Luhmanns Challenge to Theology

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The Journal of the American Academy of Religion, L / l

The Sociology of Dogmatics:Niklas Luhmann's

Challenge to Theology

Garrett Green

Demands that theology take seriously its social and cultural context

have been voiced repeatedly in recent years, both by theologians

themselves and by their interpreters and critics in other fields. It has

long been apparent that insights into the sociology of knowledge have

important implications for theology as for all areas of human inquiry. The

growth of religious studies as a field—and increasingly as the intellectual

and institutional environment for theologians in the English-speaking

world—has intensified pressures to take account of the external social worldin which theology is done. Though these pressures have led theologians to

pay more attention to sociology, social anthropology, and social history, the

only concrete result seems to have been a proliferation of methodological

proposals and programmatic essays.

Another demand frequently heard in the midst of the disciplinary iden

tity crisis through which theology has been struggling since the passing of

the great systematicians who dominated the 1930s, 40s, and 50s is for an

alternative to theologies based on metaphysical presuppositions or onto-

logical principles. This appeal was sounded earlier by Karl Barth, but nei

ther his alternative nor any other has achieved widespread acceptance by

contemporary theologians, who continue to insist on the need for a new kind

of fundamental or foundational theology.

For the most part, of course, these theological frustrations have

remained an in-house affair, attracting little attention from other disciplines.

Hecently, however, a notable exception has appeared on the scholarly horizon:

a comprehensive theory of religion, by a thoroughly "secular" sociologist,



20 Garrett Green

which assigns a major social function not just to religion generally but to

dogmatic theology in particular. From the prolific pen of Niklas Luhmann,

sociologist at the University of Bielefeld in West Germany, comes a theory

that restores religion to a central position in sociology, ascribes to "religiousdogmatics" a crucial role in the guidance of religion, and even enables a

detailed sociological analysis and critique of specific Christian doctrines. The

dialogue with theologians that Luhmann expressly invites has begun to take

shape in Germany,/l/ especially since the publication of Funktion der

Religion, in which his theory of religion—including an attempt to provide a

sociological grounding of theology—appears in its most developed

formulation. Ecclesiastical interest in Luhmann has also spread beyond the

theological faculties to leaders of the West German Protestant churches, who

have engaged his services as a consultant.

The opportunity for intensive dialogue between sociology and theology

at a sophisticated theoretical level is to be welcomed, and theologians should

be appreciative of a social-scientific theory that takes the theological enter

prise seriously enough to enter into its problems and procedures in detail.

Luhmann offers a refreshing change from sociological theories that treat

theology, if at all, merely as an epiphenomenal superstructure obscuring the

underlying economic, political, and cultural realities of religious behavior.

But theologians (and church leaders) should also beware of being flatteredinto accepting too quickly a definition of their own enterprise which offers

answers to fundamental questions that they have been unable to answer for

themselves. For Luhmann makes the bold claim, in contrast to most of the

tradition of sociology, that sociological analysis can explain not only the

"externar' actions of religious individuals and institutions but also the

"inner" realm of faith and religious experience that has been so jealously

guarded by modern theology as its exclusive preserve. Luhmann himself

warns that "the relations that could be established between sociological theory and religious dogmat ics are closer, more abstract, more fruitful, and

more dangerous than one commonly assumes" (1977:73).

Luhmann's thought is of particular relevance to theologians, because it

speaks directly to the two issues mentioned at the outset, which* continue

both to fascinate and to frustrate the work of theology: the social location

and significance of the theological enterprise itself, and the need for a new

kind of theory independent of metaphysical and ontological presuppositions.

In view of the exceptional linguistic and conceptual demands that Luhmann

makes on his readers, and the nearly total absence of English translations of

his work /2/ the first step must be a brief description of the nature and aim



The Sociology of Dogmatics: Niklas Luhmann's Challenge to Theology 21

1

Luhmann emerged as a social theorist to be reckoned with in a pub

lished debate with Jürgen Habermas which attracted the attention of German academics beyond the ranks of professional sociologists. After a latestart in academic life—he first studied law and had a career in publicadministration—Luhmann has been making up for lost time at a breathtaking pace in a series of essays and books covering most of the main areasof modern society. His work is tied together by a general theory of societyboth comprehensive in scope and grounded in a conceptually in sharp contrast to other European sociology.

