，北京：对外经济贸易大学出版社 2002 年版，第 132 页。


在船舶夹层融资贷款中，被用来作为贷款抵押的股东权利包括哪些方面的内

容，是单纯的财产性权利还是同时包含相应的非财产性权利呢？

首先需要明确，对于股东出资形式《中华人民共和国公司法》（下文简称“《公

司法》”）第 27 条做出了规定，股东可以依法用货币或非货币财产出资，这一条款

明确了股东能够以非货币形式出资。同时结合股权的性质发现，股权出资刚好符

合非货币出资的条件，即可以用货币估价而且可以依法转让。股权的价值由股东

权益决定，而股东权益的价值由运营状况和资产价值决定，是一个随市场变化的

状态，这一点也与《中华人民共和国物权法》（以下简称“《物权法》”）提及的浮动

抵押相类似。

所有权关系包括财产的占有、收益、管理、转让以及使用等权利内容。那么，

股东出资后，便享有基于此次投资回报获得的资本升值所带来的利润分红的权

利，同时也享有通过行使表决权等方式获得的对资本运作的控制权。收益权与控

制权通过股权很好地结合在一起，可以说股权是一种财产权的集合体。当然，通

过股权，股东直接享有财产性权利，但不可忽视的是，股东不单有获取分红的权利，

同时也可参与公司经营管理等非财产性方面的内容。股权是股东行使非财产性权

利的必经中间环节或“桥梁”。由此可知，此时的股东通过股权获取的权利，既有

财产性的一面，又有非财产性的一面。

夹层融资中的股权质押与现有法律规定的股权质押不完全相同。一般情况

下，股东可以将一部分股份进行质押，但夹层借款人对船厂或船公司是完全控股

的，并且以所控股的全部权利作为抵押。同时，不难发现，夹层融资中以“权利抵

押”做担保，而《物权法》中规定的“浮动抵押”以有形财产为标的作担保，这一

点与现有法律规定的区别比较明显。股东权益所代表的价值是一个不断变动的价

值，由企业的经营管理状况决定。设定抵押后，如果企业经营状况良好，不断盈利，

那么夹层贷款人的抵押股权价值就不断升高；反之则不断降低。抵押船舶的价值

是夹层融资的保障，船厂或船公司在融资后不正当或者不合理运营船舶，会导致

船舶价值减损，直接影响夹层贷款人的投资利益。尽管作为夹层融资的投资人，

其终极目标在于资本升值、获取利润，无意控制企业，但为了防范于未然，夹层贷

款人也应该要求用于抵押的股东权利中包含一定的非财产性权利，如监督权等，

以防范不当经营带来的经济损失。鉴于夹层贷款人无意控制企业的本意，在监督

权、投票权方面可以协商约定比例。

（三）融资相关主体——夹层债权人与抵押权人的利益冲突问题

1. 夹层借款人的法律定位

前文已经提到，夹层贷款人可以为信托公司或金融机构，也可以为自然人，


数量方面也没有限制。融资过程中标的额巨大，夹层贷款人往往由多个自然人或

机构组成。在运作过程中，夹层贷款人不可能全部参与到投资中来，也可能会产

生纠纷，加之出于投资税收等方面的考虑，往往需要另外成立一个单独的、值得信

任的新实体来为其开展具体融资业务。船舶夹层融资的借款人就是为进行夹层融

资而特别设立的控股企业，即该控股企业是一个特定目的实体，除了为夹层融资

贷款提供担保外，不开展其他营业行为，唯一的功能就是持有船舶所有人的股权

并以之向夹层贷款人抵押借款，以其收益偿还夹层贷款。

作为夹层融资人为特定目的而设立的实体，夹层借款人主要目的在于将股权

用作夹层贷款抵押。我国法律并没有明文对设立特定目的的实体做出说明，换言

之，只要该实体满足相应的出资、注册等设立条件，则可以获取法律上的认可地位。

夹层借款人对船厂或船舶运营企业注入夹层融资，并且对其全资控股。从两者的

资本流转状况来看，也可以理解为，船厂或船舶运营企业的股东以其对本企业的

股权出资成立了该控股企业（即夹层借款人）从事特定目的，两方股东归一，企业

形式变成了《公司法》下的一人公司。根据《公司法》，一人公司是可以合法设立的，

并同时出台了相应的特别规定加以辅佐。由此可见只要夹层借款人的设立不违反

《公司法》中有关一人公司的出资、设立等条件，夹层融资如此构造是可以合法合

规地展开运营操作的。

需要明确的是，根据《公司法》第 64 条规定，抵押借款人需要证明其财产的

独立地位，否则抵押贷款债权人可以依“揭开公司面纱”为由向夹层贷款人主张权

利，要求其承担相应的偿付责任。在美国，此类情况需要由法律顾问出具相应的“非

实质性合并意见”用以佐证抵押借款人与夹层借款人彼此独立的经营状况以及财

产分离的事实。15 当然，并不是说美国的做法可以直接套用到我国法律的操作过

程中，但为证明彼此财产与经营状况的独立，专业的法律意见及有效的财务报表、

公司账目等证据还是必不可少的。这时，可以由船厂或船公司等运营企业的法律

部门出具专业的法律意见，澄清船舶所有权人与夹层借款人之间财务、运营等相

互独立，为两个具有独立法律承受能力的实体，以保证夹层融资的顺利开展，避免

融资障碍。

2. 夹层贷款人与抵押贷款人之间的利益冲突问题

夹层贷款人与抵押贷款人之间存在的利益冲突主要表现在：

从图1中可以看出，夹层借款人仅仅持有船舶所有人的股份，不参与船厂或

船公司等船舶所有人的运营，而船舶为船舶所有人所直接拥有，并作为抵押物向

抵押贷款人抵押贷款。根据《物权法》第 179 条规定，抵押权优先于普通债权受偿。

故而当船舶所有人破产时，抵押贷款人在受偿位阶上将优先于夹层借款人，夹层

15　曾旭辉：《房地产夹层融资法律问题研究》，下载于 http://crel.law.pku.edu.cn/article_vi- ew.asp?id=92，2013 年 5 月 1 日。


贷款的优势将荡然无存。假如船舶所有人经营不善，股价贬值，直接导致夹层借

款人不能按照约定给付夹层贷款，夹层贷款人为保全利益，依融资合约将债权转

化为股权，进而控制船舶所有人。此时抵押财产所有人发生变化，直接影响抵押

贷款人抵押财产的价值，并且依《物权法》第 191 条规定，夹层贷款人还需代为清

偿债务。这与夹层融资的初衷是相违背的，夹层贷款人追求资本升值，并非有意

经营或控制船舶所有人。两者的矛盾需要协调。

一般情况下，借款人以抵押物进行再融资时，将不可避免地产生更多的债务

支出，势必会对抵押物的价值产生影响，此时根据《物权法》第 193 条的规定，抵

押贷款人可以要求船舶所有人停止该行为。然而法律规定并不是绝对的，根据《物

权法》第 191 条的规定，再结合图1来看，如果船舶所有人将船舶抵押在先，之后

经营不善，意欲通过夹层融资筹款或再融资时，必须要获得抵押贷款人的同意。

也就是说，在船舶夹层融资运作过程中，船舶所有人需要得到抵押贷款人的同意

方能再进行夹层融资，这一同意意见可通过债权人协议加以明确。

在充分考虑双方利益的基础上，本文认为，债权人协议可以对以下事项进行

约定：

（1）处分船舶时的通知权与撤销权

夹层贷款人与抵押贷款人维系利益的重要连接点就是船舶。该船舶是夹层融

资的对象，也是抵押标的物，双方都有可能对其进行处分。对于船舶的处分可能

出现两种情况：一是当夹层借款人无力支付夹层贷款，夹层贷款人通过转债为股控

制船舶所有人时，应在一定期限内通知抵押贷款人；二是，如果船舶所有人违约，

抵押贷款人也可以要求变卖抵押船舶偿还贷款，此时也应在一定期限内通知夹层

贷款人。如果没有履行相应的通知义务，双方也可以约定相应的撤销权，自变卖

之日起一年内，可以向法院申请撤销。

（2）对船舶所有权人享有有限的控制权

船舶所有人破产无疑对各方当事人来说都是最大的损失，也是融资交易最不

希望出现的状况。于是，为保证经营决策的正确性与有效性，夹层贷款人可以要

求在船舶所有人运营船舶的过程中享有有限的控制权或决策权，如采取适当的措

施加强对公司的监督管理，要求列席董事会会议或委任独立董事、特别股东等。

相对于夹层贷款人来说，抵押贷款人往往更倾向于追求风险较低的融资交易，在

运营决策的过程中双方可能就会对船舶所有人的经营行为产生分歧。此时，在债

权人协议中，夹层贷款人和抵押贷款人可以约定，对重大运营事项，如对所涉资金

占船舶所有人资产总额二分之一或三分之二的事项，双方分别享有项目运作审批

权，并且在规定期限内表决意见。对于审批权的比例分配，可以参考夹层融资金

额与船舶抵押金额的比例进行设置。

在运用夹层贷款模式进行夹层融资时，需要从融资标的、融资方式以及相关

融资主体利益关系方面进行充分考虑。此时的夹层融资希望通过债权和股权这两


种权利的利益权衡来达到资本升值的目的。股权与债权的权衡，随时都可能引发

不同的法律关系，也受到众多法律法规的调整。在契约自由的原则下，在不违反

法律规定的前提下，夹层贷款模式还是能通过当事人的协商约定来解决的，当然

约定的内容以及相关比例设置方面，仍主要由当事人自身的经济实力与交易目的

决定。资本交易市场有灵活性也有抑制性，交易方式的选择、交易内容的协商是

一个必不可少的过程。夹层贷款模式作为一个债权与股权的缓冲，为交易市场提

供了融资新途径。

（四）营运船舶夹层融资优先股法律地位问题

1. 将优先股制度引入船舶夹层融资

船舶运营本身有着很大的不确定性，融资投资者往往不直接参与船舶的相关

运营工作，这显然增加了投资的风险。此时可以借鉴优先股模式开展夹层融资，

如下图所示：

图 2 优先股模式

如上图所示，夹层投资者用投资换取夹层借款人的优先股权益，16 或者抵押

借款人的优先股权益。这样，夹层投资者拥有优先股权，就可以优先于其他股东

获得红利分配。从而使得即便在违约的情况下，优先股持有人也可以通过优先股

权获得或者控制股东的股权利益。17 在整体操作过程中，相关当事人一般还须签

16　 Alistair MacRae, Mezzanine Debt Offers Added Funds for Project Finance, International Financial Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 8, 1998, p. 15.

17　 David S. Rosenberg, Mezzanine Financing and the Inter-creditor Agreement: Can We Just Get Along?, Real Estate Finance Journal, 2000, p. 33.


订相应的股权回购协议。通常情况下，双方在协议中约定一定期限或条件，只有

所附条件都得到满足时，借款人才有权将优先股以议定的价格回赎；或者允许夹层

贷款人，在一定条件下将优先股股份转换为普通股。一定程度上，该协议可以保

持夹层投资者退出机制的畅通。

优先股承担风险相对于普通股来说比较小，但作为平衡，优先股股东不直接

参与企业运营，无形中也增加了未知运营状况带来的潜在风险。可以说优先分配

财产的权利是对无经营管理权的补偿。此时，投资人仍然可以以占有的优先股份

为基础，要求参与董事会讨论，甚至要求拥有否决权，在扩大运营状况透明度方面，

可要求公示。

2.对于优先股模式运行的法律建议

我国现行的《公司法》中仅仅规定了普通股，并没有对优先股做出规定。正

因法律的空白，一直以来，我国都没有确立优先股制度。《公司法》、《中华人民共

和国证券法》中都没有“优先股”这一概念。多部委联合发布的《创业投资企业管

理暂行办法》18 中也只是提到了优先股投资，法律层面上并没有有关优先股的具

体规定。这使夹层融资在我国现有法律框架下的应用只能以夹层贷款的方式操作。

在对优先股明文规定之前，普通股仍然是我国股权投资的主要方式，并且现阶段

的投融资行为需要符合《公司法》的相关规定，如第 104 条中“每一股份有一表决

权”的规定。

同时，也应看到，《公司法》第 127 条规定肯定了不同种类股份的存在，在第

132 条规定里提及“其他种类的股份”，这样宽泛的表达不否认除普通股之外还存

在其他股份形式。无独有偶，《公司法》第 167 规定，“股份有限公司章程规定不

按持股比例分配的除外”，这一兜底性条款的言外之意也说明，公司可以依据公司

章程或自行约定不按股东持股比例分配利润或表决权，类似较为模糊的条款为优

先股的发行保留了一定的余地。

想要在船舶夹层融资中采用优先股模式，须引入优先股制度，那么相关的法

律规定也需要随之进行修订或改善。修订法律需要经过复杂的程序，而且往往是

一个漫长的过程，从实务操作的角度来看，这一行为的效率和实效性凸显滞后感，

在实际的操作过程中，当法律规定不完善时，双方当事人仍可通过合同来共同协

商约定相应的权益，况且上述法律条款也并未对自由约定的行为加以禁止。

结合优先股本身的特点，本文认为双方当事人在约定优先股事项时，尤其应

当注意以下几点：

18　发改委、科技部、财政部、商务部、人民银行、税务总局、工商行政管理总局、银监会、证监会、外管局联合发布的《创业投资企业管理暂行办法》第 15 条规定：“经与被投资企业签订投资协议，创业投资企业可以以股权和优先股、可转换优先股等准股权方式对未上市企业进行投资。”下载于 http://forum.cnwallstreet.com/viewthread.php?tid=23351&page=1，2013 年 5 月 1 日。


首先，当公司决议涉及优先股股东重大权益时，比如针对占夹层资本总额二

分之一或三分之二的运营行为，夹层债权人享有针对此等事项发表意见或者有限

表决的权利。其次，优先股股东不能随意要求退股，可根据实际约定请求公司回

购股份。优先股的退出机制比普通股更自由，如果夹层债权人以优先股模式进行

融资，却随意要求退股，会对船舶所有人的经济状况产生直接影响。退出机制必

须进行限制。考虑到夹层资本的逐利性，可以约定当船舶所有人运营状况连续三

年亏损严重或资产负债率达百分之六十的状况下，夹层债权人可以选择退出。最

后，优先股的设置直接影响着普通股股东的权益，必须要合理设置比例。从国外

的实践经验来看，立法对股份公司优先股比例 19 都做出了一定的限制。如果优先

股占股本总额比例偏高，则不能充分保障普通股股东的权益，也增加了稀释股权

的风险；偏低则不利于吸纳外部融资扩大股本总额，企业可以根据自身实际股权结

构做出考量。

三、建造中船舶夹层融资的法律结构及法律问题

（一）建造中船舶夹层融资的法律结构

1. 对“建造中的船舶”范围的理解

《中华人民共和国海商法》（以下简称“《海商法》”）中有关于“建造中的船舶”

的字样，20 但并没有相应条款明确界定这一概念的具体内涵和外延。21《1967 年

建造中船舶权利登记公约》中也有“建造中的船舶”，但是该公约并没有出现其明

确定义。根据该公约第 8 条的内容，“建造中的船舶”权利的客体可以包括用于建

造某一船舶的材料、机器和设备，但是限于这些材料、机器和设备都已准备好在船

19　从国际上看，各国立法对公司发行无表决权的优先股的比例都设置了上限，这些国家从两个方面来规定对优先股的数量限制：一是以公司发行普通股股票的股本总额为参照，规定优先股只能占股本总额的一定比例，如法国规定这一比例不得超过 3/4，意大利规定不得超过 1/2 等；二是以有表决权的优先股为参照规定一个比例，如德国规定无表决权优先股不得超过有表决权股的面值总额，奥地利规定无表决权优先股不得超过有表决权股面值总额的 1/2等。参见张志坡：《优先股的立法、实践与启示》，载于《金陵法律评论》2012 年第 1 期，第 82~92 页。

20　《中华人民共和国海商法》第 14 条第 1 款规定：建造中的船舶，可以设定船舶抵押权。21 　司玉琢主编：《中华人民共和国海商法问答》，北京：人民交通出版社 1993 年版，第

18 页。司玉琢教授认为，“建造中的船舶”往往是船舶建造合同签订后，船舶建造完毕并交付订造人之前，所有用于建造该船只的材料和部件的总和。谢在全著：《民法物权论（上）》，北京：中国政法大学出版社 1999 年版，第 22 页。根据大陆法系一物一权的原则，一个物的部分不成立独立的所有权；数个物之上不能成立一个所有权。


厂范围内，并且能被清楚地识别为将被用于某一船舶。22 尽管比较模糊，但这一说

明勾勒了建造中船舶的范围。船舶的建造是一个动态过程，显然船舶在建造完工

之前，某些建造材料和部件仍然独立于船舶整体结构之外，甚至所有权也不归属

于建造人，严格意义上讲，“建造中的船舶”并不能成为法律上指称的物。但是船

舶建造资金巨大，往往需要在“建造中的船舶”之上设定抵押权，基于这一考虑，“建

造中的船舶”可被拟制为物，并可在其上成立单一所有权。

物权的客体原则是必须为特定、独立之物，只有“已经安放龙骨”或“已经处

于相似建造阶段”，23 船舶初步形体方为形成，才具备船舶所应有的雏形，才可以

称之为建造中的“船舶”。并且，在办理法定登记之前，尽管在物理形态上建造完工、

具备船舶功能，仍不属于法律规范中合格的“船舶”，此时这一类似船舶的钢筋混

凝土混合物可被视为仍处于“建造中的船舶”状态。

2. 建造中船舶的夹层融资法律构架

船舶处于不同的建造阶段，当然其所包含的财产范围也有所不同，自身价值

也随市场行情与原料价格的变化而变化，直至最后完工，才能最终确定。严格说来，

建造中的船舶不是名副其实的船舶，不具有建造完成后应有或具备的使用价值和

价值，换言之，建造中船舶的权利内容是有限的，其所有权之利益表现为以之为抵

押担保而获取融资信用。

投资者愿意买卖船舶，无一不期望以最小的风险赢得最大的利润。优先股模

式是优先分配股权，体现股权优异性的同时，很大程度上依然没有降低作为股权

的风险。与之相比，夹层贷款模式结合了债权债务关系与抵押担保关系，风险较

股权小，增添了债权的保障。加之，投资人投资新造船活动，追求的是转售船舶后

的差价盈余，本身无意自行运作船舶，当然营运船舶的复杂性及专业性可见一斑，

投资者未必能承受各种困难。再结合建造中船舶价值浮动这一最主要特征来说，

本文认为为更好地防范风险，建造中船舶的夹层融资可采用夹层贷款模式开展。

结合上文不难发现，夹层贷款与优先股这两种模式殊途同归，都可以达到吸

引融资降低交易风险的效果，但将两种方式相对比时也很容易发现两者在融资方

式上的不同。最明显的不同就是，夹层贷款模式是采用债权和抵押这一双保险方

式展开融资，而优先股模式是在交易中把股份中一定的优先权利让与股东。细究

22 《1967 年建造中船舶权利登记公约》第 8 条规定，国内法可以规定在建造中的船舶上登记的各种权利应适用于位于船厂辖区内，并已用标志或其他方法清楚标明将要安装在该船上的材料、机器和设备。

