Hans Jonas Niilismo e Gnosticismo Nietzsche

7/26/2019 Hans Jonas Niilismo e Gnosticismo Nietzsche

1/24

GNOSTICISM AND MODERN NIHILISMAuthor(s): HANS JONASReviewed work(s):Source: Social Research, Vol. 19, No. 4 (December 1952), pp. 430-452Published by: The New SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40982356.

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2/24

GNOSTICISM

AND

MODERN

NIHILISM

BY HANS

JONAS

i

-LNI

ETZSCHE,

n

his

time,

aid

that

nihilism,

the

most

ncanny

of

all

guests,"

stands efore

he door." Meanwhile

he

guest

has

entered

nd is no

longer guest,

nd,

as far s

philosophy

s

concerned,

xistentialisms

trying

o live with

him.

Living

n

such

ompany

s

living

n a

crisis. The

beginnings

f

the

crisis

reach

ack

nto

he

eventeenth

entury,

here

he

piritual

itua-

tion

fmodern

mantakes

hape.

Among

he features

etermining

his

ituation,

he one that

Pascalfacednall its wful

mplications

nd

expounded

ith he

full

force f

his

eloquence

s man's oneliness

n

the

physical

ni-

verse f modern

cience. "Cast into

the infinite

mmensity

f

spaces

f

which am

ignorant,

nd whichknowme

not,

am

frightened."

Whichknowme not": more hanthe

overawing

infinity

f

he

ilent

paces

nd of

imitless

osmic

ime,

more han

the

quantitative

isproportion,

he

insignificance

f

man

as a

magnitude

n

this

astness,

ore

han

hese t

s theutter

ndiffer-

ence of theCopernicanniverse ohuman spirationsthenot-

knowing

f

things

uman

n

the

part

of

thatwithin

which li

things

uman

have

preposterously

o

be

enacted

which

onsti-

tutes

he

utter oneliness fman n

the um

of

things.

As

a

part

f this

um,

man

s

only

reed,

iable to be

crushed

at

any

moment

y

the

forces f

an

immensend

blind

universe

n

which t

is

but a

particular

lind accident. As

a

thinking

eed

he

is

no

part

f

the

um,

not

belonging

o

t,

but

radically

iffer-

ent, ncommensurable,ortheresextensa oes not think,nd

nature

s

nothing

ut resextensa

body,

matter,

xternal

magni-

l

Der

Wille

zur

Macht,

34.


3/24

GNOSTICISM

AND

MODERN

NIHILISM

431

tude. If

he rushes

im,

hedoes

o

unthinkingly,

hile

e,

being

crushed,

s

aware f

being

rushed.

He alone

thinks,

ot

because

of

but n

spite

f

his

beingpart

f nature.

If

he

has no share

n

nature's

randeur,

hichhas

become

foreign

pectacle,

ature

has none

in

his

inner

oncerns.

Thus

that

which

makes

man

superior

o

all

nature,

is

unique

distinction,

ind,

no

longer

results

n a

higher ntegration

f

his

being

nto

the

totality

f

being, ut on thecontrary arks

he

unbridgeableulf

etween

himself

nd the est f

existence.

Estranged

rom

he

ommunity

of

being

n one

whole,

his

consciousness

nly

makes

him a

for-

eigner

n the

world,

nd

n

every

ct

oftrue

eflectionells

f

this

stark

oreignness.

This is

thehuman ondition.

There s

no

longer

he

cosmos

withwhose

mmanent

ogos

my

own can feel

kinship,

o

longer

theorder

f the

wholewhich

ives

meaning

o

man's

part

n

it,

and

therefore

o

his

place

n t. That

place

ppears

ow

s a

sheer

and brute ccident. "I am

frightened

nd shocked,"ontinues

Pascal,

at

being

hererather

han

there;

orthere s no reason

why

ere

rather han

here,

hy

nowrather han hen."

There

had

always

een

a

reason

efore,

o

long

as

the worldhad been

regarded

s life's osmic

ome. But Pascal

peaks

f

"this

emote

corner

f

nature" n which

man

has to

"regard

imself

s

lost,"

of

"the ittle ell

in

which

he

finds

imself

odged,

mean

the

universe."The utter

ontingency

fman's

xistence

n

the cheme

depriveshat cheme fanyhuman ense s a possible rame f

reference

orman's

understanding

f himself.

But there s more to thissituation

han

the

mere

mood of

homelessness,

orlornness,

nd dread.

The indifference

f nature

also

means

hat

nature

as

no

referenceo

ends. With

the

ejec-

tion

f

teleology

rom he

ystem

f

natural

auses,

ature,

erself

purposeless,

eased

to

provide

ny

sanction o

possible

human

purposes.

A

universe ithout n

intrinsic

ierarchy

f

being,

s

the Copernican niverses, leavesvaluesontologicallynsup-

ported,

nd the elf s

thrown ack

ntirely

pon

tselfn

its

quest

for

meaning

nd value.

Meaning

s no

longer

found,

ut

is


4/24

432

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

"given."

Values

are

no

longer

beheld

in the vision of

objective

reality,

ut are

posited

s

feats f valuation. As functions

f the

will

they

re

solelymy

own

responsibility.

Will

replaces

vision;

temporality

f the act ousts

the

eternity

f the

"good

in

itself."

This

is

the Nietzschean

hase

of the situation

n which

European

nihilism breaks

the

surface.

Now

man is alone with

himself.

The world's

gate

To desertstretchingute nd chill.

Who

once has

lost

What

thou

hast

ost stands

nowhere

till.

Thus

spoke

Nietzsche

(in

Vereinsamt)-

losing

the

poem

with

the

ine,

"Woe

unto

him

who

has no home "

Pascal's

universe,

t is

true,

was still

one created

by

God,

and

solitary

man,

bereft

f

all mundane

props,

could

still stretch

is

heart

out toward

he transmundane

od.

But this God

is essen-

tially

n

unknown

God,

an

agnostos

heos,

nd

is not discernible

in the

pattern

fhis creation. The universedoes not reveal his

purpose

by

its

order of

created

things,

r his

goodness

by

their

abundance,

or his wisdom

by

their

fitness,

r his

perfection

y

the

beauty

f thewhole

but

reveals

olely

his

power,

y

ts

magni-

tude,

its

spatial

and

temporal

mmensity.

And

though

the

con-

tingency

f

man,

ofhis

existing

ere nd

now,

s

still

contingency

upon

God's

will,

that

will,

which

has cast

me into

ust

"this

remote

corner

f

nature,"

s

inscrutable,

nd the

"why?"

f

my

existence

s

here ust as unanswerable s atheistic xistentialismmakes t out

to be. The deus

absconditus,

fwhom

nothing

ut will

and

power

can

be

predicated,

eaves

behind

as his

legacy,upon

leaving

the

scene,

he homo

absconditus,

concept

f

man

characterized

olely

by

will

and

power

the

will

for

power,

he will to

will.2

The

point

that

particularly

matters

for the

purposes

of

the

present

iscussion

s that

change

n the

vision of

nature,

hat

s,

2

The

role

of

Pascal

as

the

firstmodern

xistentialist,

hich

have here

very

roughly ketched s a starting oint,has been morefullyexpoundedby Karl

Lowith

n his article

n

"Man Between

nfinites,"

n

Measure,

A Critical

Journal

(Chicago)

vol.

i

(1950),

from

which

also the

quotations

romPascal

have been

borrowed.