But to consider Luhmann's theory simply from the point of view of

sociology as that field has usually been understood would be to risk seriouslymisconstruing both its content and its significance for theology. ForLuhmann makes some bold—even audacious—claims on behalf of his theory that put him in competition not only with the theories of other sociologists but also with the main traditions of Western philosophy. One criticmaintains that the motive underlying all of Luhmann's work, and its chief weakness, is his attempt to solve philosophical problems by sociologicalmeans (Hondrich:89ff.). Luhmann, for his part, is quite explicit about his

designs on territory traditionally occupied by philosophy, openly announcinghis intention to "resolve epistemology into an instance of the application of systems theory" (1977:17). He sees himself as the proponent of a qualitatively new kind of theory, frankly relativistic, lacking any fixed points of reference, and characterized by the ability to combine high degrees of bothchoice (Beliebigkeit) and specification (1975:200-201). He repeatedly contrasts this type of theory to old-style metaphysical and ontological theories,for which his favorite pejorative is alteuropäisch (e.g., 1974:196-97). "The

goal of knowledge," he claims, "is no longer the establishment of unchangeable, self-identical substance in its essence, but control over alternatives"(1974.36). To achieve this goal, he proposes not simply a particular sociological theory but rather a complex and multifacted "Supertheorie" (1978:9-27), a comprehensive framework for all special scientific endeavors.

Luhmann normally refers to his program as functional systems theory,and he draws many of his key concepts from Talcott Parsons (cf., e.g., 1951,1968). (In a reversal of the German-laden English prose familiar to theologians, Luhmann's works are sprinkled with anglicized German andsociological English—"adaptive upgrading," "loose coupling.") This Parsonianbase has been developed further by the use of concepts derived from



22 Garreit Green

Each of them is a "self-referential" complex of concepts, which can becombined with elements from the others in a process of "relationizing" toachieve new and more sophisticated means for analyzing particular socialphenomena. Although Luhmann affirms the goal of combining these indepen

dent elements into "a coherent theory," he acknowledges that the results areextremely complicated; he likens them to the patterns created by theintersecting concentric waves produced by three stones thrown simultaneouslyinto the water. He characterizes the resulting mode of argumentation as"neither linear, nor circular, but labyrinthine"—and few of his readers arelikely to disagree.

One further way in which Luhmann seeks to overcome the limitationsof the old European tradition is especially important for his theory of reli

gion. In order to avoid fixed ontological presuppositions, he replaces unitaryconcepts with relations. In analyzing social experience and behavior, he thusendeavors to establish not unchanging entities or structures of being butrather abstract reference-points from which apparently diverse social phenomena can be fruitfully compared. Such a theoretical point of referencecan be fixed by locating a particular problem for which the social systemseeks a solution. When viewed from the perspective of such a "reference-problem," "different possibilities of behavior [and] social circumstances that

appear externally to be quite diverse can be treated as functionally equivalent" (1974:35). Luhmann calls this kind of theory functional-structural, incontrast to the structural-functional systems theory advocated by Parsonsand others. In the latter theory, the structure of the system is presupposed asthe basis for investigating the functional achievements required to maintainthe system. Luhmann argues that functional-structural systems theory hasthe major advantage of being able to treat the systematic structure itself as aquestion and to investigate the meaning and function of system-building ingeneral (1974:113-14).

II

The point of departure for Luhmann's theory of religion is the problemof complexity, "the ultimate attainable material reference-problem of functional inquiry." Complexity means that the world "has no limits"; it alwayscontains more possibilities than can be realized, or even recognized (1973:3-5). The basic concepts of systems theory, system and environment, are

directed to this problem: systems are structured arrangements for reducingcomplexity by limiting and controlling contacts with the environment; the



The Sociology of Dogmatics: Niklas Luhmann' s Challenge to Theology 23

by strictly limiting the quantity and nature of contacts with the environ

ment. But all selection entails the risk of omission and error.