23 《浙江省人民政府办公厅转发省经信委等单位关于浙江省建造中船舶抵押管理暂行办法的通知》第 7 条第 5 款：作为抵押物的建造中船舶应该已经安放龙骨或处于相似建造阶段，同时取得由海事管理机构认可的中国船舶检验机构出具的相关证明文书。下载于 http://www.chinaacc.com/new/63_74_/2009_7_24_wa38092744551427900219176.s-

html，2013 年 3 月 15 日。参见高翔：《建造中船舶抵押权相关法律问题探析》，载于《中国海事》2007 年第 3 期，第 32~35 页。


之，两者所体现出的夹层融资性质也有所不同。优先股模式侧重于夹层融资中的

股权特性部分，即以经营管理权换取股份优先分红的权利。虽然优先分配股利，

但股东权益以及股份所代表的现金价值，依然受公司本身股权价值、营运风险的

直接影响，如果经营不善、股票贬值，则即便优先分红可能也颗粒无收。而夹层贷

款模式中，投资者往往追求资金的溢价收益，到期还本付息，无意稀释股权或控制

营运公司，着重体现出夹层融资债权之稳定特点。

两种模式都体现出投资者对公司经营管理权方面的不感兴趣，为那些有充裕

资金而不善于经营管理的投资者提供了选择的余地，共同折射出夹层融资拥有债

权加债转股的特征。当然，两种模式各有优劣之处，从夹层融资这一整体来看，投

资者还是可以根据资金盈余或运作状况以及对投资风险的偏好，以不同企业提供

的不同债权和股权融资比例方案为参考依据，灵活融资。

（二）夹层融资的保障——建造中船舶抵押权实现的法律问题

船舶建造周期长、成本高，这就潜藏着许多风险。一般情况下，船厂会要求

船东先交付定金或相应的预付款，之后依造船工程进度完成情况再相继支付余

款，一次性支付确实压力比较大，船东一般都会同意分期付款。在交船之前，船

东不是所有权人，在夹层贷款模式中，抵押借款人须为所有权人才能以船舶为抵

押展开夹层融资，这就决定了以船东为抵押借款人身份开展夹层融资是相当困难

的，除非用其他足额的财产作为抵押担保。此时，为确保船舶建造活动顺利进行，

船厂会在接收定金或预付款后，根据自身经济状况展开相应的融资活动，可以选

择夹层贷款模式。

建造中船舶最大的不确定性当数其价值的不确定性，这也直接影响着夹层融

资的开展，如何更好地实现建造中船舶的抵押权是一个不可避免的问题。

根据《海商法》第 12 条规定，法律允许用“建造中的船舶”进行抵押，但《海

商法》与《物权法》中均未对如何实现船舶抵押权作进一步的明确说明，仅提到船

舶能够“依法拍卖”，进而使抵押权人从获得的价款中优先受偿。建造完工的船舶

尚且可以拍卖，但建造中的船舶尚未建造完成，一旦发生不履行债务的行为，抵押

权人如何维权呢？

建造中船舶在建造过程中价值都不确定，只有成就了某一条件时，价值才最

终确定，这一点跟浮动抵押的情况非常相似。但法律仅规定到此，价值最终确定了，

可建造中的船舶仍然处于建造中，并未完工，法律并未回答对这仍处于建造中的

半个船舶该如何处理。建造中的船舶不是名副其实的船舶，也不具备船舶相应的

使用价值与价值，且不讨论直接拍卖能否成功售出这一问题，即使能售出，其真实

价值也会大打折扣，对于各方来说都是一笔财产损失。


本文认为，为了提高投资者参与建造中船舶抵押融资的积极性，应积极鼓励

当事人通过协商合同约定来实现建造中船舶的抵押权。事先约定在发生抵押权实

现情形时，将建造中船舶以评估价值折价售给债权人，其次由债权人继续承担之

后的建造任务，直至完工。债权人是融资方，比船厂或船东更有经济能力，让债权

人接手不能说是勉为其难，并且可以肯定的是，船舶建造是一个不断升值的过程，

即使受到经济大环境的影响，也不会过多地削弱其价值。在这个过程中，债权人

虽然接手了未完工船舶这个“烂摊子”，但并不会过多牵制其经济状况。这一做法

借鉴了英国浮动抵押的接管人制度，24 比较完整地保存了建造中船舶的价值，也

兼顾了现存法律对动产抵押规定的协调。如果遇到船厂毁约或倒闭的情形，船东

维权最实际的方法也是行使建造中船舶的浮动抵押权，并且船东要求船厂向银行

申请还款担保。

四、结语

夹层融资作为一种兼具股权和债权特性的融资方式，具有独特的灵活性，可

以多种形式与产业特性相融合。其中最具代表性的有两种模式：夹层贷款模式和

优先股模式。建造完工的船舶已经成为一个独立的法律实体，所有权、抵押权及

本身价值相对来说都已经确定并便于评估，所以船舶运营阶段可以采用夹层贷款

和优先股方式展开融资。对于夹层融资中的抵押标的——股权，不但应该包含财

产性权利的内容，还应该包含相应的非财产性方面的内容和权利。抵押债权人与

夹层债权人之间产生的权利冲突，可以通过签订债权人协议进行约定。对于优先

股，建议应立法明确优先股的法律定位，当然也不排除当事人自行对优先分配进

行约定。

船舶建造是一个动态过程，其价值也在不断变化，不能静止地认为“安放龙

骨”的那一刻是建造中船舶的标志，而应理解为自安放龙骨或处于相似建造阶段

起，直至其最后成为完整的船舶这一建造的过程或状态。同时依据法律规定，当

船舶依法办理了“船舶登记”，才转变为法律意义上的“船舶”。在建造中船舶情

24　浮动抵押中，一般通过委任接管人的方式实现抵押权，后者作为占有管理人，管理抵押效力范围内的全部财产，既可以为抵押权人的利益进行经营，也可以将全部财产作为整体出售。浮动抵押制度之精华正是在于接管人制度。由于债权人随时都可以根据债务人的违约行为而对债务人的资产进行接管，从而保证了债权人对债务人资产的控制，这也使得浮动抵押这种担保方式具有相当的灵活性和担保力。在英国，浮动抵押一般通过债券设定，或通过当事人之间的协议设立。如果具备实现抵押权的条件或具备抵押权人有可能不受清偿的危险，则可以请求法院任命接管人。接管人可以由法院委派，也可以由根据债券享有此项权利的抵押权人指派。参见刘安宁：《试论在建船舶抵押权实现的新方式》，载于《大连海事大学学报（社会科学版）》2012 年第 3 期，第 69~72 页。


形下适用夹层融资时，可采用夹层贷款模式开展。利用借贷与抵押的双重关系来

扩充救济途径。《海商法》与《物权法》中均未对如何实现船舶抵押权作出明确说明。

建造完工的船舶无疑可以依法拍卖，但建造中的船舶并未完工，还不是名副其实

的船舶，也不具备船舶相应的使用价值与价值，直接拍卖能否售出，就成为一个亟

待考虑的难题。针对此种情况本文借鉴浮动抵押以及接管人制度，建议此建造中

的船舶折价售给债权人，并由其承担继续建造的任务。这一做法比较完整地保存

了建造中船舶的价值，也兼顾了现存法律对动产抵押规定的协调。

为了保障融资顺利开展，提高建造中船舶融资状况以及营运船舶融资过程的

透明度，最大限度地减少信息不对称带来的障碍问题，本文认为，充分发挥船舶经

纪人或行业协会的“桥梁”作用不失为一个不错的选择。就目前市场状况来说，船

舶经纪人既懂船舶航运业务，又具有充分的投资意识，可以综合运用各种形式与

渠道收集市场信息，并且经纪人本身就具备“中介”的素质，更有利于促成融资交

易。行业协会是民间社会组织，发挥行业自律与协调的作用，选择行业协会作为

第三方也有利于平衡融资主体之间的利益关系，在融资过程中发挥协调作用。

总体来看，船舶夹层融资是一个新事物，其运行操作需要众多法律法规的规

范和支持。我国至今没有专门规范船舶融资的法律法规，需要从现有的法律中寻

找法律支撑。但现有法律仍然无法处理实践中存在的具体情况，应当尽早订立专

门规范船舶融资的法规，并以此为核心，构建船舶夹层融资法律体系。


The Legal Relationships of Parties Involved in Mezzanine Finance in the

Shipping Industry

WANG Ruonan*

Abstract: The conflict between the rapid development of the shipping industry and limited sources of financing requires innovation in financing instruments. Mezzanine finance is a type of intermediate capital that features aspects of both equity and debt, which makes it uniquely flexible and compatible. Despite the lack of relevant provisions in China’s legal regime, mezzanine finance in the shipping industry still conforms to China’s current laws and regulations. This article describes the potential for mezzanine finance to be used as a way to fund the construction of new ships, and ships that are already operational. Mezzanine loans may be applied to ships under construction, where relevant parties are connected through a debtor–creditor relationship and a collateral relationship. The great uncertainty of operating a ship creates considerable investment risks. Mezzanine financing can be conducted through two methods: mezzanine loans and preferred equity. For better operation of ship mezzanine finance, the legal relations of the var-ious involved parties should be defined, mainly pertaining to issues such as the nat-ure of “rights mortgages,” conflict of interests of stakeholders and definition of “pr-eferred equity.”

Key Words: Mezzanine finance; Ship finance; Legal relationships

In 2009, China’s State Council set forth to construct an international shipping

* WANG Ruonan, Shanghai Jiao Tong University KoGuan Law School. E-mail: wangruonan33 @163.com. Source of topic: “Construction of an International Shipping Center in Shanghai”,

a research project of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges directed by Prof. Zhao Jingsong.


The Legal Relationships of Parties Involved in Mezzanine Finance in the Shipping Industry 279

center in Shanghai.1 In response, the City of Shanghai launched the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” for accelerating the construction of an international shipping center.2 In2013, Shanghai also made active efforts to promote comprehensive reform in Pu-dong District by planning to establish a Pilot Free Trade Zone.3 The February 2013 establishment of the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) Shanghai Center is a manifestation of Shanghai’s growing soft power in the construction of an international shipping center.4 An indispensable strategic constituent of China’s economic reforms and “going-global” developments is the construction of a shipping industry commensurate with China’s large economic size.

1 State Council’s Opinion on Promoting the Development of a Modern Service Industry, Advanced Manufacturing Industry, and Building an International Financial Center and International Shipping Center in Shanghai (GuoFa [2009] No. 19). The overall targets for the construction of the international shipping center are: By 2020, 1) basically complete the construction of an international shipping center with global shipping resource allocation capacities, with a high concentration of shipping resources, sound and comprehensive shipping service functions, excellent shipping market environment and efficient modern logistic services; 2) basically form an international shipping hub port centering on Shanghai, with Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces as the two wings and the Yangtze River Basin as the central region, with reasonable division of work and close collaboration with other ports in China; 3) basically form a large-scale, intensive, efficient and optimally structured modernized port distribution and transportation system and international aviation hub, realizing integrated development of multiple transportation methods; and 4) basically form a modern shipping service system with high-quality service and comprehensive functions, create a convenient, efficient, safe and secure port environment and modern international shipping service environment governed by the rule of law, enhance the international shipping resource integration ability, and improve comprehensive competitiveness and service capacities.

2 The Municipal Government Issued the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” for Accelerating the Construction of the International Shipping Center (HuFuFa [2012] No. 48). The overall targets are: 1) focus on promoting and optimizing shipping competitive industries, 2) establish a complete shipping service system, 3) form a policy environment conducive to the construction of the international shipping center, 4) encourage various market subjects to give full play to their respective functions, 5) improve the efficiency of modern logistic services based on modern information technology, 6) strengthen interaction and cooperation with major ports of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, and 7) establish a reasonably structured distribution and transportation system covering the Yangtze Delta Region and the Yangtze River Basin. By the end of 2015, basically realize the comprehensive concentration of shipping factors and resources such as cargoes, ships, enterprises, funds, talents, information and technology, preliminarily assume the ability of global shipping resource allocation, and form the core functions of the Shanghai International Shipping Center, to lay a framework foundation for assuming global shipping resource allocation ability by 2020.

3 Pudong: Addressing the “Pacific Strategy”, at http://www.shport.gov.cn/kadt/gjhy/201302/t20130219_6757.html, 1 April 2013. (in Chinese)

4 The First International Shipping Organization Enters Shanghai: Enhancing the Soft Power of the Shipping Center, at http://www.shport.gov.cn/kadt/gjhy/201302/t20130226_6814.html, 1 April 2013. (in Chinese)


The shipping industry is both technology and capital intensive.5 Ship finance is characterized by requiring high inputs, being skill intensive and having a long payback period. Several financing instruments are available in the ship finance market, each with their respective advantages and disadvantages.6 Under the macro-environment impact of the continuous widening of the supply-and-demand gap in global shipping finance,7 the growth of the domestic ship finance industry is slowing down, but growth is maintained by the domestic shipping finance market.

5 Yang Liangyi, Ship Finance and Mortgage, Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 2003, p. 45. (in Chinese)

6 Borrowing from commercial banks is the most common method of ship finance. Chinese commercial banks have enormous capital flow, however, in the course of practical operation, due to lowering of ship price, transportation price and Baltic Dry Index (BDI), it is difficult for financial institutions, especially commercial banks, to assess whether the mortgage at hand can cover loans, and it is also impossible for them to judge ship owners’ future credit worthiness. Therefore, it is still a problem how much banks will lend to the shipbuilding industry. See Asian Opportunities in Ship Finance, at http://www.cnforex.com/comment/html/2012/8/23/73a7d420c14dce4c55763f47a47237ce.html, 7 March 2013 (in Chinese). A financial lease is a common financing instrument used by leasing companies. Its original intention is to make funds and materials available at the same time by borrowing materials. In the course of financial lease, the lessor is still the owner of the lease, but the lessee possesses and uses the lease for a long period of time. The long-term separation of “possession” and “ownership” tends very easily to give rise to information asymmetry in trading, which will naturally affect the parties’ enthusiasm in participation, thus increasing the resistance against financial lease. See Gao Shengping and Wang Siyuan, Legal Construction in Financial Lease Transaction, Science of Law (Journal of Northwest University of Politics and Law), No. 1, 2013, pp. 160~170 (in Chinese). Debt finance and equity finance are financing instruments often used by large shipping companies in China. Though such instruments have strong financing capabilities, yet a company has to disclose various types of information after initial public offering, while being subject to the follow-up supervision of public opinions and media. The disclosure of large amounts of information about finance, shareholders’ conditions and operation plans enables the public to learn the developments of the company, but inevitably opens a convenient channel for rivals to know the company’s development plans. In terms of equity, the entry of a large amount of external social capital into the company undeniably expands its capital strength. But it is easy to discover that capital is inhibitive. The entry of external capital inevitably contains the internal equity power in some aspects. As a result, the original management objective or set strategy is subject to examination, and it is to be further verified whether the efficiency of decision making and execution can be maintained.

7 According to relevant data, the amount of ship finance in the Far East region and Australia in 2010 was USD 66.4 billion, which increased by over 40% in 2012 to USD 93 billion. It is estimated that the rising trend will continue in the next two years. See Report on Development of Shipping Financial Market in China 2012–2013, at http://news.sol.com.cn/html/2013-02-25/A2C888E9A0ADCDADB.shtml, 18 March 2013 (in Chinese). In July 2012, relevant reports were released in international media that the financial gap in the global shipping industry amounted to USD 65 billion, which would rise to USD 101 billion by 2013. See The Global Shipping Industry Financial Gap Will Reach USD 101 Billion by 2013, at http://info.10000link.com/newsdetail.aspx?doc=610260313, 7 March 2013. (in Chinese)


In order to meet the growing demand for financing from shipping companies, China’s ship finance market is struggling with creating a suitable ship finance mode. It is imperative to open a new path for ship finance and this can be done through institutional innovation.

I. The Practical Possibility of Applying Mezzanine Finance to Ship Finance

Mezzanine finance, instead of a legal concept sensu stricto, is a general term for a financing instrument, integrating the characteristics of debt finance and equity finance,8 along with a very flexible method of financing. Scholar Xie Jianping translates the term “Mezzanine Finance” as “ 双重特性融资 ” (finance with dual nature) in Chinese.9 It seems as if mezzanine finance adds a “mezzanine” between equity and debt, thus averaging risk and return between debt and equity finance.

The investment return from mezzanine capital is primarily derived from equityincome premiums from the target enterprise, which means that mezzanine capital in-vestor must conduct a sufficient assessment before selecting a target enterprise. In order to ensure investment security, mezzanine investors not only examine tangible assets such as real estate, but also intangible assets such as human resources, brand value and the commercial reputation of an enterprise. The investors also conduct a comprehensive investigation of the personal conditions of the management and shareholders of the enterprise. An all-round assessment will help mezzanine invest-ors develop a comprehensive understanding of an enterprise, providing reference basis for investors to choose different debt to equity finance ratios provided by different enterprises. The process of financing is also very flexible. The integration of equity conversion choices on the basis of debt finance may resolve or alleviate

8 In English, “Mezzanine” means “intermediary floor just above the ground floor”. The concept of “mezzanine” is used to refer to a bond rating between investment-grade bonds and junk bonds. With market development, mezzanine finance evolves to a financing instrument between equity and ordinary debt. See Fu Xuan, Mezzanine Finance: A Capital Passage between Equity and Debt, International Financing, No. 12, 2004, pp. 56~59 (in Chinese); Mezzanine Finance: Financing Package Alleviating Lack of Debt Mortgage Channels, at http://shiju.tax861.gov.cn/bjds/wenzi/wenzi.asp?more_id=127112, 10 March 2013 (in Chinese). “A type of funding capital midway between debt and equity in that it offers a higher interest rate than senior debt, but provides a lower longer-term return than equity”, Reuters Financial Glossary, at http://glossary.reuters.com.cn/wiki/index.php/, 17 March 2013.

9 Xie Jianping, Investment Banking: In Greater China, Taipei: Best-wise Publishing Co., Ltd., 2001, pp. 2~4. (in Chinese)


the repayment pressure of a borrowing enterprise during times of slow growth. It may also retain relatively high residual capital value for borrowers in its financing structure. This integration also provides more convenient withdrawal mechanisms.

The suitability of mezzanine finance as an instrument for ship finance is close-ly related to the characteristics of ship finance and properties of mezzanine finance.

First, ships have obvious commodity properties. In the traditional sense, ships are tools of shipping and ship owners provide a transportation service. Similar to real estate, ships are deemed immovable property by law due to their huge value despite being able to physically move across oceans. The rate of return on investment in ships can be as high as 7%. This is 4%~5% higher than the return on investment of house properties.10 Therefore, ship investment has a high wealth accumulation effect, and is a quality investment.

Second, as a long-term commitment, shipping companies in search of invest-ors should focus on fund cost and financial risk.11 Long-term bank loans or issuance of long-term bonds can provide long-term operation funds for shipping companies, but at the same time raise their debt ratio, which brings with it potential financial risks. In selecting a financing instrument, one cannot just take into account the feasibility of a certain aspect, but should comprehensively assess financial risks and their relationship with the cost of capital on the basis of ascertaining the reasonableness of capital structure, in order to seek the overall balance between debt finance and equity finance. To achieve an optimal capital structure, shipping companies in China must choose appropriate financing instruments. To optimize a company’s capital structure, the ratio between debt and equity and that between internal and external finance should be taken into full account. This reflects the way that mezzanine finance combines the characteristics of equity and debt.

Third, compared with traditional financing instruments, mezzanine finance makes full use of various types of social capital so that equity and debt can flexibly participate in the real economy. Mezzanine finance helps a company make the most of their resource advantages and financial capacity. These advantages allow for the

10 The average rate of return of ship investment is higher than that of real estate by 4%~5%. See Tu Yuanting, Current Situation of Ship Finance amidst Financial Crisis and Developme- nt of Ship Open-ended Fund, Journal of Jiangxi Finance College, No. 3, 2010, pp. 19~21.

(in Chinese)11 Long-term bank loans or issuance of long-term bonds may provide long-term operating

funds for a shipping company, and the capital cost is relatively low. But at the same time, such practices raise the company’s debt ratio, and increase its financial risks. Issuance of stocks has a relatively small financial risk, but with a high capital cost.


generation of greater capital benefits. When a company occupies a certain market share, maintains stable performance and proves that it is willing and able to expand its position in its industry, both public listing and mezzanine finance are good finan-cing methods. However, public listing has high requirements and takes a long peri-od of complicated preparations, which increases the cost of financing and as a result many companies forgo a public offering. Before going public, a company may use mezzanine finance to raise money for its initial offering.

Therefore, in selecting a financing instrument, one cannot just take into account the feasibility of a certain aspect, but should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between financial risks and the cost of capital on the basis of ascertaining the reasonableness of the proposed capital structure, for the overall balance between debt finance and equity finance. To achieve an optimal capital structure, shipping companies in China must select appropriate financing instruments. The optimization of a company’s capital structure is reflected in the balance of the ratio of internal and external finance and the effective combination of debt and equity.

II. Legal Structure and Legal Issues of Mezzanine Finance for Operational Ships

Due to the different uses of funds, ship finance generally falls into two categories: finance for the construction of new ships and finance for operational ships. Of course, due to the different demands of ship finance, the relevant legal frameworks also vary. Mezzanine finance is in itself a type of trading structure, with very flexible methods of financing. Therefore, different trading methods selected by the two parties in trading will lead to different relationships of rights and obligations between the two parties. At the same time, ships also have huge target values, and their course of production also differs substantially from that of other equipment. A shipyard cannot hold an inventory of completed ships, it can only afford to start building a ship when an order is received. The value of a ship also changes over the course of construction. Financing activities can be better conducted and risks avoided only when different legal frameworks are constructed on the basis of current laws and regulations and addressing different circumstances at different stages.


A. Legal Operation Framework for Mezzanine Loan Model for Operational Ships

Fig. 1 Model of a Mezzanine Loan

As shown in the above figure, the mezzanine lender provides mezzanine loans, and the mezzanine borrower is an entity with the qualifications of a legal borrower established especially for operating mezzanine finance. The mezzanine lender uses the newly established entity to control shares of the ship operation project, while the mezzanine borrower pledges the equity of mortgage borrower to the mezzanine lender as the guarantee for mezzanine debts.12 The mezzanine borrower may also repay mezzanine debts with the dividends acquired. The mezzanine borrower provides mortgage loans to ship owners, and the ship is collateral. The mortgage borrower directly possesses the ownership of the ship, and pledges the ship as mortgage for the loans from the mortgage lender. There are two relationships between the mortgage borrower and the mortgage lender: a debtor–creditor relationship and a collateral relationship. The mortgage lender and the mezzanine

12 Andrew A. Lance Partner, Structural Protections in Inter-creditor Agreements for Mezzanine Loans, Briefings in Real Estate Finance, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2004, pp. 21~36.


lender need to coordinate their interests. To coordinate interests, the mortgage lender and the mezzanine lender create a creditor agreement.

In the mezzanine model, debtor–creditor and collateral relationships exist bet-ween the mezzanine borrower and the mezzanine lender, and between the mortgage borrower and the mortgage lender.13 The investor can acquire dual income streams from cash income and capital appreciation. The loss of mortgage right through the accidental destruction of a ship does not disentitle claims for equity compensation through the debtor–creditor relationship. In initiating mezzanine loans, the mortga-ge borrower and the mortgage lender share common interests. The mortgage lenderand the mezzanine lender typically draft a creditor agreement to resolve any poten-tial conflict of interest disputes.14 The agreement defines the rights and obligations of the parties in regards to the ship. The agreement is effective as long as it does not violate any state law or regulation.

B. Nature of Target of the Ship Mezzanine Loan Model – Equity

In traditional mortgage loans, the borrower directly owns the ship. In ship mezzanine finance, however, the mezzanine borrower does not directly own the ship or operate the company, but only holds shares for dividends. The shipyard or ship company directly possesses ownership of the ship. The mezzanine borrower mortgages the shares it holds in the shipyard or ship company to the mezzanine lender, as guarantee for the mezzanine loan. Can the financing method of using equity as collateral be operated in conformity with laws and regulations?

1. Nature of EquityThe collateral of the mezzanine finance borrower is shareholder’s equity. The-

re are many doctrines on the nature of equity, of which there are three mainstream views: ownership doctrine, creditor’s rights doctrine and community rights doctri-ne. These doctrines are reasonable to some extent, but all have points that cannot be justified.