5/24

GNOSTICISM

AND MODERN

NIHILISM

433

of the

osmic

nvironmentf

man,

s

at thebottom f

thatmeta-

physical

ituation hich

has

given

ise

to modern

xistentialism

and

to its

nihilistic

mplications.

ut

f this s

so,

f

the

essence

of

existentialism

s

a

certain

ualism,

n

estrangement

etween

man nd

the

world,

ith

he oss fthe dea

of

kindred osmos

in

short,

n

anthropological

cosmism

then

t is not

necessarily

modern

hysical

cience

lone

which an create

uch condition.

A cosmic ihilismssuch, ywhateveristoricalircumstances

t

may

avebeen

begotten,

ouldbe

the ondition

n which

ome

f

thecharacteristic

raits

f

existentialism

ight

volve.

And

the

extent o which

his

s found o

be

actually

he case

wouldbe a

test or herelevance hichwe attribute

o thedescribed

lement

in theexistentialist

osition.

There s one

situation,

nd

one

only

hat know f

n

the

his-

tory

f Western

man,

where

on a leveluntouched

y

anything

resembling

odern

cientific

hought

that

condition

as been

realized nd lived outwith ll the vehemence f a

cataclysmic

event. That is

the

Gnostic

movement,

r themore

adical

nes

among

he

variousGnostic

movements

nd

teachings,

hich

he

deeply

gitated

irst

hree

enturies f

the

Christian ra

prolif-

erated

n

theHellenistic

arts

f

the

Roman

mpire

nd

beyond

its eastern

oundaries. From

them, herefore,

e

may

hope

to

learn

omething

or n

understanding

f that

disturbing

ubject,

nihilism,

nd I

wish

o

put

theevidence efore hereader

s

far

as this anbe done nthe paceof a brief ssay.

n

The existence f an

affinity

r

analogy

cross

he

ages,

uch s is

here

lleged,

s

not

o

surprising

f

we

rememberhat n

more

han

one

respect

hecultural

ituation

n

the Greco-Roman

orld

f

the

first hristianenturies

hows road

parallels

with

he

mod-

ern situation.

Spengler

went

o

far s to

declare he

two

ages

"contemporaneous/1nthe ense fbeing dentical hasesn the

life

ycle

f their

espective

ultures.

n

this

nalogical

ense

we

would

nowbe

living

n

the

period

f the

arly

aesars.

However


6/24

434

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

that

may

be,

there

s

certainly

more

than mere

coincidence

n

the

fact that we

recognize

urselves

n

so

many

facetsof

later

post-

classical

antiquity.

Gnosticism

s one of

those

facets,

nd here

recognition,

ifficults

it is

rendered

by

the

strangeness

f

the

symbols,

omes

with the shock of the

unexpected,

ecause

it

fits

neither

he

picture

of

an

age

which

a

superficial

istorical

on-

sciousness haracterizes

ostly

y

Stoicism

nd

Epicureanism,

or

the

picture

of

modernnihilism s

in line with

the

Nietzschean

definition

essentially

post-Christian

henomenon.

In the

following

iscussion

refer o

existentialism

s more or

less

a

known

quantity.

Unfortunately

cannotdo

the

same

witti

Gnosticism.

It

lies

off

the

main road of historical

knowledge,

and

philosophers

o

not

usually

come

across

t.

I

am therefore

compelled

to dwell

much more

on

the

Gnostic

ide of

my

subject

than

a

just

balance

in

the

comparison

would warrant.

In

the

circumstances,

owever,

do

not see

how this

opsidedness

n

my

presentation

an be avoided.

The

term Gnostic

refers o

a

group

of

religious

doctrines

t

the

beginning

f

our

era

which

either

explicitly

dentified hem-

selves

by

the word

gnosis

or

implied

t as a central

point

of

their

message.3

Gnosis

means

knowledge,

nd the historical onnota-

tions

f

the

term

ave

caused

many

bservers,

ncient

nd

modern,

to see

in

Gnosticism

he

nroad of

Greek

philosophy

nto Oriental

religious

thought.

In

content,manner,

nd

aim,

however,

he

"knowledge" fthe Gnostics aslittle o do withrational hought,

and

the

Hellenic

associations

f

the name

are

more

misleading

than

enlightening.

Also

easily

misleading

s

the

fact

that the

majority

of

the

recorded

Gnostic

ects

ppear

within

the still

fluid

boundaries

of

the

early

church,

hus

nvesting

he

very

name,

in

the

minds of

observers,

ith

the

meaning

f

a Christian

eresy,

mere

epiphe-

3

What

follows

s a brief

summary

of certain

basic features of

Gnosticism.

The

full argumentfor the view presented here, which differsfrom the conventional

one,

may

be

found

in

my

Gnosis

und

sptantiker

Geist,

vol.

i

(Gttingen

1934).

Note

also

two

articles

of

mine

on

this

subject

in

Theologische

Zeitschrift

Basel)

:

vol.

4,

no.

2

(1948)

,

and

vol.

5,

no.

1

(1949)-


7/24

GNOSTICISM AND

MODERN

NIHILISM

435

nomenon o

Christianity.

odern

esearch,

owever,

as shown

the xistencef

non-Christian

nostic

eligions

s

well,

oincident

with

he

riseof

Christianity

n the

declining

ncient

world,

nd

there

s

evidence venof

pre-Christian

nosticism.

As a matter

of

fact,

he

Gnostic

movementsuchwe

must all

t was a

com-

prehensivehenomenon

n

those ritical

enturies,

eeding

ike

Christianity

n

the

mpulses

f a

widely

revalent

uman itua-

tion, nd thereforeruptingn manyplaces,manyforms,nd

many

anguages.

The salient eature o

be

emphasized

ere

s the

radically

ual-

istic

mood

which nderlies

he

wholeGnostic ttitudend unifies

the

widely

iversified,

ore r

less

systematic

xpressions

hich

that

ttitude

ave

tself

n Gnostic

itual nd literature. t is on

this

rimary

uman oundation

f dualistic

mood,

passionately

felt

xperience

f

man,

thatthe formulated

ualistic octrines

rest. The dualism s between

man

and the

world,

nd

concur-

rently

etweenheworld nd God. It is a

duality

otof

supple-

mentary

ut of

contrary

erms,

polarity

f

incompatibles,

nd

this act ominates

nostic

schatology.

asic

to it

is the

feeling

of n absolute ift etween

man

nd that

n

which e

finds

imself

lodged:

he

world. The

feeling

s

explicated

n

terms f

doctrine.