As a result of the process of selection, the environment is necessarily

twofold: it consists of what has been selected systematically, or determinatecomplexity; and also of what has not been selected, indeterminate complexity.

The definitive problem for religion—its reference-problem—is the

transformation of indeterminate into determinate complexity. Precisely

because the problem is insoluble, it becomes the "catalyst" for the devel

opment of religion (1977:20). This extremely abstract description can be

rendered somewhat more specific by concentrating on those systems of special

concern to the sociologist: what Luhmann calls "meaning-constitutive psychic

and social systems"—in other words, human individuals and societies. Here

the selection necessary for meaningful experience and action precipitates the

following twofold environment: on the one hand, an accessible environment

of ordered and familiar things and events subject to normal expectations and

probabilities; on the other hand, the inaccessible environment beyond,

experienced as the unexpected, the surprising, the disappointing ("intangible

like a bang behind one's back" [1977:17]). Luhmann, adapting terms from

Husserl's phenomenology, calls the first experience representation and the

second appresentation; they correspond to what in traditional terms would be

called reality and possibility. Their simultaneous presence in all human life isthe fundamental fact to which religion responds. "In all meaningful

experience and action," Luhmann writes, "more is continually appresented

than can be represented" (1977:22). The social system is therefore subjected to

a continuous pressure to give shape to the elusive transcendence beyond the

accessible environment, to represent and formulate it; but because

representation always takes place in a context of further appresentation, the

world forever eludes definitive formulation. Religion performs the social

function of transforming this indeterminable world into a determinable one,one which can compensate for the inevitable risk of selection and protect

against the threat of arbitrary change in the relationship of system and

environment. In order to carry out this task, religion must itself venture to

give representational form to indeterminate appresentation. "But over the

course of a long history," Luhmann explains, "it specializes its particular

efforts on representations that absorb the risk of representation" (1977:27).

Religion fulfills this function by "sacralizing" the realm of the indeter

minate through a process of "ciphering." Ciphers are not simply symbols,

since their purpose is not to point to something different; "they have their

meaning not in any relation to something else but are it themselves " They



24 Garrett Green

"latent," both for religious experience and for dogmatics. An example of religious ciphering—the most important one in Western culture—is theformula Gód, to which we will return below.

Indeterminate complexity thus serves as the general reference-problemfor which religion assumes special responsibility in the social system.Luhmann analyzes it, using the concepts of modal logic, as the problem of contingency. In simplest terms, he is saying that social choices always takeplace in a context of further unrealized possibilities. This situation poses theproblem of contingency, logically defined as the negation of both necessityand impossibility, and experienced as the sense that anything actual mightalso be otherwise: why is the world like this instead of any number of other

possible ways? The function of religion is to deal with this problem, "totransform indeterminable into determinable contingency" (1977:189).

But Luhmann's concept of religion is not sufficiently defined bydescribing the reference-problem. Although the functional aspect of religionis thereby given, Luhmann's concept also contains an evolutionary dimension. The basic problem posed by the twofold environment and the need totransform complexity or contingency does not simply produce a stable functional structure but rather initiates a developmental process. The continuouspressure of the reference-problem "catalyzes" the development of a widerange of religious forms, which vary according to cultural and historicalconditions. Religious institutions, in a way analogous to biological evolution,are exposed to ceaseless evolutionary influences, producing a long history inwhich various forms are generated, undergo change, and die out. But eventhe reference-problem does not remain unchanged but splits apart into relatively more concrete and soluble special problems. Luhmann discusses twoexamples (1977:114ff.). The first is the so-called rites of passage, which function to determine the indeterminate in the specific case of individual status-

transformations, as in the Christian rites of baptism, confirmation, marriage,and burial. A second example is the religious function of explaining and absorbing disappointments, which are experienced either as anxiety in anticipation of future possibilities or as insecurity occasioned by past disappointments.

Luhmann's theory makes it impossible to define religion either solely byits reference-problem or solely in terms of the functions it develops inresponse to this problem. He claims that this "detached conceptuality" isprecisely the advantage of functional analysis over "a definitory-categorizing

procedure." He also finds it superior to monofunctional definitions of religion solely on the basis of its integrating function, which is contradicted by




for both the unity and variety of religion, to do justice to its diverse forms in

such a way that "one can nevertheless also say that they 'always mean the

same thing'" (1977:20).

