HUMAN CAPITAL: EDUCATION

AND EARNINGS

Hewi-Lin Chuang, Ph.D.

2010/04/081

台灣 1000 大企業最愛大學生調查 文／吳永佳 2010 年 3 月 Cheers 雜誌

長期作為企業與人才之間的橋梁 ，《 Cheers 》雜誌 14 年來執行「 1000 大企業人才策略與最愛大學生」調查 ﹕ 調查對象﹕ 2009 年《天下》雜誌 1000 大企業人資主管 有效樣本﹕寄出 1,192 份問卷，回收 628 份，回收率 53

％ 調查期間﹕ 2010 年 1 月 14 日 ~2010 年 2 月 6 日 調查執行：《天下》雜誌調查中心

2

表 1 1000﹕ 大企業最愛大學生總排名 排名 學校 2009年

排名2008年排名

1 台灣大學 1 1

2 成功大學 2 2

3 交通大學 3 3

4 清華大學 4 4

5 政治大學 5 5

6 台灣科大 7 8

7 中山大學 6 9

8 淡江大學 8 7

9 台北科大 9 6

10 逢甲大學 10 10

排名 學校 2009年排名

2008年排名

11 中央大學 11 13

12 中原大學 12 11

13 輔仁大學 13 14

14 東吳大學 14 16

15 台北大學 15 19

16 中興大學 18 18

17 元智大學 17 12

18 東海大學 19 17

19 中正大學 16 15

20 文化大學 - -

排名 學校 2009年排名

2008年排名

1 台灣大學 1 1

2 成功大學 2 2

3 交通大學 3 3

4 清華大學 4 4

5 政治大學 5 5

6 台灣科大 7 8

7 中山大學 6 9

8 淡江大學 8 7

9 台北科大 9 6

10 逢甲大學 10 10

排名 學校 2009年排名

2008年排名

11 中央大學 11 13

12 中原大學 12 11

13 輔仁大學 13 14

14 東吳大學 14 16

15 台北大學 15 19

16 中興大學 18 18

17 元智大學 17 12

18 東海大學 19 17

19 中正大學 16 15

20 文化大學 - -3

表 2 1000﹕ 大企業最愛私校與技職排名

私校排名 整體排名 學校名稱

1 8 淡江大學

2 10 逢甲大學

3 12 中原大學

4 13 輔仁大學

5 14 東吳大學

6 17 元智大學

7 18 東海大學

8 20 文化大學

9 22 銘傳大學

10 26 世新大學

技職排名 總排名 學校

1 6 台灣科大

2 9 台北科大

3 21 高雄應用

4 23 雲林科大

5 24 高雄第一

6 28 南台科大

7 30 高雄餐旅

8 31 屏東科大

9 34 朝陽科大

10 36 文藻外語4

看人才，態度面最重要，最擔心的是穩定度

企業最重視新鮮人的能力﹕ 「學習意願與可塑性」（ 73.5 ％） 「穩定度與抗壓性」（ 65.7 ％） 「專業知識與技術」居第 3 （ 56.5 ％ )

企業認為新鮮人最待加強的能力﹕ 「穩定度與抗壓性」（ 67.0 ％） 「解決問題的能力」 （ 51.3 ％） 「具有國際觀與外語能力」（ 38.9% ）

資料來源﹕ http://www.cheers.com.tw/doc/page.jspx?id=40288abc276148df0127ae79cce833e8&number=1

5

新世代最嚮往 100 大企業 文／史書華 2010 年 4 月 Cheers 雜誌

《 Cheers 》雜誌第五年「新世代最嚮往 100 大企業」大調查﹕ 調查對象﹕全台灣 160 個大學科系應屆畢業生 ( 包含大學 77.98 ％

、研究所 22.02 ％ )