In

its

theological

spect

t states

hat

heDivine

has no

part

nd

no

concern

n

the

physical

niverse;

hat

he true

God,

strictly

transmundane,

s not revealed

r

even

ndicated

y

the

world,

andis thereforeheUnknown,hetotally ther, nknowablen

termsf

nyworldlynalogies.

Correspondingly,

n

ts

osmologi-

cal

aspect

t

states hat heworld s the

creation

ot

of

God

but

of

ome

nferior

rinciple;

nd,

n

its

nthropological

spect,

hat

man's nner

elf called

the

pneuma

is

not

part

of

the

world,

of nature's

reation

nd

domain,

ut,

within

hat

world,

s

as

totally

ranscendent

nd

as

unknown

y

all

worldly

ategories

s

is

ts

ransmundane

ounterpart,

heunknown

od

without.

That theworld screated ysomeonesgenerallyotdoubted

in the

mythological

ystems

though

n

some

f he

ubtler

ystems

a sort

f

dark

utogenesis

rom

rts f

divinity

s

contemplated).


8/24

436

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

But

whoever

as created he

world,man,

according

o

Gnosticism,

does not owe

him

allegiance;

and

neitherhis

creation,

though

incomprehensiblyncompassing

man,

nor

his

proclaimed

will

offers

he standards

y

which

man

can

set

his course.

Since the

true God cannotbe the creator f

that to which

selfhood

eels

o

utterly

stranger,

ature must

have

been created

by

a

lowly

demiurge, power

farremoved

rom he

supreme

ource

of

Being,

a

perversion

f

the

Divine,retaining

f

it

only

the

power

to

act,

but to act

blindly,

without

knowledge;

he created

the world out

of

ignorance

nd

passion.

Thus

the world s

the

product,

nd even

essentially

he embodi-

ment,

of the

negative

of

knowledge.

What

it reveals

is

unen-

lightened

nd

therefore

malignant

force,

proceeding

from

the

spirit

of self-assertive

ower,

from

he will to rule

and coerce

which,

s

spiritual,

s foolish

nd

bears

no relation

o

understand-

ing

and love.

The laws of

the universe

re

the aws

of this

rule,

and not of divinewisdom. Thus the essenceof the cosmos s

ignorance

agnosia).

In

this

negativity

he

idea of

knowledge

(gnosis)

finds ts

first

pplication,

n

application

n

the

privative

mood.

The

positive

complement

s

in

the fact

that the

essence

of

man

is

knowledge:

hisdetermines

he situation f

man

as that

of

the

knowing

n

the midst

of

the

unknowing,

f

light

n the

midst

f

darkness,

nd

this

relation

s

at the bottomof his

being

alien,

without

ompanionship

n

the darkvastness f the universe.

That universe asnone ofthevenerabilityfthe Greekcosmos.

Contemptuous pithets

re

applied

to it: "these

miserable

ele-

ments"

paupertina

haec

elementa),

this

puny

ell

of the

creator"

(haec

cellula

creatoris)

both

quotations

rom

Marcion,

he

second

offering

iterally

he

same

expression

hat we

found

in

Pascal.

Yet

it is

still

cosmos,

n

order

but

orderwith

a

vengeance.

Not

only

s the name

cosmosretainedfor

the

world;

it

is

called that

now

with a new

and

fearful

mphasis,

n

emphasis

t

once

awed

and disrespectful,roubled nd rebellious,forthat order s alien

to

man's

aspirations.

The

blemish

of nature

ies not in

any

defi-

ciency

of

order,

but

in

the all too

pervading

ompleteness

f it.


9/24

GNOSTICISM AND MODERN

NIHILISM

437

Far from

eing

haos,

he reation f

the

demiurge,

hat

ntitype

of

knowing,

s

a

comprehensive

ystem,overned

y

law.

But

cosmic

aw,

nce

regarded

s

the

xpression

f

reasonwith

which

man'sreason

an

communicate

n the act

of

cognition,

s now

seen

only

n

its

aspect

f

compulsion

hich

hwarts

an's

free-

dom.

The cosmic

ogos

f the

Stoics s

replaced

y

heimarmene,

oppressive

osmic ate.

This

heimarmenes

dispensed y

the

planets,

r

the stars

n

general,

he

mythical

xponents

f the nexorablend hostile aw

ofthe

universe.The

change

n the motional

ontent

f

the erm

cosmos

s nowhere

etter

ymbolized

han

n

this

depreciation

of

the

formerly

ost

ivine

art

f

thevisible

world,

he

elestial

spheres.

The

starry

ky

which

rom lato to

theStoics

was the

purest

mbodiment

f reason

n the cosmic

ierarchy,

he

para-

digm

f

ntelligibility

nd therefore

fthedivine

ature

f

reality

as such now tared

man n theface

with hefixed

lare

f alien

power

nd

necessity.

ts rule is

tyranny,

nd not

providence.

Deprived

f the

venerability

ithwhich

ll

sideric

iety p

to

thenhad invested

t,

but still

n

possession

f

the

prominent

nd

representativeosition

t had

acquired,

his stellar

firmament

becomes

ow the

symbol

f all that

s

terrifying

o

man

n

the

towering

actnessf

theuniverse.

Under his

pitiless

ky,

which

no

longer

nspires orshipful

onfidence,

an

becomes onscious

of his utter

orlornness,

f his

being

not so much

part

of,

but

unaccountablylaced n andexposed o, he nvelopingystem.

And,

ike

Pascal,

he

is

frightened.

is

solitary

therness,

is-

covering

tself

n

this

forlornness,

rupts

n the

feeling

f ele-

mentary

read.

Dread as

a fundamental ood of

being-in-the-

world

first ecame

articulate

ot in existentialism

ut

in

the

Gnostic

writings.

t

is

the self's eaction

o the

discovery

f ts

situation,

ctually

tself

n

element

n

that

discovery:

t

marks

the

awakening

f

selfhood

rom he slumber r

intoxicationf

theworld;t stheway n which he nmostpirit ecomes rigi-

nally

ware

f tself nd

of the

fact

hat t

is not

really

ts

own,

but

s

rather

he

nvoluntary

xecutor

f

cosmic

esigns.

Knowl-


10/24

438

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

edge, gnosis,might

iberate

man from

this

servitude;

but

since

the cosmos s

contrary

o

life,

the

saving

knowledge

annot

aim

at

the knower's

ntegration

nto

the

cosmic

whole,

cannot

aim

at

compliance

with the laws

of

the

universe,

s did Stoic

wisdom,

which

sought

freedom

n

the

knowing

affirmation

f

universal

necessity.

For the

Gnostics,

ontrary

o

the

Stoics,

man's aliena-

tion is not to be

overcome,

ut is

to

be

deepened

and

pushed

to

the extreme

orthe

sake

of

the self's

edemption.

in

Before

oing

ny

further,

et

us

stop

to ask

what

has

here

happened

to the old idea

of

the

cosmos

s a

divinely

rdered

whole.