Il l

Luhmann's sociology of theology is a further development of his general

theory of religion but one that plays a particularly crucial role and constitutes

the most original feature of the theory. Traditionally, sociologists who have

produced general theories of religion (Marx and Durkheim, for example) have

had little to say about the specific contents of theology; while those who have

produced sociological analyses of particular doctrines (such as Max Weber's

work on capitalism and Protestantism) have not provided a comprehensive

account of the sociological meaning of theology as such. Luhmann lays claim

to a theoretical perspective from which he can not only explain religious

dogmatics generally but also analyze the social functions of particular

doctrines, even to the extent of proposing explicit theological reforms.

Theology, or "religious dogmatics"—Luhmann uses the terms almost

interchangeably—emerges in the course of the religious evolution of West

ern Christendom. Two sorts of differentiation that occur in social evolution

must be distinguished, both of which play a role in the emergence of theology. First, the social system develops in such a way that the religious func

tion comes to be differentiated as a special subsystem enjoying considerable

independence from the total system as well as from other subsystems. Mod

ern global society has largely moved beyond the earlier stages of segmentary

and stratified organizat ion, becoming highly differentiated into autonomous

functional subsystems for politics, economy, science, religion, etc. The reli

gious system retains a connection to the total society but specializes in fulfill

ing a particular function. A second kind of differentiation is meanwhileoccurring within the subsystem in response to its increased autonomy and to

obstacles encountered in performing its function. As in all self-referential

systems, three types of relations are internally differentiated: (1) the relation

of the subsystem to the total social system takes the form of function; (2) the

relation to other subsystems within society is performance; and (3) its rela

tion to itself is differentiated as reflection. In the religious system of the

modern West (Luhmann apparently has only the Christianity of Europe and

North America in view) these three appear, respectively, as church, social

service, and theology (1977:54-59).

Assigning to theology responsibility for the reflection of the religious



26 Garrett Green

origin and source of revelation (1977:59-61). But the deepest roots of reli-J

gious dogmatics are embedded in the original ciphering of the religious

function. Luhmann argues both that religion performs the task of trans

forming indeterminate into determinate complexity and that it remains

unconscious of this function. If the function were to become explicitly the

matic, religion would be exposed to comparison and possible replacement.Dogmatics therefore grows up as a kind of ersatz for the latent function, a

replacement for the missing functional consciousness of religion. As religion

becomes increasingly free of specific situations in the course of social evolu

tion, it develops a need for interpretation. Religious dogmatics can be

defined as the "verbal and conceptual equipment for this interpretive func

tion" at any given cultural and historical point in its development. The task

performed by ritual at an earlier stage of religious evolution is transformed

by "adaptive upgrading" into dogmatic interpretation. Dogmatics does nottreat its social function as an explicit theme but reflects on religious themes

and symbols, which in turn are related to experience. In this regard theology

can be most fruitfully compared not with science but with jurisprudence

(1977:85-88). Particularly significant in contrast to other sociological theories

of religion is the central function that Luhmann assigns to theology for the

coordination of the whole religious system. Under the impact of the func

tional differentiation of society, experienced in the religious system as "secu

larization," the theological function has become more rather than less impor

tant in the modern era, thus increasing the interest and potential fruitiulness

of a dialogue between sociologists and theologians. \

The seriousness with which Luhmann takes theology is most evident in

the detailed analysis he devotes to a wide range of particular Christian doc-$

trines. These analyses include some of his most interesting and original

observations. Undoubtedly the most important of these doctrinal excursuses

is Luhmann's interpretation of the concept God as the "contingency

formula" of Western religion. Contingency formulas are defined as "symbols

or groups of symbols that serve to translate the indeterminate contingency of

a particular functional sphere into determinable contingency" (1977:201);

An example from another social sphere is the formula scarcity in the

economic system, which reduces to calculable proportions the arbitrary

possibilities expressed in the wish to have more or to have something else,

The religious formula God has traditionally reduced the complexity of the

world by grounding its contingency in a supreme principle conceived a¡

both perfect and personal. Luhmann believes that theology has encountered

difficulty since the eighteenth century because perfection has been replacedby the principle of development as the highest ideal of bourgeois society, h