有效樣本﹕寄出 4200 份問卷，回收 2,834 份 ，回收率 67.48%

調查期間﹕ 2010 年 1 月 5 日 ~2010 年 3 月 5 日 調查方法﹕根據教育部公佈 98 學年度各大專院校的人數與科系分

佈狀況，採分層比例抽樣法進行郵寄問卷調查 調查執行：《天下》雜誌調查中心

資料來源﹕

http://www.cheers.com.tw/doc/page.jspx?id=40288abc276148df0127ae6fdb1a33de&number=1

6

科技業退位，服務業竄前 歷經一場全球經濟風暴後，今年調查共有 3 大改

變、 3 大發現﹕ 【改變 1 】統一企業擠下去年榜首中華電信和科技業霸主鴻

海 1. 統一企業， 2. 誠品， 3. 統一星巴克 ( 參見表 1)

【改變 2 】「工作穩定」仍是選擇企業首要標準，但「搶抱鐵飯碗」開始退燒 畢業後打算至公營企業比例﹕ 2006 年 (36.5%) ， 2007 年

(52.0%) ， 2008 年 (66.8%) ， 2009 年 (81.4%) ， 2010 年 (70.7%)

【改變 3 】數位新媒體超越傳統徵才管道，成為新鮮人認識企業的重要來源 數位新媒體﹕如 YAHOO! 奇摩知識 + 、 PTT (4)

傳統徵才管道﹕企業徵才活動 (9) 就業輔導單位 (10) 徵才網站 (11)

( 參見表 2)

7

2010年排名 2009年排名 企業名稱

1 2 統一企業

2 3 誠品3 7 統一星巴克

4 5 鴻海精密

5 1 中華電信

6 13 台灣積體電路

7 4 中國鋼鐵

8 6 華碩電腦

9 21 王品台塑牛排館

10 10 奇美電子

排名 選項

1 企業知名度

2 企業形象／產品廣告

3 產業前景

4 社群網路（如 YAHOO!奇摩知識 + 、PTT）

5 師長、親友評價

6 企業門市與產品

7 企業的營運數字

8 看企業 CEO是誰

9 企業徵才活動

10 就業輔導單位

11 徵才網站

表 1﹕ 新世代最嚮往企業 Top 10 表 2﹕ 大學生認識企業的重要依據排名

註：群創光電 3 月 18 日已與奇美電子、統寶光電合併為「奇美電子」

8

科技業退位，服務業竄前 【發現 1 】新鮮人什麼都懂，就是不懂企業

超過 4 成的受訪者表示「不認識」自己筆下選填的企業 【發現 2 】：大學生自認「身價不只 22,000 」

新鮮人自評身價﹕研究所應屆畢業生 (33,734) ，大學應屆畢業生 (27,701)

【發現 3 】：新世代最愛企業家：王永慶蟬連兩年 ，林百里重新進榜 1. 王永慶 2. 郭台銘 3 比爾‧蓋茲（ Bill Gates ）

資料來源：http://www.cheers.com.tw/doc/page.jspx?id=40288abc276148df0127ae6fdb1a33de&number=1

9

HUMAN CAPITAL: EDUCATION AND EARNINGS

Wages will vary among workers because workers are different. We each bring into the labor market a unique set of abilities and acquired skills, or human capital.

We begin our study of human capital by focusing on the decision to acquire formal education. The skills we acquire in school make up an increasingly important component of our stock of knowledge.

10

INTRODUCTION

People bring into the labor market a unique set of abilities and acquired skills known as human capital.

Workers add to their stock of human capital throughout their lives, especially via job experience and education.

11

EDUCATION: STYLIZED FACTS

Education is strongly correlated with:Labor force participation rates

Unemployment rates

Earnings

12

1. EDUCATION IN THE LABOR MARKET: SOME STYLIZED FACTS

教育程度七十年 七十五年 八十年 八十五年 九十年 九十五年 九十七年 九十八年

九十九年( 一、二

月 )