Cer-

tainly othing omparable

o modern

hysical

cience

was nvolved

in this

catastrophic

evaluation

or

spiritual

denudation

of

the

universe. We need

only

observe

that this universe

became

thoroughly

emonized

n

the Gnostic

period.

Yet

this,

aken

with

thetranscendencef the acosmic elf, esultedn curious

nalogies

to

the

phenomena

f existentialism

n

the

vastly

ifferent

odern

setting.

If not science

nd

technology,

hat

aused,

for he

human

groups

nvolved,

he

collapse

of

the cosmos

piety

of classical

civi-

lization,

n which

so

much

of its

ethics

was

built?

The

answer s

certainly omplex,

but at least

one

angle

of

it

may

be

briefly

ndicated.

The

classical

ontological

doctrine

of

whole

and

parts

according

o which

the

whole

is

prior

to

the

parts, s better hantheparts, nd is that forthe sake ofwhich;

the

parts

are and

wherein

they

find

the

meaning

of

their exist-

ence

had lost

the

social

basis of

ts

validity.

The

living

example

of such

a whole

had

been the

classical

polis,

whose citizens

had

a

stake

in the

whole,

and

could

affirmts

superior

status

n the

knowledge

hat

hey,

he

parts,

owever

assing

nd

exchangeable,

maintained

t with

their

own

being,

and that their

ctions

made

a difference

o

the

being

and

perfection

f

thewhole.

This

whole,

the conditionforthe existence nd wellbeingof the individual,

was

thus

n addition

the

framework

or the

fulfilmentf

man's

aspirations.


11/24

GNOSTICISM

AND

MODERN

NIHILISM

439

The

ontological

rinciple

urvived

he conditions f its con-

ception.

With he

bsorption

f

he

ity

tatesnto he

monarchies

of the

Diadochs and

finally

nto the Roman

empire,

which

deprived

he

polis

ntelligentsia

f ts constructive

unction,

he

relation

no

longer

held

politically.

But Stoic

pantheism,

he

physico-theology

f

post-Aristotelian

onism,

ubstitutedor t

the relation

etween he

ndividual

nd

the

cosmos,

he

arger

living

whole.

By

this ubstitution

heclassical octrine fwhole

and

parts

was

kept

n

force ven

hough

t

no

longer

eflected

he

actual

situation f

man.

Now the

cosmos

was declared

o

be

the

great

city

f

gods

nd

men,"

nd to be

a

citizen f the

uni-

verse,

cosmopolites,

asnow

considered

o

be

the

goal by

which

otherwise

solated

man

could set his

bearings.

He

was

asked,

s

it

were,

o

adopt

he

causeof

the

universe s

his

own,

hat

s,

to

identify

imself ith hat

ause

directly,

cross

ll

intermediaries,

and to relate

is

nner

elf,

o relate

his

ogos,

o the

ogos

f

th

whole.

The

practical

ide of this dentification

onsisted

n

his

affirm-

ing

and

faithfully

erforming

he

role

allotted o

him

by

the

whole,

n

just

that

place

in

which

osmic

estiny

ad

set him.

"To

play

ne's

part"

that

igure

f

peech

n

which

toic

morals

dwelt

o

much

unwittingly

eveals

he

fictitiouslement

n

the

structure.

A

role

played

s

substituted

or

real

function

er-

formed.The actors n

the

tage

ehave as if"

they

cted heir

choice,nd"asif"theirctionsmattered.What ctuallymatters

is

only

o

play

wellrather han

badly,

with

no

genuine

elevance

to

the

outcome.

The

actors,

ravely

laying,

re

their

own

audience.

In the

phrase

f

playing

ne's

part

there

s a

bravado

that

hides

deeperdespair,

nd

only

shiftn

attitude

s

needed

to

view he

great pectacle uite

differently.

oes

the

whole

really

care,

oes t concerntself

n

the

part

hat s ?

The

Stoics

verred

that tdoesbyequatingheimarmeneithpronoia, osmic ate

with

providence.

And

does

my

part,

however

play

t,

really

contribute,

oes

t make

differenceo

the

whole?

The

Stoics


12/24

440

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

averred

hat t

does

by

their

nalogy

between

he cosmos

nd the

city.

But the

very

omparison

rings

out the

artificiality

f

the

construction,

or

in

contrast

o what s true

n the

polis

no case

can

be made out

for

my

relevance

n the

cosmic

cheme,

which s

entirely

utside

my

control nd

in

which

my

part

s

thus

reduced

to a

passivity

hich

n the

polis

it

had

not.

To

be

sure,

the strained

ervor

y

which

man's

integration

n

the whole was

maintained, hrough

his

allegedaffinity

o

it,

was

the

means of

preserving

he

dignity

f

man and

thereby

f

saving

a sanction

for a

positive

morality.

This

fervor,

ucceeding

that

which had

formerly

een

inspired

by

the

ideal

of civic

virtue,

represented

heroic

attempt

n the

part

of

the intellectuals

o

carry

ver

the

life-sustaining

orce

of

that

deal

into

fundamen-

tally

changed

conditions.

But

the

new atomized

masses of

the

empire,

who

had

never

shared

n that noble

tradition

f

arete,

reacted

very

differently

o

a

situation

n

which

they

found them-

selves

passively

nvolved: a situationn which the

part

was

insig-

nificant o the

whole,

and the

whole

alien to

the

parts.

The

Gnostic

aspiration

was

not to

"act

a

part"

in this

whole,

but

in existentialist

arlance

to "exist

authentically."

The

law of

empire,

under which

they

found

themselves,

was

an

external

dispensation

f

dominating, napproachable

orce;

nd,

for

them,

the

same

character

was assumed

by

the aw of

the

universe,

osmic

destiny,

f which

the world

state was

the terrestrial xecutor.

The very onceptof law was modifiedn all its aspects natural

law,

political

aw,

moral

aw.

I leave

it to

the

reader to

draw

whatever

nalogies

there

are

between his

alienation

of

man

fromhis

world

and

the

situation

of

atomized

ndustrial

ociety.

Such

analogies,

am

sure,

would

supplement

rom he

social

angle

the effects

have

attributed o

the

cosmology

f

modern

cience,

n

the

testimony

f Pascal.

As

in

late

antiquity,

o

today,

he term

world" contains

wo mean-

ingsat once: nature n general, nd social reality. And it may

well

be

the

latter

which

preeminently

etermines

man's relation

to

"the

world,"

the sum

of

things.


13/24

GNOSTICISM

AND

MODERN

NIHILISM

441

IV

The subversionf

the dea

of

law,

of

nomos,

eads to

a moral

consequence

n

which

he nihilistic

mplications

f

the

Gnostic

acosmism,

nd

at the

same

timethe

analogy

o

the

Nietzsche-

Heidegger-Sartre

train

f

existentialism,

ecome

ven

more bvi-

ousthan

n

the

osmological

spect:

he

ntinomismfGnosticism.

