EUR POL & SOC XX Class 8 Eisenstadt

8/21/2019 EUR POL & SOC XX Class 8 Eisenstadt

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THE

BRE KDOWN OF

COM MU NIST REGIMES

S. N

isenstadt

In this the oret ially cha llenging essay, political sociologist

S N.

Eisenstadt

em ph as im the role of critical intellectuals in the making of the reoolutions of

1989. This is an important topic addressed

by

other

contri utors

(particularly

Timoth y Garton Ash). While he notices thesimilarities with previous revolution-

ary cleauages in histoty, Eisolstadt insists what

makes

the revolutions of

1989

truly new, unprecedented m t s of radical transformations of societies, econo-

mies, and culture s. He lis ts as major nooelfe atures: the absence of class conscious-

n m

among the reu olu ti~ ~~t es;heir commihmt to non-violent means of

mistance and opposition; the

~ + R M I S

absence of chmismatic, utopia n, and

teleologiurl elements. Indeed,

th

implica tion of Eisenstadt s argument i s that

these were new types of revolutions, in which the ideological blueprints were

pmgrnmmatically rejected.

The reoolutionaries of 1989 relied on a broad vision of human and

civic

rights

and cons istently opposed the attempts to reduce theiraspir ations o an ideological

straitjacket. Thus, Eismstadt mndudes, in agreemmt with the selections in this

wlu me from Timothy Gatlon Ash and

e f f r e y

C. Isaac, that the reuolutions of

1989 symbolized the opposite of thelambin

(or

Marxist) ambition to transform

the world akm g the lines of an eschatological (saloation ist) pmject. C ompared

to clnssical revolutions, these m jor events i not sacralize the center of politics

and refused to engage in missionay zealotry. Eismtadt o m n instnrctiue dis-

cussion of reuolutiaary mus~s and

''eficts

focusing on the

major mtm

dictions of modernity.

is

intopr efatio n of the risks and threats fillwin g the

rew lutio nay drama is close to

ruce

A c h n s and Ken Jawitt s contributions

elsewhere in this wlume.

* . ,

The breakdown o f h e ommunist regimes

n

Eastern Europe has been on e

of he more dramatic we nt s

n

the

histo~y

f human kind, certainly one

o


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S

N

EI S ENS TADT

T H E B R E A K D O W N O F C O M M U N I S T R E G I ME S

the most drama& since the end o f the Second World War. What is the sig.

nificance? Are t h e evolutions like the great revolutions -t he English

civil war, the American, French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions

which in many rays ushered in modernity, creating the modem political

order?' Are they likely to lead after a possibly turbulent period of

transition to

a

relatively stable world of modernity, with liberal con-

stitutionalism haalding some kind of end of history ? Or do they teu

us something the vicissitudes and hagilities of modernity, even of

democratic coratitutional regimes.

In one sense, obriously, the breakdown of the communist regimes are rew-

lutions dras ti~ dramat ic hanges of regime. These changes, unlike many

of the regime hanges in Latin American or South Asian history, were

closely c o n n e d with crucial ideological and cultural transformations.

The revolutionay process itself, the social process that brought about

these changes , shows interesting parallels with what happened in the

classical revobtions. combination of popular uprisings with struggles

at the center siruggles that focused around various attempts

at

reform,

started duringt\odropo$s short regime, especially between conservatives

and reformists -were very serious indeed. These struggles, combined with

wider popular @sings, together helped topple the communist regime.2

Another element common to both these changes and the great revolu-

tions was the clldally important role of intellectuals. They played a vital

part in the breakdown of the communist regimes as the Puritans had in

England, as in tekctuals did to some degree in America. It is scarcely neces-

sary to emph- the role played by the different clubs of the Enlighten-

ment in the k n c h Revolution, or the contributions of the Russian

intel lig ent~ ia. ~ ajor intellectual figures like Havel, less well-known

Catholic priests in Poland, and a variety of East German Protestant

ministers were mnspicuous in aU these late-twentieth-century processes,

so much so that the da im was often made that the breakdown of the com-

munist re gimesms indeed the work of intellectuals. While various intellec-

tual groups wm important, their mode of activity, as well as their basic

orientation, wmnot that of intellectuals in the classical revolutions.

Their participalion in hastening the process of the breakdown of the

communist regimes in Eastern Europe did much to intensify the element

of prinapled pmtest in all these revolutions. The popular protest was not

just a protest agm st wrongdoing

by

the authorities, a demand for redress,

for better behamr.

In

addition to all such demands, there were highly

principled stat wen ts made in the name of liberty what was often

called civil sociq promulgated essentially by intellectuals.

s

in the

classical revoluhs, this principled protest helped bring the regimes

down. The combination of political activity by many different groups -with

by intellectuals attests to a strong historical and phenomen-

ological relationship with those great revolutions that ushered in modem

political life, in which such combinations were central.

Similarly, the processes that brought about the demise of these regimes

the combination of economic decline, together with a deterioration of

their international standing, and the growing awareness among large

sectors of the population of the sharp contradictions between the bases

of their legitimation and their actual performance were to some extent

reminiscent of those common to the classical revolutions.

The similarities, where they ek t , are striking and by no means accidental.

Still, differences are no less obvious -especially those related to new types

of echnology, particularly in communication -evident in the role television

played

in

all these revolutions. Yet, even in this respect, the differences

ought not to be exaggerated. While there was no television or even radio

to record or comment on the events of the great revolutions, influencing

them, the invention of printing and the use of the presses for political

purposes played a crucial role in all the earlier revolutions.

Of greater importance, certainly, is that the repudiated economic struc-

tures, developed by the East European regimes, were characterized by a

relatively modem, industrialized political economy; the revolutions did

not constitute a rebellion or protest against a traditional authoritarian

ncien rigime

a protest in the name of enlightenment and reason against

a long-constituted political authority.