In a holding company, shareholders contribute capital for equity. By becoming a shareholder, the investor converts property control rights into usufruct. The objec-ts of equity – shares – show that equity is a new type of right, without an appropria-

13 Patrick Lawler, What Private Equity Firms Want in a Lender, Commercial Lending Review, Vol. 22, Issue 1, 2007, p. 9.

14 Shen Daming, Subordinated Debt in the International Financial Law, Beijing: University of International Business and Economics Press, 2002, p. 132. (in Chinese)


te analogue among traditional types of rights such as property rights, creditor’s rights and intellectual property rights. Within the framework of the corporation regime provided in law, an individual becomes a share owner of the corporate juridical person by contributing capital, that is, shareholder. At the same time, the capital contribution of the individual, by going through specific legal formalities, becomes two independent legal objects, namely corporate property and the shareholder’s personal property. The two objects correspond to different legal subjects and this leads to the change in the method for realizing the shareholder’s equity. That is to say, the shareholder cannot directly dispose of the property he owns in the company, but may realize the disposal through the corporation. When the company makes profit and the capital of the shareholder appreciates, capital cannot be directly disbursed or transferred, although the shareholder may enjoy relevant control rights through legal procedure and legal organizations such as shareholders meetings or the board of directors.

Company property is the total amount of shareholders’ capital contributions. Based on the principle of unchanging capital, before changes through statutory procedures, company property remains constant. No matter what changes occur in shareholders’ capital contributions, be it transfers, withdrawals or conversions, the total assets of the company legally determined will not be affected. Shareholders bring some personal properties or characteristics to equity, but it does not and cannot conceal the fact that equity is property, and that equity is the management and control rights acquired by shareholders for their holding of relevant companyproperty shares. In other words, to establish or develop the company, the sharehold-er uses his own property to make capital contributions for relevant amount of shar-es. Equity is in fact the company shares corresponding to the ownership or usage rights of the capital contributed.

2. Nature of Equity in Mezzanine Finance for Operational ShipsWhat does the shareholder’s equity mortaged for ship mezzanine loans inclu-

de? Does it merely include proprietary rights or both the proprietary and non-proprietary rights?

First, it should be determined that Art. 27 of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter “Company Law”) provides that shareholders can make capital contributions in currency or in non-monetary properties. This article provides that a shareholder may make contribution in non-monetary properties. Equity meets the conditions for a non-monetary capital contribution, as it can be assessed on the basis of currency and may be transferred according to law. The


value of equity is determined by the shareholder’s equity, while the value of the shareholder’s equity depends on operation conditions and asset value, changing with market fluctuations. This is also similar to the floating mortgage mentioned in the Property Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter “Property Law”).

The ownership relationship includes rights such as possession, income, management, transfer and use of property. After making a capital contribution, the shareholder enjoys the right to a profit dividend from capital appreciation through the return on investment, and also has the right of control over capital operation acquired through voting rights, etc. The right to income and the right of control are well combined through equity. Therefore, equity is a kind of aggregation of property rights. Of course, shareholders own proprietary rights through equity, but they also have claims to non-proprietary aspects of a company such as operation and management. Equity is an intermediary link or “bridge” for the shareholder to exercise non-proprietary rights. It can therefore be concluded that the rights that the shareholder acquires through equity are both proprietary and non-proprietary.

Based on the equity pledge provided in the current law, under normal circums-tances, the shareholder may pledge part of his equity. However, the mezzanine bor-rower has full control over the shipyard or ship company, therefore all the equityunder the control of the mezzanine borrower is used as a pledge. Through mezza-nine finance a “rights mortgage” is used as a guarantee, while the “floating mortgage” provided in the Property Law takes tangible property as collateral. The value represented by shareholder’s equity is a changing value, depending on the operation and management conditions of the company. After the setup of a mortgage, if the company is well operated and keeps making profit, the value of mortgaged equity of the mezzanine lender will rise, otherwise, the value will drop. The value of the mortgaged ship is the guarantee for mezzanine finance. If the shipyard or ship company operates the ship poorly after financing, the value of the ship may depreciate, which directly affects the interests of the mezzanine lender. The ultimate objective of the investor is to make profits from capital appreciation instead of controlling the company. However, to prevent risks, the mezzanine lender should also require that certain non-proprietary rights be included in the shareholder’s equity mortgaged, such as the right to oversee to prevent economic loss from improper operation. As the mezzanine lender does not intend to control the company, ratio of supervising and voting rights may be stipulated through consultation.


C. Conflict of Interest for Relevant Subjects of Finance – Mezzanine Creditor and Mortgagee

1. Legal Status of the Mezzanine BorrowerAs stated above, the mezzanine lender may be trust companies, financial insti-

tutions, or natural persons, with no restriction on its number. As a huge amount of investment is involved in the course of financing, the mezzanine lender is often com-posed of several natural persons or institutions. In the course of operation, it is not possible for all mezzanine lenders to participate in the investment, and disputes may arise as a result. In addition to consideration for conditions such as investment tax, a separate and trustworthy new entity often has to be set up for conducting specific financing business. The borrower of ship mezzanine finance is a holding company specifically set up for conducting mezzanine finance. The holding company does not conduct other business, its only function is to hold the equity of the ship owner and use it as collateral to borrow from the mezzanine lenders, and to repay mezzanine loans with its income.

The mezzanine borrower is an entity established by the mezzanine financier for special purposes, and its primary purpose is to mortgage equity for mezzanine loans. No explicit provisions have been made in Chinese law for entities established for specific purposes. In other words, such entities, insofar as they meet relevant conditions for establishment such as capital contribution and registration, may acquire status approved by law. The mezzanine borrower injects mezzanine finance to shipyards or ship operation companies, and controls all their shares. In terms of capital flow between the two, it can also be understood that the shareholders of a shipyard or ship operation company contribute capital with the equity they hold in the company to establish the holding company (that is, the mezzanine borrower) for special purposes. The shareholders of the two become one, and the company becomes a one-person company in form under the Company Law. According to the Company Law, a one-person company may be lawfully established, and relevant special regulations have been made as supplementary support. Therefore, so long as the establishment of the mezzanine borrower does not violate the conditions provided in the Company Law for capital contribution and establishment of a one-person company, mezzanine finance so structured may operate in conformity with laws and regulations.

It should be made clear that according to article 64 of the Company Law, the mortgage borrower shall prove the independence of its property; otherwise


the mortgage loan creditor can make claims to the mezzanine lender by “lifting the corporate veil”, and the mezzanine lender shall assume relevant repayment liabilities. In the United States, the legal adviser issues a “non-consolidation opinion letter” to prove the independent operations and separation of property between the mortgage borrower and the mezzanine borrower.15 Of course, that does not mean that the U.S. practice may be directly applied to the operation of Chinese law. However, to prove the mutual independence of property and operation conditions, professional legal opinions and valid evidences such as financial statements and company accounts are vital. At this point, the legal department of the operating companies such as the shipyard or ship company may issue professional legal opinions to clarify the mutual independence of the ship owner and the mezzanine borrower in terms of finance and operation etc., and that they are two entities of independent legal capacity, to guarantee the smooth operation of mezzanine finance and avoid financial obstacles.

2. Conflict of Interest between the Mezzanine Lender and the Mortgage Lender

Conflict of interest between the mezzanine lender and the mortgage lender is mainly manifested as follows:

Fig. 1 shows that the mezzanine borrower only holds shares of the ship owner, and does not participate in the operation of the ship owner (shipyard or ship company), while the ship is directly owned by the ship owner, and is mortgaged to the mortgage lender for loans. According to article 179 of the Property Law, mortgage creditor shall have priority over ordinary creditor in being paid. Therefore, when the ship owner goes bankrupt, the mortgage lender will have priority over the mezzanine borrower in being paid, and thus the advantages of the mezzanine loan will be non-existent. If the ship owner’s poor operation leads to depreciation in share price, which directly influences the mezzanine borrower’s ability to pay the mezzanine loan, the mezzanine lender can convert the creditor’s right to equity according to the financing contract in order to protect its interests. The mezzanine lender then directly controls the ship owner. In this case, the owner of the mortgaged property changes, affecting the value of the mortgaged property of the mortgage lender. Also, according to article 191 of the Property Law, the mezzanine lender has to pay off the debt for the mortgage lender. This goes against

15 Zeng Xuhui, A Study of the Legal Issues in House Property Mezzanine Finance, at http://crel.law.pku.edu.cn/article_view.asp?id=92, 1 May 2013. (in Chinese)


the original intention of mezzanine finance. The mezzanine lender seeks capital appreciation and does not intend to operate or control the ship owner. The conflict between the two needs to be harmonized.

Under ordinary circumstances, when the borrower refinances with the mortga-ged property, more debt expenditure will be incurred. This inevitably has an impact on the value of the mortgaged property. According to article 193 of the Property Law, the mortgage lender may require that the ship owner stop such action. How-ever, legal provisions in China are not absolute. According to article 191 of the Property Law and in light of Fig. 1, if the ship owner mortgages the ship before its operation worsens, the consent of the mortgage lender must be obtained before using mezzanine finance to raise money or refinance. During the operation of ship mezzanine finance, the ship owner may conduct mezzanine finance subject to the consent of the mortgage lender. This opinion of consent may be further clarified through the creditor agreement.

Taking full account of the two parties’ interests, this article concludes that the creditor agreement should stipulate the following items:

a. The Rights of Notification and Revocation at Ship DisposalAn important point connecting the interests of the mezzanine lender and the

mortgage lender is the ship. The ship is both the object of mezzanine finance and the collateral. Both parties may dispose of it. Two situations may arise from the disposal of the ship: First, in the event that the mezzanine borrower is unable to repay the mezzanine loan, the mezzanine lender shall notify the mortgage lender within a prescribed period of time when it controls the ship owner by converting debt to equity; second, in the event that the ship owner breaches the contract, the mortgage lender may also require the disposal of the mortgaged ship to repay loans and shall also notify the mezzanine lender within a prescribed period of time. If the obligation of notification is not performed, the two parties may agree on relevant right of revocation, and may apply for revocation within one year from the date of ship disposal.

b. Limited Right of Control over Ship OwnerThe bankruptcy of the ship owner, bringing huge loss to all parties, is the last

thing the parties expect in financial transactions. Therefore, to guarantee that opera-tion decisions are in the best interest of the concerned parties, the mezzanine lender may require that it enjoy limited control or decision-making rights in the course of the ship owner’s operation of the ship. This may include adopting appropriate measures to strengthen supervision and management over the company, participating


in the board meetings as non-voting members or appointing independent directors or special shareholders, etc. The mortgage lender tends to pursue financial transac-tions with lower risks. Throughout the duration of the agreement the two parties may have disagreements over the operation decisions of the ship owner. The mezzanine lender and the mortgage lender may stipulate in the creditor agreement that for ma-jor operation affairs such as those involving a half or two thirds of the total assets of the ship owner, the two parties respectively enjoy the right of project operation approval, and make decisions by voting within a prescribed period. The ratio of approval rights may be allocated according to the ratio of mezzanine finance to the total ship mortgage amount.

In applying the model of mezzanine loans to mezzanine finance, full conside-ration should be given to the target of financing, the financing method utilized and the interests of relevant parties. In this situation, mezzanine finance is designed topromote capital appreciation through the balance of two rights: creditor’s right andequity. The balancing of equity and creditor’s right may give rise to different legalrelationships at any time, and is subject to the provisions of many laws and regula-tions. Under the principle of contract freedom, provided that there is no violation ofany law or regulation, the model of mezzanine loans can be settled through consul-tation and agreement of the parties concerned. Of course, the content of the agree-ment and the relevant ratio setup are based on the economic strength and needs of the signing parties. The capital transaction market is both flexible and restrictive. The selection of transaction method and the consultation over the contents of transaction are indispensable. As a buffer between debt and equity, the model of mezzanine loans provides a new financing instrument for the trading market.

D. Legal Status of Preferred Shares in Mezzanine Finance for Operational Ships

1. Introducing the Preferred Share Regime into Ship Mezzanine Finance

Ship operation is subject to great uncertainty. The fact that financing investors do not directly participate in ship operation increases investment risks. The model of preferred shares may be used as reference to conduct mezzanine finance, as shown in the following figure:


Fig. 2 Model of Preferred Shares

As shown in Fig. 2, the mezzanine investor exchanges its investment for the preferred share equity of the mezzanine borrower,16 or the preferred share equity of the mortgage borrower. In this way the mezzanine investor possesses preferred equity and has priority over other shareholders in dividends distribution. The holder of preferred shares may acquire or control shareholders’ equity entitlements through preferred equity even if there is a breach of contract.17 Relevant parties generally have to sign an equity repurchase agreement. Under this agreement the two parties stipulate certain terms or conditions to be included in the agreement. Only when all the conditions attached are satisfied is the borrower entitled to repurchase the preferred shares at the agreed price; or the mezzanine lender is allowed to convert preferred shares to ordinary shares under certain conditions. This agreement gives the mezzanine investor an exit mechanism.

Preferred shares are less risky than ordinary shares. However, the holder of preferred shares cannot directly participate in company operation, which increases

16 Alistair MacRae, Mezzanine Debt Offers Added Funds for Project Finance, International Financial Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 8, 1998, p. 15.

17 David S. Rosenberg, Mezzanine Financing and the Inter-creditor Agreement: Can We Just Get Along?, Real Estate Finance Journal, 2000, p. 33.


the potential risks from information asymmetry. The priority right to property distribution is the compensation for absence of operation and management rights. The investor can still, based on the preferred shares it has, require participation in board discussions, even including veting rights, and may require publication for transparency of operation expansion.

2. Legal Suggestions on the Operation of the Preferred Share Model

China’s current Company Law only provides for ordinary shares, but does not include provisions on preferred shares. Due to the legal gap, no preferred share regime has been set up in China. There is no concept of “preferred share” in the Company Law or the Security Law of the People’s Republic of China. The Provisional Measures on the Administration of Venture Investment Companies,18 jointly issued by several ministries and commissions only mention preferred share investment, without specific provisions on preferred shares in the legal sense. As a result, mezzanine finance can only be operated by means of mezzanine loans under China’s existing legal framework. Before express provisions on preferred shares are made, ordinary shares remain the main method of equity investment in China. At the present stage, investment and financing behaviors shall meet the relevant provisions in the Company Law, for example, the provision of “one vote, one share” in article 104.

At the same time, the provisions of article 127 in the Company Law confirm the existence of different shares; Article 132 of the same law mentions “other shares than stated in this law”. Such expressions in general terms do not deny the existence of other forms of shares. Likewise, article 167 of the Company Law provides, “a joint share limited company shall distribute the remaining profits in light of the proportions of shares held by shareholders, unless it is not permitted in the articles of association to distribute profits according to the proportions of shares

18 Article 15 of the Provisional Measures on Administration of Venture Investment Companies issued jointly by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Science and Technology of the PRC, the Ministry of Finance of the PRC, the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, the People’s Bank of China, the State Administration of Taxation, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the PRC, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange reads: By signing an investment agreement with the company invested, a venture investment company may invest in a non-listed company with quasi-equity methods such as equity, preferred shares, and convertible preferred shares.” At http://forum.cnwallstreet.com/viewthread.php?tid=23351&page=1, 1 May 2013. (in Chinese)


held by shareholders.” This general provision implicitly expresses that a company may distribute profits or voting rights according to its articles of association or separate agreements. Such vague provisions allow room for development of preferred shares.

The preferred share regime should be adopted in ship mezzanine finance if we want to apply the model of preferred shares. In order for this to happen, relevant legal provisions need to be amended or improved. The amendment of laws is a long and complicated process. The efficiency and effectiveness of such an action are obviously far behind where they need to be. In the absence of complete legal provisions, the parties may stipulate relevant rights and interests through joint consultations by contract. In addition, the aforementioned legal provisions do not prohibit any action through a free agreement.

In light of the characteristics of preferred shares, this article argues that special attention should be paid to the following points when the parties concerned stipulate terms on preferred shares:

First, when a company resolution involves major rights and interests of the holders of preferred shares, for example, operation behaviors addressing one half or two thirds of the total amount of mezzanine capital, the mezzanine creditor shall be entitled to deliver his opinions or exercise limited voting rights over such matters. Second, the holders of preferred shares cannot request share withdrawal as they like, but may request repurchase of shares according to the agreement. Preferred shares have a freer withdrawal mechanism than ordinary shares. The economic conditions of the ship owner will be directly affected if the mezzanine creditor financing through preferred shares requests share withdrawal at will. The withdrawal mechanism must be subject to restriction. Considering the profit seeking nature of mezzanine capital, it should be stipulated that when the ship owner suffers serious loss for three consecutive years or when the asset-liability ratio reaches 60%, the mezzanine creditor may opt for withdrawal. Third, as the configuration of preferred shares directly impacts the rights and interests of ordinary shareholders, the ratios must be reasonably determined. Judging from overseas practices, legislation sets certain limits to the ratio of preferred to ordinary


shares in a holding company.19 If the ratio of preferred shares to total amount of capital stock is too high, the rights and interests of ordinary shareholders cannot be safeguarded, and the risk of equity dilution will be increased; a too low ratio, on the other hand, is not conducive to absorbing external finance as a way to expand the total amount of capital stock. A company may decide based on its own actual equity structure.

III. Legal Structure and Legal Issues of Mezzanine Finance for Ships under Construction

A. Legal Structure of Mezzanine Finance for Ships under Construction

1. Understanding of the Scope of “Ships under Construction”The term “ships under construction” is found in the Maritime Law of the

People’s Republic of China (hereinafter “Maritime Law”),20 but no relevant provisions are made to better define this concept.21 The 1967 Convention Relating to Registration of Rights in Respect of Vessels under Construction also has the

19 Judging from international practices, the legislation of various countries sets an upper limit for the ratio of preferred shares without voting rights issued by a company. These countries provide for the limitations of the amount of preferred shares in two aspects. First, with reference to the total amount of capital stock of ordinary shares issued by the company, it is provided that preferred shares can only account for a certain ratio in the total amount of stock capital. For example, France stipulates that this ratio may not exceed 3/4, in Italy it cannot exceed 1/2. Second, a ratio is stipulated with reference to preferred shares with voting rights. For example, Germany stipulates that preferred shares without voting rights may not exceed the total par value of equity with voting rights. Austria stipulates that preferred shares without voting rights may not exceed 1/2 of the total par value of equity with voting rights. See Zhang Zhipo, Preferred Shares: Legislation, Practice and Implication, Jinling Law Review, No. 1, 2012, pp. 82~92. (in Chinese)

20 Article 14(1) of the Maritime Law of the People’s Republic of China reads: Mortgage may be established on a ship under construction.

21 Si Yuzhuo ed., The Maritime Law of the People’s Republic of China: Questions and Answe- rs, Beijing: China Communications Press, 1993, p. 18 (in Chinese). Prof. Si observes that

a “ship under construction” is often the total of materials and parts used to construct a ship after the signature of the ship construction contract and before the completion of ship construction and delivery of the ship to the party ordering the construction of the ship. Xie Zaiquan, Theory of Property Rights in Civil Law (I), Beijing: Chinese University of Political Science and Law Press, 1999, p. 22 (in Chinese). According to the principle of one property one right in the continental law system, a part of a property cannot constitute independent ownership; and several properties cannot constitute one ownership.


term “vessels under construction”, but without providing for its specific definition. According to article 8 of the Convention, the objects of rights for “a vessel under construction” may include materials, machinery and equipment for constructing a certain vessel, but such materials, machinery and equipment should be within the builder’s yard and by marking or other means are distinctly identified as intended to be incorporated in the vessel.22 Despite its vagueness, the description outlines the scope of ships under construction. The construction of a ship is a dynamic process. Obviously, before the completion of construction, some materials and parts are still separate from the overall structure of the ship, and they may not be owned by the builder. In the strict sense, “a ship under construction” cannot constitute property referred to in law. However, as ship building involves a huge amount of money, a “mortgage right” often has to be established on “a ship under construction”. Based on this consideration, “a ship under construction” may be viewed as property, and single ownership may be established on it.

The objects of property rights must be specific independent properties in principle. Only when “the keel is placed” or the ship is “at a similar construction stage”23 is the preliminary shape of a ship formed and may it be called a ship under construction. Before ship registration, even though construction may be completed and the normal functions of a ship are available, the vessel is not qualified as a “ship” from a legal perspective. This aggregate of various ship parts similar to a ship is in fact a “ship under construction”.

2. Legal Structure of Mezzanine Finance for Ships under Construction

At different stages of construction, a ship contains different ranges of property,

22 Article 8 of the Convention Relating to Registration of Rights in Respect of Vessels under Construction, 1967 provides that the national law may provide that the registered rights on a vessel under construction shall attach to materials, machinery and equipment which are within the precincts of the builder’s yard and which by marking or other means are distinctly identified as intended to be incorporated in the vessel.

23 Article 7(5) of the Circular of the General Office of the Zhejiang People’s Government on Re-issuing the Provisional Measures of Units Such as the Provincial Economic and Information Technology Commission on Administration of Mortgage in Respect of Ships under Construction in Zhejiang reads: a ship under construction as mortgage should be at the stage of placing keel or similar stages, and should have relevant certificate documents issued by a China ship inspection agency recognized by the maritime administration. At http://www.chinaacc.com/new/63_74_/2009_7_24_wa38092744551427900219176.shtml,

15 March 2013 (in Chinese). See Gao Xiang, Analysis of Relevant Legal Issues Concerning Mortgage Right of Ships under Construction, China Maritime Safety, No. 3, 2007, pp. 32~ 35. (in Chinese)


and its value fluctuates with market and material prices. The final value of the ship cannot be determined until the completion of construction. Strictly speaking, ships under construction are not genuine ships, as they lack the use value and monetary value that they will have after the completion of construction. In other words, the rights of ships under construction are limited, and the interests of its ownership are reflected in the way it is mortgaged for finance credit.