To

begin

with,

t

is to be conceded

hat ntinomism

the

rejec-

tion f ny bjective orm f conduct isargued nvastlyiffer-

ent heoreticalevels

n

the

wo

ases,

nd that ntinomisticnos-

ticism

ppears

rude,

nd

perhaps

ess

profound,

n

comparison

with

he

subtlety

nd

pitiless

istorical

elf-elucidationf

anti-

nomisticxistentialism.

hat

s

being

iquidated,

n

the ne

case,

is

themoral

heritage

f

a thousand

ears

f ancient

ivilization;

added

to

this,

n

the

other,

re

two housand

ears

f Occidental

Christian

metaphysics

s

background

o the dea of

a moral aw.

Nietzschexpressedhe rootofthe nihilisticituationn the

phrase

God is

dead,"

meaning

rimarily

he

Christian

God.

The

Gnostics,

f

asked

to summarize

imilarly

he

metaphysical

basis f

their wn

nihilism,

ould

have

aid

only

theGod of the

cosmoss dead" is

dead,

hat

s,

s

a

god,

has

ceased

o

be

divine

for

us

and thereforeo

affordhe odestar

or ur lives. Admit-

tedly

he

catastrophe

n

this

ase s less

comprehensive

nd thus

less

rremediable,

ut the vacuum

hatwas

left,

ven f

not so

bottomless,

as

felt o ess

keenly.To Nietzsche he

meaning

f nihilism s that "the

highest

values

become

devaluated"

or "invalidated"),

nd the

cause

of

this

evaluation

s "the

nsight

hatwe

have

not he

lightest

ustifi-

cationfor

positing

transcendence,

r

an 'in

itself of

things,

which s

divine/

which

s

morality

ncarnate." This

utterance,

takenwith hat

bout the deathof

God,

bears

out

Heidegger's

statement

hat

the

names

God

and Christian od are

in

Nietz-

sche's

hought

sed to denote

he

transcendental

supra-sensible)

world n general.God is thenamefor he realmofideas and

4

Wille

zur

Macht,

23,

24;

cf.

ibid.,

4,

"to live

alone,

withoutGod and

morals.'


14/24

442

SOCIAL RESEARCH

ideals"

(Holzwege,

p.

199).

Since

it is from

his

realm

alone

that

any

sanction

for

values can

derive,

ts

fading,

hat

s,

the "death

of

God,"

meansnot

only

the actual devaluation

f

highest

alues,

but

the

loss of the

very

possibility

f

obligatory

alues as such.

To

quote

once more

Heidegger's

interpretation

f

Nietzsche,

"The

phrase

God is dead* means

that the

transcendental orld

is without

ffective

orce."

In

a

modified,

ather

paradoxicalway

this statement

pplies

also to the

Gnostic

position.

It is

true,

f

course,

hat

ts

extreme

dualism s

of itself he

very

pposite

of

an

abandonment

f tran-

scendence.

The transmundane

od

represents

ranscendence

n

the

most

adicalform. In him

the

absolute

beyond

beckons cross

the

enclosing

osmic shells. But

this

transcendence,

nlike

the

"intelligible

world" of

Platonismor

the

world

lord of

Judaism,

does not

stand

n

any

positive

relation

to the sensible

world. It

is not the

essence

f

that

world,

but its

negation

nd cancelation.

The GnosticGod, as distinct romthe

demiurge,

s the

totally

different,

he

other,

he unknown.

Like

his inner-humanounter-

part,

the acosmic

self

or

pneuma,

which,

otherwise

idden,

also

reveals

tself

nly

n the

negative xperience

f

otherness,

f

non-

identificationnd of

protested

ndefinable

reedom,

his God

has

more of

the

nihil than

the

ens

in

his

concept.

A

transcendence

withdrawn rom

ny

normative

elation o

the world s

equal

to a

transcendence

hich has

lost its effective

orce.

In other

words,

forall purposesof man'srelation to existing eality, his hidden

God is

a

nihilistic

onception:

no

nomos emanatesfrom

him,

no

law

for

nature

nd thus

also no law

for

human

conduct

as

a

part

of

the

natural

order.

On this

basis

the

antinomistic

rgument

f

the

Gnostics

s as

simple

as

for

nstance

hat

of Sartre.

Since

the

transcendent

s

silent,

Sartre

rgues,

ince

"there

s no

sign

in

the

world,"

man,

the

"abandoned,"

reclaims

his

freedom,

r

rather,

annot

help

taking tuponhimself: e "is" thatfreedom,manbeing"nothing

but

his

own

project,"

nd

"all is

permitted

o him."5

That this

5

L'existentialisme

st un

humanisme,

p.

33

ff.


15/24

GNOSTICISM

AND

MODERN

NIHILISM

443

freedom

s

of

desperate

ature,

nd,

s a

compassless

ask,

nspires

dreadrather han

xultation,

s a different

atter.

In

Gnostic

easoning

e sometimes

eet he

merely

ubjectivist

form f the

antinomistic

rgument: othing

s

naturally

ad or

good,

things

n

themselvesre

indifferent,

nd

onlyby

human

opinion

re

actions

ood

or bad.

Spiritual

man,

n

thefreedom

of his

knowledge,

as the ndifferent

se

of

them

ll. Whilethis

reminds ne of

nothing

more

han

of classical

ophism,

hereal

metaphysical

ackground

o

this

uperficially

keptical

ubjectiv-

ism omes

o

light

n

the

deeper

Gnostic

eflection

n

the ource

of

such

human

pinions.

The

ultimate

ource

urns

ut

tobe nothuman ut

demiurgical,

and

commonwith

hat f

the order f nature. Its

product,

he

"law/1

s

thus

ot

really

ndifferent,

ut s

part

f

the

great esign

upon

our

freedom.

Being

nomos,

he moral code

is

but the

psychical

omplement

o the

physical

omos

nd,

as

such,

the

internal

spect

fthe

all-pervading

osmic ule. Both emanate

from

he

ord of the world s

agencies

f

his

power,

nified n

the

double

aspect

f the

Jewish

God as

creator nd

legislator.

Just

s the aw

of the

physical

orld,

he

heimarmene,

ntegrates

the

ndividual

odies nto

the

general ystem,

o the moral

aw

integrates

he

ouls,

nd thus

makes

hem

ubserviento thedem-

iurgic

cheme.

For

what

s

the

aw either

s revealed

hrough

oses nd

the

prophetsr as operatingn theactualhabits nd opinions f

men

but he

means f

regularizing

nd

thus

tabilizing

he

mpli-

cation

of

man n

the

business f

the

world

nd

worldly

oncerns;

of

setting y

ts

rules he

eal of

seriousness,

f

praise

nd

blame,

reward

nd

punishment,

n

his utter

nvolvement;

f

making

his

very

will a

compliant arty

o the

compulsory

ystem,

hich

thereby

ill

functionll

themore

moothly

nd

nextricably?

n

so

far

s the

principle

f thismoral

aw

s

ustice,

t

has

the

ame

characterfconstraintn thepsychicalidethat osmic atehas

on

the

physical

ide. "The

angels

hat

reated

he

world

stab-

lished

just

ctions/

o ead

men

by

such

precepts

nto

ervitude"


16/24

444

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

(Simon

Magus).