A second doctrinal issue particularly important in Luhmann's theory of

religion is his thesis that faith functions as the religious "communications

medium," analogous to truth, love, money, art, and power in other func

tional spheres. "Communications media," according to his definition, "aresymbolic codes that establish the rules for the possible combination of sym

bols and are thereby able simultaneously to insure a transfer of selective

achievements" (1977:91). In the case of religion, the immediacy of religious

experience requires some means of regulation and control as soon as it

becomes the content of communication among individuals. The church as

the arena of "spiritual communication" provides the institutional structure.

Dogmatics has the task of overseeing the communications medium—for

example, it must guard against both "inflation" and "deflation" of faith by

holding it in balance between the extremes of inflexible fixation and vapid

neutralization. Luhmann cites "civil religion" as an example of religious

inflation, fundamentalism as an example of deflation (1977:124).

IV

Luhmann's theory presents a challenge to theology in the double sense

of the word: it contains dangers to which theology must not fall prey, but it

also offers constructive possibilities by provoking theologians to rethink their

own enterprise, by throwing fresh light on old issues, and by demonstrating

new conceptual resources. Even a theory which theology dare not accept

uncritically or on its own terms may nevertheless contain useful insights and

suggest theoretical models which theologians can put to work for their own

purposes and according to their own proper criteria.

The persistent problem of relating theology to its social environment

would seem to be the point at which functional systems theory could make

its greatest contribution to the work of theology. Luhmann explicitly offersthe aid of his theory in the diagnosis of social structures in their interaction

with religion. He invites theology, in its role as the reflective sphere of reli

gion, to employ the analytical tools of systems theory as a basis for its guid

ance of the religious system (1977:271). In accepting this invitation, how

ever, theology would be acquiescing in a definition of its own work that

would fundamentally alter its nature and betray its basic commitments.

The crucial issue is posed by Luhmann's identification of Christian

theology with "religious dogmatics." The issue of the theological significanceof religion was raised by Karl Barth's theological critique of religion and

d b t d i l f ti i t Di t i h B h ff ' i t



28 Garrett Green

the instrument by which the religious subsystem maintains its identity andregulates its intercourse with the whole social system and with its sistersubsystems. It is to be judged by its success in enabling religion to performits social function smoothly and efficiently, avoiding either a loss of identity

or disruptive conflicts with other systems such as politics or the economy.Luhmann wants to assist theologians in carrying out their task by offeringthem a theoretical instrument designed to lay bare the functional structuresunderlying their own "media-code." They will then be in a position toachieve greater "structural compatibility" with modern functionally-differentiated society. They might choose, for instance, to exchange theircontingency formula God for one more in keeping with a development-oriented culture; or they might follow Luhmann's advice to abandon the

"supplementary myth of the resurrection" in favor of a concept of divineself-negation without a "happy end" as a more promising means for mediating the duality of suffering and salvation (cf. 1977:198-200).

A half-century ago Barth argued that modern Protestant theology, in aprocess that began as far back as the orthodox schools of the seventeenthcentury and reached its zenith in the liberalism of his own theological teachers, had managed "to exchange its own birthright for the concept of religion"(KD 1/2:320; cf. CD 1/2:294). The dependence of theology on a nontheolog-

ical concept of religion seems hardly to have lessened in the meantime;indeed, if theologians like Rahner, Lonergan, and Tracy are representative,one would now have to include Roman Catholics, too. Contrary to a commonassumption, the point of Barth's critique of religion was never to deny thatChristianity is a religion/4/ or to suggest that theology has nothing to do withreligious studies. In fact, Barth argues that to deny that revelation can beunderstood as religion is to deny revelation itself (KD 1/2:308; CD 1/2:283).

God's revelation in Christ was, is, and will remain bound to the Christianreligion as one religion among others, with which it has significant

continuities.