Beyond these differences in background and causes, in their respective

conaete historical settings, there were far-reaching differences in th e

revolutionary process itself. First, it would be difficult to say whether

these were bourgeois or proletarian revolutions. Even in respect to the

classical revolutions, these definitions are no t always helpful or enlighten-

ing; in respect to the events in Eastern Europe they are meaningless. If there

were specific social sectors predominant in bringing down these regimes,

they included some intellectuals, certain potential professionals, sometimes

abetted by workers, who did not appe x to be the bearers of any very strong

class consaousness.

Another difference must be noted. With the exception of Romania, the

process was relatively bloodless, nonviolent. Where protest and violent

demonstrations occurred, they were in comparative perspective very

limited. Nor was the violence, when it happened, sanctified or sacralized,

as it had been

in

most of the classical revolutions. There was no such e ao l-

ling of violence either in Eastern Europe or in the USSR itself . It was the

other way around hose who were opposed to the communist regimes


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accused the inambents of having recourse to violence, to suppress those

who would unseat them.

Although ethnic and national tensions were strong in all these societies,

ethnic violence was uncommon except in the single instance of

Yugo

slavia- in the pocess that brought these regimes down. Only later, after

their downfall,did such conflicts become much more prominent.

The relativelylow level of violence is evident in the fact that the old rulers,

except in Romania, were pushed out in a bloodless way. They were rarely

punished; few re re tried. Even in Germany, where there was talk of bring-

ing Honneckerfn court, nothing happened; the Soviets took him away, and

only now are East German officials being brought before a general (not

East) German a r t . t is significant that it is mostly in Gennany where

the distinct East German state was abolished hat the most widespread

legal proceedings are being undertaken. Meanwhile, Zhivkov is now

being tried in Bulgaria, and some further developments in this direction

will perhaps take place. There will probably be more court cases, there

w ll probably

be

some witch hunting, but it is very doubtful whether

there will be anything like the trials of Charles or Louis XVI the semi

trial of Georgem in America, or the execution of the czar.

The ruling el i i of these regimes (again with the exception of Romania)

did not generally fight; they gave up, abdicating relatively easily. Many

would certainly have tried to hold on to power had they been able to

depend on So* tanks to support them. Yet, the relative ease with

which the r u le s and not only those at the top, but in t he middle echelons

of the party and ihe bureaucracy, gave up, or were prepared, as in Hun gaq

or Bulgaria, to t y their fortunes in new open parliamentary elections, is

somewhat surpking.

Of

special interest, certainly, is the fact that the

middle echelolls of the security forces of the armies no longer protected

the rulers or theregimes. They surrendered power quickly, and not because

they had lost amar.This is intriguing, especially when one recalls that many

of these middle echelons benefited greatly from the regimes: that the

security organization and the armies were major avenues of social mobility.

Yet, often, the various echelons in these organizations,

gave

up -willingly

or unwillingly -without resistance. S i a r l y , it is very important to note

that almost ll e changes of regime were made within the framework of

existing political institutions, prevailing constitutions. Even the initial con-

stitutional changes, including the most dramatic the abolition of the

monopoly of the Communist

Party

were effected or ratified in the legis-

lative frameworks of the preceding regimes, in the existing parliaments.

There was no need to change the whole structure of government to

create entirely new constitutional frameworks for this to be done. To no

small de pe ,

it

was accomplished through processes prescribed by the

existing constiMons, or by extra-parliamentary consultants later ratiiied

by

the parliamd .

TH BRE KDOWN

O F

CO M M UNIS T REG IM ES

While new constitutions are now being negotiated, and constitutional

commissions have been set up to do this work, this is intended to highlight

the break with the past. Still, it is impossible to ignore the fact that change

was effected relatively peacefully within the framework of existing consti-

tutional institutions. It is much too early to know how stable any of these

constitutional arrangements will be.

?he same is true of the symbolic changes effected, for instance in

Hungary, where the communist symbols were removed everywhere, or in

Poland, where some expect the crown to be put back on the Polish eagle,

removed

by

the communist regime. The name of the Czechoslovak

Republic, changed to the Republ~c f the Czechs and Slovaks [before the

establishment of two separate states], heralds other important symbolic

and radical structural changes that may soon be instituted. Yet, most or

all of these changes were effected within e&ting constitutional frame-

works, through existing constitutional procedures and processes or, at a

minimum ratified by these procedures. Very few changes were made in

other ways. These facts emphasize, of coune, the far-reaching differences

from the way in which the classical revolutions of another age developed.

IV

So, also, the political, soda1 and cultural programs promulgated by these

revolutions are radically different from those of the past. In

all

these, the

earlier charismatic and utopian elements rr conspicuously missing.'

While ideological demands for freedom and a market economy were

made which do indeed contain some

v

y e utopian nonrealistic expec-

tations -the market economy was never sanaified in the manner in which

the rights of man figured in the French Revolution. There was no totalis-

tic, utopian vision rooted in eschatological expectations of

a

new type of

society. The vision or visions promulgated in Central and Eastern Europe,

calling for freedom from repressive totalitarian or authoritarian regimes,

relied on various pragmatic adjustments. Eschatological visions, the idea

of creating a new total cultur l and social order according to some utopian

prescription, and oriented to some millenial future, were very feeble

throughout these last years.6

The absence of

this

utopian or eschatological component was closely

related to yet another aucial difference, having to do with the attitude of

the revolutionary groups toward the center, toward the construction of a

new center. In

all

the classical revolutions, the utopian and eschatological

visions, together with the s a n ~ c a t i o n f violence, promoted a very

strong tendency to charismatize politics. The classical revolutionaries

believed that politics could change sodety; that through the charismatic

reconstruction of the political center, a total change of society could be

effected. There is very little of such charismatization of the center or of


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TH B R E K D O W N OF

C O M M U N I S T

R G I M S

politics in theseEast European revolutions, though some elements of such

belief can be fmnd. Similarly, any tendency to reconstmct the center as a

cont inuous L i ~ a lrena remains very weak.7

In other wonb, the Jacobin element so crucial in all the classical revolu-

tions, certainlyin the Puritan (English) one, though milder in America, but

very strong in the French and even more

in

the Russian and Chinese revo-

lutions, whichconstituted a central core in all the totalitarian corrtmunist

regimes -i s ahlos t entirely missing, though its head reappears here and

there from t i m o time. Indeed, it is antipolitics -the flight from c e n w

politics as espmsed by Gyhrgi Konrdd and many others -that seems to be

much more inrogue today in Eastern and Central Europe.'