In the normative aw

man's

will is takencare

of

by

the same

powers

that

dispose

of

his

body.

He

who

obeys

t

has

abdicated the

authority

f his

self.

It is not

possible

here to

go

into

the anarchical

nd sometimes

libertinistic

onsequences

f this

attitude.

Incidentally,

he

con-

sequences

an be either ibertinisticr

ascetic,

nd

actually,

xcept

for

brief

period

of

revolutionary

xtremism,

hey

have

probably

more

often

been the

latter han

the former.

But

the

two seem-

ingly

pposite

ttitudes

re

really

of

the

same

root,

nd

are

capa-

ble of

strange

ombinations.

The same

basic

argument

upports

themboth. The

one

repudiates

oyalty

o nature

through

xcess,

the

other

through

bstention. The one

sometimes

makes of

the

permission

o

do

everything

positive

bligation

o

perform

very

kind

of

action,

with

the

idea

of

rendering

o

nature ts

own and

thereby

xhausting

ts

powers;

the other

flouts

hose

powers

by

denying

them

opportunity

nd

reducing

commerce

with them

to the minimum. Both are livesoutsidethe law. Freedomby

abuse

and

freedom

y

non-use,

qual

in

their

ndiscriminateness,

are thus

only

alternative

xpressions

f the

same acosmism.

The

reference

o

thisroot

makes t

clear

that,

far

beyond

what

the

merely keptical

rgument

f

"subjectivism"

uggests,

here

was

a

positivemetaphysical

nterest

n

repudiating

llegiance

to

any

objective

norm.

It

was

the assertion

f

the

authentic

reedom

of the

self.

But

it

is

to be noted

thatthisfreedom

s

not a matter

of the "soul," which s as adequatelydetermined y the moral

law as the

body

s

by

the

physical

aw;

it is

wholly

matter f

the

pneuma,

the indefinable

piritual

core

of

existence,

he

foreign

spark.

The

soul,

psyche,

s

part

of

the natural

order,

reated

by

the

demiurge

o

envelop

the

foreign neuma,

and

in

the

norma-

tive

aw

the creator

xercises

ontrol

ver

what

s

legitimately

is

own.

Psychical

man,

definable

n

his

natural

essence,

or

nstance

as

rational

animal,

s still

natural

man,

and is

no more

admitted

to be theauthenticallyxisting elfofthepneumathanin mod-

ern existentialism

ny

determinative

ssence s admitted

o

prej-

udice

authentic

xistence.


17/24

GNOSTICISM AND MODERN

NIHILISM

445

It

is

pertinent

ere to

compare

n

argument

f

Heidegger's.

Against

he

classical efinition

f

man as the rational

nimal,

Heidegger,

n

his

Letter n

Humanism,

rgues

hat

hisdefini-

tion

places

man within

nimality

pecified

nly

by

a

differentia

which

fallswithin he

genus

"animal"as a

particular

uality.

This,

Heidegger

ontends,

s

placing

man oo ow.

I

suspect

here

is a

verbal

sophism

nvolved

n

thus

arguing

rom he

term

"animal" s used

n the

lassical

efinition.

ut

apart

rom

hat,

in

his

rejection

f

the

concept

f

any

definable

nature" f man

whichwould

ubject

his

sovereign

xistence

o a

predetermined

essence

nd thusmakehim

part

f

an

objective

rder f essences

in

the

wholeof nature

in

this

whole

onception

f trans-essen-

tial,

freely

projecting"

xistence

there s a

significantnalogy

to

the Gnostic

oncept

f the

trans-psychical

egativity

f the

pneuma.

This

pneuma

s

thebearer

f

a

knowledge

eculiar

o

itselfwhich s

radically

ifferent

rom herational

nowledge

f

the

psyche.

Psychical

man,

hrough

isreason, wesallegiance,

indeed,

o

themoral aw

aid

down

by

his

creator,

he

demiurge,

and

in

obediently ulfilling

t

he

has

the

only

chance

f

being

just,

that

s,

properly

adjusted"

o the

externally

stablished

order,

nd

thus f

playing

is

allotted

art

n the

cosmic cheme.

But

the

pneumticos,

spiritual"

man,

s above the

aw,

beyond

good

and

evil,

and a law unto

himself

n the

power

of his

"knowledge."

Onlyin passing wish to remark hatPaul's antinomism,

though

haring

n the

general

limate f the

Gnostic

ne,

is

a

vastly

ifferent atter.

It

certainly

oes

not

grant

freedom

from

he aw to

any

superior

knowledge."

v

But

what s this

knowledge

bout,

his

ognition

hich

s

not

of

the oul

but

of the

pirit,

nd

in which he

piritual

elf

indsts

salvationrom osmicervitude? famous ormula ftheValen-

tinian chool

hus

pitomizes

he

ontent f

gnosis:

What

makes

us

free s the

knowledge

ho we

were,

whatwe

have

become;


18/24

446

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

where

we

were,

wherein

we have

been

thrown;

whereto

we

speed,

wherefrom e are

redeemed;

what is

birth and

what

rebirth."

A real

exegesis

of this

programmatic

ormula would

have

to

unfold the

complete

Gnostic

myth.

Here

I

wish

to make

only

a

few formal bservations.

Firstwe note

the

dualistic

grouping

f the

terms

n antithetical

pairs,

and the

eschatological

ension

between

them,

with

ts irre-

versible

directedness

rom

past

to future.

We further

bserve

that

ll the terms sed

are

concepts

ot of

being

but

of

happening,

of movement.

The

knowledge

s of

a

history,

n

which

it

is

itself critical

vent.

Among

hese

erms f

motion,

he one

of

having

been

thrown"

into

something

trikes

ur

attention,

ecause

we

have

been

made

familiar

with it

in existentialist

iterature.

We are

reminded

of

Pascal's

"Cast nto

the

nfinite

mmensity

f

spaces,"

of

Heideg-

ger's

Geworfenheit;

having

been

thrown,"

which

with

him

is

a fundamental haracter f theDasein, of the

self-experience

f

existence.

The

term,

s

far

as

I

can

see,

is

originally

Gnostic.

In the Mandaean

literature

t

is

a

standing

hrase:

life has

been

thrown

nto the

world,

ight

nto

darkness,

he

soul

into

the

body.

It

expresses

he

original

violence

done

to

me

in

making

me

be

where

am and

what

I

am,

the

passivity

f

my

choiceless

mer-

gence

into an

existing

world

whose

law

is

not mine.

But the

image

of the

throw

lso

imparts

dynamic

haracter

o

the whole

of the existence hus nitiated. In our formula his s takenup

by

the

image

of

speeding

toward

some

end.

Ejected

into

the

world,

ife

is

a

kind

of

trajectory

rojecting

tself

forward

nto

the

future.