The crucial point is the error of making religion the criterion for theology; and it is just this point that Luhmann's sociology of dogmatics bringsclearly into focus. Pannenberg, who dismisses the theological critftiue of religion at the outset of his reply to Luhmann as "a self-destructive impulse"in the theology of the recent past, misses this central issue. By misstating thetheological alternative as "the separation of biblical revelation from thereligious life of humanity" (1978:99), he forfeits the basis for an effective

critique of Luhmann's account of the theological task. The real issue raisedby Luhmann for theology is contained in Barth's question whether "that




concept of dogmatics. But its importance is precisely its role as "the mostfunctional dogma," able to ground the concept of dogma itself as theself-revelation of revelation. He can then add: "Theology formulates this

self-reference as God's identity" (1977:173). For Luhmann the criterion of theology is its social function, which can be understood only with the help of functionalistic sociology; left to itself, "religious dogmatics" is only the figleaf covering the functional nakedness of religion.

Once the normative consequences implicit in Luhmann's account of therelationship between theology and society have been uncovered, it becomesclear why theologians must decline his offer of assistance with this problem.The difficulty is inherent in his concept of theory and the claims headvances on behalf of it. A theory, according to Luhmann, is an instrumentfor dealing with social problems, and it is subject to the criterion not of truthbut of success in problem-solving. Such a theory is fixed in none of its terms,any one of which can be modified if the need should arise. The very modesty of this concept of theory becomes the basis for Luhmann's immodestclaim to present a super-theory (Messner: 1), a sociology conceived as thequeen—a more fitting title would be manager—of the sciences, theologyincluded. Here the danger is not reductionism, which has so often been thecase with social-scientific theories of religion, but imperialism. And theology,

having learned the dangers of disciplinary imperialism the hard way, shouldbe especially wary of becoming anyone else's handmaid. However justifiedLuhmann may be in seeking to ferret out the social function of dogmatics,he is unable to show why this function ought to be taken as the norm fortheology. Indeed, he does not even try but simply assumes that sociologicaltheory is an adequate groundwork for dogmatics. This uncritical assumptionis finally self-contradictory, for his claim that dogmatics takes the place of functional consciousness in religion implies that it is incompatible with a

sociological analysis of its function. Indeed, seen in this light, Luhmannappears to be proposing that theologians abandon dogmatics in favor of functional systems theory. The implication, though Luhmann neveradvances the claim, seems to be that his social theory is the functional equivalent of dogmatics.

The very real danger represented by Luhmann's transformation of social function into dogmatic norm ought not to frighten off theologians tooquickly, however. For Luhmann belongs to that select group of thinkerswhose failures can be more interesting and instructive than the successes of less gifted and more timid minds. In the first place, even if he cannot telltheologians what they ought to be doing he can at least do them the service



30 Garrett Green

sophisticated, and conceptually powerful theories to come along for some

time; it has already succeeded in undermining the unquestioned preemi

nence of the Frankfurt School in German social thought.

But the main potential of Luhmann's theory for contributing positively

to Christian theology lies in that other perennial concern of modern dogmat

ics, mentioned at the outset: the quest for a qualitatively new kind of foun

dational theory, one free of any prior commitment to a metaphysics or to

ontological first principles. Luhmann contributes to this task more implicitly

than explicitly, more by analogy than by design. In brief, he presents in his

own social theory an example of a relativistic or relational thinking that aims

at illuminating its subject in a manner that is coherent yet never

systematically complete. The result is a conceptual arrangement that is

flexible and adaptable, admittedly circular, and able to bring otherwiseunrelated phenomena into comparative relationships based on their relations

to a common problem. "Foundational security," he claims, "is in fact

scientifically dispensable" (1975:201).

Now such a manner of thinking bears a striking formal resemblance to

much of the theological tradition. For example, Luhmann's rejection of

"foundational security" (Grundlagensicherheit) sounds very much like Karl

Barth's refusal on principle to offer any philosophical or methodological

grounding for dogmatics (e.g., KD I/2:954ff.; CD I/2:853ff.). Barth eschewsthe notion that theology should be a "system," understood as "a closed and

complete interconnection of principles and corollaries constructed under the

presupposition of a certain basic intuition (Grundanschauung) by the use of

certain sources of knowledge and certain axioms" (KD 1/2:963; cf. CD

1/2:861). Rather, theology must always retain an "open center," resisting

every temptation to fill it with some kind of presupposition or first principle

(such as "religion"). Systems theory as defined by Luhmann is quite obvi

ously not 3L "system" in this sense; on the contrary, it has formal similarities

to Barth's own procedure.