All investors willing to buy a ship expect maximum profit with minimum risks. The preferred share model, while having priority in equity distribution and reflecting equity distinction, does not reduce its risk as equity. In comparison, the mezzanine loan model combines the debtor–creditor relationship with the collateral relationship, with fewer risks than pure equity and more guarantees for creditor’s rights. Investors who finance ships under construction only seek a return on investment through the sale of the ship; they do not intend to operate the ships by themselves. Ship operation is complicated and professional, and investors are not necessarily able to bear the various difficulties. In light of the floating value of ships under construction, this article holds that to better prevent risks, mezzanine finance for ships under construction may be conducted through the model of mezzanine loans.

It can therefore be concluded that mezzanine loans and preferred shares have the same effect of absorbing finance and reducing transaction risks. But there are differences in the method of financing for the two models. The most salient difference is that the mezzanine loan model conducts finance with the double insurance method of creditor’s rights and a mortgage, while the preferred share model transfers certain priority rights in shares to the shareholder. A close study will discover that the nature of mezzanine finance reflected in the two is also differ-ent. The preferred share model focuses on the feature of equity in mezzanine finan-ce, that is exchanging operation and management rights for priority in dividend all-ocation. Despite the priority in allocation of dividends on shares, the cash value represented by shareholder’s equity and shares is impacted by the equity value and operational risks of the company. Poor operation and share depreciation will lead to no gain even with the priority in dividend allocation. On the contrary, in the mezzanine loan model, the investor pursues an income premium and the repayment of the principal plus interest on the date of maturity. The investor has no intention to dilute equity or control the company, which reflects the stability of creditor’s rights in mezzanine finance.

The two models both reflect the lack of interest from the investors in the com-


pany’s operation and management rights. Both models leave room for investors who have large capital reserves but lack operation and management skills to invest.The two also reflect the characteristic of mezzanine finance with creditor’s rightsplus debt-for-equity convertibility. The two methods have their respective advan-tages and disadvantages. In mezzanine finance, based on fund surplus or operation conditions as well as its preference in investment risks, the investor may conduct flexible financing by referring to different debt to equity finance ratios provided by different enterprises.

B. Guarantee of Mezzanine Finance: Legal Issues in the Realization of Mortgage in Ships under Construction

A ship has a long construction period and high cost with many hidden risks. Generally, the shipyard will require that the ship owner make a security deposit or advance payment, and then the balance is paid according to the progress of shipbuilding. As lump-sum payments bring great pressure, the ship owner agrees on payment by installments. Before the delivery of the ship, the ship owner is not the legal owner. It is normally very difficult for the ship owner to conduct mezzanine finance as mortgage borrower, unless he uses other sufficient property as mortgage. That is because in the mezzanine loan model, the mortgage borrower shall be the owner if it intends to conduct mezzanine finance by mortgaging the ship. In this case, to ensure the smooth ship construction process, the shipyard may choose the mezzanine loan model for its financing activities after receiving advance payment.

The greatest unknown in a ship under construction is the uncertainty of its value, which directly affects mezzanine finance. How to better realize the mortgage of a ship under construction is an unavoidable problem.

According to article 12 of the Maritime Law, “a ship under construction” is allowed by law to be mortgaged, but no further clarification on how to realize a ship’s mortgage is made in either the Maritime Law or the Property Law. The law only mentions that such a ship can be “auctioned according to law” with the mortgagee being paid in priority from the proceeds of the said auction. A ship whose construction is completed may be auctioned, but mortgagees encounter difficulties in safeguarding their rights for a ship under construction.

A ship under construction has an uncertain value throughout the building process. Only after a certain condition is met can its value be ascertained, very similar to a floating mortgage. But legal provisions stop at this point. The value


can finally be ascertained, but the newbuilding ship is still under construction, no answer is given by law on how to deal with the unfinished ship. A ship under construction is not a real ship, nor does it have the use value or monetary value of a ship. It is unknown whether it can be successfully sold at auction. Even if it is sold, its true value will be greatly discounted, which may result in a financial loss for the parties involved.

In order to inspire investors’ enthusiasm in participating in mortgage finance for a ship under construction, concerned parties should realize the mortgage of a ship under construction by contractual agreement through consultations. It should be agreed in advance that in case of the materialization of the right to mortgage, the ship under construction will be sold to the creditor at the value assessed, and then the creditor continues to assume building tasks until the ship is completed. Since the creditor has greater financial capabilities than both the shipyard and the ship owner, it is in a better position to take over shipbuilding responsibilities. Furthermore, shipbuilding is a process of appreciation and the value of the ship will not drastically fall even in the most uncertain macro-economic conditions. The creditor’s economic situation will not be excessively subject to the “mess” of the unfinished ship in this process. This practice draws on the United Kingdom’s receiver system for floating mortgages.24 In this way the value of a ship under construction can be preserved and consideration can be given to existing legal provisions on chattel mortgages. Should the shipyard break contract or go bankrupt, the most practical method for the ship owner to safeguard its rights is to exercise its floating mortgage rights of the ship under construction. The ship owner may require that the shipyard apply with a bank for repayment guarantee.

24 In a floating mortgage, the right to mortgage is generally materialized through the method of appointing a receiver, who acts as a possession manager to manage all property within the scope of mortgage, and may operate it for the interest of the mortgagee or sell all the property. The essence of the floating mortgage system is the receiver system. As the creditor may take over the debtor’s assets based on the debtor’s breach of contract at any time, the creditor’s control over the debtor’s assets is assured, and the method of floating mortgage is thus adequately flexible and secure. In the United Kingdom, floating mortgage is generally established through bonds or through an agreement between the parties involved. If the conditions for materialization of the right to mortgage are mature or there are risks that the mortgagee may not be repaid, the mortgagee may request the court to appoint a receiver. The receiver may be appointed by the court or by the mortgagee enjoying the right based on bonds. See Liu Anning, A Tentative Discussion on New Methods for Materialization of the Right to Mortgage in Respect of Newbuilding Ships, Journal of Dalian Maritime University (Social Sciences), No. 3, 2012, pp. 69~72. (in Chinese)


IV. Conclusion

As a financing method that combines characteristics of equity and debt, mezzanine finance has a unique flexibility. It is able to accommodate the needs of various industries. The two most representative models are the mezzanine loan model and the preferred share model. A ship whose construction is completed has become an independent legal entity, and its ownership, mortgage rights and value are assessable and have been determined. Therefore, mezzanine loans and preferred shares may be adopted to finance for operational ships. The mortgage collateral in mezzanine finance is equity and should include both proprietary and non-proprietary rights. Disputes between the mortgage creditor and the mezzanine creditor may be solved by clearly stipulating the rights of the parties in a creditor agreement. For preferred shares, it is suggested that the legal status of preferred shares be determined through legislation, and of course agreement between the parties involved.

Shipbuilding is a dynamic process and the value of a ship under construction is always changing. We cannot statically consider the moment of “keel placement” as the symbol of a ship under construction. Shipbuilding should instead be understood as a process of construction from the placement of the keel or a similar construction stage to the completion. At the same time, a ship is only a “ship” in the legal sense after it goes through “ship registration” in accordance with laws. When mezzanine finance is applied for a ship under construction, the mezzanine loan model may be adopted. The dual relationship of debtor–creditor and collateral may be used to diversity remedy approaches. No clarification has been made on how to realize the right to mortgaged ship in either the Maritime Law or the Property Law. There is no question that a ship whose construction is completed may be auctioned according to law. But a ship under construction is not a ship in the legal sense, nor does it have the use value and monetary value of a ship. Whether such a ship can be sold in direct auction is a difficult problem. In light of such a situation, this article, drawing on the floating mortgage and receiver system, suggests that such a ship under construction may be sold to the creditor at a discount, who will assume the task of continuing to build the ship. This practice will preserve the value of a ship under construction, with consideration to the coordination of existing legal provisions on chattel mortgage.

This article argues that ship brokers and industry associations can play a key role in ensuring the availability of financing and improving the financial


conditions for investment in ships under construction. These groups can also improve transparency of financing for operational ships and can minimize obstacles resulting from information asymmetry. For current market conditions, ship brokers not only have a keen understanding of the shipping business but are also savvy investors. Brokers are able to collect market information from various forms and channels. In addition, brokers themselves have the qualification of “intermediary agent”, and are able to facilitate the financing transaction. Industry associations are non-governmental social organizations and improve industry self-discipline and coordination. Choosing industry associations as a third party in financing negotiations can balance the interest relationships between the parties.

Ship mezzanine finance is a new financial instrument and its operation requires regulation and support of numerous laws and regulations. No specific laws or regulations are available in China for ship finance; therefore legal support has to be sought among existing laws. However, existing laws are still unable to deal with the specific situations presented by mezzanine finance. China should make laws and regulations that specifically address ship finance as soon as possible, and around them, construct a legal system for ship mezzanine finance.


Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for Protection against Piracy in

the Gulf of Guinea Region

1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-second session (12 to 21 June 2013), recognized the gravity of the issue of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Gulf of Guinea and the extreme violence exhibited, and expressed its deep concern for, and condemnation of, such activities.

2 The Committee called upon flag States whose ships are operating in the area to reinforce the need for the full implementation of the current recommendations to Governments and guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships* and other guidelines developed by the Organization and the industry.

3 Such other guidance includes the newly developed Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for protection against piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea region (the Interim Guidelines), developed by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), BIMCO, the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) and the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO) and are supported by NATO Shipping Centre. The Committee agreed to promulgate details of the Interim Guidelines and instructed the Secretariat to do so.

4 The Committee recognized that the Interim Guidelines should be read in conjunction with the Best Management Practices (BMP), adopted and circulated by the Committee as MSC.1/Circ.1339, and the other IMO guidance mentioned above.

5 Member Governments are invited to consider the Interim Guidelines and advise owners, operators and managers of ships entitled to fly their flag, as well as the shipboard personnel employed or engaged on such ships, to act accordingly.

6 Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations with consultative status are also invited to consider the Interim Guidelines and to advise their

*　MSC.1/Circ.1333 on Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, and MSC.1/Circ.1334 on Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, or revisions thereto.


Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for Protetionagainst Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Region 303

membership to act accordingly. 7 Member Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental

organizations with consultative status are further invited to consider bringing the results of the experience gained from using the Interim Guidelines to the attention of the Committee.

8 The Interim Guidelines can be found online following any of the links below:

http://www.ics-shipping.org/Interim%20Guidelines%20for%20Owners,%20Operators%20and%20Masters%20for%20Protection%20against%20Piracy%20in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea%20Region.pdf

https://www.bimco.org/en/News/2012/12/~/media/Security/Piracy/Gulf_of_Guinea/2012-12-20_RT_agreed_GoG_anti-piracy_guidance.ashx

http://www.intertanko.com/Global/admin_WeeklyNews/GOG%202012-12-20%20RT%20agreed%20GoG%20anti-piracy%20guidance.pdf

http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/Guidelines-for-Gulf-of-Guinea.aspx

International Seabed Authority: Selected Decision and Documents of

the Nineteenth Session

(15 – 25 July 2013)International Seabed Authority

14 – 20 Port Royal StreetKingston, Jamaica

Contents

ASSEMBLYISBA/19/A/2 Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the SeaISBA/19/A/4 Outcomes of the International Workshop on Further Consideration of the Implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the SeaISBA/19/A/7 – ISBA/19/C/11 Report of the Finance CommitteeISBA/19/A/9 Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority regarding the amendments to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the AreaISBA/19/A/12 Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority concerning overhead charges for the administration and supervision of exploration contractsISBA/19/A/14 Statement by the President on the work of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority at its nineteenth session

COUNCILISBA/19/C/2 Report and recommendations of the Legal and Technical Commission to the Council of the International Seabed Authority relating to an application for the approval of a plan of work for exploration for cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts by China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association


International Seabed Authority: Selected Decision and Documents of the Nineteenth Session 305

ISBA/19/C/3 Report and recommendations of the Legal and Technical Commission to the Council of the International Seabed Authority relating to an application for the approval of a plan of work for exploration for cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts by Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National CorporationISBA/19/C/4 Proposal for a Joint Venture Operation with the Enterprise. Report by the Interim Director – General of the EnterpriseISBA/19/C/5 Towards the Development of a Regulatory Framework for Polymetallic Nodule Exploitation in the AreaISBA/19/C/6 Considerations relating to a proposal by Nautilus Minerals Inc. for a Joint Venture Operation with the EnterpriseISBA/19/C/7 Proposed amendments to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the AreaISBA/19/C/8 Status of contracts for explorationISBA/19/C/9 Rev.1 Periodic review of the implementation of the plans of work for exploration for polymetallic nodules in the AreaISBA/19/C/12 Laws, regulations and administrative measures adopted by sponsoring States and other members of the International Seabed Authority with respect to the activities in the AreaISBA/19/C/13 Decision of the Council relating to an application for approval of a plan of work for exploration for cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts by the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development AssociationISBA/19/C/14 Summary report of the Chair of the Legal and Technical Commission on the work of the Commission during the nineteenth session of the International Seabed AuthorityISBA/19/C/15 Decision of the Council relating to an application for approval of a plan of work for exploration for cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts by Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National CorporationISBA/19/C/16 Decision of the Council relating to financial and budgetary mattersISBA/19/C/17 Decision of the Council of the International Seabed Authority relating to amendments to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area and related mattersISBA/19/C/18 Statement of the President of the Council of the International Seabed Authority on the work of the Council during the nineteenth session

关于修改《中华人民共和国船舶及其有关作

业活动污染海洋环境防治管理规定》的决定

（中华人民共和国交通运输部令 2013 年第 12 号 2013 年 8 月 31 日公布）

交通运输部决定对《中华人民共和国船舶及其有关作业活动污染海洋环境防

治管理规定》(交通运输部令 2010 年第 7 号)作如下修改：

删去第四十四条第一款。

本决定自公布之日起施行。

《中华人民共和国船舶及其有关作业活动污染海洋环境防治管理规定》根据

本决定作相应修改，重新发布。


关于修改《中华人民共和国船舶油污损害民事责任保险实施办法》的决定 307

关于修改《中华人民共和国船舶油污损害

民事责任保险实施办法》的决定

（中华人民共和国交通运输部令 2013 年第 11 号 2013 年 8 月 31 日公布）

交通运输部决定对《中华人民共和国船舶油污损害民事责任保险实施办法》

(交通运输部令 2010 年第 3 号）作如下修改：

一、删去第三章“船舶油污损害民事责任保险机构”。

二、增加一条作为第八条，内容为“中国籍船舶的所有人应当向在我国境内

依法成立的商业性保险机构、在我国境内依法成立或者在我国境内设有代表机构

或者代理机构的互助性保险机构投保船舶油污损害民事责任保险，或者取得上述

保险机构以及境内银行所出具的保函、信用证等其他财务保证。

中国籍船舶的所有人应当向具有赔付能力的保险机构投保船舶油污损害民事

责任保险或者取得财务保证，保险机构应当向中国籍船舶的所有人出示能够证明

其具有赔付能力的相关文件。”

三、将第二十条改为第十六条，并修改为：“从事船舶油污损害民事责任保险

的保险机构在生效的法院判决、仲裁裁决书或者仲裁调解书规定的履行期间届满

后拒不执行，未向所承保船舶赔付的，自发现之年次年起三年内，海事管理机构在

受理船舶油污损害民事责任保险证书申请时不接受其签发的船舶油污损害民事责

任保险单证或者其他财务保证证明”。

此外，对条文的顺序作相应的调整和修改。


《中华人民共和国船舶油污损害民事责任保险实施办法》根据本决定作相应

修改，重新发布。

关于修改《中华人民共和国国际海运条例

实施细则》的决定

（中华人民共和国交通运输部令 2013 年第 9 号 2013 年 8 月 29 日发布）

交通运输部决定对《中华人民共和国国际海运条例实施细则》作如下修改：

一、将第七条修改为：“在中国境内设立企业经营国际船舶代理业务，或者中

国企业法人经营国际船舶代理业务，应当有固定的营业场所和必要的营业设施，

其高级业务管理人员中至少应当有 2 人具有 3 年以上从事国际海上运输经营活动

的经历。

从事国际船舶代理业务的企业，应当在开业后 30 日内持营业场所证明文件

和有关人员资历证明文件向交通运输部备案。

从事国际船舶代理业务的企业变更企业信息或者不再从事国际船舶代理经营

活动的，应当在信息变更或者停止经营活动的 15 日内，向交通运输部备案。”

二、将第九条修改为：“国际船舶管理经营者在中国境内的分支机构经营相

关业务的，应当符合《海运条例》第九条的规定，并按照《海运条例》第十条和本

实施细则第八条的规定进行登记。登记申请材料应当包括：

（一）申请书；

（二）可行性分析报告；

（三）母公司的商业登记文件；

（四）母公司的《国际海运辅助业经营资格登记证》副本；

（五）母公司确定该分支机构经营范围确认文件；

（六）营业场所的证明文件；

（七）《海运条例》第九条规定的人员的从业资历或者资格的证明文件。”