國中及以下 56.69 58.89 56.55 53.00 47.71 44.34 42.87 41.67 41.45

高中（職） 54.76 57.87 60.22 60.53 61.34 63.52 63.64 62.61 62.23

大專及以上 63.13 66.19 67.27 67.97 66.82 67.38 68.18 68.40 68.78

表一 勞動參與率與教育程度 單位： %

表二 就業者與教育程度 單位： %

教育程度 七十年 七十五年 八十年 八十五年 九十年 九十五年 九十七年 九十八年九十九年( 一、二

月 )

國中及以下 69.31 64.05 54.26 44.34 35.64 27.40 24.75 23.27% 22.80%

高中（職） 20.08 23.85 29.89 33.69 35.97 35.91 35.38 34.55% 34.18%

大專及以上 10.61 12.11 15.85 21.96 28.39 36.70 39.87 42.18% 43.02%13

表三 失業率與教育程度 單位： %

教育程度 七十年 七十五年 八十年 八十五年 九十年 九十五年 九十七年 九十八年九十九年( 一、二

月 )

國中及以下 0.70 1.63 0.98 1.83 4.59 3.21 3.76 5.84 5.36

高中（職） 1.95 3.89 2.05 3.00 4.65 4.36 4.34 6.19 6.15

大專及以上 1.23 2.93 1.78 2.41 3.20 3.98 4.21 5.57 5.57

教育程度 八十五年 九十年 九十一年 九十二年 九十三年 九十四年 九十五年 九十六年 九十七年 九十八年

國中及以下 29,035 28,119

27,866 27,244 27,423 27,410 27,294 27,235 26,739 24,597

高中（職） 31,390 31,217

31,059 30,858 30,523 30,363 30,123 29,773 28,709 27,820

大專及以上 43,925 44,396

43,882 43,905 42,942 41,851 41,409 40,510 39,241 38,223

表四 薪資與教育程度 單位：元 ( 平減 95 年 CPI)

14

2. THE SCHOOLING MODEL

What factors motivates some workers to remain in school while other workers dropout before they finish high school? We assume that workers acquire the skill level that maximizes the present value of lifetime earnings.

15

2. THE SCHOOLING MODEL Real earnings (earnings adjusted for inflation).

Age-earnings profile: the wage profile over a worker’s lifespan.

The higher the discount rate, the less likely someone will invest in education (since they are less future oriented).

The discount rate depends on: the market rate of interest.

time preferences: how a person feels about giving up today’s consumption in return for future rewards. 16

(1) PRESENT VALUE CALCULATIONS

Present value allows comparison of dollar amounts spent and received in different time periods. (An idea from finance.)

Present Value = PV = y/(1+r)t

r is the per-period discount rate.

y is the future value.

t is the number of time periods.

17

The present value of the earnings stream if the worker only gets a high school education is:

46

0462 11

...11 t

tHSHSHSHS

HSHSr

w

r

w

r

w

r

wwPV

(1)

The parameter r is the worker’s rate of discount. There are 47 terms in this sum, one for each year that elapses between the ages of 18 and 64.

18

The present value of the earnings stream if the worker gets a college diploma is:

The first four terms in this sum give the present value of the direct costs of a college education, while the remaining 43 terms give the present value of lifetime earnings in the post-college period.

465432 1...

11111 r

w

r

w

r

w

r

H

r

H

r

HHPV COLCOLCOL

COL

3

0

46

4 11t tt

COLt r

w

r

H

Direct Costs of Attending College Post-College Earnings Stream

(2)

19

We assume that a person’s schooling decision maximizes the present value of lifetime earnings. Therefore, the worker attends college if the present value of lifetime earnings when he gets a college education exceeds the present value of lifetime earnings when he gets only a high school diploma, or:

HSCOL PVPV (3)

Goes to College

Quits after High School

FIGURE 1 Earning Streams Faced by a High School Graduate

Dollars

Age

wCOL

wHS

-H

18 22 65

20

(2) THE WAGE-SCHOOLING LOCUS

The salaries firms are willing to pay workers depends on the level of schooling.

Properties of the wage-schooling locus.The wage-schooling locus is upward sloping.

The slope of the wage-schooling locus indicates the increase in earnings associated with an additional year of education.

