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Game Theory: The Mathematics of Competition
6th Edition = Chapter 165th Edition = Chapter 15
Game Theory - definitions
• Strategies – courses of action a player might choose– Pure Strategy – a course of action which does
not involve randomized choices – pick a strategy and stay with it
– Mixed Strategy – randomizes the strategies to get the best outcome
• Outcomes – the consequences of the course of action
Game Theory
• Game Theory – using mathematical tools to study situations involving conflict and co-operation
• Game Theory - analyzes the rational choice of strategies How players select strategies to obtain preferred outcomes
• Game Theory – analyzing situations in which there are at least 2 players in conflict because of different goals
Applications of Game Theory
• Labor – Management Disputes• Resource Allocation Decisions• Military Choices in international conflict• Threats by animals
Definitions - Continued
• Saddlepoint – When MaxMin and MiniMax Values are the same (=), Same Result(outcome)– Complex Games have saddlepoints e.g. Chess just don’t
know where it is.– No Saddlepoint Games - Poker
• Value of the Game Where the two strategies intersect
• Zero Sum Game – payoff to one player is the negative payoff to the other player
Definitions - continued
• Conflict between players– Total – One player WINS while the other loses.– Partial – Players can benefit from some kind or
form of co-operation
Henry and Lisa- Strategy
• MaxMin Strategy – the Maximum value of the minimum choices
• MiniMax Strategy– the minimum value of the maximum choices
• Both – Worst Case analysis• Each player is guaranteed at Least the value
of their MaxMin and MiniMax strategies
Two Person – Total Conflict –Mixed Strategy
• Baseball !!!
PitcherFast Curve
Batter Fast Curve
Two Person – Total Conflict –Mixed Strategy
EF=(.300)(1-P)+.200P= .300-.300P + .200P= .300-.100P
EC = .100(1-P) + .500P= .100 -.100P + .500P= .100 + .400P
EF = EC.300 - .100P = .100 + .400P.300 - .100 = .400P + 100P.200 = .500PP = .200/.500 P=2/51-P = 3/5
PitcherFast Curve
Batter Fast 0.300 0.200 1-QCurve 0.100 0.500 Q
1-P P
Two Person – Total Conflict –Mixed Strategy
EF=(.300)(1-Q)+.100Q= .300-.300Q + .100Q= .300-.200Q
EC = .200(1-Q) + .500Q= .200 -.200Q + .500Q= .200 + .300Q
EF = EC.300 - .200Q = .200 + .300Q.300 - .200 = .300Q + 200Q.100 = .500QQ = .100/.500 Q=1/51-Q = 4/5
PitcherFast Curve
Batter Fast 0.300 0.200 1-QCurve 0.100 0.500 Q
1-P P
Partial Conflict Games
• Partial Conflict – Variable Sum Games. Different payoffs as the outcome changes
• Non-Cooperative – No binding agreement is possible or can be enforced
• Ordinal Games – Players rank the outcomes from best to worst
Prisoner’s Dilemma
• 2 people accused of a crime – both held incommunicado (Harry and Joe)
• Each have two choices:– Stay quiet– Tell on your partner
Prisoner’s Dilemma – cont.
• Harry needs to rank the possible outcomes from low to high
4. Harry tells on Joe and Joe stays quiet – Harry might get to go home!! (Joe’s going to Jail)
3. Harry remains quiet and so does Joe – possible both get off
2. Harry tells on Joe and Joe tells on Harry – both going to Jail
1. Harry is quiet and Joe tells on him – Joe gets off and Harry goes to jail for a long time
Prisoner’s Dilemma
JOEConfess Silent
Harry Confess (2,2) (4,1) Silent (1,4) (3,3)
John Nash
• Nash Equilibrium –When no player can benefit by departing unilaterally from the strategy associated with an outcome
John Nash
• Nash Equilibrium –When no player can benefit by departing unilaterally from the strategy associated with an outcome
Chicken – Partial Conflict
• Each Player has 2 choices:1. Keep going2. Swerve out of the way
Chicken - continued
• Frank vs Mustang Sally• Frank’s ordinal Choices
4. Frank keeps going – Sally swerves – Sally is the chicken – Frank “wins”
3. Frank swerves - Sally Swerves – both chicken – both alive
2. Frank swerves – Sally keeps going – Frank is the chicken and Sally “wins”
1. Frank keeps going – Sally keeps going (disaster – both dead)
Chicken - continued
SallySwerve Don't
Frank Swerve (3,3) (2,4)Don't (4,2) (1,1)
Chicken - continued
• Nash Equilibrium at (4,2) and (2,4) • There is no dominate strategy in Chicken
making it a very dangerous game – can’t tell what you opponent will do
• “Best” outcome at (3,3) but no way to get there – until T.O.M.