This

brings

us

to

the

last

observation

wish

to

make

apropos

the

Valen

inian

formula:

that

in its

temporal

terms

t

makes

no

provision

or

present

n

whose

content

nowledge

may

dwell

and,

in

beholding,

tay

the

forward

hrust. There

is

past

and

future,wherewe come fromand wherewe speed to, and the

present

s

only

the

moment

of

gnosis

itself,

he

peripety

from

e

Clemens

Alex.,

xc.

ex

Theod.,

78,

2.


19/24

GNOSTICISM

AND

MODERN

NIHILISM

447

the ne to the

other n

a

supreme

risis

f the

schatological

ow.

There is this o

remark, owever,

n

distinctiono

all

modern

parallels:

he

contextmakes

t

clear

that,

hough

hrown

nto

temporality,

e

had

an

origin

n

eternity,

nd so

also have an

aim

in

eternity.

his constitutes

metaphysical

ackground

o

innercosmicihilismwhich s

entirely

bsent

from

ts modern

counterpart.

To

turn

once more to the

modern

ounterpart,

et me

put

before

ou

an observation hichmust trike heclose tudent f

Heidegger's

ein

und

Zeit,

that

most

profound

nd still most

important

anifestof

existentialist

hilosophy.

n this

book

Heidegger

evelops

n

ontology

f

the elf

ccording

o

the

modes

in which t

exists,

hat

s

to

say,

n

which t constitutests

being

by

ts

existing,

nd these

modes re

explicated

n a

number f

fundamental

ategories

hich

Heidegger

refers

o call "existen-

tials." Unlike he

objective

ategories

f

Kant,

hey

efine

truc-

turesnotof

reality

utof realizationof theactivemovement

of

nwardness

y

which world

f

objects

s

entertainednd the

self

riginated

s

a

continuous

vent.

They

have,

herefore,

ach

and

all,

a

profoundly

emporal

meaning.

The

'

'existen

ials" re

categories

f nternal r

mental

ime,

he

ruedimension

f

exist-

ence,

nd

they

rticulate

hat imension

n

itstenses.

This

being

so,

they

must

exhibit,

nd

distribute etween

hemselves,

he

three

orizons f

time

past,present,

nd future.

Now fwetry oarrangehese 'existenials,"Heidegger'sate-

gories

f

existence,

nder

hese hree

eads,

s

it

s

possible

o

do,

we

make a

striking

iscovery

at

any

rate

one that

truck

me

very

much

when made

t

many ears go

(at

the

ime

ven

going

so

far s to draw

p

a

diagram,

n the lassical

manner

f a

"table

of

categories").

his is

the

discovery

hat

hecolumn

nder

he

head of

"present"

emains

racticallympty.

I

must

hasten

o

add

that his

tatement,

nd

what

ollows,

s

an

extreme

bridge-

ment.Actuallygreat eal s said bout he xistentialpresent."

But

it is

nothing riginal

n

its

own

right.

As far

s

the

term

is

meant o

denote

n

aspect

of

genuine

existence,"

t

is

the


20/24

448

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

present

of the

'

'situation/'

which is

wholly

defined

n termsof

the

self's relation to

its

"future" and

"past."

It flashes

up,

as

it

were,

in

the

light

of decision when

the

projected

"future"

reacts

upon

the

given

"past,"

and

in this

meeting

onstitutes

hat

Hteidegger

alls

the "moment"

(Augenblick):

moment,

not dura-

tion,

s the

temporal

mode of

this

present

a

creature

f the other

two horizons f

time,

function

f

theirceaseless

dynamics,

nd

no

independent

dimension

to dwell

in.

Detached, however,

from hiscontext f

inner

movement,

y

itself,

present"

denotes

precisely

he renouncement

f

genuine

future-past

elation

in

the "abandonment" or "surrender" o

talk,

curiosity,

nd

the

like

(Verfallenheit):

failureof

the tension

of true

existence,

kind of

lazinessof

being.

Indeed,

Verfallenheit,

negative

erm

which also

includes

the

meaning

of

degeneration

nd

decline,

s

the "existential"

proper

to

"present"

as

such,

showing

t to

be

a derivative nd "deficient"

mode

of existence.

To return, hen,to our

original

statement,we findthat all

the

relevant

ategories

f

existence,

hose

having

to

do

with

the

possible

genuineness

f

existence,

fall

in

correlate

pairs

under

the heads of either

past

or

future:

"facticity," ecessity,

aving

become,

having

been

thrown,

re

existential

modes

of

the

past;

being

ahead of

oneself,

nticipation

of

death,

care

and

resolve,

are existential

modes of

the

future.

No

present

remains

for

genuine

existence

o

repose

n.

Leaping

off,

s

it

were,

from ts

past, existenceprojects tself nto its future;faces its ultimate

limit,

death;

returns

rom

his

eschatological

limpse

of

nothing-

ness

to its sheer

factness,

he

unalterable

datum of

its

already

having

become

this,

here

nd

then;

and carries

his

forward

with

its

death-begotten

esolve,

nto

which

the

past

has

now been

gathered

p.

I

repeat,

there

s

no

present

o dwell

in,

only

the

crisis

between

past

and

future,

he

pointed

moment

between,

balanced

on

the

razor's

edge

of

decision

which

thrusts head.

This breathless ynamism olds a tremendous ppeal for the

contemporary

ind,

and

my

generation

n

the German

twenties

and

early

thirties

uccumbed

to

it

wholesale.

But

there

is a


21/24

GNOSTICISM AND

MODERN

NIHILISM

449

puzzle

n

this

vanescencef the

present

s

the

holder f

genuine

content,

n

its

reduction o

the

nhospitable

ero

point

of

mere

formal

esolution.What

metaphysical

ituation

tands

ehind

t?

Here an

additional bservations

relevant.

There

s,

after

ll,

besides

he

existential

present"

f

the

moment,

he

presence

f

things.

Does

not the

co-presence

ith

hem fford

"present"

of differentind?

But

we

earn

rom

eidegger

hat

hings

re

primarilyuhanden,hat s,usable (ofwhich ven

"useless" s

a

mode),

and therefore

elated

o

the

"project"

of

existence,

thereforencluded

n the

future-past

ynamics.

Yet

they

an

also

become

merely

orhanden

standing

efore

me),

that

s,

indifferent

bjects,

nd

the mode

of

Vorhandenheit

s an

objec-

tive

ounterpart

o whaton

the

existential

ide

s

Verfallenheit,

false

present.

Vorhanden

s what s

merely

nd

indifferently

"extant,"

he

"there" f

bare

nature,

here o

be looked

t out-

side

the relevance f the

existentialituation nd

of

practical

concern.It is

being,

s it were,

tripped

nd alienated o the

mode

of neutral

bject.

This is

the

status

eft o

"nature"

a

deficient

mode of

reality

and the

relation

n

which

t is so

objectified

s

a

deficient

odeof

existence,

ts defection

rom he

futurity

f care

into the

spuriouspresent

f mere

onlooking

curiosity.