The wage-schooling locus is concave, reflecting diminishing returns to schooling.

21

(2) THE WAGE-SCHOOLING LOCUSThe wage-schooling locus gives the salary that a particular worker would earn if he completed a particular level of schooling. If the worker graduates from high school, he earns $20,000 annually. If he goes to college for 1 year, he earns $23,000. And so on.

0 13 14 1812

30,000

20,000

23,00025,000

Years of Schooling

Dollars

22

Defn. The Marginal Rate of Return to Schooling

The percentage change in earnings resulting from one more year of school is defined to be the marginal rate of return to schooling.

23

(3) The Stopping Rule, or When Should I Quit School?

Suppose that the worker has a rate of discount r that is constant; that is, it is independent of how much schooling the worker gets. The stopping rule that maximizes the worker’s present value of earnings over the life cycle is given by:

Quit school when the marginal rate of return to schooling = r

24

This stopping rule maximizes the worker’s present value of earnings over the life cycle.

Years of Schooling

FIGURE 3 The Schooling Decision

Rate of interest

MRR

r’

r

s’ s*25

SCHOOLING AND EARNINGS WHEN WORKERS HAVE DIFFERENT RATES OF DISCOUNT

Years of Schooling

Years of Schooling

Rate of Interest

1212 1111

rBO

rAL

MRR

Dollars

wDROP PAL

PBO

wHS

26

SCHOOLING AND EARNINGS WHEN WORKERS HAVE DIFFERENT ABILITIES

Years of Schooling

Years of Schooling

Rate of Interest

1211

r

MRRACE

MRRBOB

Dollars

1211

wHS

wACE

PACE

wDROP

ZBob

Ace

Ace and Bob have the same discount rate (r) but each worker faces a different wage-schooling locus. Ace drops out of high school and Bob gets a high school diploma. The wage differential between Bob and Ace (wHS - wDROP) arises both because Bob goes to school for one more year and because Bob is more able. As a result, this wage differential does not tells us by how much Ace’s earnings would increase if he were to complete high school (wACE - wDROP).

27

3. IS EDUCATION A GOOD INVESTMENT?(1) Is Education a Good Investment for Individuals?

The rate of return typically estimated for the U.S. generally fall in the range of 5-15 percent.

At first glance, an investment in education is about as good as an investment in stocks, bonds, or real estate.

28

EDUCATION AND THE WAGE GAP

Observed data on earnings and schooling does not allow us to estimate returns to schooling.

In theory, a more able person gets more from an additional year of education.

Ability bias: The extent to which unobserved ability differences exist affects estimates on returns to schooling, since the ability difference may be the true source of the wage differential.

29

ESTIMATING THE RATE OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING

A typical empirical study estimates a regression of the form:

Log(w) = a·s + other variables

w is the wage rates is the years of schoolinga is the coefficient that estimates the rate of

return to an additional year of schooling

30

資料來源：中央產經論文 - 台灣地區大學教育報酬率時間變化之分析 (邱麗芳 )

31

資料來源：中央產經論文 - 台灣地區大學教育報酬率時間變化之分析 (邱麗芳 )

32

A. The Upward Bias

The typical estimates of the rate of return on further schooling overstate the gain an individual student could obtain by investing in education because they are unable to separate the contribution that ability makes to higher earnings from the contribution made by schooling.

i.e., Some of the added earnings college graduates typically receive would probably be received by an equally able high school graduates who did not attend college.

33

Methods to correct this bias:

a. Separating effects of ability and schooling by including the aptitude-test scores such as IQ.

b. Controlling for all the unmeasured aspects of ability by using data on twins.

Part of earnings differentials associated with higher levels of schooling are due to inherently abler persons obtaining more schooling.

34

B. The Downward Bias

a. Some benefits of college attendance are not necessarily reflected in higher productivity.

b. Most rate-of-return studies fail to include fringe benefits.

Fringe benefits, usually as a fraction of total compensation, tend to rise as money earnings rise.

a. Some of the job-related rewards of college are captured in the form of psychic or nonmonetary benefits.