Another conponent of classical revolutions almost wholly missing in

Eastern Europe today is that of universalistic visions, emphasizing the

missiomq rok of such visions. While the breakdown of the communist

regimes in E e r n Europe was seen by participants and others as having

universal sigrdicance a fact continuously emphasized by the media,

especially telRision these occurrences did not impose revolutionary

missions. They were no t ideas borne by missionary zealots. While there

were continums contacts between different protest movements an d .

indeed commm consultations, no distinctive missionary universalistic

utopian visiondeveioped, redolent of the French and Russian revolutions,

or of the Purita revolt. No revolutionary armies walked about from one

place to an ot ha hoping to reshape their respective ~oci et ie s.~

When Havel came to Poland he did not bling an army to revolutionize

Poland; he cam as head of a hiendly neighboring state, to speak before

the Polish

Sejm. There was no new revolutionary International; only a

plethora of dismssion groups, seminars, and the like, with a very strong

emphasis on w m o n hemes, such as civil society, freedom, constitutional

democracy, a d o some extent -t he free market. There was no strong

missionary unirersalistic push, a core element in many of the great revolu-

tions, especialbin France and Russia. AccordingIy, the future

is

much more

open.

As

there is no utopian sanciification of politics, the future is not pre-

scribed by totlistic utopian visions with strong missionruy orientations.

The weaknessd the utopian and missionary elements was closely related

to the basic dnracter of intellectuals, the Kulturtragw who were active,

very often c e M , but n o longer pursuing the roles characteristic of intel-

lectuals

in

the great revolutions, or in many of the major modem social

movements.

The vision tkyrep resented had changed from the classical revolutionaty

one, as indeed had many of their activities. Most of these East European

intellectuals gr w up and were active even if frequently suppressed and

mostly highly xegulated in the framework of modem academic, pro-

fessional, or li institutions recognized to be betraying some of their

principal ide als While often rebelling against the totalistic utopian visions

in the name of which the communist regimes legitimized hemselves, some

were openly pragmatic; others talked in the name of freedom, extolling the

ideals of civil society and private morality. They were no longer bearers of

the strong Jacobin eschatological visions characteristic of so many of the

classical revolutionary intellectuals.

Other actors, wholly secondary in the great revolutions above all the

bearers of national, ethnic, and to some extent religious visions and

messages have become much more important. Primordial and religious

themes played a cluaal role, not only in Poland where the church had

always been strong. but in other places as well. Certain of the churches

in East Germany played a major role

n

the overthrow of the regime,

even if not a s dramatically as in Poland.

How can one explain these revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe? Are

they to be discovered in the causes alleged to explain the breakdown

of communist regimes? Among the causes commonly given, the stagnation

of the economy, the disenchantment among large sectors of the population,

the weakening of the legitimation of these regimes, and their diminished

international standing are singled out.

While many of the causes of the decline of the Soviet system he various

manifestations of internal stagnation and of weakness in the international

arena are redolent of the decline of many empires, including those which

spawned the great classical revolutions, they do not tell enough. Just as

.such general causes do not distinguish between empires, the Roman,

Byzantine, and Abbasid, for example, or the dynastic changes in Ch ii a

(especially the decline of the Ming), or the others which gave rise to the

great revolutions, they do not explain the specific reasons for the decline

of the communist ~egimes?~lso, they do not suggest the directions

these societies may now take.

In order to be able to explain what has happened, it is imperative to look

closely at the specific contradictions of these regimes, that were

in

fact at

the very core of their legitimation. On the most general level, these contra-

diaions were rooted in the fact that the Soviet regime, as it developed after

its institutionalization in the early 1920s. was characterized

by

a rather

unusual combination of features. It combined traditional features

historical, patrimonial, and bureaucratic features characteristic especially,

of course, of the czarist empire with those of a modem regime mobilizing

whole populations, rooted in a monolithic revolutionary movement and

ideology?'

The Soviet regime changed some of the basic parameters of center-

peripheryrelat~onshat haddeveloped under theadrist emplre-espeoally

the rather delicate balance between a comrnltrnent to the impenal system


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S N EI S ENS TAD?

T H E B R E A K D O W N OF CO M M UNI S T REG I M ES

and the relatk political passivity of the periphery. The revolutionary

center mobilizal and activated the periphely to a very high degree, but at

the same time +tempted to control it tightly in the name of the communist

salvationist vi n as borne and promulgated by the ruling elite and its

cadres.

Accordingly, the most far-reaching the most encompassing and

nucial contndictions developed in these regimes were moted in their

bases of legitimation, in the nature of the vision that combined the basic

premises of modernity, together with far-reachingstrong totalitarian orien-

tations and pdicies. The most important of these contradictions were

between the paticipatory democratic and the totalitarian, the Jacobin com-

ponents of the legitimation of these regimes; between the high level of

social mobilization effected by these regimes and the attempts to control

totally all the nmbilized groups.

These contradictions became increasingly apparent after the Stalinist era,

but to some extent also after Khrushchev, the time of intensive social

mobilization nd institution building undertaken in the name of this

vision.

As

Ernest Gellner has pointed out, the exigencies of the routiniza-

tion of this vishn, which became ever more visible after the Khrushchev

era, highlighted the contradictions nherent in these communist

regime^ ^

The first aremin which the contradictions became apparent was the eco-

nomic one hefailure of the planned economy to deliver according to its

premises. The growingstagnation of the Brezhnev era constituted the

turn-

ingpoint in thert iculation of the economic problems of the Soviet regime.