三、删去第二十一条第一款中的“国际船舶代理经营者”。

四、将第三十条修改为：“国际班轮运输经营者委托代理人接受订舱、代签提

单、代收运费等项业务的，委托的代理人应当是依法成立的国际船舶代理经营者”。

五、删去第三十三条。

六、将第四十二条改为第四十一条，并修改为：“设立外商投资企业经营国际

船舶代理业务，应当通过拟设立企业所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通


关于修改《中华人民共和国国际海运条例实施细则》的决定 309

运输主管部门向交通运输部提交符合本实施细则第七条第一款规定条件的申请材

料。有关省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门收到完整齐备的上述材

料后，应当于 10 个工作日内将有关材料及意见转报交通运输部。

交通运输部应当自收到转报的上述材料和意见之日起 30 个工作日内，按照

本实施细则第七条第一款的规定进行审核，作出批准或者不予批准的决定。决定

批准的，发给批准文件；不予批准的，应当书面通知申请人并告知理由。

获得批准的申请人应当持交通运输部批准文件，按照国家有关外商投资企业

的法律、法规的要求到有关部门办理相应的设立外商投资企业的审批手续。取得

相应的批准文件后，到交通运输部领取《国际船舶代理经营资格登记证书》”。

七、删去第四十八条、第四十九条、第五十条、第五十一条。

八、将第六十三条改为第五十八条，并修改为：“班轮公会协议、运营协议和

运价协议、国际船舶代理经营者未按规定向交通运输部备案的，由交通运输部依

照《海运条例》第四十五条的规定，对本实施细则第七条、第三十二条规定的备案

人实施处罚。班轮公会不按规定报备的，可对其公会成员予以处罚”。

此外，对条文的顺序和部分文字作相应的调整和修改。


《中华人民共和国国际海运条例实施细则》根据本决定作相应修改，重新发

布。

中华人民共和国国际海运条例实施细则

（2003 年 1 月 20 日交通部发布根据 2013 年 8 月 29 日交通运输部《关于修改〈中华人民共和国国际海运条例实施细则〉的决定》修正）

第一章总则

第一条根据《中华人民共和国国际海运条例》（以下简称《海运条例》）的规

定，制定本实施细则。

第二条交通运输部和有关地方人民政府交通运输主管部门应当依照《海运

条例》和本实施细则的规定，按照公平、高效、便利的原则，管理国际海上运输经

营活动和与国际海上运输相关的辅助性经营活动，鼓励公平竞争，禁止不正当竞

争。

第三条《海运条例》和本实施细则中下列用语的含义是：

（一）国际船舶运输业务，是指国际船舶运输经营者使用自有或者经营的船

舶、舱位，提供国际海上货物运输和旅客运输服务以及为完成这些服务而围绕其

船舶、所载旅客或者货物开展的相关活动，包括签订有关协议、接受定舱、商定和

收取运费、签发提单及其他相关运输单证、安排货物装卸、安排保管、进行货物交

接、安排中转运输和船舶进出港等活动。

（二）国际船舶运输经营者，包括中国国际船舶运输经营者和外国国际船舶

运输经营者。其中，中国国际船舶运输经营者是指依据《海运条例》和本实施细则

规定取得《国际船舶运输经营许可证》经营国际船舶运输业务的中国企业法人；外

国国际船舶运输经营者是指依据外国法律设立经营进出中国港口国际船舶运输业

务的外国企业。

（三）国际班轮运输业务，是指以自有或者经营的船舶，或者以《海运条例》

第十四条第三款规定的方式，在固定的港口之间提供的定期国际海上货物或旅客

运输。

（四）无船承运业务，是指《海运条例》第七条第二款规定的业务，包括为完

成该项业务围绕其所承运的货物开展的下列活动：

（1）以承运人身份与托运人订立国际货物运输合同；

（2）以承运人身份接收货物、交付货物；

（3）签发提单或者其他运输单证；

（4）收取运费及其他服务报酬；

（5）向国际船舶运输经营者或者其他运输方式经营者为所承运的货物订舱

和办理托运；

（6）支付港到港运费或者其他运输费用；

（7）集装箱拆箱、集拼箱业务；

（8）其他相关的业务。

（五）无船承运业务经营者，包括中国无船承运业务经营者和外国无船承运

业务经营者。其中中国无船承运业务经营者是指依照《海运条例》和本实施细则

规定取得无船承运业务经营资格的中国企业法人；外国无船承运业务经营者是指

依照外国法律设立并依照《海运条例》和本实施细则的相关规定取得经营进出中

国港口货物无船承运业务资格的外国企业。

（六）国际船舶代理经营者，是指依照中国法律设立从事《海运条例》第

二十六条规定业务的中国企业法人。

（七）国际船舶管理经营者，是指依照中国法律设立从事《海运条例》第

二十七条规定业务的中国企业法人。

（八）国际海运货物仓储业务经营者，是指依照中国法律设立，提供海运货

物仓库保管、存货管理以及货物整理、分装、包装、分拨等服务的中国企业法人。

（九）国际海运集装箱站与堆场业务经营者，是指依照中国法律设立，提供


海运货物集装箱的堆存、保管、清洗、修理以及集装箱货物的存储、集拼、分拨等

服务的中国企业法人。

（十）外商投资企业，是指依照中国法律投资设立的中外合资经营企业、中

外合作经营企业和外商独资企业。

（十一）外商常驻代表机构，是指外国企业或者其他经济组织在中国境内依

法设立的，为其派出机构开展宣传、推介、咨询和联络活动的非营业性机构。

（十二）企业商业登记文件，是指企业登记机关或者企业所在国有关当局签

发的企业营业执照或者企业设立的证明文件。企业商业登记文件为复印件的，须

有企业登记机关在复印件上的确认或者证明复印件与原件一致的公证文书。

（十三）专用发票，是指由国家税务总局批准统一印制的票据，它是证明付

款人向国际船舶运输经营者或者其代理人、无船承运业务经营者或者其代理人支

付运费或者其他相关费用的凭证，包括《国际海运业运输专用发票》和《国际海运

业船舶代理专用发票》。

（十四）班轮公会协议，是指符合联合国《1974 年班轮公会行动守则公约》

定义的，由班轮公会成员之间以及班轮公会之间订立的各类协议。

（十五）运营协议，是指两个或者两个以上国际班轮运输经营者为稳定或者

控制运价订立的关于在一条或者数条航线上增加或者减少船舶运力协议，以及其

他协调国际班轮运输经营者共同行动的协议，包括具有上述性质内容的会议纪

要；两个或者两个以上国际班轮运输经营者为提高运营效率订立的关于共同使用

船舶、共同使用港口设施及其他合作经营协议和各类联盟协议、联营体协议。

（十六）运价协议，是指两个或者两个以上国际班轮运输经营者之间订立的

关于收费项目及其费率、运价或者附加费等内容的协议，包括具有上述内容的会

议纪要。

（十七）公布运价，是指国际班轮运输经营者和无船承运业务经营者运价本

上载明的运价。运价本由运价、运价规则、承运人和托运人应当遵守的规定等内

容组成。

（十八）协议运价，指国际班轮运输经营者与货主、无船承运业务经营者约

定的运价，包括运价及其相关要素。协议运价以合同或者协议形式书面订立。

（十九）从业资历证明文件，是指被证明人具有 3 年以上从事国际海上运输

或者国际海上运输辅助性经营活动经历的个人履历表。个人履历表须经公证机关

公证。

第二章国际海上运输及其辅助性业务的经营者

第四条在中国境内设立企业经营国际船舶运输业务，或者中国企业法人申


请经营国际船舶运输业务，应当符合《海运条例》第五条规定的条件，考虑交通运

输部公布的国际海运市场竞争状况和国家关于国际海上运输业发展的政策。

交通运输部应当在其政府网站和其他适当媒体上及时公布国际海运市场竞争

状况和国家关于国际海上运输业发展的政策。上述状况和政策未经公布，不得作

为拒绝申请的理由。

第五条在中国境内设立企业经营国际船舶运输业务，或者中国企业法人申

请经营国际船舶运输业务，申请人应当向交通运输部提出申请，报送相关材料，并

应同时将申请材料抄报企业所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管

部门。申请材料应当包括：


（二）可行性分析报告、投资协议；

（三）申请人的企业商业登记文件（拟设立企业的，主要投资人的商业登记

文件或者身份证明）；

（四）船舶所有权证书、国籍证书和法定检验证书的副本或者复印件；

（五）提单、客票或者多式联运单证样本；

（六）符合交通运输部规定的高级业务管理人员的从业资格证明。

有关省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门自收到上述抄报材料后，

应当就有关材料进行审核，提出意见，并应当自收到有关材料之日起 10 个工作日

内将有关意见报送交通运输部。

交通运输部收到申请人的申请材料后，应当在申请材料完整齐备之日起 30个工作日内按照《海运条例》第五条和第六条的规定进行审核，作出许可或者不许

可的决定。决定许可的，向申请人颁发《国际船舶运输经营许可证》；决定不许可

的，应当书面通知申请人并告知理由。

第六条中国国际船舶运输经营者在中国境内设立分支机构的，适用本实施

细则第五条规定的程序。申请材料应当包括：




（四）母公司的《国际船舶运输经营许可证》副本；

（五）母公司对该分支机构经营范围的确认文件；

（六）符合交通运输部要求的高级业务管理人员的从业资格证明。

中国国际船舶运输经营者的分支机构可为其母公司所有或者经营的船舶提供

办理船舶进出港口手续、安排港口作业、接受订舱、签发提单、收取运费等服务。

第七条在中国境内设立企业经营国际船舶代理业务，或者中国企业法人经

营国际船舶代理业务，应当有固定的营业场所和必要的营业设施，其高级业务管

理人员中至少应当有 2 人具有 3 年以上从事国际海上运输经营活动的经历。


从事国际船舶代理业务的企业，应当在开业后 30 日内持营业场所证明文件

和有关人员资历证明文件向交通运输部备案。

从事国际船舶代理业务的企业变更企业信息或者不再从事国际船舶代理经营

活动的，应当在信息变更或者停止经营活动的 15 日内，向交通运输部备案。

第八条中国企业法人申请经营国际船舶管理业务或者在中国境内设立企业

经营国际船舶管理业务，应当向拟经营业务所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府

交通运输主管部门提出申请，申请材料应当包括：


（二）可行性分析报告、投资协议；

（三）申请人的商业登记文件（拟设立企业的，主要投资人的商业登记文件

或者身份证明）；

（四）固定营业场所的证明文件；

（五）《海运条例》第九条第（一）项规定的高级业务管理人员的从业资历证

明文件；

（六）《海运条例》第九条第（二）项规定的人员的船长、轮机长适任证书复

印件。

有关省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门收到申请人的申请材料

后，应当在申请材料完整齐备之日起15个工作日内进行审核。材料真实且符合《海

运条例》第九条规定条件的，予以资格登记，并颁发《国际海运辅助业经营资格登

记证》；材料不真实或者不符合《海运条例》第九条规定条件的，不予登记，书面通

知申请人并告知理由。申请人持《国际海运辅助业经营资格登记证》向企业登记

机关办理企业登记，向税务部门和外汇管理部门指定的银行办理相关手续。

第九条国际船舶管理经营者在中国境内的分支机构经营相关业务的，应当

符合《海运条例》第九条的规定，并按照《海运条例》第十条和本实施细则第八条

的规定进行登记。登记申请材料应当包括：




（四）母公司的《国际海运辅助业经营资格登记证》副本；

（五）母公司确定该分支机构经营范围确认文件；

（六）营业场所的证明文件；

（七）《海运条例》第九条规定的人员的从业资历或者资格的证明文件。

第十条国际船舶运输经营者申请经营进出中国港口国际班轮运输业务，应

当向交通运输部提出申请，并报送《海运条例》第十五条规定的材料。交通运输部

应当按照《海运条例》第十五条的规定进行审核。予以登记的，颁发《国际班轮运

输经营资格登记证》。申请材料不真实、不齐备的，不予登记，应当书面通知申请


人并告知理由。

国际船舶运输经营者依法取得经营进出中国港口国际班轮运输业务资格后，

交通运输部在其政府网站公布国际班轮运输经营者名称及其提单格式样本。

第十一条申请办理无船承运业务经营者提单登记的，应当向交通运输部提

出提单登记申请，报送相关材料，并应当同时将申请材料抄报企业所在地或者外

国无船承运业务经营者指定的联络机构所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交

通运输主管部门。申请材料应当包括：



（三）企业商业登记文件；

（四）提单格式样本；

（五）保证金已交存的银行凭证复印件。

申请人为外国无船承运业务经营者的，还应当提交本实施细则第二十五条规

定的其指定的联络机构的有关材料。

有关省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门自收到上述抄报材料后，

应当就有关材料进行审核，提出意见，并应当自收到抄报的申请材料之日起 7 个

工作日内将有关意见报送交通运输部。

交通运输部收到申请人的材料后，应当在申请材料完整齐备之日起 15 个工

作日内按照《海运条例》第七条和第八条的规定进行审核。审核合格的，予以提单

登记，并颁发《无船承运业务经营资格登记证》；不合格的，应当书面通知当事人并

告知理由。

中国的申请人取得《无船承运业务经营资格登记证》，并向原企业登记机关

办理企业相应登记手续后，方可从事无船承运业务经营活动。

第十二条外国无船承运业务经营者按照外国法律已取得经营资格且有合法

财务责任保证的，在按照《海运条例》和本实施细则申请从事进出中国港口无船

承运业务时，可以不向中国境内的银行交存保证金。但为了保证外国无船承运业

务经营者清偿因其不履行承运人义务或者履行义务不当所产生的债务以及支付罚

款，满足《海运条例》第八条第三款的规定，该外国无船承运业务经营者的政府主

管部门与中国政府交通运输主管部门应就财务责任保证实现方式签订协议。

第十三条没有在中国港口开展国际班轮运输业务，但在中国境内承揽货

物、签发提单或者其他运输单证、收取运费，通过租赁国际班轮运输经营者船舶舱

位提供进出中国港口国际货物运输服务；或者利用国际班轮运输经营者提供的支

线服务，在中国港口承揽货物后运抵外国港口中转的，应当按照本实施细则的有

关规定，取得无船承运业务经营资格。但有《海运条例》第十四条第三款规定情形

的除外。

第十四条中国的无船承运业务经营者在中国境内的分支机构，应当按照《海


运条例》第八条第二款的规定交纳保证金，并按照本实施细则第十一条的规定进

行登记，取得《无船承运业务经营资格登记证》。申请登记应当提交下列材料：


（二）母公司的企业商业登记文件；

（三）母公司的《无船承运业务经营资格登记证》副本；

（四）母公司确认该分支机构经营范围的确认文件；

（五）保证金已交存的银行凭证复印件。

第十五条无船承运业务经营者申请提单登记时，提单台头名称应当与申请

人名称相一致。

提单台头名称与申请人名称不一致的，申请人应当提供说明该提单确实为申

请人制作、使用的相关材料，并附送申请人对申请登记提单承担承运人责任的书

面申明。

第十六条无船承运业务经营者使用两种或者两种以上提单的，各种提单均

应登记。

国际班轮运输经营者和无船承运业务经营者的登记提单发生变更的，应当于

新的提单使用之日起 15 日前将新的提单样本格式向交通运输部备案。

第十七条无船承运业务经营申请者交纳保证金并办理提单登记，依法取得

无船承运业务经营资格后，交通运输部在其政府网站公布无船承运业务经营者名

称及其提单格式样本。

第十八条无船承运业务经营者应当依法在交通运输部指定的商业银行开设

的无船承运业务经营者专门账户上交存保证金，保证金利息按照中国人民银行公

布的活期存款利率计息。

第十九条无船承运业务经营者交存的保证金，受国家法律保护。除下列情

形外，保证金不得动用：

（一）因无船承运业务经营者不履行承运人义务或者履行义务不当，根据司

法机关已生效的判决或者司法机关裁定执行的仲裁机构裁决应当承担赔偿责任

的；

（二）被交通运输主管部门依法处以罚款的。

有前款（一）、（二）项情形需要从保证金中划拨的，应当依法进行。

无船承运业务经营者的保证金不符合《海运条例》规定数额的，交通运输部

应当书面通知其补足。无船承运业务经营者自收到交通运输部书面通知之日起

30 日内未补足的，交通运输部应当按照《海运条例》第十三条的规定取消其经营

资格。

第二十条无船承运业务经营者被交通运输部依法取消经营资格、申请终止

经营或者因其他原因终止经营的，可向交通运输部申请退还保证金。交通运输部

应将该申请事项在其政府网站上公示 30 日。


在公示期内，有关当事人认为无船承运业务经营者有本实施细则第十九条第

一款第（一）项情形需要对其保证金采取保全措施的，应当在上述期限内取得司法

机关的财产保全裁定。自保证金被保全之日起，交通运输部依照《海运条例》对保

证金账户的监督程序结束。有关纠纷由当事双方通过司法程序解决。

公示期届满未有前款规定情形的，交通运输部应当通知保证金开户银行退还

无船承运业务经营者保证金及其利息，并收缴该无船承运业务经营者的《无船承

运业务经营资格登记证》。

第二十一条中国国际船舶运输经营者、中国无船承运业务经营者、国际船

舶管理经营者有下列变更情形之一的，应当向原资格许可、登记机关备案：

（一）变更企业名称；

（二）企业迁移；

（三）变更出资人；

（四）歇业、终止经营。

变更企业名称的，由原资格许可、登记机关换发相关经营许可证或者经营资

格登记证；企业终止经营的，应当将有关许可、登记证书交回原许可、登记机关。

第二十二条除《海运条例》和本实施细则第四章规定的外商投资企业外，

经营国际海运货物仓储、国际海运集装箱站与堆场业务的经营者应当自开始从事

上述经营活动之日起 30 日内将有关情况向企业所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民

政府交通运输主管部门报备。

第三章国际海上运输及其辅助性业务经营活动

第二十三条国际班轮运输经营者新开或者停开国际班轮运输航线，或者变

更国际班轮运输船舶、班期的，应当按照《海运条例》第十七条的规定在交通运输

部指定媒体上公告，并按规定报备。

第二十四条中国国际船舶运输经营者增加运营船舶，包括以光船租赁方式

租用船舶增加运营船舶的，应当于投入运营前 15 日向交通运输部备案，取得备案

证明文件。备案材料应当载明公司名称、注册地、船名、船舶国籍、船舶类型、船

舶吨位、拟运营航线。

交通运输部收到备案材料后，应当在 3 个工作日内出具备案证明文件。

第二十五条在中国港口开展国际班轮运输业务的外国国际船舶运输经营

者，以及在中国委托代理人提供进出中国港口国际货物运输服务的外国无船承运

业务经营者，应当在中国境内委托一个联络机构，负责代表该外国企业与中国政

府有关部门就《海运条例》和本实施细则规定的有关管理及法律事宜进行联络。

联络机构可以是该外国企业在中国境内设立的外商投资企业或者常驻代表机构，


也可以是其他中国企业法人或者在中国境内有固定住所的其他经济组织。委托的

联络机构应当向交通运输部备案，并提交下列文件：

（一）联络机构说明书，载明联络机构名称、住所、联系方式及联系人；

（二）委托书副本或者复印件；

（三）委托人与联络机构的协议副本；

（四）联络机构的工商登记文件复印件。

联络机构为该外国企业在中国境内的外商投资企业或者常驻代表机构的，不

须提供本条第一款第（二）项、第（三）项文件。

联络机构或者联络机构说明书所载明的事项发生改变的，应当自发生改变之

日起 15 日内向交通运输部备案。

第二十六条任何单位和个人不得擅自使用国际班轮运输经营者和无船承运

业务经营者已经登记的提单。

第二十七条无船承运业务经营者需要委托代理人签发提单或者相关单证

的，应当委托依法取得经营资格的国际船舶运输经营者、无船承运业务经营者和

国际海运辅助业务经营者代理上述事项。

前款规定的经营者不得接受未办理提单登记并交存保证金的无船承运业务经

营者的委托，为其代理签发提单。

第二十八条国际班轮运输经营者与货主和无船承运业务经营者协议运价

的，应当采用书面形式。协议运价号应当在提单或者相关单证上显示。

第二十九条国际船舶运输经营者不得接受未办理提单登记并交纳保证金的

无船承运业务经营者提供的货物或者集装箱。

第三十条国际班轮运输经营者委托代理人接受订舱、代签提单、代收运费

等项业务的，委托的代理人应当是依法成立的国际船舶代理经营者。

第三十一条国际班轮运输经营者和无船承运业务经营者应当将其在中国境

内的船舶代理人、签发提单代理人在交通运输部指定的媒体上公布。公布事项包

括代理人名称、注册地、住所、联系方式。代理人发生变动的，应当于有关代理协

议生效前 7 日内公布上述事项。

国际班轮运输经营者、无船承运业务经营者应当及时将公布代理事项的媒体

名称向交通运输部备案。

第三十二条国际船舶运输经营者之间订立的涉及中国港口的班轮公会协

议、运营协议、运价协议等，应当自协议订立之日起 15 日内，按下列规定向交通

运输部备案：

（一）班轮公会协议，由班轮公会代表其所有经营进出中国港口海上运输的

成员备案。班轮公会备案时，应当同时提供该公会的成员名单。

（二）国际船舶运输经营者之间订立的运营协议、运价协议，由参加订立协

议的国际船舶运输经营者分别备案。


第三十三条下列经营者在中国境内收取运费、代为收取运费以及其他相关

费用，应当向付款人出具专用发票：

（一）中国国际船舶运输经营者及其分支机构；

（二）中国无船承运业务经营者及其分支机构；

（三）国际船舶代理经营者及其分支机构；

（四）《海运条例》第三十条规定的企业。

前款所列经营者应当向公司所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输

主管部门办理专用发票使用证明后，向公司所在地的税务机关申请领取专用发票。

国家税务总局另有规定的，从其规定。

第三十四条国际船舶管理经营者应当根据合同的约定和国家有关规定，履

行有关船舶安全和防止污染的义务。

第三十五条经营进出中国港口国际班轮运输业务的国际班轮运输经营者，

应当填报《中华人民共和国海上国际运输业信息表（航运公司基本情况）》《中华

人民共和国海上国际运输业信息表（航运公司集装箱出口重箱运量）》和《中华人

民共和国海上国际运输业信息表（航运公司集装箱进口重箱运量）》，于当年 3 月

31 日前报送交通运输部。

外国国际船舶运输经营者的上述材料由其委托的联络机构报送。

第三十六条中国国际船舶运输经营者、国际船舶代理经营者以及国际集装

箱运输港口经营人，应当分别填报《中华人民共和国海上国际运输业信息表（航

运公司基本情况）》《中华人民共和国海上国际运输业信息表（国际船舶代理）》和

《中华人民共和国海上国际运输业信息表（港口集装箱吞吐量）》，于当年 3 月 15日前报送公司所在地省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门。