Such parallels between sociological systems theory and a nonsystematic

theological method—all the more remarkable in view of their virtually total

divergence in content—invite further comparative exploration. Might theol

ogians use Luhmann's thought heuristically to construct a truly theological

systems theory? Such a program would mean taking Luhmann's description

of the ideal modern theory more seriously and consistently than he does

himself. He maintains that there are no rules governing the selection of

reference-problems to be explored and consequently no absolute basis for

determining what is to be taken as a system in the first place; these choices




reduction of complexity, and to assess them in this extremely abstract per

spective as comparable and exchangeable" (1974:260). A theological pro

gram is conceivable on the basis of a different, but formally comparable,

theory-commitment. Let me conclude with a brief sketch of how such aprogram might look.

The theme of theology, God, can be paraphrased (in terms parallel to

Luhmann's sociological program) as divine activity. Christian dogmatics has

chosen to pursue this theme in relation to the ultimate reference-point of

Jesus Christ. This "theory-commitment" is formally comparable to that of

the sociologist, notwithstanding the fact that it is existentially of a different

order, since the theological theory-commitment is only one aspect of a

Christian faith-commitment. Faith, though it serves as the personal precon

dition for the theologian, does not function as a metaphysical presupposition

for theology. Formally, the ultimate source of theology in personal faith is

equivalent to the preliminary but "ungroundable" decisions necessary for

any theoretical enterprise.

Theology, understood as a theoretical undertaking in which the prob

lem of God's activity is explored in relation to Jesus Christ, permits a "rela-

tionizing" (Relationierung, Luhmann's cumbersome but important concept)

of dogmatic issues. For example, the first great controversy in the history of

dogma, which culminated in the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, involved arelational issue: "Is the Divine which appeared on the earth and has made its

presence actively felt [in Jesus Christ] identical with the supreme Divine that

rules heaven and earth?" (Harnack.l). The theological attempt to conceive

God in relation to Jesus Christ led to a relational (nonmetaphysical) concept

of God as a Trinity, whose individual members are not parts of a whole but

are constituted by their interrelations: "they mutually presuppose one anoth

er" (Luhmann, 1975:201; cf. p. 21 above). This "relationizing" of the

concept of God was followed by a "relationizing" of Christology in theformula of Chalcedon, in which the identity of the incarnate Logos is

understood to be constituted by the relation of his relations to divinity and

humanity. The central doctrines of the Reformation allow a similar analysis.

The Protestant doctrine of justification replaces the Roman Catholic

metaphysical concept of faith as an infused habitus with a relational

definition: from the perspective of Jesus Christ as the ultimate point of

reference, faith is conceived as the relation between two other relations—

that of the believer to Christ, and that of Christ to the Father. From this

perspective faith appears as the functional equivalent of works, with which

it can then be fruitfully compared Might not a corresponding method be of



32 Garrett Green

functional equivalent of Christian dogmatics—but in a radically different

sense from Luhmann's own account of theology as "religious dogmatics."*

Luhmann can even be cited in support of such a theological appropriation

of his theory, for he claims that functional analysis proceeds "neither deduc

tively nor inductively, but heuristically" (1973:2). Luhmann deserves thedialogue with theology that he has requested. If theologians are bold enough

to accept the challenge, it will not be the first time they have confronted a

theory that proposes an Aufhebung of their own enterprise. It is a risky

business, but one that might offer a worthwhile alternative to sterile in-house

discussions of the nature of theology, and to unbecoming chasing after the

skirts of cultural fads.

NOTES

/ ! / The most notable examples to have appeared so far are Rendtorff and theexchange between Luhmann and Pannenberg. The present article depends, in addition to the items listed explicitly as "Works Consulted," on various working papersand discussions of the theological study group on Luhmann's theory in Tübingenunder the leadership of Dr. Michael Welker. I would also like to thank theAlexander von Humboldt Foundation for travel and fellowship support that enabled

me to participate in the Tübingen group. /2/ The Edwin Mellen Press of Toronto has announced plans to publish thesecond chapter of Luhmann's book on religion (1977) as a separate volume, to beentitled Religious Dogmatics and the Evolution of Societies, translated with anintroduction by Peter Beyer.