The stagnation. brought about by the general inefficiency of central plan-

ning in reg ula tig a relatively routinized and diversified modem economy,

was exacerbated by the extremely heavy burden of military expenses.

Rooted in the strong military orientations of the regime, and in the

growth of the military as an autonomous sector of the Soviet soaety and

economy, but ,during the Brezhnev era, in the great military and eco-

nomic expenses incurred in connection with Soviet international policy in

the period of

th

Cold War, there was a growing tendency of the regime

to buy off va ri m sectors of the soae ty through subsidized privileges.

The failure in the economic arena touched on the central nerve of the

regime t w s in the economic arena that the salvationist vision of the

regime was to be implemented; it was the economic arena that provided

the most t e h g k s t of the regime's vision.

The contradidbn s nherent in these policies might have been suppressed

by a strong totaiitarian regime but at the same time the consequences

of such suppraaion would have weakened many aspects of the system.

Once the tota liei an lid was taken off as happened under Gorbachev

the contradiakns exploded, threatening the very existence of the

system.

The contradictions of these regimes explain some of the major character-

istics of the civil society that developed within them and in this context

it

is

essential to examine the processes of economic development and

social mobilization that became rooted under ~ommunism?~he continu-

ous processes of social

mobilization, the expansion of education, and the

of numerous professional groups and organizations created in

Soviet Russia a much greater range of nuclei, the kernels of civil soaety.

~t the same time, however, civil soae ty was not allowed any autonomy,

not even to the extent that it was allowed under the aa rs.14The totalitarian

control effectedby the Soviet regime al mo i entirely eroded all the bases of

autonomy of civil society that existed.

Still, certain institutional ideological kernels of the civil society could be

found in the existence of formal, seemingly legal procedures in many insti-

tutions and organizations. Even though these procedures were often only

fomlally acceded to, their existence served as a sort of signal about the

proper ways of dealing in the public arena.

The ideological kernels of such civil society were rooted in some of the

basic premises of these regimes -especially in their emphasis on freedom,

emancipation, and participation in the political arena, which constituted

major components of the communist vision. While these emphases were

repressed by the Jacobin components of the communist regimes, the

latter could never entirely negate or obliterate these themes. These nuclei

or kernels of civil society started to develop as some of the basic contradic-

tions of these regimes became more apparent, but also more debilitating.

The growing attempt of the regime to buy off large sectors of the more

educated and professional sectors of the society gave rise to one of the

major initial directions of the development of civil sodety in Russia, the

Soviet Union, and even more widely in Eastern Europe. Greater spaces

were provided in which these sectors were permitted some

sort

of serni-

autonomous activities, but never in the central political arena.

With the continuous weakening of the regimes and the growth, within

the ruling sectors, of an awareness of the necessity to reform, more active

attempts to impinge on t he central political arena started to develop in a

great variety of ways. At the same time, it is not dear to what extent orderly

constitutional procedures in the central arena would develop or would be

adhered to.

Such kernels of civil society were stronger

in

Eastern Europe, where

totalitarian communist rule was of much shorter duration, where certain

institutional and ideological traditions of civil sodety were stronger

even if not especially strong in comparison with those of Western Europe.

Similarly, given the shorter span of communist d e , the stronger tradi-

tions of pa rl ia me nt q regimes and the existence, as in the case of the


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S. N.

EISENSTADT

THE B R EA K D O W N

O P

C O MM U N IST R EG IMES

Catholic Chur& in Poland, of a number of autonomous sectors, all these

developments were much stronger in the communist regimes in Eastem

Europe than inRussia and it is in these countries that they became central

in bringing down the communist regimes.15

V

The specific cluracteristin of the contradictions of the Soviet and com-

munist regimesprovide the starting point for possible explanations of the

East Europeanrevolutions or regime changes that distinguish them from

all the classical revolutions. These revolutions were not oriented against

,,raditional, premodern, or even modernizing regimes. They were not

rebellions or potests against traditional authoritarian regimes, against

the divine rightof kings, made in the name of modernity or enlightenment.

Rather, they cmtituted a rebellion and protest against what was increas-

ingly perceived

by

large sectors of the East European societies as a blockage

and distortion modernity, effected by totalitarian regimes. While these

regimes blocked and in many ways distorted modernity and development,

in some of their basic, symbolic, and institutional aspects, they were very

modem societies.

In common ther modem regimes, the legitimation of these regimes

was rooted in earlier classical types of revolutionary experience (the

English, Amerian, and French) the legitimation of the new center was

couched in t e r n which entailed far-reaching transformations of center-

periphery relatiam. There developed a growing penneation of the centn

into the periphey, but also the impingement of the periphery on the

center, often &hating in the obliteration of a t least the symbolic diie r-

ences between m t e r and periphery, making membership in the collectivity

tantamount to participation in the center.16

The modernitg of these regimes is paradoxically most evident in the fact

that all of thempromulgated elections. While

it

is of course hue that the

elections were sham, as were the constitutions, one must ask why the

u rs opposed elections while the Soviet leaders imposed them. They

required electios because the regime's legitimacy, couched in modern

political terns , axepte d the necessity of political participation; appeals to

something like the divine right of kings was unthinkable. The divine

was the voice

of

the people, a secular eschatological vision borne by the

people or an imqj nary sector thereof he proletariat or the like. Accord-

ingly, these regimes promulgated modern constitutions, even

if

in practice

they were as mmh a sham as the elections themselves. Both the constitu-

tions and the eledions attested to the fact that these totalitarian regimes, in

their mode of le@timation, in their relations between the center and the

periphery, but a h n their overall cultural and political program, were

regimes. Indeed, their cultural and political program was part of the

..

.-lhlral pattern of modernity.