35

C. Selection Bias

The measured rate of return on a college education may understate the actual return for those who choose to attend college. Likewise, the measured rate of return may overstate the return that would have been received by those terminating schooling with higher school had they instead chosen to attend college.

36

: the earnings in a college-level job of those who

choose to go to college.

: the earning in a high school-level job of those who

choose not to go to college.

Let : the earnings in a high school-level job of those

who choose to attend college terminating

schooling at high school.

is perhaps less than

hth

ctct EEB ,,

Measured benefit Bt:

ctcE ,

hthE ,

cthE ,

cthE ,

hthE ,

37

benefitmeasuredBEEB tc

thc

tcct ,,

htcE ,:the earnings in a college-level job of those who choose not to attend college were to alter their decisions.

htcE ,

ctcE , is perhaps less than

benefitmeasuredBEEB th

thh

tcht ,,

→When abilities are diverse, the principle of comparative advantage is an important factor in making choices about schooling and occupations. 38

SCHOOL QUALITY AND THE RATE OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

15 20 25 30 35 40

Pupil/teacher ratio

Rat

e of

ret

urn

to s

choo

ling

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2

Relative teacher wageR

ate

of r

etur

n to

sch

oolin

g

Source: David Card and Alan B. Krueger, “Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States,” Journal of Political Economy 100 (February 1992), Tables 1 and 2. The data in the graphs refer to the rate of return to school and the school quality variables for the cohort of persons born in 1920-1929.

39

台大「惠我良多」？—論各大學畢業生初出校門的表現運用「七十二年與七十三年專上畢業生調查」與「七十三年與七十四年專上畢業生調查」資料，分析台灣各大學院校初出校門的畢業生，在薪資決定、就業與進修決擇上是否有顯著差異。

校際間的差異主要顯現在「就業比例」、「進修比例」上，然而薪資水準並無顯著差異。

未控制「聯考最低錄取分數」這項能力指標下，台大畢業生在勞動市場的表現相當優異，薪資水準高於多數大學院校。

然而在控制「聯考最低錄取分數」下，台大畢業生在勞動市場的表現並不甚佳，就業比例低於多數學校，薪資水準亦未必優於他校。

40

台大「惠我良多」？—論各大學畢業生初出校門的表現

41

台大「惠我良多」？—論各大學畢業生初出校門的表現若嘗試由「教育生產函數」理論提出解釋，由於台大畢

業生多屬聯考中的佼佼者，在未控制「能力」之下，可能使得台大的貢獻被高估。

值得注意的是，此研究所使用的資料為「專上畢業生調查」是自學校畢業或役畢未滿一年的樣本。依 Farber and Gibbons (1991) 的說法，初入勞動市場者的「薪資」與「生產力」間無必然關係，因而各大學院校對初入勞動市場者薪資的影響，未必能反映對生產力的影響。

資料來源：于若蓉 , 朱敬一 , “ 台大「惠我良多」 ? － 論各大學畢業生初出校門的表現” , 《經濟論文叢刊》 , 1998, 26: 65-89. 42

98 年大專應屆畢業青年平均薪資

資料來源：行政院青年輔導委員會 -98 年大專青年就業力現況調查報告43

98 年大專應屆畢業青年平均薪資

資料來源：行政院青年輔導委員會 -98 年大專青年就業力現況調查報告

44

(2) Is Education a Good Social Investment?

Some critics have suggested that to a large degree, education acts merely as a “sorting device”.

→Schooling does nothing to alter productive characteristics. The education is simply as a filter that has the effect of “signaling” which people are likely to be most productive.

Note: Even if schooling were only a screening device, it could have social value. Employers need a reliable method by which to select employees. Investment in schooling sends a signal to the labor market that one has a certain level of ability.

45

→School would have net social value if the decision to attend and the success one attained in school sent accurate signals about productive characteristics to employers in the least costly way.