各有关省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门应当将上述信息表及

其汇总信息于当年 3 月 31 日前报送交通运输部。

第三十七条国际船舶代理经营者、国际船舶管理经营者、国际海运货物仓

储业务经营者以及国际集装箱站与堆场业务经营者，不得有下列行为：

（一）以非正常、合理的收费水平提供服务，妨碍公平竞争；

（二）在会计账簿之外暗中给予客户回扣，以承揽业务；

（三）滥用优势地位，限制交易当事人自主选择国际海运辅助业务经营者，

或者以其相关产业的垄断地位诱导交易当事人，排斥同业竞争；

（四）其他不正当竞争行为。

第三十八条外国国际船舶运输经营者以及外国国际海运辅助企业的常驻代

表机构不得从事经营活动，包括不得：

（一）代表其境外母公司接受订舱，签发母公司提单或者相关单证；

（二）为母公司办理结算或者收取运费及其他费用；

（三）开具境外母公司或者其母公司在中国境内设立的《海运条例》第三十


条规定的企业的票据；

（四）以托运人身份向国际班轮运输经营者托运货物；

（五）以外商常驻代表机构名义与客户签订业务合同。

第四章外商投资经营国际海上运输及其辅助性业务

第三十九条设立中外合资、合作经营企业经营国际船舶运输业务，应当通

过拟设立企业所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门向交通运

输部提出申请。申请材料应当包括：



（三）合资或者合作协议；

（四）投资者的企业商业登记文件或者身份证件；

（五）符合交通运输部规定的高级业务管理人员的从业资格证明。

有关省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门应当自收到完整齐备的

材料之日起 10 个工作日内将申请材料及意见转报交通运输部。


《海运条例》第二十九条第二款、第三款和第四款的规定以及交通运输部公布的

国际海运市场竞争状况和国家关于国际海上运输业发展的政策进行审核，作出批

准或者不予批准的决定。决定批准的，发给批准文件；不予批准的，应当书面通知

申请人并告知理由。


的法律、法规的要求，到有关部门办理相应的设立外商投资企业的审批手续。取

得相应的审批手续后，应当持有关部门许可设立企业的文件和本实施细则第五条

第一款（四）至（六）项的相关材料，按照本实施细则第五条规定的程序向交通运

输部领取相应的《国际船舶运输经营许可证》。

第四十条设立《海运条例》第三十条规定的外商投资企业，应当按照交通

运输部和对外贸易经济合作部的有关规定办理。

第四十一条设立外商投资企业经营国际船舶代理业务，应当通过拟设立企

业所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门向交通运输部提交符

合本实施细则第七条第一款规定条件的申请材料。有关省、自治区、直辖市人民

政府交通运输主管部门收到完整齐备的上述材料后，应当于 10 个工作日内将有

关材料及意见转报交通运输部。


本实施细则第七条第一款的规定进行审核，作出批准或者不予批准的决定。决定


批准的，发给批准文件；不予批准的，应当书面通知申请人并告知理由。



相应的批准文件后，到交通运输部领取《国际船舶代理经营资格登记证书》。

第四十二条设立外商投资企业经营国际船舶管理业务，应当通过拟设立企

业所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门向交通运输部提交本

实施细则第八条规定的申请材料。有关省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主

管部门收到完整齐备的上述材料后，应当于 10 个工作日内将有关材料及意见转

报交通运输部。


《海运条例》第九条的规定进行审核，作出批准或者不予批准的决定。决定批准的，

发给批准文件；不予批准的，应当书面通知申请人并告知理由。



相应的审批手续后，应当持有关部门的批准文件按照本实施细则第八条规定的程

序向企业所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门办理登记，领取

《国际海运辅助业经营资格登记证》。

第四十三条经营国际海运货物仓储业务，应当具备下列条件：

（一）有固定的营业场所；

（二）有与经营范围相适应的仓库设施；

（三）高级业务管理人员中至少 2 人具有 3 年以上从事相关业务的经历；

（四）法律、法规规定的其他条件。

第四十四条经营国际海运集装箱站及堆场业务，应当具备下列条件：

（一）有固定的营业场所；

（二）有与经营范围相适应的车辆、装卸机械、堆场、集装箱检查设备、设施；

（三）高级业务管理人员中至少 2 人具有 3 年以上从事相关业务的经历；

（四）法律、法规规定的其他条件。

第四十五条设立外商投资企业，经营国际海运货物仓储业务或者设立中外

合资、合作企业经营国际集装箱站与堆场业务，应当通过拟设立企业所在地的省、

自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门向交通运输部提出申请。申请材料应

当包括：



（三）合资或者合营协议；

（四）投资者的企业商业登记文件或者身份证件。

有关省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门收到完整齐备的上述材


料后，应当于 10 个工作日内将有关材料及意见转报交通运输部。

交通运输部应当在收到转报的上述材料和意见之日起 30 个工作日内，按照

本实施细则第四十三条或者第四十四条的规定进行审核，作出批准或者不批准的

决定。决定批准的，予以登记，并发给相应的批准文件；不予批准的，应当书面通

知申请人并告知理由。


的法律、法规的要求到有关部门办理设立外商投资企业的审批手续。取得相应的

批准文件后，向交通运输部办理登记，换领《国际海运辅助业经营资格登记证》。

第四十六条国际海运货物仓储业务经营者、国际集装箱站与堆场业务经营

者，须持交通运输部颁发的资格登记证明文件，向监管地海关办理登记手续后，方

可存放海关监管货物或者集装箱。

第五章调查与处理

第四十七条利害关系人认为国际海上运输业务经营者、国际海运辅助业务

经营者有《海运条例》第三十二条和本实施细则第三十七条规定情形的，可依照《海

运条例》第三十二条的规定请求交通运输部实施调查。请求调查时，应当提出书

面调查申请，并阐述理由，提供必要的证据。

交通运输部对调查申请应当进行评估，在自收到调查申请之日起 60 个工作

日内作出实施调查或者不予调查的决定：

（一）交通运输部认为调查申请理由不充分或者证据不足的，决定不予调查

并通知调查申请人。申请人可补充理由或者证据后再次提出调查申请。

（二）交通运输部根据评估结论认为应当实施调查或者按照《海运条例》第

三十二条规定自行决定调查的，应当将有关材料和评估结论通报国务院工商行政

管理部门和价格部门。

第四十八条调查的实施由交通运输部会同国务院工商行政管理部门和价格

部门（以下简称调查机关）共同成立的调查组进行。

调查机关应当将调查组组成人员、调查事由、调查期限等情况通知被调查人。

被调查人应当在调查通知送达后 30 日内就调查事项作出答辩。

被调查人认为调查组成员同调查申请人、被调查人或者调查事项有利害关系

的，有权提出回避请求。调查机关认为回避请求成立的，应当对调查组成员进行

调整。

第四十九条被调查人接受调查时，应当根据调查组的要求提供相关数据、

资料及文件等。属于商业秘密的，应当向调查组提出。调查组应当以书面形式记

录备查。


调查机关和调查人员对被调查人的商业秘密应当予以保密。

被调查人发现调查人员泄露其商业秘密并有充分证据的，有权向调查机关投

诉。

第五十条调查机关对被调查人“低于正常、合理水平运价”的认定，应当考

虑下列因素：

（一）同一行业内多数经营者的运价水平以及与被调查人具有同等规模经营

者的运价水平；

（二）被调查人实施该运价水平的理由，包括成本构成、管理水平和盈亏状

况等；

（三）是否针对特定的竞争对手并以排挤竞争对手为目的。

第五十一条调查机关对“损害公平竞争”或者“损害交易对方”的认定，应

当考虑下列因素：

（一）对托运人自由选择承运人造成妨碍；

（二）影响货物的正常出运；

（三）以账外暗中回扣承揽货物，扭曲市场竞争规则。

第五十二条调查机关作出调查结论前，可举行专家咨询会议，对“损害公

平竞争”或者“损害交易对方”的程度进行评估。

聘请的咨询专家不得与调查申请人、被调查人具有利害关系。

第五十三条调查结束时，调查机关应当作出调查结论，并书面通知调查申

请人和被调查人：

（一）基本事实不成立的，调查机关应当决定终止调查；

（二）基本事实存在但对市场公平竞争不造成实质损害的，调查机关可决定

不对被调查人采取禁止性、限制性措施；

（三）基本事实清楚且对市场公平竞争造成实质损害的，调查机关应当根据

《海运条例》的规定，对被调查人采取限制性、禁止性措施。

第五十四条调查机关在作出采取禁止性、限制性措施的决定前，应当告知

当事人有举行听证的权利；当事人要求举行听证的，应当在自调查机关通知送达之

日起 10 日内，向调查机关书面提出；逾期未提出听证请求的，视为自动放弃请求

听证的权利。

第五十五条就本实施细则第三十七条所列情形实施调查的，调查组成员中

应当包括对被调查人的资格实施登记的有关省、自治区、直辖市交通主管部门的

人员。

对有本实施细则第三十七条第（三）项所列违法行为并给交易当事人或者同

业竞争者造成实质损害的，调查机关可采取限制其在一定时期内扩大业务量的限

制性措施。


第六章法律责任

第五十六条违反《海运条例》和本实施细则的规定应当予以处罚的，交通

运输部或授权的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门应当按照《海运条

例》第六章和本章的规定予以处罚。

第五十七条外商常驻代表机构有本实施细则第三十八条规定情形的，交通

运输部或者有关省、自治区、直辖市人民政府交通运输主管部门可将有关情况通

报有关工商行政管理部门，由工商行政管理部门按照《海运条例》第四十九条的规

定处罚。

第五十八条班轮公会协议、运营协议和运价协议、国际船舶代理经营者未

按规定向交通运输部备案的，由交通运输部依照《海运条例》第四十五条的规定，

对本实施细则第七条、第三十二条规定的备案人实施处罚。班轮公会不按规定报

备的，可对其公会成员予以处罚。

第五十九条调查人员违反规定，泄露被调查人保密信息的，依法给予行政

处分；造成严重后果，触犯刑律的，依法追究刑事责任。

第七章附则

第六十条《海运条例》和本实施细则规定的许可、登记事项，申请人可委

托代理人办理。代理人办理委托事项的，应当提供授权委托书。外国申请人或者

投资者提交的公证文书，应当由申请人或者投资者所在国公证机关或者执业律师

开出。

本实施细则所要求的各类文字资料应当用中文书写，如使用其他文字的，应

随附中文译文。

第六十一条对《海运条例》和本实施细则规定的备案事项的具体要求、报

备方式和方法应当按照交通运输部的规定办理。

第六十二条香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区和台湾地区的投资者在内地

投资从事国际海上运输和与国际海上运输相关的辅助性业务，比照适用《海运条

例》第四章和本实施细则第四章的有关规定。

第六十三条《海运条例》第十八条规定的公布运价和协议运价备案的具体

办法，由交通运输部另行规定。

第六十四条经营港口国际海运货物装卸、港口内国际海运货物仓储业务和

国际海运集装箱码头和堆场业务的，按国家有关港口管理的法律、行政法规的规


定办理。

第六十五条本实施细则自 2003 年 3 月 1 日起施行。交通部 1985 年 4 月

11 日发布的《交通部对从事国际海运船舶公司的暂行管理办法》、1990 年 3 月 2日发布的《国际船舶代理管理规定》、1990 年 6 月 20 日发布的《国际班轮运输管

理规定》、1992 年 6 月 9 日发布的《中华人民共和国海上国际集装箱运输管理规

定实施细则》和 1997 年 10 月 17 日发布的《外国水路运输企业常驻代表机构管

理办法》同时废止。


海洋生态损害评估技术指南（试行）

( 国家海洋局 2013 年 8 月 )

前言

依据《中华人民共和国海洋环境保护法》、《中华人民共和国侵权责任法》有

关规定，破坏海洋生态、海洋保护区，给国家造成重大损失的，责任者要承担责任

赔偿损失。

随着我国海洋经济的发展，各种人为活动和突发事件导致的海洋生态损害的

情形十分严重，为保护海洋生态，规范海洋生态损害评估工作，根据《中华人民共

和国海洋环境保护法》的有关规定，制定本指南。

1. 范围

本指南规定了海洋生态损害评估的工作程序、方法、内容及技术要求。

本指南适用于在中华人民共和国内水、领海、毗连区、专属经济区和管辖的

其它海域内人为活动和突发事件造成海洋生态损害的评估，也适用于在中华人民

共和国管辖领域以外，造成中华人民共和国管辖海域生态损害的评估。

2. 规范性引用文件

下列文件对于本文件的应用是必不可少的。凡是注日期的引用文件，仅所注

日期的版本适用于本文件。凡是不注日期的引用文件，其最新版本（包括所有的

修改单）适用于本文件。

GB 3097 海水水质标准

GB/T 12763.1 海洋调查规范第 1 部分：总则

GB/T 12763.2 海洋调查规范第 2 部分：海洋水文观测

GB/T 12763.3 海洋调查规范第 3 部分：海洋气象观测

GB/T 12763.4 海洋调查规范第 4 部分：海水化学要素调查

GB/T 12763.6 海洋调查规范第 6 部分：海洋生物调查

GB/T 12763.7 海洋调查规范第 7 部分：海洋调查资料交换

GB/T 12763.9 海洋调查规范第 9 部分：海洋生态调查指南

GB/T 12763.10 海洋调查规范第 10 部分：海底地形地貌调查

海洋生态损害评估技术指南（试行） 325

GB 17378.1 海洋监测规范第 1 部分：总则

GB 17378.2 海洋监测规范第 2 部分：数据处理与分析质量控制

GB 17378.3 海洋监测规范第 3 部分：样品采集、贮存与运输

GB 17378.4 海洋监测规范第 4 部分：海水分析

GB 17378.5 海洋监测规范第 5 部分：沉积物分析

GB 17378.6 海洋监测规范第 6 部分：生物体分析

GB 17378.7 海洋监测规范第 7 部分：近海污染生态调查和生物监测

GB 18421 海洋生物质量

GB 18668 海洋沉积物质量

GB 18918 城镇污水处理厂污染物排放标准

GB/T 21678-2008 渔业污染事故经济损失计算方法

GB/T 28058-2011 海洋生态资本评估技术导则

HY/T 080 滨海湿地生态监测技术规程

HY/T 081 红树林生态监测技术规程

HY/T 082 珊瑚礁生态监测技术规程

HY/T 083 海草床生态监测技术规程

3. 术语和定义

下列术语和定义适用于本指南。

3.1 海洋生态损害事件 marine ecological damage events由于人类活动直接、间接改变海域自然条件或者向海域排入污染物质、能量，

而造成的对海洋生态系统及其生物因子、非生物因子有害影响的事件。海洋生态

损害事件主要包括溢油、危险品化学品泄漏、围填海、排污、海洋倾废以及海洋矿

产资源开发等类型。

3.2 海洋环境容量损失 loss of marine environmental capacity海洋生态损害事件所导致海域污染负荷的增加或海域原有纳污能力的下降。

3.3 海洋生态修复 marine ecological restoration通过人工措施的辅助作用，使受损海洋生态系统恢复至原有或与原来相近的

结构和功能状态。

3.4 海洋生态系统服务 marine ecosystem service人类从海洋生态系统获得的效益。包括海洋供给服务、海洋调节服务、海洋

文化服务和海洋支持服务。

4. 评估的工作程序

海洋生态损害评估工作分为准备阶段、调查阶段、分析评估阶段和报告编制

阶段。海洋生态损害评估工作程序参见图 1。4.1 准备阶段

搜集损害事件发生海域的背景资料，开展现场踏勘，分析生态损害事件的


基本情况和生态损害特征，并开展以下工作：

——确定是否需要进行评估；

——确定生态损害评估的内容，初步筛选出主要生态损害评估因子、生态敏

感目标，

确定评估调查的范围、评估因子和评估方法，编制评估工作方案，明确下阶段生态

损害评估工作的主要内容。

4.2 调查阶段

根据海洋生态损害评估工作方案，组织开展海洋生态现状调查和社会经济状

况调查。

4.3 分析评估阶段

整理、分析受影响海域背景资料，分别筛选用于生态损害评估的水质、沉积

物、生物等生态背景值，对比海洋生态损害事件发生前后各生态要素变化状况，确

定损害事件的海洋生态损害范围、对象和程度，计算海洋生态损害价值。

4.4 报告编制阶段

编制海洋生态损害评估报告，同时应建立完整的相关事件档案以备追溯。

图 1 海洋生态损害评估工作程序图


5. 准备阶段

搜集受影响海域有关的背景资料，结合实地踏勘，分析损害事件的性质、损

害特征和海洋生态特征，确定评估调查的范围、评估因子、评估方法，制定海洋生

态损害调查和评估工作方案。

评估准备阶段需要搜集的资料主要包括：

——海洋生态资料：水文气象、海洋地形地貌、海水水质、沉积物环境质量、

海洋生物与生态等背景资料；

——海洋资源及其开发现状；

——损害事件发生的地理位置、时间、损害方式；

——污染物性质、数量和影响范围；

——生态敏感目标分布情况；

——海域利用方式、范围和面积、占用海岸线和滩涂；

——损害事件发生后采取的措施和控制情况，以及有关部门和单位对生态损

害事件已进行的调查取证资料；

——其它与损害事件及评估工作相关的资料。

对搜集的资料和图件，应注明资料来源和时间，使用的资料应经过筛选和甄

别，监测与调查资料应来自具备相应资质的单位，实施过程按 GB 17378.2 和 GB/T 12763.7 中规定的资料处理方法和要求执行。

6. 海洋生态损害调查

6.1 调查基本要求

海洋生态损害调查应满足损害评估和海洋生态修复方案编制的要求，反映受

影响海域生态损害程度，调查取得的数据、资料应详细做好记录。

6.2 海洋生态状况调查

海洋生态状况调查主要包括海洋水文、海洋气象、海水水质、沉积物、生物与

生态等方面。选取的调查内容应满足损害评估和修复方案编制的要求，根据损害

事件性质和海域的生态特征，重点进行生态损害的特征参数调查，同时，搜集该海

域前期的生态数据资料，并进行分析整理。

调查内容包括以下要素：

——海洋水文：选择水温、盐度、海流、波浪、潮流、潮汐、水色、透明度等全

部内容或部分内容，按 GB/T 12763.2 的要求测量；

——海洋气象：选择气压、气温、降水、湿度、风速、风向等全部或部分内容,

按 GB/T 12763.3 的要求测量；

——海水水质：应选取生态损害事件有关的特征污染物和次生污染物，同时

选取 pH、悬浮物、化学需氧量（CODMn）、溶解氧、营养盐（指无机氮、活性磷

酸盐、总氮(TN)、总磷（TP））、大肠菌群、粪大肠菌群、病原体等全部或部分内

容，其中化学要素按 GB/T 12763.4 和 GB 17378.4 的要求测定，生物要素按 GB


17378.7 的要求测定；若上述标准中没有规定的要素，可采取国内外成熟方法测

定，并在调查报告中注明；

——海洋沉积物：应选取损害事件有关的特征污染物和次生污染物，同时选

取总有机碳，氧化还原电位等全部或部分内容，按 GB 17378.5 的要求测量；若相

关标准中没有规定的要素，可采取国内外成熟方法测定，并在调查报告中注明；

——海洋生物：叶绿素 a、初级生产力、微生物、浮游植物、浮游动物、大型底

栖生物、潮间带生物、游泳生物以及珍稀濒危生物和国家重点保护动植物等全部

或部分内容，按 GB/T12763.6、GB 17378.7 和 GB/T 12763.9 的规定执行。

——海洋生物质量：应选取损害事件有关的特征污染物和次生污染物，及其

代谢产物。按 GB 17378.6 的要求测定。若相关标准中没有规定的要素，可采取

国内外成熟方法测定，并在调查报告中注明。

对于明显改变岸线和海底地形的，还应将水文动力和地形地貌作为调查内

容，具体调查按 GB/T 12763.10 中的规定执行。

受影响海域涉及海洋生态敏感区的，还应增加以下相关内容进行调查：

——海洋保护区，主要包括保护区的级别、类型、面积、位置、主要保护对象

等；

——典型海洋生态系统，主要包括滨海湿地、红树林、珊瑚礁、海草床等的位

置、面积大小等，应分别按照 HY/T 080、HY/T 081、HY/T 082、HY/T 083 的有

关要求执行；

——珍稀和濒危动植物及其栖息地，主要包括保护生物种类、数量及栖息地

面积等，可采取调访等手段，并参照《海洋自然保护区监测技术规程》中的有关要

求执行；

——海洋渔业资源产卵场、索饵场、育幼场、重要渔业水域，包括主要海洋渔

业资源的种类、生物学特性等；

——海水增养殖区，主要包括位置、养殖种类、养殖面积、养殖数量等。

6.3 社会经济调查

调查海洋生态损害评估工作所需的社会经济资料，主要内容包括：

——受影响海域开发利用与经济活动的资料，具体可参照 GB/T 28058-2011的有关调查方法；

——商品化的海洋生物资源的市场价格；

——受影响海域生态建设、生态修复工程建设投资费用；

——受影响海域环境基础设施建设工程的规划方案与投资费用。

7. 海洋生态损害对象、范围与程度确定

7.1 背景值选取原则

背景值应选择损害事件所在海域或具有代表性的邻近海域近三年内的监测资

料，对于海洋生物生态背景值，还应选择与损害事件发生同一季节的本底数据；已


有监测资料满足不了评估要求的，可采用受影响范围邻近海域实际监测的资料作

为背景值。

7.2 海水水质损害

分析损害事件前后的水质状况及对水质产生的影响，计算特征污染物不同污

染程度，确定超出 GB 3097 各类海水水质标准值及背景值的海域范围和面积，绘

制浓度分布图。

7.3 海洋沉积物损害

分析损害事件发生前后的沉积物的质量状况，计算特征污染物不同污染程

度，确定超出GB 18668各类海洋沉积物质量标准值及背景值的海域范围和面积。

7.4 海洋生物损害

比较事件前后海洋生物种类、数量、密度与质量的变化，直接确定急性与慢

性生物损害的程度与范围，确定超出 GB 18421 的海洋生物质量标准值及背景值

的海域范围和面积。

根据事件引起的污染物在水体和沉积环境中的分布监测结果，结合污染物对

特定生境海洋生物毒性，间接推算事件对海洋生物种类损害的程度与范围。

根据直接调查与间接推算结果，综合分析事件的海洋生物损害程度与范围。

7.5 水动力和冲淤损害

对于明显改变岸线和海底地形的损害事件，还应分析造成的水动力和冲淤环

境变化，以及对海洋环境容量、沉积物性质及生态群落的损害情况。受损程度确

定可采取现场调查和遥感调查等方法。

7.6 生态系统损害程度的综合评估结论

综合比较事件发生前后海洋生态系统及主要生态因子的变化，阐明主要生境

类型及物种的受损程度，明确损害事件对海洋保护区、典型海洋生态系统、珍稀和

濒危动植物及其栖息地、海洋渔业水域等生态敏感区的损害评估结论。

8 海洋生态损害价值计算

8.1 海洋生态损害价值计算的原则

海洋生态损害价值采用基于生态修复措施的费用进行计算，即将海洋生态系

统恢复到基线水平所需的费用作为首要和首选的海洋生态损害价值计算的方法；

同时，还应包括海洋生态损害发生至恢复到基线水平的时间内（即恢复期）的损失

费用。

对于无法修复的情形，则通过替代工程的费用来计算海洋生态损害的价值损

失。

8.2 海洋生态损害价值计算内容

——清除污染和减轻损害等预防措施费用；

——海洋生物资源和海洋环境容量等恢复期的损失费用；

——海洋生态修复费用；


——监测、试验、评估等其它合理费用。

8.3 清除污染和减轻损害的费用

清除污染和减轻损害的预防措施所产生费用，主要包括应急处理费用和污染

清理费用。

——应急处理费用主要包括应急监测费用、检测费用、应急处理设备和物品

使用费、应急人员费等；

——污染清理费用包括污染清理设备的使用费、污染清理物资的费用、污染

清理人员费、污染物的运输与处理费用等；

清除污染和减轻损害的费用根据国家和地方有关标准或实际发生的费用进行

计算。

8.4 海洋环境容量和海洋生态资源恢复期损失计算

8.4.1 海洋环境容量的损失价值计算

海洋环境容量的损失量计算，应采取数值模拟或其它成熟方法，计算因污染

物排入或海域水体交换、生化降解等自净能力变化等导致的海洋环境容量的损

失，并采用调查或最近监测的实测数据予以验证。

——对于非直接向海域排放污染物质的生态损害事件，计算因海域水动力、

地形地貌等自然条件改变而导致的海域 COD、TN、TP 及原有特征污染物负荷

能力下降的量；

——对于直接或间接向海域排放污染物质生态损害事件的，计算污染物入海

增加的海域环境污染负荷量；当受污染海域面积小于 3 km2 时，可根据现场监测的

污染带分布情况，按照下式进行计算：

Qi =V (Cs − Ci )×10−6 +VK (Cs − Ci)×T ×10−6……………………（1）

式中：

Qi——第 i 类污染物环境容量损失量，单位为吨（t）；V——受影响海域的水体体积，单位为立方米（m3）；

K——受影响海域的水交换率，单位为每天（d-1）；

Cs——损害事件发生后受影响海域第i 类污染物的浓度，单位为毫克每升

（mg/L）；Ci——受影响海域第 i 类污染物的背景浓度，单位为毫克每升（mg/L）；T——自损害发生起至调查监测时期限，单位为天（d）。环境容量损失的价值计算，可以采用当地政府公布的水污染物排放指标有偿