The specific political and cultural policies promulgated

by

these regimes

developed out of tensions inherent in the cultural programs of modernity-

espedaUy the tensions between the lacobin and liberal or pluralistic

elements of this program. These Jacobin orientations, with their belief in

the transformation of society through totalistic political action, are very

modern,

even if their historical roots go back to medieval eschatological

sources.

The Jacobin element exists in different guises n many populist, funda-

mentalist or fascist movements and indeed in ll modem societies,

including those that are democratic-constitutional. It exists also in nat ion-

alist movements. s Noberto Bobbio has often emphasized, the Jacobin

element is strong in both fascism and in communism, which in a way are

mirror images of one another.

n

pluralistic, constitutional societies -i n the United States, Britain, or

France this Jacobii element is hemmed in; it constitutes only a single

component in the overall pluralistic constitutional arrangements. In totali-

tarian regimes, the pluralistic ideologies and shuctures were repressed

almost totally, but never entirely obliterated. The fact of such repression

meant that severe contradictions developed not only in respect to economic

performance, but also in respect to basic political premises.

V

From the point ofview of social and economic conditions orinstitutions, t he

communist societies were not traditional or under-developed societies in

the sense in which that term is used to designate the so-called Third

World

-

itself a highly heterogeneous entity. Their economic shuctures

were those of a relatively indushialized and urbanized political economy.

Moreover, their distinctive mode of industrialization became connected

with widespread social mobilization and the expansion of education,

conditions that did not always obtain in the Third World. A pretense of

equality, even if very shabby, evolved. With respect to the middle and

lower groups, it was not only pretense.

These institutional developments

-

the expansion of education, the

controlled but potentially meaningful possibility of political patidpation,

and their connection to industrialization were created by the regime

itself. They were not external to the regime; they generated the major

contradictions in the regimes. The Soviet and communist societies were

not simply backward and underdeveloped, aspiring to become modem.

Rather, they were modern or modernizing societies, which, in seeking to

catch up with the more developed, selected and totalized the Jacobm

ideological and institutional elements of modernity.


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S

N E I S E N S T A D T

T H E B R E A K D O W N O F C O M M U N I S T R E G I M E S

Thus, the remhtions against the communist regimes in Eastern Europe

and against thebtalitarian regime in Russia need to be seen as rebellions

against certain types of modernity which negated in practice other more

pluralistic elemmts of modernity, while officially instituting certain central

components of tbeir premises. The rebellions or revolutionary processes, as

much

as

the va hu s attempts at r e fo m together with the new social and

political movemmts in what had once been the USSR were rebellions or

protests against a misrepresentation of modernity, a flawed interpre-

tation of

modernity

They were an unfolding of the dynamics of modern

civilization.

IX

It is the speciBca& modem contradictions of these regimes that provide the

beginning of anexplanation for why the various ruling groups and not

only the top nlers, but also the middle echelons of the bureaucracy,

army, and secudy forces gave up so easily.

ll

were highly mobilized

and underwent htense processes of political socialization. Politically the

most socialized goups of the regime, they were socialized in the name of

two quite diffemt components or orientations. One was Jacobin, the

eschatological e h e n t transformed into a totalitarian setting. They were

also socialized in the name of freedom, participation, and democracy

even if these ehnents were subverted and suppressed. This specific

political so dak&n could easily, under appropriate conditions, in te ns e

their awareness the contradictions between the premises of the regimes

and their perfownce. It s difficult to know how seriously these groups

took their ideals. Once things started to change, however, and the impact

of foreign televirion became greater, the more democratic themes found

easy resonance, plradodcally perhaps because of the political socialization

received. This m y partially explain the strong predisposition of large

sectors of these Podeties to listen to radio and television messages from

the West; it may dso explain the impact of their messages.

If the downfa1 of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe must be

explained in tems different from those of the dassical revolutions

which ushered inthe political program of modernity, there are similarities:

the close relationsamong popular protests, struggles in the center, and the

intellech~al rou p that developed; the place of principled protest; the

emphasis on the legitimacy of such protest, central in all of them. U

these were charaderistic features of the great revolutions; all are character-

istic of the modan political process ushered in by these revolutions. From

the point of viewof the development of such themes, there seems to have

developed in thepocess of breakdown of the communist regimes, a rather

interestingparaU&m- together with great differences in concrete details-

with respect to s m e developments in the contemporary West, especially

with respect to some of those developments which have often been dubbed

as postmodern : the decharismatization of the centers; the weakening

of the overall societywide utopian political vision and of the missionary-

ideological component. Even when the belief in democracy and the free

market sometimes evince such elements, there is a concomitant disposition

of many utopian orientations to disperse; daily and semi-private spheres

of

life become centralJ8

The fact that the breakdown of these regimes seems to lead to the insti-

tutionalization of new and on the face of it democratic-constitutional

regimes -more modem societies does not mean that such institutionali-

zation will be easy. It

is

now fuUy recognized that the transition is fragile.

Many economic pitfalls, great social turbulence and dislocations attendant

on the transition from the communist command economy to some free-

market type, the weakness in East European countries of constitutional

and democratic traditions, and the continuous threat of the upsurge of

primordial, ethnic loyalties, become increasingly apparent. There is

always the possibility of economic collapse and general anarchy.

These problems, however, do not simply arise out of the breakdown of

traditional empires, the transition from some premodern to fully

modem, democratic sodety, or from a distorted modernity to a relatively

tranquil stage which may weU signal some ldnd of end of history. The

turbulence evident in Eastem Europe today bean witness to some of the

problems and tensions inherent in

modernity itself, attesting to the poten-

tial fragility of the whole project of modernity.