Either education does enhance worker productivity or it is a cheaper screening tool than any other that firms could use. In either case, the fact that employers are willing to pay a high price for an educated work force seems to suggest that education produces social benefits.

46

SCHOOLING AS A SIGNAL Education reveals a level of attainment which

signals a worker’s qualifications or innate ability to potential employers.

Information that is used to allocate workers in the labor market is called a signal.

There could be a “separating equilibrium.”

Low-productivity workers choose not to obtain X years of education, voluntarily signaling their low productivity.

High-productivity workers choose to get at least X years of schooling and separate themselves from the pack. 47

EDUCATION AS A SIGNAL

Workers get paid $200,000 if they get less than y years of college, and $300,000 if they get at least y years. Low-productivity workers find it expensive to invest in college, and will not get y years. High-productivity workers do obtain y years. As a result, the worker’s education signals if he is a low-productivity or a high-productivity worker.

300,000

250,001 y

20,000 y

0

Dollars

Years of Schooling

Costs

Slope = 25,000

300,000

200,000

0

Dollars

Years of Schooling

Costs

Slope = 20,000

(a) Low-Productivity Workers

y y

(b) High-Productivity Workers

200,000

48

EDUCATION AS A SIGNAL The low-productivity worker will not attend college if

(6-16)

Solving for implies that

(6-17)

The high-productivity workers get years of college whenever

(6-18)

Solving for yields

(6-19)

)001,25($000,300$000,200$ y

y

999.3y

)000,20($000,300$000,200$ y

5y

y

y

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IMPLICATIONS OF SCHOOLING AS A SIGNAL

Education is more than a signal, it alters the stock of human capital.

Social return to schooling (percentage increase in national income) is likely to be positive even if a particular worker’s human capital is not increased.

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4. POST-SCHOOL HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENTS

Some important properties of age-earnings profiles:Highly educated workers earn more than less educated

workers.

Earnings rise over time at a decreasing rate.

The age-earnings profiles of different education cohorts diverge over time (they “fan outwards”).

Earnings increase faster for more educated workers.

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AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES

Men

200500800

110014001700200023002600

18 25 32 39 46 53 60

Age

Wee

kly

Earn

ings

Some college

College Graduates

High school graduatesHigh school dropouts

52

AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES

Women

200400

600800

1000

12001400

18 25 32 39 46 53 60

Age

Wee

kly

Earn

ings

Some college

High school graduates

College Graduates

High school dropouts

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ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

Most workers augment their human capital stock through on-the-job training (OJT) after completing education investments.

Two types of OJT:

General: training that is useful at all firms once it is acquired.

Specific: training that is useful only at the firm where it is acquired.

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IMPLICATIONS

Firms only provide general training if they do not pay the costs.

In order for the firm to willingly pay some of the costs of specific training, the firm must share in the returns to specific training. Engaging in specific training eliminates the possibility of the worker separating from the job in the post-training period.

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THE ACQUISITION OF HUMAN CAPITAL OVER THE LIFE CYCLE

MC

MR20

MR30

Dollars

0 Q30Q20 Efficiency Units

The marginal revenue of an efficiency unit of human capital declines as the worker ages (so that MR20, the marginal revenue of a unit acquired at age 20, lies above MR30). At each age, the worker equates the marginal revenue with the marginal cost, so that more units are acquired when the worker is younger.

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AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES AND OJT

Human capital investments are more profitable the earlier they are taken.

The Mincer earnings function:

Log(w) = a·s + b·t – c·t2 + other variables.

The “overtaking age” is t* and indicates the time when the worker slows down acquisition of human capital to collect the return on prior investments so as to “overtake” earnings of those that did not undertake similar investments.

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THE AGE-EARNINGS PROFILE IMPLIED BY HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY

Dollars

Age-Earnings Profile

Age

The age-earnings profile is upward-sloping and concave. Older workers earn more because they invest less in human capital and because they are collecting the returns from earlier investments. The rate of growth of earnings slows down over time because workers accumulate less human capital as they get older.

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