/ 3 / A notable exception to this trend is the work of Jürgen Moltmann (see, e.g.,1974:32ff., 321ff.).

/4/ This common misinterpretation in the English-speaking world is due in partto one of the most egregious translation errors in modern theology. In the title of §17

of the Church Dogmatics ("Gottes Offenbarung als Aufhebung der Religion"), thetranslator has rendered Aufhebung with "Abolition" (KD 1/2:304; CD 1/2:280). Tomake matters worse, the key occurrences of the same term in the final sentences of both the first and second subsections have been translated differently each time, as"abolition" and "abrogation" (KD 1/2:324, 356; CD 1/2:297, 325). The context makesunmistakably clear that Barth uses the term in the deliberately ambiguous sense firstintroduced by Hegel to signify the crucial dialectical transition in his philosophy("the negation of the negative"): Aufhebung in this sense means both "annulment"and "preservation" or "elevation." The title of the third subsection of §17 ("True

Religion") should remove any doubts about Barth's intention to use Aufhebung inboth its senses.




WORKS CONSULTED

Barth, Karl

CD 1/2 Church Dogmatics. Eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F.

Torrance. Vol. 1, The Doctrine of the Word of God,pt. 2. Trans. G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight.

Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956.

KD 1/2 Die kirchliche Dogmatik. Vol. 1, Die Lehre vom Wort

Gottes, pt. 2. 6th ed. Zurich: Theologischer Verlag

Zürich, 1975.

Habermas, Jürgen, and Luhmann, Niklas

1971 Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie—Was

leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt am Main:

Suhrkamp Verlag.

Harnack, Adolf

1961

Hondrich, Karl Otto

1973

History of Dogma. Vol. 4. Trans. Neil Buchanan. Re

print ed. New York: Dover.

"Systemtheorie als Instrument der Gesellschaftsanalyse:

Forschungsbezogene Kritik eines Theorieansatzes." In

Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie: Bei-

träge zur Habermas-Luhmann-Diskussion(Theorie-Diskussion Supplement 1), edited by Franz Maciejewski,

pp. 88-114. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Vertrauen: Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer

Komplexität. 2nd ed. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag.

Soziologische Aufklärung: Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer

Systeme. Vol. 1. 4th ed. Opladen: Westdeutscher Ver

lag.

Soziologische Aufklärung: Aufsätze zur Theorie der

Gesellschaft. Vol. 2. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Funktion der Religion. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

Verlag.

"Soziologie der Moral." In Theorietechnik und Moral,

edited by Niklas Luhmann and Stephan H. Pfürtner,

pp. 8-116. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Luhmann, Niklas, and Pannenberg, Wolf hart

1978 "Die Allgemeingültigkeit der Religion: Diskussion überLuhmanns Religionssoziologie." Evangelische Kommen

tare 11:350,355-57.

Luhmann, Niklas

1973

1974

1975

1977

1978



34 Garrett Green

Messner, Brigitta1980

Moltmann, Jürgen

1974

Pannenberg, Wolfhart1978

Parsons, Talcott1951

1968

Rendtorff, Trutz

1975

"Der Anspruch der Theorie Niklas Luhmanns." Unpublished working paper for the theological study group onLuhmann's theory. Tübingen.

The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the

Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology.

Trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden. New York:Harper & Row.

"Religion in der säkularen Gesellschaft: Niklas Luh-

manns Religionssoziologie." Evangelische Kommentare

11:99-103.

The Social System. Glencoe, IL: Free Press."Systems Analysis II: Social Systems." International

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 15:458-73. Ed.David L. Sills. N.p.: Macmillan, and Free Press.

Gesellschaft ohne Religion? Theologische Aspekte einer

sozialtheoretischen Kontroverse (Luhmann/Habermas).

Munich: R. Piper&

Co.



^ s

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Luhmanns Challenge to Theology