Partial Conflict – important Points
• Dominant Strategy – the strategy that will give the highest average result
• (x,y) = x+y = value of the game• (1,1) = disaster• (3,3) = compromise• (4,x) = best for row player – won’t change• (1,x) = worst for row player – nash
equilibrium not possible
TOM – Theory of Moves
• John Neumann• Based on Game
Theory• Postulate – players
will think AHEAD• Elucidates on different
kinds of Power
Tom - Continued
• Oskar Morgenstern• Games in extended
form – sequential choice for players.
• Many games only depend on the final state reached
• Payoffs only if you stay
TOM
• Backward induction – reasoning process in which players working backward from the last possible move in a game, anticipate each other’s rational choices
• Survivor – payoff selected at each state as a result of backward induction
• Block(age) – when it is not rational to move beyond this point in a game
TOM - Outcomes
• Non-myopic Equilibria (NME) regardless of who moves first the same outcome is reached. The consequence of both players looking ahead and anticipating where the move – countermove process will end up
• Indeterminate – the result of the game depends on who moves first – the outcome is different depending on who goes first
Samson
• Great Warrior4. Samson Don’t tell – Delilah Don’t nag
(party all the time)3. Samson Tell – Delilah Nag2. Samson Tell – Delilah Don’t Nag1. Samson Don’t Tell – Delilah Nag
Delilah
• Paid for Info4. Delilah Don’t Nag - Samson Tells (no
work involved)3. Delilah Nag – Samson Tells (have to work
but get results)2. Delilah Don’t Nag - Samson Don’t Tell1. Delilah Nag – Sampson Don’t Tell
(disaster)
Samson vs Delilah
SamsonDon't Tell Tell
Delilah Don't Nag (2,4) (4,2)Nag (1,1) (3,3)
Samson vs Delilah
SamsonDon't Tell Tell
Delilah Don't Nag (2,4) (4,2)Nag (1,1) (3,3)
Delilah Starts (4,2)->(3,3)->(1,1)->(2,4)->(4,2)
Samson Starts (4,2)->(2,4)->(1,1)->(3,3)->(4,2)
Larger Games
• Truel – Duel with Three People• Each Player has a gun with One bullet –
everyone is a perfect shot – no communications between players
• Goals1. Survive2. Survive with as few opponents left as possible
Larger Games with TOM
• Modify Rules1. Take Turns firing – One Player at a time
“moves”• Now must “think ahead”• Two choices
1. Shot2. Don’t shot
Order Power
• A player has order power – if that player can force the other player to move first
• Only beneficial when the outcome is indeterminate
Samson vs Delilah
SamsonDon't Tell Tell
Delilah Don't Nag (2,4) (4,2)Nag (1,1) (3,3)
Delilah Starts (1,1)->(2,4)->(4,2)->(3,3)->(1,1)
Samson Starts (1,1)->(3,3)->(4,2)->(2,4)->(1,1)
Cycling
• TOM Rule changes5’ If at any state a player whoes turn it is to
move has received his best payoff (4) that player will not move!
– Moving Power – one player has the ability to force the other player to STOP! Then
6’ at some point in cycling the player must stop
Row vs Column
ColumnS1 S2
Row S1 (2,4) (4,1)S2 (1,2) (3,3)
Rows turn (2,4)->(1,2)->(3,3)->(4,1)->(2,4)
Column has moving power!! Tell Row has to stop!!