This

existentialist

epreciation

f the

concept

f nature

the

absence

f

"nature"

s

a relevant

opic

from

Heidegger's

hi-

losophys in itself revealing act) bviouslyeflectstsspiritual

denudation

t

thehands

f

physical

cience,

nd t has

something

in common ith

heGnostic

ontempt

or ature. No

philosophy

has

everbeen

ess

concerned

bout

nature,which,

or

t,

has no

dignity

eft o

it: this

unconcern

s

not to

be

confounded ith

Socrates'

efraining

rom

hysical

nquiry

s

being

bove man's

understanding.

To look at what s

there,

t nature s

it

is

in

itself,

t

Being,

the ncients alledbythenameofcontemplation,heoria. But

the

point

here s

that,

f

contemplation

s left

with

only

the

irrelevantly

xtant,

hen

t loses

the noble status t once had


22/24

450

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

as does the

repose

n

the

present

o which

it holds

by

the

pres-

ence

of its

objects.

Theoria

had

that

dignity

because of its

Platonic

implications

because it beheld eternal

objects

in

the

forms

of

things,

transcendence f immutable

being

shining

through

the

transparency

f

becoming.

Immutable

being

is

everlasting resent,

n

which

contemplation

an

share

in

the

briefdurations

f

the

temporalpresent.

Thus

it is

eternity,

ot

time,

that

grants present

nd

gives

it

a status of its own

in

the flux of

time;

and

it

is

the loss

of

eternity

hich

accounts

for the loss of

a

genuine

present.

Such

a

loss

of

eternity

s

the

disappearance

f

the world of

ideas and

ideals

in which

Heidegger

sees

the

true

meaning

of

Nietzsche's

"God

is dead":

in

other

words,

he absolute

victory

f

nominalism

over

realism.

Therefore he same

cause which

s at

the root of

nihilism

s also at the root of the

radical

temporality

f

Heideg-

ger's

scheme

of

existence,

n

which

the

present

s

nothing

but

themoment ftransience rom

past

to future. If values are not

beheld

in

vision

as

being (like

the Good

and the

Beautiful of

Plato),

but

are

posited

by

the will

as

projects,

hen

ndeed exist-

ence

is committed

o

constant

futurity,

ith death

as the

goal;

and

a

merely

ormal

esolution o

be,

without

nomos for

that

resolution,

ecomes

a

project

from

nothingness

nto

nothingness.

In

the words

of

Nietzsche

quoted

before,

"Who once

has lost

what

thou

hast

lost

stands

nowhere

still."

VI

Once

more our

investigation

eads

back to the

dualism

between

man

and

physis

s

the

metaphysical

ackground

f the nihilistic

situation.

There

is

no

overlooking

one

cardinal

difference

between

he Gnostic

nd the

existentialist

ualism:

Gnostic

man

is

thrown

nto

an

antagonistic,

nti-divine,

nd

therefore

nti-

human

nature,

modern

man

into an

indifferent

ne.

And

only

the atter ase representsheabsolutevacuum,thereallybottom-

less

pit.

In the

Gnostic

conception

he

hostile,

the

demonic,

s

still

anthropomorphic,

amiliar

ven

in

its

foreignness,

nd

the


23/24

GNOSTICISM

AND

MODERN NIHILISM

451

contrast

tself

ives

direction

o existence a

negative

irection,

to

be

sure,

ut

one that

has behind t the

sanction

f the

nega-

tive

transcendenceo

which

he

positivity

f

the

world

s the

qualitative

ounterpart.

Not

even

this

antagonistic

uality

s

granted

o

the

ndifferent

ature

fmodern

cience,

nd from

hat

nature

o

directiont

all

can

be

elicited.

This

makesmodern

ihilism

nfinitely

ore

adical nd more

desperate

han

Gnostic ihilismvercouldbe,for ll itspanic

terror

f the

world

nd its defiant

ontempt

f its laws. That

nature oesnot

are,

ne

way

r

the

ther,

s the

rue

byss.

That

only

man

cares,

n

his finitude

acing

othing

ut

death,

lone

withhis

contingency

nd the

objective

meaninglessness

f his

projecting eanings,

s

a

truly

nprecedented

ituation.

But

this

ifference,

hich eveals he

greater

epth

f modern

nihilism,

lso

challenges

ts

self-consistency.

nostic

dualism,

fantastics

it

was,

was

at least

self-consistent.he

idea of a

demonicnature

gainst

whichthe self s

pitted,

makes ense.

Butwhat

bout n indifferentaturewhich

everthelessontains

in its midst

omething

o which ts own

being

does make a

difference?

he

phrase

f

having

been

flung

nto indifferent

nature

s a

remnant rom dualistic

metaphysics,phrase

o

whose se

the existentialists'wn monistic

eliefs

ive

them

no

right.

What

s the

throw

without

he

thrower,

nd

without

beyond

whence

t started?Rather houldthe

existentialist

ay

thatife conscious,aring, nowingelf has been"thrownp"

by

nature. If

blindly,

hen he

seeing

s a

product

f the

blind,

the

aring

product

f the

uncaring,

teleological

ature

egot-

ten

unteleologically.

Does

not

this

paradox

ast doubt on the

very

oncept

f an

indifferent

ature,

hat bstractionf

physical

cience?

So radi-

cally

has

anthropomorphism

een

bannedfrom

he

concept

f

nature

hat ven

man

must

ease to be

conceived

nthropomor-

phicallyf he is justan accident fthatnature.As theproduct

of the

ndifferent,

is

being,

oo,

must e

indifferent.

hen

the

facing

f his

mortality

ould

simply

warrant

he

reaction

Let


24/24

452

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

us

eat

and drink

for

tomorrowwe

die."

There is

no

point

in

caring

orwhathas

no sanction ehind

t

n

any

creative

ntention.

But

if

the

deeper

nsight

f

Heidegger

s

right

that,

facing

our

finitude,

we find

that we

care,

not

only

whetherwe

exist

but

how we exist

then

the

mere factof

there

being

such

a

supreme

care,

anywhere

within

the

world,

must also

qualify

the

totality

which

harbors

that

fact, nd,

having

given

rise

to

it

physically,

cannot

be

only

the

indifferent

xternality

of

a-teleological

science.

The

disruption

etween

man

and total

reality

s

at the bottom

of

nihilism.

The

illogicality

f the

rupture

makes ts fact

no

less

real,

or

its

seeming

alternative

more

acceptable:

the stare

at

isolated

selfness,

o

which

it commits

man,

may

seek

release

and

has

found

t

in a monistic

aturalism

which,

long

with the

rupture,

would

abolish

also

the

idea

of

man as

man.

Between

that

Scylla

nd

this

her

twin

Charybdis,

he

modern

mind hovers.

Whether third oad is

open

to it one bywhichthefatal dual-

ism

can

be overcome

nd

yet

nough

of

the

dualistic

nsight

aved

to

uphold

the

humanity

f

man

philosophy

will

have to

find ut.

Documents

Hans Jonas Niilismo e Gnosticismo Nietzsche