使用的计费标准或排污交易市场交易价格计算。

——对于非直接向海域排放污染物质的生态损害事件导致的海洋环境容量损

失，按照当地城镇污水处理厂的综合污水处理成本计算；

——对于污染导致的生态损害事件，按照污水处理厂处理同类污染物的成本

计算；


——所选择用于成本类比的污水处理厂的处理工艺，应能满足 GB 18918 的

出水水质控制要求；事件海域处于海洋保护区或其它禁排、限排区的，至少应满足

一级标准的 A 标准的基本要求。

8.4.2 海洋生物资源的恢复期损失价值量计算

海洋生物资源的恢复期损失价值量，参照 GB/T 21678-2008 中“天然渔业资

源”损失的计算方法进行。

8.5 海洋生态修复方案编制及修复费用计算

8.5.1 海洋生态修复目标

海洋生态修复应将受损区域的海洋生态修复到受损前原有或与原来相近的结

构和功能状态，无法原地修复的，采取替代性的措施进行修复；根据损害程度和该

区域的海洋生态特征，制定修复的总体目标及阶段目标。

8.5.2 海洋生态修复方案

针对海洋生态修复目标，制定海洋生态修复方案，要求技术上可行，能够促

进受损海洋生态的有效恢复，修复的效果要能够验证，海洋生态修复方案应包括：

生态修复的对象、目标、内容、方法、工程量、投资估算、效益分析等。海洋生态

修复方案编制要求参见附录 A。8.5.3 修复费用计算

海洋生态修复的费用测算，按照国家工程投资估算的规定列出，包括：工程

费、设备及所需补充生物物种等材料购置费、替代工程建设所需的土地（海域）

购置费用和工程建设其他费用等部分组成，采用概算定额法或类比工程预算法编

制，计算公式为：

F = FG + FS + FT + FQ ………………………………………（3）式中：

F——海洋生态修复总费用，单位为万元；

FG——工程费用（水体、沉积物等生境重建所需的直接工程费），单位为万元；

FS——设备及所需补充生物物种等材料购置费用，单位为万元；

FT——替代工程建设所需的土地（海域）的购置费用，单位为万元；

FQ——其他修复费用（包括调查、制订工程方案、跟踪监测等费用），单位为

万元。

8.6 其它费用

为开展海洋生态损害评估而支出的监测、试验、评估等相关合理费用，根据

国家和地方有关监测、评估服务收费标准或实际发生的费用进行计算。

9 海洋生态损害评估报告的编制

海洋生态损害评估报告应数据详实、结论明确。海洋生态损害评估报告的格

式与内容参见附录 B。


附录 A（资料性附录）

海洋生态修复方案的编制要求

海洋生态修复方案应包括以下的全部或部分章节，依据海洋生态修复的具体

内容，可对下列章节及内容适当增设或删减。

A.1 生态修复的项目概况

概括生态修复区域的自然和社会环境概况、生态损害的原因、对象、范围和

程度；概述海洋生态修复总体方案，包括生态修复的目标、范围、规模、修复项目、

修复成本、实施周期、预期成效与验收指标等关键内容。

A.2 海洋生态修复目标

根据生态损害评估结果，明确给出海洋生境、海洋生物和生态敏感区的修复

目标。

A.3 海洋生态修复范围

根据生态损害评估结果，明确必须进行生态修复的受损海域范围。

A.4 海洋生态修复内容与总体布局

A.4.1 生态修复项目与规模

针对海洋生境、海洋生物、典型海洋生态系统等修复目标，建立修复措施目

录，确定每种受损海洋生态的修复措施目录并进行归类；

核定修复措施的规模，包括初级修复措施的规模及补偿性修复措施规模，明

确各具体生态修复项目的工程量。

A.4.2 生态修复项目的总体布局

根据修复项目所在海域的功能区划、生态属性与生态修复目标，对生态修复

项目布局进行空间优化，确定生态修复项目的布局方案。

A.5 海洋生态修复项目投资测算

海洋生态修复项目的投资测算，按照国家有关规定编制，包括项目的前期工

作投入、主体工程造价及生态修复成效评估等经费概算。生态修复工程投资费用

可采用概算定额法，按照地区或行业有关工程造价定额标准编制，也可采用类比

已建或在建的相似生态修复工程，编制生态修复工程的费用。

A.5.1 概算定额法

根据生态修复方案设计的工程内容，计算出工程量，按照概算定额单价（基

价）和有关计费标准进行计算汇总，得出修复项目的投资造价。概算定额法编制

生态修复投资的步骤如下：

——列出修复工程中各分项工程名称，并计算其工程量；

——确定各分项工程项目的概算定额单价；


——计算分项工程的直接工程费，合计得到单位工程直接工程费总和；

——按照有关标准计算措施费，合计得到单位工程直接费；

——按照一定的取费标准计算间接费和利税；

——计算单位工程投资总额。

A.5.2 类比法

当生态修复方案设计的生态修复目标、修复内容等与已建或在建的生态修复

工程的设计相类似，可采用类比法来计算生态修复的费用。

A.6 实施周期与进度安排

根据生态修复内容，明确生态修复实施周期，制定各生态修复项目的具体实

施进度安排。

A.7 预期修复成效

根据技术可行性分析结合相关成功经验，按不同实施阶段，分析生态修复具

体项目的预期成效及总体生态修复预期成效。

A.8 跟踪监测与竣工验收要求

根据生态修复方案中所提出的修复内容、实施方式、实施规模和范围，制定

跟踪监测方案，为项目验收提供依据，并提出竣工验收的要求。

附录 B（资料性附录）

海洋生态损害评估报告的编制格式与内容

B.1 文本格式

B.1.1 文本格式

海洋生态损害评估报告书文本外形尺寸为 A4（210 mm×297mm）

B.1.2 封面格式

海洋生态损害评估报告书封面格式如下：

第一行书写××××海洋生态损害评估报告书（居中）

第二行落款书写：编制单位全称（居中）

第三行书写：××××年××月（居中）

以上内容字体字号应适宜，各行间距应适中，保持封面美观。

B.1.3 封里 1 内容

封里 1 为评估资质证书，同时应写明评估单位的全称、单位法人代表、通讯

地址、邮政编码、联系电话、传真电话、电子信箱等。

B.1.4 封里 2 内容

应写明评估技术负责人（姓名、职务、职称）、审核人（姓名、职务、职称）、

主要参加人员（姓名、职务、职称）等，并签名。


B.1.5 封里 3 内容

应写明海洋调查及样品分析人员的姓名、职务、职称、上岗证号等，并签名。

B.2 海洋生态损害评估报告章节内容

海洋生态损害评估报告主要内容应包括以下内容：

B.2.1 前言

全面反映海洋生态损害评估任务的由来和评估目的，评估依据，评估所采用

的法规与技术标准，生态损害调查与评估的范围与评估重点等。

B.2.2 海洋生态损害事件概况

详细阐述海洋生态损害事件的发生的地点、时间、规模、性质等概况。

B.2.3 自然环境和社会环境概况

应详细阐明和分析海洋生态损害事件所在海域的自然环境和社会环境状况。

主要包括：

区域的气候与气象状况，海域的水文动力情况，海岸线、滩涂与海域的地质、

地形、地貌状况；

海洋自然资源状况，海洋经济开发利用的内容、类型和程度，海域开发使用

现状海洋资源开发利用类型和程度，海洋功能区划，海洋环境保护规划等。

阐述与评估工作有关的区域社会经济调查结果。

B.2.4 海洋生态现状

详细阐述生态损害事件所在海域生态调查范围、站位布设、调查方法、调查

时间、调查频率和调查结果；阐述区域水质、沉积物质量、海洋生态状况等。

B.2.5 海洋生态损害对象、范围和程度

阐述海洋生态损害程度评估的方法，分别给出生态损害事件造成的海水水

质、海洋沉积物、海洋生物和典型海洋生态系统等损害的范围和程度。

B.2.6 海洋生态损害价值

说明海洋生态损害价值量化的方法，给出海洋生态修复方案或替代方案及费

用计算，给出包括生态修复费用、海洋生物资源和海洋环境容量等过渡性损失费

用以及监测、评估等合理费用的汇总表。

B.2.7 海洋生态损害评估结论

给出受海洋生态损害事件影响海域的损害对象、范围、程度和损害金额的结

论。

附录和附件


海域评估技术指引

（国家海洋局 2013 年 10 月）

为规范海域评估行为，统一评估程序和方法，保障评估结果客观、公正、合理，

根据《中华人民共和国海域使用管理法》、《海域使用权管理规定》等法律、法规

的有关规定，制定本技术指引。

1 范围

本技术指引适用于宗海的海域价格评估和沿海地方政府管辖海域的基准价格

评估。

2 术语及定义

2.1 海域评估

是指海域评估专业人员按照一定的原则、程序和方法，对特定海域的价值进

行评定的活动。

2.2 海域价格

是指一定年期海域使用权价格及其附属用海设施和海上构筑物价格的总和。

2.3 海域基准价格

是指某一基准日上一定年期海域使用权的区域平均价格。

3 海域评估原则

海域评估应遵循以下基本原则：

（1）预期收益原则

海域评估应以海域在正常开发利用条件下的未来客观有效的预期收益为依

据。

（2）最有效利用原则

海域评估应反映海域在合法利用的前提下，实现海域、资本、劳动力、管理、

技术等生产要素的优化组合，并取得最佳经济效益时的价格。

（3）替代原则

海域评估应以同类地区类似海域在同等利用条件下的价格为基准。

（4）市场供需原则

海域评估应充分考虑海域供需的特性和海域市场地域性。

（5）贡献原则


海域评估应以海域在开发利用活动中的重要程度确定其对总收益的贡献值。

4 海域价格评估

4.1 海域价格评估目的

海域价格评估的目的是揭示宗海在正常条件下的价格水平，为海域使用权出

让、转让、抵押、收回补偿等提供价格参考。

4.2 海域价格评估程序

海域价格评估应按以下六个步骤开展：

（1）确定评估基本事项

根据委托方的要求，确定评估目的、评估对象、评估基准日等基本事项。

（2）收集相关资料

对评估对象的社会经济和自然环境条件进行现场调访和勘测，收集评估对象

及其周边海域的基本情况、相关的生产经营与财务状况、交易实例和海域市场发

展现状等资料，并核验资料的完整性和可靠性。

（3）选择评估方法

根据评估目的、评估对象所属的用海类型、评估对象开发利用状态和海域市

场现状等，选择确定适用的评估方法。

（4）确定修正系数和评估参数

分析海域价格影响因素及其影响程度，确定必要的价格修正内容和系数，并

根据社会平均投资效益、用海类型和产业类型的投资风险差异等，确定海域投资

回报率、海域还原利率等参数。

（5）测算和确定海域价格

利用经核验的有效资料，采用选定的评估方法和评估参数，评定海域价格。

多种方法测算海域价格的，可用加权平均等方法评定最终结果。

（6）编制海域价格评估报告

对整个评估工作的成果进行总结整理，编制完成海域价格评估报告，并提交

给委托方。海域价格评估报告格式要求见附录A。

4.3 海域价格评估方法

海域价格评估的主要方法有收益法、成本法、假设开发法、市场比较法和基

准价格系数修正法，各方法的适用条件及注意事项如下：

4.3.1 收益法

对于能够计算现实收益或潜在收益的海域，可采用收益法评估海域价格，即

按一定的还原利率，将海域未来每年预期收益折算至评估基准日，以折算后的纯

收益总和作为海域价格。收益法的计算公式及参数说明见附录 B.1。

采用收益法时，应以客观、持续、稳定的收益为基础计算海域的年总收入，按

不重不漏原则计算年总费用，合理测算海域纯收益。

4.3.2 成本法

海域评估技术指引 337

对于新开发的海域，或在海域市场欠发达、海域交易实例少的地区，可采用

成本法评估海域价格，即以开发和利用海域所耗费的各项费用之和为基础，加上

正常的利润、利息和税费等来确定海域价格。成本法计算公式及参数说明见附录

B.2。采用成本法时，海域取得费和海域开发费应是评估基准日的重置费用，各项

费用的取费标准应有明确、充分的依据。

4.3.3 假设开发法

对于待开发和再开发的海域，可采用假设开发法评估海域价格，即在测算出

海域开发完成后的总价值基础上，扣除预计的正常开发成本和利润来确定海域价

格。假设开发法的计算公式及参数说明见附录 B.3。

采用假设开发法时，应根据最有效利用原则确定海域用途，再结合海域的规

模、开发难易程度等情况合理估算开发建设周期，并假设在开发周期内各项成本

均匀投入或分阶段均匀投入。

4.3.4 市场比较法

在海域市场较发达、海域交易实例充足的地区，可采用市场比较法评估海域

价格，即根据市场替代原理，将评估对象与具有替代性且在近期市场上已发生交

易的实例做比较，根据两者之间的价格影响因素差异，在交易实例成交价格的基

础上做适当修正，以此来确定海域价格。市场比较法的计算公式及参数说明见附

录 B.4。

采用市场比较法时，比较实例应与评估对象的用海类型相同，且位于相邻区

域或类似区域，交易时间应相近，数量不少于 3 个；应选择差异显著的比较因素进

行价格修正，因素条件应尽量量化，无法量化时应定性描述指标的大小。

4.3.5 基准价格系数修正法

在已有海域基准价格的地区，可用基准价格系数修正法评估海域价格，即针

对评估对象价格影响因素的特殊性，利用海域价格修正系数，在同一地区同类用

海的海域基准价格基础上做适当修正，以此确定海域价格。基准价格系数修正法

的计算公式及参数说明见附录 B.5。

采用基准价格系数修正法时，应准确把握本区域海域基准价格的内涵及其修

正体系的构成，根据海域价格影响因素实际情况确定修正系数。

4.4 海域价格影响因素

海域价格影响因素是指对海域质量和使用效益有重要影响的社会经济条件和

自然环境条件。

（1）造地工程用海价格影响因素

包括区域经济状况、交通条件、区划与规划、基础设施和配套设施条件、毗邻

土地情况、工程建设条件等因素。分析指标详见附录 C.1。

（2）交通运输用海价格影响因素


包括区域经济状况、交通条件、区划与规划、基础设施和配套设施条件、港口

等级和规模、码头建设规模、码头作业条件、工程建设条件等因素。分析指标详见

附录 C.2。（3）渔业用海价格影响因素

包括区域经济状况、交通条件、区划与规划、基础设施和配套设施条件、海域

开发利用现状、养殖条件等因素。分析指标详见附录 C.3。

（4）旅游娱乐用海价格影响因素

包括区域经济状况、交通条件、区划与规划、基础设施和配套设施条件、旅游

景区条件、滨海旅游资源条件等因素。分析指标详见附录 C.4。

5 海域基准价格评估

5.1 海域基准价格评估目的

海域基准价格评估的目的是揭示不同类型海域使用权区域平均价格水平，为

海洋管理部门掌握和调控海域市场秩序、制定海域管理政策提供科学依据。

5.2 海域基准价格评估技术路线

以社会经济条件和自然环境条件类似的均质区域为测算单元，利用海域市场

交易资料，测算和修正样点价格，通过算术平均确定不同类型的海域使用权区域

平均价格。

5.3 海域基准价格评估程序

5.3.1 准备工作

制定海域基准价格评估技术方案，划分测算单元，设计调查表，准备工作底

图等。

5.3.2 资料调查

按照代表性好、分布均匀的原则，在测算单元内收集宗海样点资料，包括海

域使用权出让、转让、抵押等价格资料；资产租赁、交易中包含海域使用权的价格

资料。

5.3.3 样点价格测算和修正

（1）样点价格测算

海域使用权出让、转让价格和抵押价格可直接作为样点价格；资产租赁中含

有海域使用权时，可利用收益法测算样点价格；资产交易中含有海域使用权时，应

从交易总价中扣除非海域资产的价格、应交税金和管理费计算样点价格。

（2）样点价格修正

根据海域基准价格的内涵对样点价格进行交易情况修正、海域使用年期修正

和评估基准日修正。

5.3.4 海域基准价格测算

对于交易资料充足的测算单元，可利用样点修正价格的算术平均值作为该区

域的海域基准价格；对于交易资料欠缺的测算单元，可将其与已有基准价格的同类


区域进行价格影响因素比较和修正，以此确定该区域的海域基准价格。

5.3.5 建立海域基准价格修正体系

采用特尔斐法确定海域基准价格修正系数表的因素及其权重。将测算单元内

样点价格的最高值、最低值与海域基准价格做相对比较，得到相对于海域基准价

格的最高和最低修正幅度，并按等间隔划分出五个档次。根据档次和影响因素的

权重，将修正幅度分解到各影响因素上，得到修正系数，并确定对应的影响因素指

标条件。

5.3.6 编制海域基准价格评估成果

海域基准价格评估成果应包括海域基准价格评估报告、海域基准价格图、海

域基准价格表、海域基准价格修正系数表和因素指标条件说明表。

5.3.7 海域基准价格评估成果验收和公布

海域基准价格评估成果应由省级海洋管理部门组织专家组进行验收，经审

核、备案后，向社会公布。

附录 A 海域价格评估报告规范格式

海域价格评估报告

项目名称：（说明评估项目的全称）

委托评估方：（说明委托评估的单位）

评估机构:(说明承担该项评估的机构名称）

评估报告编号：（说明该评估机构对该项目的编号）

提交报告日期：（说明海域价格评估报告提交的具体日期）


第一部分摘要

一、评估项目名称

与封面文字一致。

二、委托评估方

说明该项评估的委托单位或个人。

三、评估目的

说明委托评估方的评估需求以及评估结果的使用方向。

四、评估对象

说明评估对象的位置、面积和用途，并明确评估对象是否包含附属用海设施

和海上构筑物。

五、评估基准日

说明评估结果对应的具体日期，格式为××××年××月××日。

六、海域价格定义

说明评估报告中海域价格的具体内涵，包括评估基准日、现状利用或规划利

用条件、设定的开发程度与用途、使用年限以及是否包含附属用海设施和海上构

筑物等。

七、评估结果

以人民币表示最终评定的海域价格和单位面积价格，海域价格附大写金额。

海域评估人员签字：（签名，海域评估岗位培训证书编号）

××× ××××××

××× ××××××

海域评估机构：（机构公章）

××××年××月××日


第二部分报告正文

一、评估的依据

说明该项评估所依据的国家或地方有关法律、法规，采用的技术规程，委托

方提供的有关材料，评估人员实地勘察、调查所获取的资料等。

二、评估对象概况

（一）海域使用权登记情况

说明评估对象的地理位置、四至、海域使用类型、用海方式、用海面积、海域

使用权证书编号，海域使用金缴纳情况及其他事项。

（二）权利状况

说明海域使用权取得时间、批准使用年限和剩余使用年限、海域是否被抵押、

有无权利纠纷等情况。

（三）利用状况

介绍海域开发利用现状、沿革及附属用海设施和海上构筑物建设情况。

三、海域价格影响因素分析

针对不同海域使用类型，通过定性与定量相结合的方式，重点分析海域质量

和海域使用效益的主要影响因素及其影响程度、影响趋势，与本次评估相关性小

的因素可作为参考。在海域价格影响因素分析时,应做到描述客观，内涵准确，

分析合理，参数有据。

四、海域评估的原则、方法和过程

（一）评估原则

简要说明该项评估所遵循的主要原则。

（二）评估方法和过程

应针对不同评估方法说明参数取值依据和标准、计算过程和评估结果。

1. 成本法

（1）应明确海域取得费各组成项目及费用标准，并说明确定依据；

（2）应明确评估对象的开发状况、开发期限、开发费用标准，并说明依据；

（3）应说明贷款利息、投资回报率、海域还原利率取值的依据、来源、分析

计算过程；

（4）应说明计算公式和结果。

2. 收益法

（1）应说明年总收入的确定依据或计算方法和过程；

（2）应明确年总费用各项构成的确定依据和方法；


（3）应说明海域年纯收益的测算依据和方法；

（4）应说明海域还原利率和海域使用年限确定的方法和依据；

（5）应明确计算公式和评估结果。

3. 假设开发法

（1）应综合分析评估对象条件、利用现状、区划、规划等限制条件，确定海

域最有效利用方式；

（2）应明确评估对象开发完成后的利用方式，并依据当前市场状况估算海域

开发后的总价值，说明估算方法和依据；

（3）应说明评估中涉及的海域取得费、海域开发费确定依据和方法；

（4）应说明开发周期、利息、税费、利润选择依据；


4. 市场比较法

（1）应说明比较实例选择的依据和原则；

（2）应说明比较因素选择依据；

（3）应说明评估对象和比较实例的各因素条件；

（4）应编制比较因素条件指数表；

（5）应在各因素条件指数表的基础上，进行比较实例的评估基准日修正、交

易情况修正、影响因素修正和年期修正；


5. 海域基准价格修正系数法

（1）应说明海域基准价格公布的时间、批准文号、批准机关、海域基准价格

的内涵；

（2）应说明评估对象所在位置、海域使用类型、所在区域的海域基准价格及

对应因素修正幅度表和因素条件说明表；

（3）应说明评估对象各项因素的具体条件；

（4）应明确评估对象各因素的修正系数和综合修正系数；

（5）应说明评估基准日、海域使用年期、交易情况修正系数的确定方法和依

据；


五、海域价格的确定

采用一种方法评估的，测算价格为最终海域价格。多种方法评估的，可用加

权平均等方法评定最终结果。海域出让评估应明确海域开发费、专业费、补偿费、

业务费、其他费用等内容。海域转让评估应明确海域转让前的取得价格、附属用

海设施和海上构筑物重置费以及转让增值收益等内容。

最终结果以人民币注明海域价格和单价，海域价格应附大写金额。

六、需要说明的事项


（一）评估的前提条件和假设条件

说明本次评估结果成立的前提条件、假设条件。

（二）评估结果和评估报告的使用

1. 评估结果和评估报告发生效力的法律依据；

2. 评估结果和评估报告使用的方向和限制条件；

3. 评估报告的有效期自评估基准日起不超过 1 年。

（三）需要特殊说明的事项

1. 有关材料来源及未经证实或无法实地确认的资料和事项；

2. 评估对象的特殊性、评估中未考虑的因素及采取的特殊处理措施；

3. 其他需要特殊说明的问题。

第三部分附件

一、评估委托书

二、委托评估方证明材料

三、评估机构证明材料

四、评估对象权属及有关背景材料

五、现场勘察资料

附录 B 海域价格评估计算公式 B.1 收益法

1. 计算公式

式中：

P ——海域价格；

ai——分别为未来各年的海域纯收益；

ri——海域还原利率；

n——海域使用年期。

2. 年总收入

指合理使用海域、附属用海设施、海上构筑物以及其他生产要素进行经营活


动时持续且稳定获得的正常年收入，包括生产经营收入、租金收入、保证金和押金

的利息收入等。

3. 年总费用

指利用海域、附属用海设施、海上构筑物以及其他生产要素进行经营活动时

正常合理的必要年支出。

4. 年总收益

指年总收入扣除年总费用后的余额。

5. 海域纯收益

指年总收益中扣除非海域生产要素的贡献后的余额。

6. 海域还原利率

采用纯收益与价格比率法、安全利率加风险调整值法或投资风险与投资效益

综合排序插入法计算。

B.2 成本法 1. 计算公式

P =（Q+D+B+I+T）× K2 式中：


Q ——海域取得费；

D ——海域开发费；

B ——海域开发利息；

I ——海域开发利润；

T ——税费；

K2 ——海域使用年期修正系数。

2. 海域取得费

指用海者为取得海域使用权而支付的各项客观费用，包括海域使用金、专业

费和各种补偿费。海域使用金是指一次性缴纳或逐年已缴纳的海域使用金。专业

费包括海域使用论证费、海洋环境影响评价费、工程可行性研究费和建筑设计费

等。各种补偿费根据国家和当地政府规定的标准或应当支付的客观费用来确定。

3. 海域开发费

指投入并固化在海域上的各种客观费用，包括基础设施配套及填海、炸礁、

疏浚、建堤坝等费用。在确定海域开发费时，应综合考虑宗海界址内外的开发程度，

并根据实际受益程度分摊开发费用。

4. 税费

指海域开发过程中必须支付的有关税收和费用。

5. 海域开发利润

以海域取得费、开发费和税费为基数，根据海域使用类型、开发周期和所处


地区社会经济条件综合确定的海域投资回报率来计算海域开发利润。

6. 海域开发利息

按照界定的海域开发程度的正常开发周期、各项费用投入期限和年利息率，

分别计算各期投入应支付的利息。海域开发周期超过一年时，利息按复利计算。

7. 海域使用年期修正系数

采用成本法评估有限年期海域价格时，应根据具体情况计算海域使用年期修

正系数。公式为：

K2=1 – 1 /(1 + r)n

式中：

K2——海域使用年期修正系数；

r ——海域还原利率；

n ——海域使用年期。

B.3 假设开发法

1. 计算公式

P = V – Z – I 式中：


V ——海域开发后的总价值；

Z ——开发成本；

I ——开发利润。

2. 海域开发后的总价值

指开发完成后形成的海域、建筑物、附属用海设施和海上构筑物的总价。海

域开发后用于销售时，根据当地市场现状，采用市场比较法确定开发完成后的总

价；海域开发后用于出租或自营时，根据当地市场现状，采用收益法确定开发完成

后的总价。

3. 开发成本

指项目开发建设期间正常发生的客观费用总和，一般包括海域取得费、海域

开发费、管理费、销售税费和投资利息等。海域取得费、海域开发费和管理费等全

部预付资本要计算利息。利息的计算要充分考虑资本投入的进度安排，按复利计

算。

4. 开发利润

一般按海域开发完成后形成的不动产总价或开发前预付总资本的一定比例计

算，利润率采用同一市场上类似项目的平均利润率。

B.4 市场比较法 1. 计算公式

P = Pb × K1 × K2 × K3 × K4


式中：


Pb——比较实例的海域价格；

K1——交易情况修正系数；

K2——海域使用年期修正系数；

K3——评估基准日修正系数；

K4——价格影响因素修正系数。

2. 交易情况修正系数

交易情况修正是指排除交易行为中的一些特殊情况所造成的比较实例的价格

偏差，将其成交价格修正为正常市场价格。评估人员可通过已掌握的交易资料进

行分析计算，将特殊因素对海域价格的影响程度求和，确定修正系数。交易行为

中的特殊情况包括：