These turbulences highlight tensions inherent in the modem political

process, which are indeed characteristic of this process. The most important

are tensions between different and often competing conceptions of the

general will, and the relation of these conceptions to the representation

of the discrete interests of various sectors of society, i.e., tensions between

aggregative poliaes and politics of the common good, between the articu-

lation and aggregation of different interests and of different conceptions of

common good, between to use Bruce Ackerman's formulation the

routine and revolutionaq politics.19

Contrary to the assumptions of many rational-choice analysts, the

mobilization of support around leaders and programs, effected mainly

but not only through the medium of parties and of social movements, is

not based simply on the aggregation of many disae te interests. Such mobi-

lization also takes place around the articulation of different conceptions of

the common good; it plays a central role in the mobilization of political sup-

port. Such mobilizationwill often focus, as Alessandro Pizo mo has shown,

around symbols of collective identity political, social, or e t h i c identity


8/10

THE BRE KDOWN OF COMM UNIS T REGIMES

as well as around the closely related conception of the common good of

the whole socies more closely related to the primordial and sacred

components of le@ im at i~ n. ~~

XI

These tensions nherent in all modem regimes. In authoritar ian and

totalitarian reginur, they are suppressed but never obliterated. In relatively

stable democratic-constitutional regimes, the tensions may be attenuated,

but they always shm er , ready, as it were, to erupt in situations of intensive

change. The tensirms and potent ial fragility of democratic-const itutional

basically

of

all &ern regimes, is enhanced by the fact that modem

regions develop highly volatile and continuously changing intemal and

international se ttsgs. The conditions conducive to theirinstitutionalization

and continuity

x

hemselves inherently unstable.

In any s itua tiw of rapid change, modern societies may develop rather

contradictory terdencies in respect to the development of conditions

conducive to insfitutionalization, to the perpetuation and continuity of

democratic consfautional

regimes. Such situations generate changes in

the definition of th boundaries of the political,21 n what is seen to be an

appropriate range of activities for the state; in the structures of centers of

power; in the exhnt of the access of different sectors of civil society to

these centers: in th na tu re of the linkages among the sectors, and between

them and the st* in the types of entitlements extended to dl er en t

sectors of society.

From the point d vi ew of the construction of civil society and its relations

to the state, in such transitional situations, developments could take several

direction^.^^ One would include the development of new autonomous sec-

tors of civil soci* the political activization of such sectors through the

activities of multiple elites and counter-elites; the growth of various inter-

linkingarenas bet men the state and society, including both the activization

of older types, such as consultative bodies, and the development of

new ones athmed in different degrees to democratic-constitutional

arrangements.

Alternatively,

tb

processes of transition may develop in quite other

directions. They m y work to undermine the conditions favoring the

development and continuity of democratic-constitutional regimes. The

continuous social

m

economic transitions may easily change the distribu-

tion of power w i t h the major sectors of socieiing eroding many autono-

mous centers of pare r, creating a power vacuum. Moreover, policies uch

as, for instance, t hee connected with the institutionalization of the welfare

state whose initidaim was to weaken eist ing semi-monopolistic centers

ofpower, may incr ase the political and administrative power of the state to

such an extent as toobliterate independent bases of power.

s

attested by

de Tocqueville, Man , and Weber, the specter of the bureaucratization of all

major arenas of social and political life has haunted the political discourse of

modern societies, with an intensity only reinforced by the development of

totalitarian regimes.

Other possibilities exist. Many of the edsting sectors of civil society, with

their complexinterlinkingarenas, may become impediments to the restruc-

turing of relat ions between civil society and the s tate. The very entrench-

ment of these sectors may lead them increasingly to represent narrow

or ascriptive sectors, and may weaken their initial acceptance

of

newly emergent common frameworks and centers. FinaUy, both the

older associational structure and the new sectors of civil society may

become undermined, giving rise to the development of highly volatile

masses. In many such cases these processes have been exacerbated by

the emergence of new collective-national and ethnic communities, with

aggregative policies and politics of the common gobd, between routine and

revolutionary politics.

:

It is in these situations, as in many involving intensive change in modem

regimes, that the confrontation between the different modes of legitimation

and the d ifferent aspects of the modem political process become especially

acute. All such tensions and problems became highly visible in the pro-

cesses of transition in Eastern Europe. Such periods of change of transi-

tion are in no way exceptional. They are, as indicated above, exceedingly

common, given the continuously changing intemal an d international set-

tings of the contemporary world. It is

in

such periods tha t articulations of

protest come f o m d as a major component of the political process.

The

most intensive themes and movements of protest are those in which

articu

lation of concrete aggregate interests becomes closely related to the pro-

mulgation of different conceptions of the common good.

The ubiquity of these tensions in the modem democratic-constitutional

regimes points to o ne of the most important chauenges before these

regimes namely, how to create some common framework in which dif-

ferent views of the common good can compete without undermining the

very possibility of the system working. It poses the question of the nature

of the common basis or bases of acceptance of a democratic-const itutional

ensuing internecine conflicts.

Such developments or transitions whether from nondemocratic to

democratic-constitutional regimes, or within democratic-constitutional

regimes are closely connected with tensions inherent in the modem

political process between different and often competing conceptions

of

the general will and the relation of such conceptions to the representation

nf the discrete interests of various sectors of society; i.e., tensions between


9/10

S .

N. EISENSTADT

regime beyo rd adher ence to the rules of the game and the possibili ty

that su ch common elements m ay exist in multiple bases of legitimation,

s o l o ng a s n o cme of them becomes predominant.

The ubiquityof such tens ions indicates that one of the major continuous

challenges befae the modem consti tutional regime is not just the assur-

ance tha t the m jo r pol i ti cal ac tors wil l adhere to th e exis t ing rules of t h e

game, bu t also their capacity to incorporate protest , t o redefine the bound-

aries of th e po liia l , to transform the bases of lcgit imation of these regimes.

The great crises of these regimes such as those of the 1930s in many

Europ ean counbies were usually associated with a failure to achieve

s u ch i n t ern a l t m s fo m a t i o n s .

The

constitufional regimes of the West, since the Second World War,

though not be tween the two world

wan,

evinced despi te cont inuous

fears abou t the crisis of th e state o r capitalism, a high degree of capacity

for self-transfamabili ty. In the West, no democratic regime has broken

dow n s ince the end of the Second World War. Indeed, the genera l t rend

has seem ed to go the o the r way,

with

the authoritarian regimes

in Spain, Porhqal, Greece, and most recently, in some Latin American

countries

be am in g democratic . Similarly, several non-E uropean coun-

tries India, Japan, an d Israel have been able to maintain democratic-

consti tutional regimes since the en d of the Second World War as have

also Ge rm any and Italy he two countries in which the breakdow n of

democracy in t k n te rwar per iod was most dramat ic .

But even

wit in

these regimes the possibility of crisis or breakdown

c a n n ot b e e n t d y d i s co u n te d . Th i s is, of course, even more true of the

emer ging consti lutional regimes of Eastern Europe. T he init ial stages of

the break dow n of comm unist regimes he relatively peaceful charader-

istics whi ch d&nguished them from the great revolutions suggested

that they m ight also evince some su ch capacity for self-transfo mab iity.

At the sam e t im , however , the turbulences a t tendant on these t rans i tions

cast new doub t rabout tha t capac ity. Such doubts a re due n ot only to the

specific cond itims of thes e transit ions, but also to th e combination of con-

di t ions inheren tm m ode m regimes , e speaa l ly

in

democratic-consti tutional

o n es . T h us , t h e h e l o p m e n t s

in

Eastern Europe cast important l ight on he

problematics of modernity, o n th e inher ent fragil i ty of th e great historical

and cultural prc t of modernity.

Notes

ource Reprinted

by

permission of the publisher from

aedalus

(Journal of the

American Academy of

Arts

and Sciences), from the issue entitled 'The Edt from

Comm unism, 121.2 (Spring 1992): 21-41 .

THE BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNIST REGIMES

1

On

the classical modem revolutions, see: S.

N.

Eisenstadt, Rmlutions and the

Transformation of Societies (New York: Free Press, 1978); idem , Framew orks o f

the Great Revolutions: Culhlre, Social Structure, History and Human Agency,

International Social ScienceJoumal, 133 (1992): 385 401 ; M. Lasky, 'Th e Birth of

a Metaphor: On the Origins of Utopia and Revolution, Encounter34 2) 1970):

3-5, and (3) (1970): 30- 42; Utopia and Rmolution (Chicago,

n:

niversity of

Chicago Press, 1976). On the Revolutions and modernity, see for instance th e

spe aal issue 'Th e French Revolution and the Birth of Modernity, Social

w ar ch (1989).

~

2

See

Eiicnsradr. R~-;.olutionsnd tlrz Transfonnnt~on

ocSm mr

3

On

the role of groups of intellectuals in som e of the revolutions, see

A . Cnrhin.

Lo

R~~olullont la Lr5rc Pn s k (Pans. Pl~ n- No un it, 924'. ~ d e m .'mpri: du

JamUnisme (Paris: Universitaires de France, 1979); and 1. ~aechler, rekace in

Cochin, L'espnt du ]ambinisme, 7-33. See also

F.

Furet, French Revolution

(New York: Macmillan, 1970); idem , Rethinking the French Rm lut ion (Chica go,

I L

University of Chicago Press, 1982) and

V.

C. Nahimy, The Russian Intelli-

gentsia:

Fmm

Torment to ilence (New B runsm~ck

NI:

Transaction Books, 1983).

4 On the sancti6cation of violence

in

classical revolutions, see: S.

N .

Eisenstadt,

Frameworks of the Great Revolutions: Culture, Social Structure, History and

Hum an Ag ency International Social Science Jo um l, 133 (1992): 385-401.

5 On the utopian elements in the great civilizations and revolutions, see:

A

B.

Seligm an, ed., Order and Transcendence: The Role of Utopias an d the Dynamics

of Civilkntiom (Leiden: E. J Brill, 1989); M. Lasky, Utopia and Rmolutia;

R Saage, Das Ende der Politisches Utopie? (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,

1990).

6 On the eschatological elements, see: A. Selignan, Order and Transcendence;

S. Friedlander, G. Holton, Leo Ma n. an d E. Skolnikoff, eds. Visions of

Apocalypse: End or Rebirth? (New York and Lo ndon: Holmes Meier, 1985);

C. Lefort,

The

Political Forms of Modem Son @: Bmenumay, Dmouacy and

Totnliiarianism (Cam bridge,

MA:

MTI

Press, 1986); idem, Part

IS

On Revolu-

tion, in C. Lefo rt, Demonacy and Political

heory

(Minneapolis,

MN

niversity

of Mi nne sota Press, 1 988) , 57-163; J Dunn , 'Totalitarian Democracy and the

Legacy of Mod em Revolutions Explanation or indictme nt? in J. Dunn,

K D. Bracher, and Sh. Avineri, Totalitarian and Afier, International Colloquium

in

Memmy

ofJamb

L

Talmon, Jeru sale m, 21-24 Jun e 1982,

The

Israel Academy

of Sciences and Humanities ( Jemsdem : The Hebrew University Magnes Press,

198 4), 37-56; K. D. Bracher,

Turn

of the Ce ntury and Totalitar ian Ideology,

in Dun n, Bracher, and Aviner i 70-83; Sh. Avineri. Different '&ions of

Political Messianism in the Mandst European Tradition,

in D m ,

Bracher,

a n d A h e n ,

96-104.

On th e liminal aspec ts of the revolu tionary pmcess.

see: S. N. Eisens tadt, Comparative Liminality: Liminality

and

Dynamics of

Civilization,'' Religion (15) (1985): 315-38.

7 From the vast literature on this subject, see for instance: Pieho Grilli di

Corrona, 'Trom Communism to Democracy: Rethinking Regime Change

in

Hungary and Czechoslovakia, ln tm tio na l Social

Science

Jouml (128) (May

1991): 315-31.

G.