（1）不同出让方式的交易；

（2）以净价形式进行的交易；

（3）多宗用海同时交易的情形；

（4）宗海面积较大的交易。

3. 海域使用年期修正系数

海域使用年期修正是指将各比较实例的不同使用年期修正到评估对象的使用

年期，得出修正系数，以消除因海域使用年期不同而对价格带来的影响。

4. 评估基准日修正系数

评估基准日修正是指将比较实例在其成交日期的价格调整为评估基准日的价

格。在未建立海域价格指数的情况下，应通过收集大量案例资料，运用统计方法

分析特定区域内海域价格随时间变动的规律，求取相关指数，确定修正系数。

5. 海域价格影响因素修正系数

海域价格影响因素修正是指将比较实例的价格调整为评估对象在相似社会经

济和自然环境条件下的价格。价格影响因素修正系数确定的主要步骤：

（1）选择比较因子。根据评估对象的具体用海情况，选择重要的比较因子。

比较因子选择可参考附录 C。

（2）确定各因子条件指数。在海域价格和各影响因子相关关系分析的基础

上，总结各因子条件量化标准和规律。根据各因子指标条件，对照上述标准和规律，

并结合实际状况确定条件指数。

（3）修正系数的确定。采用单因子与海域价格相关关系分析确定条件指数

时，应采用积算的方式确定评估海域和比较实例的因子条件指数后比较确定相应

的修正系数。

B.5 基准价格系数修正法 1. 计算公式


P = Pj × ( 1 + K ) × Kj

式中：

P——海域价格；

Pj——某一用海类型的海域基准价格；

K——海域价格影响因素总修正幅度；

Kj——其他修正系数。

2. 海域基准价格

指评估对象所在区域的相同用海类型的海域基准价格。

3. 海域价格影响因素总修正幅度

指根据海域基准价格修正体系和评估对象的具体条件确定的各影响因素修正

系数之和。

4. 其他修正系数

指评估基准日修正系数、海域使用年期修正系数、交易情况修正系数的乘积。

附录 C 海域价格影响因素指标参考表表 C.1 造地工程用海价格影响因素分析指标

影响因素分析指标说明

经济状况GDP 评估对象所处行政区域的经济规模总

量。

人均 GDP 评估对象所处行政区域的人均 GDP。

交通条件

距交通节点距离指评估对象与火车站、汽车站、港口、等

级公路的距离。

距社会经济活动中心距离指评估对象与商业中心、公共服务设施

或城镇的距离。

区划与规划功能区划符合度评估对象与海洋功能区划相关管理要求

的符合程度。

基础设施和配套

设施条件基础设施齐全性

道路、供水、排水、供电、供气、供热、

通讯等基础设施的齐全性及保证率。

毗邻土地情况土地级别与基准价格评估对象毗邻土地的用地类型、级别与

基准价格。

工程建设条件填海造地适宜性

综合考虑评估对象所在海域的地形地

貌、岸滩冲淤变化趋势、海洋水动力条

件、泥沙输移特征、工程地质条件等，确

定对填海造地工程的适宜程度。


表 C.2 交通运输用海价格影响因素分析指标


经济状况直接腹地 GDP 港口所处行政区域的经济规模总量。

间接腹地 GDP 与相邻港口分享物资运输的行政区域的经济规模总量。

交通条件集疏运方式铁路运输、公路运输、水路运输、管道运输、航空运输的齐

全性与运输规模。

区划与规

划功能区划符合度评估对象与海洋功能区划相关管理要求的符合程度。

基础设施

和配套设

施条件

基础设施齐全性道路、供水、排水、供电、供气、供热、通讯等基础设施的齐

全性及保证率。

配套设施完善度堆场、航道、锚地、海关、海事和商检等配套设施完善程度。

港口等级

和规模

港口等级评估对象所属港口的级别或者定位。

港口吞吐量评估对象所属港口一年间经水运输出、输入港区并经过装卸

作业的货物总量。

码头建设

规模

码头通过能力码头各泊位在一定时间内能够装卸船舶所载货物的额定数

量的总和。

码头设计吨位码头能允许靠泊的最大船舶吨位。

码头作业

条件码头作业天数

根据码头作业标准，通过对风、雨、雾、浪等气象水文资料

的统计分析确定适宜开展码头作业的天数。

工程建设

条件港口建设适宜性

综合考虑评估对象所在海域的水深、海底地形地貌、工程地

质条件等，确定对港口建设的适宜程度。

表 C.3 渔业用海价格影响因素分析指标


经济状况人均 GDP 评估对象所在行政区域的人均 GDP。

交通条件

距交通节点距离指评估对象与港口、火车站、汽车站、等级公路或机场

的距离。

距社会经济活动中

心距离指评估对象与村镇或城区的距离。

区划与规划功能区划符合度评估对象与海洋功能区划相关管理要求的符合程度。

基础设施和

配套设施条

件

基础设施齐全性道路、供水、排水、供电、供气、供热、通讯等基础设施

的齐全性及保证率。

配套设施完善度评估对象所在区域的水产品加工厂、育苗场等渔业配

套设施的数量与规模。

海域开发利

用现状渔业用海规模评估对象所在区域相同类型的养殖用海数量与面积。

养殖条件养殖适宜性综合考虑评估对象所在海域的海水环境质量、水文条

件、灾害性天气等条件，确定对养殖用海的适宜程度。


表 C.4 旅游娱乐用海价格影响因素分析指标


经济状况人均 GDP 评估对象所在行政区域的人均 GDP。

交通条件距交通节点距离评估对象与公共交通设施、火车站、汽车站、港口、等级

公路或机场的距离。

区划与规划功能区划符合度评估对象与海洋功能区划相关管理要求的符合程度。

基础设施和

配套设施条

件

基础设施齐全性道路、供水、排水、供电、供气、供热、通讯等基础设施的

齐全性及保证率。

配套设施完善度旅游娱乐设施、宾馆饭店的等级、数量和接待能力等。

旅游景区条

件

景区质量等级旅游景区质量等级。

景区年客流量景区每年游客数量。

滨海旅游资

源条件

适游期根据评估对象所在海域的气象、水文条件确定一年内适宜

开展旅游活动的天数。

旅游资源质量

综合考虑评估对象所在海域的岸滩类型、沙滩长度和宽

度、海底地形地貌特征、海水环境质量、海洋生物等因素，

确定对旅游开发活动的适宜程度。


《中国海洋法学评论》稿约

《中国海洋法学评论》（China Oceans Law Review），ISSN：1813-7350，是由厦门大学海洋政策与法律中心、上海交通大学海洋法律与政策研究中心、香港

理工大学董浩云国际海事研究中心、台湾中山大学海洋事务研究所以及澳门大学

高级法律研究所两岸四地五校联合主办，（香港）中国评论文化有限公司出版的海

洋法领域中英双语对照的优秀国际学术期刊。《中国海洋法学评论》秉承“海纳百

川，有容乃大”的精神，力求刊发海内外与海洋法律、海洋政策相关的一切研究成

果，热忱欢迎专家学者不吝赐稿，兹立稿约如下：

一、鼓励英文著述，同一学术水准稿件，英文著述将优先录用。

二、来稿形式不限，学术专论、评论、判解研究、译作等均可，篇幅长短不拘，

不考虑稿件作者的身份和以往学术经历，只有学术水准和学术规范的要求。关于

引证规范，请具体参见尾页所附之引证体例。

三、来稿须同一语言下未曾在任何纸质和电子媒介上发表。稿件请附中英文

注明作者姓名、学位、工作单位及职务、职称、研究领域和通讯方式等。来稿必复，

编辑部在收到来稿两个月内将安排匿名审稿。届时未接到录用通知者，作者可自

做他用。来稿一律不退，请作者自留底稿。

四、译作请附寄原文，并附作者或出版者的翻译书面授权许可。译者需保证

该译本未侵犯作者或出版者的任何权利，并在可能的损害产生时自行承担损害赔

偿责任。《中国海洋法学评论》编辑部及其任何成员不承担由此产生的任何责任。

五、《中国海洋法学评论》欢迎对所刊文章的转载、摘登、翻译和结集出版，

但应尊重原作者依照《著作权法》享有的权利，并在实施转载时注明“转自《中国

海洋法学评论》20xx 年第 x 期”和原作者、译校者署名，同时书面通知《中国海

洋法学评论》编辑部。

六、为扩大本刊及作者知识信息交流渠道，本刊已加入 Westlaw China、北大

法宝、台湾华艺、维普、中国知网、超星法源、Heinonline 等中外相关数据库，除

非作者在来稿时声明保留，否则即视为同意《中国海洋法学评论》拥有以非专有方

式向第三人授予已刊作品电子出版权、信息网络传播权和数字化汇编、复制权；和

向《中国社会科学文摘》、《高等学校文科学术文摘》和中国人民大学书报复印资

料等文摘类刊物推荐转载已刊作品的权利。

七、《中国海洋法学评论》实行双向匿名审稿制度。来稿一经刊用，即从优支

付稿酬，并提供样书两册，无需版面费。

八、凡向《中国海洋法学评论》编辑部投稿，即视为接受本稿约。来稿请寄电

子邮箱：[email protected] 或 [email protected]。为了实现办公信息化，要求作者

必须以电子邮件方式投稿，本刊不再接受纸质投稿。

《中国海洋法学评论》编辑部

《中国海洋法学评论》稿约 351

China Oceans Law Review Call For Papers

China Oceans Law Review (COLR – ISSN：1813-7350) is a compilation of research focusing on ocean-related laws and policies. This Chinese-English bilingual journal is jointly hosted by Shanghai Jiao Tong University Center for Oceans Law and Policy, Xiamen University, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, University of Macau Institute for Advanced Legal Studies and（Taiwan）Sun Yat-sen University and is published semi-annually. Beginning from Spring 2011，COLR is indexed by Westlaw China, Lawinfochina.com, Airiti, Cqvip and Heinonline.

Papers from all academics and industry practitioners are faithfully respected and welcomed. The agreements for all contributors are as follows:

1. There are no restrictions on the style, idea, perspective or length of the paper.

2. Potential contributors are expected to provide personal information; including your name, degree, occupation, and contact information.

3. Please strictly follow the format for academic writings which can be referred to in the “China Oceans Law Review Writing Format” in the appendix of COLR.

4. If your paper is a translation from other professionals, please attach the original paper and literary authority license from the original publisher.

5. Authors are responsible for the text of their contribution, unless declared otherwise. The editorial office reserves the discretion to edit the textual detail.

6. Submissions are subject to double-blind peer review within two months of submission. Authors of selected papers will be paid in a lump-sum. Two free copies of sample books will be offered to the author.

7. Submission of an article implies that the authors have read, understood and agreed to the above statements.

Please include an electronic copy with your submission, either by CD or e-mail ([email protected] or [email protected]).


短期访问学者招聘

上海交通大学凯原法学院 CMT 国际海事研究中心设立研究课题，面向境内

外公开招聘短期访问学者。

一、应聘条件

访问学者应具有海洋、海事专业背景。

二、聘期要求

1. 聘期二至四周；

2. 聘期内撰写一篇 8000 字以上的论文，题目须经双方书面协议，作者须保证

无著作权问题，并愿发表于《中国海洋法学评论》；

3. 工作地点为上海交通大学凯原法学院 CMT 国际海事研究中心。

三、工作条件及待遇

1. 中心为访问学者提供必要的办公空间；

2. 中心为访问学者提供一定的经费支持，具体数额另议；

3. 访问学者在沪期间生活自理，中心可提供部分协助。

四、申请材料

1. 个人简历；

2. 拟研究的题目；

3. 详细的联络方式。

联系人：田明、谢月红

电话：021-34204740电子邮箱：[email protected]联系地址：上海市闵行区东川路 800 号上海交通大学凯原法学院 503 室

短期访问学者招聘 353

Short-term Visiting Scholar Recruitment

The CMT Center for International Maritime Research of KoGuan Law School of Shanghai Jiao Tong University has set up a research project, which is now recru-iting short-term visiting scholars from both home and abroad.

I. Qualification for applicationThe visiting scholar shall have professional background of ocean and maritime

affairs.

II. Requirements for the employment duration1. The employment duration will last two to four weeks;2. During the employment, the scholar is required to finish a paper of 8,000

words, the topic of which is to be decided through a written agreement between thetwo parties. The paper should be free from any copyright issue and might be publis-hed in China Oceans Law Review;

3. The work place will be at the CMT Center for International Maritime Research of KoGuan Law School of Shanghai Jiao Tong University.

III. Working conditions and compensation. 1. The Center will provide the visiting scholar with a necessary office space;2. The Center will provide the visiting scholar with some financial support, the

amount to be arranged;3. The visiting scholar’s living expenses during stay in Shanghai will be borne

by himself/herself, and the Center may provide some assistance.

IV. Application materials1. Curriculum Vitae;2. The topic proposed for research;3. Detailed contact information.

Contacts: TIAN Ming and XIE YuehongTel.: 021-34204740Email: [email protected]: Room 503, KoGuan Law School, Shanghai Jiao Tong University 800 Dongchuan Rd., Minhang District, Shanghai 200240, China


《中国海洋法学评论》订购单

订购人

邮寄地址（邮编）

电子邮件

联系电话 /传真

订购期数自年第期至年第期

（未填写者视为从收到本单时最新一期开始订阅）

订购本数每期本

合计金额（每本定价人民币 80元 /港币 80 元 /美元 80 元）

平邮邮资另付：港澳台地区每本人民币 10 元 /港币 10元，亚洲及欧美地区每本人民币 30 元 /美元 15 元

备注

您可向上海交通大学转账订购本刊：

账户名称：上海交通大学

银行账号：439059226890开户银行：中国银行上海市交通大学支行

转账时请留言“订阅《中国海洋法学评论》”。转账成功后请将订购期数、邮寄地址、

联系人、汇款数额的信息发送至 [email protected]。

诚邀赞助

《中国海洋法学评论》是由（香港）中国评论文化有限公司出版的海洋法领

域中英双语对照的优秀国际学术期刊，每年出版两期，每期发行量为 2000 册，

读者主要包括各高校、研究所、科研机构、相关行政机关的科研人员和决策者。

我刊致力于推动中国海洋法学的繁荣发展，衷心欢迎关心海洋法学发展的企事业

单位提供赞助。有意者请垂询《中国海洋法学评论》编辑部。

China Oceans Law Review Order Form

Buyer’s Full Name:

Mailing Address:

E-mail Address:

Tel /Fax numbers:

Issues Ordered:From Year_______No._______ to Year_______

No._______ (If not specified, begin from the lastest issue upon receipt of order.)

Copies of Each Issue:

Total Amount Due (RMB ¥80/HK $80/US

$80 for each copy):

Surface Postage: HK, Macao, Taiwan, RMB ¥10/HK $10 each copy. Other Asian area, America, Europe,

RMB ¥30/US $15 each copy.

Remarks:

You can purchase COLR via this way:Send your order form together with the amount due to:China Oceans Law Review Editorial BoardShanghai Jiao Tong University KoGuan Law School, 800 Dongchuan Road, Minh-ang District, Shanghai 200240, ChinaTel/Fax: (86-21)- 3420 5992; 3420 4740E-mail: [email protected]

Invitation to SponsorsChina Oceans Law Review (COLR–ISSN: 1813-7350) is a compilation of res-

earch focusing on ocean-related laws and policies. This Chinese-English bilingual journal is jointly hosted by Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Xiamen University, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, (Taiwan) Sun Yat-sen University and University of Macau and is published semi-annually. If you are interested in sponsoring this periodical, please kindly contact COLR Editorial Board.

中国海洋法学评论China Oceans Law Review2013 年卷第 2 期，总第 18 期 (Volume 2013 Number 2)刊号：ISSN 1813-7350出版时间：2013 年 12 月 (Publication: December 2013)

本刊由上海交通大学、厦门大学、香港理工大学、（台湾高雄）中山大学和澳门大学资助出版。COLR is co-sponsored by Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Xiamen University, The Hong Kong Polytech University, (Taiwan’s) Sun Yat-Sen University and University of Macau.

《中国海洋法学评论》已被 Westlaw、万律、中国知网、北大法宝、台湾华艺数位、维普、超星法源、HeinOnline 等电子数据库收录。China Oceans Law Review has been indexed by several digital databases such Westlaw, Westlaw China, CNKI, Lawinfochina.com, Airiti, Cqvip, Lawy.com.cn and HeinOnline.

中国航运——可靠、高效率的事业伙伴

中国航运股份有限公司为一多元化经营之国际性公司，旗下事业包括海运、陆运、空运、仓储物流等，尤其以海、陆专业运输为主轴，为客户在运输领域提供全方位的服务。针对近年来因大陆经济发展所带动的两岸商机，中航亦逐步跨足物流、观光旅游等相关上下游产业，藉由扩大经营规模以提升营运绩效，为股东创造最大的价值！

Chinese Maritime Transport: A Trusted, Resourceful Partner

A diversified company with global interests, Chinese Maritime Transport offers a wide array of services in ocean shipping, inland trucking, air freight, container consolidation and logistics. Looking ahead, CMT is poised to capitalize on the cross-Taiwan Strait opportunities created by China’s economic growth, especially in the transportation and travel sectors. These new openings will strengthen even further already consistent returns and maximize value for the loyal shareholders.

中国航运股份有限公司台北市中正区济南路一段 15 号中国航运大楼

Chinese Maritime Transport Ltd.15 Chi-Nan Rd. Sec.1 Taipei 10051, Taiwan

Tel: 886-2-2396 3282 Fax: 886-2-2356 8085 www.agcmt.com.tw

Documents

中国海洋法学评论 - Xiamen University...中国海洋法学评论 2013 年卷第2 期 总第18 期 顾问委员会 （按姓氏字母排序） 陈宏远，中山大学，高雄

中国海洋法学评论 - Xiamen University...中国海洋法学评论 2013 年卷第2 期总第18 期顾问委员会（按姓氏字母排序）陈宏远，中山大学，高雄