K o d d , Antipolitik Mitteleuropiiische Meditationen (Franldurt

am

Main:

Suhrkamp, 1985).

9 On the universalistic and missionary components

in

the great revolutions, see:

C. Lefort

in

Eisenstadt, Revolutions,

R.

Kosellek J3istorical Criteria of the

Mod em Concept of Revolutions, in idem, Futures Past on

th

Semantics of

Historical Time (Cambridge, MA:

MIT

Press, 1985), 39, and S. N. Eisenstadt,

u

hlsbNhT DT T H C DREAKDOWN OF


10/10

Frameworks d the Great Revolutions: Culhtre, Social Shucture, History and

Human Agenq International Son'al Sc i m Journal, 133 (1992): 385-401.

10 On the anal ys~of uch cases, see: S. N. Eisenstadt, Frameworks of the Great

Revolutions: GlNr e, Social Shucture, History and Human Agency Inter-

~ t i o n a locialScience~oumal, 33 (1992): 385-401. J A Goldstone, Rewlution

and Rebellion inthe Early Modem World (Berkeley and Los Angeles,

CA:

Univer.

sitv of Ca li fo h Press. 1991).

11

On the specifrprocesses of the breakdown f the

M ~ T U N S ~

egme, see for

instance

bout

fRe l~ te ra ~r ef the Wert the specizl issue of World l'ulrtin, 44 1.

October 1991 il.81-rrahation and Denl.>cratizatlonm the So\?et L'nion and

Eastern ~uro p ), lso S. N. Eisenstadt Center Periphery in Soviet Russia,.

in A.

J Motyl ed., Rethinking Themeticnlly about Soviet Nationalities (New

York: Columbh University Press, 1992).

12 Remarks madebyEmest Gellner

in

the seminar an Fundamentalism under the

auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Chicago. November

1991.

13 see the specid issue of World Politis mentioned in Note 11 and Eisenstadt,

Center Periphrry in Soviet Russia.

14 On ci dl s oc i g in the czarist empire, see for instance E. W. Clowes, S.

D

Kassow, and I L West, eda. Between Tsar and People (Princeton, NJ: Prince ton

Univenity Pre g 1991).

15 P. Grilli di Cowna, From Communism to Democracy; also id em e Crisi politische

nei reximi commist i (Milan: Franco

Angeli

1980).

16 On the concepl of center, see E. Shils, Center and Peripheq in idem, Center

and Pm'pkey, k a y s

n

M a ~ o l o g yChicago,

L

University of Chicago

Press, 1975), S24 On center-petiphery relations on modernity , see S. N.

Eisenstadt. T d d i m Omn p and Modernity

(New

York: John

Wiley

1973),

chaps. 941 ,ZaF58 , and idem, Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity

and Recons-n of Tradition,

in S.

N. Eisenstadt, ed., Post-Traditional

Societies (New York:

W.

W. Norton, 1972), 1-29. On the general prospect

of modernity, see J. Habermas, Tke Philosophical Dismum o Modernity

(Cambridge,

NA:

MlT Ress, 1987).

17 N. Bobbio, n Mum della Dmuzz ia (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1984);

idem, Postfmime, in N Bobbio, PmJilo Ideologiw del Nm m t o Italiano

florino: GiulioEmaudi, 1986). 177-85. N. Matteucci, Demonazia e autoaazia

nel pensiero 6 Norberto Bobbio, in

Per unn

Teoria G e m l e della Politica

-

Soitt i Dediurt6 N&o Bobbio pire me: Passigli Editori, 1983), 149-79. See

also E. Frank4 StNkNrdefekte der Demokratie und deren Ubenvindung'

and '2atennydm und Soziale Selbstbestimrnung, in E. Rankel, Deutschland

und die Westlir ol Donokratien (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 68-95

and 95-137, mpe tive ly. A very strong statement against the emphasis on

common wiiT in the name of emancipation can be found

in

H Lubbe,

Freikeit staff knzipationszwang: Die Libernfen Tmdi tia rn und das Ende der

Manistirdten h ion en (Zurich: Edition Interfrom, 1991j.

18 On some aspea of poshnodem developments, see: J Habermas, 'Vie Neue

Uniibersichtli&eit, Die Krise des Wohlahrtsstaates und die Erschdpfung

Utopische-enagien,

in

J Habermas,

Dte

Neue Uniibersichtlichkeit Frankfurt

am Main: Sulutamp, 1985), 14147;

A

Melucci, L'innw'one delpresente, Mmi-

menti Sociali n& Societa Complffise (Bolopa: Societa Editori

Il

Mulino, 1982);

idem; The Syabolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements, Social Research

(Winter 1985). 789-816; S

N. Eisenstadt, Some Observations on 'Post-

Modern' Socieb

in

Volker Romrchier et al., eds, Diskontinuitnt

des

Sozialen

M e l s (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1990), 287-96; C.

Offe

New Social

Wem ent s: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics, in idem,

m-09;

Saage, Das Ende der Politische Utopie?

19 ARzeworski, Democracy

as

a Contingent Outcome of Contlicts, in J Elster

. Slagstad, eds, Constihrtimmlisrn and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge

lLiversity Press and Nonvegian University Press, 1988), 59 41 . Ackerman,

m o Federalism? 153-95. J Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and

Paradox of Private Property, 241-75. J. Lambert, Tocqueville

el

les dew

&maties (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1983).

2

&Pinorno, 1 So~e ttiel Pluralirmo Classi Partiti Sindicati (Bologna: II Mulino,

~

m .

21 fee Charles S. Maier,

ed.

Chrmging Boundaries o the Politicnl (Cambridge.

&bridge University Press, 1987).

225m

S. N Eisenstadt, lntroduction

in

idem, ed., Democracy and Modernity,

bmnational Colloouium on the Centenaw of David Ben Gurion (Leiden:

H .

rill, 1991). vdxiv.

Documents

EUR POL & SOC XX Class 8 Eisenstadt